Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Anglo-Nepalese War
War
Date 1814–16
Location Kingdom of Nepal
Result
East India Company victory
Belligerents
Patiala State
Francis Rawdon-Hastings
Girvan Yuddha
David Ochterlony
Bikram Shah
Rollo Gillespie †
Balbhadra Kunwar
Strength
campaign)[1][2] 17,000 (Second
campaign)[3]
campaigns.
extremely heavy
Contents
[hide]
1Historical background
2Causes
o 2.1Trade
o 2.2Political safety
o 2.3Border dispute
3War preparation
o 3.1Pre-war opinions
o 3.2Finance
o 3.3Terrain
4First campaign
o 4.1British plan of operation
o 4.2Battle of Makwanpur Gadhi
o 4.3Battle of Jitgadh
o 4.4Battle of Hariharpur Gadhi
o 4.5Battle of Nalapani
o 4.6Battle of Jaithak
o 4.7Trying times for Nepalese troops
o 4.8Second Battle of Malaon and Jythak
5Second campaign
6Aftermath
o 6.1The Treaty of Sugauli
o 6.2Mithila after Sugauli treaty
o 6.3Cost of war
o 6.4Gorkha recruitment
o 6.5Fate of protagonists
6.5.1Bhimsen Thapa
6.5.2David Ochterlony
7See also
8Notes
9References and further reading
o 9.1Primary sources
o 9.2Secondary sources
o 9.3Bibliography
10External links
Historical background[edit]
Further information: Unification of Nepal, Sino-Nepalese War, and East India Company
Causes[edit]
Map of India in 1805
The British were also expanding their sphere of influence at an alarming rate. While the Nepalese
had been expanding their empire – intoSikkim in the east, Kumaon and Garhwal in the west and into
the British sphere of influence in Awadh, or Oudh as the British called it, in the south – the British
East India Company had consolidated its position in India from its main bases
of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. This British expansion had already been resisted in India,
culminating in three Anglo-Maratha wars as well as in the Punjab where Ranjit Singh and the Sikh
Empire had their own aspirations.
Trade[edit]
The economic cause constituted the major cause of conflict with Nepal. The British had made
constant efforts to persuade the Nepalese government to allow them their trade to the fabled Tibet
through Nepal. Despite a series of delegations headed by William Kirkpatrick (1792), Maulvi Abdul
Qader (1795), and later William O. Knox (1801), the Nepalese Durbar refused to budge an inch. The
resistance to open up the country to the Europeans could be summed up in a Nepali precept, "With
the merchants come the musket and with the Bible comes the bayonet."
Lord Hasting was not averse to exploiting any commercial opportunities that access to the Himalayan
region might offer. He knew that these would gratify his employers and silence his critics, because
the East India Company was at this time in the throes of a cash-flow crisis. It needed substantial
funds in Britain, in order to pay overheads, pensions, and dividends; but there were problems about
remitting the necessary assets from India. Traditionally the Company had bought Indian produce and
sold it in London; but this no longer made economic sense. The staple Indian export was cotton
goods, and demand for these was declining as home-produced textiles captured the British market.
So the Company was having to transfer its assets in another, more complicated and expensive way.
It was having to ship its Indian textiles to Canton; sell them on the Chinese market; buy tea with the
proceeds; then ship the tea for sale in Britain (all tea at this time came from China. It was not grown
in India until the 1840s).[5]
So when Hastings told the directors of the Company about an alternative means of remittance, a rare
and precious raw material that could easily and profitably be shipped from India directly to London,
they were at once interested. The raw material in question was a superior-quality wool: the
exquisitely soft and durable animal down that had been used since time immemorial to make the
famous wraps, or shawls, of Kashmir. This down was found only on the shawl-wool goat, and the
shawl-wool goat was found only in certain areas of western Tibet. It refused to breed anywhere else.
This all explains why, under the terms of the treaty of 1816, Nepal was required to surrender its far
western provinces. Hastings hoped that this territory, partly annexed by the Company and partly
restored to its previous rulers, would give British merchants direct access to the wool-growing areas.
[5]
Similarly David Ochterlony, then an agent at Ludhiana, on 24 August 1814 noted of Dehra Dun as a
"potentially thriving entrepot for Trans-Himalayan trade." He contemplated annexing Garhwal not so
much with the view to revenue, but for security of commercial communications with the country
where the shawl wool is produced. The British soon got to know that Kumaon provided a better
facility for trade with Tibet. Therefore, the annexation of these two areas became part of their
strategic objectives.
Political safety[edit]
While trade was indeed a major objective of the Company, out of it grew a concept of "political
safety," which essentially meant a strategy of dissuasion and larger areas of occupation. The
evidence does not support the claim that Hastings invaded Nepal only for commercial reasons. It was
a strategic decision. He was wary of the Hindu revival and solidarity among the Marathas, the Sikhs,
and the Gurkhas amid the decaying Mughal empire. He was hatching pre-emptive schemes of
conquest against the Marathas in central India, and he needed to cripple Nepal first, in order to avoid
having to fight on two fronts.[5]
That it was a flawed strategy is explained by P.J. Marshal: "Political safety meant military
preparedness. The military expenditure for 1761-62 to 1770-71 was 44 percent of the total spending
of 22 million pounds. War and diplomacy rather than trade and improvement; most of the soldiers-
would-be politicians and Governor Generals rarely understood. The political safety of Bengal was
their first priority and they interpreted safety as requiring the subjugation of Mysore, the Marathas,
the Pindaris, the Nepalese and the Burmese."
Border dispute[edit]
The acquisition of the Nawab of Awadh's lands by the British East India Company brought the region
of Gorakhpur into the close proximity of the raja of Palpa – the last remaining independent town
within the Nepalese heartlands. Palpa and Butwal were originally two separate principalities; they
were afterwards united under one independent Rajput prince, who, having conquered Butwal, added
it to his hereditary possessions of Palpa. The lands of Butwal, though conquered and annexed, were
yet held in fief, or paid an annual sum, first to Awadh, and afterwards, by transfer, to the British. [6]
[7]
During the regency of Rani Rajendra Laxmi, towards the close of the 18th century, the hill country
of Palpa was conquered and annexed to Nepal. The rajah retreated to Butwal, but was subsequently
induced, under false promises of redress, to visit Kathmandu, where he was put to death, and his
territories in Butwal seized and occupied by the Nepalese. [7] Bhimsen Thapa, the Nepalese prime
minister from 1806 to 1837, installed his own father as governor of Palpa, leading to serious border
disputes between the two powers. The "illegal" occupation from 1804 till 1812 to the Terai of Butwal
by the Nepalese, which was under British protection, was the immediate reason which led to the
Anglo-Nepal war in 1814.[7][8][9]
On October 1813, the ambitious Francis Edward Rawdon-Hastings, the Earl of Moira, assumed the
office of the Governor-General, and his first act was to re-examine the border dispute between Nepal
and British East India Company. These disputes arose because there was no fixed boundary
separating the Nepalese and the British. A struggle with the former was unpromising as the British
were ignorant of the country or its resources and, despite their technological superiority, it was a
received persuasion that the nature of the mountainous tract, which they would have to penetrate,
would be as baffling to them as it had been to all the efforts of many successive Mahomedan
sovereigns.[10] A border commission imposed on Nepal by the Governor-General failed to solve the
problem. The Nepalese Commissioners had remarked to the British the futility of debating about a
few square miles of territory since there never could be real peace between the two States, until the
British should yield to the Nepalese all the British provinces north of the Ganges, making that river
the boundary between the two, "as heaven had evidently designed it to be." [10] In the mean time, the
British found that the Nepalese were preparing for war; that they had for some time been laying up
large stores of saltpetre; purchasing and fabricating arms, and organizing and disciplining their troops
under some European deserters in this service, after the model of the companies of East India's
sepoy battalions.[6] The conviction that the Nepalese raids into the flatland's of the Terai, a much
prized strip of fertile ground separating the Nepalese hill country from India, increased tensions [10] –
the British felt their power in the region and their tenuous lines of communication
betweenCalcutta and the northwest were under threat. Since there was no clear border,
confrontation between the two powers was "necessary and unavoidable". [11] Britain formally declared
war with the Nepal on 1 Nov 1814.[12]
War preparation[edit]
Bhimsen Thapa, prime minister of Nepal from 1806 to 1837.
Pre-war opinions[edit]
When the Kathmandu Durbar solicited Nepalese chiefs' opinions about a possible war with the
British, Amar Singh Thapa was not alone in his opposition, declaring that – "They will not rest
satisfied without establishing their own power and authority, and will unite with the hillrajas, whom we
have dispossessed. We have hitherto but hunted deer; if we engage in this war, we must prepare to
fight tigers."[13] He was against the measures adopted in Butwal and Sheeoraj, which he declared to
have originated in the selfish views of persons, who scrupled not to involve the nation in war to gratify
their personal avarice.[13][14]
This contrasts sharply with the naivety of prime minister Bhimsen Thapa – " ... our hills and fastness
are formed by the hand of God, and are impregnable." [15][16] This stance by Bhimsen Thapa is not
surprising, as insinuated by Amar Singh, considering Amar Singh had made the usurpations in
Butwal and Sheoraj, and whose family derived most of the advantages. [14] Prinsep estimates that the
revenue of the usurped lands could not have been less than a lakh of rupees a year to the Nepalese,
in the manner they collected it: the retention of this income was therefore an object of no small
importance to the ambitious views of Bhimsen Thapa and the preservation of the influence he had
contrived to establish for his family.[14] The Nepalese prime minister realized the Nepalese had
several advantages over the British including knowledge of the region and recent experience fighting
in the mountainous terrain. However, the British had numerical superiority and far more modern
weapons.
In the meantime, the Governor-General also naively believed that "the difficulties of mountain warfare
were greater on the defensive side than on that of a well conducted offensive operation." [10] Soldiers
like Rollo Gillespie saw the Nepalese as a challenge to British supremacy — "Opinion is everything in
such a country as India: and whenever the natives shall begin to lose their reverence for the English
arms, our superiority in other respects will quickly sink into contempt."
Francis Edward Rawdon, Marquess of Hasting, Governor-General of India from 1813 to 1823.
Finance[edit]
The Governor-General looked towards the Nawab of Awadh to finance the impending warfare with
Nepal: two crore (20 million) rupees were solicited. Of this matter he writes:
"...Saadut Ali[17] unexpectedly died. I found, however, that what had been provisionally agitated with
him was perfectly understood by his successor,[18] so that the latter came forward with a spontaneous
offer of a crore of rupees, which I declined as a peishcush or tribute on his accession to the
sovereignty of Oude, but accepted as a loan for the Honourable Company. Eight lacs were
afterwards added to this sum, in order that the interest of the whole, at six per cent, might equal the
allowances to different branches of the Nawab Vizier's family, for which guarantee of the British
Government had been pledged, and the payment of which, without vexatious retardments, was
secured, by the appropriation of the interest to the specific purpose. The sum thus obtained was
thrown into the general treasury, whence I looked to draw such portions of it as the demands of the
approaching service might require. My surprise is not to be expressed, when I was shortly after
informed from Calcutta, that it had been deemed expedient to employ fifty four lacs of the sum
obtained by me in discharging an eight per cent loan, that the remainder was indispensable for
current purposes, and it was hoped I should be able to procure from the Nawab Vizier a further aid
for the objects of the war. This took place early in autumn, and operations against Nepaul could not
commence till the middle of November, on which account the Council did not apprehend my being
subjected to any sudden inconvenience through its disposal of the first sum. Luckily I was upon such
frank terms with the Nawab Vizier, as that I could explain to him fairly my circumstances. He agreed
to furnish another crore; so that the Honourable Company was accommodated with above two
millions and a half sterling on my simple receipt." [19]
This was in contrast with the Nepalese who had spent huge amount of resources on the first and
second wars against the Tibetans, which had not fared well for the Nepalese.
Terrain[edit]
1st Foot Guards
To the British, who were used to fighting in the plains, but were unacquainted with the terrain of the
hills, the formidability of the topology is expressed by one anonymous British soldier as such:
"...The territory subject to Nepal consists of a mountainous tract of country, lying between Tibet and
the valley of the Ganges, in breadth not exceeding one hundred miles, but in length stretching nearly
along the whole extent of the north-west frontier of the British dominions. Below the hills they held
possession of a portion of the plain of irregular width, distinguished by the name of the Nepal Turrye,
[20]
but the period at which the acquisition was made is not ascertained.
The general military character of the country is that of extreme difficulty. Immediately at the front of
the hills the plain is covered with the Great Saul Forest, [21] for an average width of ten or twelve miles;
the masses of the mountains are immense, their sides steep, and covered with impenetrable jungle.
The trenches in these ridges are generally water-courses, and rather chasms or gulfs than any thing
that deserves the name of a valley. The roads are very insecure, and invariably pathways over
mountains, or the beds of rivers, the usual means of transport throughout the country being by hill
porters. Notwithstanding this general description, spaces comparatively open and hollow, and
elevated tracts of tolerably level land, are to be met with, but so completely detached as to contribute
but little to facilitate intercourse.
One of the largest and most fertile of these constitutes the valley of Nepal Proper. [22] To the westward
of Nepal, there is a difficult tract, till the country again opens in the valley of Gorkah, the original
possession of the present dynasty. -- Westward of this the country is again difficult, till it somewhat
improves in the district of Kemaoon.[23] Further to the westward lies the valley of the Dhoon, [24] and the
territory of Sue-na-Ghur;[25] and further still, the more recent conquests, stretching to the village, in
which Umar Sing,[26] a chief of uncommon talents, commanded, and indeed, exercised an authority
almost independent."[11]
First campaign[edit]
British plan of operation[edit]
Officer and Private, 40th Regiment of Foot, 1815
A Gorkhali warrior.
The initial British campaign was an attack on two fronts across a frontier of more than 1,500
kilometres (930 mi), from the Sutlej to the Koshi. In the eastern front, Major-General Bennet Marley
and Major-General John Sullivan Wood led their respective columns across theTarai towards the
heart of the valley of Kathmandu. Major-General Rollo Gillespie and Colonel David
Ochterlony commanded columns in the western front. These columns were faced with the Nepalese
army under the command of Amar Singh Thapa.[27] About the beginning of October, 1814, the British
troops began to move towards different depots; and the army was soon after formed into four
divisions, one at Benares, one at Meeruth, one at Dinapur, and one at Ludhiana.
The first division, at Dinapur, being the largest, was commanded by Major-General Marley, and was
intended to seize the pass atMakwanpur, between Gunduk and Bagmati, the key to Nepal, and to
push forward to Kathmandu: thus at once carrying the war into the heart of the enemy's country. [27]
[28]
This force consisted of 8,000 men, including his Majesty's 24th foot of 907 strong; there was a train
attached to it of four 18-pounders, eight 6- and 3-pounders, and fourteen mortars and howitzers. [29][30]
The second division, at Benares, under command of Major-General Wood, having subsequently
removed to Gorakhpur, was meant to enter the hills by the Bhootnuill pass, and, turning to the
eastward, to penetrate the hilly districts, towards Kathmandu, and cooperate with the first division,
while its success would have divided the enemy's country and force into two parts, cutting off all the
troops in Kumaonand Garhwal from communication with the capital.[27][28] Its force consisted of his
Majesty's 17th foot, 950 strong, and about 3000 infantry, totaling 4,494 men; it had a train of seven 6-
and 3-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers. [29][31]
The third division, was formed at Meerut, under Major-General Gillespie; and it was purposed to
march directly to the Dehra Dun; and having reduced the forts in that valley, to move, as might be
deemed expedient, to the eastward, to recover Srinagar from the troops of Amar Singh Thapa; or to
the westward, to gain the post of Nahan, the chief town of Sirmaur, where Ranjore Singh Thapa held
the government for his father, Amar Singh; and so sweep on towards the Sutlej, in order to cut off
that chief from the rest, and thus to reduce him to terms. [27][28] This division originally consisted of his
Majesty's 53d, which with artillery and a few dismounted dragoons, made up about one thousand
Europeans, and two thousand five hundred native infantry, totaling 3,513 men. [29][31]
The fourth, or north-western division, at Ludhiana, was to operate in the hilly country lying near the
Sutlej: it assembled under Brigadier-General Ochterlony, and was destined to advance against the
strong and extensive cluster of posts held by Amar Singh and the troops under his immediate orders
at and surrounding Irkee, a considerable town of Kahlur, and to cooperate with the forces under
Major-General Gillespie, moving downwards among the hills, when these positions should be forced,
surrounding Amar Singh, and driving him upon that army. [27][28] The force consisted exclusively of
native infantry and artillery, and amounted to 5,993 men; it had a train of two 18-pounder, ten 6-
pounders, and four mortars and howitzers.[29][32]
Lastly, beyond the Koshi River eastward, Major Latter was furnished with two thousand men,
including his district battalion, for the defence of the Poornea frontier. This officer was desired to
open a communication with the Raja of Sikkim, and to give him every assistance and encouragement
to expel the Gorkhas from the eastern hills, short of an actual advance of troops for the purpose.
[30]
Captain Barré Latter was sent to the border with Poornea and after a successful mission to confine
the Gorkhas to their own territory concluded the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty of Titalia confirming the
Raja's dominions, although the latter lost territory from his border to the Tamur River.[33]
The Commander-in-Chief of the British forces was Lord Moira. All four divisions composed mostly of
Indian Sepoys. Ochterlony's army was the only division without a single British battalion.
Battle of Jitgadh[edit]
With the help of an ousted Palpali king, Major General Wood planned to march on Siuraj, Jit Gadhi
and Nuwakot with a view to bypass the Butwal defenses, flushing out minor opposition on the axis,
and assault Palpa from a less guarded flank. Nepalese Colonel Ujir Singh Thapa had deployed his
1200 troops in many defensive positions including Jit Gadhi, Nuwakot Gadhi and Kathe Gadhi. The
troops under Colonel Ujir were very disciplined and he himself was a dedicated and able
commander. He was famous for exploiting advantage in men, material, natural resources and well
versed in mountain tactics. The British advance took place on 22nd Poush1871 BS (January 1814
AD) to Jit Gadh. While they were advancing to this fortress, crossing the Tinau River, the Nepalese
troops opened fire from the fortress. Another of the attackers' columns was advancing to capture
Tansen Bazar. Here too, Nepalese spoiling attacks forced the General to fall back to Gorakhpur.
About 70 Nepalese lost their lives in Nuwakot pakhe Gadhi. Meanwhile, more than 300 of the enemy
perished.
Battle of Nalapani[edit]
Further information: Battle of Nalapani
The Battle of Nalapani was the first battle of Anglo-Nepalese War. The battle took place around the
Nalapani fort, near Dehradun, which was placed under siege by the British between 31 October and
30 November 1814. The fort's garrison was commanded by Captain Balbhadra Kunwar, while Major-
General Rollo Gillespie, who had previously fought at the Battle of Java, was in charge of the
attacking British troops. The failure to obey the field orders by his men led Gillespie to be killed on
the very first day of the siege while rallying his men. Despite considerable odds, both in terms of
numbers and firepower, Balbhadra and his 600-strong garrison successfully held out against more
than 3,000 British troops for over a month.
After two costly and unsuccessful attempts to seize the fort by direct attack, the British changed their
approach and sought to force the garrison to surrender by cutting off the fort's external water supply.
Having suffered three days of thirst, on the last day of the siege, Balbhadra, refusing to surrender,
led the 70 surviving members of the garrison in a charge against the besieging force. Fighting their
way out of the fort, the survivors escaped into the nearby hills. The battle set the tone for the rest of
the Anglo-Nepalese War, and a number of later engagements, including one at Jaithak, unfolded in a
similar way.
The experience at Nalapani so discomforted the British that Lord Hastings so far varied his plan of
operations as to forego the detachment of a part of this division to occupy Gurhwal. [35] He accordingly
instructed Colonel Mawbey to leave a few men in a strong position for the occupation of the Doon
and to carry his undivided army against Amar Singh's son, Colonel Ranajor Singh Thapa, who was
with about 2300 elite of the Gurkha army, at Nahan. [35] It was further intended to reinforce the division
considerably; and the command was handed over to Major-General Martindell. [35] In the mean time
Colonel Mawbey had led back the division through the Keree pass, leaving Colonel Carpenter posted
at Kalsee, at the north western extremity of the Doon. [36] This station commanded the passes of the
Jumna on the main line of communication between the western and eastern portions of the Gurkha
territory, and thus was well chosen for procuring intelligence. [36]
Battle of Jaithak[edit]
Further information: Battle of Jaithak
Major General Martindale now joined the force and took over command. He occupied the town of
Nahan on 27 December, and started his attack on the fort of Jaithak. The fort had a garrison of 2000
men under the command of Ranajor Singh Thapa, the son of the Amar Singh Thapa. The first
assault ended in disaster, with the Nepalese successfully warding off the British offensive. The
second managed to cut off the water supply to the fort, but could not capture it mainly because of the
exhausted state of the troops and shortage of ammunition. Martindale lost heart and ordered a
withdrawal. Jaithak was eventually captured much later in the war, when Ochterlony had taken over
the command.[37]
A single day of battle at Jaithak cost the British over three hundred men dead and wounded and
cooled Martindell’s ardour for battle. For over a month and a half, he refused to take any further
initiative against the Nepalese army. Thus by mid-February, of the four British commanders the
Nepalese army had faced till that time, Gillespie was dead, Marley had deserted, Wood was
harassed into inactivity, and Martindell was practically incapacitated by over-cautiousness. It set the
scene for Octorloney to soon show his mettle and change the course of the war.
Second campaign[edit]
Gorkhali soldiers in 1815.
The outstretched Nepalese army was defeated on the Western front i.e. Garhwal and Kumaon area.
Ochterlony had finally outfoxed Bada Kaji Amar Singh Thapa. He was the only successful British
Commander in the first Nepal-Company campaign. Not surprisingly Lord Moira appointed him as the
Main Operational Commander in the second offensive on the Bharatpur-Makawanpur-Hariharpur
front with 17,000 strong invasion force, but again, most of them were Indian sepoys [38]
The British had given a 15-day ultimatum to Nepal to ratify a treaty on 28 November. But the points
of the treaty were very difficult for the Nepalese to ratify quickly. The delay provided the excuse for
the British to commence the second military campaign against the kingdom. Colonel Bhaktawar
Singh Thapa, another brother of Bhimsen Thapa, had been appointed as Sector Commander for
defensive battles for the area from Bijayapur to Sindhuli Gadhi in the first campaign. In this second
campaign, Bada Kaji Amarsingh Thapa[note 2]was detailed as Sector Commander forSindhuli Gadhi and
the eastern front. Colonel Bhaktawar Singh Thapa was manning his headquarters at Makwanpur
Gadhi. Major General David Ochterlony, was the overall commander against Nepal with a massive
17,000 British troops to assault the fronts including Upardang Gadhi, Sinchyang Gadhi, Kandrang
Gadhi, Makawanpur Gadhi and Hariharpur Gadhi.
During the campaign in February 1816, Ochterlony decided to take a very infrequently used pass
through the mountains. The failure there would have been a disaster for British. But the successful
passage would allow Birith to directly emerge and attack the Nepalese's rear. Colonel Kelly and
Colonel O’Hollorah followed the river Bagmati to reachHariharpur Gadhi. Some of the heads of
villagers were bribed for sensitive information about the defensive positions in the area of Hariharpur
Gadhi. The information seriously compromised the Nepalese defences. Secret routes would have
given the enemy advantage even if they were able to get only a battalion through. But the British
were able to advance with more than a brigade’s strength. Colonel Kelly and Colonel O’Hollorah
launched their attack from two different directions on 29 February. The Nepalese troops were
eventually driven back from Hariharpur Gadhi after a big battle. Kaji Ranjore Singh Thapa withdrew
to Sindhuli Gadhi to link up with Bada Kaji Amar Singh Thapa. The British troops did not approach
Sindhuli Gadhi and fell back to Makawanpur by the end of March 1815 AD.
The situation became very critical for Nepal and the British could have reached Kathmandu if the
signing of the treaty was delayed any further. Major General David Ochterlonysettled down to receive
the treaty, signed by Kathmandu Durbar through Chandra Sekhar Upadhyaya, Pandit Gajaraj Mishra
and finally though Bhaktawar Singh Thapa. Two days later the ratified treaty was handed over to the
British in Makawanpur. The war ended with the Treaty of Sugauli and Nepal succeeded in remaining
independent but lost about one-third its territory. The river Mechi became the new Eastern border
and the Mahakali the Western boundary of Nepal.
Aftermath[edit]
The Treaty of Sugauli[edit]
Bhimsen Thapa's troops, right, at Segauli, 1816, with India Pattern Brown Bess muskets and chupi bayonets.
The Treaty of Sugauli 4 March 1816. It suited Ochterlony to bring the campaign to a speedy conclusion
because of the approach of the dreaded aul-fever season but also because a number of his European troops
Cost of war[edit]
Despite the boast of Lord Moira to the British parliament on having increased the state coffers, the
Gurkha War had in reality cost more than the combined cost of the campaigns against
the Marathas and the Pindaris for which Lord Moira's administration is better known: Sicca Rs.
5,156,961 as against Sicca Rs. 3,753,789.[44] This was the kind of fact which greatly influenced the
policy of the Company government in subsequent years. Thus, while the Company Government, in
theory, thoroughly approved of the development of trade, especially in shawl wool, between Western
Tibet and its territories, it was unprepared to take any decisive step to bring this about. It preferred to
leave the Chinese in Tibet to their own devices, and hoped to avoid the risk, however slight, of
another expensive hill war.[44]
Furthermore, despite the British merchants' direct access to the wool growing areas after the war, the
hopes of shawl wool trade were never realised. The British merchants found that they were too late.
The shawl wool market was strictly closed and closely guarded. It was monopolised by traders from
Kashmir and Ladakh, and the only outsider with whom they dealt was Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the
powerful Sikh ruler of Lahore. Ranjit was very zealous of his privilege, and he was the last person the
British could afford to offend at this time of crisis and uncertainty. So the East India Company never
did get its shawl wool. When it finally acquired the Punjab and Kashmir, after the Sikh Wars of the
1840s, it had long since given up trade, and Kashmir was so little valued that it was quickly discarded
– sold for a knock-down price to the Raja of Jammu. [45]
Gorkha recruitment[edit]
Main articles: Brigade of Gurkhas and Gorkha regiments (India)
David Ochterlony and the political agent William Fraser were quick to recognize the potential of
Nepalese soldiers in British service. During the war the British were keen to use defectors from the
Nepalese army and employ them as irregular forces. His confidence in their loyalty was such that in
April 1815 he proposed forming them into a battalion under Lieutenant Ross called the Nasiri
regiment. This regiment, which later became the 1st King George’s Own Gurkha Rifles, saw action at
the Malaun fort under the leadership of Lieutenant Lawtie, who reported to Ochterlony that he "had
the greatest reason to be satisfied with their exertions".
About 5,000 men entered British service in 1815, most of whom were not 'real' Gorkhali but
Kumaonis, Garhwalis and other Himalayan hill men. These groups, eventually lumped together under
the term Gurkha, became the backbone of British Indian forces.
As well as Ochterlony’s Gorkhali battalions, William Fraser and Lieutenant Frederick Young raised
the Sirmoor battalion, later to become the 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles; an additional
battalion, the Kumaon battalion was also raised eventually becoming the 3rd Queen Alexandra's
Own Gurkha Rifles. None of these men fought in the second campaign.
Fate of protagonists[edit]
Bhimsen Thapa [edit]
Main article: Bhimsen Thapa
Prime Minister Bhimsen Thapa, with the support of the queen regent Tripura Sundari, remained in
power despite the defeat of Nepal. Other ruling families, particularly the Pandes, decried what they
saw as Bhimsen Thapa’s submissive attitude towards the British. The prime minister however had
been able to retain power by maintaining a large, modernized army and politically dominating the
court during the minority of King Rajendra Bikram Shah, (reigned 1816–1847). Additionally, he was
able to freeze out the Pandes from power by appointing members of his own family into positions of
authority.
When queen Tripura Sundari died in 1832, Bhimsen Thapa began to lose influence. In 1833, Brian
Hodgson became British resident, openly favouring Bhimsen Thapa’s opponents, and in 1837 the
king announced his intention to rule independently, depriving the prime minister and his nephew of
their military powers. After the eldest son of the queen died, Bhimsen Thapa was falsely accused of
attempting to poison the prince. Although acquitted, the Thapas were in turmoil. When the head of
the Pande family, Rana Jang Pande, became prime minister, he had Bhimsen Thapa re-imprisoned;
Bhimsen Thapa committed suicide in August 1839.
See also[edit]
Gurkha
History of Nepal
Kingdom of Nepal
Brigade of Gurkhas
Sino-Nepalese War
Nepalese-Tibetan War
East India Company
Company rule in India
Nawab of Awadh
Awadh
Battle of Nalapani
Treaty of Thapathali
Notes[edit]
1. Jump up^ Not to be confused with the better known commander of Gorkhali forces in
the Gurkha War with the same name. The two Amar Singhs are differentiated by the qualifier
Bada (greater) and Sanu (lesser).
2. Jump up^ Not to be confused with the better known commander of Gorkhali forces in
the Gurkha War with the same name. The two Amar Singhs are differentiated by the qualifier
Bada (greater) and Sanu (lesser).
1. Jump up^ Historical Dictionary of the British Empire: A-J, Volume 1; Volume 6, pp. 493
15. Jump up^ Prinsep, p. 458: The entire letter by Bhimsen Thapa is as follows: "Through the
influence of your good fortune, and that of your ancestors, no one has yet been able to cope
with the state of Nipal. The Chinese once made war upon us, but were reduced to seek peace.
How then will the English be able to penetrate into the hills? Under your auspices, we shall by
our own exertions be able to oppose to them a force of fifty-two lakhs of men, with which we will
expel them. The small fort of Bhurtpoor was the work of man, yet the English being worsted
before it, desisted from the attempt to conquer it; our hills and fastnesses are formed by the
hand of God, and are impregnable. I therefore recommend the prosecution of hostilities. We can
make peace afterwards on such terms as may suit our convenience."
16. Jump up^ Hunter, p. 100.
21. Jump up^ Shorea robusta, also known as sal or shala tree, is a species of tree belonging to
theDipterocarpaceae family.
22. Jump up^ "Nepal Proper" refers to the Kathmandu Valley. Before the conquest of the
Kathmandu Valley by Prithvi Narayan Shah, only this valley was originally referred to as Nepal.
23. Jump up^ Kumaon
33. Jump up^ Paget, William Henry (1907). Frontier and overseas expeditions from India. p. 40.
34. Jump up^ The use of English terms for their grades of command was common in the Nepalese
army, but the powers of the different ranks did not correspond with those of the British system.
The title of General was assumed by Bhimsen Thapa, as Commander-in-chief, and enjoyed by
himself alone; of Colonels there were three or four only; all principal officers of the court,
commanding more than one battalion. The title of Major was held by the adjutant of a battalion
or independent company; and Captain was the next grade to colonel, implying the command of
a corps. Luftun, or Lieutenant, was the style of the officers commanding companies under the
Captain; and then followed the subaltern ranks of Soobadar, Jemadar, and Havildar, without
any Ensigns. (Prinsep, p. 86-87)
35. ^ Jump up to:a b c Prinsep, p. 94.
Secondary sources[edit]
Smith, Thomas. (1852). Narrative of a five-year's residence at Nepaul. Vol 1. London: Colburn
and Co. [9]
Oldfield, Henry Ambrose. (1880). Sketches from Nipal, Vol 1. London: W.H. Allen and Co. [10]
Hunter, William Wilson. (1896). Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson. London: John Murray. [11]
Lamb, Alastair. (1986). British India and Tibet, 1766-1910. Taylor & Francis. pp. 26–43. ISBN
0710208723
Gould, Tony. (2000). Imperial Warriors – Britain and the Gorkhas. Granta Books ISBN 1-
86207-365-1
Naravane, M. S. (2006). Battles of the honourable East India Company: making of the Raj.
APH Publishing. pp. 189–191. ISBN 978-81-313-0034-3.
Rai-Zimmdar, G. L. (2008). Anglo-Gorkha Friendship. Lulu.com ISBN 1435728653
Pemble, John. (2009). Forgetting and remembering Britain's Gurkha War. Asian Affairs, 40(3),
361–376. Abstract available here (retrieved 12-22-2009).
Pemble, John. (2009). Britain's Gorkha War: The Invasion of Nepal, 1814-16. Casemate Pub &
Book Dist Llc ISBN 978-1-84832-520-3.
Nepalese Army Headquarters (2010). The Nepalese Army. ISBN 978-9937-2-2472-7.
Bibliography[edit]
Marshall, Julie G. (2005). Britain and Tibet 1765-1947: a select annotated bibliography of
British relations with Tibet and the Himalayan states including Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.
Routledge. ISBN 0-415-33647-3
External links[edit]
Nepalese War.
History of Nepal
History of the Nepalese Army
Indian-Nepalese border; The Tarai region
The Sugauli Treaty
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