Lagman v.

Ochoa

The petitioners seek to declare EO No. 1 unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions for the following reasons:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission."

(c) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations,
past and present, who may be indictable.

Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as
expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? - NO

HELD: The provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition

thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations
where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has
to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in
said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

Is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create
a public office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above
provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. 48 The
said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities,
transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation
to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as
Larin v. Executive Secretary.49

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the
President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and
inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to
create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree,
embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will

necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government.

HELD: The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. 
The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this
power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he
is bereft of such authority.51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus.

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot
be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that
all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.

Is there a usurpation of the powers of the Congress? - NO

HELD: Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor
General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will
be the very source of the funds for the commission."

Is there a violation of the equal protection clause? - YES

HELD: 1987 Constitution Article IIISection 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be

valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 81 "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification."

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at
least three portions of the questioned executive order. 

Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative

of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Mayor Vergara

FACTS: A complaint was filed by Bonifacio G. Garcia, on June 21, 2005 before the Office
of the Environmental Ombudsman against respondent Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara and
then Vice-Mayor Raul Mendoza (Vice-Mayor Mendoza). Respondent Mayor Vergara was
then serving as Mayor of Cabanatuan City for his third term (2004-2007). The complaint
was about the neglect of these public officials of their duties to implement RA 9003. And
in their failure to be responsive to the problems of the 87 barangays regarding the
dumpsite.

Mayor Vergara was found guilty by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Ismaela
B. Boco for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the assailed decision that
meted him the penalty of suspension for six (6) months from government service cannot
be implemented or enforced as the same runs counter to the established doctrine of
condonation, since he was reelected as Mayor of Cabanatuan City on May 10, 2010.

ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of condonation applies in this case - NO

HELD:

Although, in November 10, 2015, this Court, in Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA and
Jejomar Binay, Jr.,   extensively discussed the doctrine of condonation and ruled that
9

such doctrine has no legal authority in this jurisdiction, the above ruling, however, was
explicit in its pronouncement that the abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is
prospective in application.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the
1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term
can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is folly absolved of any administrative
liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.

How about the contention that, for the doctrine to apply, the respondent should have
been re-elected in the same position in the immediately succeeding election ?

HELD: The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-elected
to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. In Giron v. Ochoa,  the 38

Court recognized that the doctrine can be applied to a public officer who was elected to a
different position provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to
another office is the same. 

It is inconsequential whether the said re-election be on another public office or on an

election year that is not immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that
re-elected the public official be the same.

In this case, the respondent was re-elected as mayor by the same electorate that voted
for him when the violation was committed. As such, the doctrine of condonation is applied
and the CA did not err in so ruling.