[ G.R. No.

 9438, November 25, 1914 ]

PAULA MARTINEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICTORINO
BAGANUS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J.:

Paula Martinez was, from December 1, 1890, the owner of a town lot situate in a barrio
of the municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, description whereof is not
necessary, as the property has been well identified. She was the owner through purchase
from the spouses Martin Magahis and Severina Dignasan for the price of P70, as is
recorded in the instrument executed therefor, which is in every way valid. Jose Mojica,
son of Paula Martinez, sold said lot to Victorino Baganus for the same price, P70, on
March 15, 1909, as is likewise recorded in the instrument executed therefor, also in every
way valid.

On May 22, 1913, Paula Martinez sought recovery of ownership and possession of the
lot, previously requesting that the sale thereof made by Jose Mojica to Victorino Baganus
be declared null and void.

The defendant Baganus alleged that he bought the lot from Jose Mojica with the consent
of the latter's mother, Paula Martinez, in the belief that it belonged to Jose Mojica and
that the money with which the latter had bought it had been earned by Jose when he was
the patron of a sailboat; that he had paid to Paula Martinez a deposit of P30 in advance
and agreed to pay the P40 balance when the instrument of sale had been executed, as was
later done; that confiding in good faith in the validity and efficacy of his acquisition, he
had made necessary and useful improvements on the lot, having built a house and a
carriage shop thereon, graded it, and planted fruit trees, all which had cost him over
P1,000.

Jose Mojica, 40 years of age, confirmed the sale he had made to Baganus for the price of
P70, having received P30 in advance and P40 later when the sale was put on record; but
he says that he made the condition that if his mother did not agree to the sale he might
take back the land and would return the money received; and that in fact his mother did
not agree to it. Upon being asked why his mother had not for four years exercised the
right of action she was now exercising in the face of Baganus' refusal to, return the land,
he replied that he did not know why his mother had not done so immediately; that he had
always been a farmer, and never the patron of any sailboat; that Baganus resided near the
lot under consideration.
Concepcion Mojica, 36 years of age, another child of Paula Martinez, confirms the sale
of the lot made by her brother Jose. She says that her mother ceased to possess the lot
four years ago, and two years ago she, the witness, talked with a lawyer in order to find
some way to arrange the matter or to repurchase the land, in view of the fact that her
mother was not in accord with the sale made by her brother.

Filomena Tolentino was presented as a witness to testify that Jose Mojica made the
condition that the sale should not be carried out if his mother did not agree to it; but this
witness, who says she was a pupil of Jose Mojica's in 1911, likewise says that before
1911 she had been in Mojica's house and heard a conversation between Mojica and
Baganus before and after the signing of the instrument of purchase (which was in 1909).
To each of them she ascribed words that suit the case.

Maria Alicante was also presented as a witness to prove that Paula Martinez had paid a
certain married couple as if to say that this was not the money of any patron of a sailboat.

Victorino Baganus affirms that he arranged the sale with Paula Martinez and paid her in
advance P30. He said that the value of the improvements were: For construction of the
house, P1,000; for the warehouse, P80; and for the fruit trees planted, P300, although
they had not yet borne fruit. The only thing impugned is the planting of the trees; counsel
for the plaintiff only acknowledged the grading of the land or lot in question.

This case was tried by the justice of the peace of the capital of Batangas, by delegation
from the Court of First Instance of the province. He decided it by declaring null and void
and of no force or effect the sale made by Jose Mojica to Victorino Baganus and
sentenced the latter to return the lot claimed to Paula Martinez, to remove at his own
expense the buildings and plants he had placed thereon, and to pay the costs; without
prejudice to the right of action he had against Jose Mojiea, which was reserved, on the
ground of ejectment.

The defendant assigned as errors to the judgment:

(1) Trial of this case by the justice of the peace who decided it when he lacked
jurisdiction and competency therefor; (2) declaration .that the lot in litigation belongs to
Paula Martinez; (3) declaration that the defendant acquired the land in bad faith; and (4)
the order for the defendant to return the lot claimed and to remove the buildings and
plants he had placed thereon.

There is no ground for sustaining the first, second, and third assignments of error. The
justice of the peace delegated was completely vested with the necessary competency and
jurisdiction. The subject matter of the litigation, since the price of the sale did not exceed
W0, and the value of the improvements claimed only amounts altogether to P1,380, the
total of these sums is within the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 2131. It is evident, and
this was not impugned at the trial, that the lot in litigation is the property of the plaintiff;
and the defendant acquired it in bad faith, for he himself says that he dealt with the
plaintiff, but consented that one who was not the owner of the thing sold should appear as
the vendor.

The fourth assignment of error is sustained. Even though the defendant built and planted
in bad faith, the plaintiff also acted in bad faith:

"Bad faith On the part of the owner is understood whenever the act (of building or
planting) has been executed in his presence with his knowledge and tolerance and
without objection." (Civil Code, art. 364 par. 2.)

Concepcion Mojica, plaintiff's daughter, two years after the sale made the proposition, in
talking with a lawyer for the purpose, that the land be repurchased .All were present and
were living in the barrio, the mother and her two children.

"When there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sowed, or
planted on another's land, but also on the part of the owner thereof, the rights of each
shall be the same as if both had acted in good faith." (Civil Code, art. 364, par. 1.)

"The owner of the land on which building, sowing, or planting is done in good faith shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing, Or planting after the indemnity
mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or, to oblige the person who has built or planted, to
pay to him the value of the land. * * *." (Civil Code, art. 361.)

Articles 453 and 454 mentioned concede the right of retention to the possessor in good
faith (as the defendant now is) who may have made necessary and useful improvements
on another's property.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far as the sale of the lot claimed is
thereby declared null and void and of no force and effect, with the costs in first
instance; and there is reserved to the defendant his right of action against Jose
Mojica to warrant the sale; but it is reversed in so far as it orders the defendant to
deliver to the plaintiff the lot claimed in the complaint and to remove therefrom at
his own expense the buildings and sowings (plantings, not sow[ G.R.
No. 28721, October 05, 1928 ]
MARTIN MENDOZA AND NATALIO ENRIQUEZ, PLAINTIFFS AND
APPELLEES, VS. MANUEL DE GUZMAN, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT. MAX. B. SOLIS, INTERVENOR AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:

This case calls for the application of. articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil Code to the
proven facts.

On November 6, 1916, Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo Solis brought an action
in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against Martin Mendoza for the recovery of a
certain piece of land. Judgment was rendered in that case absolving Mendoza from the
complaint, and this judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. [1] When
the ease was remanded to the court of origin, the trial judge issued an order requiring the
provincial sheriff immediately to dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction and to put
Mendoza in the possession of the land. By virtue 6f this order, Mendoza was in fact put
in possession of the property.

In the cadastral proceedings of the municipality of Sariaya, Tayabas, the piece of land
above-mentioned was identified as lot No. 687. In the decision rendered in the cadastral
ease, this lot was adjudicated in favor of Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in equal
parts pro indiviso subject to the right of retention on the part of Manuel de Guzman until
he shall have been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land. By virtue of
this judgment, De Guzman presented a motion requesting the issuance of a writ of
possession for lot No. 687 in his favor which was granted on June 25, 1924. From the
time Leandra Solis and Bernardo Solis, as well as Manuel de Guzman who was working
on the land, were ejected therefrom, Martin Mendoza possessed it until June 25, 1924,
when De Guzman obtained the writ of possession abovementioned. Since then De
Guzman has had dominion over the land.

Being unable to come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed for the
improvements made on the land, Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began an action
requesting the court to (a) fix the value of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by
Manuel de Guzman in introducing the improvements; (b) require the defendant to render
an accounting of the fruits received by him and order that the value of the fruits be
applied to the payment of the necessary and useful expenses; and (c) decree the
restitution of the postettion to the plaintiffs. To the complaint, the defendant filed an
answer in the form of a general denial with special defenses and appended a counterclaim
and cross-complaint, in which a total of P6,000 was asked. During the pendency at the
case, Bernardo Solis, or Max B. Solis, one of the persons who was ejected from the land,
asked leave to intervene, alleging, among: other things, that De Guzman, in consideration
of the sum of P5,000, had transferred all his rights in the improvements and in the lot to
him with the exception of two hundred coconut trees. This petition was granted by the
trial court.

When the case was called for trial, the parties entered into the following stipulation:
"1. That the plaintiffs are the owners and proprietors of the land described in the second
paragraph of the complaint.

"2. That a decree of registration has been issued on said land in the terms set forth in
paragraph 3 of the complaint.

"3. That the defendant Manuel de Guzman is the one who has been in possession and
enjoyment of the land from June 25, 1924, up to the present time by virtue of a writ of
possession obtained by him from the Court of Land Registration.

"4. That the defendant has made improvements on said land by planting coconut trees
thereon.

"5. That the plaintiff Martin Mendoza is the one who has been in possession and
enjoyment of said property and its improvements since December 16, 1916, by virtue of a
writ of possession in civil case No. 356 until said possession was transferred to the
defendant Manuel de Guzman.

"6. That from March 20, 1920, the plaintiff Natalio Enriquez has been in possession and
enjoyment of a portion of the land, the subject matter of the complaint herein, by virtue of
a deed of sale executed in his favor by Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who, in turn, acquired
it from the other plaintiff Martin Mendoza, until June 25, 1924.

"The parties desire to submit, as they do submit, under this stipulation of facts the
following questions:

"(a) The amount of the indemnity to be paid to the defendant for the improvements made
by him on said lot and the basis upon which said amount shall be fixed.

"(b) Whether or not the defendant is obliged to render an account of the fruits received by
him from June 25, 1924, until the improvements are delivered after same have been paid
for.

"(c) Whether the value of said fruits and products received by the defendant shall be
applied to the indemnity to which he is entitled, or whether said defendant is obliged to
deliver to the plaintiffs the remainder in case of excess.

"(d) Whether or not the defendant has the right to be paid by the plaintiffs in whole or in
part for the value of the fruits received by Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez from
the respective dates that they were in possession and enjoyment of the land until June 25,
1924.

"The parties at the same time that they submit to the court for decision the questions
presented in the above stipulation reserve to themselves, whatever said decision may be,
the right to present later their evidence in support of their respective views with respect to
the amount of the indemnity.

"After the preliminary questions have been decided, the parties request that
commissioners be appointed to receive said evidence with respect to the amount of the
indemnity in accordance with the views of both parties."

The trial court resolved the questions presented by holding (1) that in accordance with the
provisions of articles 453 and 454 in relation with article 361 of the Civil Code, the value
of the "indemnizacion" to be paid to the defendant should be fixed according to the
necessary and useful expenses incurred by him in introducing "las plantaciones en
cuestion"; (2) that the plaintiffs as the owner of the property have the right to make their
own "las plantaciones hechas por el demandado" upon payment in the form indicated in
No. 1, the defendant having the right to retain the land until the expenditures have been
refunded; (3) that the defendant is obliged to render a detailed and just account of the
fruits and other profits received by him from the property for their due application; and
(4) that the value of the fruits received by the defendant should first be applied to the
payment of the "indemnizacion," and in case that it exceeds the value of the
"indemnizacion," the excess shall be returned to the plaintiffs. With respect to the last
question as to whether or not the plaintiffs are obliged to return to the defendant the value
of the fruits received by them before the defendant took possession of the land, the trial
court abstained from making any pronouncement for the reason that the circumstances
under which the plaintiffs acquired possession and the defendant again acquired it were
not before him, the parties needing to submit their evidence with respect to this point.

At the trial which followed and at the instance of the parties, two commissioners were
appointed with instructions to inspect the land and to count the number of coconut trees
planted thereon, determining the number of fruit-bearing trees and those that are not fruit-
bearing as well as the condition of the same. After trial, Judge of First Instance Gloria
rendered judgment declaring (a) that the defendant Manuel de Guzman and the intervenor
Bernardo Solis have the right to collect from the plaintiffs Martin Mendoza and Natalio
Enriquez the sum of P2,046 as compensation for the necessary and useful expenditures in
the proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de Guzman and 80 per cent for Bernardo Solis;
and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and Bernardo Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P666.93 per annum from June 25, 1924, one-fifth of this amount to be paid by
Manuel de Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis. As on the date when this
judgment was rendered, that is on September 23, 1927, the amount that the plaintiffs
were required to pay to the defendant and intervenor exceeded the amount that the latter
were to pay the former, the defendant and intervenor were ordered to deliver the land and
its improvements as soon as the plaintiffs have paid the difference, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
The appeal of the defendant and intervenor is based on fourteen assigned errors relating
to both questions of fact and of law. The question of fact mainly concerns the amount to
be paid as "indemnizacion" in the form of necessary and useful expenditures incurred by
the defendant. The question of law mainly concerns the interpretation of articles 361,
453, and 454 of the Civil Code. Counsel for the appellants has presented a learned brief
divided into three chapters. Counsel for the appellees has countered with an equally
helpful brief in which the fourteen assigned errors are reduced for purposes of argument
to four fundamental questions. It would not be profitable and it is not necessary to follow
opposing counsel into all of their refinements of fact and law.

As to the facts, the findings of the trial judge should be given effect. An examination of
the evidence shows that these findings are fully substantiated. Our only doubt has been as
to the just value for each coconut tree now found on the land. However, everything
considered, we have at last determined that we would not be justified in changing the
value per tree of 92 as fixed in the trial court. With respect to the fruits received by the
defendant while the land was in his possession, the finding in the trial court is correct.

With the facts as above indicated, little time need be taken to discuss the points of law.
Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion."
However one may speculate as to the true meaning of the term "indemnizacion" whether
correctly translated as "compensation" or "indemnity," the amount of the
"indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of
the Civil Code, which in the present case is the amount of the necessary and useful
expenditures incurred by the defendant. Necessary expenses have been variously
described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing (4
Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 258); as those without which the thing would
deteriorate or be lost (Scaevola's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 408); as those that
augment the income of the things upon which they are expended (4
Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 261; 8 Scaevola's Comentarios al Codigo
Civil, p. 416). Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation,
production, upkeep, etc. (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 257). Here the
plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced on the land and are disposed
to pay the amount of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant.
Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not exactly a possessor in good faith within the
meaning of the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures, it
is only just that he should account to the owners of the estate for any rents, fruits, or crops
he has gathered from it.

In brief, therefore, and with special reference to the decision appealed from, the errors
assigned on appeal, and the argument of counsel as addressed to the decision in the lower
court and the assignment of errors, we may say that we are content to make the findings
of fact and law of Judge Gloria in the lower court the findings of fact and law in the
appellate court.
Based on the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellants.

ings) he placed thereon.

In lieu thereof, we hold that the plaintiff should recover the lot under consideration, first
indemnifying the defendant for the value of the buildings and plantings he has placed
thereon, with the right on his part to retain it until she has reimbursed him for said
necessary and useful improvements; or in the contrary case, for the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff the price of the land, making himself the legitimate owner thereof; without
special finding as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 120303, July 24, 1996 ]
FEDERICO GEMINIANO, MARIA GEMINIANO, ERNESTO GEMINIANO,
ASUNCION GEMINIANO, LARRY GEMINIANO, AND MARLYN
GEMINIANO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINADOR
NICOLAS, AND MARY A. NICOLAS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari  has its origins in Civil Case No. 9214 of Branch 3
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Dagupan City for unlawful detainer and
damages. The petitioners ask the Court to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
which, in turn, reversed the MTCC; ordered the petitioners to reimburse the private
respondents the value of the house in question and other improvements; and allowed the
latter to retain the premises until reimbursement was made.

It appears that Lot No. 3765-B-1 containing an area of 314 square meters was originally
owned by the petitioners' mother, Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano. On a 12-square-
meter portion of that lot stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners
sold in November 1978 to the private respondents for the sum of P6,000.00, with an
alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot occupied by the house.
Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a contract of lease over a 126 square-
meter portion of the lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of the
private respondents for P40.00 per month for a period of seven years commencing on 15
November 1978.[1] The private respondents then introduced additional improvements and
registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease contract in
November 1985, however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly rentals.

It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which resulted in its
acquisition by one Maria Lee in 1972. In 1982, Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo, who in
turn sold it in 1984 to the spouses Agustin and Ester Dionisio.

On 14 February 1992, the Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said
property in favor of the petitioners.[2] As such, the lot was registered in the latter's names.
[3]

On 9 February 1993, the petitioners sent, via registered mail, a letter addressed to private
respondent Mary Nicolas demanding that she vacate the premises and pay the rentals in
arrears within twenty days from notice.[4]

Upon failure of the private respondents to heed the demand, the petitioners filed with the
MTCC of Dagupan City a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to confine the issues to: (1) whether
there was an implied renewal of the lease which expired in November 1985; (2) whether
the lessees were builders in good faith and entitled to reimbursement of the value of the
house and improvements; and (3) the value of the house.

The parties then submitted their respective position papers and the case was heard under
the Rule on Summary Procedure.

On the first issue, the court held that since the petitioners' mother was no longer the
owner of the lot in question at the time the lease contract was executed in 1978, in view
of its acquisition by Maria Lee as early as 1972, there was no lease to speak of, much
less, a renewal thereof. And even if the lease legally existed, its implied renewal was not
for the period stipulated in the original contract, but only on a month-to-month basis
pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The refusal of the petitioners' mother to
accept the rentals starting January 1986 was then a clear indication of her desire to
terminate the monthly lease. As regards the petitioners' alleged failed promise to sell to
the private respondents the lot occupied by the house, the court held that such should be
litigated in a proper case before the proper forum, not an ejectment case where the only
issue was physical possession of the property.

The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code, which allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of
improvements and retain the premises until reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the
private respondents, because the latter knew that their occupation of the premises would
continue only during the life of the lease. Besides, the rights of the private respondents
were specifically governed by Article 1678, which allows reimbursement of up to one-
half of the value of the useful improvements, or removal of the improvements should the
lessor refuse to reimburse.

On the third issue, the court deemed as conclusive the private respondents' allegation that
the value of the house and improvements was P180,000.00, there being no controverting
evidence presented.

The trial court thus ordered the private respondents to vacate the premises, pay the
petitioners P40.00 a month as reasonable compensation for their stay thereon from the
filing of the complaint on 14 April 1993 until they vacated, and to pay the sum of
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs.[5]

On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of Dagupan City reversed the trial court's
decision and rendered a new judgment: (1) ordering the petitioners to reimburse the
private respondents for the value of the house and improvements in the amount of
P180,000.00 and to pay the latter P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and (2) allowing the private respondents to remain in possession of
the premises until they were fully reimbursed for the value of the house.[6] It ruled that
since the private respondents were assured by the petitioners that the lot they leased
would eventually be sold to them, they could be considered builders in good faith, and as
such, were entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements with
the right of retention until reimbursement had been made.

On appeal, this time by the petitioners, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC[7] and denied[8] the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present
petition.

The Court is confronted with the issue of which provision of law governs the case at
bench: Article 448 or Article 1678 of the Civil Code? The said articles read as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
xxx                   xxx                xxx

Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to
the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the
property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half
of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may
suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the
property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is
caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying
their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
The crux of the said issue then is whether the private respondents are builders in good
faith or mere lessees.

The private respondents claim they are builders in good faith, hence, Article 448 of the
Civil Code should apply. They rely on the lack of title of the petitioners' mother at the
time of the execution of the contract of lease, as well as the alleged assurance made by
the petitioners that the lot on which the house stood would be sold to them.

It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident of title and possession, a
person may be a lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is
not the owner of the premises let.[9] After all, ownership of the property is not being
transferred,[10] only the temporary use and enjoyment thereof.[11]

In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by the
petitioners' mother. The land was allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue of
an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Lee, however, never sought a writ of possession
in order that she gain possession of the property in question.[12] The petitioners' mother
therefore remained in possession of the lot.

It is undisputed that the private respondents came into possession of a 126 square-meter
portion of the said lot by virtue of a contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother
in their favor. The juridical relation between the petitioners' mother as lessor, and the
private respondents as lessees, is therefore well-established, and carries with it a
recognition of the lessor's title.[13] The private respondents, as lessees who had
undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are then estopped to deny their
landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third
person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender
possession to the landlord.[14] This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at
the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created,[15] and may be asserted not only by
the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.[16]

Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises
would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as
possessors nor builders in good faith.[17]

In a plethora of cases,[18] this Court has held that Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation
to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to
a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his
landlord out of his property.

Anent the alleged promise of the petitioners to sell the lot occupied by the private
respondents' house, the same was not substantiated by convincing evidence. Neither the
deed of sale over the house nor the contract of lease contained an option in favor of the
respondent spouses to purchase the said lot. And even if the petitioners indeed promised
to sell, it would not make the private respondents possessors or builders in good faith so
as to be covered by the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot
raise the mere expectancy of ownership of the aforementioned lot because the alleged
promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even proven. The first thing that the
private respondents should have done was to reduce the alleged promise into writing,
because under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real property
or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof be
produced. Not having taken any steps in order that the alleged promise to sell may be
enforced, the private respondents cannot bank on that promise and profess any claim nor
color of title over the lot in question.

There is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was
done in Pecson vs. Court of Appeals,[19] because the situation sought to be avoided and
which would justify the application of that provision, is not present in this case. Suffice it
to say, "a state of forced co-ownership" would not be created between the petitioners and
the private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the rights of the
private respondents as lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which
allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements.

It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil
Code arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the petitioners
refused to exercise that option,[20] the private respondents cannot compel them to
reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can they retain the
premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is to
remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property
leased than is necessary.[21]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition;

REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals of 27
January 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34337; and REINSTATING the decision of Branch
3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Dagupan City in Civil Case No.
9214 entitled "Federico Geminiano, et al. vs. Dominador Nicolas, et al."

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 117642, April 24, 1998 ]
EDITHA ALVIOLA AND PORFERIO ALVIOLA, PETITIONERS, VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FLORENCIA BULING VDA DE
TINAGAN, DEMOSTHENES TINAGAN, JESUS TINAGAN, ZENAIDA T.
JOSEP AND JOSEPHINE TINAGAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners assail the decision  of the Court of
[1]

Appeals dated April 8, 1994 which affirmed the decision of the lower court ordering
petitioners to peacefully vacate and surrender the possession of the disputed properties to
the private respondents.

Culled from the record are the following antecedent facts of this case to wit:

On April 1, 1950, Victoria Sonjaconda Tinagan purchased from Mauro Tinagan two (2)
parcels of land situated at Barangay Bongbong, Valencia, Negros Oriental.  One parcel
[2]

of land contains an area of 5,704 square meters, more or less;  while the other contains
[3]

10,860 square meters.  Thereafter, Victoria and her son Agustin Tinagan, took possession
[4]

of said parcels of land.

Sometime in 1960, petitioners occupied portions thereof whereat they built a copra dryer
and put up a store wherein they engaged in the business of buying and selling copra.
On June 23, 1975, Victoria died. On October 26, 1975, Agustin died, survived by herein
private respondents, namely his wife, Florencia Buling Vda. de Tinagan and their
children Demosthenes, Jesus, Zenaida and Josephine, all surnamed Tinagan.

On December 24, 1976, petitioner Editha assisted by her husband filed a complaint for
partition and damages before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch
1, Dumaguete City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6634, claiming to be an acknowledged
natural child of deceased Agustin Tinagan and demanding the delivery of her shares in
the properties left by the deceased. [5]

On October 4, 1979, the aforesaid case was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that
recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parent and petitioner Editha did not fall in any of the exceptions enumerated in Article
285 of the Civil Code. [6]

Petitioners assailed the order of dismissal by filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before this Court.  On August 9, 1982, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
[7]

 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on October 19,
[8]

1982. [9]

On March 29, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession
against Editha and her husband Porferio Alviola before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 35, Dumaguete City, docketed as Civil Case No. 9148, praying,
among others, that they be declared absolute owners of the said parcels of land, and that
petitioners be ordered to vacate the same, to remove their copra dryer and store, to pay
actual damages (in the form of rentals), moral and punitive damages, litigation expenses
and attorney’s fees. [10]

In their answer, petitioners contend that they own the improvements in the disputed
properties which are still public land; that they are qualified to be beneficiaries of the
comprehensive agrarian reform program and that they are rightful possessors by
occupation of the said properties for more than twenty years. [11]

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in Civil Case No. 9148, for Recovery of

Property, the court hereby renders judgment:

a) Declaring plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the land in question including the
portion claimed and occupied by defendants;
b) Ordering defendants Editha Alviola and her husband Porfirio Alviola to
peacefully vacate and to surrender the possession of the premises in question to
plaintiffs; Defendants may remove their store and dryer on the premises without
injury and prejudice to the plaintiffs;

c) Ordering defendants to pay the following amounts to the plaintiffs:

1. P150.00 monthly rentals from April 1988 up to the time the improvements in the
questioned portions are removed;

2. P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees;

3. P3,000.00 for litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. [12]

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. On April 8, 1994, the respondent court

rendered its decision,  affirming the judgment of the lower court. Petitioners filed a
[13]

motion for reconsideration  but the same was denied by the respondent court in an order
[14]

dated October 6, 1994. [15]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners aver that respondent court erred in declaring private respondents the owners of
the disputed properties. They contend that ownership of a public land cannot be declared
by the courts but by the Executive Department of the Government, citing the case
of Busante vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Oct. 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 774; and that the
respondent court erred in not considering that private respondents’ predecessor-in-
interest, Victoria Sonjaco Tinagan, during her lifetime, ceded her right to the disputed
properties in favor of petitioners.

Moreover, petitioners maintain that the respondent court erred in holding that they were
in bad faith in possessing the disputed properties and in ruling that the improvements
thereon are transferable. They claim that the copra dryer and the store are permanent
structures, the walls thereof being made of hollow-blocks and the floors made of cement.

Private respondents counter that the question of whether or not the disputed properties are
public land has been resolved by overwhelming evidence showing ownership and
possession by the Tinagans and their predecessors-in-interest prior to 1949. They further
aver that they merely tolerated petitioners’ possession of the disputed properties for a
period which was less than that required for extraordinary prescription.

The petition must fail.

Petitioners claim that the disputed properties are public lands. This is a factual issue. The
private respondents adduced overwhelming evidence to prove their ownership and
possession of the two (2) parcels of land on portions of which petitioners built the copra
dryer and a store. Private respondents’ tax declarations and receipts of payment of real
estate taxes, as well as other related documents, prove their ownership of the disputed
properties. As stated previously in the narration of facts, these two (2) parcels of land
were originally owned by Mauro Tinagan, who sold the same to Victoria S. Tinagan on
April 1, 1950, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale,  wherein the two (2) lots, Parcels 1 and 2,
[16]

are described.  Anent Parcel 1, tax declarations indicate that the property has always
[17]

been declared in the name of the Tinagans. The first, Tax Declaration No. 3335  is in the
[18]

name of Mauro Tinagan. It was thereafter cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 19534
effective 1968,  still in the name of Mauro. This declaration was cancelled by Tax
[19]

Declaration No. 016740 now in the name of Agustin Tinagan,  effective 1974, followed
[20]

by Tax Declaration No. 08-421 in the name of Jesus Tinagan, effective 1980;  and[21]

finally by Tax Declaration No. 08-816 in the name of Jesus Tinagan, effective 1985. [22]

With regard to Parcel 2, private respondents presented Tax Declaration No. 20973 in the
name of Mauro Tinagan, effective 1959,  Tax Declaration No. 016757, effective 1974;
[23]

 Tax Declaration No. 08-405-C in the name of Agustin Tinagan, effective 1980  and
[24] [25]

Tax Declaration No. 08-794 in the name of Agustin Tinagan, effective 1985.  Moreover,
[26]

the realty taxes on the two lots have always been paid by the private respondents.  There [27]

can be no doubt, therefore, that the two parcels of land are owned by the private
respondents.

The record further discloses that Victoria S. Tinagan and her son, Agustin Tinagan, took
possession of the said properties in 1950, introduced improvements thereon, and for more
than 40 years, have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation thereof
in the concept of owners.

Petitioners’ own evidence recognized the ownership of the land in favor of Victoria
Tinagan. In their tax declarations,  petitioners stated that the house and copra dryer are
[28]

located on the land of Victoria S. Tinagan/Agustin Tinagan. By acknowledging that the

disputed portions belong to Victoria/Agustin Tinagan in their tax declarations,
petitioners’ claim as owners thereof must fail.

The assailed decision of the respondent court states that “Appellants do not dispute that
the two parcels of land subject matter of the present complaint for recovery of possession
belonged to Victoria S. Tinagan, the grandmother of herein plaintiffs-appellees; that
Agustin Tinagan inherited the parcels of land from his mother Victoria; and that
plaintiffs-appellees, in turn, inherited the same from Agustin.”[29]

Taking exception to the aforequoted finding, petitioners contend that while the 2 parcels
of land are owned by private respondents, the portions wherein the copra dryers and store
stand were ceded to them by Victoria S. Tinagan in exchange for an alleged indebtedness
of Agustin Tinagan in the sum of P7,602.04. [30]

This claim of the petitioners was brushed aside by the respondent court as merely an
afterthought, thus -

“Appellants’ claim that they have acquired ownership over the floor areas of the store and
dryer 'in consideration of the account of Agustin Tinagan in the sum of P7,602.04' is not
plausible. It is more of an 'after-thought' defense which was not alleged in their answer.
Although the evidence presented by them in support of this particular claim was not duly
objected to by counsel for appellees at the proper time and therefore deemed admissible
in evidence, an examination of the oral and documentary evidence submitted in support
thereof, reveals the weakness of their claim.
“Appellant testified that the areas on which their store and dryer were located were
exchanged for the amount of P7,602.04 owed to them by Agustin in 1967 (TSN, Hearing
of April 14, 1989, p. 9); that he did not bother to execute a document reflecting such
agreement `because they were our parents and we had used the land for quite sometime
already they had also sold their copra to us for a long time.’ (Id.) Yet, as earlier
discussed, the tax declarations in appellants’ answer show that even after 1967, they
expressly declared that the parcels of land on which their store and dryer were
constructed, belonged to Victoria and Agustin (Exhs. 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, 3-A, 3-B). If
appellants really believed that they were in possession of the said particular areas in the
concept of owners, they could have easily declared it in said tax declarations.”
[31]

Concededly, petitioners have been on the disputed portions since 1961. However, their
stay thereon was merely by tolerance on the part of the private respondents and their
predecessor-in-interest. The evidence shows that the petitioners were permitted by
Victoria Sanjoco Tinagan to build a copra dryer on the land when they got married.
Subsequently, petitioner Editha Alviola, claiming to be the illegitimate daughter of
Agustin Tinagan, filed a petition for partition demanding her share in the estate of the
deceased Agustin Tinagan on December 6, 1976. However, the petition was dismissed
since it was brought only after the death of Agustin Tinagan. This Court dismissed the
petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioner Editha Alviola on August 9,
1982. It was on March 29, 1988, when private respondents filed this complaint for
recovery of possession against petitioners. Considering that the petitioners’ occupation of
the properties in dispute was merely tolerated by private respondents, their posture that
they have acquired the property by “occupation” for 20 years does not have any factual or
legal foundation.

As correctly ruled by the respondent court, there was bad faith on the part of the
petitioners when they constructed the copra dryer and store on the disputed portions since
they were fully aware that the parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan. And, there
was likewise bad faith on the part of the private respondents, having knowledge of the
arrangement between petitioners and Victoria Tinagan relative to the construction of the
copra dryer and store. Thus, for purposes of indemnity, Article 448 of the New Civil
Code should be applied.  However, the copra dryer and the store, as determined by the
[32]

trial court and respondent court, are transferable in nature. Thus, it would not fall within
the coverage of Article 448. As the noted civil law authority, Senator Arturo Tolentino,
aptly explains: “To fall within the provision of this Article, the construction must be of
permanent character, attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a
transitory character or is transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must remove
the construction. The proper remedy of the landowner is an action to eject the builder
from the land.”[33]

The private respondents’ action for recovery of possession was the suitable solution to
eject petitioners from the premises.

WHEREFORE, this petition should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED. The assailed

decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000 ]
VERONA PADA-KILARIO AND RICARDO KILARIO PETITIONERS, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SILVERIO PADA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

The victory[1] of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court[2] in an ejectment suit[3] filed against them by private respondent Silverio
Pada, was foiled by its reversal[4] by the Regional Trial Court[5] on appeal. They elevated
their cause[6] to respondent Court of Appeals[7] which, however, promulgated a
Decision[8] on May 20, 1998, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.

The following facts are undisputed:

One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino,
Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of
residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion
of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission
from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When
Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight
children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that
house since 1960.

Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition
of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however,
never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his
other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta,
both died without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador
was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son,
Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the
said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-
owner of said property.

On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father,
Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.

On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of
his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.

Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went
through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of
amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.

On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner
spouses.

On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia
Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation [9] transferring to
petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No.
5581.

On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of
Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto
Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was
executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who
represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through
a private document that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of
Leyte.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It
made the following findings:
"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court finds that the
evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his ownership over x x x Cadastral Lot
No. 5581 x x x while defendants has [sic] successfully proved by preponderance of
evidence that said property is still under a community of ownership among the heirs of
the late Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano Pada and
Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-described residential
property x x x as their share of the inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial
settlement, how come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano
Pada was not transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and still
remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the part pertaining to the
share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the name of his heirs x x x.

"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the genuineness
and due execution of said document was assailed as doubtful and it appears that most of
the heirs were not participants and signatories of said settlement, and there was lack of
special power of attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in
the participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement.

"Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-described property
long before the sale of said property on November 17, 1993 was executed between Maria
Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said portion
of the above-described property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the heirs
of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic]
donated x x x their share of [sic] the above-described property to them, virtually
converting defendants' standing as co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus,
defendants as co-owners became the undivided owners of the whole estate x x x. As co-
owners of x x x Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x their possession in the northern portion is
being [sic] lawful."[10]
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On
November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:
"x x x [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo were never
questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40 years, thereby lending credence
on [sic] the fact that the two vendors were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties
ceded or sold. x x x At any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada
Pavo have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias, nevertheless,
said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or estoppel.

"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, but this doctrine
of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the heirs possessed the property as
an owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription because from the
moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and denies the rest
their share of the community property, the question then involved is no longer one for
partition but of ownership. x x x Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period of 42 long
years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long extinguished by
laches, estoppel or prescription.

"x x x

"x x x [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother of
Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the case or after the lapse of more
than 40 years reckoned from the time the extrajudicial partition was made in 1951.
Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others, were
absolutely bereft of any right in donating the very property in question."[11]
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment earlier
promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, [sic] consequently,
defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:

"1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the appellant, being
the lawful possessor in concept of owner;

"2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the option of
acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has to
be applied;

"3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their occupancy and use
of the portion of the land in question in the sum of P100.00 commencing on June 26,
1995 when the case was filed and until the termination of the present case;

"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00 as moral
damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;

"5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit."[12]

Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision of
the Regional Trial Court.
On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said
petition. It explained:
"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de facto or
physical or material possession and not de jure. Hence, even if the question of ownership
is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the
question of possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It
cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being inutile in an
ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession x x x.

"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the land possessed
by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a
daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada who was the registered owner of the subject
lot. The right of vendee Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-
judicial partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which was
written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject land was adjudicated
to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and
genuineness of the extra-judicial partition is now being questioned by the heirs of
Amador Pada, no action was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such
partition.

"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent facts that Maria

Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally owned by Jacinto Pada x x x and
that the disputed lot was adjudicated to Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias,
and upon the death of Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot, i.e.
Maria Pavo the vendor for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share x x x.
Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court that during the
cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as
Lot No. 5581, while the share of Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that
both Maria Pada Pavo and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary
shares. Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have been occupying a
portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any rental owing to the liberality
of the plaintiff x x x. Petitioners cannot now impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition
executed by the heirs in 1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria
Pada, and her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary division
of the estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is conclusive and confers
upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the respective portions assigned to them x x x.

"The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute made by the heirs of
Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona
Pada is a futile attempt to confer upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors
had no interest nor right to transfer. x x x This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought
to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the respondent
court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of laches and estoppel come into
play due to the donors' failure to assert their claims and alleged ownership for more than
forty (40) years x x x. Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the
vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by petitioners."[13]
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.

On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said motion.

Hence this petition raising the following issues:

"I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT

PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE PREMISES
CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA DONATED TO THEM
THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.

"II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT

MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE.

"III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH." [14]

There is no merit to the instant petition.

First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs
made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law
requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid.
[15]
 The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be
put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and
the heirs themselves against tardy claims.[16] The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved.[17] Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of
an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan
different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be
inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid.[18] The
partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be
effective as regards the heirs that participated therein.[19] The requirement of Article 1358
of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a
public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect
the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves.[20] And
neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply
because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property,
considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a
confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor
of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.[21] The 1951 extrajudicial
partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and
Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to
Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively.[22]

Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily
and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.[23] When they discussed and
agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in
furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and
until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid.
[24]
 No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of
Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their
voluntary acts.

The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador
Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of never
having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject
property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what
was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was a parcel of
residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut
land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of
rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners
of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is
too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951
extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.

Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the
heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been
occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only
relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family.[25] Their admissions are evidence
of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject
property is concerned.

Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance
of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any
time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they
will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them.[26] Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders
in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448[27] and Article 546[28] of the New Civil
Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one
who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.[29] Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.
Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going
to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the
time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled,
i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized. [30] More
importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia,
Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such,
petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built
on the said lot.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[ G. R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962 ]

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG AND ESTEBAN CALALUNG,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia
Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 25169-R) reversing
that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing
petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to
and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without
petitioners' consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a
parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of
Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased
mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in
whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342.
When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and
for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by
action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof
had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial
deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the
registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square
meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the
land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the
value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated
February 18,1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have
been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the
year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision
adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering
respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to
pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:

"It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the
gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a
navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the
northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the
survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the
land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or
began in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendants' witness and the boundary
owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little
more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the
declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to
the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only
contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the
incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectares, more or less, was formed
in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by
the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2') when they entered upon the land. We
could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2') canceled
Tax Dec. No. 28226 (Exh. '1'), because Exh. "2" says that 'tax under this declaration
begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation
purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere
occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of
land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question
being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs
to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code).
Assuming, arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948,
or earlier, is of no moment, because the 'law does not require any act of possession on the
part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest
(Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil, 567). Further, no act
of appropriation on the part of the riparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire
ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa,
C.C., pp. 231-236).

"This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they
have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by
prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering
that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of
the land for ten (10), years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary
prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by
law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within' the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496; and, therefore, it could not be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person."

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September

14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

"That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvion,
which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for
both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should
properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural
accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that 'to
the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the water.' The defendants, however,
contend that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses
the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on
two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate,
and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently,
falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that 'no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession'; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant
began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for
prescription before the present action was instituted.

"As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct.
An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to
belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become
entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land
Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in
the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually
deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character
of collusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect
the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in
the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil.
55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by the Land
Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he
has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession;
and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person
through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et
al. vs. Baguisa, et al., CA-G. R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.

"We now proceed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding
the length of time that the defendant have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified
that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by
the plaintiffs. The area tinder occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In
1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was
superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it
is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is
corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years
of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in
question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1941, he has always known
it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the
same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or
1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.

"We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and
credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in
1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the
defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners; that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of
title from the surveyor, Domingo Parian; and that they never declared the land in question
for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the
defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not
because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey
included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the
defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included,
containing an area of some 458 square meters.

"The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession—from
1933 to 1958—is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact
that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and
by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiffs had really been in prior possession and
were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the
same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy
of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of
the surveyor Domingo Parian, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The
payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the
certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file
an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they
allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon
consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934,
immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their
rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however,
prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants."

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial
property in question through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and Article
366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the
registered owners of the land to which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion
becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by
a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered
owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of
that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral
Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the
title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third
parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact
remains, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property
(which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical
possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after
analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the
alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these
facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented
by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the
provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the
pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the
New Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
respondents acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in
accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitions. So ordered.

[ G. R. No. L-17645, October 30, 1962 ]

JULIANA ZAPATA, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, OPPONENT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

It appears that Juliana Zapata owns two parcels of land situated in the municipality of
Santo Tomas, province of Pampanga, adjoining a non-navigable and non-floatable river
called the Candalaga Creek. The two parcels are designated as Lot No. 25 and the
northern part of Lot No. 16 of the Cadastral Survey of San Fernando, Pampanga.[1] The
first lot contains a superficial area of 6,592 square meters and is registered in her name,
as shown by transfer certificate of title No. 12907 issued by the Registrar of Deeds in and
for the province of Pampanga (Exhibit A). Her ownership or title to a part of Lot No. 16
was confirmed by a decree entered on 21 November 1955 by the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga ordering that the "remaining portion of Lot No. 16 with an area of 474
square meters" be registered "in the name of Juliana Zapata" (Exhibit A-1); Cad. case No.
1, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 137).

In 1915, when the cadastral survey of San Fernando was begun, the width of the
Candalaga Creek adjoining the two parcels of land owned by Juliana Zapata was about 90
or 100 meters. At present, the width is 15 meters, because soil had been accumulated by
the water current of the river on the banks of Lot No. 25 and of that part of Lot No. 16
owned by Juliana Zapata. The accreted land is delimited in plan Psu-140515 and
designated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, the first containing an area of 6,260 square meters, the
second, 449 and the third, 2,238 (Exhibit B) and described in the technical descriptions
(Exhibit C).

In a verified petition filed on 16 June 1956 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Juliana Zapata claims that the aforesaid three lots belong to her by accretion, as provided
for in article 457 of the Civil Code, and prays that the same be registered in her name
under the Land Registration Act (Land Reg. Case No. N-273, L.R.C. rec. No. 1167). On
19 October 1956 on her motion the court entered an order of general default against all
persons except the Director of Lands. On 24 October 1956 the Director of Lands objected
to the petition and prayed that the registration of the three lots in the name of Juliana
Zapata be denied and that they be declared to form part of the public domain.

After trial, on 26 December 1956 the court rendered judgment, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court, overrulling the opposition of the Director of Lands; and
confirming the order of general default herein entered, and the applicant's title to the
aforesaid Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3, referred to plan Psu-140515, aforecited, hereby orders that
the same be registered in the name of Juliana Zapata, the herein applicant * * *. Once this
decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree issue.

The Court of Appeals certified to this Court the appeal taken by the Director of Lands
because only questions of law are involved.

The appellant contends that article 457 of the Civil Code providing that—

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

cannot apply and does not support the appellee's claim that the accretion or deposit of
alluvial soil, which is delimited in plan Psu-140515 and designated as Lots 1, 2 and 3,
belongs to her as riparian owner, because such accretion "was not due to the natural effect
of the current but was artificially induced on account of the erection of the fish traps on
the creek." The contention cannot be sustained. The appellant does not dispute that the
accreted land delimited in plan Psu-140515 and designated as Lots 1, 2 and 3 adjoining
Lot No. 25 and that part of Lot No. 16, both owned by the appellee, had been formed
gradually due to the effect of the water current of the Candalaga Creek, but claims that
the accretion was artificially brought about by the setting up of fish traps, such
as salag net, bunuan (bamboo trap), sabat (cutting of channels) and fencing that the
fishermen had built in the stream. True, those fish traps might have slowed down the
current of the Candalaga Creek and might have brought about or caused the accretion, but
as there is no evidence to show that the setting up or erection of the fish traps was
expressly intended or designed to cause or bring about the accretion, the appellee may
still invoke the benefit of the provisions of article 457 of the Civil Code to support her
claim of title thereto. Moreover, the fishermen who since 1894 used to set up fish traps in
the creek (p. 7, t.s.n.), later on secured permit from the Government that auctioned off the
right or license to set up fish traps in the creek (p. 6, t.s.n.), and the setting up of such fish
traps stopped or was discontinued even before 1926 (p. 7, t.s.n.), all go to show that the
alluvial accretion was not entirely due to the setting up of such fish traps.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-40399, February 06, 1990 ]
MARCELINO C. AGNE, FELIX ORIANE, AGATON TAGANAS, HILARIO
ESCORPIZO, ISABELO MAURICIO, HEIRS OF ROMAN DAMASO,
NAMELY: JORGE DAMASO AND ALEJANDRO DAMASO, HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO RAMOS, NAMELY: ENCARNACION R. LEANO AND
DOMINGA R. MEDRANO, HEIRS OF SABINA GELACIO AGAPITO,
NAMELY: SERAPIO AGAPITO AND NICOLASA AGAPITO, FELISA
DICCION AGNE, ESTANISLAO GOROSPE, LIBRADO BADUA, NICOLAS
VILLANUEVA, HEIRS OF CARLOS PALADO, NAMELY: FORTUNATA
PALADO AND ISABELITA PALADO, PRIMITIVO TAGANAS, PANFILO
SOINGCO, BERNARDO PALATTAO, MARCELINO S. SANTOS AND
PAULINO D. AGNE, JR. (MINOR), REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER
FELISA DICCION AGNE, PETITIONERS, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
PRESENTACION AGPOON GASCON, JOAQUIN GASCON AND HON.
ROSALIO C. SEGUNDO, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH V, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 72255. FEBRUARY 6, 1990]

 MARCELINO C. AGNE, FELIX ORIANE, AGATON TAGANAS
(DECEASED), REPRESENTED BY FLORENTINO C. TAGANAS, FELISA
DICCION AGNE, HILARIO ESCORPIZO, NICOLAS VILLANUEVA,
ISABELO MAURICIO, ESTANISLAO GOROSPE (DECEASED),
REPRESENTED BY ELIZABETH G. BADUA AND SILVINA G. VALERIO,
LIBRADO BADUA, JOSE ALSISTO, SERAPIO AGAPITO, NICOLASA
AGAPITO, JORGE DAMASO, ALEJANDRO DAMASO, ENCARNACION
RAMOS, DOMINGA RAMOS AND CARLOS PALADO, PETITIONERS, VS.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PRESENTACION AGPOON
GASCON AND JOAQUIN GASCON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Before us are two separate petitions for review on certiorari of the order of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 2649, entitled
"Marcelino C. Agne, et al. vs. The Director of Lands, et al.," dismissing the complaint
filed by herein petitioners in said case;[1] and the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-R, entitled "Presentacion Agpoon Gascon vs.
Marcelino C. Agne, et al.," promulgated on January 30, 1985, affirming in toto the
decision of the trial court in favor of herein private respondents,[2] which cases are
docketed herein as G.R. No. L-40399 and G.R. No. 72255, respectively.

These two petitions, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties and
common questions of law, were ordered consolidated in our resolution of August 9, 1989.

As found by respondent court and disclosed by the records, the land subject matter of this
case was originally covered by Free Patent No. 23263 issued on April 17, 1937 in the
name of Herminigildo Agpoon. On May 21, 1937, pursuant to the said patent, the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo Agpoon Original Certificate
of Title No. 2370.[3] Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the said parcel of land upon
the death of her father, Herminigildo, and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.
32209 on April 6, 1960. Respondent Presentacion declared the said land for taxation
purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No. 11506 and taxes were paid thereon in
her name.[4]

On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed Civil Case No. U-2286 in the then
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners under the aforesaid
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog,
Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of petitioners; that during the
Japanese occupation, petitioners, taking advantage of the abnormal conditions then
obtaining, took possession of said land by means of fraud, stealth, strategy and
intimidation; that private respondents repeatedly demanded the surrender of the physical
possession of said property but the latter refused.[5]

Petitioners, in answer to said complaint, alleged that the land in question was formerly a
part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River: that in the year 1920, a big flood occurred
which caused the said river to change its course and abandon its original bed; that by
virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the law
in force, petitioners, by operation of law, became the owners by accession or accretion of
the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties; that since 1920,
they and their predecessors in interest occupied and exercised dominion openly and
adversely over said portion of the abandoned river bed in question abutting their
respective riparian lands continuously up to the present to the exclusion of all other
persons, particularly Herminigildo Agpoon; that they have introduced improvements
thereon by constructing irrigation canals and planting trees and agricultural crops
thereon[6] and converted the land into a productive area.

In their joint stipulation of facts, the parties agreed as follows: 

“1. That the parties admit the identity and area of the land in question, which forms part
of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River, and further admit that the said river bed was
abandoned as a result of a flood in 1920 and opened a new bed. The location and course
of the aforesaid abandoned river bed as well as the relative position of the lands
bordering the same can be gleaned from Cadastral Survey Plan of Asingan, Pangasinan,
Sheet No. 49 thereof, as approved by the Director of Lands on October 12, 1912, a
photostat copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex
‘A’. 

“2. That the parties admit that the defendants are the riparian owners of the area in
question and further admit that the defendants are in possession thereof but that each of
them is in possession only of an aliquot part of the said area proportionate to the length of
their respective lands. (As amended). 

"3. That the parties likewise admit that a Free Patent No. 23263 in the name of
Herminigildo Agpoon covering the area in question was issued on April 17, 1937 and
that they admit O.C.T. No. 2370 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan covering the
same parcel of land was issued to the same. Herminigildo Agpoon on May 21, 1937, a
photostat copy of said O.C.T. is hereto attached as Annex 'B'. 

"4. That the parties admit that the property in controversy is now covered by T.C.T. No.
32209 in the name of Presentacion Agpoon Gascon and by Tax Declaration No. 11506 in
the name of said Presentation Agpoon Gascon, a photostat reproduction of said T.C.T.
No. and Tax Declaration are hereto attached and marked as Annexes ‘C’ and ‘F’,
respectively."[7] 

On March 6, 1974, while the above-mentioned case was still pending, petitioners filed a
complaint against the respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with the former
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or
action to clear title to a parcel of land, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. U-
2649. Petitioners alleged in their said complaint that the land in question, which was
formerly a portion of the bed of Agno-Chico river which was abandoned as a result of the
big flood in 1920, belongs to them pursuant to the provision of Article 370 of the old
Civil Code; that it was only on April 13, 1971, when respondent spouses filed a
complaint against them, that they found out that the said land was granted by the
Government to Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to which
Original Certificate of Title No. 2370 was issued in the latter's name; and that the said
patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land,
an abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a
public land grant.[8]

On June 21, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. U-2286, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows: 

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment: 

1. Ordering the defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs the physical possession of the
land in question described in paragraph 3 of the amended complaint; 

2. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the produce of the
land in question in the total sum of P5,000.00 per year from the date of the filing of the
present action at the rate of 6% interest per annum until fully paid; 

3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P800.00
representing attorney's fees; 

4. And to pay the costs. 

SO ORDERED. "[9]

Not satisfied with said decision, petitioners appealed to respondent court. As earlier
stated, on January 30, 1985 the former Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto in
AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-R the said decision of the court a quo,[10] and with the denial of
petitioner's motion for the reconsideration,[11] the case came up to us as G.R. No. 72255.
On June 24, 1974, the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, acting on the
motion to dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon, issued an
order dismissing Civil Case No. U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the
statement in the case of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al.[12]  that an action to annul a free
patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of action.
[13]
 Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of said order was denied on September 11,
1974,[14] hence the recourse to us in G.R. No. L-40399.

In these petitions, petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether or not the lower court is justified in dismissing the complaint by simply
invoking the ruling in the aforestated case of Antonio although the facts and
circumstances set forth in the complaint show that the land in question was private land
under Article 370 of the old Civil Code and that the subsequent derivative certificates of
title in question were null and void ab initio because the said land was not within the
authority of the government to dispose of in favor of any party and must be ordered
annulled, cancelled or rescinded;[15]

2. Whether or not the trial court and the former Intermediate Appellate Court were
justified in not basing their judgments on the judicial admissions of private respondents
in the stipulation of facts of the parties, since such admissions have the legal force and
effect of precluding private respondents from disputing such admission;

3. Whether or not respondent court can presume that private respondents or their
predecessor had prior possession of the land in dispute in the light of provisions of law
which oblige them to prove such possession, as well as the stipulated facts and other facts
and circumstances on record showing that private respondents or their predecessor were
not in actual occupancy of the said land, and without appreciating the evidence put up by
petitioners to prove their prior possession thereof;

4. Whether or not respondent court was justified in its application of Section 41 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in favor of private respondents, although the private respondents
did not invoke said law in this case and did not adduce any evidence or proof that all the
essential requisites of acquisitive prescription under the said law were present in their
favor;

5. Whether or not the Government had the right to convey by way of free patent to any
party the land in dispute which belonged to the riparian owners as decreed by Article 370
of the old Civil Code, the law then in force and despite the fact that the patentee herein
never occupied the said land during the period prescribed by Act No. 2874; and

6. Whether or not private respondents are guilty of laches for not having attempted to file
suit to recover the land in dispute during an interval of 50 or 30 years.[16]
The issues and arguments raised by the proponents in these petitions are well taken.

We agree with petitioners that the lower court erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil
Case No. U-2649. The aforesaid case of Antonio relied upon by the lower court in its
dismissal order is not controlling. In that case, the complaint was dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action, not only because of the delay in the filing of the complaint but
specifically since the ground relied upon by the plaintiff therein, that is, that the land was
previously covered by a titulo real, even if true, would not warrant the annulment of the
free patent and the subsequent original certificate of title issued to defendant. Thus: 

"It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either
the invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of his
predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation made in his answer
that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the absolute owner of the property covered
by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency are
grounds for the annulment of the free patent and original certificate of title in question.
Evidently, it was Barroga's privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim of private
ownership in favor of his predecessor in interest and of whatever the latter's Titulo Real
was worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider that the property covered by
the Titulo Real was still part of the public domain. Acting accordingly he applied for a
free patent and was successful. It must be borne in mind that the Titulo Real was not an
indefeasible title and that its holder still had to prove that he had possessed the land
covered by it without interruption during a period of ten years by virtue of a good title
and in good faith (Royal Decree of June 25, 1880). We may well presume that Barroga
felt that he had no sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to
acquire the land as part of the public domain."

In the case at bar, the facts alleged in the complaint, which are deemed hypothetically
admitted upon the filing of the motion to dismiss, constitute a sufficient cause of action
against private respondents. Petitioners in their complaint in Civil Case No. U-2649
alleged, among others, that the disputed area was formerly an abandoned river bed
formed due to natural causes in 1920; that the riparian owners of the lands abutting said
abandoned river bed were the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors in interest; that since
then and up to the present, they have been occupying and cultivating aliquot portions of
the said land proportionate to the respective lengths of their riparian lands; that they are
the real and lawful owners of the said land as decreed by Article 370 of the old Civil
Code, the law then in force; that since the said area was a private land, the same could not
have been the subject matter of an application for free patent; and that all these facts were
known to the private respondents and their predecessor in interest.

If the said averments are true, and the factual recitals thereon have been admitted in the
stipulation of facts hereinbefore quoted, then the land in question was and is of private
ownership and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands. The free
patent and subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The indefeasibility
and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent may be invoked only
when the land involved originally formed part of the public domain. If it was a private
land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity. [17]

The rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the expiration of one year
after the entry of the decree, pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act, does
not apply where an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are null and void because the Bureau
of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all, the land in question having been
withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the patent and the
grant of a certificate of title to another person. Such an action is different from a review
of the decree of title on the ground of fraud.[18]

Although a period of one year has already expired from the time a certificate of title was
issued pursuant to a public grant, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null
and void if the property covered thereby is originally of private ownership, and an action
to annul the same does not prescribe.[19] Moreover, since herein petitioners are in
possession of the land in dispute, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible.[20] Their action
for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession for a number of years gave them a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse
claims of a third party and the effect on her title.[21] As held in Caragay-Layno vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.,[22] an adverse claimant of a registered land, undisturbed in his
possession thereof for a period of more than fifty years and not knowing that the land he
actually occupied had been registered in the name of another, is not precluded from filing
an action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property as against the
registered owner who was relying upon a Torrens title which could have been
fraudulently acquired. To such adverse claimant, the remedy of an action to quiet title is
imprescriptible. In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the
conveyance complained of was void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would
be unavailing.[23]

The resolution of the other assigned errors hinges on the issue of who, as between the
riparian owner presently in possession and the registered owner by virtue of a free patent,
has a better right over the abandoned river bed in dispute.

We rule in favor of petitioners.

The claim of ownership of herein petitioners is based on the old Civil Code, the law then
in force, which provides: 
"The beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has
naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective
lengths. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new
dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom."[24]

It is thus clear under this provision that once the river bed has been abandoned, the
riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by this
article. The acquisition of ownership is automatic.[25] There need be no act on the part of
the riparian owners to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is subject
thereto ipso jure  from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without the
need of any formal act of acquisition.[26] Such abandoned river bed had fallen to the
private ownership of the owner of the riparian land even without any formal act of his
will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser. The
right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it is a mode of
acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion. Since the accessory
follows the nature of the principal, there need not be any tendency to the thing or
manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso
jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident.[27]

The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has been said to rest in the
law of nature, and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and the
owner of flocks and herds to their natural increase.[28] Petitioners herein became owners
of aliquot portions of said abandoned river bed as early as 1920, when the Agno River
changed its course, without the necessity of any action or exercise of possession on their
part, it being an admitted fact that the land in dispute, prior to its registration, was an
abandoned bed of the Agno River and that petitioners are the riparian owners of the lands
adjoining the said bed.

The failure of herein petitioners to register the accretion in their names and declare it for
purposes of taxation did not divest it of its character as private property. Although we
take cognizance of the rule that an accretion to registered land is not automatically
registered and therefore not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility
enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system,[29] the said rule is not applicable
to this case since the title claimed by private respondents is not based on acquisitive
prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the Government, which presupposes
that it was inceptively a public land. Ownership over the accession is governed by the
Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is a concern of the Land Registration
Act.

Under the provisions of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents'
predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a
public land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void.
[30]
 The nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.[31] The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands
is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately owned.[32] The purpose
of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to
limit its application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are
not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in
freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and
cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject"
of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act[33] 
and the same are excluded from the provisions or text thereof.

We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the issuance of a free patent
over the same land because the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public
domain.[34] Only public land may be disposed of by the Director of Lands.[35] Since as
early as 1920, the land in dispute was already under the private ownership of herein
petitioners and no longer a part of the lands of the public domain, the same could not
have been the subject matter of a free patent. The patentee and his successors in interest
acquired no right or title to the said land. Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to
Heminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto
cannot become final and indefeasible. Hence, we ruled in Director of Lands vs. Sisican,
et al.[36] that if at the time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein
were already private property of another and therefore, not part of the disposable land of
the public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land.

Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud
consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not.
As earlier stated, the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit but, from the fact that the
land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.[37] Being null and void, the free
patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no legal effects whatsoever. Quod
nullum est, nullum producit effectum.[38]

A free patent which purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any
title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true
owner.[39] The Court has previously held that the Land Registration Act and the Cadastral
Act do not give anybody who resorts to the provisions thereof a better title than what he
really and lawfully has. 

"x x x The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of
a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another (Gustilo
vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 838). The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to
the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to
obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he
really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may have
been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected
(Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). x x x." [40]

We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable conclusion that the title of herein
petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner which is
a total nullity. The long and continued possession of petitioners under a valid claim of
title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from
the beginning.

The quality of conclusiveness of a Torrens title is not available for use to perpetrate fraud
and chicanery. To paraphrase from Angeles vs. Samia, supra, the Land Registration Act
does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing and vested.
It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. It cannot be a shield for the commission
of fraud. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Stated
elsewise, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already
have on the land. Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of
land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens system of registration.[41] Resort to the
provisions of the Land Registration Act does not give one a better title than he really and
lawfully has.[42] Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring property. It
is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the holder any
better title than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith.
The effect is that it is as no registration was made at all.[43]

Moreover, the failure of herein private respondents to assert their claim over the disputed
property for almost thirty (30) years constitute laches[44] and bars an action to recover the
same.[45] The registered owners' right to recover possession of the property and title
thereto from petitioners has, by long inaction or inexcusable neglect, been converted into
a stale demand.[46]

Considering that petitioners were well within their rights in taking possession of the lot in
question, the findings of respondent court that herein petitioners took advantage of the
infirmities and weakness of the preceding claimant, Herminigildo Agpoon, in taking
possession of said land during the Japanese occupation is neither tenable in law nor
sustained by preponderant evidence in fact.

Where the evidence show that the plaintiff is the true owner of the land subject of the free
patent and title granted to another and that the defendant and his predecessor in interest
were never in possession thereof, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and
without ordering the cancellation of said title issued upon the patent, may direct the
defendant registered owner to reconvey the property to the plaintiff.[47] Further, if the
determinative facts are before the Court and it is in a position to finally resolve the
dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by such a resolution
and thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the
case of the trial court.[48] On these considerations, as well as the fact that these cases have
been pending for a long period of time, we see no need for remanding Civil Case No.
2649 for further proceedings, and we hold that the facts and the ends of justice in this
case require the reconveyance by private respondents to petitioners of the disputed lot.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent court in its AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-
R and the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 2649 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby
rendered ORDERING private respondents to reconvey the aforesaid parcel of land to
petitioners.

SO ORDERED. 

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 05, 1990 ]
EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO
BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD PABLO
BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

The Cagayan river separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east

in the province of Cagayan.  According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor,
Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were
covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre.  In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was
issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin
(Exh. 2-Agustin).

As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the
western bank.  The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.

In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre.  Among those
occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents,
namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878,
7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns
Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad).  Pablo Binayug began his possession in
1947.  An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares
were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead Application No.
W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug).  Binayug's possession
was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-Binayug).  On the other
hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of
Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P?5026
for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its

eastern bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-
Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on
the western bank.

However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its
1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and
the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on
the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river.  To cultivate those lots they had to cross the
river.

In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their
lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the
mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and
drove away the private respondents from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a

complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and
its 6.6-hectare accretion.  On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a
separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.

On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:

"In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao,
Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or
agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of
portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these defendants to
restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the only
interested heirs of Macario Melad.
"In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres
Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan,
Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi,
Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, or any
of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875,
7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 1891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore
possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronimo Ubina.  Without pronouncement as
to damages which were not properly proven and to costs.
"SO ORDERED.  (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.)" (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)

Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in

Civil Case No. 344-T, only defendants-
petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir),
Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed.  But upon motion of plaintiffs-private
respondents, the trial court ordered the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal
was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial (Order dated August
15, 1975).

On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision

affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendants-
appellants.

In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of
Appeals erred:

1.  in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as
a result of accretion;
2.  in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain to
petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof;
and
3.  in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not
affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it
reverted to its old bed.

The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the
private respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they
were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a
finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court.  That finding is supported
by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides:

"Art. 457.  To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.  (366)"
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present:  (1) that
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).

All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:

"x x x Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49
years.  Within this period, the alluviun (sic) deposited on the other side has become
greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases.  Still the addition in
every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be measured after
the lapse of a certain time.  The testimonial evidence in these cases that
said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial
of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone.  Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of
Solana, Cagayan, said so.  Arturo Taguian said so, Timoteo Melad said so,
Francisco Ubina said so, Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that
when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions
of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919.  This could not have happened if that part
of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River.  These
testimonies cannot be destroyed by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin
and Eulogio Agustin Alone.  x x x." (p. 27, Rollo.)

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of
the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of
49 years.  It was gradual and imperceptible.  Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original
area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in
June, 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been
added to it.  Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to
Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares
through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east.  These accretions
belong to the riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made
(Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806).  The reason for
this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other
damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject
to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers
as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of
accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).

The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the
sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it
reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side
(or eastern bank) of the river.  Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this
situation.
"Art.   459.  Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on
its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land
to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he
removes the same within two years."
"Art. 463.  Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of
land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his
ownership.  He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the curre
nt.  (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a

strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be
“separated from the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the
ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.  The decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed.  Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996 ]
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO AND LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE
SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON.
ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA
AND HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., IN THEIR OFFICIAL AND/OR
PRIVATE CAPACITIES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint
by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for
annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the
Bureau of Lands regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted
administrative remedies before having recourse to the courts.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan
de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up
Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.

Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject
lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals.
As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the
Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered
against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.

The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the
same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of
judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which
dismissed the same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of
judgment but private respondents filed another case for certiorari with prayer for
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower
court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the
subject lots they occupied.

Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the
survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released
to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of
Lands.

In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera,
respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a
report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-
D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be
cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land
applications.

Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto
Hilario rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of
Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private
respondents who, if qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective
portions.

Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio,
Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad
then ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove
whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private
respondents be placed in possession thereof.

Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners
Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC,
Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera,
report and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order
by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of
execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the
Bureau of Lands.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the
approval of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual
findings made by the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held
to be controlling as the preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to the
Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.[1]

Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by
Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same
had been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-
Charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does not fall within the
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also held that there
was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and
executed.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assign the following errors:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY

AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW
ON THE MATTER;

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY

AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT THE EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ABELARDO G.
PALAD, JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE
DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE
PROPER SUBJECT FOR ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
THE LOWER COURT.

The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not the
subject land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an
accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:

"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."

In the case of Meneses v. CA,[2] this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring

property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called
the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current
of waters.

For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the
above-mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was
formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land.[3] It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was
gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila,[4] this Court held
that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and
flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first
and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a
riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from
denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA
(G-6) 571.[5] The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land
being applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan No. MSI-10-
06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which was conducted as a
consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land
was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was, however,
controverted by respondent Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based
on the findings of his ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of
Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The investigation report also
states that except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole
area is fully occupied by a part of a big concrete bodega of petitioners and several
residential houses made of light materials, including those of private respondents which
were erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978.[6]

Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which
was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in
accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. [7] This Court
has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but even finality.[8] Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court.[9]

It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or
artificial. In Republic v. CA,[10] this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit
should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from
Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it
differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus,
in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al.,[11] where the land was not formed solely by the
natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made
accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the
Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.[12] Even if this Court were
to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of
the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other
filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, [13] the
same would still be part of the public domain.

Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as
well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have Jurisdiction
over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo
dismissed petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which
ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.

However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the
decision of respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of The Bureau of Lands.
Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of Lands."[14] It would be
incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands
acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands.

In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge"
of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent's Hilario's decision, he was acting on
said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the
case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,[15] This Court held that
the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside
the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving public
lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot therefore, be said to have acted beyond the
bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. [16]

As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an
artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority
and control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law
(C.A. No. 141) which states, thus:

"Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officer
charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands who
shall act under his immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control
of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and
management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact
shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources."

In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or

capriciousness in the execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the
Director of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on the
conclusive finding that the subject land was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his rights when he issued the
assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.

Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate the
subject land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect
for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to
private respondents Salasalans and Rayabas as they had not yet been issued patents or
titles over the subject land. The execution order merely directed the segregation of
petitioners' titled lot from the subject land which was actually being occupied by private
respondents before they were ejected from it. Based on the finding that private
respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the subject land
instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the exercise
of this administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the subject land on the
ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants thereof.

While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by
them, they nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous
Sales Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were
in fact directed to do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely
implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that petitioners' own
application still has to be given due course.[17]

As Director of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over

any form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.
[18]
 He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long
as they are based on the findings of fact.

In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros,[19] this Court held that where, in the disposition of

public lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he
clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is
one of judgment, but not an act or grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari.
Thus, except for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, this Court finds
no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

R
 FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997 ]
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration
case by oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does
ownership of land formed by alluvium.

The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered.
His registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the
Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan
River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's
registered land on the east and on the west.

The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land.
Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.

The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that
it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as
foreshore land?

Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision[1] and (2) two subsequent
resolutions[2] of the Intermediate Appellate Court[3] (now the Court of Appeals) in Land
Registration Case No. N-84,[4] the application over which was filed by private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the Court
of First Instance[5] (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

  On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore
lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of
approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953.
So was his motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro,
filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25)
hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application
was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the
public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27,
1988, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the
property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.

The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of
Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The then Executive Secretary,
acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.

On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an
application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611
square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in
Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the
Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as
the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand
and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed
the accretion as the riparian owner.

On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor
General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-
interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the
public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director
of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the
same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director
of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.

On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director
of Lands and the Director of Forestry.

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and,
on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application.
Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public
domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in
possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the
Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he had already
converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960,
Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo
Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed,
through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-
175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon:
thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This,
notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.

The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been
docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the parties and the subject
matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case
and was jointly tried by the court a quo.

During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on
November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.

Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the
herein private respondents.

On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property
to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of
land registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment
in Civil Case No. 2873;

(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land in
question; and

(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2873
and as applicant in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances."[6]

The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assigned the
following errors:
"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action
of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants
[private respondents].

2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.
3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and is controversy in favor
of applicants-appellants [private respondents].

4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private
respondents] are entitled to eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]."[7]
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the
petition for registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters
from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards
corner 6 of the Psu-175181.

The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:

"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their
respective briefs is — whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or
foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of
Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the
Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed by the action of the
Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.

xxx

It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land

immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their property which is covered
by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the
Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers come
from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between the
Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers acting
as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the
Manila Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private
respondents'] land adding thereto the land now sought to be registered.

This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is
immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof,
at the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We
can understand therefore the confusion this case might have caused the lower court, faced
as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed
by the action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found
at the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be
quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property of
the State as the lower court did in fact rule x x x .

xxx
It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies between these
two rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as a
barricade preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two rivers is
downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their
mouths.

It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the
deposit thereat for in the natural course of things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the
shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add anything to the land but
instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves and the wind. It is then more
logical to believe that the two rivers flowing towards the bay emptied their cargo of sand,
silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing appellants' [private respondents'] land to
accumulate therein.

However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to
accept this theory and stated that the subject land arose only when x x x Pascual planted
'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see
how this act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the land mass came into
being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the sea. Following Mr. Justice
Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then the
land that grew would have stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But this
is not so because the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were
planted.

On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants' [private respondents'] clearly show
that the land that accumulated beyond the so-called boundary, as well as the entire area
being applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees x x x. The
existence of vegetation on the land could only confirm that the soil thereat came from
inland rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to the shore but sand,
pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the two rivers would be bringing
soil on their downward flow which they brought along from the eroded mountains, the
lands along their path, and dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private
respondents'] land.

In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is
true that the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants'
[private respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an accretion from the action of
the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the Bureau of Lands found
out, as shown in the following report of the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco,
to wit:
'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11, 1960, it
was found out that the said land is x x x sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers x x x These
two rivers bring down considerable amount of soil and sediments during floods every
year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private property of the applicant
[private respondents]. About four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land
whereon are planted palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of these
two rivers that has caused the formation of said land x x x subject of this registration
case. It has been formed, therefore, by accretion. And having been formed by accretion,
the said land may be considered the private property of the riparian owner who is the
applicant herein [private respondents'] x x x .

In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be withdrawn,
except for the portion recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May 2,
1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. x x x'
  Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of
Lands withdrew his opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited 'the same to the
northern portion of the land applied for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide along the
Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part of the foreshore' x x x.” [8]
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of
the corresponding decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the
reversion to private respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property
included in Navarro's fishpond permit.

On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited
decision. The Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same
decision. Both motions were opposed by private respondents on January 27, 1979.

On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its
decision, to read, viz:
"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion
included in their fishpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession
of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said portion is not within the strip of land
fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern portion of the land subject of the
registration proceedings and which area is more particularly referred to as fifty (50)
meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards
corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181.” x x x[9]
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the
Director of Forestry, an extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for
review of the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of
the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.

Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for
review entitled, "The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals."[10] We, however,
denied the same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been
prematurely filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners'
pending motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.

On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for

reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978.

On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that
the decision dated November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein
petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court
of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.

On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
November 29, 1978 was filed by petitioners' new counsel.

On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners'
request for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.

On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule
52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall
be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the final order or
judgment.

Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably
erred in appreciating the facts of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and
case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.

We find merit in the petition.

The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila
Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea
which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees
planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948.

Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, private respondents
vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint
action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and
western boundaries, respectively, of private respondents' own tract of land.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river;
and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
[11]
 Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil
deposited on the estate fronting the river bank;[12] the owner of such estate is called the
riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the
latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.
[13]
 The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by
the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen[14] but is not
automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.[15]

Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of
accretion, is misplaced.

First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary
to be Manila Bay. Private respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the
Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, private respondents
insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the private respondents,
Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the
disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and
bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise.[16]

Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) private
respondents' own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers. Private respondents' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in
front of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948,
there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or
both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on
either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of private respondents' own tract of
land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly
lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on
the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.

Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private respondents' own tract of land
adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already
settled as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we
held that:

  "Appellant next contends that x x x Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find
said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:

'Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the
entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing
of the shore of the sea or of a lake.' 7 C.J. 1013-1014."[17]
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what
used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respindents' own tract of
land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code
but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the
facts of the case. As the trial court correctly observed:

"A perusal of the survey plan x x x of the land subject matter of these cases shows that on
the eastern side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the western side by
Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by Manila Bay.
It is not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion
because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay River is straight while
the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and there is no portion where the two rivers
meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property
belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion [caused by the action of the two
rivers].

Applicant Pascual x x x has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he
has applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his registered land of soil,
earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the
action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where the accretion must
have been caused by action of the bay."[18]

The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing observation is that
the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public
domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own
land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the
disputed land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two rivers because private
respondents' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and that the
current of the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay
which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are
fatally incongruous in the light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was
deposited, not on either the eastern or western portion of private respondents' land where
a river each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila
Bay. Worse, such conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic and consonance
with natural experience in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted
palapat and bakawan trees on the northern boundary of their own land. In amplification
of this, plainly more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in
his dissenting opinion when he stated that:
    "As appellants' (titled) land x x x acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to
meet, and considering the wide expanse of the boundary between said land and the
Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters x x x it is believed rather farfetched for the
land in question to have been formed through 'sediments of sand and salt [sic] . . .
deposited at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the flow of the two rivers is
downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their
mouths,' why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the
northern portion of appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the
mouths and banks of these two rivers? That being the case, the accretion formed at said
portion of appellants' titled [land] was not caused by the current of the two rivers but by
the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.

The conclusion x x x is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the
contrary, shows that the disputed land was formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less
than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original applicant, testified on cross-
examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore and it was only in 1948 that he
noticed that the land was beginning to get higher after he had planted trees thereon in
1948. x x x

x x x it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide could
reach as far as the dike of appellants' fishpond within their titled property, which dike
now separates this titled property from the land in question. Even in 1948 when
appellants had already planted palapat and bakawan trees in the land involved, inasmuch
as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still reach the dike. This must be
so because in x x x the survey plan of the titled property approved in 1918, said titled
land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the
north. It was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question
began to rise or to get higher in elevation.

The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and at
the same time a kind of block to the strained sediments from being carried back to the sea
by the very waves that brought them to the former shore at the end of the dike, which
must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore
leading to the formation of the land in question."[19]

In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and
bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the
drying up of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila
Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern boundary of private
respondents' own tract of land.
  The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm
of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, part of the public domain.

At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.

While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano[20] that Manila
Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion is to be
applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as accretions on lands
adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.

In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose, [21] Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[22] Republic v. Alagad[23], and Meneses v. Court of Appeals,[24] we
categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the mandate
of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land
contiguous thereto.

The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the
foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

    "Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of
the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be
the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of
the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which,
for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the
herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation
belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due
form by a competent authority."[25] Only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained
by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause
of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.[26] Petitioners utterly
fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the
disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be
the property of private respondents as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.

The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in CA G.R. No.
59044-R dated November 29, 1978 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
resolution dated November 21, 1980 and March 28, 1982, respectively, promulgated by
the Intermediate Appellate Court are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch 1,
Balanga, Bataan, is hereby ORDERED REINSTATED.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 116290, December 08, 2000 ]
DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS AND LEONOR LOZANO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision dated June 30, 1994 of the Court of Appeals affirming
the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No.
555-89, of petitioner's complaint for recovery of possession with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No. 415, a 146,900 square
meter agricultural land situated in Ma-a, Davao City under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-15757 particularly described as follows:

...Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. 419 and 416; on the SE by the Davao River; on the
SE., (sic) by Lots Nos. 1092 and 1091; and on the NW., by Lots Nos. 413 and 418... [1]

Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land located across and
opposite the southeast portion of petitioner's lot facing the Davao River.  Lozano acquired
and occupied her property in 1962 when his wife inherited the land from her father who
died that year.

On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint[2] for Recovery of Possession with

Mandatory Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for:  (1) the
surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162 square
meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-
15757; and (2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which
Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed her property.  Bagaipo contended
that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her property became divided into
three lots, namely:  Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C.

In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the
trial court a survey plan[3] prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno.  The
survey plan allegedly showed that: a) the area presently occupied by Bagaipo, identified
as Lot 415-A, now had an area of only 79,843 square meters; b) Lot 415-B, with an area
measuring 37,901 square meters, which cut across Bagaipo's land was taken up by the
new course of the Davao River; and c) an area of 29,162 square meters designated as Lot
415-C was illegally occupied by respondent Lozano.  The combined area of the lots
described by Engineer Magno in the survey plan tallied with the technical description of
Bagaipo's land under TCT No. T-15757. Magno concluded that the land presently located
across the river and parallel to Bagaipo's property still belonged to the latter and not to
Lozano, who planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old abandoned
river bed.

Bagaipo also presented Godofredo Corias, a former barangay captain and long-time
resident of Ma-a to prove her claim that the Davao River had indeed changed its course. 
Corias testified that the occurrence was caused by a big flood in 1968 and a bamboo
grove which used to indicate the position of the river was washed away.  The river which
flowed previously in front of a chapel located 15 meters away from the riverbank within
Bagaipo's property now flowed behind it.  Corias was also present when Magno
conducted the relocation survey in 1988.

For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to
their titled property.  He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that
the reduction in Bagaipo's domain was caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the
Davao River.  Lozano added that it is also because of the river's natural action that silt
slowly deposited and added to his land over a long period of time.  He further averred
that this accretion continues up to the present and that registration proceedings instituted
by him over the alluvial formation could not be concluded precisely because it continued
to increase in size.
Lozano presented three witnesses: Atty. Pedro Castillo, his brother-in-law; Cabitunga
Pasanday, a tenant of Atty. Castillo; and Alamin Catucag, a tenant of the Lozanos.

Atty. Castillo testified that the land occupied by the Lozanos was transferred to his sister,
Ramona when they extra-judicially partitioned their parents' property upon his father's
death.  On September 9, 1973, Atty. Castillo filed a land registration case involving the
accretion which formed on the property and submitted for this purpose, a survey
plan[4] approved by the Bureau of Lands as well as tax declarations[5] covering the said
accretion.  An Order of General Default[6] was already issued in the land registration case
on November 5, 1975, but the case itself remained pending since the petition had to be
amended to include the continuing addition to the land area.

Mr. Cabitunga Pasanday testified that he has continuously worked on the land as tenant
of the Castillos since 1925, tilling an area of about 3 hectares.  However, the land he
tilled located opposite the land of the Lozanos and adjacent to the Davao River has
decreased over the years to its present size of about 1 hectare. He said the soil on the
bank of the river, as well as coconut trees he planted would be carried away each time
there was a flood.  This similar erosion occurs on the properties of Bagaipo and a certain
Dr. Rodriguez, since the elevation of the riverbank on their properties is higher than the
elevation on Lozano's side.

Alamin Catucag testified that he has been a tenant of the Castillos since 1939 and that the
portion he occupies was given to Ramona, Lozano's wife.  It was only 1 hectare in 1939
but has increased to 3 hectares due to soil deposits from the mountains and river. Catucag
said that Bagaipo's property was reduced to half since it is in the curve of the river and its
soil erodes and gets carried away by river water.

On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection.  It concluded that the
applicable law is Article 457[7]. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.7 of the New Civil Code and not Art. 461[8] The reduction in the land area of
plaintiff was caused by erosion and not by a change in course of the Davao River.
Conformably then, the trial court dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and decreed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
plaintiff-appellant.[9]

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in:

....NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE RELOCATION SURVEY (EXHIBIT
"B") PREPARED BY LICENSED GEODETIC ENGINEER GERSACIO MAGNO. 
THE CASE OF "DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. HEIRS OF JUANA CAROLINA" 140
SCRA 396 CITED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT IN DISREGARDING EXHIBIT
"B" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

....NOT FINDING THAT ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE

QUESTIONED LOT 415-C (EXHIBIT "B-1") OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT
LEONOR LOZANO WAS THE RESULT OF AN ACCRETION, THE PRINCIPLE OF
ACCRETION CANNOT AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE TO
FAVOR SAID RESPONDENT BECAUSE SAID LOT 415-C IS WITHIN AND FORM
PART OF PETITIONER'S LAND DESCRIBED IN TCT NO. 15757 (EXHIBIT "A")

....FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES WHEN SHE INSTITUTED THE

SUIT.

....NOT ORDERING RESPONDENT LEONOR LOZANO TO VACATE AND

SURRENDER LOT 415-C IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER AND FOR HIM TO PAY
PETITIONER DAMAGES FOR ITS UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION THEREOF.

....NOT HOLDING PETITIONER ENTITLED TO THE ABANDONED RIVER BED.

[10]

For this Court's resolution are the following issues: Did the trial court err in holding that
there was no change in course of the Davao River such that petitioner owns the
abandoned river bed pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code?  Did private respondent
own Lot 415-C in accordance with the principle of accretion under Article 457?  Should
the relocation survey prepared by a licensed geodetic engineer be disregarded since it was
not approved by the Director of Lands?  Is petitioner's claim barred by laches?

On the first issue.  The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in
land area was brought about by erosion and not a change in the river's course.  This
conclusion was reached after the trial judge observed during ocular inspection that the
banks located on petitioner's land are sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land
on the other side of the river.  Additionally, the riverbank on respondent's side is lower
and gently sloping.  The lower land therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried
by the river current.[11] These findings are factual, thus conclusive on this Court, unless
there are strong and exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported by the evidence on
record, or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[12] These factual
findings are based on an ocular inspection of the judge and convincing testimonies, and
we find no convincing reason to disregard or disbelieve them.

The decrease in petitioner's land area and the corresponding expansion of respondent's
property were the combined effect of erosion and accretion respectively.  Art. 461 of the
Civil Code is inapplicable.  Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned
riverbed because the same is inexistent.  The riverbed's former location cannot even be
pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place gradually
over an unspecified period of time, up to the present.

The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following
requisites are present:  1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it
resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and 3) That the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.[13] These requisites were sufficiently
proven in favor of respondents.  In the absence of evidence that the change in the course
of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the
change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion. [14]

As to Lot 415-C, which petitioner insists forms part of her property under TCT No. T-
15757, it is well to recall our holding in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, 135:

... The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiff's estate, which is
covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the
owner thereof.  Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of
the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. 
Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current
become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; Art. 457
of the new).  Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams
and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land
Registration Act.[15]

Petitioner did not demonstrate that Lot 415-C allegedly comprising 29,162 square meters
was within the boundaries of her titled property. The survey plan commissioned by
petitioner which was not approved by the Director of Lands was properly discounted by
the appellate court.  In Titong vs. Court of Appeals[16] we affirmed the trial court's refusal
to give probative value to a private survey plan and held thus:

...the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec.
28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No.
2711.  Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes,
computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the
Bureau of Lands for verification and approval.  A survey plan not verified and approved
by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity
of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 
The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to its
due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value
therefor.  To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to
each other...

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary now to discuss the defense of laches.  It
is mooted by the disquisition on the foregoing issues.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated June 30, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G. R. CV No. 37615, sustaining the judgment of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED. 
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 146616, August 31, 2006 ]
SIAIN ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC.,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed on September 18, 1973 a

foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots registered in
its name, located in Loboc, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City, including Lot 3309. It eventually
withdrew the application and filed on March 1976 a petition for registration over the
same foreshore land with the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The case was,
however, archived as WESVICO's representative could no longer be contacted.

It appears that WESVICO ceased to hold operations and its properties including Lot 3309
were foreclosed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which later
consolidated its ownership thereon.[1]

On July 7, 1983, F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City,
District Land Office VI-1 a foreshore lease application [2] over a foreshore land, a portion
of which is adjacent to Lot 3309. The application was docketed as FLA (VI-1) 176.
In the preliminary investigation report [3] on F.F. Cruz' FLA (VI-1) 176, Senior Special
Investigator Ramon Torre who personally visited and examined the land applied for
recommended that the application be given due course.

District Land Officer Norberto Bernas thereafter submitted to the Director of Lands a
report,[4] together with relevant documents including the preliminary investigation
report. The pertinent portion of Bernas' report reads:
. . . I personally visited the area applied for by the herein applicant and found that
the same is actually occupied and used by them as a sanctuary of their marine
equipment which they are using in their construction work of the Iloilo Port. The
applicant has also introduced some facilities on the area applied for in the repair and
maintenance of said
equipment. A portion of the land applied for has already been filled up by the applican
t as they are in need of a land area for the repair and maintenance of their equipment
and in the loading and unloading of materials that they use in the construction of the
Iloilo City Port.

x x x x[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner Siain Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN), who purchased from the DBP the
properties previously owned by WESVICO including Lot 3309, [6] filed on September 29,
1986 a foreshore lease application [7] over the foreshore land adjacent to the properties
it bought from DBP.

Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz's
foreshore lease application overlapped that covered by its foreshore lease application,
SIAIN filed on January 9, 1987 a protest[8] alleging that it being the owner of the property
adjoining the overlapping area, it should be given preference in its lease.

On March 6, 1987, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Iloilo City, by Resolution No. 174,

[9]
 approved the recommendation of its Committee on Finance that "for the mutual
interest" of F.F. Cruz and SIAIN, SIAIN would get 70 linear meters and F.F. Cruz would get
60 linear meters of the disputed area, in light of its finding that, among other things,
both SIAIN and F.F. Cruz would "contribute substantially to the economic growth of the
City of Iloilo."
Concurring with the Sangguniang Panglungsod, the Land Management Bureau (LMB)
through its Director, by Order[10] of July 15, 1989, dismissed SIAIN's protest in this wise:
. . . While it cannot be denied that protestant is now the registered owner of the
property adjoining the foreshore in question, the disputed foreshore cannot be
considered to have been built or formed by means of accretion but is a  reclaimed land
made by respondent F.F. Cruz and Company for the purpose of utilizing the same in the
loading and unloading of their equipment and materials and for the repair and
maintenance of said equipment which respondents use in the reclamation of the Iloilo
City Port. This is supported by the findings of the District Land Officer Norberto Bernas
who, in his letter dated February 18, 1984 to this Office, reported that he personally
visited the foreshore in question and found that the same is  now actually occupied and
used by the respondent company as a sanctuary  of its marine equipment which it is
using in its construction work of the Iloilo City Port and that  a portion of the land
applied for has already been filled up by the applicant to be utilized in the repair and
maintenance of its equipment and in the loading and unloading of materials it uses in
the construction of the Iloilo City Port. It is therefore clear that the foreshore in question
is neither an accretion nor an accessory to protestants' property. While protestant SEI
appears to be owner of the property adjacent to the disputed foreshore, it cannot be
considered as a riparian owner within the contemplation of the aforementioned law.
[11]
 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the LMB disposed:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the protest of SIAIN Enterprises, Inc. be, as it
hereby it is, dismissed and this case, dropped from the records. Both Foreshore Lease
Application Nos. (VI-5) 220 and (VI-1) 176 of SIAIN Enterprises, Inc. and F.F. Cruz and
Co., Inc. respectively, shall be amended in such a way that SIAIN's application shall cover
SEVENTY (70) linear meters of the disputed foreshore adjoining Lot 3309 while F.F.
Cruz's application shall cover SIXTY (60) linear meters thereof. Accordingly, both
applications shall be give due course in accordance with the provisions of the Public
Land Law, otherwise known as Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
[12]
 (Underscoring supplied)
SIAIN appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), arguing that the LMB:

1. . . . made [a] false assumption of fact when it considered the foreshore area
under . . . controversy as reclaimed land;
 2. . . . committed a grave error in not considering the preferential right of the
riparian owner/littoral owner, . . . to apply for a lease over the foreshore under
controversy; [and]

3. . . . erred in awarding sixty (60) linear meters of the foreshore under controversy
to [F.F. Cruz].[13]

By Decision[14] of May 6, 1997, then DENR Acting Secretary Antonio G.M. La Viña set
aside the LMB Order, the pertinent portions of which decision read:
It is blatant error to consider the contested area as reclaimed land as it has no
basis in fact, in law and jurisprudence.

The area in question is unquestionably a natural foreshore for which various

applicants prior to the herein parties have applied. CRUZ's F.L.A. No. (VI-1) 176 itself
which was filed on July 7, 1983, long after it had allegedly filled up the area undeniably
shows CRUZ's admission that it is a foreshore and not something else.

The assumption that the contested area is a reclaimed land runs smack against the
provision of Article 5 of the Spanish Law on Waters of August 3, 1866 stating that:
"Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State,
or by provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms
of the grant of authority."
We cannot find in the records anything to show that a "permission" was ever
sought by or granted to, CRUZ for the alleged reclamation of the land in question.

x x x x

It is by reason of the Director of Lands' erroneous classification of the contested area

as "reclaimed" that he awarded 60 linear meters thereof to CRUZ. However, as
heretofore discussed, the said area in question is clearly a natural foreshore and SIAIN
is correct in claiming it to be so. Hence, the law that applies in this case is Section 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 which was issued by the Secretary of the then
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources . . .

x x x x
It is an undisputed fact that SIAIN is the registered owner of the land adjoining the
foreshore area in controversy. Hence SIAIN is the riparian/littoral owner insofar as the
contested foreshore area is concerned and should  enjoy the preferential right to lease
the entire one hundred thirty (130) linear meters of said area adjoining its property,
which includes the sixty (60) linear meters thereof awarded to CRUZ in the questioned
Order.

x x x x[15] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied)

The DENR Acting Secretary thus ordered that the application of F.F. Cruz be
amended to exclude the disputed foreshore area adjacent to Lot 3309 and that SIAN's
application be given due course.

F.F. Cruz appealed to the Office of the President, contending that the DENR Acting
Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion:

I. IN DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS MANAGEMENT

BUREAU THAT THE CONTROVERTED AREA IS A RECLAIMED LAND UNDERTAKEN
BY APPELLANT F.F. CRUZ . . .

II. IN RULING THAT [SIAIN] HAS A PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE; [and]

III. IN ISSUING THE SUBJECT DECISION CONSIDERING THAT HE IS NOT EMPOWERED

BY LAW OR RULE TO ISSUE THE SAME.[16]

By Decision[17] of March 12, 1999, the Office of the President, through then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, reversed the decision of the DENR Acting Secretary and
reinstated that of the LMB in this wise:
Records reveal that WESVICO, who may be considered as the real riparian
owner, had previously availed itself of the preferential right to apply for the foreshore
area adjacent to its property. However, it withdrew its application, and instead sought
the titling of said property via a petition for registration filed with the court, which
eventually archived the case for petitioner's lack of interest. In net effect, WESVICO's
preferential right adverted to, albeit initially pursued, was thereafter abandoned due
to its voluntary withdrawal of the corresponding application and its erroneous resort
to some other mode of acquisition, i.e., the filing of a petition for
registration. Consequent to such abandonment, it may be said that WESVICO had
already waived its preferential right over the controverted area at the time SIAIN
purchased the adjacent property. As vendee, SIAIN was subrogated not only to the
rights and actions of its predecessor-in-interest, WESVICO, but also to the
absence/lack of those.

Also decidedly going for CRUZ is the fact that it applied for the disputed area, occupied
the same and introduced improvements thereon long before SIAIN filed its own lease
application. Subject to certain exceptions, it is axiomatic in public land grant that he
who is first in time is preferred or stronger in law – Priore in tempore, potior jure.

It may be, as stated by the DENR, that the contested area abuts upon the titled property
of SIAIN, a circumstance which ordinarily would accord that firm a preferential right to
lease the property in question, the rule being that a riparian/littoral owner enjoys
preference over the abutting foreshore lands formed by accretion or alluvial deposits.

x x x x

. . . The principle thus enunciated in Santulan  properly applies where the adjoining lot is
a natural foreshore, meaning that the foreshore was formed by what may rightfully be
considered as accretion, or the settling down, by natural causes, of soil, earth and other
deposits. But such is not what it obtains in this case, contrary to the bare assertion of
the DENR Acting Secretary that the "area in question is unquestionably a natural
foreshore." . . .

x x x x

Not being the product of accretion, the disputed strip of foreshore land cannot be the
proper subject of a riparian or littoral claim.

x x x x

The actuality of the DENR not formally granting CRUZ a permit to undertake reclamation
works on the disputed area can be conceded. But in the light of the Bernas report, . . .
there can be no quibbling that CRUZ occupied and raised, thru filling, the area to its
present level, with the implicit consent, if not approval, of lands authorities. That
consent and/or approval have been given may be deduced from the fact that the
Bureau of Lands required the payment of, and received from appellant, the amount of
P40,032.00 as occupation fee. Any suggestion that CRUZ, after paying the occupational
fee, merely planted itself on the disputed area without as much as dredging and filling
the same is unacceptable. In a very real sense, therefore, the reclamation work
undertaken by CRUZ was with the proper permission, or at least the acquiescence of the
Bureau of Lands, the agency which, following Insular Government v. Aldecoa (19 Phil.
505), is empowered to grant such permit in behalf of the DENR Secretary. [18] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In its petition for review before the Court of Appeals, SIAIN raised the issues of 1)
whether the disputed area is reclaimed land or foreshore land and if found to be
foreshore land, 2) whether SIAIN has preferential right to lease the same. [19]

By Decision of July 3, 2000,[20] the appellate court dismissed SIAIN's petition, ruling that
there is no justification to digress from the findings and conclusions of the Office of the
President and the LMB and that administrative matters within the executive jurisdiction
can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

Hence, the present petition for review filed by SIAIN.

SIAIN contends that the evidence overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area is
foreshore land and not reclaimed land as found by the Office of the President. It invites
attention to F.F. Cruz's own declaration in its foreshore lease application that the
disputed area is a "parcel of foreshore land." To SIAIN, this declaration is equivalent to a
judicial admission which does not require proof and is conclusive as to it.

Further, SIAIN argues that the records reveal that the only evidence relied upon by the
Office of the President is the Bernas report which speaks of a portion allegedly filled-up
by F.F. Cruz, the identity, location and size of which were never established; and that
there is no evidence to prove that the filled-up portion is one and the same as the
disputed area, but that even assuming that it is, F.F. Cruz cannot have a better right over
it as the reclamation was made without the necessary permit, hence, it cannot be
allowed to benefit from its own wrongdoing.
Furthermore, SIAIN contends that there can be no waiver of preferential right over the
disputed property, no advice from the Director of Lands having been communicated to
WESVICO, DBP or SIAIN of their preferential right to lease the adjacent foreshore land,
and therefore, the 60 days within which they are supposed to apply [21] has not begun to
run.

The key to the present controversy lies in the classification of the disputed area.

The DENR Secretary found that the disputed area is a "natural foreshore," hence, it
concluded that SIAIN, being a littoral owner (owner of land bordering the sea or lake or
other tidal waters[22]), has preferential right to lease it as provided in paragraph 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936 which reads:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore

lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable
lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his
property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and
regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefore
within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the
Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.[23] (Emphasis supplied)

The DENR Secretary found the LMB's classification of the disputed area as "reclaimed"
erroneous for lack of basis in fact, law and jurisprudence.

On the other hand, while the Office of the President recognized the preferential right of
littoral owner WESVICO, it held that it had waived its preferential right and SIAIN, as
successor-in-interest, was subrogated to WESVICO's right or lack of it.

The Office of the President went on to hold that since the disputed area is already
reclaimed land, it cannot be subject to littoral claim, SIAIN, not being the littoral owner
within the contemplation of the law, citing Santulan v. The Executive Secretary [24] which
elucidated on the principal reason for giving a riparian or littoral owner preferential
right, thus:
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the
preferential right to leasethe foreshore land abutting on his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial
deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands,
when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast
guard service," shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners
of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral (riparian
according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial
deposits due to the action of the sea.

The reason for the preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions
to the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the
destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the
encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession .[25] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Furthermore, as reflected above, the Office of the President, finding that F.F.
Cruz's occupation and introduction of improvements on the contested area long before
SIAIN filed its lease application, held that "it is axiomatic in public land grant that he who
is first in time is preferred or stronger in law."

The petition is impressed with merit.

That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of
foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.

It bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought the disputed foreshore area
into existence. Such foreshore area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its
reclamation. It was "formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the
sea." Following Santulan, the littoral owner has preferential right to lease the same.

Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President, as affirmed by the appellate court,
littoral owner WESVICO cannot be considered to have waived or abandoned its
preferential right to lease the disputed area when it subsequently filed an application
for registration thereover. For being a part of the public domain, ownership of the area
could not be acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential right remained, however. Its move
to have the contested land titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in fact more than proves
its interest to utilize it.

As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO's petition for registration which, as stated
earlier, was archived by the trial court, pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO would
not have been barred from filing anew a foreshore lease application. Parenthetically,
the petition for registration of WESVICO was archived not on account of lack of interest
but because it ceased operations due to financial reasons.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 3, 2000 is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE.

The May 6, 1997 Decision of then Acting Secretary Antonio G.M. La Viña of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 168800, April 16, 2009 ]
NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. TEOFILO VICTOR
TANJUATCO, JR., AND VICENTE CUEVAS,* RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

Petitioner through counsel prays for the reversal of the Orders dated February
12, 2005[1] and July 1, 2005[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch
37, in Civil Case No. 2662-98-C.  The RTC had granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
respondent Tanjuatco, and then denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint [3] for Rescission/Declaration
of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and
the Register of Deeds of Calamba before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 37.  NRSI
alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to
apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of
accretion.  Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying P82,400.38 to
the Bureau of Lands.  On January 2, 1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust
Agreement[4] over their shares of stock in the corporation.  Then, pending approval of
the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the
sum of P85,000.[5]  On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands released an Order, [6] which
approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-369406[7] and T-369407[8] were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,[9] Tanjuatco advanced the affirmative defense that the
complaint stated no cause of action against him.  According to Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas
who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation.  He averred further that the
complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and
NRSI.

Upon Tanjuatco's motion, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defense, but denied the motion to dismiss, and ordered petitioner to amend
its complaint and implead Cuevas as a defendant. [10]

Summons was served on respondent Cuevas through publication, [11] but he was later
declared in default for failure to file an answer. [12]

After NRSI completed presenting evidence, Tanjuatco filed a Demurrer to Evidence,

[13]
 which the RTC granted in an Order dated February 12, 2005.  In dismissing NRSI's
complaint,[14] the RTC cited the Order of the Director of Lands and certain insufficiencies
in the allegations in the complaint.  The trial court further held that Tanjuatco is an
innocent purchaser for value.

NRSI moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
July 1, 2005, thus:
 WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff on May 3, 2005
is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence, NRSI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE

COMPLAINT MAY BE USED AS A BASIS TO DISMISS THE SAME BY WAY OF A DEMURRER
TO EVIDENCE;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT A COMPLAINT MAY BE DISMISSED ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

BASED ON A DOCUMENT NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED, MARKED AND OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE.[16]
In a nutshell, the issue for our determination is whether the trial court erred in
dismissing the case on demurrer to evidence.

NRSI argues that the supposed insufficiency of allegations in the complaint did not
justify its dismissal on demurrer to evidence. It contends that a dismissal on demurrer to
evidence should be grounded on insufficiency of evidence presented at trial.  NRSI
contends that the sufficiency of its allegations was affirmed when the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss.  It likewise asserts that the RTC erred in declaring Tanjuatco a
buyer in good faith.  It stressed that the Order of the Director of Lands, as the basis for
such finding, was not formally offered in evidence.  Hence, it should not have been
considered by the trial court in accordance with Section 34, [17] Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.

Tanjuatco, for his part, maintains that NRSI failed to make a case for reconveyance
against him.  He insists that the complaint stated no cause of action, and the evidence
presented established, rather than refuted, that he was an innocent purchaser. 
Tanjuatco adds that the RTC's denial of the motion to dismiss, and admission of
evidence negated NRSI's claim that it relied on the complaint alone to decide the case.  
Lastly, Tanjuatco argues that the Order of the Director of Lands was a matter of judicial
notice.  Thus, under Section 1,[18] Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, there was no need to
identify, mark, and offer it in evidence.

After serious consideration, we find the instant petition utterly without merit.

In its petition, NRSI questions the trial court's dismissal of its complaint upon a demurrer
to evidence and invites a calibration of the evidence on record to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the trial court's order.  This factual analysis, however,
would involve questions of fact which are improper in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.  It is well established that in an appeal by certiorari, only
questions of law may be reviewed. [19]  A question of law exists when there is doubt or
difference as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.  A question of fact exists if the
doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [20]  There is a question of law
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. [21]  Otherwise, there is a
question of fact.  Since it raises essentially questions of fact, the instant petition must be
denied.

In any event, we find that based on the examination of the evidence at hand, we are in
agreement that the trial court correctly dismissed NRSI's complaint on demurrer to
evidence.

Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity of contract,

reconveyance and damages against respondents. An action for reconveyance is one that
seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal
owner.[22]  In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is respected as
incontrovertible.  What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, specifically the
title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's
name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. [23]

To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or dominical right
over the land registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in
the name of the defendant was procured through fraud [24] or other illegal means;[25] (3)
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; [26] and (4) the action
is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible [27] but
within four years from the discovery of the fraud, [28] or not later than 10 years in the
case of an implied trust.[29]  Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.

Primarily, NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of
accretion.  It submitted in evidence, titles[30] to four parcels of land, which allegedly
adjoin the lots in the name of Tanjuatco.

But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article
457[31] of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers. [32]  Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order
to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by
preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law.  Petitioner
has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has
satisfied the foregoing requisites.

Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.  Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, [33] which
under Article 502 (1)[34] of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion.  The
Certification[35] issued by Forester III Emiliano S. Leviste confirms that said lands were
verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable Project No. 11-B of Calamba, Laguna
per BFD LC Map No. 3004, certified and declared as such on September 28, 1981.  
Clearly, the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to
respondent.

Next, petitioner sought to establish fraudulent registration of the land in the name of
Tanjuatco.  NRSI presented before the trial court a copy of the Voting Trust Agreement
which the spouses Cuevas executed in favor of Pauline Co. However, nothing in said
agreement indicates that NRSI empowered Cuevas to apply for the registration of the
subject lots on its behalf.
Neither did petitioner adduce evidence to prove that Cuevas was its President and
Chairman.  Even assuming that Cuevas was the president of NRSI, his powers are
confined only to those vested upon him by the board of directors or fixed in the by-laws.
[36]
  In truth, petitioner could have easily presented its by-laws or a corporate
resolution[37] to show Cuevas's authority to buy the lands on its behalf. But it did not.

Petitioner disagrees with the trial court's finding that Tanjuatco was a buyer in good
faith.  It contends that the March 12, 1996 Order of the Director of Lands which
declared that the lots covered by TCT Nos. T-369406 and T-369407 were free from
claims and conflicts when Cuevas assigned his rights thereon to Tanjuatco.  But
petitioner's claim is untenable because respondents did not formally offer said order in
evidence.  Lastly, petitioner makes an issue regarding the "below-fair market value"
consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the assignment of his rights to the lots. 
But it draws unconvincing conclusions therefrom that do not serve to persuade us of its
claims.

We note that Tanjuatco filed a demurrer to evidence before the RTC.  By its nature, a
demurrer to evidence is filed after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence but before the defendant offers evidence in his defense.  Thus, the Rules
provide that if the defendant's motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence.  However, if the defendant's motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
[38]
  It is understandable, therefore, why the respondent was unable to formally offer in
evidence the Order of the Director of Lands, or any evidence for that matter.

More importantly, petitioner introduced in evidence TCT Nos. T-369406 and T-369407 in
the name of respondent Tanjuatco. These titles bear a certification that Tanjuatco's
titles were derived from OCT No. 245 in the name of no less than the Republic of the
Philippines.  Hence, we cannot validly and fairly rule that in relying upon said title,
Tanjuatco acted in bad faith.  A person dealing with registered land may safely rely upon
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way
oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. [39] 
This applies even more particularly when the seller happens to be the Republic, against
which, no improper motive can be ascribed.  The law, no doubt, considers Tanjuatco an
innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the
property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in
such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or
before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. [40]

As regards the consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the assignment of rights
to the lands, suffice it to state that the assignment merely vested upon Tanjuatco all of
Cuevas's intangible claims, rights and interests over the properties and not the
properties themselves.  At the time of the assignment, the lots were still the subjects of
a pending sales application before the Bureau of Lands. For, it was not until May 24,
1996, that titles were issued in Tanjuatco's name.  The assignment not being a sale of
real property, it was not surprising that Cuevas demanded from Tanjuatco only P85,000
for the transfer of rights.

From all the foregoing, it is plain and apparent that NRSI failed to substantiate its claim
of entitlement to ownership of the lands in Tanjuatco's name.  The trial court, therefore,
correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint for reconveyance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Orders dated February 12, 2005 and July 1,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 2662-98-C
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010 ]
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE
CITY ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY
ENGINEER OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY
CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY
VITALEZ, PARAÑAQUE CITY, TERESITA A. GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R.
ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M. ARGOTE,
CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES,
ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, AND MYRNA P. ROSALES,
PETITIONERS, VS. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS
 NAMELY, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO,
LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, AND ARNEL V. EBIO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision[1] and June 8, 2007
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA had reversed the Order [3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No.
05-0155.

Below are the facts.

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406
square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez,
Parañaque City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of
respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents
assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great
grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez.
From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In
1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy,[4] Pedro was able
to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name.[5] Since then, respondents
have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property.[6]

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro's daughter, Zenaida. Upon
Pedro's advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in
October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office
for the construction of their house within the said compound.[7] On April 21, 1987, Pedro
executed a notarized Transfer of Rights[8] ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land
in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro's name were
cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio's name.[9]

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed

Resolution No. 08, series of 1999[10] seeking assistance from the City Government of
Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said
barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters
long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound[11] traversing the
lot occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised all the affected
residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition
thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended. [12]

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the
barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on
the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Office of the
Vice Mayor.[13] On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting
to discuss the construction of the proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted
their opposition to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over the affected
property.[14] On November 14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with officials
from the city government, but no definite agreement was reached by and among the
parties.[15]

On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted
from the said property.[16] Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the City
Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim over the subject property and expressing
intent for a further dialogue.[17] The request remained unheeded.

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21,
2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.[18] In the course
of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending
application for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).[19]

On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[20] denying the petition for lack of merit. The
trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an
established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation
of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they
failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. [21]

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31,
2007, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents. According to
the Court of Appeals--

The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands adjoining
Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion
beside RL 8.

The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of 291
square meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-62176. The
same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City
Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966 and which was accepted by the then Mayor
FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence however, when RL 8
has been intended as a road lot.

On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the
accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of
declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The property then became the subject of
Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor
had been paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and
1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for the
subject property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the
accreted property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.

Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary
evidence, it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the accreted
property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached.
However, this is without the application of the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant case.

xxxx

The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which
[was] duly proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants together with
their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of
the subject property and starting 1964 had introduced improvements thereon as evidenced
by their construction permits. Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,]
Appellants have acquired ownership of the property in question since 1930 even if the
adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. x x x.

xxxx

Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8 registered in
its name, which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO VITALEZ occupied the
adjoining accreted property in 1930. x x x.

xxxx

We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants which
bolster their right over the subject property. x x x.
xxxx

In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply proven their
right over the property in question.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The

challenged Order of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[22]

On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A
RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE[;]

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS
AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITH
THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE

COMPLAINT ... FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT. [23]

The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State is an
indispensable party to respondents' action for prohibitory injunction; and substantively,
whether the character of respondents' possession and occupation of the subject property
entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

The petition is without merit.

An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance

of an act.[24] It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which
cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an independent action or proceeding.
Moreover, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory
or mandatory injunction may issue.[25]

In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local
government of Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road
that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of
acquisitive prescription.

Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified
as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time
should also be considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should have
included the State as it is an indispensable party to the action.

We do not agree.

It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that
have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that
governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, which remains in effect,[26] in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over

alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the
owners of such lands.[27]

Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks
of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically
belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.[28]

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter

how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against
the State regarding property of public domain.[29] Even a city or municipality cannot
acquire them by prescription as against the State.[30]

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,[31] the land which is
formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does
not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a
final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed
without their presence.[32] In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the
proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest is
separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. [33]

In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of
Parañaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The
State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no positive act
shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the
case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be
divested nor any of its rights infringed.

We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the
contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.

A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right.[34] A party seeking to avail of an

injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or
existing.[35] It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never
arise.[36]

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had
occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio
secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their
family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and
occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes.
Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of
Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8
to the local government of Parañaque.

From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one
conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes,
Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to
register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired
ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such
right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be
remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only
the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration
was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership.[37] A decree of registration merely
confirms, but does not confer, ownership.[38]

Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending
before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?
We answer in the negative.

Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through
judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents
admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the property administratively by filing
an application for sales patent.

Respondents' application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or
derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales
patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since
ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon
them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any
authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no
longer a public land.[39]

Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is
equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007
Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against petitioners.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ARCADIO IVAN A.
SANTOS III, AND ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion – the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the
effects of the current of the water – belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the
banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the
dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the
riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot
4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parañaque City.  The property,
which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to
respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River,
in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also
owned by Arcadio Ivan.[1]

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He
alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. [2]

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating
that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within
the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the
property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be
registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard
that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. [3]

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,[4] the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A.

SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE
and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay
of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square
meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of
Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the
registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:

x x x x

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the
Issuance of the Decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, [5] to wit:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES
DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID
PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL
THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN
OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE.

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC. [6]

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
October 20, 2003.[7]

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that: [8]

I
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR
ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS “PREVIOUSLY A
PART OF THE PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP,”
THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT
THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL
TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE
CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH
INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein;
and whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).

Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.

I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457
of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit

Article  457 of the Civil Code provides that “(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
currents of the waters.”

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of
this application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an
orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same
property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him
through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.

Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:

“Article 457.  To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” [9]

The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that “to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters” (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and
Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4
which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the
latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).[10]

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457
of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did
not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.

The Republic’s submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to
establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is
meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in
opposition to it.[11] They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and
apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed,
the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. [12] The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.[13] Accordingly, respondents should establish the
concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for
land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof.  They did not show that
the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of
the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was
the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to
themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was “the land which was previously part of the
Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up.”

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the
original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B
came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River,
the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been
deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of
Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore
that the effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of
land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the
river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both
lower courts herein.  In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the
increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the
effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of
soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had
been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the
span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4
was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not
yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness Rufino  Allanigue
alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only
plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-
up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own
testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque River
that had dried up and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had
been formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot
therein described, was bounded “on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed.” [14] That
boundary line of “SW along line 5-1” corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B,
which was described as “bounded by Lot 4079  Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name
of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast.” [15]

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that
became respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved
the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not
equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the
river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners
had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and
categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to
accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to .
Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there
is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. [16] The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law. [17]

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural
beds are public dominion of the State. [18] It follows that the river beds that dry up, like
Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless
there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some
other person.[19]

II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also
because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the
adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following
ratiocination, viz:[20]

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the
owners thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-
interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank.
Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. “L”) which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a
portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus,
the Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of
the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration
Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds
and so holds that the applicants have  satisfied all the requirements of law which are
essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a
certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are
not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), which pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. —The following persons may file in the proper
[Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide  claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the
following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim
of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. [21]

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents “took possession
of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty
(30) years.”[22]

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be
disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court,
[23]
 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following,
to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in
making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings
are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the
owners thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest
are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. 
Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. “L”) which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC – Chief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a
portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus,
the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be “more

than thirty years” from the fact that “their predecessors in interest are the adjoining
owners of the subject parcel of land.” Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts
respondents had performed showing their possession of the property “continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely” in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that
they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That,
to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of
realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were
paid for,[25] the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of
ownership;[26] and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved was not
itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil
does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are
necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to
belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of
the water becomes manifest[27]  has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot
4998-B was not formed through accretion.  Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent
to the river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession
of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The
admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation
purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 1999 [28] signified that their alleged
possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application for
land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B
for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire
the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land
was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that
declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or

of private ownership.  Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part
of public dominion, namely:  (a) those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.  As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil
Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not
was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,
[29]
 a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the
natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:

As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-
up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession
and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22,
1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of
accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil
Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible
to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which
may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only
to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the
Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that
the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for
purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of
the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public
domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-
up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

x x x x

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code
took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-
in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, “river beds which
are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong
to the owners of the land occupied by the new course,” and the owners of the adjoining
lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are
applicable only when “[r]iver beds are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters.” It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau
of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a
result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration.
Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article

370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands
that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier
finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and,
hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of
the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in

the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is
not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public
dominion.  (Bold emphases supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. [30] No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the
State.[31] Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. [32]
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river
beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso
facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives
to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds
not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of
course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of
public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously
declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-
B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents
could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and
disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and
disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: [33]

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive
Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was “inside” the map
“classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan.
1968” sufficient proof of the property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a
presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of
public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap[34] that:

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.  There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,

report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.  The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable.  Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept
the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006.  Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.” (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic,[35] which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,[36] we

specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient
evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:
 To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read:  “This
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C.
Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,” appearing on
Exhibit “E” (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient.  Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: “All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x.”

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must

overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.  Indeed,
“occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.” To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit

“E” indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation
does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the
land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.  (Emphasis
supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[37]  we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification
by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer
(CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the
following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO.  In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that
the land is alienable and disposable.  Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted

by respondent.  The government officials who issued the certifications were not
presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not
have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. 
Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they
have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

x x x x

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that
Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary.  Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the
facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the
certifications are prima facie  evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but
they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.  (Emphasis
supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on  the survey plan of Lot 4998-B,
Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the “survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t” did not prove that Lot 4998-B was
already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly
assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals

promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro
Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of
the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 30829, August 28, 1929 ]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, APPLICANT AND
APPELLANT, VS. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE ET AL., CLAIMANTS.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, APPELLEE.

DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the Government of the Philippine Islands from a

decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, rendered in cadastral case No. 30, G. L.
R. O. Record No. 359 of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, ordering the
registration of the two parcels of land known as lots 1 and 2 described in the
application, in favor of the Colegio de San Jose in accordance with the provisions of law,
without special pronouncement as to the costs, it being understood, however, that the
lease of said lands executed by the aforesaid Colegio de San Jose in favor of Carlos
Young y Baldwin is valid and subsists under the terms and conditions set forth in the
instruments, Exhibits Y-1 and Y-2, and providing for the issuance of the proper decree
once said decision becomes final.

In support of the appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed
by the court below in its judgment, to wit:

"1. The lower court erred in not holding that the parcels of land in question are part of the
bed of Laguna Lake and, therefore, belong to the public domain.

"2. The lower court erred in finding that said lands are included in the title of the appellee
and in finding that the appellee has been in the possession and occupation of the same.
"3. The lower court erred in qualifying as extraordinary inundations the fact that the lands
in dispute are under water during the rainy season.

"4. The lower court erred in decreeing the registration of the lands in dispute to the
appellee and in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial."

The pertinent facts necessary to decide the questions of fact and of law raised in the
instant appeal, are as follows:

During the months of September, October and November every year, the waters of
Laguna de Bay cover a long strip of land along the eastern border of the two parcels of
land in question, the width of which strip varies from 50 to 70 meters according to the
evidence of the Colegio de San Jose and up to the eastern border of the pass claimed by
the municipality of San Pedro Tunasan, according to some witnesses for the Insular
Government; and, according to other witnesses for the Insular Government, the flooded
strip includes the aforementioned pass itself, which is usually completely covered with
water, so that the people can fish in said flooded strip.

The claimant Colegio de San Jose contends, and its evidence tends to prove, that the
above-named parcels of land are a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging
to said claimant, which has been in possession thereof since time immemorial by means
of its tenants or lessees and farmers.

On the other hand, the Government of the Philippine Islands contends that the said two
parcels of land belong to the public domain, and its evidence tends to prove that they
have always been known as the shores of Laguna de Bay, and they are situated alongside
the highway running parallel to said shore; that the water of the lake has receded a great
distance on that side; that said parcels of land had been under water formerly; that at
present, during the rainy season, the water of the lake reaches the highway, and that when
the water recedes the people of the place occupy and cultivate said lands during the dry
season.

The only question to be decided in the present appeal is whether the two aforesaid parcels
of land in controversy belong to the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan and are owned by
the claimant Colegio de San Jose, or whether they belong to the public domain as a part
of the bed of Laguna de Bay.

It is of primary importance to determine whether the body of water called Laguna de Bay
is naturally and legally a lake or a lagoon.

The Enciclopedia Juridica Española, volume XXI, pages 124 and 125, defines "lake" and
"lagoon" as follows:
"LAKE. A body of water formed in depressions of the earth. Ordinarily fresh water,
coming from rivers, brooks, or springs, and connected with the sea by them"

"LAGOON. A small lake, ordinarily of fresh water, and not very deep, fed by floods, the
hollow bed of which is bounded by elevations of land."

Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh
water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by the
Pasig River. According to the definition just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.

Inasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, we must resort to the legal provisions governing
the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the
character and ownership of the parcels of land in question.

Article 407 of the Civil Code says the following in its pertinent part:

"ART. 407. The following are of public ownership:

*******

"4. Lakes and ponds formed by nature on public lands, and their channels."

*******

And article 44 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:

"ART. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by public waters,
belong to the public domain."

*******

It is beyond discussion that Laguna de Bay belongs to the public domain, being a natural
lake existing upon public lands, and fed by public waters from rivers, brooks and springs.

Now then, what is the bed of Laguna de Bay?

Article 74 of the Law of Waters cited above defines the bed of a lake as follows:

"ART. 74. The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by
their waters when at their highest ordinary depth."

This definition raises the question: Which is the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay?
The evidence shows that during the dry season, that is, during the months of December,
January, February, March, April, May, June, July and August, the water of the lake at its
highest depth reaches no farther than the line forming the northeastern boundary of the
two parcels of land in controversy, and that it is only during the wet season, that is,
during the months of September, October and November, that said water rises to the
highway, completely covering said parcels of land. Therefore, the waters of Laguna de
Bay have two different levels during the year: One during the dry season, which obtains
during nine months, and the other during the wet season, which continues for three
months. Which of these two heights marks the land limit of the waters of Laguna de Bay,
that is, which of them forms its natural bed or basin? The law says, the highest ordinary
depth. Now then, which of the two aforesaid depths of the waters of Laguna de Bay is the
ordinary one? The word "ordinary" is defined in the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy
as follows:

"ORDINARY. Not exceeding the average; common, natural, occurring always or most of
the time; not going beyond what often happens or takes place."

The word extraordinary is defined in the same dictionary as follows:

"EXTRAORDINARY. Uncommon, transcending the general rule, order, or measure;

exceeding, surpassing, or going beyond that which is ordinary, commonly met with,
current, settled, or admitted by the majority."

According to the foregoing definitions of the words "ordinary" and "extraordinary," the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one,
and the highest depth they attain during the rainy season is the extraordinary one;
inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs
always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the
general rule, order or measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If,
according to the definition given by article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the
natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their
highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered
by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season, that is, up to the
northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.

Inasmuch as, according to article 407 of the Civil Code, cited above, lakes and their beds
belong to the public domain, and inasmuch as, according to article 74 of the Law of
Waters cited above, the bed of a lake is the ground covered by its waters at their highest
ordinary depth; whereas the waters of Laguna de Bay at their highest depth reach no
farther than the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question, said parcels
are outside said bed and, consequently, do not belong to the public domain.
The Government of the Philippine Islands also contends that as the waters of Laguna de
Bay have receded very much, as a result of which the two parcels of land under
discussion, which had been under water before, were left uncovered, the claimant
Colegio de San Jose which owned the estate bordering upon said Laguna de Bay, did not
acquire said two parcels of land, in accordance with the provisions of article 367 of the
Civil Code, as follows:

"ART 367. The owners of estates bordering on ponds or lagoons, do not acquire the land
left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, nor lose those inundated by them in
extraordinary floods"

As may be seen, the legal provision quoted above, cited by the appellant in support of its
contention, refers to ponds and lagoons, and has therefore no application to the case at
bar, which refers to a lake, a lagoon being legally distinct in character from a lake.

Having pointed out that the inundation of the two parcels of land in question during the
months of September, October and November, is extraordinary, the legal provision
applicable to the case is that contained in article 77 of the aforesaid Law of Waters,
which reads:

"ART. 77. Lands accidentally inundated by the waters of lakes, or by creeks, rivers, and
other streams, shall continue to be the property of their respective owners."

If, as we have seen, the two parcels of land in litigation form no part of the bed of Laguna
de Bay, and, consequently, do not belong to the public domain, they must belong to the
claimant Colegio de San Jose as a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, owned by
it, the north-eastern part of which borders on said lake, and in accordance with the legal
provision just quoted, the fact that they are inundated by its waters during extraordinary
risings, which take place during the months of September, October and November, does
not deprive said claimant of the ownership thereof.

Article 84 of the said Law of Waters further provides:

"ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the
owners of such lands."

*******

Even if, therefore, the two parcels of land in litigation were considered as accretions!
gradually deposited by accessions or sediments from the waters of Laguna de Bay, they
would still, according to the legal provision just quoted, belong to the claimant Colegio
de San Jose as owner of the lands bordering on said Laguna de Bay.
The appellant also contends that the two parcels of land form a part of the shores of
Laguna de Bay and are therefore of public ownership, citing paragraph 3 of article 1 of
the Law of Waters, which says:

"ART. 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use:

*******

"3. The shores.—By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the
movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest
equinoctial tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at
the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms or tempests."

As the court below correctly held, this legal provision refers to the waters of the sea,
being included under Title I, which treats of the ownership and use of said waters of the
sea. Lake waters, being terrestrial waters, their ownership and use are governed by Title
II of said Law of Waters. In the same manner as the shore of the sea is that space covered
and uncovered by the waters during tides, the exterior or terrestrial limit being the line
reached by the highest equinoctial tides, so the shore of a lake is that space covered and
uncovered by the waters during the tides, its interior or terrestrial limit being the line
reached by its highest ordinary depth. In the instant case, the interior or terrestrial limit of
the Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters in its highest ordinary depth, that
is, up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question.

Summarizing, we find: (1) That the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground
covered by its waters at their highest ordinary depth during the dry season, that is, during
the months of December, January, February, March, April, May, June, July and August;
(2) that the highest depth reached by said waters during the rainy season, or during the
months of September, October and November, is extraordinary; (3) that the two parcels
of land in litigation form an integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan belonging to the claimant Colegio de San Jose; (4) that said two parcels of land,
being accidentally inundated by the waters of Laguna de Bay continue to be the property
of the claimant Colegio de San Jose (art. 77, Law of Waters of August 3, 1866) ; (5) that
even supposing that the said two parcels of land have been formed by accession or
deposits of sediment by the waters of said Laguna de Bay, they still belong to the said
claimant Colegio de San Jose, as owner of the land of the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan, bordering on said Laguna de Bay (art. 84, Law of Waters of August 3, 1866);
(6) that the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of the
waters of the sea are not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes, which are
governed by special provisions.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, that the judgment
appealed from should be affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 108065, July 06, 1993 ]
SPOUSES FELIX BAES AND RAFAELA BAES, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the respondent Court of

Appeals which affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court in Civil Case No. 0460-P, the
dispositive portion of which read thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring null and void TCT Nos.
14405, 29592, 29593, 29594, 29595, and TCT No. 29593's derivative titles TCT Nos.
124725, 124726, 124727 and 124729, and ordering the Register of Deeds for Pasay City
to cancel them and issue new ones in their stead in the name of the plaintiff after
segregating from TCT No. 29593 452 sq. m., the actual area of Lot 2958-C (covered by
cancelled TCT No. 11043) belonging to defendant Felix Baes. The counterclaim is hereby
dismissed.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.

The controversy began in 1962, when the government dug a canal on a private parcel of
land, identified as Lot 2958 and covering an area of 33,902 sq.m., to streamline the Tripa
de Gallina creek.

This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in his name under TCT No.
10990 and then had it subdivided into three lots, namely: (a) Lot 2958-A, with an area of
28,889 sq.m.; (b) Lot 2958-B, with an area of 3,588 sq.m.; and (c) Lot 2958-C, with an
area of 452 sq.m., covered by TCT Nos. 11041, 11042 and 11043, respectively.
In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was totally occupied by the canal, the government
gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area as Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of
Real Property dated June 20, 1970.  The property, which was near but not contiguous to
[1]

Lot 2958-C, was denominated as Lot 3271-A and later registered in the name of Felix
Baes under TCT No. 24300. The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up the old
bed of the creek.

Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot 2958-A designated as Lot 1, Blk.
4, resurveyed and subdivided. On January 12, 1968, he submitted a petition for the
approval of his resurvey and subdivision plans, claiming that after the said lots were
plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found that there were errors in respect of their
bearings and distances.

The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the Court of First Instance of Pasay City
in an order dated January 15, 1968.[2]

As a result, the old TCTs covering the said lots were canceled and new ones were issued,
to wit: (a) Lot 1-A, Blk. 4, with 672 sq.m., under TCT No. T-14404; (b) Lot 1-B, with
826 sq.m., representing the increase in area after the resurvey, under TCT No. T-
14405; (c) Lot 2958-C-1, with 452 sq.m., under TCT No. T-14406; and (d) Lot 2958-C-2,
with 2,770 sq.m. representing the increase after resurvey, under TCT No. T-14407.

Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-C-2 were later consolidated and this time further subdivided into
four (4) lots, namely, Lot 1, with an area of 147 sq.m.; Lot 2, with an area of 950 sq.m.;
Lot 3, with an area of 257 sq.m.; and Lot 4, with an area of 1,868 sq.m., which were
respectively issued TCT Nos. 29592, 29593, 29594, and 29595.

In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot 1-B (with TCT No. 14405
and an area of 826 sq.m.), on which the petitioners had erected an apartment building,
covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a filled-up portion of the Tripe de
Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C (covered by TCT Nos. 29592 to 29595, with
an increased area of 2,770 sq.m. after resurvey and subdivision) had been unlawfully
enlarged.

On November 17, 1982, it filed a petition for cancellation of TCT Nos. 14405 and 29592
to 29595.[3]

Baes did not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT Nos. 29592, 29594 and
29595 and was not able to prove during the trial that the government utilized a portion of
Lot 2 under TCT No. 29593. The trial court therefore decreed (correctly) that the original
Lot 2958-C (with an area of 452 sq.m.) be reverted to its status before the resurvey-
subdivision of Lot 2958-C.
The only remaining dispute relates to Lot 1-B (TCT No. 14405), which the petitioners,
relying on Article 461 of the Civil Code, are claiming as their own. The government
rejects this claim and avers that the petitioners had already been fully compensated for it
on June 20, 1970 when they agreed to exchange their Lot 2958-B with Lot 3271-A
belonging to the government.

Article 461 of the Civil Code states:

River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. (Emphasis supplied)

A portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek was diverted to a man-made canal which totally
occupied Lot 2958-B (with an area of 3,588 sq.m.) belonging to Felix Baes. Thus, the
petitioners claim that they became the owners of the old bed (which was eventually filled
up by soil excavated from Lot 2958-B) by virtue of Article 461.

The petitioners rely heavily on Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino's interpretation of this Article, to
wit:

This article (461) refers to a natural change in the course of a stream. If the
change of the course is due to works constructed by concessioners authorized by the
government, the concession may grant the abandoned river bed to the concessioners. If
there is no such grant, then, by analogy, the abandoned river bed will belong to the
owners of the land covered by the waters, as provided in this article, without prejudice
to a superior right of third persons with sufficient title. (Citing 3 Manresa 251-252; 2
Navarro Amandi 100-101; 3 Sanchez Roman 148)

We agree.

If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property
due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in
the course of the river is effected through artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of
the land covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the
government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was
therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.

We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated. Felix Baes was
given Lot 3271-A in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange
of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange because the two lots were
of the same area and value and the agreement was freely entered into by the parties. The
petitioners cannot now claim additional compensation because, as correctly observed by
the Solicitor General,

... to allow petitioners to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of the creek
would be a clear case of double compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of
the state.

The exchange of lots between the petitioners and the Republic was the result of voluntary
negotiations. If these had failed, the government could still have taken Lot 2958-B under
the power of eminent domain, upon payment of just compensation, as the land was
needed for a public purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so

ordered.