Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Subject : Contracts 1
Prepared by: B.V.S.Suneetha
Assistant Professor
Damodaram Sanjivayya
National Law University
Sabbavaram.
1. Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571
2. Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211
EWCA Civ 11 QB 256
3. Carlil v Carbolic Smoke Ball company
4. Galloway v Galloway (1914) 30 TLR 531
5. Harvey v Facie [1893] UKPC 1
6. Pharmaceutical society v Boots Cash Chemist Ltd 2 WLR 427
7. Lalman Shukla V Gauri Datt 1913 40 ALJ 489
8. Boulton v Jones (1857) 2 H and N 564
9. Ramsgate v Victoria Montefiore (1866) LR 1 Ex 109
10.Henderson v Stevenson (1843) 3 Hare 100
11.Parker v South eastern railway [1877] 2 CPD 416
12.Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 AppCas 666
13.Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27
14.Felthouse v Bindley (1862) EWHC CP J 35
15.Powell v Lee (1908) 99 LT 284
16.Thornton v Shoe lane parking ltd. [1970] EWCA Civ 2
17.Entores v Far Miles East Company [1955] EWCA Civ 3
20.Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia vs. Girdharilal [1965] Insc 171
Parshottamdas & Co. & Ors.
21.Tweedle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC J57 (QB)
22.Chinnaya v Ramayya ILR (1876-82) 4 Mad 137
23.Durgaprasad v Baldeo 1880 3 ALL 221
24.Kedarnath v Gorie Muhammad (1887) ILR 14 Cal 64
25.Shuppu Ammal v K. Subramaniam 4 Ind Cas 1083
26.Khwaja Mohammad Khan v Hussaini Begum (1907) ILR 29 All 222
27.Mohireebibi v Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 Cal. 539
28.Leslie v Shiell [1914] 3 KB 607
29.Chikkam Ammiraju v Chikkam Seshamma (1917) 41 Mad 33
30.Derry v Peek [1889] UKHL 1
31.Peek v Gurney [1873] LR 6 HL 377
32.With v O’Flanagan [1936] Ch 575
33.Shri Krishnan v Kurukshetra University AIR 1976 SC 376
34.Mannu singh v Umadatt (1890) 12 All 523
35.Cundy v Lindsay LR 3 App Cas 459
36.Griffith v Brymer 1903 19 T.L.R. 434.
37.Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31
38.Bai Vijili v Nansa Nagur (1886) I.L.R. 10 B. 152
FACTS
JUDGMENT
[1892] EWCA CIV 1 filled with carbolic acid (or phenol). The
tube would be inserted into a user's nose
and squeezed at the bottom to release the
COURT MEMBERSHIP vapours. The nose would run, ostensibly
flushing out viral infections.
JUDGE(S) SITTING
The Company published advertisements in
LINDLEY LJ, BOWEN LJ AND AL
the Pall Mall Gazette and other
SMITH LJ
newspapers on November 13, 1891,
FACTS
claiming that it would pay £100
The Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. made a (equivalent to £11,000 in 2018) to anyone
product called the "smoke ball" and who got sick with influenza after using its
product according to the instructions they replied with an anonymous letter that
provided with it. if it is used properly the company had
complete confidence in the smoke ball's
£100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic
efficacy, but "to protect themselves against
Smoke Ball Company to any person who
all fraudulent claims", they would need her
contracts the increasing epidemic influenza
to come to their office to use the ball each
colds, or any disease caused by taking
day and be checked by the secretary. Mrs.
cold, after having used the ball three times
Carlill brought a claim to court. The
daily for two weeks, according to the
barristers representing her argued that the
printed directions supplied with each ball.
advertisement and her reliance on it was a
£1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, contract between the company and her, so
Regent Street, showing our sincerity in the the company ought to pay. The company
matter. During the last epidemic of argued it was not a serious contract.
influenza many thousand carbolic smoke
JUDGMENT
balls were sold as preventives against this
disease, and in no ascertained case was the The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company,
disease contracted by those using the represented by H. H. Asquith, lost its
carbolic smoke ball. argument at the Queen's Bench. It
appealed straight away. The Court of
One carbolic smoke ball will last a family
Appeal unanimously rejected the
several months, making it the cheapest
company's arguments and held that there
remedy in the world at the price, 10s. post
was a fully binding contract for £100 with
free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5s.
Mrs. Carlill. Among the reasons given by
Address: “Carbolic Smoke Ball
the three judges were
Company”, 27, Princes Street, Hanover
Square, London. (1) that the advertisement was not a
unilateral offer to all the world but an offer
Mrs. Louisa Elizabeth Carlill saw the
restricted to those who acted upon the
advertisement, bought one of the balls and
terms contained in the advertisement
used it three times daily for nearly two
months until she contracted the flu on 17 (2) that satisfying conditions for using the
January 1892. She claimed £100 from the smoke ball constituted acceptance of the
Carbolic Smoke Ball Company. They offer
ignored two letters from her husband, a
(3) that purchasing or merely using the
solicitor. On a third request for her reward,
smoke ball constituted good consideration,
because it was a distinct detriment incurred Then, what is left? The first observation I
at the behest of the company and, will make is that we are not dealing with
furthermore, more people buying smoke any inference of fact. We are dealing with
balls by relying on the advertisement was a an express promise to pay £100. in certain
clear benefit to Carbolic events. Read the advertisement how you
will, and twist it about as you will, here is
(4)that the company's claim that £1000
a distinct promise expressed in language
was deposited at the Alliance Bank
which is perfectly unmistakable —
showed the serious intention to be legally
bound. The judgments of the court were as “£100. reward will be paid by the Carbolic
follows. Smoke Ball Company to any person who
contracts the influenza after having used
the ball three times daily for two weeks
Lord Justice Lindley according to the printed directions
Lindley LJ gave the first judgment on it, supplied with each ball.”
after running through the facts again. He He follows on with essentially five points.
makes short shrift of the insurance and First, the advertisement was not "mere
wagering contract arguments that were puff" as had been alleged by the company,
dealt with in the Queen's Bench. because the deposit of £1000 in the bank
which were raised in the Court below. I advertisement was an offer made
refer to them simply for the purpose of specifically to anyone who performed the
dismissing them. First, it is said no action conditions in the advertisement rather than
will lie upon this contract because it is a a statement "not made with anybody in
approximately $8,400 per year. Based substantially dependent upon the other
upon its findings, the trial court concluded spouse for his or her maintenance and
on 27 October 1977. The Court also maintenance and support from the other
concluded that the plaintiff was not spouse." A wife is actually substantially
substantially dependent upon the defendant dependent upon her husband for her
We additionally note that the order Facey – Lowest price for bumper hall is
appealed from was entered more than one $900.
year ago and that some change in the
Harvey – We agree to buy bumper hall for
conditions of the parties is likely. Further,
the sum of $900 asked by you.
the record on appeal does not reflect any
evidence with regard to the reasonable Harvey sued for specific performance of
value of attorney's fees sought by the this agreement and for an injunction to
plaintiff. For the reasons previously stated, restrain the town of Kingston from taking
the order of the trial court from which the conveyance of the property (Facey was
plaintiff has appealed will be vacated and previously engaged in negotiations to sell
the cause remanded to the trial court for a the land to Kingston)
accepts that offer. Then the contract is point of time did the sale in this particular
completed. I can see no reason at all, that shop at Edgware take place? My Lord has
being I think clearly the normal position, explained the system which has been
for drawing any different implication as a introduced into that shop (and possibly
result of this layout. The Lord Chief other shops since) in March 1951. The two
Justice, I think, expressed one of the most ladies in this case, Miss Mainwaring and
formidable difficulties in the way of the Miss Marrable, who went into that shop,
suggestion when he pointed out that, if the each took a particular package containing
Plaintiffs are right, once an article has poison from the particular shelf, put it into
their basket, came to the exit and there think I am bound to say in this case the
paid. It is said upon the one hand that sale was made under the supervision of a
when the customer takes the package from pharmacist. By using the words 'The sale
the poison section and puts it into her is effected by, or under the supervision of,
basket the sale there and then takes place, a registered pharmacist', it seems to me
On the other hand, it is said the sale does the sale might be effected by somebody not
not take place until that customer who has a pharmacist. If it be under the
placed that package in the basket comes to supervision of a pharmacist, the
the exit. pharmacist can say 'You cannot have that.
That contains poison'. In this case I
The Lord Chief Justice dealt with the
decide, first that there is no sale effected
matter in this way, and I would like to
merely by the purchaser taking up the
adopt these words:
article. There is no sale until the buyer's
"It seems to me therefore, applying offer to buy is accepted by the acceptance
common sense to this class of transaction, of the money, and that takes place under
there is no difference merely because a the supervision of a pharmacist. And in
self-service is advertised. It is no different any case, I think, even if I am wrong in the
really from the normal transaction in a view I have taken of when the offer is
shop. I am quite satisfied it would be accepted, the sale is by or under the
wrong to say the shopkeeper is making an supervision of a pharmacist".
offer to sell every article in the shop to any
I agree with that and I agree that this
person who might come in and that he can
appeal ought to be dismissed.
insist by saying 'I accept your offer'".
Issues Dealt:
FACTS
Plaintiff was a servant of defendant who at his position. Defendant was among
was sent to Hardwar for finding the those several servants who were sent for
nephew of his master, who has absconded the search of master’s child. He was sent
from his house. The servant was able to to Hardwar from Cawnpore and there he
find the missing child and he was was able to trace the child and for this
rewarded with two sovereigns and Rs. 20. accomplishment he was awarded with two
Later on after 6 months when he was sovereigns and Rs. 20 when he returned to
dismissed from his work he brought a suit Cawnpore. In the meantime when plaintiff
against his masters claiming Rs. 499 for was at the search of child defendant issued
a hand bill offering reward of Rs. 501 to
the person who traces the missing child It was contended by the respondents that
and defendant was totally ignorant of this there must be an acceptance to offer in
reward. order to convert it into a contract and
assent is the basic essential in order to
constitute a contract. At the time he was
Later on after 6 months of this incident tracing the boy he was unaware about this
plaintiff brought a suit against his master reward associated with child, so without
claiming Rs. 499 stating that the master knowledge how can it create a contract
had promised to the person who will find between parties.
the missing child a reward. He alleged his
master of not providing reward for the
specific performance of his promise. It was also argued by them that at the time
of tracing the missing child he was acting
CONTENTIONS OF BOTH THE
as a servant and thus fulfilling the
PARTIES
responsibilities and obligations for which
PETITIONERS he was sent to Hardwar from Cawnpore.
associated with such proposal is fulfilled. action accrues to persons other than those
to whom the offer is made.
FACTS
BOULTON
The defendant i.e. Jones sent a written
V
order for goods to a shop which is owned
JONES by Brocklehurst and which was addressed
to him by name. Unknown to the
{1857} 2H AND N564
defendant, Brocklehurst had earlier that
day sold and transferred his business to
3 Can Boulton claim the amount of the him money, and upon which A seeks to
goods which was used by the Jones? sue.” So, the Jones will not be liable to pay
{Section 64 will also apply} which talks
JUDGEMENT
about rescissions of a voidable contract.
The court held that the defendant i.e. Jones
COMMENT
was not liable for the price. When a
Contract is made for the identity of the Originally the contract is between
person is important to the Contract. Hence, Brocklehurst and Jones has no idea that
there was no Contract. “POLLOCK” said now the business is taken over by the
that the rule of law is clear, that if you Boulton. Jones assumed that he placed an
propose to make a contract with A, then B order to Brocklehurst which is the original
cannot substitute himself for A without party to the contract but not to the Boulton.
your consent and to your disadvantage, Only the person to whom the offer is made
securing to himself all the benefit of the can acceptit. No other party can accept on
contract. behalf of the either party. According to me
“MARTIN B” said that where the facts the judgement which is given in this case
prove that the defendant never meant to is right according to the facts of the case.
contract with A alone, B can never force a Acceptance is only made by that person to
contract upon him, he was dealt with A, whom it is given. For example- Contract to
and a contract with no one else can be set write a book or perform a concert, paint a
up against him. portrait then no other person can adopt the
JUDGEMENT
SIGNIFICANCE
KEATING J saying,
Section 2(b) of Contract Act 1872- When "If I hear no more about him, I consider
the person to whom the proposal is made the horse mine at £30.15s."
signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is The nephew did not reply. He was busy at
said to be accepted. A proposal, when auctions on his farm in Tamworth. He told
accepted, becomes a promise. the man running the auctions, William
revocation of proposals and acceptances, inconsistently with their rights. But for the
respectively, are deemed to be made by Uncle to show the horse was his property,
any act or omission of the party he had to show there was a valid contract.
proposing, accepting or revoking, by Bindley argued there was not, since the
Willes J delivered the lead judgment. It is clear that there was no complete
“I am of opinion that the rule to enter a bargain on the 2nd of January: and it is
nonsuit should be made absolute. The also clear that the uncle had no right to
horse in question had belonged to the impose upon the nephew a sale of his
plaintiff's nephew, John Felthouse. In horse for £30 and 15s. unless he chose to
December, 1860, a conversation took place comply with the condition of writing to
between the plaintiff and his nephew repudiate the offer. The nephew might, no
relative to the purchase of the horse by the doubt, have bound his uncle to the bargain
former. The uncle seems to have thought by writing to him: the uncle might also
that he had on that occasion bought the have retracted his offer at any time before
horse for £30, the nephew said that he had acceptance. It stood an open offer: and so
sold it for 30 guineas, but there was clearly things remained until the 25th of February,
when the nephew was about to sell his
farming stock by auction. The horse in likely construction: and, if so, it is clear
question being catalogued with the rest of that the plaintiff cannot recover. But,
the stock, the auctioneer (the defendant) assuming that there had been a complete
was told that it was already sold. It is clear, parol bargain before the 25th of February,
therefore, that the nephew in his own mind and that the letter of the 27th was a mere
intended his uncle to have the horse at the expression of the terms of that prior
price which he (the uncle) had named, £30 bargain, and not a bargain then for the first
and 15s.: but he had not communicated time concluded, it would be directly
such his intention to his uncle, or done contrary to the decision of the court of
anything to bind himself. Nothing, Exchequer in Stockdale v. Dunlop to hold
therefore, had been done to vest the that that acceptance had relation back to
property in the horse in the plaintiff down the previous offer so as to bind third
to the 25th of February, when the horse persons in respect of a dealing with the
was sold by the defendant. It appears to me property by them in the interim. In that
that, independently of the subsequent case, Messrs. H. & Co., being the owners
letters, there had been no bargain to pass of two ships, called the " Antelope" and
the property in the horse to the plaintiff, the "Maria," trading to the coast of Africa,
and therefore that he had no right to and which were then expected to arrive in
complain of the sale. Liverpool with cargoes of palm-oil, agreed
verbally to sell the plaintiffs two hundred
Then, what is the effect of the subsequent
tons of oil,- one hundred tons to arrive by
correspondence? The letter of the
the "Antelope," and one hundred tons by
auctioneer amounts to nothing. The more
the "Maria." The "Antelope" did
important letter is that of the nephew, of
afterwards arrive with one hundred -tons
the 27th of February, which is relied on as
of oil on board, which were delivered by
shewing that he intended to accept and did
H. & Co. to the plaintiffs. The "Maria,"
accept the terms offered by his uncle's
having fifty tons of oil on board, was lost
letter of the 2nd of January. That letter,
by perils of the sea. The plaintiffs having
however, may be treated either as an
insured the oil on board the "Maria,"
acceptance then for the first time made by
together with their expected profits
him, or as a memorandum of a bargain
thereon, it was held that they had no
complete before the 25th of February,
insurable interest, as the contract they had
sufficient within the statute of frauds. It
entered into with H. & Co., being verbal
seems to me that the former is the more
only, was incapable of being enforced.
Byles J delivered to Morrisons, it was held that the
defendants were liable to the plaintiffs.
I am of the same opinion, and have
nothing to add to what has fallen from my
Brother Willes.
Keating J
to support the judgment of the trial court, contained on the face, words “Dublin to
in the absence of his findings of fact and White heaven” on the back, certain terms,
conclusions of law, this court must affirm one of which excluded liability of the Co.
- that they failed to complete their part of that ticket contains conditions.
- that the conditions on the ticket were It is the duty of the person delivering the
insufficient to protect them against the document to give adequate notice to the
consequences from near future. offeree of the printed terms and conditions.
he admitted that he knew the ticket there should be a retrial. They said that if
contained writing. Mr. Parker's bag, which Mr Parker knew of the conditions he
was worth more than £10, was lost. He would be bound. If he did not know, he
sued the company. The question of law put would still be bound if he was given the
to the court was whether the clause applied ticket in such a way as amounted to
to Mr. Parker. At trial the jury found for "reasonable notice". Mellish LJ said the
Applying the principles which I have for the opening of the letter of credit, and
stated, I think that the contract in this case that this was an acceptance by conduct
was made in London where the acceptance which was complete as soon as the acts
case for service out of the jurisdiction. I am not sure that this argument about
variations is correct. It may well be that
the contract is made at the place where
first completed; not at the place where the
BENCH
variations are agreed. But whether this be
so or not, I think the variations were J.C. SHAH, K.N. WANCHOO AND M.
I think that the decisions of the master and communication such as telephone which
the judge were right, and I would dismiss facilitate formation of contract between
FACTS
the goods were also agreed to be made in acceptance of offer is intimated to the
Khamgaon and the City Civil Court of offerree. Hence, the court in whose
Ahmedabad did not have jurisdiction to try territorial jurisdiction such acceptance of
the suit. The City Civil Court of offer was intimated can try such suit.
CASE COMMENT
FACTS
ISSUE
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
CHINNAYA V RAMAYYA
CONTENTIONS BY THE PLAINTIFF
ILR (1876-84) 4 Mad 137
The consideration for the defendant’s Innes J drew similarities between the
mother to gift the property to the defendant instant case and the English case Dutton v.
was defendant’s promise to pay an annuity Poole [(1677) 2 Levinz 210]. In Dutton v.
to the plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff is Poole, a man had a daughter of
entitled to sue the defendant to recover the marriageable age and wanted to sell a
same. portion of wood that he possessed at the
time to meet his daughter’s wedding
CONTENTIONS BY THE
portion. The man’s son (defendant)
DEFENDANT
promised to pay the daughter (plaintiff)
The plaintiff had not furnished any £.1000 if the man forbore from selling the
consideration under the contract. Hence, wood. The man forbore but the defendant
she is not entitled to sue the defendant for failed to pay the promised sum. The
the recovery of the amount promised to daughter and her husband sued the
her. defendant for the sum. Though the
promise. From this definition, it is clear of the contract in question, the plaintiff had
that in a valid contract the consideration been receiving a sum of money out of her
need not flow from the promisee only. It sister’s estate. When the lady transferred
could flow from any other person who is the same to her daughter, the defendant,
not a party to such contract. The Hon’ble the contract stipulated that the same
Court in this case, upheld this point of law arrangement be continued by her. When
in the plaintiff’s right to recover the the plaintiff’s sister transferred the
annuity due to her from the defendant property to the defendant, the plaintiff
under the contract in question but their suffered a loss of annuity that she had been
reasons for the same were different. receiving so far. It was held that such loss
formed the consideration for the promise. Consideration must be moved at the
Hence, the plaintiff was deemed to have desire of the promisor
given the consideration.
DURGAPRASAD
Kindersley J also arrived at the same
V
conclusion but his reasoning was different.
The deed of gift and the defendant’s BALDEO
agreement to pay the annuity to the
plaintiff were executed at the same time.
1880 3 ALL 221
Thus, they could be considered parts of the
same transaction. The defendant’s promise FACTS
to pay the plaintiff was the consideration
The plaintiff sued to establish an
for the defendant’s mother to transfer the
agreement in writing by which the
property to the defendant. Hence, the
defendants promised to pay him a
defendant’s failure to pay the same would
commission on articles sold through their
amount to breach of contract and would
agency in a azar in which they occupied
entitle the plaintiff to sue her for the
shops, in consideration of the plain tiff
recovery of the same. The defendant was
having' expended, money in the
held liable to pay the annuity to the
construction of such bazar. Such money
plaintiff.
had not been- expended by the plaintiff at
the request of the defendants nor had it
been expended by him for them
voluntarily, but it had been expended by
him voluntarily.
EQUIVALENT CITATIONS
JUDGEMENT
(1887) ILR 14 CAL 64
The agreement was void being without
consideration as it had not moved at the
IN CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
desire of A. Hence the Court decided that
the additional work done by B was not
BENCH: W C PETHERAM,
wanted by A and hence B cannot claim
BEVERLEY
anything from A.
the purpose to which the money was to be Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act,
applied, and they knew that on the faith of 1872 states openly that “an agreement
their subscription an obligation was to be made without consideration is void”. In
incurred to pay the contractor for the work. other words, the presence of consideration
Under these circumstances, this kind of is essential for a contract to be valid.
contract arises. The subscriber by
Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act,
subscribing his name says, in effect,--In
1872, talks of Consideration for a promise
consideration of your agreeing to enter into
is “When the promisor wishes, the fiancé
a contract to erect or yourselves erecting
or any other person has done or abstained
this building, I undertake to supply the
from doing, or does or refrains from
money to pay for it up to the amount for
doing, or promises to do or refrain from
which I subscribe my name. That is a
doing something, such act or abstinence
perfectly valid contract and for good
or Promise.” It is the price paid by one BENCH
party for the promise of the other. The
J STANLEY, W BURKITT
consideration is the benefit that
corresponds to the parties to a contract. FACTS
The consideration may be “right, interest, This appeal arises out of a suit brought by
profit or benefit” for one of the parties. It the plaintiff Muhammad Rustam Ali Khan
may also be ‘some indulgence, prejudice, against his wife for restitution of conjugal
loss or responsibility given, suffered or rights. The plaintiff is the son of Khwaja
assumed by the other. Muhammad Khan, a Nawab of Dholepur,
and was married to the defendant Husaini
Begam, who is the daughter of a wealthy
SHUPPU AMMAL AND ANR. VS K.
resident of Moradabad, now deceased, on
SUBRAMANIAM AND ORS
the 2nd of November 1877. At the time of
4 IND CAS 1083 the marriage the plaintiff's father agreed to
give the defendant Rs. 500 a month for
pin-money. The plaintiff and the defendant
BENCH lived together from the year 1883 up to the
R BENSON, OFFG., K AIYAR year 1896, when she left her husband and
went to her father's house on the ground,
as she alleges, of her husband's
FACTS misconduct. She subsequently sued her
father-in-law for arrears of the monthly
JUDGEMENT
annuity, agreed to be paid to her, up to
1901, and obtained a decree in the terms of
MUHAMMAD RUSTAM ALI KHAN a compromise. Her father-in-law failing to
VS pay the annuity after the date of this
decree, a suit was instituted by the
HUSAINI BEGAM
defendant against him for arrears of it,
IN ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT from the 1st of May 1901 to the 31st of
wherever she likes and has become danger to the life of the defendant if she
immoral. Moreover, she has now became goes and lives with her husband in his
fact that it only occurred to the husband to learned District Judge in the course of his
institute a suit for restitution of conjugal judgment says: "It is urged that the case at
rights when the wife had taken legal steps present pending in appeal before the High
to recover her arrears of annuity from his Court between the appellant in this case
father. And it is also significant that he and the respondent's father shows that
should desire to resume connubial enmity exists and the fact that the
relations with a person in the condition in respondent charged her with having
The knowledge of the respondent’s Though Mr. Brahmo Dutt was not
actual age which Mr. Kedar Nath personally present at the time of the
Mitter possessed should not be transaction, Mr. Mitter acted as his
imputed to the appellants as Mr. authorised agent in the transaction and Mr.
Dedraj acted as the agent of Dedraj too acted under his instructions in
Brahmo Dutt in this transaction. good faith believing Mr. Mitter to be Mr.
Dutt’s authorised agent. Hence, their
The respondent is estopped by
Lordships held that the knowledge of the
section 115 of the Indian Evidence
respondent’s minority possessed by Mr.
Act, 1872 from claiming that he
Mitter was rightly imputed to Mr. Dutt.
was a minor at the time of
executing the mortgage. Section 115 of the Indian Evidence
Act,1872 was held to be not applicable in
The respondent must repay the
the instant case as both the parties were
amount advanced according to
aware of the truth. Further, such provision
section 64 and 38 of the Indian
was held to be not applicable in the case of
Contract Act (1872); and section
minority as held in Nelson v. Stocker 4 De
41 of the Specific Relief Act
G. and J. 458 (1859). Their Lordships also
(1877).
relied on section 19 of the Indian Contract
Act (1872) which says that a fraud or
misrepresentation which does not cause
the consent to a contract of the party on Their Lordships, taking into consideration
whom such fraud is practised, or to whom sections 2, 10 and 11 of the Indian
such misrepresentation is made, does not Contract Act (1872), held that the Act
render the contract voidable. makes it essential that all contracting
parties should be “competent to contract,”
According to section 64 of Indian Contract
and expressly provides that a person who
Act (1872), when a person at whose
by reason of minority is incompetent to
option a contract is voidable rescinds the
contract cannot make a contract within the
contract, he must restore to the other party
meaning of the Act. Their Lordships also
any benefits that he might have received
considered various other provisions of the
from that party. Their Lordships found the
same Act to point out the void nature of a
same to be applicable only in the case of
contract by a minor. Sec. 68 states that if a
persons competent to contract and not in
person incapable of entering into a contract
the case of minors who are incompetent to
or any one whom he is legally bound to
contract. The decision of the lower courts
support is supplied by another person with
to decree in the respondent’s favour
necessaries suited to his condition in life,
without ordering him to return the money
the person who has furnished such supplies
advanced was upheld by the Privy
is entitled to be reimbursed from the
Council.
property of such incapable person.It is
clear from the Act that a minor is not liable
The impugned mortgage in the instant case
even for necessaries, and that no demand
was executed under the Transfer of
with respect to the same is enforceable
Property Act (1882). Section 7 of the
against him by law, though a statutory
aforementioned Act says that a person
claim is created against his property.
must be competent to contract in order to
Under sections 183 and 184 no person
be competent to transfer property. Section
under the age of majority can employ or be
4 of that Act provides that the chapters and
an agent. Again, under sections 247 and
sections of that Act which relate to
248, although a person under majority may
contracts are to be considered part of the
be admitted to the benefits of a
Indian Contract Act, 1872. Hence, the
partnership, he cannot be made personally
instant case was considered to fall
liable for any of its obligations; although
underTransfer of Property Act (1882).
he may on attaining majority accept those
obligations if he thinks fit to do so.
Their Lordships held that when there was the above definition of the proposal is also
no question of creation of a contract on valid for an offer. According to Section
account of one of the parties being a 2(B) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
minor, the question whether such a when the person to whom the proposal is
contract is void or voidable does not arise made signifies his assent thereto, the
at all as the contract itself is void ab initio. proposal is said to be accepted. A
The Indian Contract Act (1872) is proposal, when accepted, becomes a
exhaustive and imperative and clearly promise.
provides that a minor is not capable of
Offer is an open invitation by the promisor
entering into a contract. Their Lordships
for the acceptance of the terms and
further found no merit in interfering with
conditions of the undertaking, which when
the decisions of the lower courts not to
accepted by the promisee becomes binding
order the respondent to return the money
on both parties and the proposal becomes a
advanced. They relied on the decision in
promise. Hence the difference between an
Thurston v. Nottingham Permanent
offer (proposal) and a promise lies in
Benefit Building Society [L. R. (1902)1
acceptance of the offer (proposal).
Ch. 1 (1901); on appeal, L. R. (1903) App.
Cas. 6] wherein it was held that a Court of Under Section 2(h) it is said that an
compel a person to pay any moneys in a contract. American Law defines contract
that person the Legislature has declared to promise or a set of promises for the
be void and rejected the appellants’ claim breach of which the law gives a remedy or
for an equitable remedy. The appeal was the performance of which the law in some
If an infant obtains property or goods by Lord Sumner further repeated the decision
is traceable in his possession. This is indication about the way that Lord Sumner
Infant can’t be held liable for a wrong In addition, as such, it was held that, in
such, it is palpable that equity in this area only question in this case is whether the
was developed with the assistance of release-dead Ex. A. was executed by the
BENCH
(c) that though the threat was not made by property. It means the same thing whether,
the defendants (the parties to the deed) but when a man kills himself, it is called an act
by their brother, the document was of suicide or a successfully accomplished
voidable as "coercion". attempt to commit suicide; and an attempt
to commit suicide is punishable under the
Used by a person who is not a party to the
Penal Code. Hence suicide and an attempt
deed also negatived free consent. On these
to commit suicide are acts forbidden by the
findings the plaintiffs suit for cancellation
Penal Code though the former cannot be
of the deed was decreed.
punished under the code as a dead man
REASONING cannot be punished. Provided the threat of
The Courts below ought to have held that the forbidden act does have the intended
any persuasion on the part of the 1st effect of bringing about the consent to the
plaintiff's husband who is no party to Ex. agreement, it does not matter who made
A, even if proved, cannot invalidate the the threat or to whose prejudice it was
Act, Section 15) as "committing, or Mr. Patanjali Sastriar for the appellants
threatening to commit, any act forbidden argued that the "prejudice" to the feelings
by the Indian Penal Code, or the unlawful or to the supposed spiritual welfare of the
detaining, or threatening to detain any wife and son of Swami by the carrying out
property to the prejudice of any person of Swami's threat was not the sort of
whatever, with the intention of causing any prejudice contemplated by Section 15 and
person to enter into an agreement". I think that the "prejudice" to Swami's own life by
the words "any person whatever" have the threatened act was immaterial as ho
been advisedly used by the legislature to was not a party to the deed. It is
indicate that the act need not be to the unnecessary to go into the question
prejudice of the person entering into the whether prejudice or injury to sentiments,
Contract. I think also that the words " to feelings or supposed spiritual welfare is
the prejudice of any person whatever," also contemplated in the definition of
which are separated by a comma from the coercion in the Contract Act.
previous word "property" relate both to the
I agree with the lower Courts that the
committing or threatening to commit an
prejudice to Swami's own life is sufficient
act forbidden by the Penal Code and to the
to bring his threat within the definition of
unlawful detaining or threatening to detain
"coercion," provided it was intended by
the person using the threat to bring about deed of adoption, as her relations (not the
the agreement thereby. Mr. Sastriar put the adopted boy) obstructed the removal of her
following question in support of his husband's corpse by her or her guardian to
contention : "Suppose A threatens to blow the cremation ground unless she executed
up the Taj Mahal unless B gives C a the deed.
pronote for Rs. 10,000 and suppose B is a
Collins, C.J. and Muthuswami Aiyar, J.,
man of such fine artistic feelings that to
held that the act of the defendants was an
save the noble structure, he gives the
unlawful act covered by Section 15 or
pronote, is the note voidable for coercion?"
Section 16 of the Contract Act. I think
I see no difficulty in answering the
that when a man uses a threat of suicide to
question in the affirmative, provided the
his wife and his son and they owing to the
court is able to arrive at the conclusion that
distress of mind caused by the strength of
the threat (which was to do an act of
that threat execute a document, they are
mischief or vandalism prohibited by the
persons "whose mental capacity" which, I
Penal Code to the prejudice of
take it, includes volitional freedom and
Government) was in-tended to bring about
strength) "is temporarily affected by
the execution of the pronote and did have
reason of mental distress" within the
that effect (I need not say that the mere use
meaning of that expression in Clause 2(b)
of the threat will not render the agreement
of Section 16 of the Contract Act.
voidable unless the agreement was not
only intended to be but was actually JUDGEMENT
"caused" by it. See Section 19 of the The court held in favour of the respondents
Contract Act and the explanation thoreto.) and dismissed the appeal. The court agreed
question whether the release deed was that forbidden act is a wider term. It held
caused by undue influence. The line that suicide and attempt to commit suicide
between coercion (Section 15 of the are both punishable, but suicide is not
(Section 16 of the Act) is sometimes thin person. The court observed that in
and it is possible to conceive of cases definition, the words “to prejudice to any
where the Act might fall under both beads. person whatsoever” are included. The
In Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti (1889) respondents will not execute such a deed
I.L.R. 13 Mad. 214 a widow executed a unless they were prejudicially affected by
the threat of the husband. This case does was issued, permission was refused and
not fall under the undue influence because the company ended up in liquidation.
the husband was not a party to the
Led by Sir Henry Peek, shareholders who
contract. The threat by the husband
had purchased their stakes in the company
amounted to coercion and the appeal by
on the faith of the statement sued the
the younger brothers of the husband was,
directors in misrepresentation.
thus dismissed.
MISREPRESENTATION AND
FRAUD JUDGMENT
RATIO
Lord Wright MR held that Mr With could and relying upon that representation, A
rescind either because there was a duty to cannot hold B to the bargain. There is
point out the change in circumstance or ample authority for that statement and,
because the representation continued till indeed, I doubt myself whether any
authority is necessary, it being, it seems to SHRI KRISHNAN
me, so obviously consistent with the
VS
plainest principles of equity.”
THE KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY
Clauson J concurred.
SIGNIFICANCE
AIR 1976 SC 376, (1976) 1 SCC 311,
This affirms a general principle that any
1976 (8) UJ 15 SC
change to a fundamental reason for
contracting (supervening falsification)
must be communicated, where it is known BENCH
to one party. It does not matter what the
H KHANNA, P BHAGWATI, S M ALI
reason or motive is for not communicating
is, it need not be malicious or fraudulent,
but merely known to the representor
FACTS
his candidature could not be withdrawn for study for the prescribed number of
mandatory provisions of Clause 2(b) of the Certificate (b) will be provisional and can
Kurukshetra University Calender Vol. I, be withdrawn at any time before the
Ordinance X under which the candidature examination if the applicant fails to attend
could be withdrawn before the candidate the prescribed course of lectures before the
took the examination. Secondly it was end of his terra.
argued that the order of the University was
The last part of this statute clearly shows
mala fide because the real reason for
that the University could withdraw the
canceling the candidature of the appellant
certificate if the applicant had failed to
was the insistence of the District Education
attend the prescribed course of lectures.
Officer that the appellant should not have
But this could be done only before the
been admitted to the Law Faculty unless
examination. It is, therefore, manifest that
he had obtained the permission of his
once the appellant was allowed to take the
superior officers. In order to appreciate the
examination, rightly or wrongly, then the
first contention it may be necessary to
statute which empowers the University to
extract the relevant portions of the statute
withdraw the candidature of the applicant
contained in Kurukshetra University
has worked itself out and the applicant
Calender Volume I, Ordinance X. Clause 2
cannot be refused admission subsequently
of this Ordinance runs as follows:
for any infirmity which should have been
The following certificates, signed looked into before giving the applicant
by the Principal of the permission to appear. It was, however,
College/Head of the Department submitted by Mr. Nandy learned Counsel
for the respondent that the names of the question of the appellant committing a
candidates who were short of percentage fraud did not arise. It is well settled that
were displayed on the Notice Board of the where a person on whom fraud is
College and the appellant was fully aware committed is in a position to discover the
of the same and yet he did not draw the truth by due diligence, was fraud is not
attention of the University authorities proved. It was neither a case of suggestion
when he applied for admission to appear in falsi, or suppression yeri. The appellant
LL.B Part II Examination, Thus the never wrote to the University authorities
appellant was guilty of committing serious that he attended the prescribed number of
fraud and was not entitled to any lectures. There was ample time and
indulgence from this Court. opportunity for the University authorities
to have found out the defect. In these
It appears from the averments made in the
circumstances, therefore, if the University
counter-affidavit that according to the
authorities acquiesced in the infirmities
procedure prevalent in the College the
which the admission form contained and
admission forms are forwarded by the
allowed the appellant to appear in part I
Head of the Department in December
Examination in April 1972, then by force
preceding the year when the Examination
of the University Statute the University
is held. In the instant case the admission
had no power to withdraw the candidature
form of the appellant must have been
of the appellant. A somewhat similar
forwarded in December 1971 whereas the
situation arose in Premji Bhai Ganesh Bhai
examination was to take place in
Kshatriya v. Vice Chancellor, Ravishankar
April/May 1972. It is obvious that during
University, Raipur and Ors. where a
this period of four to five months it was
Division Bench of the High Court of
the duty of the University authorities to
Madhya Pradesh observed as follows:
scrutinise the form in order to find out
whether it was in order, Equally it was the From the provisions of Ordinance Nos. 19
duty of the Head of the Department of Law and 48 it is clear that the scrutiny as to the
before submitting the form to the requisite attendance of the candidates is
University to see that the form complied required to be made before the admission
with all the requirements of law. If neither cards are issued. Once the admission cards
the Head of the Department nor the are issued permitting the candidates to take
University authorities took care to their examination, there is no provision in
scrutinise the admission form, then the Ordinance No. 19 or Ordinance No. 48
which, would enable the Vice-Chancellor order suffers from yet another infirmity.
to withdraw the permission. The discretion The annexures filed by the appellant and
having been clearly exercised in favour of the respondent as also the allegations made
the petitioner by permitting him to appear in the counter-affidavit clearly show that
at the examination, it was not open to the there were series of parleys and
Vice-Chancellor to withdraw that correspondence between the District
permission subsequently and to withhold Education Officer and the respondent in
his result. the course of which the respondent was
being persuaded, to the extent of
We find ourselves in complete agreement
compulsion, to withdraw the candidature
with the reasons given by the Madhya
of the appellant because he had not
Pradesh High Court and the view of law
obtained the permission of his superior
taken by the learned Judges. In these
officers. Mr. Nandy appearing for the
circumstances, therefore, once the
respondent has not been able to show any
appellant was allowed to appear at the
provision in the statutes of the University
Examination in May 1973, the respondents
which required that the candidates
had no jurisdiction to cancel his
attending the evening law classes who are
candidature for that examination. This was
in service should first get the prior
not a case where on the undertaking given
permission of their superior officers. We
by a candidate for fulfilment of a specified
have also perused the University Statute
condition a provisional admission was
placed before us by counsel for the
given by the University to appear at the
appellant and we do not find any provision
examination which could be withdrawn at
which could have afforded justification for
any moment on the non-fulfilment of the
the respondent to cancel the candidature of
aforesaid condition. If this was the
the appellant on the ground that he had not
situation then the candidate himself would
obtained the previous permission of his
have contracted out the statute which was
superior officers.
for his benefit and the statute therefore
would not have stood in the way of the Mr. Nandy counsel for the respondent
University authorities in cancelling the placed great reliance on the letter written
candidature of the appellant. by the appellant to the respondent wherein
he undertook to file the requisite
As regards the second point that the order
permission or to abide by any other order
was passed malafides, it is difficult to find
that may be passed by the University
any evidence of malafides in this case. The
authorities. This letter was obviously the requisite permission from his superior
written because the appellant was very officers, therefore he was not allowed to
anxious to appear in Part II Examination & appear at the examination, does not merit
the letter was written in terrorem and in consideration, because the impugned order
complete ignorance of his legal rights. The does not mention this ground at all and it
appellant did not know that there was any was not open to the respondent to have
provision in the University Statute which refused admission to the appellant to LL.B.
required that he should obtain the Part III or for that matter to refuse
permission of his superior officers. But as permission to appear at the examination on
the respondent was bent on prohibiting a ground which was not mentioned in the
him from taking the examination he had no impugned order.
alternative but to write a letter per force. It
Having gone into the circumstances
is well settled that any admission made in
mentioned above, we are of the view that
ignorance of legal rights or under duress
the impugned orders suffers from errors of
cannot bind the maker of the admission. In
law patent on the face of the record, and in
these circumstances we are clearly of the
any event this was not a case which should
opinion that the letter written by the
have been dismissed by the High Court in
appellant does not put him out of court. If
liming.
only the University authorities would have
exercised proper diligence and care by The appeal in accordingly allowed and the
scrutinising the admission form when it order of the University dated June 26,
was sent by the Head of the Department to 1973, is hereby quashed by a writ a
1971 they could have detected the defects declare the result of LL.B. Part II
or infirmities from which the form Examination in which the appel ant had
suffered according to the University appeared on May 19, 1973 and also to give
Statute. The Head of the Department of him an opportunity to appear in the three
Law was also guilty of dereliction of duty subjects in which he had failed in LL.B.
the appellant before he forwarded the same examination which may be held by the
UMA DATT
FACTS
MISTAKE
CUNDY
LINDSAY
HOL OF UK
BENCH
BLACKBURN J.,
LORD CAIRNS
FACTS
JUDGMENT
anybody who takes them from him with Co had meant to deal only with Blenkiron
notice; but where a person has bonâ fide & Co. There could therefore have been no
acquired an interest in the goods, you agreement or contract between them and
cannot, as against that person, avoid the the rogue. Accordingly, title did not pass
contract. Where the goods have come into to the rogue, and could not have passed to
the hands of a bonâ fide purchaser you Cundy. They were forced to therefore
cannot take them back. The case is very return the goods.
closely analogous to the old common-law Lord Cairns explained the mistake to
rule, in the case of felony or trespass. If identity, and the consequences:
goods are stolen or taken away by
“Now, my Lords, stating the matter shortly
trespass, no title whatever is conferred, in
in that way, I ask the question, how is it
general, upon a purchaser from the person
possible to imagine that in that state of “The distinction in outcome thus drawn
things any contract could have arisen between these two kinds of fraudulent
between the Respondents and Blenkarn, misrepresentation, one as to 'attributes' and
the dishonest man? Of him they knew the other as to 'identity', is unconvincing. It
nothing, and of him they never thought. has been described as a reproach to the
With him they never intended to deal. law. To a considerable extent the
Their minds never, even for an instant of distinction has now been eroded. Cundy v
time rested upon him, and as between him Lindsay was decided over a century ago,
and them there was no consensus of mind and since then there have been significant
which could lead to any agreement or any developments in this area of case law.
contract whatever. As between him and Unfortunately these developments have
them there was merely the one side to a left the law in a state of disarray. The
contract, where, in order to produce a question before the House on this appeal is
contract, two sides would be required. whether this distinction, so far as it
With the firm of Blenkiron & Co. of course remains, should still be regarded as good
there was no contract, for as to them the law
matter was entirely unknown, and
therefore the pretence of a contract was a
failure.” GRIFFITH
V.
DEVELOPMENTS BRYMER
ISSUES
(1886) ILR 10 BOM 152
The issue here was whether the defendants
could claim possessory title over the
vehicle based on a contract made by SIR SARGENT, KT., CJ &
HELD
court applied the general principle of the The Respondent had advanced money to
process of forming a binding contract to the Appellant who was a married woman
the current facts. Where an offeror makes in order to enable her to obtain a divorce
an offer to the promisee, the offeror is from her husband. He promised to marry
making such an offer only with the person her as soon as she was divorced. He then
identified and no one else. The fraudster sued to recover the advances he had made.
pretended to be a well known business
JUDGEMENT
man and that was the only reason why the
Plaintiffs accepted payment by cheque, as The object of the agreement with the wife
initially they had refused. The contract for to divorce her husband and marry the
sale was therefore only made with the Respondent was immoral and, therefore,
wealthy businessman and not the fraudster the agreement was void. Hence the
in his personal capacity. Thus, the fact that Respondent could not recover the money
the fraudster used someone else’s identity he had advanced.
to make the contract prevented a contract
from being formed. It also prevented the
SM. SUMITRA DEVI AGARWALLA
possessory title from being passed to the
fraudster and then on to the defendant. VS
defendants from letting out the suit Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil
premises to any person other than the Procedure praying for restraining the
plaintiff. The suit premises is the first floor defendants from letting out or parting with
of premises No. 310, Rabindra Sarani, the possession of the suit premises to any
Calcutta. It is not, disputed that the person other than the plaintiff till the
defendant No. 1 Sm. Sulekha Kundu is the disposal of the suit. Before the application
owner of the said premises. The defendant for temporary injunction was disposed of,
No. 2 Kestodas Kundu is the husband's on January 14, 1975, the plaintiff filed the
elder brother of Sulekha Kundu. The application under Order 23, Rule 3 inter
plaintiff's cape is that on November 2, alia alleging therein that on October 13,
1973, she entered into a contract of lease 1974, due to the intervention of common
of the suit premises with the defendants on friends, the parties settled the disputes
certain terms and conditions. Pursuant to between them in the presence of their
the said agreement, the plaintiff advanced respective lawyers. The terms of
to the defendant No. 2 as the agent of the settlement were recorded in writing in the
form of a letter addressed by the defendant and threat without the knowledge of the
No. 1 Sulekha Kundu to the plaintiff. The contents thereof and without any
original, and duplicate letters bearing the independent legal advice. It is contended
signatures of the defendant were detained that the said purported agreement is void
by Shri Sunil Krishna Dutta, Advocate, and not legally enforceable. Further, it is
representing the defendants in the matter. contended that the terms of the said
It is alleged that a true copy of the said alleged agreement are not lawful. It is also
letter was handed over to the plaintiff her case that Sunil Krishna "Dutta,
through her husband Krishna Kumar Advocate was never engaged by her and
Agarwal (hereinafter referred to as she had no occasion to give any instruction
Agarwal). A copy of the said letter to him. The said Sunil Krishna Dutta was
incorporating the terms of settlement acting on behalf of and represented the
agreed to by the parties has been annexed defendant No. 2 Kestodas Kundu. She has
to the application. It is alleged that the enumerated the circumstances under which
defendants deliberately and with an she was compelled to sign the said letter in
ulterior motive have backed out from the duplicate containing the terms and
said terms and are not willing to perform conditions of the purported settlement.
their part of the agreement, though the
JUDGEMENT
plaintiff at all material times was and is
still ready and willing to abide by the The learned Judge after considering the
same. Accordingly, it has been prayed by evidence and the facts and circumstances
the plaintiff that the terms and conditions of the case has held that the said agreement
referred to in the letter dated October 13, is in the nature of an executory contract
1974 should be recorded and the suit and not a concluded one and, as such, does
should be decreed on the said terms. not come within the purview of Order 23,
Rule 3; that the consideration for the
The defendant No. 1 Sulekha Kundu and
agreement was unlawful and opposed to
the defendant No. 2 Kestodas Kundu both
public policy and, consequently, the
opposed the said application under Order
agreement was hit by Section 23 of the
23, Rule 3 by petitions of objection. They
Contract Act and that, the agreement was
have denied the allegations made by the
not read over and explained to Sulekha
plaintiff in the said application. It has been
Kundu before she put her signature
averred by Sulekha Kundu that she was
thereon. It has been held by him that the
made to sign the said letter under duress
plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Court that
the suit has been wholly or partly adjusted Mr. Dutt has placed before us a number of
by a lawful agreement or compromise. decisions of different High Courts in
Upon the aforesaid findings, he has support of his contention. The first of such
dismissed the application under Order 23, decisions on which reliance has been
Rule 3. Hence, this appeal, placed by him is a Bench Decision of the
Allahabad High Court consisting of
The first question that arises is whether the
Sulaiman and Kendall JJ. in Quadri Jahen
documents, Exts. 1 and 1 (a) embodying
Begum v. Fazal Ahmad, ILR 50 All 748 =
the purported terms of settlement have
(AIR 1928 All 494). In that case, it has
been executed by the defendant No. 1
been observed as follows;
Sulekha Kundu under threat and coercion.
It has, however, been strenuously urged by "In our opinion the word "lawful" in Order
Mr. B.C. Dutt, learned Advocate appearing XXIII, Rule 3, does not merely mean
on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that an binding or enforceable. A contract which
enquiry as to whether an agreement in is brought about either by undue influence,
adjustment of the suit is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or fraud is, under
undue influence or coercion does not come Sections 19 and 19-A of the Indian
within the purview of the provision of Contract Act, merely avoidable and not
Order 23, Rule 3. In order to consider this absolutely illegal or unlawful. Section 23
contention, we may refer to the provision of the Act indicates when the consideration
of Order 23, Rule 3 which provides as or object of an agreement is unlawful.
follows: These are cases where it is forbidden by
law or is of such a nature that, if permitted,
"Where it is proved to the satisfaction of
it would defeat the provisions of any law,
the Court that a suit has been adjusted
or is fraudulent, or involves or implies
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement
injury to any person or property, or where
or compromise, or where the defendant
the court regards it as immoral or opposed
satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the
to public policy. We think that the word
whole or any part of the subject-matter of
"lawful" in Order XXIII, Rule 3, refers to
the suit, the Court shall order such
agreements which in their very terms or
agreement, compromise or satisfaction to
nature are not "unlawful", and may
be recorded, and shall pass a decree in
therefore include agreements which are
accordance therewith so far as it relates to
avoidable at the option of one of the
the suit."
parties thereto because they have been
brought about by undue influence, agreement has been obtained by the other
coercion or fraud." party by some illegal means, namely, by
fraud, undue influence or coercion, would
It has been further observed that it is
the Court be able to hold that there is an
possible to take the view that,
agreement? With respect, we are unable to
independently of Order XXIII, Rule 3, the
understand the principle of law laid down
Court has inherent jurisdiction under
in those two decisions. It has been already
Section 151 of the Cede to refuse to record
observed that if the consent of one party is
a compromise which has been brought
obtained by fraud, undue influence or
about by undue influence.
coercion, it cannot be said that he has
It is clear from Order 23, Rule 3 that agreed to the term to which his consent has
before the Court considers whether, or not been so obtained and consequently the
an agreement is lawful, it must be satisfied Court has to come to the finding that there
that there has been an agreement between is no agreement. If it is required under
the parties. An agreement is brought into Order 23, Rule 3 that the Court has to be
existence where one party makes an offer satisfied as to whether an agreement has in
and another accepts the same. It is the fact been reached as held by the Allahabad
consensus of minds of two persons in High Court in the above two decisions, we
regard to certain matter. Of these two are of the opinion that an enquiry by the
persons if one has not agreed to the term Court for such satisfaction will include
proposed by the other, there is no also an enquiry into the allegation of a
agreement between them. When the party that his consent to the terms of the
consent of one to the term is obtained by agreement has been procured by fraud,
the other by some illegal means, namely, undue influence or coercion. It is true that
by fraud, coercion or undue influence, it is fraud, undue influence or coercion makes a
difficult to hold that the person whose contract a avoidable one and not void. But
consent has been so obtained has agreed to as soon as a party complains about the
the term. practice upon him of fraud, undue
confined only to the proof of the signatures avoids the contract. If the party complains
of the parties on the document containing to Court that his signature to a document
the terms? Even in spite of the fact that the containing the terms has been obtained by
signature of a party or his consent to the the other party at the point of a revolver,
would the Court refuse to make an enquiry
into the same on the ground that the agreement is the withdrawal and non-
agreement is only avoidable and not void? prosecution of a criminal case, the
With due respect, we are unable to agreement is opposed to public policy and
subscribe to such a bold proposition and, is void.
in our opinion, to consider whether or not
For the reasons aforesaid, we affirm the
an agreement has been reached between
order of the learned Judge dismissing the
the parties, the Court will of necessity
plaintiff's application under Order 23, Rule
embark upon an enquiry as to the
3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
allegation of a party that his consent to the
dismiss the appeal with costs. No separate
"agreement or his signature on the
order need be passed in the connected
document containing the terms, has been
Rule, which shall be deemed to have been
obtained by fraud, undue influence or
disposed of without any order as to costs,
coercion. It is true that the party
Sharma, J.
complaining has his remedy by way of suit
He can obtain a declaration that the con- PEARCE
The question on severability was whether score of public policy, the law reserved to
the reasonable restriction could be the seller an absolute and indefeasible right
enforced when it was in the same contract to start a rival business the day after he
restriction. The court used the test of judicially, that in cases where the
whether striking out (with a blue pencil) purchaser, for his own protection, obtains
would leave behind a contractual competing with him, within bounds which
obligation that still made sense. If it did, having regard to the nature of the business
then the amended contract would be are reasonable and are limited in respect of
ammunition anywhere in the world , thus Elizabeth all restraints of trade, whatever
permitting him to trade in those very items they were, general or partial, were thought
illustrating the limited practical utility of therefore void.’ and ‘The true view at the
the rule under its strike-out only stricture. present time I think, is this: The public
prima facie contrary to public policy and on his trade freely: so has the individual.
void, unless it can be shown that the All interference with individual liberty of
restraint is, in the circumstances of the action in trading, and all restraints of trade
fund could not be treated as falling within the plaintiffs and the defendants?
that description, and could not be awarded 2. Whether the defendants were not
in a suit where they had accrued due induced to sign the said A and B to plaint
subsequently to its institution. An order by the representations of the plaintiffs or
directing a Company to furnish an account their agents respecting as alleged in
would not extend beyond, or include paragraphs
contributions which accrued later than, the
3. Whether the said representations or any
date when the business of such Company
of them were true in fact ?
was transferred to a limited Company.
APPEAL from Russell J. 4. Whether, if last two issues are decided
in defendants’ favour, the defendants are
On the 15th of March 1902, the Bombay
bound by the agreement?
Ice Manufacturing Company, Limited,
Messrs. J. and J. Moir, Messrs. S. B. 5. Whether the agreement in A and B is a
Fraser and Company, and Chubildas valid agreement in law and binding on
Lulloobhoy entered into an agreement defendants?
relating to the manufacturer and sale by
6. If not, whether the plaintiffs are entitled
them of ice, which contained, inter alia, the
to maintain this suit on the said
following provisions.
agreement?
That the defendants S. B. Fraser and
7. Whether the plaintiffs have performed
Company be decreed to pay the plaintiffs^
their part of the agreement as alleged?
costs of this suit.
8. Whether the plaintiffs are in any event
entitled to specific performance of the said
FACTS
agreement?
In this case the parties to the contract
I therefore am of opinion that so far as
carried on business as braziers in a certain
contributions are concerned relief must.
part of Calcutta. As the mode of the
The restricted to those that accrued before
business of the plaintiff was found by the
suit, and I further hold that no claim can be
defendants to be detrimental to their
made in respect of the sale of frosted ice.
business interest, an agreement was
The plaintiffs cannot recover the whole of
entered into between the plaintiff and the
each instalment, but only damages for the
defendants whereby the plaintiff agreed to
non-payment. In the view I take it is
stop his business in that quarter and the
unnecessary to discuss the transfer by
defendant promised in consideration of his
Frasers to the limited Company and the
doing so to pay the plaintiff all the sums
development by the P, & O. Company of
which he had then distributed as advance
their ice business, as both are subsequent
to the workers. In terms of the agreement
to the suit.
the plaintiff ceased carrying on the
From the course which the case took business in that quarter, but the defendants
before Russell,, no evidence of these failed to perform their part of the contract,
damages, so that unless the parties can namely, to pay to the plaintiff all the sums
come to some agreement an enquiry must which the plaintiff had advanced to their
be directed. workmen.
cease carrying on the said business in the general principle of the Common Law that
said locality, on the ground of its being a man is entitled to exercise any lawful
detrimental to their business, and offered trade or calling as and when he wills and
and agreed in consideration of his doing so the law has always regarded jealously any
to pay to the plaintiff all sums which he interference with trade, even at the risk of
workmen, whereupon the plaintiff did is public policy to oppose all restraints
agree and consent to cease carrying on the upon liberty of individual action which are
said business, and did accordingly cease; injurious to the interests of the State. In
and that the defendants have neglected and deciding whether a contractual term
refused to perform their part of the amounts to a restraint of trade, the Court
contract, to wit, to reimburse the plaintiff looks not at the form of the term but its
in all same that he had advanced to effect. It was held that the doctrine can
The court had a number of issues to (a) A agrees to sell B “a hundred tons of
decide. The most prominent issue was oil”. There is nothing whatever to show
whether the offer from the buyer, to pay what kind of oil was intended. The
more for the horse if it was lucky, could be agreement is void for uncertainty. (a) A
considered to be a valid offer for the agrees to sell B “a hundred tons of oil”.
purposes of the sale. This would give an There is nothing whatever to show what
indication as to whether the seller could kind of oil was intended. The agreement is
rely on the payment that had been void for uncertainty."
mentioned. Specifically, the court was
(b) A agrees to sell B one hundred tons of
required to understand whether the terms
oil of a specified description, known as an
‘lucky’ and ‘buy another horse’ could be
article of commerce. There is no
defined and considered legally binding on
uncertainty here to make the agreement
the parties.
void. (b) A agrees to sell B one hundred
JUDGEMENT tons of oil of a specified description,
The court held that the condition to pay $5 known as an article of commerce. There is
extra for the horse if it was lucky, was no uncertainty here to make the agreement
2) Whether M by denying to take delivery and wait till a reasonable time, for the
REPORT THIS AD
Though the time of delivery was
unreasonable due to lateness of the usual
business hours, yet there was full and
Since in present case, M was present at the
sufficient time for M to weigh, examine
warehouse and was in a position to
and receive into their possession the
reasonably ascertain the quality, quantity
delivered oil before midnight (in
of the product delivered, hence, there was
dissenting opinion, however, C.J. points
a valid tender even when made at
out there ought to be reasonable time as
unreasonable time for it was made within
well as opportunity. Absence of all
the time stipulated under the contract and
workers from the warehouse or any other
thus rendered literal possibility of
reason thereof due to the lateness of the
performance within the letter of contract.
hour could be pleaded as factor negating
the tender for it will not provide
reasonable opportunity to examine the DOMINION OF INDIA
product).
VS
GAYA PERSHAD of April, 1946. In each case it was
mentioned in the railway receipt that the
AIR 1957 ALL 193
wagon was to be carried by C. O. G.
Special. We understand from learned
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT counsel for the appellant that the correct
term used is C. O. G. which letters connote
BENCH
trains known as Coaching Specials. These
AGARWALA, V BHARGAVA trains are parcel trains which run faster
than goods trains like parcel express. The
FACTS
goods consigned on the 21st of March
These four appeals arise out of four
1946 were delivered at Lucknow to the
different suits which were numbered as
plaintiff-respondent on the 30th of March,
Suits Nos. 64/5 of 1947, 72/10 of 1947,
1946 when it was found that the oranges
73/11 of 1947 and 74/12 of 1947 in the
had considerably deteriorated. The amount
trial Court. In all the four suits the
of deterioration was estimated by the
plaintiffs and the defendants were the
Station Superintendent, Lucknow at 75%
same. The suits all related to a claim made
which was noted down in the delivery
by the plaintiff-respondent against the
book. The other three consignments were
defendants-appellants who are the two
offered for delivery at Lucknow to the
railway administrations at present known
plaintiff-respondent on 3rd May, 1946
as the Central Railway and the Northern
when the plaintiff refused to take delivery
Railway and which, at the time of the suits
on the ground that the goods had
were known as the G. I. P. Railway and the
deteriorated completely and become unfit
E. I. Railway; The claim was in respect of
for consumption.
damages to baskets of oranges which were
A note was made by the plaintiff-
sent from the railway station Katol on the
respondent In the delivery book that the
Central Railway to Lucknow on the
contents of these wagons were extremely
Northern Railway. The consignors of the
rotten and unfit for human consumption so
four consignments were different but the
that he was refusing to take delivery.
consignee in each case was the plaintiff-
Thereafter the plaintiff-respondent gave
respondent. The first consignment in
notice to the two railway administrations
question was booked from Katol on the
concerned and then instituted these four
21st of March, 1946 and the other three
suits for recovery of damages incurred by
consignments were booked 011 the 22nd
the plaintiff by reason of the late delivery point, which learned counsel took up, was
of the goods. that the amount of damages awarded by
the lower Court had not been properly
Various defences were raised to the suits.
assessed. No other points besides these
All the four suits were tried together and
three were canvassed before us on behalf
decided by one single judgment. The Court
of the appellants.
rejected the pleas in defence and decreed
the suit for damages. The first point raised an important question
of law. In that question it had to be
Four different appeals have been filed in
determined whether the consignee had a
this Court but since all the suits were
right to bring a suit for damage to the
decided by one judgment and common
goods in respect of which he was entitled
questions are involved, we are also
to take delivery from the railway
deciding these four appeals by one single
administration even though he was not the
judgment.
owner of these goods. It was found by us
When these appeals came up for hearing that in considering this question it was
before us, learned counsel for the necessary to reconsider a Division Bench
appellants urged three points before us. decision of this Court. Consequently we
The first point urged was that the plaintiff- framed a question and referred it for
respondent, who was only the consignee opinion to a Full Bench. The decision of
and not the owner of the goods of these the Full Bench on that point was given on
four consignments, had no right to bring the 23rd of March, 1955 (Reported as (S)
suits for damages to or loss of the goods. AIR 1956 All 338). That decision of the
The second point urged was that it was Full Bench is against the appellants and in
incumbent upon the plaintiff-respondent to favour of the plaintiff-respondent. The
establish that the damage to the goods was decision was that the consignee in these
the result of misconduct on the part of the cases had a right to bring the suits for
railway administrations or their servants in damage to the goods even though he was
view of the risk notes which had been not the owner of these goods. That point is
executed by the consignors at the time thus disposed of by the decision of the Full
when the goods were booked and since the Bench.
plaintiff-respondent failed to establish any
The main contention on the second point
such misconduct, he was not entitled to a
on behalf of the appellants was that though
decree in any of these suits. The third
the position of the railway as carrier of the
goods was that of a bailee by virtue of the administration concerned. This plea of the
provisions of the Indian Railways Act, in plaintiff-respondent was not accepted by
this particular case the appellants were the lower Court, nor has it been pressed
specially protected by the risk notes in again before us. The position, that has
Form B which had been executed by the been taken up on behalf of the plaintiff-
consignors when these four consignments respondent before us, is that in this case
were booked. Under these risk notes the the facts admitted and proved showed that
consignors had, in consideration of lower the goods were not carried by the railway
charge, agreed and undertook to hold the administrations in accordance, with the
railway administration harmless and free contracts entered into as evidenced by the
from all responsibility for any loss, parcel way bills and since the goods were
destruction or deterioration of, or damage not carried in accordance with the contract
to the said consignments from any cause and there was a breach of the contract on
whatever except upon proof that such loss, the part of the railway administrations, the
destruction, deterioration or damage arose railway administrations were not entitled
from the misconduct on the part of the rail to claim the protection of the risk notes. It
way administration or its servants. There appears from a joint statement given by
were also some provisos to this clause but learned counsel for the parties in the lower
they, need not be quoted as they are not court that the wagons in respect of all the
applicable and relevant to the case before four consignments were despatched from
us. On behalf of the appellants stand was Katol railway station, where the goods
taken on this condition in the risk notes were consigned, by C. O. G. Specials. In
and it was urged that, unless the plaintiff- all cases the goods were carried up to
respondent had proved that the damage to Jhansi by C. O. G. Specials. The first
the goods was the result of misconduct on consignment, which was in Wagon No.
the part of the railway administration or 8126, was sent from Jhansi by being
their servants, the plaintiff-respondent attached to a goods train which left Jhansi
could not claim damages from the on the 26th of March, 1946 at 4.00 a.m. It
appellants. In the lower Court, this point arrived at Juhi near Kanpur Central Station
was sought to be met on behalf of the on the 26th of March, 1946 at 4.40 p.m.
respondent on the ground that the risk and from there it was despatched by
notes had been obtained from the another goods train on the 27th of March
consignors by misrepresentation of facts at 12.00 a.m. The wagon arrived at
by the servants of the railway Lucknow on the 28th of March, 1946, at
11.50 a.m. when it was placed in the goods carrying 11 bogies. Further questioned, the
yard. Thereafter it was placed at the parcel witness went on to say that the train was
delivery siding on the 29th of March, 1946 actually carrying 10 passenger bogies, one
at 5.00 p.m. So far as the other three military motor van and one military stores
consignments are concerned, they were wagon. The train ordinarily carried 8
carried by C. O. G. Special from Jhansi up passenger bogies but there were 10
to Juhi where they arrived on the 27th of passenger bogies in the train that day. He
April, 1946 at 7.15 a.m. From Juhi, has also stated that this excess in the
however, the wagons were attached to a number of bogies in the train came about
goods train which left Juhi on the 1st of since two extra passenger bogies had come
May, 1946 at 11-20 p.m. The wagons then in the train from Bombay. This does show
arrived at Lucknow on the 2nd of May, that the train was carrying an overload that
1946 at 6.30 a.m. and were placed for day so that this Wagon No. 8126 could not
delivery at the parcel delivery siding on be attached to that train. The witness has
the 3rd of May, 1946, on which date also stated that in order to avoid heavy
delivery was refused by the plaintiff- detention, this Wagon No. 8126 was then
respondent. This movement of the wagons attached to the goods train No. D-5. It has
containing the goods shows that part of the been urged by the learned counsel for the
way the goods were carried by the type of appellants that this step which was taken at
train which was agreed upon between the Jhansi was a prudent act of a bailee
consignors and the railway administration, inasmuch as the wagon was attached to the
but for part of the way the wagons were goods train to avoid further detention as
carried by goods train which was contrary far as possible in view of the fact that the
to that contract. The reason in the case of wagon contained perishable goods. Having
Wagon No. 8126 given on behalf of the heard learned counsel on this point, we are
railway administration is that though that not satisfied that this step, which was taken
wagon could be attached to a passenger on behalf of the railway administration,
(No. 603 Down) which was to leave Jhansi was really a prudent act. The facts
at 3.00 a.m. on the 26th of March, 1946, disclosed by the railway administration
this could not be done as that train was themselves show that the result of the
already carrying an overload. According to attachment of that wagon to the goods
the evidence of defence witness S. D. train at Jhansi was that the wagon went to
Awasthi, that train usually had a load of 10 Juhi where there had to be a detention of
bogies whereas on that day it was actually about 17 hours. Even when it was sent
from Juhi by another goods train to of wagons ordinarily sent by goods train,
Lucknow, there was a further delay in could have been avoided. No such prudent
delivery of the goods, the wagon having step was taken either. Another aspect that
come by a goods train, which according to has to be kept in view is that the failure to
rules, had to be sent to the goods yard. It attach the wagon to No. 603 Down
actually reached the goods yard at 11.50 passenger train was also the result of the
a.m. on the 28th of March, 1946 and actions of the railway administration itself.
thereafter there was a delay of about 30 The two extra coaches, that had been
hours before it could be placed at the attached from Bombay, were attached by
delivery siding. There were thus two long the same railway administration which
delays at Juhi and Lucknow which were accepted the hooking of these goods at
clearly very material delays in view of the Katol. It is true, as urged by learned
nature of the goods that were being counsel, that during those days there was
carried. The delays occurred because the pressure of traffic on the railways and
goods were sent from Jhansi onwards by a there was at the same time shortage of
goods train and not by the type of train rolling stock and engines but if the railway
which had been agreed upon between the administrations anticipated that the goods
consignor and the railway administration. booked by C.O.G. Special from Katol
If the wagon had not been sent by goods could not be carried by passenger train and
train from Jhansi on the 26th of March, had to be carried by goods train, they
1946, but had been sent by the passenger should not have contracted to carry the
train No. 603 Down on the 27th or 28th of goods by C.O.G. Special. Having,
March, 1946 even then it could have been contracted with the consignors to carry the
available for delivery at Lucknow earlier goods by C. O. G. Special, the equivalent
than the time when it became available on of which is a passenger train, it was the
being attached to the goods train. Further, duty of the railway administration to take
it appears that when that wagon was steps that the goods were carried in the
attached to the goods train at Jhansi, no expeditious manner contracted between the
steps were taken to ensure that the railway parties and not by a slower train. For all
servants, who had to deal with the wagon these reasons, we are unable to hold that
at later stages, came to know that there had the alteration of the type of train from the
been a contract to carry that wagon by C. C. O. G. Special to goods train was a
O. G. Special. If any such step had been prudent act on behalf of the railway
taken, the delays, which occur in the case administration. The result of this alteration
by the railway administration was that the Chatham Rly. Co.'s Managing Committee,
goods were no longer being carried in 1915-2 KB 370 (A). In that case also an
accordance with the terms of the contract owner's risk note had been executed by the
between the parties. Once the carriage of consignor under which the consignor had
the goods was no longer in accordance elected to book the goods at a reduced rate
with the terms of the contract, and a breach agreeing to relieve the Managing
of the contract in that respect had been Committee and all other companies or
committed by the railway administration, persons over whose lines the merchandise
the railway administration could no longer may pass, or in whose possession the same
seek the protection of the risk note in Form may be during any portion of the transit,
B as that risk note was executed by the from all liability for loss, damage,
consignor on the clear understanding that misdelivery, delay, or detention, except
the goods would be carried by C. O. G. upon proof that such loss, damage,
Special and not by goods train. In the case misdelivery, delay, or detention arose from
of perishable goods like oranges, the term wilful misconduct on the part of the
of contract that the goods are to be carried Managing Committee's servants. It was
by a special type of train which is faster held that the owner's risk clause could only
than the ordinary goods train, is clearly of be effective in cases in which the railway
the essence of the contract. The arrival of afforded the consignor an alternative rate
the goods was delayed in consequence of below the general rate. The rate was
the change of type in train and not because alternative to a general rate "for the
it was not possible for the railway carriage of fruit by passenger train or by
administration to carry the goods other similar service" which of course the
throughout by C. O. G. Special. Midland goods train (by which the goods
were actually carried for part of the way)
The railway administration need not have
was not. To make the owner's risk
contracted to do so, but when they did
operative the contract had to be one for
contract to do so, the risk note, which was
carriage by passenger or equivalent train.
executed by the consignor, could protect
It was held that it was during any portion
the railway administration only so long as
of such transit only that the sender agreed
they carried out the transit of the goods in
to relieve the company from liability. It
accordance with the terms of the contract.
was only during the performance by the
This view of ours is fully supported by a
railway company of such transit that the
decision in Gunyon v. South Eastern &
sender could be called upon to show that
his loss had arisen from the wilful resulting from delay on that part of the
misconduct of the company's servants. But transit could be claimed without proof of
when in London the cherries were shipped misconduct. In our case also, the delay
on a goods train, that contract was no occurred materially in the transit between
longer being performed and the goods Jhansi and Lucknow when the goods were
were no longer being carried at owner's not being carried in accordance with the
risk. The Midland Railway Company terms of the contract under which they had
shipped the goods upon a train to which to be carried by C. O. G. Special. They
neither the contract nor the rate of payment were being carried by goods train which
applied and consequently the ordinary was slower than C. O. G. Special and to
incidents of carriage by carrier at once which the rates applicable must be lower.
became applicable. The mere fact that they This principle was applied in India by the
were being carried over the line of rails of Bombay High Court in B. B. & C. I.
the Midland Railway Company did not Railway v. Mahamadbhai Rahimbhai and
constitute the performance or an attempted Anr., AIR 1929 Bom 355 (B). In that case
performance of that special contract. The also the goods were being carried under a
company never carried and never intended risk note which was in Form H under
to carry at owner's risk; for they must have which the railway administration was
known that the only valid owner's risk rate protected unless there was wilful neglect
for fruit in force was oae for carriage by on. their part. It was held that the carriage
passenger train. It will be noticed that the of goods, which were of a perishable
above case was similar in facts to the cases nature, by passenger or parcel train was the
before us. In both cases owner's risk forms essence of the contract and when that
had been executed under which the railway contract was broken by carrying the goods
administrations were exempted from by goods train the protection of the risk
liability for damage, etc., except upon note was no longer available to the railway
proof of misconduct on the part of the administration. In these circumstances,
railway administrations or their servants. since we are unable to hold that the
In the case of Gunyon v. South Eastern railway administration was justified in
and Chatham Railway Companies' sending the Wagon No. 8126 from Jhansi
Managing Committee (A) the goods were by goods train and in committing breach of
to be carried by passenger train and were contract, the railway administration is not
instead carried by goods train for part of entitled to the protection of the risk note in
the way. It was held that the damage Form B. The facts with regard to the other
three consignments are very similar. In far as the goods of the other three
these cases also the goods were sent from consignments are concerned, there is
Juhi by goods train. There was evidence on behalf of the respondent that
considerable delay at Juhi where the there was complete deterioration and the
wagons were dealt with like wagons being goods had become unfit for consumption.
sent at ordinary rate by goods train. Again There is no evidence to the contrary on
at Lucknow, there was delay in placing the behalf of the appellants to show that the
wagons for delivery, because, having been goods were still in good condition and fit
treated as wagons coming by goods train, for consumption. The deterioration was
they first went to the goods yard and were due to delay in delivery as no alternative
later placed at the delivery siding, in these cause for deterioration has been alleged or
circumstances, no question arises of the proved on behalf of the appellants. The
plaintiff-respondent being required to second point urged on behalf of the
prove that the damage to the goods booked appellants must also, therefore, be decided
was due to any misconduct on the part of against them.
the railway administrations or their
So far as the question of the amount of
servants and consequently we need not go
damages is concerned, learned counsel has
into the question whether there was any
only pressed it before us with regard to the
such misconduct in this case or not.
amount of damages in one suit, No. 64/5
Learned counsel for the appellants also
of 1947 out of which First Appeal No. 89
urged before us that there was no evidence
of 1948 has arisen. It was in that case that
that the deterioration in the goods was the
the amount of loss was estimated at 75%.
result of delay in delivery occasioned by
Learned counsel's argument was that the
the carrying of the goods by goods train
value of the damage to the goods accepted
instead of C. O. G. Specials. The nature of
by the lower Court as Rs. 3,447-5-0 has
the goods itself indicates that detention of
not been properly proved by the plaintiff-
the goods before delivery was likely to
respondent whose evidence on this point
affect the quality of the goods. The longer
was unsatisfactory. We, however, find that
they were delayed, the more deterioration
the value of the damage was assessed by
was bound to occur. In the case of goods
an officer of the railway administration at
sent on the 21st of March, 1946, there was
Lucknow who has also been produced in
an assessment by the Station
this case as a witness on behalf of the
Superintendent, Lucknow, himself that the
appellants. No attempt was made to show
deterioration was to the extent of 75%. So
in his evidence that his assessment was Appeal from the judgment and decree,
wrong or had been arrived at on some dated June 3, 1966 of the Calcutta High
misrepresentation made by the plaintiff- Court in Appeal No. 251 of 1965. M.C.
respondent. There is, therefore, no reason Chagla and S.N. Mukherjee, for the
for rejecting the figure of assessment of appellant. S. V. Gupte, M.G. Poddar and
damage made by him. In the other three D.N. Mukherjee, for the respondent.
cases, the rate per basket for the goods
The Judgment of the Court was delivered
damaged was fixed by the lower Court on
by Bachawat,I. By an indenture of lease,
the basis of the statement of Mr. G. Dan,
dated February 17, 1954 the respondent
who was the Assistant Fruit Marketing and
leased to the appellant a plot of land at
Utilisation Officer and who had been in
premises No. 22, Jatindra Mohan Avenue,
Government service. We see no reason to
Calcutta, for a term of 10 years
differ from the views taken by the learned
commencing from February 1, 1954.
Judge of the lower Court that his evidence
Clause 3(c) of the deed provided for a
is reliable.
renewal of the lease and was in the
Consequently we find that there is no force following terms :--
in these appeals and they are dismissed
"3 (c). The lessor will on the written
with cost
request of the lessees made two calendar
months before the expiry of the term
hereby created and if there shall not at the
CALTEX
time of such request be any existing breach
V or non observance of any of the covenants
before specified time, and fails to do any essence of the contract even if they were
such thing at or before the specified time, not expressed to be so and were construed
been performed, becomes voidable at the the common law rule in respect of such
option of the promisee, if the intention of contracts and did not regard the stipulation
the (1) L.R. 43 I.A. 26. as to time as not of the essence of the
bargain. As stated in Halsbury's Laws of
parties was that time should be of the
England, 3rd ed., vol. 3, art. 281, p. 165
essence of the contract." In Jemshed's
"An option for the renewal of a lease, or
case(1) Viscount Haldane observed that
for the purchase or re-purchase of
the section did not lay down any principle
property, must in all cases be exercised
as regards contracts to sell land in India
strictly within the time limited for the
different from those which obtained under
purpose, otherwise it will lapse." This
the law of England. It is well known that
passage was quoted with approval by
in the exercise of its jurisdiction to decree
Danckwerts L.J. in Hare v. Nicoll(2). A
specific performance of contracts the
similar statement of law is to be found in
Court of Chancery adopted the rule,
Foa's General Law of Landlord and
especially in the case of contracts for the
Tenant, 8th Art. 453, p. 310, and in Hill
sale of land, that stipulations .as to time
and Redman's Law of Landlord and
were not to be regarded as of the essence
Tenant, 14th ed., p. 54. The reason is that a
of the contract unless they were made so
renewal of a lease is a privilege and if the
by express terms or unless a clear
tenant wishes to claim the privilege he
must do so strictly within the time limited and being prevented by means, I have
for the purpose. With regard to equitable alluded to, will give relief ... I decide this
relief against the failure of the tenant to case upon the principles on which, Lord
give notice of renewal within the stipulated Thurlow decided (Bayley v. The
time. the law is accurately stated in Corporation of Leominster 1792, 1 Ves.
Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed.,vol. 476), and I hope now, it will be known,
23, p. 626, Art. 1329, footnote (u) that it is expected, these covenants shall be
thus :--"Relief will not be given in equity literally performed where it can be done;
against failure to give notice in time, save and that Equity will interpose, and go
under special circumstances. The decided beyond the stipulations of the covenant at
cases show that in such cases relief is not law, only where a literal performance has
given in equity save upon the ground of been prevented by the means,-I have
unavoidable accident, fraud, surprise, mentioned, and no injury is done to the
ignorance not wilful or inequitable conduct lessor?' We are of the opinion that the
on the part of the lessor precluding him stipulation as to time in clause 3 (c) of the
from refusing to give the renewal. The indenture of lease dated February 17, 1954
limits of the equitable interference in such should be regarded as of the essence of the
cases were clearly stated by the Master of contract." The appellant not 'having
the Rolls (Sir R.P.Arden) in Eaton v. exercised the option of renewal within the
Lyon.(3) He observed :- "At law a time limited by the 'clause is not entitled to
covenant must be strictly and literally a renewal.
performed; in equity it must be really and
substantially.
The appellant claims relief against the
consequences of its default on the grounds
performed according to the true intent and enumerated in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the
meaning of the parties so far as plaint. Grounds (b) and (e) cannot be
circumstances will admit; but if regarded as special circumstances. As. to
unavoidable accident, if by fraud, by ground (d), it is. not shown that the service
surprise or ignorance not wilful, parties station is of immense public utility. The
may have been prevented from executing it fact that the appellant constructed a service
literally, a Court of Equity, will interfere; station is an irrelevant consideration.
and upon compensation bei ng made, the Ground (c) is not established and it is not
party having done everything in his power, 'shown that the time is not of the essence
of the bargain. As to ground (a) there is stipulated time. Equity will not relieve the
some evidence to show that the delay in tenant from the consequences of his own
giving the notice of renewal was due to neglect which could well be avoided with
oversight. But it is not shown that the reasonable diligence.
delay was due to any unavoidable
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
accident, excusable ignorance, fraud or
surprise. The delay arose from mere
neglect on the part of the appellant and
could have been avoided by reasonable
IMPOSSIBILITY EXISTING AT THE
diligence. As observed 'by the Master of
TIME OF CONTRACT
the Rolls in Reid & Anr. v. Grave &
Others(1): "The rule is now well
established, that no accident will entitle a
party to renew unless it be unavoidable. I
am of opinion, that nothing but accident, COUTURIER
which, could not have been avoided by V
reasonable diligence, will entitle the
HASTIE
plaintiff to a renewal in this Court."
& Tenant, 8th ed., article 455, pp. 311-12, MR. BARON ALDERSON, MR.
Ram Lal (1) 9 L.J. Ch, 245, 248. JUSTICE WIGHTMAN, MR.
Dubey v. Secretary of State for India (1), JUSTICE CRESWELL, MR. JUSTICE
On the 23d February the ship sailed on the the cargo became so heated that the vessel
homeward voyage. On the 1st May 1848, was obliged to put into, Tunis, where, after
Messrs. Bernouilli, the London agents of a survey and other proceedings, regularly
the Plaintiffs, and the persons to whom the and bona fide taken, the cargo was, on the
bill of lading had been indorsed, employed 22d April, unloaded and sold. It did not
the Defendants to sell the cargo, and sent appear that either party knew of these
them the bill of lading, the charterparty, circumstances: at the time of the sale. The
and the policy of insurance, asking and contract having been made on the 15th of
receiving thereon an advance of £600. May, Mr. Callander, on the 23d of May,
wrote to Hastie and Hutchinson: "I
On the 15th May the Defendants sold the
repudiate the contract of the cargo of
cargo to A. B. Callander, who signed a
Indian corn, per the Kezia Page, on the
bought note, in the following terms:
ground that the cargo did not exist at the
date of the contract, it appearing that the
news of the condemnation and sale of this this contract was made, the Plaintiffs could
cargo, at Tunis, on the 22d April, was not recover in the action. He therefore
published at Lloyd's, and other papers, on directed a verdict for the Defendants. The
the 12th instant, being three to four days case was afterwards argued in the Court of
prior to its being offered for sale to, me." Exchequer before the Lord Chief Baron,
Mr. Baron Parke, and Mr. Baron Alderson,
The Plaintiffs afterwards brought this
when the learned Judges differed in
action. The declaration was in the usual
opinion, and a rule was drawn up directing
form. The Defendants pleaded several
that the verdict found for the Defendants
pleas, of which the first four are not now
should be set aside on all the pleas except
material to be considered. The fifth plea
the sixth, and that on that plea judgment
was that before the sale to Callander, and
should be entered for the Plaintiffs, non
whilst the vessel was on the voyage, the
obstante veredicto. That the Defendants
Plaintiffs sold and delivered the corn to
should be at liberty to treat the decision of
other persons, and that since such sale the
the Court as the ruling at Nisi Prius, and to
Plaintiffs never had any property in the
put it on the record and bring a. bill of
corn or any right to sell or dispose thereof,
exceptions (8 Exch. 40). This was done,
and that Callander on that account
and the Lord Chief Baron sealed the bill of
repudiated the sale, and refused to perform
exceptions, adding, however, a
his contract, or to pay the price of the corn.
memorandum to the effect that he did so as
Sixthly, that before the Defendants were
the ruling of the Court, but that his own
employed by the Plaintiffs, the corn had
opinion was in opposition to such ruling.
become heated and greatly damaged in the
vessel, and had been unloaded by reason The case was argued on the bill of
thereof, and sold and disposed of by the exceptions in the Exchequer Chamber,
captain of the said vessel on account of the before Justices Coleridge, Maule,
Plaintiffs at Tunis, and that Callander, for Creswell, Wightman, Williams, Talfourd,
that reason, repudiated the sale, etc. and Crompton, who were unanimously of
opinion that the judgment of the Court of
The cause was tried before Mr. Baron
Exchequer ought to be reversed (9 Exch.
Martin, when his Lordship ruled, that the
102). The present writ of error was then
contract imported that at the time of the
brought.
sale, the corn was in existence as such, and
capable of delivery, and that as it had been
sold and delivered by the captain before
The purchaser bought in fact the shipping they are shipped "to arrive," which saves
documents, the rights and interests of the the vendee from all risk till they are safely
vendor. A brought to port. The intention of the
parties is understood to be declared by
contract of such a kind is valid, Paine v.
different terms of expression, and the
Meller. The language of the contract
judgment of the Exchequer Chamber here
implies all this. The representation that the
really violates that intention.
corn was shipped free on board at
Salonica, means that the cargo, was the As Lord Chief Baron Richards said, in
Hitchcock v. Giddings (4 Price, 135), " If a
property of, and at the risk of the shipper.
man will make a purchase of a chance, he
The Court of Exchequer proceeded on the
must abide by the consequences." Here,
words of this contract and gave the correct
however, the chance was only that of the
meaning to them. Mr. Baron Parke said,
arrival of the cargo, and that chance was
"There is an express engagement that the
covered by the policy, for the cargo, itself,
cargo was of average quality when
as stated in the contract, had been actually
shipped, so that it is clear that the
shipped. Had the cargo been damaged at
purchaser was to run the risk of all
the time of this contract, the loss thereby
subsequent deterioration by sea damage
arising must have been borne by the
or otherwise, for which he was to be
purchaser. Suppose the corn had been
indemnified by having the cargo fully
landed at Tunis, and had remained in the
insured; for the 27s. per quarter were to
warehouse there, it would have ceased to
cover not merely the price, but all
be a cargo in the strict and literal meaning
expenses of shipment, freight, and
of the word, but the purchaser would still
insurance." In a contract for the sale of
have been bound by his contract.
goods afloat, there are two periods which
are important to be regarded, the time of There was a total loss, and the Plaintiff
sale and the time of arrival. If at the time recovered on the policy, it is difficult to
of the sale there is anything on which the understand how such an opinion could be
contract can attach it is valid, and the entertained. A technical objection arising
vendee bound. on the form of the policy would not affect
this question. The contract here was, that
The goods are either shipped, as here, "free
the cargo was shipped "free on board." To
on board," when it is clear that they are
that extent the vendor was bound, but he
thenceforward at the risk of the vendee, or
was not bound by any farther and implied
warranty. The Lord Chancellor: My wrong; and I am also of that opinion
Lords, this case has been very fully and myself now, having been one of the Judges
ably argued on the part of the Plaintiffs in before whom the case came to be heard in
Error, but I understand from an intimation the Court of Exchequer.
which I have received, that all the learned
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, that
Judges who are present, including the
being so, I have no hesitation in advising
learned Judge who was of a different
your Lordships, and at once moving that
opinion in the Court of Exchequer, before
the judgment of the Court below should be
the case came to the Exchequer Chamber,
affirmed. It is hardly necessary, and it has
are of opinion that the judgment of the
not ordinarily been usual for your
Court of Exchequer Chamber sought to be
Lordships to go much into the merits of a
reversed by this writ of error was a correct
judgment which is thus unanimously
judgment, and they come to that opinion
affirmed by the Judges who are called in to
without the necessity of hearing the
consider it, and to assist the House in
counsel for the Defendants in Error.
forming its judgment. But I may state
If I am correct in this belief, I will not shortly that the whole question turns upon
trouble the learned counsel for the the construction of the contract, which was
Defendants in Error to address your entered into, between the parties. I do not
Lordships, because I confess, though I mean to deny that many plausible and
should endeavour to, keep my mind ingenious arguments have been pressed by
suspended till the case had been fully both the learned counsel who have
argued, that my strong impression in the addressed your Lordships, showing that
course of the argument has been, that the there might have been a meaning attached
judgment of the Court of Exchequer to that contract different from that which
Chamber is right. I the words themselves impart. If this had
depended not merely upon the construction
should therefore simply propose to ask the
of the contract but upon evidence, which,
learned Judges, whether they agree in
if I recollect rightly, was rejected at the
thinking that that judgment was right. Mr.
trial, of what mercantile usage had been, I
Baron Alderson said: My Lords, Her
should not have been prepared to say that a
Majesty's Judges are unanimously of
long continued mercantile usage
opinion that the judgment of the
interpreting such contracts might not have
Exchequer Chamber was right, and that the
been sufficient to warrant, or even to
judgment of the Court of Exchequer was
compel your Lordships to adopt a different BENCH
construction. But in the absence of any
BLACKBURN J
such evidence, looking to the contract
itself alone, it appears to me clearly that FACTS
what the parties contemplated, those who Caldwell & Bishop owned Surrey Gardens
bought and those who sold, was that there & Music Hall, and agreed to rent it out to
was an existing something to be sold and Taylor & Lewis for £100 a day. Taylor had
bought, and if sold and bought, then the planned to use the music hall for four
benefit of insurance should go with it. I do concerts and day and evening fetes on
not feel pressed by the latter argument, Monday 17 June, Monday 15 July,
which has been brought forward very ably Monday 5 August, and Monday 19 August
by Mr. Wilde, derived from the subject of 1861. They were going to provide a variety
insurance. I think the full benefit of the of extravagant entertainments including a
insurance was meant to go as well to losses singing performance by Sims Reeves, a
and damage that occurred previously to the thirty-five to forty-piece military and
15th of May, as to losses and damage that quadrille band, al fresco entertainments,
occurred subsequently, always assuming minstrels, fireworks and full illuminations,
that something passed by the a ballet or divertissement, a wizard and
contract of the 15th of May. If the contract Grecian statues, tight rope performances,
of the 15th of May had been an operating rifle galleries, air gun shooting, Chinese
contract, and there had been a valid sale of and Parisian games, boats on the lake, and
purchaser would have had the benefit of According to the contract the parties had
insurance in respect of all damage signed, the defendants were to provide
previously occurring. most of the British performers. Taylor &
Lewis agreed to pay one hundred pounds
sterling in the evening of the day of each
TAYLOR
concert by a crossed cheque, and also to
V find and provide, at their own cost, all the
necessary artistes for the concerts,
CALDWELL
including Mr. Sims Reeves. Then, on 11
[1863] EWHC QB J1 June 1861, a week before the first concert
was to be given, the music hall burned to
the ground. The plaintiffs sued the music code of France and the Roman law for the
hall owners for breach of contract for proposition that when the existence of a
failing to rent out the music hall to them. particular thing is essential to a contract,
There was no clause within the contract and the thing is destroyed by no fault of
itself which allocated the risk to the the party selling it, the parties are freed
underlying facilities, except for the phrase from obligation to deliver the thing. He
"God's will permitting" at the end of the further analogized to a situation in which a
contract. contract requiring personal performance is
made, and the party to perform dies, the
JUDGMENT
party's executors are not held liable under
Judge Blackburn began his opinion by English common law. Blackburn J thus
stating that the agreement between the held that both parties were excused from
parties was a contract, despite their use of their obligations under their contract.
the term "lease". Under the common law
IMPORTANCE
of property in England at the time, under a
lease the lessee would obtain legal Until this case, parties in a contract were
possession of the premises during the lease held to be absolutely bound and a failure to
period, while the contract at issue in this perform was not excused by radically
case specified that legal possession would changed circumstances. Instead, the
remain with the defendants. contract was breached and gave rise to a
claim for damages. This ruling, though
Blackburn J reasoned that the rule of
quite narrow, opened the door for the
absolute liability only applied to positive,
modern doctrine of contract avoidance by
definite contracts, not to those in which
impracticability.
there was an express or implied condition
underlying the contract.
JUDGEMENT
conveyance within one month from the August 1940, between the first and the
receipt of the letter by paying the balance second defendant, or rather his nominee,
of the consideration money and take the the plaintiff, was still subsisting; and
land in the condition in which it existed at (2) that the plaintiff was entitled to get a
that time, the company undertaking to conveyance executed and registered by the
construct the roads and the drains, as
defendant on payment of the consideration Gupta and Lahiri JJ. The only question
money mentioned in the agreement and in canvassed before the High Court was,
the manner and under the conditions whether the contract of sale was frustrated
specified therein. by reason of the requisition orders issued
by the Government? The learned Judges
The suit was resisted by the defendant
answered this question in the affirmative in
company who raised a large number of
favour of the defendant and on that ground
defences in answer to the plaintiff's claim,
alone dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The
most of which are not relevant for our
plaintiff has now come before us on the
present purpose. The principal contentions
strength of a certificate granted by the
raised on behalf of the defendant were that
High Court under article 133(I)(c) of the
a suit of this description was not
Constitution of India. The learned
maintainable under section 42 of the
Attorney General, who appeared in support
Specific Relief Act and that the plaintiff
of the appeal, has put forward a three-fold
had no locus standi to institute the suit.
contention on behalf of his client. He has
The most material plea was that the
contended in the first place that the
contract of sale stood discharged by
doctrine of English law relating to
frustration as it became impossible by
frustration of contract, upon which the
reason of the supervening events to
learned Judges of the High Court based
perform a material part of it. Bejoy
their Decision has no application to India
Krishna Roy did not file any written
in view of the statutory provision
statement and he was examined by the
contained in section 56 of the Indian
plaintiff as a witness on his behalf.
Contract Act. it is argued in the second
The trial judge by his judgment dated 10th place, that even if the English law Applies,
October, 1.947, overruled all the pleas it can have no application to contracts for
taken by the defendant and decreed the sale of land and that is in fact the opinion
plaintiff's suit. An appeal taken by the expressed by the English judges
defendant to the Court of the District themselves. His third and the last argument
Judge of 24-Parganas was dismissed on the is that on the admitted faacts and
25th February 1949, and the judgment of circumstances of this case there was no
the trial court was affirmed. The defendant frustrating event which could be said to
company thereupon preferred a second have taken away the basis of the contract
appeal to the High Court which was heard or tendered its performance impossible in
by a Division Bench consisting 'of Das any sense of the word.
The first argument advanced by the England. It speaks of something which is
learned AttorneyGeneral raises a impossible inherently or by its very nature,
somewhat debatable point regarding the and no one can obviously be directed to an
true scope and effect of section 56 of the act. The second paragraph enunciates the
Indian Contract Act and to what extent, if law relating to discharge of contract by
any, it incorporates the English rule of reason of supervening impossibility or
frustration of contracts. illegality of the act agreed to be done. The
wording of this paragraph is quite general,
Section 56 occurs in Chapter IV of the
and though the illustrations attached to it
Indian Contract Act which relates to
are not at all happy, they cannotderogate
performance of contracts and it purports
from the general words used in the
to deal with one circumstances under
enactment. This much is clear that the
which performance of a, contract is
word "impossible" has not been used here
excused or dispensed with on the ground
in the sense of physical or literal
of the contract being-void. The section
impossibility. The performance of an act
stands as follows: "An agreement to do an
may not be literally impossible but it may
act impossible in itself is void. A contract
be impracticbale and useless from the
to do an act which after the contract is
point of view of the object and purpose
made, becomes impossible, or, by reason
which the parties had in view and if an
of some event which the promiser could
untoward event or change of
not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when
circumstances totally upset the very
the act becomes impossible or unlawful.
foundation upon which the parties rested
Where one person has promised to do their bargain, it can very well be said that
something which he knew, or, with the promisor found it impossible to do the
reasonable diligence, might have known, act which he promised to do. Although
and which the promisee did not know to be various theories have been propounded by
impossible or unlawful, such promisor the Judges and jurists in England regarding
must make compensation to such promisee the juridical basis of the doctrine of
for any loss which such promise sustains frustration, yet the essential idea upon
through the non-performance of the which the doctrine is based is that of
promise". impossibility of performance of the
down the law in the same way as in frustration are often used as
interchangeable expressions. The changed
circumstances, it is said, make the Ali J., in speaking about frustration,
performance of the contract impossible observed in his judgment as follows:
and the parties are absolved from the
"It seems necessary for us to emphasise
further performance of it as they did not
that so far as the courts in this country are
promise to perform an impossibility The
concerned, they must loot primarily to the
parties shall be excused, as Lord Loreburn
law as embodied in sections 32 and 56 of
says(1), "if substantially the whole
the Indian Contract Act, 1872."
contract becomes impossible of
performance or in other words We hold, therefore, that the doctrine of
impracticable by some cause for which frustration is really an aspect or part of the
requisition order was passed nearly 15 commenced the development work when
months after the contract was made and the requisition order was passed in
apparently no work was done by the November, 1941. There was no question,
The learned Judges of the High Court in conditions at the time when it was entered
deciding the case against the plaintiff into, the extent of the work involved in the
relied entirely on the time factor. It is true development scheme and last though not
that the parties could not contemplate an the least the total absence of any definite
fulfil their contract. They might certainly within which the work was to be
have in mind a period of time which was completed, it cannot be said that the
reasonable having regard to the nature and requisition order vitally affected the
time. Das Gupta, J., who delivered the Mr. Gupta, who appeared for the
judgment of the High Court, says first of respondent company. put forward an
all that the company had in contemplation alternative argument that even if the
performance of the contract was not made Act. In our opinion, the events which have
impossible. it certainly became illegal as a happened here cannot be said to have
result of the requisition order and con- made the performance of the contract
sequently the contract became void under impossible and the contract has not been
section 56 of the Indian Contract Act as frustrated at all. The result is that the
soon as the requisition order was made. In appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree
support of his contention the learned of the High Court of Calcutta are set aside
counsel placed reliance upon certain and those of the courts below restored. The
provisions of the Defence of India Rules plaintiff will have his costs in all the
and also upon illustration (d) to section 56 courts.
of the Contract Act. All that the Defence
Regulations show is that the violation of a
requisition order could be punished as a Appeal allowed.
desert, or do not perform their duty, they The Court of King's Bench held that Cutter
are not entitled to wages though the owner was not entitled to wages because he had
earn the freight. Nor is it conclusive not completed the journey. Part
against the defendant that the intestate was performance was no performance at all.
prevented fulfilling his contract by the act Lord Kenyon CJ led with his judgment. I
of God; for the same reason would apply should be extremely sorry that in the
to the loss of a ship, which may equally decision of this case we should determine
happen by the act of God, and without any against what had been the received opinion
default in the sailors; and yet in that case in the mercantile world on contracts of this
the sailors lose their wages. But there are kind, because it is of great importance that
other cases that bear equally hard upon the laws by which the contracts of so
contracting parties; and in which an numerous and so useful a body of men as
innocent person must suffer if the terms of the sailors are supposed to be guided
his contract require it; e.g. the tenant of a should not be overturned. Whether these
house who covenants to pay rent and who kind of notes are much in use among the
is bound to continue paying the rent, seamen, we are not sufficiently informed;
though the house be burned down. and the instances now stated to us from
Liverpool are too recent to form anything this particular contract my opinion is
like usage. But it seems to me at present formed at present; at the same time I must
that the decision of this case may proceed say that if we were assured that these notes
on the particular words of this contract and are in universal use, and that the
the precise facts here stated, without commercial world have received and acted
touching marine contracts in general. That upon them in a different sense, I should
where the parties have come to an express give up my own opinion.”
contract none can be implied has prevailed
Ashhurst J concurred, emphasising that the
so long as to be reduced to an axiom in the
contract was entire and that completion
law. Here the defendant expressly
was a condition precedent to the obligation
promised to pay the intestate thirty
to pay.
guineas, provided he proceeded, continued
and did his duty as second mate in the ship “We cannot collect that there is any
the case are that the common rate of wages nothing to guide us but the terms of the
is four pounds per month, when the party contract itself. This is a written contract,
is paid in proportion to the time he serves: and it speaks for itself. And as it is entire,
and that this voyage is generally performed and as the defendant's promise depends on
no contract between these parties, all that the other party, the condition must be
the intestate could have recovered on a performed before the other party is
quantum meruit for the voyage would have entitled to receive any thing under it. It
been eight pounds; whereas here the has been argued however that the plaintiff
defendant contracted to pay thirty guineas may now recover on a quantum meruit:
provided the mate continued to do his duty but she has no right to desert the
as mate during the whole voyage, in which agreement; for wherever there is an
case the latter would have received nearly express contract the parties must be
four times as much as if he were paid for guided by it; and one party cannot
stipulated to receive the larger sum if the advantage. Here the intestate was by the
whole duty were performed, and nothing terms of his contract to perform a given
unless the whole of that duty were duty before he could call upon the
which the parties knew, when they made of three volumes or the entire set?
The Court of Exchequer, led by Baron Sir result of the breach of it. Now, if the
Edward Hall Alderson, declined to allow special circumstances under which the
Hadley to recover lost profits, in this case, contract was actually made were
holding that Baxendale could only be held communicated by the plaintiffs to the
liable for losses that were generally defendants, and thus known to both
foreseeable, or if Hadley had mentioned parties, the damages resulting from the
his special circumstances in advance. The breach of such a contract, which they
mere fact that a party is sending something would reasonably contemplate, would be
to be repaired does not indicate that the the amount of injury which would
party would lose profits if it is not ordinarily follow from a breach of contract
Hadley could have entered into this other hand, if these special circumstances
contract that would not have presented were wholly unknown to the party
such dire circumstances, and noted that breaking the contract, he, at the most,
where special circumstances exist, could only be supposed to have had in his
provisions can be made in the contract contemplation the amount of injury which
voluntarily entered into by the parties to would arise generally, and in the great
impose extra damages for a breach. multitude of cases not affected by any
the idea of reducing contractual man? Those items of damage for which the
Darling J. said:
TRUSTS, WILLS, PROBATE
The flat was let to the defendant for the AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
purpose of enabling her to receive the
visits of the man whose mistress she was
and to EGERTON
Public policy ‘has been confounded with principles to be clearly deduced from them
what may be called political policy; such by sound reason and just inference; not to
as whether it is politically wise to have a speculate upon what is best, in his opinion,
sinking fund or a paper circulation, or the for the advantage of the community. Some
degree and nature of interference with of these decisions may have no doubt been
foreign States; with all which, as applied to founded upon the prevailing and just
the present subject, it has nothing whatever opinions of the public good; for instance,
to do.’ For these reasons, in our view, the the illegality of covenants in restraint of
defendants’ point on public policy is marriage or trade. They have become part
In Anson's Law Contract, it is observed as holiday were 63.45 and it was proved that
follows under the head 'Compensatory he did not get the promised facilities,
"damages for breach of contract are given found that in the first week, he got a
by way of compensation for suffered, and holiday which was inferior and for the
not by way of punishment for wrong second week, a holiday he got was very
inflicted. Hence the 'vindictive' or largely inferior to what he had been led to
"exemplary' damages of the law of tort expect. The Court at the first instance took
have no place in the law of contract. To the difference in value between what he
paid for and what he got and it was The next question that arises is about the
thought that the plaintiff had got half of quantum of damages to be awarded. In a
what he had paid for and so the trial Court case of this nature, there is no ready
gave him half the amount which he had measure of damages unlike commercial
paid namely 131.72. The Court of Appeal contracts. There could be several relevant
enhanced the damaged to 125 and circumstances to be taken into account.
negatived the argument that on a breach of Such as social and financial position of the
contract, damages cannot be given for parties (even though inability to pay
mental distress and that damages cannot be damages may not result into denial or
given for disappointment of mind dimination of damages if otherwise the
occasioned by breach of contract. Lord plaintiff is entitled to larger quantum of
Denning observed as follows : - damages). The respondent-defendant is
working as a Stenographer in a well
"I think that those limitations are out of
reputed public sector corporation like
date. In a proper case damages for mental
Indian Oil Corporation. If the promise had
distress can be recovered in contract, just
been fulfilled, the appellant-plaintiff would
as damages for shock can be recovered in
have shared his life as a family member
tort. One such case is a contract for a
and would have enjoyed all the facilities of
holiday, or any other contract to provide
the family life including the earnings of
entertainment and enjoyment. If the
the husband. In the event of desertion by
contracting party breaks his contract,
the husband, she would be entitled to
damages can be given for the
maintenance commensurate with the social
disappointment, the distress the upset and
and economic status of the husband and
frustration caused by the breach. I know
wife. In the present case, it would not have
that, it is difficult to assess in terms of
been less than Rs. 500/- per month. It
money, but it is no more difficult than the
would probably be somewhere between
assessment which the Courts have to make
Rs. 750/- and Rs. 1000/-per month.
every day in personal injury cases for loss
Another measure, is suggested, to compare
of amenities."
with the case where a wife loses her
What is said to be applicable in a case of husband in a fatal motor accident and to
breach of promise of a happy holiday come to annual loss and apply a multiplier
would must strongly and appropriately of 15 to arrive at a lump sum figure. Even
apply in the case of breach of promise of if a conservative amount of Rs. 500/- per
marriage and happy family life. month is taken as a datum figure in this
case, that would be Rs. 6000/- per year. If 22. We put on record our appreciation of
a multiplier of 10 is applied, it would be Mr. M. D. Pandya for having assisted the
Rs. 60,000/-. Such amount would give a Court as amicus curiae at the request of the
reasonable maintenance per month for Court. His assistance was disinterested and
lifetime. That would also take care of all useful and was sought on the question
the aspects of damages including whether damages could be awarded in a
compensatory, aggravated or exemplary case like the present one and what would
damages. be the measure for such damages.