G.R. No.

85044 June 3, 1992

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch
20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this
case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however,
was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted
without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura
had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No.
0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption
was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually
living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished
by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.

Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the
15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January
1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that
said notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both motions were denied by the
trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal,
this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
ending 22 December 1987.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition

for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December
1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent
spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the
acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the
following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to
appeal, may still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take
cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and
(2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned
may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for

reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of
Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were
considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period
to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and
place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the
reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the
service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2

In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order
that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the
application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of
appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where

the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.
The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical
sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override,
 substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made
their aim would be defeated. 4

2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault

or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .

Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor
child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as

vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law,
where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of
vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the
following terms:

With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or

omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so
elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy.
to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected
to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in
which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or
in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agent or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position
of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.  7 (Emphasis
Supplied)

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the
Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents
were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to
supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in
other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of
the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual
custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code 8 which reads as follows:

Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the

Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and
the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which
shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis
supplied)
 The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in
relation to Article 39 of the same Code:

Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the
time the Petition for adoption was filed.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and
the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule:

Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of
the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions
of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been

retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at
the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may
be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority
had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen
since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above.
Article 35 provides as follows:

Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and
until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at
least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the
adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child
during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet
begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,

were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-
G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed
before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court
for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc
spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 143989 - July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, Petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred

to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), Respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children.
The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and
Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to
bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth,
love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr.
and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition
was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the
spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred

"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused
to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly
her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his
desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or
interest may pertain to respondent in the future.

xxx - xxx - xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the
feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until
the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his
profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

xxx - xxx - xxx

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her
household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a
son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once
a year.

"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila
became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when
petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the
more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of
a son.

"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and
nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were
only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded
feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his
expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late
husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition
against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent,
rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner,
for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation," 1

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the
life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.

"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of
action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by
way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively
apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the
regime of then Article 3482 of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No.
8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No.
99-11-07 SC.

"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs.
Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to
rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of
the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.

"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions
of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that
petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said
right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the
averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have
been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing
of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already
prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered

dismissed."4

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
petitioner raises the following questions; viz:

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the
subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the
family.5 The continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of adoption and
all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly
any mention about the rights of the adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and
England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor
recognized adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in
law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern. 8 Spain
itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman
law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The
Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most
countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration. 9 In the
early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the
Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948,10 followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of
the Child,11 were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of
adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines 12 of 1950 on adoption, later modified
by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13 and then by the Family Code of the
Philippines,14 gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In
1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared
to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only
in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an
adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to
sever the legal ties created by adoption.

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right
to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the
case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in
force.

The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due

process15 that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it includes not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and
irrefutable.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by
Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code
(Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse
or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was
still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic
argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone
and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of
the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time
when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without
being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic
vs. Miller,21 spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael
Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption
having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the action was commenced,
P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988
disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the
withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic,
the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action
to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, 22 had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the
Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. 24 While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. 25 It is a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.28

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right
to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out
to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have
to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will
and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of
his estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164948             June 27, 2006

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No.
2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.
 The Antecedents

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of

America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition 3 for
the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; 4 Elma
Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; 5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who
was born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.

Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19,
1990,7 the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their
biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by
her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos
nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the
minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the
children; the minors have given their written consent 8 to the adoption; she is qualified to
adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who
are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives
alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her
children gave their written consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after

publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor
children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the
petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name follow the family name of
petitioner.

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises. 10

On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than
April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. 11 The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance 12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of
Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13 Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was
allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14

The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the
adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.15 The
petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her
children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized
by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent. 16

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field
Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:

In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed
Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:

1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their

adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to
provide the parental care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of
Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.

2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to
be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit
of consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment to the
petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.

3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also
family to look after. As young adolescents they really need parental love, care,
guidance and support to ensure their protection and well being.

In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D.

Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt
Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with
considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments was already
developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors. 17

Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3
weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the
adoption of her children.

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was
conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal
relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much
concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption,
they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their
temporary guardian.

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her
children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she
already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her
children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them,
she believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better
position to provide a secured and bright future to her children. 18

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.

On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a
decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and
maintenance from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents
and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
considering that parent-children relationship has long been established between the
children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from
"Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him
to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-
mentioned minors.

SO ORDERED.19

The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its
brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION

DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL
MOTHER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION

DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER’S
CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION

DESPITE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO
SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision 22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held
that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the
children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children
could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and
was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and
although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in
its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari 26 on September 7, 2004,
assigning the following errors:

1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND

MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF
WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE
AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT

THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT
THE THREE CHILDREN.27

The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the
petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological
mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed
by the petitioner-adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or
not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in
Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter
as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood
and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the liberality with
which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the
beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child
arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit
and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and
perspective. The Court’s position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best
interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents
over the child.31

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998, provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled
and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the
written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter,
if living with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption.32

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and
re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia
Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said
Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is
incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent
to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia
Ramos as witness in support of the petition.

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no
longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and
never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal
grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the
children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively
abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after
12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her
child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD
social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the
social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.

Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court,
Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal
guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother
of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his
consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display
filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.34

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such an abandonment.35 To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption. 36

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove
her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioner’s testimony on that
matter follows:

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she
communicated with the family?
A None, sir.

Q How about with her children?

A None, sir.

Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?

A I do not know, sir.

Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.

Q From whom did you learn that?

A From others who came from Italy, sir.

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?

A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?

A In Italy, sir.

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

A After my father died, sir.

Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?

A Two years old, sir.

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?

A No, sir.38

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:

IV. Background of the Case:

xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of
their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of
their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her
children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children financially,
even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother
also sends financial support but very minimal. 39

xxxx

V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:

xxxx

As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps
them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on
their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she
already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt. 40

xxxx

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that
they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which
include the petitioner had continued providing support for them. However being
ashamed of just depending on the support of her husband’s relatives, she decided to
work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in
going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.

When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care &
custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on
November 2000.

While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became
live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The
three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is
planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is
providing his legitimate family regular support.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her
parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The
petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the
needs & education of minors up to present. 41

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the
country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or
relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased
mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for
serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the
children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the
effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees,
and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter. 42 It would thus be against the
spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in
deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More
proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that
the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting
parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of
the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the
purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of
paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings
thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally
offered.44

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of
Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise,
failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children 45 was notarized on
January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same
way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No.
2103,46 which states:

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign

country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are
made in accordance with the following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister,

secretary of legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of
the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is
accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country
to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act
is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act
and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to
 keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment
is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is
accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under his official
seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of
the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority
under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place
where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any,
are genuine.

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the
afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document
whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed
or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
makers.47

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate
the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to
support the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and
commitment of her children and her siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that
she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a
house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month.
Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial
backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement
in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears
that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support
the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a
position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows
that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to
support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by the Department of Public

Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no
longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual
lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old,
employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around
$1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter
to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same
is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a
hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only
has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the
financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating
that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only
creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings and her children are financially
able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again
sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces
and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the
CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the
herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 168992-93               May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to
set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which
dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim
and Michael Jude P. Lim.
 The Facts

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23

June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children2 were named
Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date
of birth is 1 August 1983.4

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records
and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty 5 given
under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of
a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months
old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development

(DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her
natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael. 11

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The
trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article
185 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied
in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that
petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA
8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was
untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency
and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party
in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption
is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated
child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty
of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to
be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case
since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
 adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee,
or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she
has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other;
or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate

son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 12

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being
an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in
his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the
latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt

cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall
not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. 15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains
the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority
over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible
for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of
legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
 ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse
of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of

the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate
filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the
child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime
and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to
the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled 20 such as
support21 and successional rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed
to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in
the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion
of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a
manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied
with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the
Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case
at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.
(Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of
his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption
is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September

2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.

CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M.
CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA
REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of
notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all
instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the
other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal
service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive
service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by
petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the
trial court that granted respondents' decree of adoption. 3chanrobleslaw

The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio
(Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is
the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne
Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria
Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose."

Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their
marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in
1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario
allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between
them.4chanrobleslaw

Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a
year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if
she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during
weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose
had homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for
fifteen (15) years despite their separation(.)" 6chanrobleslaw

On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition 7 for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of
Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), 8 whom Rosario alleged was his
erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years
old.10chanrobleslaw

According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the
trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three
children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.

He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. 12 The report mentioned
that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children. 13 It
also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to
bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March 1989. 14 Under
"Motivation for Adoption," the social welfare officer noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill
his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children
will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and
surname. . . .15

At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in
Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's
death in July 1995.17chanrobleslaw

On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, 18 having ruled that "[n]o
opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the government
which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General." 19 A certificate of
finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.

Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed
a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 21 In
her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their
daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years. 22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised
and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his
driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and
consent.23 She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that
Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for
his homosexual relationship with Larry.24chanrobleslaw

In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in
his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always offered help,
but it was often declined.25 He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because
they are his illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the falsification
alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him
paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because several properties
had to be sold to pay for medical treatments. 26 He then implored the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and equity." 27chanrobleslaw

On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. 28chanrobleslaw

On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to
annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's
adoption.29chanrobleslaw

In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime
in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as
"Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates
showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the
time she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be
Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be
Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are
not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry
who were married at the time of their birth.34chanrobleslaw

On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.

While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the
spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the
hearing."35chanrobleslaw

The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] in
obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the
interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands were bound by the trial court
decision that had already attained "finality and immutability."37chanrobleslaw

The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the
different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the
persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for
annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and
could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.38chanrobleslaw

When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10,
2009,39 they filed this petition.

The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition
for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.

In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the
law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment. 40 They argue that because of the
fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth
certificates presented as evidence before the trial court, 41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from
them.42chanrobleslaw

Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law on
jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable
parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not
only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and
such consent was never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw

Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have been
deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply protected by the
participation and representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized public
prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw

Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only
notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue
that since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be
extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of
judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because
adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the
state.48chanrobleslaw

The petition is granted.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47

of the Rules of Civil Procedure 

Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with
the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner."49chanrobleslaw

In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50chanrobleslaw

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that

it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment,
final order or final resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is
not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting
the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by
prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for
annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or
final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine
of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the
dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability
serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an
end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the
courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification
is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to
the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which
annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four
years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred
by estoppel or laches.52chanrobleslaw

Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. 53 Extrinsic fraud, on the
other hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured." 54chanrobleslaw

The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was
obtained through extrinsic fraud.

Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings

vis-a-vis the law on adoption

Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the
adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.

Petitioners are correct.

It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on
August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The
law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.

Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the
consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of
wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following

cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis supplied)

The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of
Michelle P. Lim:57chanrobleslaw

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 58

The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose,
however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of
the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would
have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years
old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly

counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the
adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)

The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among
the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will
have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another
person.

It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was
over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent,
therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.

To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and
Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the
proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough
to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

There was extrinsic fraud

The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have been
committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is
erroneous.

In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully
exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of
a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)

An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from
discovery.61 Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005.
The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.

The badges of fraud are present in this case.

First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of the
parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte. 62 Larry and Lilibeth were
residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila. 65 The petition
for adoption, however, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. 66 The
trial court gave due course to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he
was a resident of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he
was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68chanrobleslaw

Second, using the process of delayed registration, 69 Jose was able to secure birth
certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry as merely the
informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured:
one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila, 71 and
another wherein the portion for the mother's name was not filled in at all. 72 The birth
certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that
their father was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to
the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his petition for
adoption.

Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation for
adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were childless, 74 to the prejudice of
their daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by
Rosario and alleged to be fraudulent. 75chanrobleslaw

All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in approving
his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the
proceedings or opposing the petition.

The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on
the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured testimonies" 76 presented during
the trial. It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the
other party was either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when
such instrument or testimony was presented in court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just
determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification
and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication
of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in
court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means,
including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the
modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of
documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been
regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are
not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during
the trial.

Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial
court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of
Jose's acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.

The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under
Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —    
 
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not
more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the
court shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud,
improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for
adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under
the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of
simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and
a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal
liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of
adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners
also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 79 since rescission of
adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no
other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.

The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to
believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the love and care of a
father, her parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never even
benefited from any monetary support from her father. Despite all these adversities,
Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the University of the Philippines
College of Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These
accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is
allowed to continue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is
rendered NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192531               November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17,
2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No.
SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS)
[Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the
deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2

The Facts

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As
such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel
whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day. 4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina
P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San
Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10,
20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:

We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are
no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.

The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.6

In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against
petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground
she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records,
John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s
grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No.
8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree
of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio
who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned,
would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that
Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:

Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the
"dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."

The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent
of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended
Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not
considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption
to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the
legitimate parent of the deceased.

xxxx

In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted
child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent
referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the
claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant. 9 (Emphasis
supplied)

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by
the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and
lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological
son.

III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due
course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration. 11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered,
but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in
appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record

To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death
benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven
that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:

Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive
parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for
Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this
Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to
claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that
appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her
status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.

We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.

Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great

respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction. 12 However, in
the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the
petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13

Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on
October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on
February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have
ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed
away.

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law

This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death
benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this
regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:

ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:
 xxxx

(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o
approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of
disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as
follows:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and

determined atthe time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death
until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor
mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural
children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no
longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held
by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner,
effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of
being a secondary beneficiary.

We disagree.

a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates
from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amendedExamining the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as mended, it
is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation.
In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated
by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)

As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco

Corporation16 that:

As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for

regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between
the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to
refer to "legitimate parents."

It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this
Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 17 in this wise:

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood
to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one.
Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule
ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the termin a
more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003
and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as
already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-
quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general
sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The
phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish,
one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not
intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of
being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers
contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have
simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the
provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents"
was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or
adoption.

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in

contravention of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded,
prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of
the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be
countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. 19

The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 20

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against

illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits
the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of
reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented.
We see no pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as to
warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind
the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the
policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate
benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.

There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate
ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as
unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.

Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC
extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death
benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority.
Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up
John for adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.

To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents"
pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the
ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In
addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the
adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the
commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify
as John’s secondary beneficiary.

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s
parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail
the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died
less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four
(4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at
bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in
favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that
adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed
away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological
parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 22 (RA 8552),
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted,
the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody
of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The
reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall
be extinguished. (emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of

custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, 23 justifies the retention of vested rights and
obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of
parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was
enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which
provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant
petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies
behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child,
which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child
that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her
adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the
adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this
case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the
role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents
are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances,
are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by
the following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of
legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants,
his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at
least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-
à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights
still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We
rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a
minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents
was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of
life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself
orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority
resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on

John can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it
appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late
husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was
unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she
consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John
repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact,
this veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate 25 executed in Brazil, and in the
Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel
boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed
Decision.27 Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before
the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be
assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner
indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries

for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA
8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly
allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member
unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least
evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the
confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the
restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of
address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively
made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary
under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis.
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already
died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue
solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to
a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.