EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 ]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA AND MARIA
ISABEL ONGPIN, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, IN THEIR
CAPACITIES AS FOUNDING MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE
FOR REFORMS, MODERNIZATION AND ACTION (PIRMA),
RESPONDENTS, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-
IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) AND
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), PETITIONERS-
INTERVENORS.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of
initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars,
before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself,
through the original proponent[1] and the main sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on
Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as “innovative”.
[3]
 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of
proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by
Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention.[4] For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due
course to this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (hereafter,
Delfin Petition)[5] wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached “Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist

Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People’s
Initiative,[6] a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize
people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to
exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be
conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as
required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all
over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the
signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated
for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to
adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary
that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections
4 and 7 of Article VI,[7] Section 4 of Article VII,[8] and Section 8 of Article X[9] of the
Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a “Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution”[10] embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from
the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4
AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people,
and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in
the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-
037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order[11] (a)
directing Delfin “to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3)
daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense” not later than 9 December
1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared:
Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco,
together with his two other lawyers; and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).[12]Senator Roco,
on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not
the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file
their “memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda” within five days.[13]

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,

Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for
prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional
Amendments by People’s Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24
November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative
on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege
speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: “There is not a single word in that law which
can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such
implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.”

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern “the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,
is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since
the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right
of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution
to pass the implementing law.

(5)The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision

thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the people’s initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds
for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners
allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people’s initiative
spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-
registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of
additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative
itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues
raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer’s
and legislator’s suit.[14]Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the
petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders,
enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment[15] on
the petition. They argue therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT “IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL

TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT
LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)” IF THE
“COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC.”

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT
DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE
ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE
SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,
200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE

SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND “TO
SUPERVISE CLOSELY” PURSUANT TO ITS “INITIATORY JURISDICTION”
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO’S
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991

PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE
THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: “THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO
NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.”

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO’S SENATE BILL NO. 1290

CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO
“PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY
TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT.” (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290,
ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE

OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A
“REVISION” OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT.
“AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO
WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED.” (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097
PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a
Comment[16] which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a “knee-jerk
reaction to a draft ‘Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution’ ... which is not
formally filed yet.” What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an “Initiatory Pleading” or
“Initiatory Petition,” which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to
amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC
power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as
follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for
such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an
initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a)
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners’
estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure.
Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay
Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority government
expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.

In the Comment[17] for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997,
the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that
power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes
initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the
Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735
because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked
pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for
initiative on the Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735
does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC
to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining
order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the
latter’s Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the
Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him
to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for
hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.

On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the

Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed
a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention,
which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend
that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., [18] it would involve a
change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties.[19] A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other
national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, “to open
up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a
few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and
decision-making for the common good”; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and
nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-
of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by
the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but
not as a premium for good performance.[20]

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that
implements the people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a)
the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the
petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e)
the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the
signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the
holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people’s initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfin’s petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure
for a people’s initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function
exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal
basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention.[21] He avers that
R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people’s right to initiate
constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of
that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that
the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin
Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading
contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the
Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required
number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional
amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them
is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC’s role in an initiative on
the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition
and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition
in Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII
of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law
on the initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the
required number of signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed
only by Congress or a constitutional convention.[22]
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for
Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for
Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention
of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP;
(c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their
Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring
LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days
from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of
five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal
issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the
pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover
initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum
on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in
the draft “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution,” would constitute a revision of,
or an amendment to, the Constitution.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia,
the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to
submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the
allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC
should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action
and that the Commission’s failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and
the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No.
21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the
Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6
June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on
the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.[23] The parties
thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda.[24]

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth
issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE

PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN

 PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the
fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil
action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the
inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People
v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly
divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned
Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs
for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the
political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold
the paramount majesty of the Constitution.[25]
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss
the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to
entertain the petition.[26] The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after
having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December
1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda.[27] Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the
petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the
notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC’s failure to act on
Roco’s motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and
viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required
minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which
does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant
case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we
stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.:[28]

A party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM

OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,

INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall
be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action,
in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on
Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
(Proposed Resolution No. 332).[30] That section reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____
Section ____ of the Constitution.[31]

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee
submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section
2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the
Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2
of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
“The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.”

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.[32]

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left
to the legislature. Thus:

   FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are
no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we
are leaving this matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS.           And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the
legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially
with respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the
plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature.
The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of
initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise
of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that
five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules
governing the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS.           Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is
to be carried out - is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for
ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?

MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself
as a body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to
muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and
submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an initiative.

xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to
vest constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft
of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a
great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we
have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and
the modes of amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to
again concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the
mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands
of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the
mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations. [33]
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited
to proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative,
which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be
separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1
of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.[34]

xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of

initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it
were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that
was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage
of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process
of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. [35]
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2
with the following:

xxx

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking
into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable
Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The
modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows:
"SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective
of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept
the proposed amendment.[36]
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2
clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the
right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the
legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative...?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner’s amendment does not prevent the legislature
from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this
particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for
submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other
words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or
impair the right conceded here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines
initiative to AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on

line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."[38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation.
Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is
an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a
proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a
constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import
being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than
probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the
National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by
the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent.
Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on
plenary sessions.[39]
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the
final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against,
reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.[40]
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second
reading on 9 July 1986.[41]Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner
Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third
Readings on 1 August 1986.[42]

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended
by changing “percent” to “per centum” and “thereof” to “therein” and deleting the phrase
“by law” in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress [43] shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.[44]This amendment was
approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution
under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.

Has Congress “provided” for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who
answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor
Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the
right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or
rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute
the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the
rules implementing the exercise of the right. The “rules” means “the details on how [the
right] is to be carried out.”[46]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,[47] which dealt with the initiative and
referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)
House Bill No. 988,[48] which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well
as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and
initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No.
17[49] solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of
local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill
No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8
June 1989 by the Senate[50] and by the House of Representatives.[51] This approved bill is
now R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to “provide
for the implementation of the exercise of the right?”

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.”

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from
Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local
initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases “propose and enact,”
“approve or reject” and “in whole or in part.”[52]

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative,
and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case
of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things,
statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition,
the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring
supplied).
The use of the clause “proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed” only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for
initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that
the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national
in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III
(Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not
based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is
“national initiative,” if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a
law which only Congress can pass. It is “local initiative” if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of
the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is actually
based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:

SEC. 3. Definition of terms --

xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring
supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.[53]

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate.
Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed
therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification
and proclamation of the Commission. (Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the
legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited people’s organization, as defined by
law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the
findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which
could be petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on “Authority of Courts” under subtitle III on Local
Initiative and Referendum is misplaced,[54] since the provision therein applies to both
national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper
courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the
said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for
the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local
legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on
national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of
the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes
for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.[55]

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for
the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative body’s failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation
of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local
government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been
obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the
registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.[56]

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735,
in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word “Constitution” in
Section 2; (b) defines “initiative on the Constitution” and includes it in the enumeration
of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of “plebiscite” as the process by
which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by
the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who
should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount
system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. [57]

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate,
or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be
cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.[58]

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.[59] The recognized exceptions to the rule are
as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of
the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions,
to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under
no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing
that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable --
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[61]A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected.[62]

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No.

6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

III

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND

REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations
to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A.
No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
“completeness” and the “sufficient standard” tests.

IV

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of
Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has
validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a
petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures
and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather
signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; [63] (2) to
issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number
of registered voters in each legislative district;[64] (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;[65] and (4) to verify, through its
election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’
affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.[66]

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or
proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition
was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than
a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December
1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift
the term limits of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a
revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional
mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on

Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to
the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN

petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as

against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996 ]
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA AND CATALINO A.
CALIMBAS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The 1987 Constitution is unique in many ways.  For one thing, it institutionalized people
power in law-making.  Learning from the bitter lesson of completely surrendering to
Congress the sole authority to make, amend or repeal laws, the present Constitution
concurrently vested such prerogatives in the electorate by expressly recognizing their
residual and sovereign authority to ordain legislation directly through the concepts and
processes of initiative and of referendum.

In this Decision, this Court distinguishes referendum from initiative and discusses the
practical and legal implications of such differences.  It also sets down some guidelines in
the conduct and implementation of these two novel and vital features of popular
democracy, as well as settles some relevant questions on jurisdiction -- all with the
purpose of nurturing, protecting and promoting the people's exercise of direct democracy.

In this action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to nullify the respondent
Commission on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848
promulgated on June 27, 1996[1] denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local
initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.

The Facts

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the
Subic Special Economic Zone, thus:
"Sec. 12.  Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special
Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of
Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its
contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province
of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and
bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the
Philippines.  Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government
unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to
the Office of the President.  Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a
proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein."
(Underscoring supplied)
RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.[2] Petitioner
was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed
and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among other assets, "(a)ll lands
embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, as well as permanent improvements
and fixtures upon proper inventory not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred to
another government agency."[3]

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to
the Philippine government.  Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of
its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.

In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed a Pambayang

Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as
required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone.  On
September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition
with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993.  The petition prayed for the following:
"I.      Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 Serye
1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEFZ na walang
kundisyon.

II.       Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa
SSEFZ kung ang mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at
isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng Morong at Bataan:

(A)  Ibalik sa Bataan ang 'Virgin Forests' -- isang bundok na hindi nagagalaw at punong-
puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba't-ibang halaman.

(B)  Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEFZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.

(K)  Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng

salaping ipinagkaloob ng pamahalaang national o 'Internal Revenue Allotment' (IRA) sa
Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.

(D)  Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling 'special economic zones' ang bawat bayan ng
Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan.

(E)  Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.

(G)  Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa.

(H)  Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito
sa magbukas pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon
ng pagkakataong umunlad rin ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng
Bataan.

(I)  Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-

Dinalupihan para sa kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga
ng mga kabundukan.

(J)  Magkakaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong,

Hermosa at Bataan."
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia,
Calimbas, et al. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye
1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. No.
7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in items (A), (B), (K), (E) and (G)
of private respondents' petition.  The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong also informed
respondents that items (D) and (H) had already been referred to and favorably acted upon
by the government agencies concerned, such as the Bases Conversion Development
Authority and the Office of the President.

Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents
resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991,[4] Sec.
122 paragraph (b) of which provides as follows:
"Sec. 122.  Procedure in Local Initiative. -

x x x                           x x x                                x x x

(b)     If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the

proponents, through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke
their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the sanggunian concerned.

x x x                         x x x                                x x x."

On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623
denied the petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. 
On July 13, 1993, public respondent Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution no. 93-
1676) further directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the
authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents.

On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and
mandamus[5] before this Court against the Commission on Elections and the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it
disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of the required
number of signatures in support of the initiative and the gathering of signatures.
On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of the Philippines
issued proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.  Said
proclamation included in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval Base,
including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the
scheduled referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec
promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".

On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public
respondent "is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of
a national law.  x x x"

The Issues
[6]
The petition  presents the following "argument":

"Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack of jurisdiction in scheduling a local initiative which seeks the amendment of a
national law."
In his Comment, private respondent Garcia claims that (1) petitioner has failed to show
the existence of an actual case or controversy; (2) x x x petitioner seeks to overturn a
decision/judgment which has long become final and executory; (3) x x x public
respondent has not abused its discretion and has in fact acted within its jurisdiction; (and)
(4) x x x the concurrence of local government units is required for the establishment of
the Subic Special Economic Zone."

Private respondent Calimbas, now the incumbent Mayor of Morong, in his Reply (should
be Comment) joined petitioner's cause because "(a)fter several meetings with petitioner's
Chairman and staff and after consultation with legal counsel, respondent Calimbas
discovered that the demands in the petition for a local initiative/referendum were not
legally feasible."[7]

The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondent, identified two issues, as follows:
"1. Whether or not the Comelec can be enjoined from scheduling/conducting the local
intiative proposing to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.
2. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
request of petitioner SBMA to stop the local initiative."
On July 23, 1996, the Court heard oral argument by the parties, after which, it issued the
following resolution:
"The Court Resolved to (1) GRANT the Motion to Admit the Attached Comment filed by
counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996 and (2) NOTE the:
(a) Reply (should be comment) to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer 
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunctiom, filed by counsel for
respondent Catalino Calimbas, dated July 22, 1996; (b) Separate Comments on the
petition, filed by: (b-1) the Solicitor General for respondent Commission on Elections
dated July 19, 1996 and (b-2) counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated
July 22, 1996 and (c) Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner dated July 22, 1996.

At the hearing of this case this morning, Atty. Rodolfo O. Reyes appeared and argued for
petitioner Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) while Atty. Sixto Brillantes for
private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, and Atty. Oscar L. Karaan for respondent Catalino
Calimbas.  Solicitor General Raul Goco, Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta
and Solicitor Zenaida Hernandez-Perez appeared for respondent Commission on
Elections with Solicitor General Goco arguing.

Before the Court adjourned, the Court directed the counsel for both parties to INFORM
this Court by Friday, July 26, 1996, whether or not Commission on Elections would push
through with the initiative/referendum this Saturday, July 27, 1996.

Thereafter, the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution.

At 2:50 p.m. July 23, 1996, the Court received by facsimile transmission an Order dated
also on July 23, 1996 from the respondent Commission on Elections En Banc inter alia 'to
hold in abeyance the scheduled referendum (initiative) on July 27, 1996 pending
resolution of G.R. No. 125416.' In view of this Order, the petitioner's application for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and
academic and will thus not be passed upon by this Court at this time.  Puno, J., no part
due to relationship. Bellosillo, J., is on leave."
After careful study of and judicious deliberation on the submissions and arguments of the
parties, the Court believes that the issues may be restated as follows:
(1) Whether this petition "seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long become
final and executory"; namely G.R. No. 111230, Enrique Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.;

(2) Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the conduct of
the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan;" and

(3) Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the
people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a
national law."
First Issue: Bar by Final Judgment

Respondent Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in Enrique T.
Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et. al.[8] on "the very issue raised in (the)
petition:  whether or not there can be an initiative by the people of Morong, Bataan on the
subject proposition -- the very same proposition, it bears emphasizing, the submission of
which to the people of Morong, Bataan is now sought to be enjoined by petitioner x x x".

We disagree.  The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a

municipal resolution as contra-distinguished from an ordinance may be the proper
subject of an initiative and/or referendum.  We quote from our said Decision:[9]
"In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is
whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative
stance as they contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance
can be the subject of initiative.  They rely on Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of
the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: 'Local Initiative Defined. -- Local
initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.'

We reject respondent's narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide
with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the
provisions of the Local Government of 1991 on initiative and referendum.

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate
subjects of a local initiative.  Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: 
'The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for  a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or
local legislative  body x x x'.  An act includes a resolution.  Black defines an acts 'an
expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature,
including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgement, resolves,
awards and determination x x x.' It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony
with and not in violation of the Constitution.  In line with this postulates, we held in In Re
Guarina that if there is doubt or uncertainly as to the meaning of the legislative, if the
words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
construction, that interpretations will be adopted which will avoid the effect of
unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the
more usual or apparent import of the language used.' "
Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in said G.R. No. 111230 and we found that the sole
issue presented by the pleadings was the question of "whether or not a Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution can be the subject  of a valid initiative or referendum".[10]

In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of municipal resolution as
the form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may validly
exercised.  What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan  Blg. 10, Serye
1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and substance for submission to the people for their
approval; in fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating
and implementing Resolution No. 2848.
Second Issue:  Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848

The main issue in this case may be re-started thus: Did respondent Comelec commit
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848?

We answer the question in the affirmative.

To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but
respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.  In fact, in the body
of the Resolution[11] as reproduced in the footnote below the word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all.  The Comelec labeled
the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers,
"Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description
"referendum".  To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of
Resolution No. 2848.  And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. 
In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act,[12] Congress differentiated one term from
the other, thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a  petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through
an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law,
or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum  on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz[13] defines initiative as the
"power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls
independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he explains that referendum
"is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been
passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of
electors become a law." The foregoing definitions, which are based on Black's[14] and
other leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local Government Code (RA 7160)
substantially as follows:
"SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. -- Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.

"SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined. -- Local referendum is the legal process whereby
the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any
ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.

The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within
sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.

The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum."
Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by
the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law,
ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one
already existing.  Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the
opportunity to enact the proposal.  If its refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days
from its presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered
representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned.  Should the proponents be able to collect the number of
signed conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on
Elections "shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition
shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned x x x".

On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered
voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution
which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority.  Said referendum shall
be conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections.[15]

In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun
and consented to by the law-making body.  Initiative is a process of law-making by the
people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting
what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.  Hence, the process and the
voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where
expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.

[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as
"powers" or "legal processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or
"concepts", or "the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in this
Decision.]

From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise
an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and
canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is
in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the
electorate.  This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and
complicated, and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such
part to be voted upon separately.  Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition
embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate,"[16] although "two
or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative".[17]

It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of
the proposition."

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.  These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation.  In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it
should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the
orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.
 Third Issue: Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of Conditionalities -- Ultra
Vires?

Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite,

namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or beyond the
powers of the Sangguniang Bayan to enact,[18] stressing that under Sec. 124 (b) of RA
7160 (the Local Government Code), "local initiative shall cover only such subjects or
matters as are within the legal powers of the sanggunians to enact." Elsewise stated, a
local initiative may enact only such ordinances or resolutions as the municipal council
itself could, if it decided  to so enact.[19] After the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong and the
other municipalities concerned (Olongapo, Subic and Hermosa) gave their resolutions of
concurrence, and by reason of which the SSEZ had been created, whose metes and
bounds had already been delineated by Proclamation No. 532 issued on February 1, 1995
in accordance with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the power to withdraw such concurrence
and/or to substitute therefor a conditional concurrence is no longer within the authority
and competence of the Municipal Council of Morong to legislate.  Furthermore,
petitioner adds, the specific conditionalities included in the questioned municipal
resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to impose.  Hence, such withdrawal can
no longer be enacted or conditionalities imposed by initiative.  In other words, petitioner
insists, the creation of SSEZ is now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation. 
Thus, Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for
such concurrence as this would effectively render nugatory the creation by (national) law
of the SSEZ and would deprive the entire nation of the benefits to be derived therefrom. 
Once created, SSEZ has ceased to be a local concern.  It has become a national project.

On the other hand, private respondent Garcia counters that such argument is premature
and conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a proposal.  If the people
should reject it during the referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal.

Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed,
the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage.  It is not yet an approved law. 
Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate.  It is
only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or
resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this
point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
conjecture or possibility.  Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.[20]

We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides[21] that "(n)othing in
this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act x x x."

So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court.[22] It passes upon errors of law (and
sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts
as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or instrumentality" of government.  In
the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. 
However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it
has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality"
or lower court, for that matter.  The Commission on Elections itself has made no
reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings.  The Comelec
simply included  verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence,
there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this
Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.

Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to
pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative.  Quite the contrary, we are ruling that
these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission -- to which
then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and by which the same
should have been decided in the first instance.  In other words, while regular courts may
take jurisdiction over "approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the
Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate
and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as
discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts
thereof are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to
enact."[23] Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the
capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec
upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.

While on the subject of capacity of the local lawmaking body, it would be fruitful for the
parties and the Comelec to plead and adjudicate, respectively, the question of whether
Grande Island and the "virgin forests" mentioned in the proposed initiative belong to the
national government and thus cannot be segregated from the Zone and "returned to
Bataan" by the simple expedient of passing a municipal resolution.  We note that Sec. 13
(e) of R.A. 7227 speaks of the full subscription and payment of the P20 billion authorized
capital stock of the Subic Authority by the Republic, with, aside from cash and other
assets, the "... lands, embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, ..." which
includes said island and forests.  The ownership of said lands is a question of fact that
may be taken up in the proper forum -- the Commission on Elections.

Another question which the parties may wish to submit to the Comelec upon remand of
the initiative is whether the proposal, assuming it is within the capacity of the Municipal
Council to enact, may be divided into several parts for purposes of voting.  Item "I" is a
proposal to recall, nullify and render without effect (bawiin, nulipikahin at
pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No. 10, Series of 1993.  On the other hand, Item
"II" proposes to change or replace (palitan) said resolution with another municipal
resolution of concurrence provided certain conditions enumerated thereunder would be
granted, obeyed and implemented (ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa) for the benefit
and interest of Morong and Bataan.  A voter may favor Item I -- i.e., he may want
a total dismemberment of Morong from the Authority -- but may not agree with any of
the conditions set forth in Item II.  Should the proposal then be divided and be voted upon
separately and independently?

All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the ground of prematurity.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the present
controversy as the issue raised and decided therein is different from the questions
involved here; (ii) the respondent Commission should be given an opportunity to review
and correct its errors in promulgating its Resolution No. 2848 and in preparing -- if
necessary -- for the plebiscite; and (iii) that the said Commission has administrative and
initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass upon the question of whether the proposal is
sufficient in form and language and whether such proposal or part or parts thereof
are clearly and patently outside the powers of the municipal council of Morong to enact,
and therefore violative of law.

In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and referendum, as concepts and
processes, are new in our country.  We are remanding the matter to the Comelec so that
proper corrective measures, as above discussed, may be undertaken, with a view to
helping fulfill our people's aspirations for the actualization of effective direct
sovereignty.  Indeed we recognize that "(p)rovisions for initiative and referendum are
liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby."[24] In his authoritative treatise on the
Constitution, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. treasures these "instruments which can be used
should the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the people."[25] Impelled by a
sense of urgency, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 to give life and form to the
constitutional mandate.  Congress also interphased initiative and referendum into the
workings of local governments by including a chapter on this subject in the local
Government Code of 1991.[26] And the Commission on Elections can do no less by
seasonably and judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules, for both national and local
use, in implementation of these laws.  For its part, this Court early on expressly
recognized the revolutionary import of reserving people power in the process of law-
making.[27]

Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing
popular sovereignty.  And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every
effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise.  For it is but sound public
policy to enable the electorate to express their free and untrammeled will, not only in the
election of their anointed lawmakers and executives, but also in the formulation of the
very rules and laws by which our society shall be governed and managed.

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848

is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings
consistent with the foregoing discussion.  No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. NO. 174153, October 25, 2006 ]
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH
6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., INTERVENOR.

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L.

QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, AND CARLOS
P. MEDINA, JR., INTERVENORS.

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, INTERVENOR.

BAYAN REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON DR. CAROLINA

PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON DR. REYNALDO LESACA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD,
HEAD REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL DR. GENE
ALZONA NISPEROS, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM REPRESENTED
BY FR. DIONITO CABILLAS, MIGRANTE REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON CONCEPCION BRAGAS-REGALADO, GABRIELA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL EMERENCIANA DE
JESUS, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTED BY SEC. GEN.
CRISTINA PALABAY, ANAKBAYAN REPRESENTED BY CHAIRPERSON
ELEANOR DE GUZMAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
REPRESENTED BY CHAIR VENCER CRISOSTOMO PALABAY, JOJO
 PINEDA OF THE LEAGUE OF CONCERNED PROFESSIONALS AND
BUSINESSMEN, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO OF THE SOLIDARITY OF
HEALTH AGAINST CHARTER CHANGE, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS OF
HEALTH ACTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENORS.

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, AND ANA THERESA

HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, INTERVENORS.

LUWALHATI RIACASA ANTONINO, INTERVENOR.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, INTERVENOR.

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INTERVENOR.

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, INTERVENOR.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO

F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, AND
AMADO GAT INCIONG, INTERVENORS.

RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, AND RUELO BAYA,

INTERVENORS.

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION

(PTGWO) AND MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, INTERVENORS.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,

MANUEL VILLAR, JR., INTERVENOR.

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., INTERVENOR.

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A.

LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, AND RANDALL TABAYOYONG,
INTERVENORS.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU

PROVINCE CHAPTERS, INTERVENORS.

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. AND

SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEGA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
 ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM AND PANFILO LACSON, INTERVENORS.

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,

INTERVENORS.

[G.R. NO. 174299]

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., AND RENE A.V.

SAGUISAG, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., AND
COMMISSIONERS RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A.
TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO
T. FERRER, AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to
amend the 1987 Constitution.

Antecedent Facts

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico
B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups[1] and individuals, commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25
August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) [2] and Section 7[3] of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.
The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)[4] and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department)[5] and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions."[6] These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed
that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following
proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM
ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of
their initiative.[7]

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago  v.
Commission on Elections[8] declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.[9]

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari
and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel
the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course
to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino
Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition
deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent
COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for
the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's
petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay
Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes
with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling.
The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules
"as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or

opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors [10] uniformly hold
the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago.
On the other hand, the opposing intervenors[11] hold the contrary view and maintain
that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the
Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering
and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum
requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section
2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;[12] (4) the nature of the proposed changes as
revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006.
After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for
resolution.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's
initiative;
 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due

course to the Lambino Group's petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to
revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For
following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the Commision on Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that

allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of
an amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,"
thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they
sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments
is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal
in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to
the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one
of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing.

The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed [14] the concept of people�s initiative
from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative
clause. In almost all States[15] which allow initiative petitions, the unbending
requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on
an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.[16]

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of
various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant
potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative
petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This
danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is
the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets
the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot. [17] (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,[18] the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative
commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text
requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can
intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full
text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector
to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to
vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would
be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
 Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of
the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and
misleading" which renders the initiative void.[19]

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must
set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the
framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and
that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b)
of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group
invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents
secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents
are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures.

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional

requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving
that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures
- that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted
to this Court a copy of a signature sheet[20] after the oral arguments of 26 September
2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with
this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached [21] to the
opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-
Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet
attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the
signature sheet in full:

Province: City/Municipality No. of

: Verified
Legislative Barangay: Signatures:
District:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER�"

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature

herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution
signifies my support for the filing thereof.

Na
me
Precinct  Birthdate Signatur Verificati
Last Name, Address
Number MM/DD/YY e on
First Name,
M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
___________________ __________________
___________________ Witness Witness
 Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that
the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino
admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before
they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the
"petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the
initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from
February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature
sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25
August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of
their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino
initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer
and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.

The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30
August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when
they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's
"Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August
2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my
personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto
attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the
present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines"[22] has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
 RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE

COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to
adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's
Consultative Commission on Charter Change;

WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP
Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the
majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October
2005;

WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her

Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final
report sometime in December 2005;

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which
militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of
Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously
agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and
Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-

LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT
THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January
2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to
prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed
with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the
Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and
referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the
Consultative Commission[24] are vastly different from the proposed changes of the
Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed
with the COMELEC.

For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all

provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions.
The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National
Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's
proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to
affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of
new Transitory Provisions.

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months
before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition
with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that
ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with
the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary,
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they
circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed
changes.

In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the
Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed
amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and
paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed
to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
 The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because
the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to
August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition
of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments."

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege
in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain
any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature
sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino

Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud,
a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the
act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the
registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood
the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition
for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province
Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain
the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group
alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention
the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral
arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30
August 2006.

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who
did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his
signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino
Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed
by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be

incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the
present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with,
or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris
Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from
February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition
or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less
than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated,
together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless,
even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only

100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the
COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional
copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional
copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the
printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000
copies.

Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino

Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and
reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."[25] This admission
binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group
failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the
people who signed the signature sheets.

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with
certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no
wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each
signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition.
Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed
each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum
number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would
not exceed 1,000,000.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all
or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they
signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group
failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If
ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the
proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an
indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted
this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact
is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The
failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders
the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of
the Constitution.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets
did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have
known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members

of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;[26]
 2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members,
who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will
determine the expiration of their own term of office; [27]

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim

Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.[28]

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino
Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that
they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly
controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes
merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his
group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the
regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed
changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the
proposed changes belies this.

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the
amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be
held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the
elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local
elections without specifying the year.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed
changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all
local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the regular
Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the
proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim
Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously
with any future local elections.

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own
term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold
office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-
year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to
the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million
signatories, and even the entire nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation.
In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not
contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3
million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require
the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local
elections.

The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the
signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article
XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a
strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a
"surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a
surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on
initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since
they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a
petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find
unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire

proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,[29] the
Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal
constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we
cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling
because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents'
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the
electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot
language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it
impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that
proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v.
McAlpine,[30] the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and
fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems
that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater
danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood
of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth
and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular
provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less
appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative
promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential
petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the
initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or
splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent
assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their
signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament
to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the
interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from
ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence
of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to
amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise
again the Constitution.

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or
revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what
specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament
to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people
are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed
changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because
the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.

There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition
of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of
Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present
members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30
June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus,  all the
present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30
June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime
Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not
schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will
come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to
the exclusion of the present Senators.

The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3
million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their
signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have
known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim
Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people
the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as
a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative
must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people
must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so
vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special
power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this
Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust
emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment
is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed
the petition.

In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally
fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that
the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition."
 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing
Revision through Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the

Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention
can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the
Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

1)
A constitutional convention.
2)

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by

the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its
Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is
through a people's initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII,
referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This
distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant
to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter
of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With
the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
 The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article
on Amendment or Revision. x x x x

xxxx

MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a

separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of
Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this

process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into
a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense
that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas,
the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?

MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.

xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on
line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be

covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and
wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may
propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's
initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose
revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.

This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus,
in McFadden v. Jordan,[32] the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution
x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of "laws and
amendments to the Constitution" and does not purport to extend to a constitutional
revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished
only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope
of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed "the measure") now before us is
so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state
Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the
writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:[33]
 It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it
may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision,
or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution
itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a revision; and it
is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1.
The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the constitution
drafted by the "Commission for Constitutional Revision" authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to
receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article
XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the
plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.

To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be

submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed
at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can
only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally
prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by
6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in
the Constitution itself.

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:[34]
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended
in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost
invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is
universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an
orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where
the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people
may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the
self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution,
cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear
command of the Constitution that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise,
the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision,
then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the
fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding
nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the
people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial
entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the
other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions."[36] The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision."[37] Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches."[38] A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances."[39]

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. [40] Qualitatively,
the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the

three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced
into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical
change in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters
the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,
the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-
balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President
and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily
apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set
forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts
or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress
specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-
examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-
all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they
should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.
[41]
 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,[42] an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the
Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The
issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the]
proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution."
The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the
initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to
provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the
states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize
a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the
American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of
government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but
would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
x x x x

We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by
the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to
submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and
conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the
people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of
this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1
of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be
other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.

The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and
many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to
eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant,
homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we
were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.[43] (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present
petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments.
The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.

In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida

Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the
Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr.[44] There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far
more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision"
is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a
deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes
are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative,
are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do
not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.

Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their
Memorandum:

99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly
provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and
constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for
"amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent
distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the
common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention
delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their
occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the
words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of
coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.

100. Stated otherwise, the difference

between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or
extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)

The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had
drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present
initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the
Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative
constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed
changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group
trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict
the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical
intent and language.[45] Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and
language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by
creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such
a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the
Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government
does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.

The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American
jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,[46] the
Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the
constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely
provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the
constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the
constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the
distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and
subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a
formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes
far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's
relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed
ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law,"
the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on
the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.

We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit
revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court
concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative,
because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1,
relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the
initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar
sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the
only section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and
it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure
before the electorate." x x x x

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply
to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the
express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.

We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for
amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the
spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an
amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of
the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul
of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of
government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution
without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered
an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from
18 years to 15 years[47] is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing
Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision.[48] Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a
revision.[49]

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of
the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not
also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or
within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the
spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is
located.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a

revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision
and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with
"monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II [50] of the Constitution radically
overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of
the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of
government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a

constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake
a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the
altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally
authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions
to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which
do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to
undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be
deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction
of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such
irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a
future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino
readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future
amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of
statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of
irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.

The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory

Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a
provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the
inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of
government."

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's

proposed changes refer to - the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand
models, which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The
proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government - the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did
the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the
Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many
articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will
only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.

In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision
and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because
it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's
initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative
clause on amendments to the Constitution.

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the
case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a
logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds. [51]

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional

provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here
because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a
valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the
"petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of
RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended
petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty.
Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended
petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the
COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million
signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply
with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating,
"No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the
interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a
subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the
present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission
of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino
Group's initiative will still fail.

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the
Lambino Group's Initiative

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely

followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.[52] For following this Court's ruling, no
grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the
present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate
its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion
could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions
of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and
obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by
cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in
unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the
day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the
constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that
comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this
country.

An overwhelming majority - 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total

votes cast[53] - approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February
1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the
people's sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or
revising the Constitution.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the
Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the
people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The
alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people's
sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and
should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the
real sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide"
cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the
Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that
provides enduring stability to our society becomes easily susceptible to manipulative
changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the
Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the
Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification
of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms."
The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified
support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in
the present initiative.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The
Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This
Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm
initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the
Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 111511, October 05, 1993 ]
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND LUCILA PAYUMO, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

The EDSA revolution of 1986 restored the reality that the people's might is not a
myth. The 1987 Constitution then included people power as an article of faith and
Congress was mandated to pass laws for its effective exercise. The Local Government
Code of 1991 was enacted providing for two (2) modes of initiating the recall from office
of local elective officials who appear to have lost the confidence of the electorate. One
of these modes is recall through the initiative of a preparatory recall assembly. In the
case at bench, petitioners assail this mode of initiatory recall as unconstitutional. The
challenge cannot succeed.
We shall first unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the
May 11, 1992 elections. In the early evening of July 1, 1993, some mayors, vice mayors
and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the
province met at the National Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan. At about
12:30 A.M. of the following day, July 2, 1993, they proceeded to the Bagac town plaza
where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the
recall election of petitioner Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar de los
Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen
as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-
Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that
a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner Garcia on the ground of "loss of
confidence."  The motion was "unanimously seconded."  The resolution, states:
[1] [2]

RESOLUTION NO. 1

Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly in
the Province of Bataan have voluntarily constituted themselves for the purpose of the
recall of the incumbent provincial governor of the province of Bataan, Honorable
Enrique T. Garcia pursuant to the provisions of Section 70, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991;
Whereas, the total number of all the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly in the province of Bataan is One Hundred and Forty-Six (146) composed of all
mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of all the 12 towns of the
province of Bataan;
Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly,
after a serious and careful deliberation have decided to adopt this resolution for the
recall of the incumbent provincial governor Enrique T. Garcia for loss of confidence;
Now, therefore, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that having lost confidence
on the incumbent provincial governor of Bataan, Enrique T. Garcia, recall proceedings
be immediately initiated against him;
Resolved Further, that copy of this resolution be furnished the Honorable
Commission on Elections, Manila and the Provincial Election Supervisor, Balanga,
Bataan.
One hundred forty-six (146) names appeared in Resolution No. 1 but only eighty (80)
carried the signatures of the members of the PRA. Of the eighty (80) signatures,
only seventy-four (74) were found genuine.  The PRAC of the province had a
[3]

membership of one hundred forty-four (144)  and its majority was seventy-three (73).
[4]

On July 7, 1993, petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition to deny
due course to said Resolution No. 1. Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to comply
with the "substantive and procedural requirements" laid down in Section 70 of R.A.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In a per
curiam Resolution promulgated August 31, 1993, the respondent COMELEC dismissed
the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan on
October 11, 1993. Petitioners then filed with Us a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent
COMELEC on various grounds. They urged that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall
through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the
sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate recall proceedings, and (2) it
violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to
equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC in
passing Resolution No. 1 suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was
the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the
assembly. On September 7, 1993, We required the respondents to file their
Comments within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days.  On September 16, 1993,
[5]

We set the petition for hearing on September 21, 1993 at 11 A.M. After the hearing, We
granted the petition on the narrow ground that the sending of selective notices to
members of the PRAC violated the due process protection of the Constitution and fatally
flawed the enactment of Resolution No. 1. We ruled:
xxx
"After deliberation, the Court opts not to resolve the alleged constitutional
infirmity of sec. 70 of R.A. No. 7160 for its resolution is not unavoidable to decide the
merits of the petition. The petition can be decided on the equally fundamental issues of:
(1) whether or not all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified of
its meeting; and (2) assuming lack of notice, whether or not it would vitiate the
proceedings of the assembly including its Resolution No. 1.
The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly, especially to the
members known to be political allies of petitioner Garcia was admitted by both counsels
of the respondents. They did not deny that only those inclined to agree with the
resolution of recall were notified as a matter of political strategy and security. They
justified these selective notices on the ground that the law does not specifically
mandate the giving of notice.
We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the
Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always
be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for notice
to all the members of the assembly is also imperative for these members represent the
different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notified of
the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice of the people they
represent nullified. The resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the
members of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely determined only after
all the members of the assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the will
of their constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement of notice is mandatory for it is
indispensable in determining the collective wisdom of the members of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall
petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of Bataan.
 The petition raises other issues that are not only prima impressionis but also of
transcendental importance to the rightful exercise of the sovereign right of the people
to recall their elected officials. The Court shall discuss these issues in a more extended
decision."
In accord with this Resolution, it appears that on September 22, 1993, the
Honorable Mayor of Dinalupihan, Oscar de los Reyes again sent Notice of Session to
the members of the PRAC to "convene in session on September 26, 1993 at the town
plaza of Balanga, Bataan at 8:30 o'clock in the morning."  From news reports, the
[6]

PRAC convened in session and eighty-seven (87) of its members once more passed a
resolution calling for the recall of petitioner Garcia.  On September 27, 1993, petitioners
[7]

filed with Us a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion

pressing for a resolution of their contention that section 70 of R.A. 7160 is
unconstitutional.
We find the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the
constitutionality of section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall
assembly to initiate the recall of local elective officials as bereft of merit.
Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The presumption rests on the respect
due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is
passed, and the Chief Executive, by whom the law is approved.  For upholding the
[8]

Constitution is not the responsibility of the judiciary alone but also the duty of the
legislative and executive.  To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a
[9]

clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
permits.  The annulment cannot be decreed on a doubtful and arguable implication.
[10]

The universal rule of legal hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law.
[11]

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his
term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their
sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all
governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper
administration of public affairs.  Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a
[12]

fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy. [13]

Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance
in our 1973 Constitution.  It was mandated in section 2 of Article XI entitled Local
[14]

Government, viz:
SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may
not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a
more responsive and accountable local government structure
with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications,
election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and
all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However,
any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. (Underscoring
supplied)
The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled "The Local Government Code
of 1983." Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall
elections of local elective officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%)
of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned, viz:
Sec. 54. By Whom Exercised; Requisites. - (1) The power of recall shall be
exercised by the registered voters of the unit to which the local elective official subject
to such recall belongs.
(2)  Recall shall be validly initiated only upon petition of at least twenty-five
percent of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned
based on the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.
Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided
by BP 337 was exercised by our people.
In February 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for
they resorted to revolution and they booted out of office the highest elective officials of
the land.
The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited
the trust of the electorate led to its firm institutionalization in the 1987 Constitution. Its
Article XIII expressly recognized the Role and Rights of People's Organizations, viz:
Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to
enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their
legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated
capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership,
and structure.
Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by laws, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local
government code which "shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum…," viz:
 Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units."
In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992. In this
Code, Congress provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a
preparatory recall assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors,
vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities. We
quote the pertinent provisions of R.A. 7160, viz:

CHAPTER 5 - RECALL

Sec. 69. By Whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to such recall belongs.
Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a
preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to
which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
(b)  There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district,
and municipality which shall be composed of the following:

(1) Provincial level. - all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of

the municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in

the city;

(3)  Legislative District level. - In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan

members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the
district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are
elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and

(4)   Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay

members in the municipality.
 (c)  A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in
session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in
the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials
shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members
of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.
(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may be
validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five (25) percent of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which
the local official sought to be recalled was elected.
Sec. 71. Election Recall - Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall
with the appropriate local office of the Comelec, the Commission or its duly
authorized representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be
later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in the
case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials, and forty-five (45) days in the case of
provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be
considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and,
like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
Sec. 72. Effectivity of Recall. – The recall of an elective local official shall be
effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall.
Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence
in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
Sec. 73. Prohibition from Resignation. - The elective local official sought to be
recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of
a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b)  No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election.
A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea
of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local
elective officials originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate.
 The legislative records reveal that there were two (2) principal reasons why this
[15]

alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a)
to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to
cut down on its expenses.  Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the
[16]

mechanism of initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in
the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor
failed. Former Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by
direct action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible
to implement.  Consequently, our legislators added in the Code a second mode of
[17]

initiating the recall of local officials, i.e., thru a preparatory recall assembly. They
brushed aside the argument that this second mode may cause instability in the local
government units due to its imagined ease.
We have belabored the genesis of our recall law for it can light up many of the
unillumined interstices of the law. In resolving constitutional disputes, We should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they
have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs. Prescinding from this
proposition, We shall now resolve the contention of petitioners that the alternative mode
of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the process of recall is
unconstitutional.
It is first postulated by the petitioners that "the right to recall does not extend merely
to the prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the
official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes
the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or
not."
[18]

We do not agree. Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the

Constitution that will sustain this submission. To be sure, there is nothing in the
Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right
to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for
any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.  Neither did it prohibit
[19]

the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by
section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x" By
this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose
the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to
select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to
carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not straightjacketed to one
particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the Constitution simply required
is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by
Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress
deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement
the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. Congress has made its
choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to
supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even then, the remedy
against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle
of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law. [20]

Petitioners also posit the thesis that in passing Resolution No. 1, the Bataan
Preparatory Recall Assembly did not only initiate the process of recall but had de
facto recalled petitioner Garcia from office, a power reserved to the people alone. To
quote the exact language of the petitioners: "The initiation of a recall through the
PRA effectively shortens and ends the term of the incumbent local officials. Precisely, in
the case of Gov. Garcia, an election was scheduled by the COMELEC on 11 October
1993 to determine who has the right to assume the unexpired portion of his term of
office which should have been until June 1995. Having been relegated to the status of a
mere candidate for the same position of governor (by operation of law) he has,
therefore, been effectively recalled."  In their Extremely Urgent Clarificatory
[21]

Manifestation,  petitioners put the proposition more bluntly by stating that a "PRA
[22]

resolution of recall is the recall itself."

Again, the contention cannot command our concurrence. Petitioners have
misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. They have
embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a
misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done
indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the
people to act through their elected representatives. Nothing less than the paramount
task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives,
elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent
assembly. The initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or
reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives of
the people. More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the recall
itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall merely starts the
process. It is part of the process but is not the whole process. This ought to be self
evident for a PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for
validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise, a PRA resolution of recall that is
rejected by the people in the election called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever.
The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before
the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in
office. Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned
remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to question. This is clear in
section 72 of the Local Government Code which explicitly states that "the recall of an
elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a
successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast
during the election on recall."
We shall next settle the contention of petitioners that the disputed law infracts the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioners asseverate:
5.01.2. It denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws for the local officials
constituting the majority party can constitute itself into a PRA and initiate the recall of a
duly elected provincial official belonging to the minority party thus rendering
ineffectual his election by popular mandate. Relevantly, the assembly could, to the
prejudice of the minority (or even partyless) incumbent official, effectively declare a
local elective position vacant (and demand the holding of a special election) for purely
partisan political ends regardless of the mandate of the electorate. In the case at bar, 64
of the 74 signatories to the recall resolution have been political opponents of petitioner
Garcia, not only did they not vote for him but they even campaigned against him in the
1992 elections.
Petitioners' argument does not really assail the law but its possible abuse by the
members of the PRAC while exercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. More
specifically, the fear is expressed that the members of the PRAC may inject political
color in their decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political
opponents especially those belonging to the minority. A careful reading of the law,
however, will ineluctably show that it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally
elected officials belonging to the political minority. First to be considered is the politically
neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly. Sec. 70 (b) of the Code
provides:
Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a
preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to
which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
(b)  There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district,
and municipality which shall be composed of the following:

(1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice mayors and sanggunian members of

the municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in

the city;

(3)  Legislative District level. - In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan

members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the
district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are
elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and

(4)  Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay

members in the municipality.

Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities

and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is
given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall
assembly at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the
province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one
political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only
ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The
members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but
as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot
be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution
encourages the multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is
indispensable to the growth and nurture of the democratic system. Clearly then, the law
as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against elected local officials belonging to
the minority.
The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party
and that it may use its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political
persuasions, especially those belonging to the minority, is not a ground to strike down
the law as unconstitutional. To be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there
can be no escape from the reality that all powers are susceptible of abuse. The mere
possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the grant of power to an individual or
entity. To deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee is to render
government powerless and no people need an impotent government. There is no
democratic government that can operate on the basis of fear and distrust of its officials,
especially those elected by the people themselves. On the contrary, all our laws
assume that our officials, whether appointed or elected, will act in good faith and will
regularly perform the duties of their office. Such a presumption follows the solemn oath
that they took after assumption of office, to faithfully execute all our laws.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall
process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous
influences. As explained above, the diverse and distinct composition of the membership
of a preparatory recall assembly guarantees that all the sectors of the electorate
province shall be heard. It is for this reason that in Our Resolution of September 21,
1993, We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine
qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all
the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. It
also requires that the recall resolution by the said majority must be adopted during its
session called for the purpose. The underscored words carry distinct legal meanings
and purvey some of the parameters limiting the power of the members of a preparatory
recall assembly to initiate recall proceedings. Needless to state, compliance with these
requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which
can he given due course by the COMELEC.
Furthermore, it cannot be asserted with certitude that the members of the Bataan
preparatory recall assembly voted strictly along narrow political lines. Neither the
respondent COMELEC nor this Court made a judicial inquiry as to the reasons that led
the members of the said recall assembly to cast a vote of lack of confidence against
petitioner Garcia. That inquiry was not undertaken for to do so would require crossing
the forbidden borders of the political thicket. Former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a
major author of the subject law in his book The Local Government Code of 1991: The
Key to National Development, stressed the same reason why the substantive content of
a vote of lack of confidence is beyond any inquiry, thus:
"There is only one ground for the recall of local government officials: loss of
confidence. This means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly
may resolve to recall any local elective officials without specifying any particular ground
except loss of confidence. There is no need for them to bring up any charge of abuse or
corruption against the local elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition.
In the case of Evardone vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 204 SCRA 464, 472
(1991), the Court ruled that "loss of confidence" as a ground for recall is a political
question. In the words of the Court, "whether or not the electorate of the municipality
of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question."
Any assertion therefore that the members of the Bataan preparatory recall assembly
voted due to their political aversion to petitioner Garcia is at best a surmise.
Petitioners also contend that the resolution of the members of the preparatory recall
assembly subverted the will of the electorate of the province of Bataan who elected
petitioner Garcia with a majority of 12,500 votes. Again, the contention proceeds from
the erroneous premise that the resolution of recall is the recall itself. It refuses to
recognize the reality that the resolution of recall is a mere proposal to the electorate of
Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. The proposal will still be passed upon
by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As this judgment has yet to be expressed, it is
premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the electorate of Bataan has been
subverted. The electorate of Bataan may or may not recall petitioner Garcia in an
appropriate election. If the electorate re-elects petitioner Garcia, then the proposal to
recall him made by the preparatory recall assembly is rejected. On the other hand, if the
electorate does not re-elect petitioner Garcia, then he has lost the confidence of the
people which he once enjoyed. The judgment will write finis to this political controversy.
For more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is
final for "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them."
In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people,
particularly their direct right to initiate and remove elective local officials thru recall
elections. If the petition would succeed, the result will be a return to the previous system
of recall elections which Congress found should be improved. The alternative mode of
initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall assembly is, however, an
innovative attempt by Congress to remove impediments to the effective exercise by the
people of their sovereign power to check the performance of their elected officials. The
power to determine this mode was specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed
by the Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing
the constitutionality of section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall
assembly to initiate the recall process are dismissed for lack of merit. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
 [ G.R. No. 123169, November 04, 1996 ]
DANILO E. PARAS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan

City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994.  A petition for his recall
as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the
petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to
approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the
recall election on November 13, 1995.[1] At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however,
deferred the recall election in view of petitioner’s opposition.  On December 6, 1995,
the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995.  To prevent
the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional  Trial Court  of 
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with
the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order.  After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required
petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. [2]

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the
recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent
prayer for injunction.  On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to
comment on the petition.  In view of the Office of the Solicitor General’s manifestation
maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law
department filed the required comment.  Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.[3]

Petitioner’s argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and
every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union
v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a
regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK
election from the recall election.  We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

"SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election."

[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.[4] The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his term of office.  Paragraph (b) construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of
office.  Thus, subscribing to petitioner’s interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the
Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of
the people before the end of his term.  And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No.
7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the
purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner,
then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to
have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. [5] An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. [6]

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be

interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. [7] Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of
the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict
with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a
local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x"

Moreover, petitioner’s too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we
cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
"We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict
rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is
usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth’ x x x" [8]
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the
conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. 
The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned.  The electorate could choose the official’s replacement
in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected
through a recall election.  It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the
recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated
under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the
barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled on May 1997.[9]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. 
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the
recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 126576, March 05, 1997 ]
MAYOR RICARDO M. ANGOBUNG, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, AND ATTY. AURORA S. DE ALBAN,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us on certiorari is a petition seeking to annul and set aside Resolution No.
96-2951[1] dated October 15, 1996 issued by public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) which (1) approved the Petition for Recall filed and signed by only one
registered voter - herein private respondent Ma. Aurora Siccuan de Alban, against
petitioner - incumbent Mayor Ricardo Angobung; (2) set the further signing of said
petition by the rest of the registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela on November 9, 1996;
and (3) in case the said petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of
registered votes in Tumauni, Isabela, scheduled the recall election on December 2, 1996.

On October 25, 1996, this court issued a Temporary Restraining Order [2] enjoining public
respondent COMELEC from implementing and enforcing Resolution No. 96-2951.

The facts of this case are not disputed.

Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the
local elections of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private respondent de
Alban was also a candidate in said elections.

Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election
Registrar in Tumauni, Isabela, a Petition for Recall [3]against petitioner. On September 12,
1996, petitioner received a copy of this petition. Subsequently said petition was
forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of
COMELEC in Manila, for approval.

Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson
submitted to the COMELEC En Banc, a Memorandum [4] dated October 8, 1996
recommending approval of the petition for recall filed by private respondent and its
signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters as required by Section 69(d) of the Local Government code of 1991.

In turn acting on the abovementioned Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director

Joson, the COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.

Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and

therefore invalid, on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for
Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25%
minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting and petition for recall;
and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the
May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.

In at least three (3) urgent motions, private respondent has sought the lifting of the
Temporary Retraining Order issued last October 25, 1996 on the twin grounds (1) that
the issue of the one-year bar on recall elections has been resolved in the case of Paras v.
COMELEC[5] promulgated on November 4, 1996; and (2) that the procedure prescribed
by Resolution No. 96-2951 involving petition signing upon initiation of even just one
person, is no different from that provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 which
was upheld as constitutional in the 1991 cases of Sanches, et al. v. COMELEC [6]and
Evardone v. COMELEC[7]

Private respondent is correct in saying that in the light of our pronouncement in Paras v.
COMELEC[8], the recall election scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the instant case
cannot be said to be barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. In construing the
meaning of the term, “regular local election” in Section 74 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 which provides that “no recall shall take place within one (1) year x x x
immediately preceding a regular local election,” we ruled that for the time bar to apply,
the approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the official to
be recalled, is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate. Thus, in the instant
case where the time bar is being invoked by petitioner mayor in view of the approaching
Barangay Elections in May 1997, there can be no application of the one year bar, hence
no invalidity may be ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951 on this ground.

We, however, find petitioner’s second ground to be impressed with merit.

Before the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code, the recall of public officials
voted for in popular elections, was governed by Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983. Pursuant to Section
59 thereof, which states that “the Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise
the process of and election on recall x x x and, in pursuance thereof, promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations,” the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2272
Sections 4 and 5 of which provide as follows:
“Sec. 4. How instituted. - The recall of an elective provincial, city or municipal
official shall be commenced by the filing of a duly verified notice of recall containing the
address and precinct number of the voter filing the notice, and the name of the official
sought to be recalled, his position, and the ground(s) for the recall. Each notice shall
refer to only one official.lex

The notice shall be filed in triplicate with the local Election Registrar if the recall involves
a city or municipal official, or with the Provincial Election Supervisor if it involves a
provincial official, one copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin
board in the city/municipal hall.

If the recall involves a provincial official, two additional copies of the notice shall also be
furnished by the voter filing the notice to the Election Registrar of each city and
municipality in the province, one copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on
the bulletin board in the city/municipal hall.
In every case, the voter filing the notice of recall shall furnish a copy thereof to the
official sought to be recalled, the Commission on Elections in Manila and the Election
Records and Statistics Department of the Commission.

Section 5. Schedule and place of signing of the petition. - The Election Registrar shall
submit to the Commission on Elections, not later than ten days from filing of the notice
of recall, the schedule of the signing of the petition to recall for approval and funding x x
x.”[9]
In the case of Sanchez v. COMELEC [10], petitioners therein contended that the
aforegoing “Resolution No. 2272 is unconstitutional there being no legislative
enactment yet on [the] mechanism of recall as mandated under Sec. 3, Art. X of the
Constitution”[11] It is true, as private respondent asseverates, that we upheld the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272, but not because we found nothing
constitutionally infirm about the procedure of allowing the initiatory recall petition to be
filed by only one person. The issue in Sanchez was not this questioned procedure but
the legal basis for the exercise by the COMELEC of its rule-making power in the alleged
absence of a grant of such power by an enabling statute on recall. Thus we ruled:
While it is true that Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution mandates the Congress to
enact a local government code providing among others for an effective mechanism of
recall, nothing in said provision could be inferred the repeal of BP 337, the local
government code existing prior to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 3, Art. X
of the Constitution merely provides that the local government code to be enacted by
Congress shall be ‘more responsive’ than the one existing at present. Until such time
that a more responsive and effective local government code is enacted, the present
code shall remain in full force and effect. Thus, under Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, ‘(a)ll existing
laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked.’

Considering that the present local government code (BP 337) is still in effect, respondent
COMELEC’s promulgation of Resolution No. 2272 is therefore valid and constitutional,
the same having been issued pursuant to Sec. 59 of BP 337. It reads:
‘Sec. 59. Supervision by the Commission on Elections. - The Commission on
Elections shall conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall x x x and, in
pursuance thereof, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations.’” [12]

We reiterated the foregoing ruling in the case of Evardone v. COMELEC [13] in this wise:

“Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all
existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until
amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local
Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically
repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local
Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case.

x x x

Chapter (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local
elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct
and supervise the process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers,
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations. x x x Thus, pursuant to the rule-making
power vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May
1990.

We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is

valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to
approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.” [14]
In Sanchez and Evardone, the COMELEC prescribed procedure of (1) allowing the
recall petition to be filed by at least one person or by less than 25% of the total number
of registered voters and then (2) inviting voters to sign said petition on a date set for
that purpose, was never put to issue. As this is the crux of the present constitutional
challenge, the proper time has come for this court to issue a definitive ruling on the
matter.

Apropos for starters is the following chronicle of the evolution of the mechanism of
recall as a mode of removing a public officer by direction action of the people, essayed
in the case of Garcia v. COMELEC:[15]
“Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of
his term of office. The people’s prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of
their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is
implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable
for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently
described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy.

Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in
section 2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:
‘SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may
not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a
more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system
of recall x x x’

The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled, ‘The Local Government
Code of 1983’ Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall
elections of local election officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%)
of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned x x x.

Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by
BP 337 was exercised by our people.

In February , 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for
they resorted to revolution and they booted out of office the highest elective officials of
the land. The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have
forfeited the trust of the electorate led to its firm institutionalization of the 1987
Constitution. Its Articles XIII expressly recognized the Role and Rights of People’s
Organizations x x x.

Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local
government code which ‘shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum x x x. In response to this constitutional
call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992.”[16]
Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that
“recall of any elective x x x municipal x x x official may also be validly initiated upon
petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in
the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected”. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates
recall proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters, may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note of the phrase,
“petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) and point out that the law does not state
that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the
petition must be “of” or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must
be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters. This is understandable, since the signing of the petition is statutorily required to
be undertaken “before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence
of a represetantive of the official sought to be recalled, and in public place in the x x x
municipality x x x”.[17] Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the
signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, the petition must
contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose
behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.

We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of
people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof
by just one person, as in the instant case, since this is indubitably violative of clear and
categorical provisions of subsisting law.

Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum.
They knew that this is the requirement under a majority of the constitution and recall
statutes in various American states to the same extent that they were aware of the
rationale therefor. While recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to
remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether
or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience
dictates,[18] it is a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their
leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. In other words, recall must be
pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small
percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purposes as a direct remedy of the
people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to
recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of
government.
A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of
minimum voter requirement in American recall statutes, unmistakably reveals the
vigilance of lawmakers against the abuse of the power of recall. For instance, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held in the case of In Re Bower [19] that:
“[t]the only logical reasons which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait
one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their
parting voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to
evaluate the soundness of his political policies and decisions. We view the statutory
provision requiring the number of petition signers to equal at least 45% of the total
votes case in the last general election for mayor as a further attempt to insure that an
official will not have to defend his policies against frivolous attacks launched by a small
percentage of disenchanted electors.”[20]
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Colorado held in the case of Bernzen
v. City of Boulder[21] that:

“[t]he framers, by requiring that a recall petition contain the signatures of at least
25% of all votes cast in the last election for all candidates for the position which the
person sought to be recalled occupies, assured that a recall election will not be held in
response to the wishes of a small and unrepresentative minority. However, once at least
25% of the electorate have expressed their dissatisfaction, the constitution reserves the
recall power to the will of the electorate.”[22]
And in the case of Wallace v. Tripp[23], the Supreme Court of Michigan, echoed the
foregoing posturings in this wise:
“Much of what has been said to justify a limit upon recall clearly not provided or
contemplated by the Constitution has revealed fears about an irresponsible electorate
xxx. A much cited Nebraska case pertaining to a Nebraska recall statute provides some
answers which are equally applicable to the Michigan constitutional right of recall:
‘xxx Doubtless the provision requiring 30 per cent of the electors to sign the
petition before the council [is] compelled to act was designed to avoid such a
contingency. The legislature apparently assumed that nearly one-third of the electorate
would not entail upon the taxpayers the cost of an election unless the charges made
approved themselves to their understanding and they were seriously dissatisfied with
the services of the incumbent of the office.’” [24]

In the instant case, this Court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly
repugnant to the applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law.
Private respondent who is a lawyer, knows that Section 69(d) of the Local Government
Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a petition of 25% of the total
number of registered voters. Notwithstanding such awareness, private respondent
proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She
claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost
confidence in the leadership of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names of
all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust
petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private respondent is truly
earnest in her cause, and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows
that she claims responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioner’s continuance in
office. But the same cannot be said of all the other people whom private respondent
claims to have sentiments similar to hers. While the people are vested with the power
to recall their elected officials, the same power is accompanied by the concomitant
responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of such power,
including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his
family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end.
The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then
setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the
public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the
performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law
but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. We can not and must not, under
any and all circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum
voter requirement in the initiation of the recall process.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is

hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 96-2951 is hereby DECLARED
NULL and VOID and accordingly SET ASIDE.

The RESTRAINING ORDER heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
 [ G.R. No. 127066, March 11, 1997 ]
REYNALDO O. MALONZO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY
(CALOOCAN CHAPTER) AND ALEX L. DAVID, CONRADO G. CRUZ,
TRINIDAD REPUNO, GLORIA M. CRUZ, MIRALI M. DURR, FERMIN
JIMENEZ, AURELIO BILUAN, ROGELIO SARAZA, HELENE VALBUENA,
AND HIGINO RULLEPA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

TORRES, JR., J.:

The Court is called upon to strike down Resolution 96-026, [1] dated November 18,
1996, of the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) calling for an Election for
the Recall of the Petitioner Reynaldo O. Malonzo, the incumbent Mayor of Caloocan
City.

Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995, winning over
former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term, petitioner's office as
Mayor was put to serious question when on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and
Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen, constituting a
majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan,
met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall
Assembly Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and
calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.

Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the
COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with the
respondent Commission alleging, principally, that the recall process was deficient in
form and substance, and therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition
devoid of merit and declared the recall proceedings to be in order. The COMELEC's
Resolution on the petition states pertinently:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc hereby
RESOLVES to DISMISS the Petition. We approve and give DUE COURSE to PRA Resolution
No. 01-96 entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE RECALL OF REYNALDO O. MALONZO AS
MAYOR OF KALOOCAN CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. Accordingly and conformably
with Section 71 R.A. 7160, the Commission SETS the date of the Election on Recall on
December 14, 1996. We shall, by separate resolution, issue a calendar of activities
involved in said exercise.

SO ORDERED."[2]
On November 28, 1996, Mayor Malonzo came to us on a "Petition for Certiorari
With Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction", assailing the COMELEC's resolution as having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion. The Petition, in the main, raises the issue of the validity of the institution
and proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of the service of notices to
the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting in
the issuance of the questioned Resolution.

Due to the importance of the matters in issue, and the proximity of the Recall Election
date declared by the COMELEC, the Court, on November 29, 1996, issued a
Resolution[3] ordering the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from proceeding
with the recall election projected on December 14, 1996, and directing the respondents
to file their respective Comments.

Private respondents Liga ng mga Barangay (Caloocan Chapter), Alex L. David, Conrado G.
Cruz, Trinidad Repuno, Gloria M. Cruz, Mirali M. Durr, Fermin Jimenez, Aurelio Biluan,
Rogelio Saraza, Helene Valbuena and Higino Rullepa, filed their Comment [4] on
December 6, 1996, alleging that all the requirements for the holding of a recall election
were duly complied with and that the petition is therefore without basis. On the other
hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment [5]on
February 7, 1997, with the surprising submission that the COMELEC was amiss in its
duties as enforcer of election laws.

According to the Solicitor General, the veracity of notices sent to 42 members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly were not directly passed upon by the COMELEC before it
issued the questioned Resolution. It thus submits that the propriety of notices sent to
said PRA members must first be determined by the COMELEC, after giving private
respondents the chance to prove the same, otherwise, a discussion of the other issues
in the present petition would be premature.
At this juncture, the Court finds that there is no need to refer the matter of the veracity
of the questioned notices sent to certain members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly
back to the COMELEC, for the reason that the COMELEC has already conducted an
investigation into the same, and has found the proceedings instituting the recall to be in
accord with law.

The Solicitor General's observation that the issue of veracity of the notices was not
directly passed upon by the COMELEC is incorrect. On the contrary, the matter of
validity of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was sufficiently
considered by the respondent Commission, as in response to petitioner's request for a
technical examination of the recall documents, the COMELEC directed its Election
Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to resolve the matter of notices sent to the
Preparatory Recall Assembly members. The ERSD in turn performed its task and
reported its findings to the COMELEC. The following excerpts from Resolution UND 96-
026 of the COMELEC reflect the results of the ERSD's investigation, and the resulting
action of the COMELEC:

"The ERSD Report gave the following information:

Three (3) lists of elected Barangay officials were used as reference, namely: COMELEC
list; DILG list and Caloocan City list.

According to the COMELEC listing, of the 188 barangays in Kalookan City, there should
have been 1,692 members of the PRA. However, one barangay, Barangay 94, did not
elect an SK Chairman, thus, there are of record, 1,691 elected barangay officials of
Kalookan City, broken down as follows:

Punong Barangay              -           188

Barangay Kagawads          -           1,316

SK Chairmen                     -           187

               (One Barangay, Barangay 94 did not elect its SK Chairman)
The DILG registry is incomplete, showing only a listing of 1,390 barangay officials. The
Kalookan City Talaan ng mga Barangay tallies with the COMELEC List. From the records,
the following data is found: Of the 1,691 barangay officials, forty (40) had resigned. In
the stead of twenty-eight (28) resignees, replacements were appointed. Twelve (12)
positions however, remained vacant, there being no successors named therein. Twenty-
two (22) barangay officials are deceased. Twelve (12) vacancies caused by such death
were filled up by appointing replacements. Ten (10) vacant positions were however not
filled up. There being twenty-two (22) unfilled posts, the total number of Barangay
officials of Kalookan City at the time of the constitution of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly was initiated is 1,669.

ERSD reported that there were a total of 1,927 notices sent, some members being
served two or three notices. The Notices were sent in three modes; Personal, registered
mail and by courier and they were in the name of the PRA member, and addressed at
his residence or office of record.

In its initial report, the Department stated that six persons listed in the COMELEC record
as barangay officials were not duly notified. These were: Jose de Chavez, listed as
Barangay kagawad of Barangay 6; Enrico Marasigan, listed as Barangay kagawad of
Barangay 65; Pablo Musngi, listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 119; Rolando Ang,
listed as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 109; and Pilar Pilares, Barangay Kagawad of
Barangay 162 and Teresita Calayo, listed as kagawad of Barangay 182. Respondents
explained the absence of notice to these persons thus:

'1. Jose de Chavez has been removed from office as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 6 by
virtue of Resolution No. 95-011 passed on July 16, 1995, and has been replaced by
Corazon Obusan by virtue of Resolution No. 95-016 passed on August 1995, both
promulgated by the Barangay Council of said barangay. In view of the fact that it is
Corazon Obusan who is the recognized Barangay kagawad of the aforementioned
barangay, as it appears in the official roster of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) the notice of the July 7, 1996 PRA session was duly served on her
and not on Mr. de Chavez.

2. Enrico Marasigan has resigned as Barangay kagawad of Barangay 65 as evidenced by

his resignation letter dated March 24, 1995. He was replaced by Ronio de la Cruz, by
virtue of a Resolution passed by the Barangay Council of Barangay 65 dated August 10,
1995. Accordingly, the notice of the July 7, 1996 PRA session was duly served on Mr. de
la Cruz and not on Mr. Marasigan.

3. Pablo Musngi ceased to be a Barangay kagawad of Barangay 119 by reason of his

death on April 12, 1996. He has been replaced by Sylvia Saberola on whom notice of the
July 7, 1996 PRA session has been duly served.

4. Notices, both by personal delivery and by registered mail, were served on Mr.
Rolando Ang at his official address at Barangay 109 Zone 10 East Grace Park, Caloocan
City. The returns of the said service of notice, however, disclosed that he can no longer
be located in the said address. He has, however, not informed the DILG of any change in
his official address.

5. Pilar Pilares had been served notice by personal delivery but refused to sign
acknowledgment receipt. She has likewise been served notice by registered mail as
evidenced by the receipt in her behalf by a certain Ricardo Pilares III.' (Respondents'
Comment, dated October 14, 1996.

As to Teresita Calayo, respondent defends lack of notice to her, thus:

'Teresita Calayo is not a duly elected kagawad of Barangay 182, Zone 16.

Per certification issued by the Board of Election Tellers, Ms. Calayo did not win in the
May 1994 Barangay Election. Records would show that it should be Kagawad Fermin
Quintos who should be recognized as legitimate barangay kagawad of the said barangay
having placed no. 7 in the election and not Ms. Calayo who appears to be a loser/9th
place. There appears to be an apparent oversight in placing the name of Calayo in the
subject PRA Resolution for signature, wherein it shows that both the names of Fermin
Quintos and Teresita Calayo are included.' (Respondents' Compliance dated November
13, 1996, p. 6)

In the ERSD's final and complete report, two (2) additional names were reflected as not
having been served notices and these were Lino Ramos and Teodulfo Abenoja, listed as
kagawads of Barangay 174.

Commenting on this report, respondents stated:

'1. As regards Tomas Daep and Teodulfo Abenoja (not Agenoja);

Notice by registered mail was served on, and acknowledged by Tomas Daep, who
personally signed the return card.

There was actually an error committed by the ERSD when it concluded that Tomas Daep
has already resigned and was replaced by Ernesto Taupa. Official records would show
that Tomas Daep and Ernesto Taupa are still both presently holding the position of
Kagawad of Barangay 174 Zone 15.

Ernesto Taupa was officially appointed to the position vacated by Teodulfo Abenoja by
virtue of the latter's resignation on 15 March 1996. Teodulfo Abenoja, on the other
hand, was appointed to the position vacated by Lino Ramos and Teodulfo Abenoja -
they, having resigned and, the latter, having been already replaced by Ernesto Taupa.

Ernesto Taupa on the other, as correctly determined by the ERSD, was validly served
with the notice of the PRA session two (2) days before the scheduled PRA meeting.'

Respondents' submission, being substantiated by documents and uncontroverted

by Petitioner are hereby accepted as meritorious.

In addition to the aforenamed, three persons; Pablo de Castro, Ruben Ballega, and Jesus
Tan claiming to be the Barangay captains of Barangay 116, Barangay 148 and Barangay
156, respectively, and therefore members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, came
before the Commission and manifested that they were not duly notified about the PRA
session.

The records in custody of the Commission, however, revealed that there was no truth to
their allegations.

Pablo de Castro was served notice by registered mail on July 1, 1996, and this he
received on July 3, 1996, as shown in the return card duly signed in acknowledgment.
The same notice was served on him by courier (LBC) on July 5, 1996.

Ruben Ballega was notified by personal service on July 1, 1996, the receipt of which was
duly acknowledged and by registered mail on July 2, 1996.

Jesus Tan Sr. was served notice personally and by registered mail. The personal service
was completed on July 1, 1996, as shown by the receipt signed by his daughter, one
Analiza T. Asque. The same notice was sent him by registered mail, received by the same
daughter on July 2, 1996.

The Commission however regards the sending of notice one thing, and the completion
of service thereof another, for indeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully
satisfied, if there was not only service, but also completion of service thereof. Thus, we
were obliged to inquire more closely into the records and we found:
Personal services were acknowledged by receipts signed, if not by the addressee
himself, then, as indicated thereon, by his or her spouse, nearest relative or a person of
sufficient discretion in the member's residence or office. Service by registered mail was
evinced by the return card duly signed by the addressee or by persons acting for him.
There were instances when notices were served but were refused, this fact noted in the
acknowledgment receipt by the server and his witnesses. The circumstances being thus,
we hold that there was complete service of the notices as contemplated in Section 8,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides:
'Section 8 - Completeness of Service - Personal service is complete upon delivery.
Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing,
unless the court otherwise provides; Service by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five
(5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the
expiration of such time.'
That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng mga Barangay who sent the
notices is of no moment. We had earlier determined that as member of the PRA, he can
legally exercise the prerogatives attached to his membership in the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, sending notices to the other members of its scheduled convening.

It is evident from the foregoing and, therefore, the Commission so holds that the
requirements of notice had been fully complied with." [6]
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is
factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the
Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its
own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the
court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.

Moreover, to order the COMELEC to repeat the process of determining the notices'
propriety would be sanctioning a recycling of administrative functions, entailing added
cost and waste of effort.

Petitioner likewise attacks the COMELEC's ruling on the validity of the proceedings held
by the Preparatory Recall Assembly, in that it allegedly ruled that the LIGA ng mga
Barangay is authorized to initiate the recall and convene the Preparatory Recall
Assembly. Petitioner likewise averred that the session held, and the adoption of the
recall resolution, by the recall assembly were tainted with irregularities, violence, graft
and corruption.

The pertinent provisions of law, as regards the initiation of the recall process, are
Sections 69 and 70 of R.A. 7160:

"SEC. 69. By whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to such recall belongs.

SEC. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. -

(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters
of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall
belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and
municipality which shall be composed of the following:
xxx

(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;

xxx

(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in
a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local
government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be
validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the
preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be
validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in
the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected.
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his
representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a
representative of the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the province,
city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the COMELEC
through its office in the local government unit concerned. The COMELEC or its duly
authorized representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a public and
conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20)
days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and
the required percentage of voters.

(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized
representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and
thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official
sought to be recalled."
Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm
since it was convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes
that "respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not an organization of
barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the
barangay captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It also
provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay
chairman."[7] The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the
Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities representing the
barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the
majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for
the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance
with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members
convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of
Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings,
therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground.

Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedings held during the recall assembly should
be laid to rest. As the respondent COMELEC pertinently observes:
"The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there
was a session held. Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of the
Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on establish. Rules of procedure, simple they
may be were formulated. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was
that of petitioner's recall. The members were given the opportunity to articulate on
their resolve about the matter. More importantly, their sentiments were expressed
through their votes signified by their signatures and thumbmarks affixed to the
Resolution. No proof was adduced by Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the
signatures appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the
resolution. The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it
demand a specific procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with the provision that
there should be a session called for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings,
attended by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly, in a public
place and that the resolution resulting from such assembly be adopted by a majority of
all the PRA members."[8]
The charges of graft and corruption, violence and irregularities, before and during
the session of the preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, and cannot
override the substantiated findings of the respondent COMELEC.
"In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."[9]
 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [10] It means such evidence which affords a
substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. [11] To overturn
the presumption of validity of performance of official duty, more than a mere scintilla of
proof is needed, otherwise, one disgruntled fellow can destroy the foundations laid by
the overwhelming majority, and this is not the scenario envisioned by our democratic
system of government.

In sum, we are persuaded strongly by the principle that the findings of fact of
administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great
weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are
made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and
in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby RESOLVED to DISMISS the present petition, for lack of

merit. The decision of the respondent Commission on Elections to GIVE DUE COURSE to
PRA Resolution No. 01-96 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Commission on Elections is
hereby ORDERED to set the date of the Election on Recall in the city of Caloocan, which
date shall not be later than thirty days after receipt of notice of this Resolution, which is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 140560, May 04, 2000 ]
JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT AND RICHARD ADVINCULA, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 140714.]

PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, HEREIN

REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, RICHARD ADVINCULA,
PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND HON.
 JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These are petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the Preparatory
Recall Assembly of Pasay City (PRA) in the Commission on Elections in E.M. No. 99-005
entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 01,
S-1999 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999 FOR THE RECALL OF MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF
PASAY CITY. G.R. No. 140560 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the
nullification of the resolution, [1] dated October 18, 1999, of the COMELEC giving due
course to the petition for the recall of petitioner Jovito O. Claudio as mayor of Pasay
City. On the other hand, G.R. No. 140714 is a petition for mandamus filed by the PRA,
represented by its Chair, Richard Advincula, to compel the COMELEC to set the date for
the holding of recall elections in Pasay City pursuant to the aforecited resolution of the
COMELEC.

The facts are as follows:

Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay
City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998.

Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay
City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor
Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair
Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone 4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an
ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula, private
respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714, was designated chair.

On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads,
and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999,
entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF
PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as
chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13)
Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal submission to the Office of the Election
Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall.

As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an
affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules
of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin boards of the local
COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public market at Libertad St.
and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos St., all in
Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the
resolution was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City
designated by the COMELEC.

Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald
Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the
petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show
attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of
the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the
convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election
case,[2] filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the
proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before
recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to
obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually
double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang
kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed
affidavits of retraction.

In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and
dismissed the oppositions against it. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted
by a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended
the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering
that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics
of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total
membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to
constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall
resolution. Based on the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the
COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient. On whether the
pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the
COMELEC ruled that it was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of
the case to delay the recall proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition for recall
violated the bar on recall within one year from the elective official's assumption of
office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall is a process which starts
with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999,
exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held
that the petition was filed on time.

Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in Baguio City on April
4, 2000, after which the Court, by the vote of 8 to 6 of its members, [3] resolved to
dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 140560 for lack of showing that the COMELEC
committed a grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the Court unanimously
dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 140714 on the ground that the issue raised therein
had become moot and academic.

We now proceed to explain the grounds for our resolution.

In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of the recall
elections in Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for mandamus in
G.R. No. 140714 to compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay
City is no longer tenable. We are thus left with only petitioner Claudio's action for
certiorari and prohibition.

The bone of contention in this case is §74 of the Local Government Code (LCG) [4] which
provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
As defined at the hearing of these cases on April 4, 2000, the issues are:
 WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160) ...

A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening of
the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.

B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the
election period for that regular election or simply the date of such election.

(1)

On Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of §74 of the Local Government Code
Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a
Recall Resolution
Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in §74(b) refers to a process, in
contrast to the term "recall election" found in §74(a), which obviously refers to an
election. He claims that "when several barangay chairmen met and convened on May
19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the taking of votes
by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a resolution ‘to initiate the
recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence,’ the process of
recall began" and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office,
the PRA was illegally convened and all proceedings held thereafter, including the filing
of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and void.

The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts with the
filing of the petition for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that,
since the petition for recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a
day after petitioner's assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the
one-year prohibited period.

Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in
§74 refers to a process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of
the one-year limitation in paragraph (b) of §74.

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the
preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition,
the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the
scheduled date.[5] However, as used in paragraph (b) of § 74, "recall" refers to the
election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local
official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this
conclusion.

First, § 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations
on Recall." On the other hand, §69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective
official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate
recall proceedings[6] but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in §74
cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term
"recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the
PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the
signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.

Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or
petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of
times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the
purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the
power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the
preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of §74
seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date
of assumption of office of an elective local official.

Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC[7] where two objections
were raised against the legality of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall
proceedings is the sole prerogative of the electorate which cannot be delegated to
PRAs, and (2) that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally
authorizes it to shorten the term of office of incumbent elective local officials. Both
objections were dismissed on the ground that the holding of a PRA is not the recall
itself. With respect to the first objection, it was held that it is the power to recall and not
the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. With respect to the
second objection, it was held that a recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the
official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be
allowed to continue in office.  [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment,
the official concerned remains in office . . . ."

If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on

whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people,
then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year
after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to
be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph
(b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take
place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of an elective local official. In the Bower case[8] cited by this Court
in Angobung v. COMELEC,[9] it was held that "The only logical reason which we can
ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall election
is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official
before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and
decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall
because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal
petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least
twelve months." But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle
announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for
evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as
the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate
a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official
concerned has been in office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without
sufficient basis. As already stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall
resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is
the vote of the electorate in the Election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall
election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he
will not be judged on his performance prematurely.

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the
PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials
would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its
members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the
performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public
opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes
the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to
unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to
assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary,
they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-
year period in paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of
repose" during which "[his] attention should not be distracted by any impediment,
especially by disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot
really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an
elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is
not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated
and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of
partisan politics is the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against
such shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may, have the
incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose
of the limitation on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a
sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official.

In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable
as recalls initiated directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing
repudiation by the people of [Kaloocan City's] Preparatory Recall Assembly" when,
instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him.

Two points may be made against this argument.

One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local
official whose recall is sought is actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into
cities and providing for the holding of plebiscites during which the question of cityhood
is submitted to the people for their approval are not always approved by the people.
Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good judge of the will of the voters in the
locality. In the case of recall elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA
was resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the incumbent mayor
failed to obtain the signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall,
there may be some plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the
people's will as are the 25 % of the voters.

Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a local government
unit cannot be more representative of the sentiments of the people than those initiated
by PRAs whose members represent the entire electorate in the local government unit.
Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to political maneuverings or
manipulations as are those composing PRAs.

The other point regarding Justice Puno’s claim is that the question here is not whether
recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year
period of limitation in paragraph (b) includes the convening of the PRA. Given that
question, will convening the PRA outside this period make it any more representative of
the people, as the petition filed by 25 % of the registered voters is claimed to be?

To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the
preliminary proceedings to initiate recall -

1. Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to §69, is a power

which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the
voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of
recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph
(b);

2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a
sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the
day of the election; and

3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall
proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the
Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after
petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its
holding on that date.
(2)

On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of §74 of the
Local Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply
the Date of Such Election
Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall
election is within the second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the
phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the
regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as
well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the
election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be
held.

This contention is untenable.

The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this
limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus
Election Code,[10] it could have expressly said so.

Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a
recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one
year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30
following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year
to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months
and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as
including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an
interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is
designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable."

Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the
Omnibus Election Code,[11] unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period
commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days
thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in
paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of
the people.

To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, §74 imposes limitations on the holding of
recall elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than
once during the term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b)
prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official assumed
office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year
immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v.
COMELEC,[12] "[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates
the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is,
during the second year of office."
(3)

On Whether the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly
Verified
Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of
the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of
the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did
not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their
names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their
concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by
hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.

This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in
this case. It was not raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner
was that some of the names in the petition were double entries, that some members
had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidad's pending
election protest was a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the
petition for recall could be given due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the
stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not include the
issue now being raised by petitioner.

Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it
was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it.
Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is
absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution
signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they
signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the
pages in question are part.

The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was
not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as
notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this
issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.

WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R.
No. 140714 is DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 141787, September 18, 2000 ]
MANUEL H. AFIADO, JASMINIO B. QUEMADO, JR. AND GLESIE L.
TANGONAN, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,
praying for the early resolution of the petition for the "recall" of former Vice-Mayor
Amelita S. Navarro (currently the Mayor) of Santiago City, which was filed with
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

The facts are as follows:

During the May 11, 1998 elections in Santiago City, Joel Miranda became the substitute
candidate for his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, for the position of Mayor. When the
ballots were counted, Joel emerged as the winner over his opponent Antonio Abaya and
he was later proclaimed. Amelita S. Navarro also won and was proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Santiago City.

On May 13, 1998, the defeated candidate, Antonio Abaya, filed before the COMELEC
against Joel Miranda a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,
docketed as SPA No. 98-288, which was later amended. The amended petition sought the
declaration of the certificate of candidacy of Jose Miranda, the father of Joel, as null and
void.

The petition, as amended, was granted by the COMELEC en banc, and consequently the
election and proclamation of Joel Miranda as Mayor of Santiago City was annulled. This
ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a Decision promulgated on July 28, 1999 in
G.R. No. 136531, entitled "Joel Miranda vs. Antonio Abaya and COMELEC." In that
decision, we ruled that since the certificate of candidacy of Jose Miranda was not valid,
he could not be validly substituted by his son, Joel Miranda, as a mayoralty candidate in
Santiago City. Hence, Joel Miranda could not be validly proclaimed as the winner in the
mayoralty elections. Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro thus became the new Mayor of
Santiago City by virtue of the law on succession.[1] Joel Miranda filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was denied with finality by the Supreme Court in a Resolution
dated September 28, 1999.

Navarro took her oath of office and assumed her position as Mayor of Santiago City on
October 11, 1999.

Meanwhile, on July 12, 1999, while the said G.R. No. 136531 was still pending in the
Supreme Court, petitioners Manuel H. Afiado, Jasminio B. Quemado and Glesie L.
Tangonan convened the barangay officials of Santiago City who compose the Preparatory
Recall Assembly (PRA) at the Santiago City People's Coliseum after giving them due
notice. On the same date, July 12, 1999, the PRA passed and adopted Preparatory Recall
Assembly Resolution No. 1 for the recall of Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro. The
pertinent portions of the said Resolution No. 1 read as follows:
 ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 1

-oOo-

RESOLUTION OF THE PREPARATORY

RECALL ASSEMBLY OF THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS OF SANTIAGO CITY
FOR THE RECALL OF THE INCUMBENT
VICE-MAYOR OF SANTIAGO CITY

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, during the Preparatory Recall Assembly the official acts of City Vice Mayor
Navarro that brought forth the loss of confidence in her capacity and fitness to discharge
the duties and to perform the functions of her public office were recounted for the
contemplation and evaluation of the members present, to wit:

1. Her lack of respect and due regard for superior authority…

2. Her greed for political power which worked against public interest and the general
welfare…

3. Her lack of regard for public officials, subordinates and lowly employees, which is
conduct unbecoming of a public official and speaks of her unprofessionalism…

4. Her constant insistence to usurp the powers or authority vested upon other public
officials…

5. Her application of delaying tactics in the SP actions on the City Government's

annual budget…

6. Her disregard of parliamentary rules by imposing her unsolicited and unnecessary

opinion unto the city councilors…

7. Because of her preoccupation towards matters other than those of public concerns,
substantial part of the legislative tasks of the Sangguniang Panlungsod brought to
it for action have remained unacted unfinished (sic);

8. Her alleged malfeasance of corruption while she was still the City Mayor in acting
capacity, specifically her direct hand in the anomalous acquisition of six dump
trucks, a request for investigation for (sic) which is pending at the Office of the
Ombudsman;

9. Her antagonistic attitude towards development concerns…

WHEREAS, on accounts of the documented facts and stated hereinabove the members
of the Preparatory Recall Assembly present have lost, after due thought their confidence
upon the incumbent City Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro.

NOW WHEREFORE, upon a motion duly seconded, be it -

RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED to INVOKE THE RESCISSION OF THE

ELECTORAL MANDATE OF THE INCUMBENT CITY VICE-MAYOR
AMELITA S. NAVARRO for LOSS OF CONFIDENCE through a recall election to
be set by the COMMISSION ON ELECTION as provided for under Section 71 of the
Local Government Code of 1991;

xxx xxx xxx

APPROVED by the majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly held
on July 12, 1999 at the People's Coliseum, Santiago City, Isabela.[2]
According to the petitioners, PRA Resolution No. 1 together with all the reglementary
requirements, has been forwarded and submitted to the office of respondent COMELEC
at Santiago City and later to its Head Office in Manila through the Provincial Elections
Office and Regional Elections Office.

On September 9, 1999, while the subject Preparatory Recall Resolution No. 1 was under
evaluation in the COMELEC's Head Office, then Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a
petition, docketed as EM No. 99-006, with the COMELEC which sought the nullification
of the said PRA Resolution No. 1. In Navarro's petition, the herein petitioners Afiado,
Quemado and Tangonan (as officers of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Santiago
City) were impleaded as the respondents therein.

Hearings in EM No. 99-006 were then conducted at the COMELEC's head office. After
the deadline for the submission of memoranda on December 1, 1999, herein petitioners as
the respondents in that case, alleged that they were not informed nor were they aware of
further developments. This prompted them to file on December 27, 1999 an Urgent
Motion for the Early Resolution of the Petition (EM No. 99-006). According to the herein
petitioners, the act of herein respondent COMELEC in not deciding the said petition
violates Rule 18, Section 7 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides
that:
Sec. 7. Period to Decide by the Commission En Banc. - Any case or matter submitted
to or heard by the Commission en banc shall be decided within thirty (30) days from the
date it is deemed submitted for decision or resolution, except a motion for reconsideration
of a decision or resolution of a Division in Special Actions and Special cases which shall
be decided within fifteen (15) days from the date the case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision, unless otherwise provided by law.
The herein petitioners allege that the act of respondent COMELEC in not resolving the
petition, EM No. 99-006, within the reglementary period constitutes neglect in the
performance of its duties and responsibilities; and that the alleged inaction of respondent
COMELEC will render the said case and/or PRA Resolution No. 1 moot and academic
inasmuch as recall elections cannot be undertaken anymore come June 30, 2000 pursuant
to Section 74 of the 1991 Local Government Code, which provides that:
Sec. 74. Limitation on Recall. -

(a) any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his
term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. [3]
Finally, on February 18, 2000, sensing the urgency of the situation since PRA Resolution
No. 1 was not yet acted upon by the COMELEC, the herein petitioners filed the present
petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to resolve and deny
immediately Navaro's petition, docketed therein as EM No. 99-006, and in effect to give
due course to and implement the said PRA Resolution.

The corollary issue in the case at bench is whether or not an elective official who became
City Mayor by legal succession can be the subject of a recall election by virtue of a
Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution which was passed or adopted when the said
elective official was still the Vice-Mayor.

We deny the petition.

On March 31, 2000 respondent COMELEC issued and promulgated in EM No. 99-006 a
Resolution[4] which denied due course to the subject PRA Resolution No. 1. This
development therefore rendered the present petition for mandamus moot and academic.
The record shows that herein petitioners' counsel of record was furnished copies of the
COMELEC's Resolution dated March 31, 2000 by registered mail on April 1, 2000.

Anent the corollary issue as to whether or not Mayor Navarro can be the subject of recall
election by virtue of Resolution No. 1 of the Preparatory Recall Assembly which was
passed when she was still the elected City Vice-Mayor, the same has become moot and
academic. We quote below the pertinent portion of the COMELEC's Resolution dated
March 31, 2000 in EM No. 99-006 and to which we agree, to wit:
The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City
is a supervening event which rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and
academic. A perusal of the said Resolution reveals that the person subject of the recall
process is a specific elective official in relation to her specific office. The said resolution
is replete with statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose of the assembly was to
recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her official acts as Vice Mayor. The title itself
suggests that the recall is intended for the incumbent Vice Mayor of Santiago City. The
third paragraph of the resolution recounted " the official acts of City Vice Mayor Navarro
that brought forth the loss of confidence in her capacity and fitness to discharge the
duties and to perform the functions of her public office." And because of such acts, the
assembly "RESOLVED to invoke the rescission of the electoral mandate of the incumbent
City Vice Mayor." Clearly, the intent of the PRA as expressed in the said Resolution is to
remove the petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost their confidence in her by
reason of her official acts as such. To recall, then, the petitioner when she is already the
incumbent City Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will of the PRA. Having, thus,
succeeded to the position of City Mayor, the petitioner was placed beyond the reach of
the effects of the PRA Resolution.[5]
The specific purpose of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was to remove Amelita S.
Navarro as the elected Vice-Mayor of Santiago City since PRA Resolution No. 1 dated
July 12, 1999 expressly states that "…it is hereby resolved to invoke the rescission of the
electoral mandate of the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro for loss of
confidence through a recall election to be set by the Commission on Election as provided
for under Section 71 of the Local Government Code of 1991."[6] However, the said PRA
Resolution No. 1 is no longer applicable to her inasmuch as she has already vacated the
office of Vice-Mayor on October 11, 1999 when she assumed the position of City Mayor
of Santiago City.

Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly were to reconvene to adopt another resolution
for the recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as Mayor of Santiago City, the same would
still not prosper in view of Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
provides that "No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption of office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election." There is
no more allowable time in the light of that law within which to hold recall elections for
that purpose. The then Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro assumed office as Mayor of
Santiago City on October 11, 1999. One year after her assumption of office as Mayor will
be October 11, 2000 which is already within the one (1) year prohibited period
immediately preceding the next regular election in May 2001.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976 ]
PABLO C. SANIDAD AND PABLITO V. SANIDAD, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
 [G.R. NO. L-44684.  OCTOBER 12, 1976]

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. L-44714.  OCTOBER 12, 1976]

RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., AND ALFREDO

SALAPANTAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MARTIN, J.:

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction
relates to the power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amend-
ments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which
has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
powers. [1]

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related
decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No.
991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the
mariner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable
to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.  Quite relevantly, Presidential
Decree No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full
text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.
[2]

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree
No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16, 1976.  The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the
people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
 The questions ask, to wit:
"(1)    Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2)     Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the
following amendments to the Constitution?  For the purpose of the second question,
the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section
2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

1.       There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an

interim Batasang Pambansa.  Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall
not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent
President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the
nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their
respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of
the Cabinets Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law.  The
number of representatives from each region or sector and the manner of their election
shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2.       The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly
and the members thereof.  However, it shall not exercise the power provided in Article
VIII, Section 14 (1) of the Constitution.
3.       The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the
election and selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and
preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected.  The incumbent
President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise
all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to
discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and
prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five Constitution and the powers
vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4.       The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers
and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime
Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the
President (Prime Minister) may prescribe.  The President (Prime Minister) if he so
desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he
may deem necessary.
5.       The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until
martial law shall have been lifted.
6.       Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a
grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate
action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or
letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7.       The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but
their functions, powers, and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the supervision of the
Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government deems it necessary
to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter whether of national
or local interest.
8.       All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these
amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9.       These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall
have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control
of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father
and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos.
991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to
the new Constitution.  As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis.
 On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent
Commission on Elections.  The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners
have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial
cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction,
docketed as L-44684, was instituted by V ICENT M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or
revision of, the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on
the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. [3]

Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October
5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to
the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial
Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a
short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the
President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-year olds to vote
would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage
to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.

Justiciability of question raised.

1.       As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo

C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional
premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033.  It is now an ancient rule that
the valid source of a statute - Presidential Decrees are of such nature - may be
contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.   At the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be
enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of  the State
for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds.  The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five
[4]

Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes.  Presidential Decree No.
[5]

1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions.  The [6]

interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these

amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the
validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.  Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits,
this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not.  For the present
[7]

case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority
upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2.       The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political
one, lying outside the domain of judicial review.  We disagree.  The amending process,
both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question.  This is especially true in
[8]

cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals
of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted.  Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions).  After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and
2 of Art. XV I, 1973 Constitution).  The normal course has not been followed.  Rather
than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.  Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended,
raises a contestable issue.  The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and
1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as
invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within
the competence of this Court to pass upon.  Section 2 (2), Article X of the new
Constitution provides:  "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc, and no
treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. * * *." The Supreme Court has the last word in
the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself.
 The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a
[9]

delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act.  Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the
contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.  What is in the heels of
the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in pro posing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly.  Whether the amending process confers
on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question.  Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen.  If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the
procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. [10]

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and
the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the people
ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter.  A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle.  Is
it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in
1973?  Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is
indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves - of course - who
exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people
themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine
whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not.  And, this
inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and
ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court on prior constitutional cases underline
the preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the
amending process as one of non-political impression.  In the Plebiscite Cases,  the [11]

contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree
No. 73 "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or
rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor, " is a political one, was
rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in
nature.  Subsequently, in the Ratification Cases  involving the issue of whether or not
[12]

the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, "announcing the Ratification by the
Filipino people of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,"
partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of the Solicitor
General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable.  Chief
Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, "(T)hus, in the aforementioned
plebiscite cases, We  rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question
whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973,
for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was
not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political
nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one.  With
identical unanimity, We overruled the respondents' contention in the
1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional
sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this
Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castañeda, insofar as it adhered to the
former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply.  For the
same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito."  The return
[13]

to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanagvs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was
decisively refused by the Court.  Chief Justice Concepcion continued:  "The reasons
adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in
support of the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite
cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally
unsound and constitutionally untenable.  As a consequence, Our decisions in the
aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of
a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."

II

The amending process as laid out in the new Constitution.

1.       Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:

"SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
by a constitutional convention.
(2)     The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call
a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the
question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the
Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power.  Section 15 of the
Transitory Provisions reads:
"SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by
the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution.  Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the
nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition.  In times of normalcy, the
amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly.  However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the
electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the
National Assembly.  In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority
vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by
the interim Prime Minister.
2.       This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC,  had already settled that the incumbent
[14]

President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially

convene the interim National Assembly.  Speaking for the majority opinion in that case,
Justice Makasiar said:  "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional
Convention, revealed:  "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted
on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the
incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene
the interim  National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza;
as a matter of fact, the propose that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate
Pimentel (V), was rejected."  The President's decision to defer the convening of
[15]

the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves.  In the
plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was
submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly.  In
the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") reiterated their
sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly.  Again, in the
referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether
the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some
of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were
deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its
inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved
against it.
3.       In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the
proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of
lawmaking.  It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.  Rather, it is
[16]

exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself.  In

the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the
regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for
the interim National Assembly).  While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body
to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character.  In political science a distinction is made
between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative
character.  The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.  Such being the case,
[17]

approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer.  The prerogative

[18]

of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of

legislation.  The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution. [19]

III

Concentration of Powers in the President during crisis government.

1.       In general, the governmental powers in crisis government -

the Philippines is a crisis government today - are more or less concentrated in the
President.  According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a
[20]

democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in

the doctrine of the separation of powers.  In most free states it has generally been
regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among
three mutually independent branches - executive, legislature, and judiciary.  It is
believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any
two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers
is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal
times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental
action.  By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to
a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence.   There
are moments in the life of any government when all powers must work together in
unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive,
legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man.   The more complete the
separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more
necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis.  This is evident in a comparison of the
crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government.  In the
former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in
the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected.  As a result, cabinet
is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship.  The
power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be
freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations.  John Locke, on
[21]

the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even
of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the
legislative power had not provided.  The rationale behind such broad emergency
[22]

powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of
constitutional restraints" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2.       The presidential exercise of legislative powers in times of martial law is now
a conceded valid act.  That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3
(pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: [23]

"The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene

the interim National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until
the interim Speaker shall have been elected.  He shall continue to exercise his powers
and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the
powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until he
calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and
the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by
this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or
done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain
valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate,
"that the Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to
call the interim National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened
soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers.  Otherwise, with no
one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire
governmental machinery."  Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor
[24]

in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time.  The separation of

executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to
efficient crisis government.  The steady increase in executive power is not too much a
cause for worry as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems
the President has been called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which
involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis - a
crisis greater than war.  In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the
national forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had
convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed to
the President to take emergency measures. [25]
 IV

Authority of the incumbent President to propose amendments to the Constitution.

1.       As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned

to the interim National Assembly during the transition period.  However, the initial
convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President.  And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to
defer the convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's
preference.  Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President
(Sec. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).  Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign
will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly.  Would it then be
within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that
constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's
legislative functions?  The answer is yes.  If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he
cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to it s gross legislative
power.  This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature.  Rather,
with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the
Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon
the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution.  Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses
no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions.  For the
President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending
process would leave the governmental machinery at a stalmate or create in the powers
of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis
government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that
Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people
reigns supreme.  After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the
President now, are mere agents of the people. [26]

2.       The President's action is not a unilateral move.  As early as the referendums

of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of
the interim National Assembly.  The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of
the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and
the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay, representing
42,000 barangays, about the same number
of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces,
3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment
of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly.  Other issues
concerned the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution.  The national
[27]

organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial

law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the
period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be
held on October 16.  The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under
[28]

Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9

officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive
committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit
directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed
amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law.  Similarly, the
[29]

"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the
proposed amendments to the people on October 16.  All the foregoing led the President
to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance
of Presidential Decree No. 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions
(proposed amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16.

The People as Sovereign.

1.       Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is

easily seen.  In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty ''resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.  In its fourth [30]

meaning, Savigny would treat "people" as "that particular organized assembly of

individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists."  This is [31]

the concept of popular sovereignty.  It means that the constitutional legislator, namely,
the people, is sovereign.  In consequence, the people may thus write into the
[32]

Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express
constitutional prohibition.  This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitutions an
[33]
experiment, as all life is an experiment."  "The necessities of orderly government,"
[34]

wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted to

permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a
self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it.[35]

12.     The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to

exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator.  The proposed amendments,
as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man.  Rather, they are the
collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the
authority who can presently exercise the powers of government.  In equal vein, the
submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a
referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented
only by the authority of the President.  Indeed, it may well be said that the amending
process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure
to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.

VI

Referendum-Plebiscite not rendered nugatory by the participation of the 15 –

year olds.

1.       October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite.  The question - (1) Do

you want martial law to be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year
olds may participate.  This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the
larger mass of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in
pursuing his program for a New Order.  For the succeeding question on the proposed
amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate.  This is the plebiscite
aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution.  On this
[36]

second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will
have valid bearing on the results.  The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously
asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm
the referendum-plebiscite.  There is nothing objectionable in consulting the people on a
given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed
constitutional amendments.  The fear of conmingled votes (15 -year olds and 18-year
olds above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for
every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and
under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and
above.  The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen
[37]
shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in
another ballot box.  And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately
prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. [38]

2.       It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A

"referendum" is merely consultative in charact er.  It is simply a means of assessing
public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the
calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the
President.  It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of
[39]

whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex-convicts.  A "plebiscite," on

[40]

the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months preceding the election."  Literacy, property, or any other
[41]

substantive requirement is not imposed.  It is generally associated with the amending

process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.

VII

Freedoms of expression and assembly not disturbed.

1.       There appears to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial
law stultifies in main the freedom to dissent.  That speaks of a bygone fear.  The martial
law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, "is impressed with a mild
character" recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice.  To be sure, there are
restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that
liberty is aimed at.  The machinery for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16
recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly.  The President
himself had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting
views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the
genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand.  Thus, the dissenters soon
[42]

found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on
the proposed amendments and even on the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution,
which is already a settled matter.  Even government employees have been held by the
[43]

Civil Service Commission free to participate in public discussion and even campaign for
their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. [44]

VIII
Time for deliberation is not short.

1.       The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not

too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues.  The
questions are not new.  They are the issues of the day.  The people have been living with
them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago.  The referendums of 1973
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law.  That notwithstanding, the contested
brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for
constitutional amendments.  Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls:  'Under
the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the
scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Corn. Act No. 34).  The constitutional
amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings -Kocials - kowski was
published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite (Corn. Act 492).  For the 1940 Constitutional amendments
providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice-President,
and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com. Act No. 517).  And the Parity
Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as
the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)."
[45]

2.       It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision
as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall
be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."
In Coleman v. Miller,  the United States Supreme Court held that this matter of
[46]

submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political,

social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The
constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which
the people may act.  This is because, first, proposal and ratification are not treated as
unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being
that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there is
deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the
reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and
disposed of presently; and third, ratification is but the expression of the approbation of
the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously.  In the words of Jameson,
[47]

"(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and
the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be
supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon,
unless a second time proposed by [proper body]." [48]

IN RESUME

The three issues are:

1.       Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991,
1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2.       During the present stage of the transition period, and under the
environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to
propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3.       Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the
time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique
M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo,
Cecilia Muñoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the
view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar,
Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate
Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the
affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma voted in the
negative.  Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition
that there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus
raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate
Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that
there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification
by the people.  Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however,
that the period of time may be extended.  Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and
Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the
competence and cognizance of this Court.  Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21
SCRA 774).  Associate Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma hold
that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power
to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper
submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection
under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra.
and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
 Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at
bar.  For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando
concurs in the result.  Associate Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma voted to grant
the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby
dismissed.  This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

In Sanidad, the Court declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution

No. 2167 which provided as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 19 Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers — During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues." cralaw virtua1aw library

Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the
plebiscite mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167
constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The
Court, through Medialdea, J., said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . [N] either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd par. of R.A.
6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite. Therefore,
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2476 has no statutory basis."

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 103328, October 19, 1992 ]
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:

Pursuant to Republic Act 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November

13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows:

“WHEREAS,  Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the

Municipality of Tulay-Na?Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of
Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.
WHEREAS, under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution  the creation of a
[1]

municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the

political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)  said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission
[2]

on Elections;
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in
holding the plebiscite shall be taken out of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal
year appropriations;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to
promulgated (sic) the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:

1.    The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units
affected, namely the barangays comprising the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of
Labo, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11,
1986).

xxx                                  xxx              xxx”

In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only
2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the
Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. [3]

Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte,
seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the
Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA
7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that
the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by
COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or
units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should
not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte. [4]

In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the
1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth
in Tan v. COMELEC  relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus
[5]

reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary  which held that where a local unit
[6]

is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be
included in the plebiscite. [7]

Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently,
whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of
Labo is valid.

We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating
Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.

Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC has been superseded with the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling
in Paredes v. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that
since Tan v. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution  our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X
[8]

of the 1987 Constitution, especially since the latter provision deleted the words “unit or.”

We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase “unit or” in Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution has not
affected our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner,
now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:

Mr. Maambong. While we have already approved the deletion of “unit or,” I

would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present Local
Government Code, the words used are actually “political unit or units.” However, I do
not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial
difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo. Can we not adhere to the original “unit or units”? will there be no
objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide. I would object.
I precisely asked for the deletion of the words “unit or” because in the plebiscite to be c
onducted, it must involve all the units affected.
If it is the creation of a barangay, the municipality itself must participate in the plebiscite 
because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.  (Underscoring supplied)
[9]

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted “in the
political units directly affected,” it means that residents of the political entity who would
be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in
said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase “political units directly
affected,” is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
 Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12
[10]

barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the

parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2312.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 125646, September 10, 1999 ]
CITY OF PASIG, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTION AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 128663.  SEPTEMBER 10, 1999]

MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY OF PASIG, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the
suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary
disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.

G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663
involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of
its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed
barangays encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be
converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan,
the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. [1] Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was
thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52,
Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. [2] Plebiscite for this purpose was
set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to

suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the
Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND
No. 96-016)[3] and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the
Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute.
[4]
 According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been
finally decided by the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta
and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in
abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving
the two municipalities.[5] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.

The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for
being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997
where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast therein.[6] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.

The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of
Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the
pending boundary dispute between the two local governments.

To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006
involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the
creation of the proposed barangays may be held.

The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases
are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has held
in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, [7] that, in the interest of good order, we can
very well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely
interrelated or linked to the first.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that
portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be
decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of
Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction
to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries.[8] Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending
civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial
jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only
that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, [9] we held that –
“The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a
local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for
they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far
more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination
of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.

Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case
of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already
been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its
petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of
Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial
Court.

In Tan v. Commission on Elections,[10] we struck down the moot and academic argument
as follows --
“Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held
and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot
truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this
newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally
born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to
its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents’ urging that, as
there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the
prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as
respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents’ submission
will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those
who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create,
merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or
stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to
their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.”
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held
in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig
and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same
vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico,
Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1.  The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit; while

2.  The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The
COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of
Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until
after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and
the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-300.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000 ]
ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE LEON, CLEMENTE M. MATIRA,
REGION P. DE LEON, MARILOU C. DE LEON, JAIME RELEVO, JOEY S.
 VERGARA, CARMENCITA A. SALVA, DIONISIO B. DE LEON, JORGE S.
VERGARA, GORGONIO B. DE LEON, AND OTHERS TOO NUMEROUS TO
ENUMERATE AS A CLASS SUIT, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ROBERTO L.
MAKALINTAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. XI,
BALAYAN, BATANGAS; HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGLALAWIGAN OF
BATANGAS, BATANGAS CITY; HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGBAYAN,
CALACA, BATANGAS; AND HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the

reversal of the Order dated February 25, 1998,[1]  of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, Branch XI,[2]  in Civil Case No. 3442, denying the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from holding the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.

The facts are undisputed.

On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael,

Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), docketed as Civil Case No. 3442, before the Regional Trial Court of
Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No.
345, series of 1997, both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of 1998, with prayer for preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order.  Ordinance No. 05[3]  declared the abolition
of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca,
Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as
provided under Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991.[4]  On the other hand, Resolution No. 345[5]  affirmed
the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto [6]  exercised by the
governor of Batangas.[7]  Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for
being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements under
Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the attestations
or certifications of the Department of Finance (DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and
the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), were obtained.  Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution,
on February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the
rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on
February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its
merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.[8]  Simultaneous with the filing of the
action before the trial court, petitioners also filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents from enforcing Ordinance No. 05,
Resolution No. 345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.

In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex parte motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction for lack of
jurisdiction.  According to the trial court, the temporary restraining order/injunction
sought by petitioners is directed only to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.  The trial court
ruled that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the
COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.[9]

On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts Order
dated February 25, 1998, claiming the urgency or immediate necessity to enjoin the
conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998. [10]

In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to maintain
the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition. [11]

On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, declaring that he concurs with petitioners cause and recommending that the
instant petition be given due course. [12]  Consequently, the Court further resolved on
September 29, 1998 to require the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas to submit their own Comment on the petition.

In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and require the parties to submit their respective memoranda. [13]

In their Memorandum filed on October 26, 1999, petitioners submitted the following
issue for the resolution of this Court:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN THE
COMELEC FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998, WHICH
PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITE
SCHEDULED ON FEBRUARY 28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION OF BARANGAY SAN
RAFAEL AND ITS MERGER WITH BARANGAY DACANLAO, CALACA, BATANGAS, PENDING
THE DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442 FOR THE ANNULMENT OF ORDINANCE
NO. 05, RESOLUTION NO. 345 AND COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2987.[14]
First, petitioners contend that the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, encourages multiplicity of suit[s]
and splitting a single cause of action, contrary to Section 3, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court.
[15]
  Petitioners maintain that since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was only issued
pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 of the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, the propriety of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No.
2987 is dependent upon the validity of the Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345. [16] 
And considering that the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the validity
of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 is not disputed, the assailed Order dated
February 25, 1998, directing petitioners to seek the preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before this Court, advances multiplicity of suits and splitting
a single cause of action.

Second, petitioners assert that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions
under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are
subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely
ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court,[17] 
citing Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer  (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:
"It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on
the Commission on Elections may either be classifi1ed as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative
and sometimes ministerial in character."[18]
Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that [t]he conduct of [a] plebiscite, pursuant
to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory [or quasi-judicial] in
nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature [and only] in obedience to the
aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution, citing Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99
(1996), thus:
"xxx To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative
questions that are best ventilated before the RTC [Regional Trial Court], a court which
the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions."[19]
Lastly, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite sought to be enjoined has
already been conducted on February 28, 1998, the instant petition is far from being
moot and academic, claiming that the actual holding of the said plebiscite could not
validate an otherwise invalid ordinance and resolution; [20]  that there are still substantial
matters to be resolved;[21]  assuming arguendo that this petition has become moot and
academic,  courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review;[22]  and finally, petitioners maintain that this Court has
resolved to require the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the
filing of the petition, that is, a day before the plebiscite was scheduled to be conducted.
[23]

Concurring with petitioners arguments, the Solicitor General, in his Memorandum filed
on September 7, 1999, asserts that xxx. [i]t is already settled in this jurisdiction that
what is contemplated by the terms any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari to this Honorable Court, as provided under Section 7, Article IX-
A of the [1987]  Constitution, are those that relate to the COMELECs exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city
officials. (Citations omitted.)[24] 24 The Solicitor General further argues that the issuance
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a ministerial duty of the COMELEC in the exercise of
its administrative functions, hence, it is submitted that the aforecited constitutional
provision is inapplicable.

Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on the other hand, submits that
the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this
Court, citing the earlier cases of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo (23 SCRA 533, 540-541
[1968] ); Luison vs. Garcia (L-10916, May 20, 1957); Macud vs. COMELEC (23 SCRA 224
[1968] ); and Aratuc vs. COMELEC (88 SCRA 251, 272 [1979]);[25]  thus:
 "xxx.  For even without the express constitutional prescription that only this
Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections, it is
easy to understand why no interference whatsoever with the performance of the
Commission on Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this
Court.  The observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz while not
precisely in point, indicates the proper approach.  Thus:  It is easy to realize the chaos
that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to
arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the
Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to
impotence."[26]
The COMELEC further argues that if a Regional Trial Court does not have
jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies of government like the ones cited
above [referring to the former Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office,
Public Service Commission, Social Security Commission, National Electrification
Administration and Presidential Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not
have any such jurisdiction over the Commission on Elections, a constitutional
independent body expressly clothed by the 1987 Constitution with, among others,
quasi-judicial functions and tasked with one of the most paramount aspects of a
democratic government.  xxx.[27]  Finally, the COMELEC contends that the temporary
restraining order sought by petitioners has been rendered moot and academic by the
actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be enjoined. [28]

The appeal is meritorious.

Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:

"SEC. 7.  xxx.  Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996] ) and Filipinas Engineering
and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found occasion to interpret the
foregoing provision in this wise:
"xxx.  What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the
said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."[29]
 In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that the powers vested by the Constitution
and the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining
to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently
administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.[30]

As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after the COMELEC
ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition
of barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite
to be held in the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 7160.  We agree with the Solicitor General that xxx.  [t]he issuance of
[COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is
enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions.  It involves no
exercise of discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies
defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of
public officers and the enforcement of the election laws. (Citation omitted.)[31]  Briefly,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing
the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final
order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court.  Any question pertaining to the validity of
said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention  that the
power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court 
are simply not in point.  Zaldivar vs. Estenzo[32]  speaks of the power of the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of
the judiciary.  In the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority
of the COMELEC to enforce and administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia[33]  refers to
this Courts power to review administrative decisions, particularly referring to a
COMELEC resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy null and void, based on
Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution.  In Macud vs. COMELEC,[34]  we reiterated
that when a board of canvassers rejects an election return on the ground that it is
spurious or has been tampered with, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the
COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board,
the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court.  In both Luison and Macud, the assailed
COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.

In view of the foregoing, public respondents other contentions deserve scant

consideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Order dated
February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is
hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.  The Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas,
Branch XI is ordered to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442.  The
execution of the result of the plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred
depending on the outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004 ]
MA. SALVACION BUAC AND ANTONIO BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac

and Antonio Bautista assailing the October 28, 2002 'en banc Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which held that it has no jurisdiction over
controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its result.
The facts show that in April, 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of
the Taguig Cityhood Law (Republic Act No. 8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig
from a municipality into a city. Without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other
election returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared that the "NO" votes won and
that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig to a city.
The Board of Canvassers was, however, ordered by the COMELEC en banc to reconvene
and complete the canvass. The Board did and in due time issued an Order proclaiming
that the negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite conducted.

Forthwith, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul[1] the results of the
plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots cast therein. They alleged
that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes. The case was
docketed as an election protest and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. [2]

Private respondent Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot be the
subject of an election protest. He averred that the jurisdiction to hear a complaint
involving the conduct of a plebiscite is lodged with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).[3]

The COMELEC Second Division initially gave due course to the petition and ruled that it
has jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition as akin to an election protest
considering that the same allegations of fraud and irregularities in the casting and
counting of ballots and preparation of returns are the same grounds for assailing the
results of an election. It then ordered the Taguig ballot boxes to be brought to its Manila
office and created revision committees to revise and recount the plebiscite ballots. [4]

In an unverified motion, intervenor Cayetano moved for reconsideration of the

COMELEC Order insisting that it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition
contesting the results of a plebiscite.

In a complete turnaround, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order on November

29, 2001 granting the Motion for Reconsideration. It dismissed the petition to annul the
results of the Taguig plebiscite and ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over
said case as it involves an exercise of quasi-judicial powers not contemplated under
Section 2 (2), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution.[5]

On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2nd Division. It held that
the COMELEC cannot use its power to enforce and administer all laws relative to
plebiscites as this power is purely administrative or executive and not quasi-judicial in
nature. It concluded that the jurisdiction over the petition to annul the Taguig plebiscite
results is lodged with the RTC under Section 19 (6) of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 which
provides that the RTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
[6]

Hence this petition.

Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista reiterate their submission that
jurisdiction to decide plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally vested with the
COMELEC. They likewise claim that the impugned Order is discriminatory as during the
pendency of the Taguig case, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over a similar case
concerning the revision and recount of the plebiscite ballots involving the conversion of
Malolos into a city. The COMELEC resolved said case and already declared Malolos a
city.

Respondents contend that there is no such action as a plebiscite protest under the
Constitution, the laws and the COMELEC rules as they provided only for election
protests; the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC over election contests extends
only to cases enumerated in Section 2(2), Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which does
not include controversies over plebiscite results; and, even if the petition to annul
plebiscite results is akin to an election protest, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over
election protests involving municipal officials, and the COMELEC has only appellate
jurisdiction in said cases.

The petition is impressed with merit.

First. The key to the case at bar is its nature. The case at bar involves the determination
of whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the
municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for the
purpose. Respondents submit that the regular courts of justice, more specifically, the
Regional Trial Court, has the jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy concerning the
conduct of said plebiscite. We hold that the invocation of judicial power to settle disputes
involving the conduct of a plebiscite is misplaced. Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution defines judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, "the first part of the authority represents
the traditional concept of judicial power involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law."[7] The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig
plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power. It does
not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement. There is no
plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of the
vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of
their municipality to a highly urbanized city. There is no invocation of a private right
conferred by law that has been violated and which can be vindicated alone in our courts
of justice in an adversarial proceeding. Rather, the issue in the case at bar is the
determination of the sovereign decision of the electorate of Taguig. The purpose of this
determination is more to protect the sovereignty of the people and less to vindicate the
private interest of any individual. Such a determination does not contemplate the clash of
private rights of individuals and hence cannot come under the traditional jurisdiction of
courts.

Second. If the determination of the result of a plebiscite is not fit for the exercise
ofjudicial power, the invocation of Section 19 of B.P. Big. 129, as amended, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, is ineluctably errant, viz:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;    

xxx   xxx   xxx

6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

There cannot be any bout with doubt that the aforequoted provisions refer to civil cases
or actions. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.[8] As stressed above, a
plebiscite involves the expression of the public will on a public issue. The determination
of the public will is a subject that does not fit the jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil
courts are established essentially to resolve controversies between private persons. [9]

The case of Salva v. Macalintal [10] does not support the overarching thesis that "any
question on the validity of plebiscite, or any dispute on the result of the plebiscite falls
within the general jurisdiction of regular trial courts." Looking at it with clear eyes, Salva
resolved the validity, not of a plebiscite or its result, but of a provision in the rules and
regulations issued by the COMELEC governing the conduct of a plebiscite.

Third. To grant the RTC jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results can lead to
jumbled justice. Consider for instance where the plebiscite is national as it deals with the
ratification of a proposed amendment to our Constitution. Snap thinking will tell us that
it should be the COMELEC that should have jurisdiction over a petition to annul its
results. If jurisdiction is given to the regular courts, the result will not enhance the
orderly administration of justice. Any regional trial court from every nook and corner of
the country will have jurisdiction over a petition questioning the results of a nationwide
plebiscite. Bearing in mind that the jurisdiction of these courts is limited only within their
respective judicial regions, the difficulties that will attend their exercise of jurisdiction
would be many if not unmanageable.

Fourth. An eye contact with our Constitution and related laws will reveal
that only contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of elected officials
are subject to the exercise of judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial power of our
administrative agencies, thus: (a) contests involving elective municipal officials are tried
and decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, while those involving barangay
officials are tried and decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction; in both cases,
however, the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction; (b) contests involving all
elective regional, provincial and city officials fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power; (c) contests
involving members of the House of Representatives fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-
judicial power; (d) contests involving members of the Senate fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-judicial
power; and, (e) contests involving the President and the Vice President fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, also in the exercise
of quasi-judicial power.

What grabs the eyeball is the intent of our Constitution and election laws to
subject only contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of elected
officials — from the barangay to the President of the Philippines — to the exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative tribunals. Contests which do
not involve the election, returns and qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to
the exerci of the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts oradministra i agencies.
Clearly, controversies concerning the conduct plebiscite appertain to this category. In the
case at bar. conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is the core of the controversy. This is a
matter that involves the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a
plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX
(C) of the Constitution which gives it the power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of a x x x plebiscite x x x."

Fifth. The Court agrees with the following submissions of the Solicitor General, viz.      

xxx   xxx   xxx

There can hardly be any doubt that the test and intent of the constitutional grant of
powers to the COMELEC is to give it all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest and peaceful and credible elections
[Maruhom v. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 473 (2000)]. Hence, the all encompassing power
endowed the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election (or plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall) includes the
power to cancel proclamations [(Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762 (1997)]. The
COMELEC also has the power to supervise and control the proceedings of the board of
canvassers, suspend and/or annul illegal and void proclamations, declare a failure of
elections and promulgate rules and regulations concerning the conduct of elections. 

While the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is most commonly invoked over popular
elections — that which involves the choice or selection ' of candidates to public office by
popular vote, the same may likewise be invoked in connection with the conduct of
plebiscite.

In the present case, petitioners filed a petition for revision of ballots cast in a plebiscite.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
petition considering that the issue raised therein calls for the exercise by the COMELEC
of its judicial or quasi-judicial power. According to the COMELEC, there is no law nor
any constitutional provision that confers it with jurisdiction to hear and decide a case
contesting the officially proclaimed results of a plebiscite based on frauds and
irregularities.

The COMELEC's position is highly untenable. Article LX-C, Section 2(1) is very explicit
that the COMELEC has the power to "enforce administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." To
enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause the performance of such act or acts
necessary to bring into actual effect or operation, a plan or measure. When we say the
COMELEC has the power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite, it
necessarily entails all the necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the holding of
an honest and credible plebiscite. Obviously, the power of the COMELEC is not limited
to the mere administrative function of conducting the plebiscite. The law is clear. It is
also mandated to enforce the laws relative to the conduct of the plebiscite. Hence, the
COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to correct or check what the Board of Canvassers
erroneously or fraudulently did during the canvassing, can verify or ascertain the true
results of the plebiscite either through a pre-proclamation case or through revision of
ballots. To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain the true results of the
plebiscite through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally mandated
power to "enforce" laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite. It is not correct to argue that
the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC is limited to contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective Barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction. If the COMELEC has quasi-judicial power to enforce
laws relating to elective officials then there is no reason why it cannot exercise the same
power to ascertain the true results of a plebiscite. All that the Constitution provides is that
the COMELEC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to elective
officials. The provision is not a limiting provision in the sense that it only limits the
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to said cases. To repeat, the power of the
COMELEC to ascertain the true results of the plebiscite is implicit in its power to enforce
all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite. 

COMELEC's claim that the petition for revision of ballots is cognizable by the Regional
Trial Courts pursuant to Section 19 (6) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
whieh provides that "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x
x x in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court tribunal, person or body
exercisingjudicial or quasi-judicial functions lacks merit. To repeat, the power to
ascertain the true results of the plebiscite is necessarily included in the power to enforce
all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.[11]

Sixth. From our earliest Constitution and election laws, the conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the
regular courts. If the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this matter, our laws would
have been amended to that effect. There is another reason why the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to resolve disputes involving plebiscite results should be upheld. Such a case
involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an
independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise
in the field of election and related laws. Consequently, we should be extra cautious in
delimiting the parameters of the COMELEC's broad powers. We should give the
COMELEC enough latitude in the exercise of its expertise, for to straightjacket its
discretion in the enforcement and administration of laws relating to the conduct of
election, plebiscite or referendum may render it impotent. This is the first time that the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over a petition to annul the results of a plebiscite has been
assailed and surprisingly, this is the first time that the COMELEC has yielded its historic
jurisdiction. More inexplicable is the inconsistent stance of the COMELEC on the issue.
As stressed by the petitioners, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over the case
assailing the result of the Malolos plebiscite. In the case at bar, it refused to exercise
jurisdiction.

Seventh. Finally, it appears that the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent
Congressman Cayetano was filed out of time. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure provides that a motion for reconsideration should be filed within five (5)
days from receipt of the COMELEC Order or Resolution. Congressman Cayetano
himself admitted[12] that he received a copy of the October 3, 2001 Resolution of the
COMELEC 2nd Division on October 9, 2001. The records show that it was only ten (10)
days after said receipt, or on October 19, 2001, that private respondent Cayetano filed his
undated and unverified Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the COMELEC 2nd
Division had no jurisdiction to entertain his Motion. .
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC is directed to
reinstate the petition to annul the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to decide it
without delay.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 176970, December 08, 2008 ]
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,[1] with a

prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that
Republic Act No. 9371[2] - the law that Resolution No. 7837 implements - is
unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed
and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the
Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro." [3] This law eventually became
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.[4] It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one
to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of
residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to
Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:

Legislative Districts - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is
hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of
this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua,
Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan,
Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon,
Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa,
Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban
barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district. [5]

On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc  promulgated Resolution No.

7837[6] implementing R.A. No. 9371.

Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March
27, 2007.[7]  On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the
following as respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the
Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and
its Board of Canvassers.[8]

In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional
grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371
without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite
which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He
prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to
COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan
de Oro.

Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded
according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the
constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod  pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is
a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A.
No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling in Del Mar v.
PAGCOR,[9] the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within
the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator - the material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well as of the people
therein; 4) a voter's sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire
city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned
law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated
by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the
Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and
6) government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign
electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.[10]

THE ISSUES

The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can be limited to
the following contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition
be dismissed on this ground?

2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de
Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?

3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?

OUR RULING

Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without
merit. 

The hierarchy of courts principle.

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.[11]  It was pursuant to this
original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.

While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [12] and the RTCs,[13] a direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of
practicality, dictated by an increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in
favor of matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule
otherwise known as the "principle of hierarchy of courts." More generally stated, the
principle requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.[14]

Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be exceptions
to the rule, are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
warranto against our nation's lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is
assailed.[15]  The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of
the issues raised - among them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a division
of Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit - are reasons enough for considering
it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as
well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative
apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees.  As an action against a COMELEC en
banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a
review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.[16]  For these reasons, we do not
see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block in our consideration of
the present case.

The Plebiscite Requirement.

The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro
as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative
apportionment. This argument essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the
constitutional concepts of apportionment of legislative districts and division of local
government units.

Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of

the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a
legislative body.[17]  It is  the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting
power among the districts.[18]  Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment
or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated
by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.[19]

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules
on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:

Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.

x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact,
and adjacent territory.  Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4)  Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment

speaks of, are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as
"municipal corporations") that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.[20]   In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been
defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the
inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof." [21]  The
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government
units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article
on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the
authority to act has been vested in the Legislature.  The Legislature undertakes the
apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, [22] and likewise acts on local
government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition
and alteration of  boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation.  Other than this, not
much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different
although they interface and relate with one another.

The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation
and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people
can be effectively heard.  As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to
equalize population and voting power among districts." [23]  Hence, emphasis is given to
the number of people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed
among the representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in
terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent
territory.  In terms of the people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people
and every province (irrespective of population) is entitled to one representative. In this
sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other,
relate and interface with each other.  To ensure continued adherence to the required
standards of apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as
soon as the given standards are met.

In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered."  Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units'
corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that
must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the
local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.  Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are specified as
verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide services. [24]  The division or
merger of existing units must comply with the same requirements (since a new local
government unit will come into being), provided that a division shall not reduce the
income, population, or land area of the unit affected to less than the minimum
requirement prescribed in the Code. [25]

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on

the requirement of a plebiscite.  The Constitution and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a local
[26]
government unit.   In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.   In Tobias v. Abalos,[27] a case that arose
from the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no
plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up
because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into
a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this
happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the
objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a
new legislative district only followed as a consequence.  In other words, the
apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed
for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.

The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for one
under Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical
roots of these two provisions, the nature of the concepts they embody as heretofore
discussed, and their areas of application.

A Bit of History.

In Macias v. COMELEC,[28] we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of

our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the
[29]
Fourteenth Amendment  of the U.S. Constitution and from the constitutions of some
American states.  The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created the Philippine Assembly,
[30]
 the body that acted as the lower house of the bicameral legislature under the
Americans, with the Philippine Commission acting as the upper house.  While the
members of the Philippine Commission were appointed by the U.S. President with the
conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine Assembly were elected by
representative districts previously delineated under the Philippine Organic Act of 1902
pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly among the
provinces as nearly as practicable according to population. Thus, legislative
apportionment first started in our country.

The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the apportionment
provision, dividing the country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative districts
electing one delegate each to the House of Representatives. Section 16 of the Act
specifically vested the Philippine Legislature with the authority to redistrict the
Philippine Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative
apportionment together with "district" as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern
was "equality of representation . . . as an essential feature of republican institutions" as
expressed in the leading case of Macias v. COMELEC.[31]   The case ruled that inequality
of representation is a justiciable, not a political issue, which ruling was reiterated
in Montejo v. COMELEC.[32]  Notably, no issue regarding the holding of a plebiscite ever
came up in these cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite was required.

Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal
representation "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" with each district being, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This formulation was
essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution, distinguished only from the previous
one by the presence of party-list representatives. In neither Constitution was a
plebiscite required.

The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local
government units was not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution.
However, as early as 1959, R.A. No. 2264[33] required, in the creation of barrios by
Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of boundaries be "upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected." In 1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan
(R.A. No. 3278) carried this further by requiring that the "Act shall take effect after a
majority of voters of the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the conversion of their
municipality into a city in a plebiscite."  This was followed up to 1972 by other legislative
enactments requiring a plebiscite as a condition for the creation and conversion of local
government units as well as the transfer of sitios from one legislative unit to another.[34] 
In 1973, the plebiscite requirement was accorded constitutional status.

Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite was
never a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment.  After it became
constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation,
division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never
with the concept of legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a

political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of
Representatives and members of the local legislative body.  It is not, however, a political
subdivision through which functions of government are carried out.  It can more
appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the
whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit.   Not being a
corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a
representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or
a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a
district does not have its own chief executive.  The role of the congressman that it elects
is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to
oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that
it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. 
Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other
similar action on a legislative district.

The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units.  They
are the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. [35] They possess legal personality
on the authority of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature.  The Constitution
defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or
whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the
Constitution and the Legislature.[36] A local government unit's corporate existence begins
upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members
of its S anggunian.[37]

As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in

carrying out the functions of government." [38] As a corporate entity with a distinct and
separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole
benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration
of local affairs"[39] and the mediums through which the people act in their corporate
capacity on local concerns.[40]  In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to
expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite.

These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment

or reapportionment and the division of a local government unit.  Historically and by its
intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a
division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place.  Thus, the
plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality
or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite
for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837    

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in
accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the
Constitution.  Its core provision - Section 1 - provides:

SECTION 1.   Legislative Districts. -- The lone legislative district of the City of
Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after
the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen,
Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia,
Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya,
Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays
Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag,
Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all
urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate
entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit
and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains
completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and
the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House
of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into
play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two
districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of
another congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along
the lines of the congressional apportionment made.  The effect on the Sangguniang
Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law - R.A.
No. 6636[41] - whose Section 3 provides:

SECTION 3.   Other Cities. -- The provision of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding the City of Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than one
representative district shall have eight (8) councilors for each district who shall be
residents thereof to be elected by the qualified voters therein, provided that the cities
of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other cities comprising a
representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all other cities shall
have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the qualified voters of the said
cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of councilors according to
their charters be reduced.

However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro
into two political and corporate units and territories.  Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in
the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one
congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately
500,000.[42]  By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman,
Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000
of the city's population.  In terms of services for city residents, this easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as
against the 500,000 he used to represent.  The same goes true for the Sangguniang
Panglungsod with its ranks increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district now
has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the fewer constituents represented translate
to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian;
each congressman and each councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer
constituents whose fewer numbers are now concentrated in each representative. The
City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in
the halls of Congress.  Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not
increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two congressman
(instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional
improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.

Equality of representation.

The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1
has only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071.  District 1 is composed
mostly of rural  barangays  while District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays.
[43]
 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of representation.

A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall
be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered
voters therein. We settled this very same question in Herrera v. COMELEC[44] when we
interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied
to the Province of Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the
number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the official
1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the
National Statistics Office.

The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population
of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of
the National Statistics Office which shows that barangays  comprising Cagayan de Oro's
first district have a total population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322
residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts.[45] The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or
rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. [46] In fact, for cities, all
it asks is that "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall
have one representative,"  while ensuring representation for every province regardless
of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves
the local government units as they are found and does not require their division, merger
or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes.  Its requirements are satisfied
despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as
far as practicable.

The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan
de Oro City into two districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly
rural barangays while the second district is mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But
even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the division on the basis of the
difference in the barangays' levels of development or developmental focus as these are
not part of the constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.  What the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would
be is a matter for the lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of
any grave abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal parameters, this Court
cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies. [47]

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.  Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R No. 188078, March 15, 2010 ]
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G.
MORADA, AND MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010. [1]
The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and
rejected in the Decision, that Congress' reliance on the Certification of Alberto N.
Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting
Malolos City's population in 2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to
the other sources of Malolos City's population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of
Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report [2]) and as of 2008 (Certification of the
City of Malolos' Water District, dated 31 July 2008, [3] and Certification of the Liga ng
Barangay, dated 22 August 2008[4]) which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic
Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these
materials.

We find no reason to grant the motion.

First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of
the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws
creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court's judicial
review power,[5] then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions
impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with
a specific constitutional limitation  under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in
Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the
authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply
with the constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already rejected
claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation:

It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves
existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship,
consider the question involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The
overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to
review by the courts[:]

The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and

not one which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question.

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the
political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it.

It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political
situation does not render it political instead of judicial.

The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no
excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end
does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the
existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will
opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of the
Constitution.[6] (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)

To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend
that this Court has no power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELEC's theory, this Court would be
reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable
and non-authoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify their creation.
There can be no surer way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.[7]

Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress
used to measure Malolos City's compliance with the constitutional limitation are
unreliable and non-authoritative. On Miranda's Certification, (that the "projected
population of the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135's
requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be based on a set of
demographic projections and estimates declared official by the National Statistical and
Coordination Board  (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be
as of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates
must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further,
using Miranda's own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City's population as of 1
August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using
as base Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda
issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the
document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrator's designated
certifying officer  nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to
use demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB  or make the
projection as of the middle of 2010.

Nor are the 2007 Census of Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report, the
Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the
Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of
them qualifies as authoritative population indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of
Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on
the population census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual
population as indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos City's population at
223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts
Malolos City's claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear
that come Year 2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall short of the
constitutional requirement."[8] This unbecoming attack by the government's chief
counsel on the integrity of the processes of the government's census authority has no
place in our judicial system. The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-
called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the
performance of its functions.

The Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes
from its ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of
pursuing its business. To elevate the water district's so-called population census to the
level of credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO.
This will allow population data incidentally gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and
other utilities to enter into legislative processes even though these private entities are
not in the business of generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific training,
experience and competence to handle, collate and process them.

Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like
the Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct
population census, much less during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135
authorizes to conduct population census are local government units (that is, province,
city, municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and under the
technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing. [9]

By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent

population figures,[10] the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on
non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135's stringent standards ensuring reliability of
population census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government
decisions and, in this case, the legislative function of enforcing the constitutional
mandate of creating congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000 constituents.

There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA

9591. The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and
authoritativeness of Miranda's certificate.[11] It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt
standards contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an
express prohibition.[12] Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any distinction, statistically
speaking, on the reliability of an NSO certification of a city's population for purposes
of creating its legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a highly-urbanized
or an independent component city.[13] Congress itself confirms the wisdom and
relevance of EO 135's paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that
compliance with the population requirement in the creation and conversion of local
government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO certification.[14] Unquestionably,
representation in Congress is no less important than the creation of local government
units in enhancing our democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to
the same stringent standards.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May
2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member." COMELEC
neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the
Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on
the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for
Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town
of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district.[15] This
contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall
"comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no
argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a
district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the
center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative
District is not an insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3)
impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its
purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative for Congress
was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City's legislative district. Although
unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional
requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation
of the minimum mass of constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission

on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings
be allowed.

SO ORDERED.