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2019 Political Law Last Minute Tips (Jurisprudence)

POLITICAL LAW

(1) Doctrine of relative constitutionality explained. A statute valid at one time may become void for being unconstitutional at another time
because of altered circumstances. If a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by
a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in light of changed conditions. (Central Bank Employees Association v. BSP, Dec. Page | 1
15, 2004) A law or provision of law that was declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a
reverse conclusion. (Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Cabiles, Aug. 5, 2014) Thus, a law passed prior to 1987 Constitution which is
presumed valid and constitutional can be subsequently struck down as unconstitutional once it becomes inconsistent with the present
Constitution. (Rama v. Moises, Dec. 6, 2016)

(2) Requisites of judicial review involving constitutionality or validity of law: The requisites are: (i) actual case or controversy; (ii) person
challenging the act must have standing to question the validity of the subject or issuance; (iii) question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (iv) issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. (SPARK v. Quezon City, Aug. 8, 2017)

Instances where there is no actual case or controversy: (i) Petition challenging constitutionality of a proposed bill, which is not a law, does
not present an actual justiciable controversy. (In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy, Jan. 21,
2015); (ii) Petition to declare a Securities and Exchange Commission circular void based on a hypothetical case of a fictional corporation.
(Roy v. Herbosa, Nov. 22, 2016); (iii) Petition challenging constitutionality of law on ground that its implementation may be abused.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies. (SHENI v. ATC, Oct. 5, 2010);
(iv) Petition challenging constitutionality of peace agreements that can only be implemented through passage of law. Until such law is passed,
petition is premature. (Philconsa v. Philippine Government, Nov. 29, 2016); and (v) Moot and academic case. A case is moot and academic if
it ceases to present justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value or use.
(Timbol v. COMELEC, Feb. 24, 2015)

Instances when courts can take cognizance of moot and academic cases. Instances are: (i) there was a grave violation of the Constitution;
(ii) case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (iii) issues raised required the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public; and (iv) case was capable of repetition yet evading review. (Timbol v.
COMELEC, Feb. 24, 2015) Number (iv) requires that that the challenge action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation and there is reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action. Thus, assailing
COMELEC resolution on Gun Ban issued for the 2016 Elections does not present moot and academic case even if the election period is over
since the election period was only for 150 days and the COMELEC has consistently issued rules on Gun Ban for previous elections.
(PADPAO v. COMELEC, Oct. 3, 2017) So is the expiration of the Biosafety Permits and completion of the field trials of Bt talong, a
bioengineered eggplant specie, subject of a petition for writ of kalikasan render said petition moot and academic. (ISAAA v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia, July, 26, 2016)

(3) Void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines explained. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects: (i) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (ii) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
government muscle. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Apr. 8, 2014) Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject
to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014)

(4) A litigant cannot successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. If a
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. (SHENI v. Anti-terrorism Council, Oct. 5, 2010)
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, however, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is
applicable (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014)

As-applied challenge and facial challenge distinguished. In an as-applied challenge, one can challenge the constitutionality of statute only if
he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits the constitutionality of statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons
not before the court. In facial challenge, a petitioner challenges the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own
rights under the assailed statute on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute where it involves free speech and component rights such
as religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
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grievance. The rationale for this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014;
Imbong v. Ochoa, Apr. 8, 2014)

(5) Political question explained. It pertains to a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has
been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. It pertains to the
wisdom, justice, or expediency of a law. Examples are (i) foreign relations, as the Constitution commits its conduct to the executive and
legislative – the political – departments of the government. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, Apr. 28, 2010); (ii) decision to have the remains Page | 2
of Marcos interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, the same being a question of policy based on wisdom that it shall promote national healing
and forgiveness (Ocampo v. Enriquez, Nov. 8, 2016); and (iii) whether the House of Representatives observed its own internal rules of
procedure (Baguilat v. Alvarez, July 25, 2017) Size limitation on election campaign propaganda and its reasonableness, however, are not
political questions because the existence of constitutionally imposed limits on regulations on free speech justifies subjecting the official
actions of the COMELEC to review of the court. (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, Jan. 21, 2015)

(6) Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, providing that the State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nation’s historical
and cultural heritage and resources, is not self-executory. Congress needs to pass laws dealing with preservation and conservation of
cultural heritage. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI, Apr. 18, 2017)

(7) One subject-one title rule explained. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof. The rule is satisfied if all parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. It is not required to employ in the title language of such precision as to
mirror or catalogue all the minute details therein. (Remman Enterprises v. Philippine Regulatory Commission, Feb. 4, 2014)

(8) Legal basis of bicameral conference committee explained. The creation of bicameral conference committee is in response to a problem, not
addressed by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over changes or amendments
introduced by the other in a legislative bill. (Abakada Guro v. Ermita, Sept. 1, 2005) It is not a constitutional body but is based on Section
16(3), Article VI: Each house has the power to determine the rules of its proceedings. The jurisdiction of the conference committee is not
limited to resolving differences between Senate and House. It may propose entirely new provision. What is important is that its report is
subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, Oct. 30, 1995)

(9) The House of Representatives of a particular Congress may waive the application of a long-standing tradition where the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes for speakership automatically becomes minority leader. Congress may determine the
rules of its proceedings; each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. These legislative rules are subject to
revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. (Baguilat Jr. v. Alvarez, July 25, 2017)

(10) A law requiring ¾ votes of House of Representatives and Senate for it to be revised in the future is unconstitutional for being an
irrepealable law. While a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the
passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action and flexibility. The
present legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. (Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, Oct.18, 2011)

(11) Requisites for valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The requisites are: (i) law
authorizing President, Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice, and heads of the Constitutional Commissions
to transfer funds within their respective offices; (ii) funds to be transferred are savings generated from appropriations for their respective
offices; and (iii) purpose of transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino,
July 1, 2014) Thus, the Career Executive Service Board does not have legal authority to use its savings for the payment of additional benefits
to employees since it is an attached agency of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and only the heads of CSC can transfer funds, if
authorized by law. (CESB v. COA, June 19, 2018)

Some principles on Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) implemented under Aquino administration.
(a) Following acts violate Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: (i) withdrawal of unobligated allotments from implementing
agencies, and the declaration of withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to end of fiscal year
without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in General Appropriations Acts; and (ii) cross-border transfers of
the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and funding of projects, activities, and
programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
(b) Programs, activities, and projects already implemented under the unconstitutional acts and practices of the DAP may be given
effect under the operative fact doctrine. While an unconstitutional act cannot be source of any legal rights or duties, the doctrine of
operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact
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that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. It nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. (Araullo v. Aquino, July 1, 2014 and Feb. 3, 2015)

(12) Congressional Pork Barrel (PDAF) is unconstitutional for giving authority to legislators to participate in post-enactment phases of
project implementation. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers. It likewise violates the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power as an individual legislator is given authority to dictate how much fund would go to a specific project or Page | 3
beneficiary, which power of appropriation is lodge in Congress as a whole. Also, being a lump-sum appropriation and having no item which
can be an object of veto, it undermines the system of checks and balance by impairing the President’s item veto power. Finally, it violates the
constitutional principles on local autonomy allowing district representatives who are national officers to substitute judgment of local officials
on use of public funds for local development. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, Nov. 19, 2013)

(13) Revenue collected for a special purpose is treated as a special fund to be used exclusively for the stated purpose. For instance, coconut
levy funds are special funds allocated for a specific purpose and cannot be used for purposes other than for the benefit of the coconut farmers
or development of the coconut industry. (Confederation of Coconut Farmers v. Aquino, August 8, 2017)

(14) Land Transportation Office’s Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program is properly funded even if it did not appear as an
item in the General Appropriations Act as long as budget is granted for a general item which would cover the said program, which in
this case is Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver’s Licensing Regulatory Services. Appropriation for motor vehicle registration naturally
and logically includes plate-making inasmuch as plate-making is an integral part of the registration process. (Dela Cruz v. Ochoa Jr., Jan. 23,
2018)

A line item budget of COMELEC for “conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites” and “management
and supervision of elections and other electoral exercises” is comprehensive enough to include other kinds of electoral exercises,
including initiative elections. Thus, COMELEC errs if it claims that a proposal for initiative should be denied because it has no budgetary
allocation therefor. (Marmeto v. Comelec, Sept. 26, 2017)

(15) Statements made in media interviews are not covered by parliamentary immunity. Only covered are the speech delivered in Congress or
any of its committees, spoken in the course of any debate in said for a, or made in the official discharge or performance of duties as legislator.
(Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, Mar.14, 2018)

(16) Presidential immunity from suit explained. President enjoys immunity from suit during his tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his tenure.
(Lozada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Apr. 24, 2012)

(17) Faithful execution clause explained. President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. The mandate
is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best
construed as an imposed obligation, not to a separate grant of power. (Ocampo v. Enriquez, Nov. 8, 2016)

(18) A governor or any local chief executive, during emergency, cannot call out the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to set up checkpoints, chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures, and other actions necessary
to ensure public safety. As a civilian agency of the government, the PNP properly comes within and is subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control. As to AFP, calling-out powers belong to the President as commander-in-chief, under Section 7,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to the exclusion of any other person, even if he is a local chief executive. (Kulayan v. Tan, July 3, 2012)
The calling out power of the President is constitutionally vested to him and he does not need congressional authority to exercise the same,
even during when a state of emergency is declared. (Ampatuan v. Puno, June 7, 2011)

(19) Pardon issued by the President stating that “The pardonee is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” remits the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification remitted, notwithstanding Article 36 holding that a pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored and Article 41 holding
that perpetual absolute disqualification shall be suffered unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. President’s
pardoning power cannot be limited by legislative act, like the Revised Penal Code. Articles 36 and 41 cannot serve to abridge or diminish the
exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, Jan. 21,
2015)
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Instances in which the Constitution limits the President’s pardoning power. Instances are: (i) impeachment cases; (ii) cases that have not
yet resulted in final conviction; and (iii) cases involving violations of election laws, rules, and regulations, in which there was no favorable
recommendation from the COMELEC. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, Jan. 21, 2015)

President can pardon or condone liability arising from administrative offenses. If the president can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can he grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, Nov. 10, 2015) Page | 4
(20) Some principles on martial law:
(a) Effects of declaration of martial law. President exercises police power, which is normally a function of the legislature. He exercises
police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being are
unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the State. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017) As
Commander-in-Chief, he may order the (i) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (ii) ban on public assemblies; (iii) takeover of
news media and agencies and press censorship; and (iv) issuance of Presidential Decrees. (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, May 3, 2006)
(b) Constitution requires mere sufficiency, and not accuracy, of factual basis for the declaration of martial law. The parameters for
determining sufficiency of factual basis are: (i) actual rebellion or invasion; (ii) public safety requires it; and (iii) probable cause for the
President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. Only the facts known to the President at the time of declaration of martial
law should be considered in determining sufficiency of factual basis; these facts are found in the proclamation and written report
submitted by him to Congress.
(c) President has discretion to determine territorial scope of martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law must be
confined only in particular place where armed public uprising actually transpired. President’s power to maintain peace and public safety
extends to other areas where present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. (Lagman v. Medialdea, Dec. 5, 2017)
(d) Limitations on the power of Congress to extend period of martial law. The limitations are: (i) extension should be upon the
President’s initiative; (ii) it should be grounded on persistence of invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and (iii) it is
subject to the Supreme Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen. Moreover, the Constitution
gives the Congress the authority to decide on its duration.
(e) Congress may promulgate its own internal rules governing extension of martial law. Congress is granted the right to promulgate its
own rules to govern its proceedings. Courts will not review the same except on clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power
as to deny due process. (Lagman v. Pimentel, Feb. 6, 2018)
(f) Exhaustion of less severe remedies is not required before the President can invoke martial law. The President has the discretion
which extraordinary power to use – calling out power, power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and power to declare
martial law – depending on the exigencies or threats that endanger the State. (Lagman v. Medialdea, Dec. 5, 2017)
(g) Congress is not mandated to convene jointly upon the President’s proclamation of martial law. The only exception is to vote jointly
to revoke the President’s declaration. (Padilla v. Congress, July 25, 2017)

(21) Doctrine of qualified political agency explained. Doctrine of qualified political agency postulates that the heads of the various executive
departments are alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by them in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts
of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine does not extend to Cabinet members sitting as ex
officio members in Board of Directors of a government corporation as they sit therein by reason of their office or function, not because of their
direct appointment to said Board by the President. (Manalang-Demegillo v. TIDCORP, Mar. 5, 2013)

(22) Compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
intimately relates to a person’s integrity, a qualification which satisfies the “proven integrity” requirement for one to be a member of
the Judiciary. To be of proven integrity means the applicant must have established a steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles.
Failure to file SALN is a violation of law and shows that the applicant cannot be said to be of proven integrity. (Republic v. Sereno, May 11,
2018)

(23) Rule-making power is exclusive to the Supreme Court. The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. Examples where Supreme Court rejected previous attempts of Congress, in
exercise of its legislative power, to amend Rules of Court:
(a) Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14. (Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West,
July 2, 2014)
(b) Despite statutory provision, the GSIS is not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141. (Re: Petition for Recogniion of
Exemption of GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees, Feb. 11, 2010)
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(c) Section 14(1) of R.A. No. 6770, prohibiting courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58. (Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals, Nov. 10, 2015)
(d) Section 23 of Dangerous Drugs Act prohibiting persons charged with violation of said law to enter into plea bargaining is
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions of the Rules of Court on plea bargaining. (Estipona v. Lobrigo, Aug. 15, 2017)

Administrative agencies, like the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, have no certiorari power. Determining whether Page | 5
an act of an officer or state organ exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers was made without or in excess of jurisdiction demands an
examination of the law delimiting that officer’s or organ’s jurisdiction. It is an exercise in legal interpretation that only courts are competent to
engage. (Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank, Sept. 8, 2017)

(24) Supreme Court, as Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), is clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice-President. The conferment of this
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court includes the means necessary to carry it into effect, thus justifying budget allocation to the PET. (Macalintal
v. PET, Nov. 23, 2010)

(25) Some principles relative to Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

(a) Congress cannot have two representatives, one from Senate and one from House of Representatives, each having ½ vote to sit in
the JBC. There should only be one (1) representative from Congress based on the unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1).
(Chavez v. JBC, July 17, 2012)
(b) JBC’s policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level
courts must be published but is not required to be submitted to the UP Law Center Office of the National Administrative
Register (ONAR). The policy should be published as it is not merely interpretative or internal in nature; it does not regulate only the
members of the JBC and their staff but also the lawyers at large who may be interested to serve the judiciary. The policy, however, is not
required to be filed with the ONAR as said requirement applies only to issuances by administrative agencies under the Executive branch
required by the Administrative Code, which JBC is not being under the supervision of the Supreme Court. (Villanueva v. JBC, Apr. 7,
2015)
(c) Six-month rotational representation of Congress in the JBC where a member of House of Representatives would represent it
from January to June while a member of the Senate will represent it from July to December is constitutional. This is in line with
the constitutional mandate of providing only one representative of Congress to the JBC. (Umali v. JBC, July 25, 2017)
(d) In choosing appointees to vacancies in collegiate court, President can disregard clustering of nominees by the JBC. JBC’s power to
recommend cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint, as long as the appointee is nominated by the JBC. Thus,
President cannot be compelled to simply choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each
specific vacancy, and no other. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, Feb. 21, 2017)

(26) That persons are missing in enforced disappearances cases is not enough for writ of amparo to issue. The disappearances must be shown
to be carried out by or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the government or a political organization, followed by refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons. (Navia v. Pardico, June 19, 2012)

Instances where writ of amparo is improper. Instances are: (i) threatened demolition of a building (Canlas v. Napico Homeowners
Association, June 5, 2008); (ii) barangay captain’s alleged trespass of petitioner’s property, which is only a violation of the latter’s property
rights (Pador v. Arcayan, 12 March 2013); (iii) biological mother attempting to recover custody of child from DSWD, where there is really no
enforced disappearance within the Rules on Amparo. (Caram v. Segui, August 5, 2014); (iv) alien detained by Bureau of Immigration by
virtue of legal process (Mison vs. Gallegos, June 23, 2015); (v) inclusion in the name of military’s Order of Battle List (Ladaga vs. Mapagu,
November 13, 2012) or in a list of purported communist front organizations (Zarate v. Aquino, Nov. 10, 2015), there being no actual threat to
life, liberty and security; and (vi) detention cases, since a petition for writ of amparo may be filed only in cases of extralegal killings, enforced
disappearances or threats of such. (Callo v. Morente, Sept. 14, 2017)

Amparo proceedings are not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain criminal liabilities of individuals or entities involved. It is a
remedial measure designed to direct specified course of action to government agencies to safeguard constitutional right to life, liberty, and
security of aggrieved individuals. Thus, while application of command responsibility is not wholly proper in amparo cases being a form of
criminal complicity, it may be given limited application to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that
are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. (Boac v. Cadapan, May 31, 2011)

(27) Writ of habeas data explained. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
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informational privacy. In order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. (Gamboa vs. Chan, July 24, 2012)

Instances when habeas data is improper. Instances are: (i) an employee wants to get details on the reason for her transfer of venue of
employment since this is purely labor law matters (Manila Electric vs. Gopez-Lim, October 5, 2010); (ii) inclusion of a mayor in a list of
persons maintaining private armed groups since the right to informational privacy yields to overriding legitimate state interest (Gamboa vs.
Chan, July 24, 2012) and (iii) inclusion in a list as members of purported communist front organizations but where the details are of public Page | 6
knowledge and readily accessible to everyone due to being featured in news reports. (Zarate v. Aquino, Nov. 10, 2015)

(28) Commission on Audit (COA) has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities, and
local governments. Regional Trial Court does not have primary jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit.
Money claims are limited to liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers
within the reach of accounting officers. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction, Nov. 27, 2013) But when exceptions exist to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction – such as there is estoppel or unreasonable delay or where the question involved is purely legal – money
claims against the government may be filed directly with the courts. (Vigilar v. Aquino, Jan. 18, 2011) Only when the COA rejects the claim
can the claimant elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari, which in effect is a suit against the State. (Roxas v. Republic Real
Estate Corporation, June 1, 2016)

(29) Constitutional requirements under Section 2, Article XII for a valid service contract for the large-scale exploration and development
of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The requirements are: (i) the service contract is crafted in accordance with a general law that
will set standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements; (ii) the President is the signatory for the government; and (ii) within 30 days,
the President reports it to Congress. (Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, Apr. 21, 2015)

(30) For purposes of determining Filipino ownership of a public utility, “capital” in Section 11, Article XII refers only to shares of stock
that can vote in the election of directors. Preferred shares are to be factored in only if they are entitled to vote (Gamboa v. Teves, June 28,
2011; Roy v. Herbosa, Nov. 22, 2016)

(31) Two tests to determine nationality of a corporation explained. The first is the control test, providing that shares belonging to corporations
or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens is of Philippine nationality. The second test is the grandfather
rule, providing that if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares
corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality. The control test is still the prevailing mode of determining
whether or not a corporation is a Filipino corporation. When there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in the
60-40 Filipino-equity ownership in the corporation, the grandfather rule applies.

Examples of application of the two tests. If 100,000 shares are registered in the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% of the
capital stock or capital, respectively, of which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded as owned by Filipinos. But if less
than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the corporation or partnership, belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be
counted as owned by Filipinos and the other 50,000 shall be recorded as belonging to aliens. Under the control test, there is no need to further
trace the ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings since a corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned is considered as
Filipino. The grandfather rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt, i.e., in cases where the joint venture
corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings. Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino-
foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the grandfather rule will not apply. (Narra Nickel Mining vs Redmont Consolidated, Apr. 21, 2014)

(32) Non-Filipinos can engage in hydropower generation but not in water exploitation, development, and utilization. Waters are natural
resources within the meaning of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. As such, the exploitation, development, and utilization of
waters should be limited to Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens.
Utilization of waters can be opened even to foreign nationals, after the same have been extracted from the source by qualified entities. The
process of generating electric power from the dam water entering the power plant – hydropower generation – does not constitute appropriation
of natural resource. There is no legal impediment to foreign-owned companies undertaking the generation of electric power using waters
already appropriated by qualified entities. (IDEALS v. PSALM, Oct. 9, 2012)

(33) Sale of Philippine land to an alien but is titled in the name of the Filipino spouse contravenes the Constitution and is void. This is true
even if the alien provided the funds used to purchase the land. By entering into an illegal contract, no implied trust is created and no
reimbursement is allowed. (Manigque-Stone v. Cattleya Land, Inc., Sept. 5, 2016)
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(34) Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not legalize abortion. Consistent with the intent of the framers of 1987 Constitution in protecting the
life of the unborn from conception, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. It prohibits not
only drugs or devices that prevent implantation of fertilized ovum to the uterus but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb.

Principle of double effect explained. Whenever a conflict situation between the life of the child and that of the mother exists, the doctor is
morally obliged to try to save both lives. If it is impossible, the doctor may act in favor of either one, provided no direct harm is intended to Page | 7
the other. Since the loss of the child’s life or the mother’s life is not intentional and unavoidable, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or
murder. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Apr. 8, 2014)

(35) Precautionary principle in environmental cases explained. Where there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect, the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with
the goal of preserving and protecting the environment. Precautionary principle is relevant if these elements are present: (i) uncertainty, (ii)
threat of environmental damage, and (iii) serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively certain, only preventive, not
precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the precautionary principles apply if there is no indication of a threat of environmental
harm, or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers, Aug. 16, 2016)

(36) Curfew ordinances requiring minors to stay at home at certain hours during the night do not deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth. The only aspect of parenting that these ordinances affect is the parents’ prerogative to allow
minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during curfew hours. These neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for
the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors’ activities (SPARK v.
Quezon City, Aug. 8, 2017)

(37) Background view, vista, sightline or setting of heritage property, such as the Rizal Monument, is not protected by heritage law. No law
mentions that another project, building, or property, may be the subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background
view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property or building. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI, Apr. 18, 2017)

(38) Section 4(3), Article XIV of the Constitution: “All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties” prevails over Section 30 of the Tax Code.
Section 30 providing that the income of whatever kind and character of a non-stock and non-profit educational institution from any of their
properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be
subject to tax is contrary to Section 4(3), Article XIV of the Constitution. The limitations in Section 30 do not apply to non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions. (CIR vs. De La Salle, November 9, 2016)

(39) Whether State immunity from suit is waived:

(a) No: Entering into a contract for construction of road. It is done in the exercise of governmental function. (Mendoza v. DPWH, July 9,
2014)
(b) No: DOH and its officials for issuing orders in the implementation of the law. DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs
sovereign functions. Likewise, the mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of official functions. (DOH v. Phil Pharma Wealth, Feb. 20, 2013)
(c) No: Bacolod City agents padlocked a lotto betting station for lack of mayor’s permit. While the authority of city mayors to issue
business permits is granted by the Local Government Code (LGC), which also vests local government units with corporate powers, one
of which is the power to sue and be sued, the power to issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the government's
proprietary function but of the police power of the State, ergo a governmental act. No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can be
implied from mere exercise of power to issue permits. (City of Bacolod v. Phuture Visions, Jan. 17, 2018)
(d) Yes: Entering into a contract for management and maintenance of an airport. It is primarily private and non-governmental. (Air
Transportation Office v. Ramos, Feb. 23, 2011)
(e) Yes: Expropriation. Whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to
initiate expropriation proceedings. (DOTC v. Abecina, June 29, 2016)
(f) Yes: Taking of private property without just compensation. State immunity is not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a
citizen. (Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, Feb. 23, 2011)
(g) Yes: To shield Bureau of Customs from ineptitude and gross negligence resulting in loss of imported goods. State should not avail
itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties. (Commissioner of Customs v. AGFHA, Mar. 28, 2011)

Provision in a contract involving discharge of government functions providing that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall
be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines does not amount to waiver of immunity
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from suit. Such provision is meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by
any subsequent act. (Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, June 26, 2003)

Suability does not amount to liability. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable. When State waives
its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff chance to prove, if it can, that the State is liable. (UP v. Dizon, Aug. 23, 2012)

(40) Impeachment proceedings is initiated when House of Representatives takes initial action of an impeachment complaint filed. The Page | 8
initial action taken is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
Feb. 15, 2011)

Betrayal of public trust as a ground for impeachment explained. It refers to acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross
faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
powers. (Gonzales III v. Office of the President, Sept. 4, 2012)

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed
from office. The permissive term “may” in Section 2, Article XI, “may be removed from office on impeachment” denotes discretion and
cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. It allows the institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. A quo
warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of a public officer's
appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds. (Republic v.
Sereno, May 11, 2018)

(41) Amendment vis-a-vis revision of Constitution. Amendment refers to a change that adds, reduces, deletes constitutional provision, without
altering the basic principle involved, and generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Revision implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the Constitution, and generally affects several provisions of the Constitution. (Lambino v. COMELEC, Oct. 25, 2006)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(42) Applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with naturalization law. Thus, a foreign national who failed to
show that he was carrying on a trade and that he was not included in the payroll despite allegedly employed by his parents, thereby suggesting
an intention to evade taxes, are indicia of proclivity for untruthfulness and dishonesty. Hence, his application should be denied. (Republic v.
Huang Te Fu, Mar. 18, 2015)

(43) The following laws are constitutional:

(a) Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, authorizing Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to file with Court of Appeals an ex parte
application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments, does not violate due process clause. There is no physical seizure
of property involved at that stage. AMLC’s power of inquiry does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial
powers. Hence, there can be no violation of right to procedural due process. (Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v.
Court of Appeals, Dec. 6, 2016)
(b) R.A. 9646 requiring real estate developers to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose of their properties
does not deprive property without due process of law. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade is a legitimate
subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of
real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards. (Remman Enterprises v. PRC, Feb. 4, 2014)
(c) R.A. No. 7432, as amended, allowing business establishments to claim 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction,
does not contravene Section 9, Bill of Rights, which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power, and not of eminent domain. The 20% discount is intended
to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other
disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. This does not purport to appropriate or burden specific
properties, used in the conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or of senior citizens, but
merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to and the amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private
establishments may derive from, senior citizens. (Manila Memorial Park v. Secretary of DSWD, Dec. 3, 2013)

(44) Requisites of rational relationship test for a valid exercise of police power. The requisites are (i) the interests of the public generally
require its exercise and (ii) means employed are reasonably necessary for the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. (Fernando
v. St. Scholastica’s College, Mar. 12, 2013)
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(45) COMELEC, through regulation, can compel survey firms to disclose the identities of subscribers to election surveys, despite
confidentiality clause in their contracts. The regulation effects the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for
public service and is impelled by the imperative of fair elections. Election surveys may influence voter preferences and when left unregulated,
it can undermine the holding of fair elections. Non-impairment of contracts clause is limited by the exercise of police power. (SWS v.
COMELEC, Apr. 27, 2015)

(46) Ordinance requiring land owners to setback their fences by five meters to provide for public parking space amounts to taking of Page | 9
private property for public use without just compensation. It would no longer be for the exclusive use of the land owners but would be
available for use by the general public. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, Mar. 12, 2013)

(47) Expansive concept of public use in relation to eminent domain explained. Public use includes any use of that is of “usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit of the public.” Hence, if the genuine public necessity allowing the expropriation of a
private land ceases or disappears, then no more cogent point exists for the government retention of the expropriated land. (National Power
Corporation v. Posada, Mar. 11, 2015)

(48) Some principles on payment of just compensation:

(a) Action for payment of just compensation does not prescribe and cannot be barred by laches. Action for payment of just
compensation does not prescribe. Laches as a doctrine of equity does not apply as the law and equity dictate payment of just
compensation.
(b) Reckoning point for determining just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property. This holds true even if the taking happened earlier and the action for
payment of just compensation was instituted years after. While disparity in the valuation exists as property owners will be receiving such
outdated valuation of their property, it is equally true that, in these cases, they too are remiss in guarding against the cruel effects of
belated claim. (Secretary of DPWH v. Tecson, July 1, 2013)
(c) In case of delay in the payment, interest must be paid to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. Just compensation due is an effective forbearance on the part of the State.
(DAR v. Romana, July 9, 2014) Absent full payment, interest on the balance is due on the unpaid amount. (Evergreen v. Republic, Sept.
6, 2017)
(d) A law or executive issuance cannot determine the just compensation. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
Laws and executive issuances fixing or providing for method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts but are best
treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. (DAR v. Romana, July 9, 2014)

(49) There is compensable taking even if the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a
lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property nor
material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. (NPC v. Heirs of Sangkay, Aug.
24, 2011)

(50) Reliefs available to owners whose property has been expropriated but subsequently the expropriation proceeding was abandoned. If
the taking for public purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. Nevertheless, they are
entitled to compensation based on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use,
including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed, if any. (Republic v. Borbon, Jan. 12, 2015)

(51) Action to recover just compensation from the State, or inverse condemnation, distinguished from the action for damages. The former
is based on the Constitution and has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the expropriating agency. The latter action, predicated on statutory
enactments, seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.
When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the
Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible. (NPC v.
Heirs of Sangkay, Aug. 24, 2011)

(52) Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private persons. Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state; its
concern is not the relation between private individuals. (People v. Marti, Jan. 18, 1991) Thus, Bill of Rights cannot be invoked:
(a) Discipline of members by a political party, being a private organization, not a State instrument. (Atienza v. COMELEC, Feb. 16, 2010)
(b) Flight steward claiming equal protection clause on his dismissal from a private airline company. (Yrasuegui v. PAL, Oct. 17, 2008)
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(c) Private electric company enters the premises of a private individual pursuant to their service contract, there being no unreasonable search.
(Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, Mar. 26, 2014)
(d) Extrajudicial confession given by accused during interview by a field reporter even if done inside detention cell and surrounded by police
officers is admissible, there being no proof of undue pressure or coercion from said officers or collusion of the reporter with them.
(People v. Quitola, July 13, 2016)

But the privacy of communication and correspondence can be invoked against a wife who entered the clinic of her dentist husband Page |
and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinets, obtaining therefrom private correspondence between her husband and his alleged
paramour. The private correspondence is inadmissible for violation of privacy of communication and correspondence. (Zulueta v. Court of
10
Appeals, Feb. 20, 1996)

(53) Due process requirements in administrative cases set in Ang Tibay case do not apply to preliminary investigations. The purpose in
conducting preliminary investigation is to determine probable cause for filing an information, and not to make final adjudication of rights and
obligations of parties under the law, which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, Jan. 21, 2015)

(54) Instances in which absence of either or both notice and hearing as elements of procedural due process does not amount to denial of
due process. The instances are (i) cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, (ii) preventive
suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, (iii) distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, (iv) padlocking of
restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, (v) abatement of nuisance per se, and (vi) arrest of a person
in flagrante delicto. (Legaspi v. City of Cebu, Dec. 10, 2013)

(55) Three levels of scrutiny at which the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law is reviewed.
(a) Deferential or rational basis scrutiny. Challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest; this is usually applied in cases involving economics or social welfare;
(b) Middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny. Government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and
that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; this is usually applied in classifications based on gender or
illegitimacy; and
(c) Strict judicial scrutiny. A legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

(56) Requisites to determine valid and reasonable classification under the equal protection clause. The classification must (i) rest on
substantial distinctions; (ii) be germane to the purpose of the law; (iii) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (iv) apply equally to all
members of the same class. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, Dec. 7, 2010) Whether equal protection clause is violated:
(a) Yes: E.O. No. 1 creating the Truth Commission to investigate reported cases of corruption of Arroyo administration. It does not
apply to all members of the same class. The Arroyo administration is but a member of the class of all previous administrations. (Biraogo
v. Philippine Truth Commission, Dec. 7, 2010)
(b) Yes: COMELEC’s directive allowing owners of private vehicles and other properties to express their political ideas by posting
election campaign materials on their properties but denies this right to owners of public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport
terminals in relation to their PUVS and transport terminals. No substantial distinction exists between owners of PUVs and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. In terms of ownership, the distinction is merely superficial. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification. (1-Utak v. COMELEC, Apr. 14, 2015)
(c) Yes: Ordinance banning aerial spraying in all agricultural lands to prevent drifting of pesticides. It is under-inclusive as it does not
include all individuals tainted with same mischief (airblast, ground, etc.) that the law seeks to eliminate (drift or the movement of
droplets from target area). It is also over-inclusive as it affects groups that have no relation to accomplishment of the legislative purpose
(purpose is for pesticides but covers also sprays for vitamins and other substances). (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers, Aug. 16,
2016)
(d) Yes: Garbage collection fees based on whether the payee is an occupant of lot, condominium, social housing project, or
apartment. There is no substantial distinction based on where the payee occupies. Garbage output produced by these types of occupants
is uniform and does not vary to a large degree. (Ferrer Jr. v. Bautista, June 30, 2015)
(e) No: Real property owners and informal settlers for purposes of socialized housing program. Disparities between them as two
distinct classes are obvious. Hence, a socialized housing tax on real property owners to provide funds for the socialized housing of the
latter is not a class legislation. (Ferrer Jr. v. Bautista, June 30, 2015)
(f) No: R.A. No. 9262 by favoring women over men as victims of violence to whom the State extends its protection. R.A. No. 9262
rests on substantial distinctions – the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men
to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women. (Garcia v. Drilon, June 25, 2013)
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(g) No: JBC’s policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level
courts. Placing a premium on many years of experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards
requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven competence”. (Villanueva v. JBC, Apr. 7, 2015)
(h) No: RA 8791, or the General Banking Law, by providing that juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an
extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of
foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure,
whichever is earlier, as opposed to one (1) year redemption period for natural persons. The difference in the treatment of juridical Page |
persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed – whether these are used as residence, for which the
more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is
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deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of
these acquired assets (Alan v. PNB, Jan. 27, 2016)

(57) COMELEC is incorrect in disqualifying Ang Ladlad LGBT Party from participating in the party-list system on ground that
homosexual conduct is immoral. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior.
The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) have the same interest in participating in the party-list system as other political parties
similarly situated. (Ang LadLad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, Apr. 9, 2010)

(58) An accused is denied due process when during trial, he was represented by a sham lawyer (non-lawyer) and he was convicted. Unless
the accused is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in court proceedings. This would certainly be denial of due process. Judgment must be set aside and the case
remanded for new trial. (Inacay v. People, Nov. 28, 2016)

(59) Warrantless search cannot be made during roadside questioning of a motorist pursuant to a routine traffic stop. It is not an arrest,
justifying a warrantless search, by virtue of the nature of questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time
the procedure is conducted. (Luz v. People, Feb. 29, 2012) Similarly, shabu seized from a person who was caught crossing the street in a place
not designated for crossing is inadmissible in evidence where the person was not arrested at all. (Homar v. People, Sept. 2, 2015)

There is no valid warrantless arrest – and hence a valid search incident to lawful arrest – for an offense penalized by a fine only.
Under Rules of Court, warrant of arrest need not be issued if Information is for an offense punished by fine only. Neither can a warrantless
arrest be made for such an offense. There being no valid arrest, warrantless search cannot be made. (Luz v. People, Feb. 29, 2012)

(60) While a warrantless arrest must precede with a warrantless search, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. In this case, what must be resolved is
whether or not the police had probable cause for the arrest when the search was made. (Aparente v. People, Sept. 27, 2017)

Silence does not necessarily amount to consent to a search. Silence is not necessarily a consent to a search but mere passive conformity
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances. The police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one
which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. (People v. Cogaed, July 30, 2014)

(61) Airport security searches are valid even without a warrant. They are valid because of their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. (Sales v. People, Feb. 6, 2013)

(62) Requisites for a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid. The requisites are: (i) person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (ii) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of arresting officer. (People v. Edano, July 7, 2014)

(63) Arrest of a person who presented himself before the police station to clear his name and prove that he is not the accused is invalid. He
was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might
have committed. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo v. Warden, Apr. 8, 2015)

(64) Heckler’s veto explained. It involves situations in which the government attempts to ban protected speech because it might provoke a violent
response. In such situations, the mere possibility of a violent reaction to protected speech is simply not a constitutional basis on which to
restrict the right to speak. (Roe v. Crawford, Jan. 22, 2008)

(65) Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, insofar as it prohibits the sending of internet “spam” or unsolicited ads and aiding and abetting
the commission of internet libel are unconstitutional, while cyberlibel is constitutional. Prohibition of sending of internet spam violates
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freedom of expression, as to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is entitled to protection. Cyberlibel or libel committed online is an unprotected speech
and may be penalized, as the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Aiding and abetting the
commission of internet libel is unconstitutional for being overbroad, as the terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates
chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts and other messages. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014)

(66) COMELEC cannot order the removal of clergies’ tarpaulin classifying election candidates under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” Page |
according to their respective votes on the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, which was posted on the church vicinity. Regulation of
speech is unconstitutional if done in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as
12
members of a political party which are principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections. Regulation of
election paraphernalia is constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is to be regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object
the endorsement of a candidate only. (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, Jan. 21, 2015)

(67) COMELEC resolution limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of 120 minutes and 180 minutes for political campaigns or advertisements is invalid. It is unreasonable
and arbitrary, as it unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of the press. It unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to connect with the people. It likewise violates the people’s right to suffrage as it restricts the right of people to determine their
own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government. (GMA Network v. COMELEC, Sept. 2, 2014)

(68) Non-establishment clause explained. It prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It
mandates strict neutrality in affairs among religions groups, prohibiting establishment of a state religion and use of public resources for the
support or prohibition of a religion. (Re: Letter of Valenciano, Mar. 7, 2017) COMELEC cannot invoke the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of a party list registration. (And LadLad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, Apr. 8, 2010)

Holding of masses at the basement of a hall of justice does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of church and State.
This is an accommodation which the State adopts as a policy. There is no law or ordinance mandating that judiciary employees attend Catholic
masses. Judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith at their own initiative. No government funds are being spent because the
lightings and airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. (Re: Letter of Valenciano, Mar. 7, 2017)

Benevolent neutrality theory explained. It believes that with respect to governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
not to promote government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion. What is sought under the
theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application. (Imbong v.
Ochoa, Apr. 8, 2014) It cannot exempt a judge from administrative liability where she had sexual relations with her second husband while her
first marriage was subsisting. Legal implications and obligations attach to any person who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless
of how civil marriages are treated in that person’s religion. (Perfecto v. Esidera, July 22, 2015)

A State university professor violates a student’s religious freedom when he gave a failing grade to such student, a member of Seventh-
day Adventist Church who strictly observes Sabbath day every Saturday, when the student failed to take an exam moved on a
Saturday, despite his prior requests to be excused. The fact that other students who are also members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church
do not request same exemption is of no moment. One man’s convictions and another man’s transgressions are theirs alone to bear. (Valmores
v. Achacoso, July 19, 2017)

(69) DOJ Circular No. 41 providing for rules on hold departure orders, watchlist orders, and allow departure orders is not a valid
limitation to the constitutional right to travel. Right to travel may be impaired only in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law. There is no law providing for the authority of the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise of the
right to travel. (Genuino v. De Lima, Apr. 17, 2018)

Circular providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel before they can travel abroad does not violate one’s right
to travel. It does not restrict but merely regulates the right to travel, by proving guidelines, before they can go on leave to travel abroad,
consistent with the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. (OAS-OCA v. Macarine, July 18, 2012)

Unlike the Quezon City curfew ordinance, Manila and Navotas curfew ordinances restricting minors’ travel during certain hours at
night are invalid for being not narrowly drawn, thus offending the minors’ fundamental constitutional freedoms. The exemptions
under the Manila and Navotas ordinances, e.g. minors with night classes or working at night, while protect the minors’ rights to education,
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gainful employment and travel at night from school or work, do not include exemptions from exercise of other constitutional freedoms, such
as rights to participate in legitimate organizations and to engage in political rallies. (SPARK v. Quezon City, Aug. 8, 2017)

(70) Right to privacy explained. It is the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference
by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned. Simply put, it is the right to be let alone. The test to be used to
determine if there is violation of right to privacy is the reasonable expectation of privacy test, which depends on: (i) whether, by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (ii) this expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes as reasonable. Page |
(Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, June 26, 2013) Situations where right to privacy may or may not be invoked:
(a) Yes: Installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing another person’s business office or residence, without his consent, where
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the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, June 26, 2013)
(b) No: Government employee has no expectation of privacy in his government-issued computer containing his personal file if the
government office implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create,
store, send or receive on the office computers. (Pollo v. David, Oct. 18, 2011)
(c) Yes: Posts of a person in online social networks, such as Facebook, if the user show intention to keep certain posts private through the
use of privacy tools, or any employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College,
Sept. 29, 2014)
(d) Yes: Ordinance requiring property owners to expose their property by limiting the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in
excess thereof to be at least 80% see-thru. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, Mar. 12, 2013)

(71) When custodial investigation commences. It commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s participation therein and which tend
to elicit an admission. (People v. Guting, Sept. 9, 2015)

A person who admitted her crime of theft during initial interview is not under custodial investigation when the police is simply
making a general inquiry in the house where the theft happened. Her confession is admissible even without the presence of counsel, as
she was not yet singled out as a suspect. (People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017)

Miranda rights apply to suspects who voluntarily surrender to the police and are subjected to questioning. They are already under
custodial investigation, which begins when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. (People v. Chavez, Sept. 22, 2014)

Rights in custodial investigation do not apply to admissions made in an administrative investigation, such as in an administrative
inquiry conducted by an employer to his employee. Rights in custodial interrogation apply only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. An employee’s written statement given during administrative inquiry is
admissible as evidence against the employee, even if he was not assisted by a lawyer. (Tanenggee v. People, June 26, 2013)

Right to counsel is not available to resource persons in a congressional inquiry. A resource person under congressional inquiry is not
under custodial investigation. (Philcomsat v. Senate, June 19, 2012)

(72) Right against self-incrimination is limited only to testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination does not extend when the
body of the accused is proposed to be examined. Hence, a paraffin test without a lawyer is valid. (Peole v. Fieldad, Oct. 1, 2014)

The right is available to a person who was arrested for extortion but was subjected to mandatory drug testing, found positive, and
accordingly charged. What the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused,
but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. (Dela Cruz v. People, July 23, 2014)

(73) A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. A courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract
the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
Thus, due to impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that can accommodate all interested parties, the Supreme Court
allowed the live broadcasting by radio and television of Maguidanao Massacre cases, subject to guidelines. (Re: Petition for Radio and
Television Coverage, June 14, 2011)
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(74) Factors to consider in determining whether right to speedy disposition of cases is violated. The factors are: (i) length of delay; (ii) reasons
for the delay; (iii) accused’s assertion of or failure to assert the right to speedy disposition of cases; and (iv) prejudice caused by the delay.
(People v. Sandiganbayan, Apr. 16, 2018)

(75) Non-impairment of contracts clause explained. Contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the
rights and obligations of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraw remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. (Goldenway Page |
Merchandising v. Equitable PCI, Mar. 13, 2013)
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(76) Free access clause under Section 11, Article II cannot be extended to juridical persons working with and for the indigents. Free access
to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. The Constitution
has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer. (Re: Query of Mr. Roger
C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., Aug. 19, 2009)

(77) Bail may be allowed if the continued incarceration is injurious to the health of the accused or to endanger his life. Denying him bail
despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during trial. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,
Aug. 18, 2015)

(78) Elements for double jeopardy to attach: The elements are: (i) valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (ii)
court of competent jurisdiction; (iii) accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; (iv) accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent. Thus, an accused will be placed under double jeopardy if the court will recall the judgment of acquittal
upon manifestation by the prosecution. (People v. Alejandro, Jan. 11, 2018)

(79) Duty to permit access to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Bill of Rights vis-a-vis duty to disclose information
under Section 28, Article II. Unlike the latter which is mandatory under the Constitution, the other aspect of the people’s right to know
requires a demand or request for one to gain access to documents and paper of the particular agency. the duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions
involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency. (IDEALS v.
PSALMS, Oct. 9, 2012)

Requisites before the right of information under Section 28, Article II may be compelled. The requisites are: (i) information sought must
be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest and (ii) it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. As to the first, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper determination of the
courts on a case to case basis. As to the second requisite, the information requested must not be excluded by law from the constitutional
guarantee, such as national security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters,
diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, among others. (Sereno v.
Committee on Trade and Related Matters, Feb. 1, 2016)

Rules on privileged documents or communications in the judiciary:

(a) The following are privileged documents or communications: (i) court actions such as result of raffle of cases and actions taken by the
Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session on acts done material to pending cases, except where a party litigant
requests information on the result thereof; (ii) deliberations of Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before the Court;
(iii) predecisional and deliberative court records, or those which are part of or related to deliberative process, e.g. notes, drafts, and
internal discussions.
(b) Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees are privileged even after their term of office.
(c) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made
available by the court to the public.
(d) Principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that highest officials of each department be exempt from the compulsory
processes of other departments.
(e) The privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or judge in his individual capacity. No sitting or retired
justice or judge may claim exemption without the Court’s consent. (In re: Production of Court Records and Documents, Feb. 14, 2012)

(80) Foundlings are natural-born Filipino citizens. The 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that the framers intended foundlings
to be covered by the enumeration on who are natural-born citizens. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless
just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two,
foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational and unjust. Also, the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict
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of Nationality Laws presumes foundling to have the nationality of country of birth; while the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, presumes foundling as born of citizens of the country where he is found. Current legislations, such as domestic
laws on adoption, support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos, who could be adopted. (Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, Mar. 8, 2016)

(81) Failure to immediately file the documents of election of Filipino citizenship with the nearest civil registry pursuant to 1935
Constitution does not result to loss of right to elect Philippine citizenship. Statutory requirements for electing Philippine citizenship under
the 1935 Constitution are (i) statement of election under oath; (ii) oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government; and (iii) registration Page |
of election and oath with the nearest civil registry. The registration of documents of election should be allowed, if in the meanwhile, positive
acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship is actual notice to the
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Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. (Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010)

(82) A Filipino who became a naturalized citizen of another country and who executed an affidavit stating that he is a Filipino citizen is
liable for falsification of public document and cannot raise the defense that he subsequently became a Filipino again after reacquiring
citizenship when R.A. No. 9225 was enacted. Section 2 of R.A. 9225 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign
citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that
such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity. While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become
citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions
of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs.
Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign
country, but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group. Considering that the Filipino
here was naturalized as a foreign citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under
the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship,
he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance. (David v. Agbay, Mar. 18, 2015) Reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship does not have retroactive effect. (Tan v. Crisolog, Nov. 8, 2017)

(83) Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), on its own, cannot dismantle billboards installed in a private property.
MMDA’s powers are limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in R.A. No. 7924, its charter, granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. (MMDA v. Trackworks Rail, Dec. 16, 2009)

(84) Four essential freedoms of a university in relation to academic freedom. These four essential freedoms relate to determine for itself on
academic grounds (i) who may teach; (ii) what may be taught; (iii) how it shall be taught, and (iv) who may be admitted to study. (Cudia v.
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, Feb. 24, 2015)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(85) Requisites for a valid administrative implementing rules and regulations. The requisites are: (i) its promulgation must be authorized by
the legislature; (ii) it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; (iii) it must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure; and (iv) it must be reasonable. (Lokin v. COMELEC, June 22, 2010)

(86) Kinds of administrative regulation – legislative rule, interpretative rule, and contingent rule – explained. Legislative rules are in the
nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. Interpretative rules are
intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Contingent rules are those
issued by an administrative authority based on the exercise of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
(Republic v. Drugmaker’s Laboratories, Mar. 5, 2014)

(87) Essence of due process as applied to administrative proceedings explained. It means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary,
and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. (Vivo v. PAGCOR, Nov. 12, 2013) But, a motion for reconsideration cannot cure the
due process defect, if the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process and the lack of opportunity to be
heard on the merits remained. (Fontanilla v. COA, June 21, 2016)
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(88) Doctrine of primary jurisdiction explained. If a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge
of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts,
even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction, Nov. 27, 2013)

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies explained. This holds that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be
resorted by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must
be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought. (Samar II Electric Cooperative v. Seludo, Apr. 25, 2012)
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(89) Notice and hearing is not required when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power. This holds true unless the
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law provides otherwise. (Quezon City PTCA Federation v. Department of Education, Feb. 23, 2016)

(90) An administrative order cannot grant quasi-judicial powers to an administrative body. There must be an enabling statute conferring
quasi-judicial power upon the administrative body. (Villanueva v. PCSD, Feb. 25, 2013)

(91) Doctrine of res judicata does not apply to exercise of administrative powers. It applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and
not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers are those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative
proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.

Determination whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions. Adjudication signifies the
exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation
is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to
make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and
PO1 Caubang, Apr. 11, 2013)

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

(92) Requisites of valid appointment. The requisites are: (i) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (ii) transmittal of
the appointment paper and evidence of transmittal; (iii) vacant position at the time of appointment; and (iv) receipt of the appointment paper
and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. (Velicaria-Garafil v.
Office of the President, June 16, 2015)

(93) Prohibited midnight appointments are inapplicable to judiciary. Section 14 and Section 16, Article VII refer only to appointments within
the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 on ban on midnight appointments also applies only to the Executive Department.
(De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, Mar. 17, 2010) Similarly, prohibition on midnight appointments does not apply to those made by local
chief executives. No law exists that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his tenure. (Provincial
Government of Aurora v. Marco, Apr. 22, 2015)

(94) DOTC undersecretary cannot be designated concurrently as OIC of Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). While all other
appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law, such as in an ex-officio capacity or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. (Funa v. Ermita, Feb. 11, 2010)

Acting Secretary of Justice cannot be appointed as acting Solicitor General, even if subsequent appointment is only in an acting
capacity. Prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by a member of the cabinet applies to all appointments or designations,
whether permanent or temporary. (Funa v. Agra, Feb. 19, 2013) Official actions done during the prohibited holding of dual offices are
presumed valid, binding and effective, as the official concerned is considered de facto officer. (Espiritu v. Lutgarda, Oct. 14, 2014)

Chairman of CSC cannot sit as director or trustee of GSIS, Philhealth, ECC, and HDMF. While the Chairman of CSC can hold any
other office or employment in the government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, he
cannot sit as director or trustee of GSIS, Philhealth, ECC, and HDMF, as this will allow him to exercise powers and functions – such as
imposing interest on unpaid contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers and other non-personnel related
functions – which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Moreover, as the GSIS, Philhealth, ECC, and HDMF are
under the executive branch, the CSC Chairman, if he will sit as director or trustees of these, will be under the control of the president, thereby
impairing the independence of the CSC. (Funa v. Duque, Nov. 25, 2014)
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A commissioner who resigns after serving in a constitutional commission for less than seven (7) years is eligible for appointment to the
position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing Chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the
predecessor will not exceed seven years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
disability or removal by impeachment. "Reappointment" found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). An appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Page |
Constitution. (Funa v. Villar, Apr. 12, 2012)
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(95) Ombudsman’s term is for seven years, regardless of the cause of vacancy. He does not serve only for the unexpired portion of the term of
his predecessor in case of the latter’s death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability. (Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, Apr. 24, 2018)

(96) President exercises disciplinary authority over the Special Prosecutor but not over the Deputy Ombudsman. Exercise by the President
of disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman will impair the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman since a Deputy Ombudsman, unlike the Office of the Special Prosecutor, acts as an agent of the Ombudsman in the performance
of duties. (Gonzales III v. Office of the President, Jan. 28, 2014)

(97) De facto officer explained. He is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its
duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent is not a mere volunteer. His acts are just as valid for all purposes in so far as public are concerned. (Funa v. Agra, Feb. 19, 2013)

(98) Consultancy service is not considered government service. Said contract is not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. There
is no employer-employee relationship but that of a client-professional relationship. (Joson v. Ombudsman, Apr. 6, 2016)

(99) Next-in-rank rule does not give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that position become
vacant. Next-in-rank rule is only a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. (Abad v. Dela Cruz, Mar. 18, 2015) It is not a
guarantee to one's fitness to the position aspired for, and the applicant must go through the rigors of screening and selection process as
determined and conducted by a department or agency, subject to standards and guidelines set by CSC. (Estrellado v. David, Feb. 16, 2016)

(100) Re-election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense. No constitutional or statutory basis exists to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. (Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals, Nov. 10, 2015) The abandonment of this condonation doctrine has prospective application and is applicable in
cases that transpired prior to 10 November 2015 ruling of Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals. (Ombudsman v. Vergara, Dec. 6, 2017)

(101) Arias doctrine enunciated in Arias v. Sandiganbayan as a defense against public officer’s liability explained. Heads of offices have to
rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
(Jaca v. People, Jan. 28, 2013) The doctrine is inapplicable if a public official has foreknowledge of any fact or circumstance that would
prompt him to investigate the acts or omissions of his subordinates. (Abubakar v. People, June 27, 2018)

(102) Ombudsman has jurisdiction over a complaint concerning an act of the public official that is not service-connected. The law does not
qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official that the Ombudsman may investigate, as long as the same appears to be
illegal, unjust, or improper. (Samson v. Restrivera, Mar. 28, 2011)

(103) Nature of CSC’s jurisdiction over administrative cases explained. The CSC can hear and decide administrative cases brought before it
directly or on appeal. The complaint may even be filed by a private citizen. For administrative cases brought directly before it, it may deputize
any department or agency to conduct an investigation. (CSC v. Court of Appeals, Oct. 9, 2012)

ELECTION LAW

(104) COMELEC jurisdiction vis-à-vis HRET jurisdiction regarding intra-party matters. When the resolution of an intra-party controversy is
necessary or incidental to the performance of the constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC, the latter can step in and exercise
jurisdiction over intra-party matter. Where the matter involved is the expulsion of an incumbent member of Congress from his party, and
touch upon the meaning of the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization, the HRET has jurisdiction as it is the sole
judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. (Lico v. COMELEC, Sept. 29, 2015)
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(105) Requisites to oust COMELEC of jurisdiction over House of Representative candidates and for House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal to take cognizance of all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of its members. The requisites are: (a) valid
proclamation; (b) a proper oath; and (c) assumption of office. (Reyes v. COMELEC, June 25, 2013)

(106) HRET cannot rule on the alleged nullity of naturalization of the father of a Member of the House. To rule otherwise would operate as an
impermissible collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. (Villando v. HRET, Aug. 23, 2011) Page |
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(107) R.A. No. 10367 or Biometrics Registration System Act mandating registered voter to be submitted for validations, on pain of
deactivation from registry list is constitutional. The biometrics validation is not a qualification but an aspect of registration procedure,
which the State has right to regulate. Registration regulates exercise of right of suffrage. (Kabataan Partylist v. COMELEC, Dec. 16, 2015)

(108) Prior notification to the parties must be made if resort to print out of the images of ballots is made. The picture images of the ballots are
electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. Despite the equal probative weight
accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective
proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. Picture images of ballots are to be used
only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.(Maliksi v. COMELEC, Apr. 11, 2013)

(109) Ways by which a candidate can be disqualified. If a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy within the twenty-five (25) day period prescribed under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise
the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the OEC within ten days from proclamation of
the results of the election. (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, Aug. 10, 2012)

COMELEC motu proprio can bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the
final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because it is constitutionally bound to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. (Dimapilis v. COMELEC, Apr. 18, 2017)

(110) Petition for disqualification under Section 68 vis-a-vis a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section
78 of the OEC. Disqualification under Section 68 is hinged on either a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
country or his commission of certain election offenses. One who is so disqualified is still technically considered to have been a candidate,
albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions, which do not, however, deny his statutory eligibility.
Meanwhile, a denial of due course or cancellation of certificate of candidacy under Section 78 is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of
any material qualifications for the elective office aspired for. A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course or cancelled
is deemed not to have been a candidate at all.

Disqualified candidate can be validly substituted if disqualified under Section 68, and not under Section 78. Under this Section, he
remains a candidate. (Tagolino v. House of Representatives, Mar. 19, 2013)

False nickname in the certificate of candidacy is not a material misrepresentation and cannot be a ground to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Nickname is not a material matter as it does not pertain to qualification for elective
office. (Villafuerte v. COMELEC, Feb. 25, 2014)

“Second-placer” rule explained. The second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible
should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing, but subsequently cancelled
for a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Thus, if the
certificate of candidacy is void, there is no valid candidate, no valid votes cast, and any votes for said candidate should not be counted. The
qualified person who obtained the highest number of votes must be proclaimed. (Jalosjos v. COMELEC, Oct. 9, 2012)

(111) Parameters for party-list elections.

(a) National and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized
and underrepresented” sector;
(b) Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections; a political party that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system;
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(c) Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” – such as labor, urban poor handicapped – or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies” – such as professionals, women and youth;
(d) Majority of members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the such
sector they represent; the same must be true to those lacking in “well-defined political constituencies”; the nominess of said sectoral
parties either must belong to their respective sectors or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors, and must be
bona fide members of such parties or organizations (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, Apr. 2, 2013)
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(112) Requirements for natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The requirements are (i) take the oath of allegiance under RA
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9225, and (ii) execute a personal sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy. (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, Aug. 10, 2012)

Use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship. It does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the oath of renunciation required to
qualify one to run for an elective position. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, Apr. 16, 2013) An official candidate who used his foreign passport after
renouncing his foreign citizenship is no longer qualified to run for an elective office. (Agustin v. COMELEC, Nov. 10, 2015)

(113) Candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that
he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he
lives would make property a qualification for public office. (Jalover v. Osmena, Sept. 23, 2014)

LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

(114) Decentralization of administration and decentralization of power explained. There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments ‘more responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. Decentralization of power involves an abdication of
political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. The autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

Conditional Cash Transfer Program is constitutional, even if implemented by the Department of Social Work and Development and
not by the local government unit concerned. The Local Government Code provides express reservation of power by the national
government in that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. (Pimentel v. Ochoa, July 17, 2012)

(115) Local government units covered by their respective Cityhood Laws are exempt from coverage of R.A. No. 9009, increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality to city from P20 Million to P100 Million. Congress intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. It was cognizant of the fact that there were
municipalities that then had pending conversion bills. Deliberations show that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then
pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress. Also, the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class
of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. (League of Cities of
the Philippines v. COMELEC, Apr. 12, 2011)

(116) Requisites for creation of province. The requisites are: (i) average annual income of P20,000,000 and (ii) either of the following: (a)
contiguous territory of at least 2,000 sq. km. or (b) population of not less than 250,000. The requirement of population is not indispensable,
but is an alternative one in addition to the indispensable income requirement. (Aquino v. COMELEC, Apr. 7, 2010)

(117) A law can be passed entitling a city that will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the immediately
following election to a legislative district. Official record to that effect must be present. (Aldaba v. COMELEC, Jan. 25, 2010)

(118) Some principles on the three-term limit rule:

(a) The requisites for disqualification under the three-term limit rule are: (i) official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post; and (ii) he has fully served three consecutive terms.
(b) No violation of the three-term limit rule if in one term, the official was not elected to the office but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law, e.g. succession due to death or incapacity of the incumbent.
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(c) Recall election is not an immediate reelection and thus interrupts the continuity of the term.
(d) Conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service. The official
never ceased from acting as such of the local government unit.
(e) Period during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his
service. The suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period.
(f) When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election Page |
protest and is ousted from office, no matter how short, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion
of his term of office had the protest been dismissed.
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(g) When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said
office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish.
(Abundo v. COMELEC, Jan. 8, 2013)
(h) Three-term limit rule applies in case of legislative reapportionment, where the district is practically the same as the district that
previously elected the same candidate, 8 out of 10 town constituencies, amounting to less than 10% of population of the latter. This
numerical fact renders the new district as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old one. (Naval v. COMELEC, July 8, 2014)

(119) Reapportionment explained. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population
and voting power among districts. (Naval v. COMELEC, July 8, 2014)

(120) When an independent component city is to be converted into a highly urbanized city, the registered voters of the entire province are
qualified to participate in the plebiscite. The entire province certainly stands to be directly affected – economic and political rights of the
province and its residence – by the conversion of an independent component city into a highly urbanized one. All qualified voters of the
province should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose. (Umali v. COMELEC, Apr. 22, 2014)

(121) The Mayor of Cebu City, a highly urbanized city, and not the governor of Cebu province, can appoint board members to Metro Cebu
Water District (MCWD), which was created pursuant to P.D. No. 198, granting the power to appoint the board members of a local
water district to the mayor in the event that more than 75% of the total active water service connections are within the boundary of
any city or municipality, or to the governor of the province, if below. Even if the total active water service connections in Cebu City fell
below 75%, the governor of Cebu province cannot appoint the board members of MCWD. Highly urbanized cities are independent of the
province, subject only to the President’s retained power of general supervision in accordance with the LGC and principle of local autonomy of
local government units. (Rama v. Moises, Dec. 6, 2016)

(122) Requisites that must be met before a national project affecting the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented. The requisites are: (i) prior consultation with the affected local communities and (i) prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Lack of prior public consultation and approval cannot be corrected by any subsequent endorsement. (Boracay
Foundation v. Province of Aklan, June 26, 2012)

(123) Tests of a valid ordinance. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law (formal tests), it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements (substantive tests): (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive;(iii) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not
be unreasonable.

Ordinance authorizing the immobilization of vehicles violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions through the clamping of tires
does not violate due process. The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors
were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. Nor should the lack of a
trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process, for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the
apprehensions through a timely protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing. (Legaspi v. City of Cebu, Dec. 10, 2013)

Ordinance by Batangas City regulating the use of ground water by private corporations by mandating all heavy industries operating
along Batangas Bay to use seawater in the operation of their respective facilities and install desalination plants for this purpose is
invalid. The ordinance effectively contravenes the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of
ground water, which under said law, pertains solely to the National Water Resources Board. It fails to satisfy a requisite for a valid ordinance:
it must not contravene any statute, which is the Water Code. (City of Batangas v. Philippines Shell, June 7, 2017)
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(124) A mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions after complying with due process. LGC empowers the mayor to
order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. Insofar as illegal
constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition. This
power is distinct from the power to summarily abate nuisances per se. (Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, Sept. 29, 2014)

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

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(125) R.A. No. 9522, passed in compliance with the terms of UNCLOS, is constitutional and does not reduce Philippine maritime territory,
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even if it shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some base points around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories – Kalayaan Island Group and Scarborough Shoal – as regimes of islands which islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones. Baselines laws, such as R.A. No. 9522, are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific base points along
their coasts from which baselines are drawn, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. They play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or diminution of territory. In international law, States acquire or lose
territory through occupation, accretion, cessation, and prescription, not by executing treaties on regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with treaty terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. (Magallona v. Ermita, July 16, 2011)

(126) Some principles in the Philippines-China arbitration:

(a) Coral reefs that are submerged at high tide generate no entitlement to maritime zones, while those that are above water at high tide
generate to an entitlement of 12 nautical mile territorial sea;
(b) Islands generate an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and to a continental shelf, but rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall generate no such entitlement;
(c) China’s claim to historic rights in the maritime areas of the South China Sea in relation to its Nine-Dash Line is extinguished by the entry
into force of the UNCLOS to the extent that they were incompatible with said Convention’s system of maritime zones;
(d) China violated Philippine’s sovereign rights with respect to its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf when China prohibited
fishing by Philippine vessels in said exclusive economic zone, protected and failed to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within said
zone, and constructed installations and artificial islands;
(e) China’s large scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands caused severe harm to the coral reef
environment, thereby violating its obligation under UNCLOS to preserve and protect marine environment with respect to fragile
ecosystems and habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species. (In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, July 12, 2016)

(127) Writ of Kalikasan will not issue against commander and officers of US military ship which ran grounded on the northwest side of the
South Shoal of Tubbataha Reefs and their acts of salvaging, and post-salvaging operations. The US officers were sued in their official
capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS military ship and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the grounding was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriations of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. Principle of State immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over their persons.

There is no waiver of immunity of suit found in Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) on special civil actions. The waiver of State immunity
under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions, such as a petition for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan.
(Arigo v. Swift, Sept. 16, 2014)

(128) Soft law explained. It pertains to non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior. It does not fall into any of the
categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. Examples are certain
declarations and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights. (Pharmaceutical and
Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, Oct. 9, 2007)

(129) Exchange of notes defined. It is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement
consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of one signed by the representative of the other. The
accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. It is an internationally accepted form of international agreement; it is
being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. (Bayan Muna v. Romula, Feb. 1, 2011)

(130) Rule of specialty and dual criminality rule in extradition explained. Under the rule of specialty, a requested state shall surrender to a
requesting state a person to be tried only for a criminal offense in their treaty of extradition. Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable
offense must be criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the requested states. This simply means that the requested state comes
under no obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the request for extradition as criminal. Thus, a
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person cannot be extradite for the crime “accepting an advantage as an agent” or private sector bribery since this is not a crime defined and
punished as criminal in the Philippines. (Government of Hongkong v. Muñoz, Aug. 16, 2016 and Nov. 7, 2017)

(131) Treaty distinguished from an executive agreement. Agreements involving political issues or changes in national policy, as well as those
involving international agreements of a permanent character, usually take the form of treaties. They may also include commercial agreements,
which are executive agreements essentially, but which proceed from previous authorization by Congress, thus dispensing with the requirement
of concurrence by the Senate. Treaties must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements are generally intended Page |
to implement a treaty already enforced or to determine the details of the implementation thereof that do not affect the sovereignty of the State.
(Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jan. 12, 2016) Those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and
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those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, Feb. 1,
2011) Thus, a foreign loan agreement is an executive agreement. (DPWH v. CMC, Sept. 13, 2017)

Accession to the Madrid Protocol, which aims to facilitate securing protection for marks and make the management of registered
marks easier in different countries, does not need the concurrence of the Senate. Accession to the Madrid Protocol may be done in an
executive agreement as the Philippines already has established national policy for the streamlining of administrative procedures for registering
marks, as reflected by the Congress in Section of the Intellectual Property Code. (IPAP v. Ochoa, July 19, 2016)

An executive agreement cannot amend a treaty. An executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its
ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the Senate.
(Bayan Muna v. Romulo, Feb. 1, 2011)

(132) Pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the
agreement. Thus, a State that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may
be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. (Deutsch Bank v. CIR, Aug. 19, 2013)

(133) Guidelines in the establishment of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country.
(a) Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent requirements that must be fulfilled by the international agreement
allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines: (i) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty,
and (ii) it must be duly concurred in by the Senate;
(b) If the agreement is not covered by the above situation – such as involving details of adjustment, then the President may choose the form
of the agreement (i.e., either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided that the agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities is not the principal agreement that first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines;
(c) Executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and standards set by the law and/or treaty that the former purports
to implement; and must not unduly expand international obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in the law or treaty; and
(d) Executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution and existing laws and treaties. (Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jan. 12, 2016)

(134) How a private individual can bring a claim with the international legal system. The private individual must persuade his government to
bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, Apr. 28, 2010)

(135) “Erga omnes” and “jus cogens” explained. Erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) refers to obligations owed by the State towards the
community of states as a whole. All States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such
obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from outlawing of acts of aggression and of genocide. Jus cogens (literally,
“compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can
be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, Apr. 28, 2010)

(136) When international customary rules considered binding. They are binding if these are present: (i) established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and (ii) a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. (Poe-
Llamanzares v. COMELEC, Mar. 8, 2016)

By: Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura αφß2006A, 10th Place 2015 Bar. May the GAOTU bless you.

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