REPUBLIC VS BENJAMIN GUERRERO

G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006

FACTS: BARANDA VS. GUSTILO
 December 1964: Benjamin Guerrerro filed with the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales Application GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988
covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. This application was approved and
Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued subsequent thereto. FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by original
 Angelina Bustamante later filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that Guerrero obtained the sales certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts. This was however dismissed Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and
by the Director of lands and further affirmed by then Minister of Natural Resources. possession over the said land. However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held by
 Through a MFR, an ocular investigation and relocation survey found out that 83 sq. m. of the titled property respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of
of Guerrero is under actual physical possession of Marcelo Bustamante, husband of Angeluna. Thus, upon petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order
the directive of the Office of The President, the Director of Lands instituted a petition for the amendment of declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of  titles in the name of petitioners.
plan and technical description. However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the
 Guerrero opposed said motion through a motion to dismiss but however was dismissed thereafter. However, new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
the RTC ruled in favor of Guerrero stating that the Republic failed to prove its allegation that Guerrero certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis
obtained the sales patent and certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation. RTC also ruled that the pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
original certificate of title in the name of Guerrero acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the
expiration of 1 year from the entry of the decree of registration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court. ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a
ISSUES: Torrens certificate of title?
1. W/N the Republic has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Guerrero procured
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT through fraud and misrepresentation. HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the notice of lis
2. W/N Guerrero’s title acquired the characteristic of indefeasibility. pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals. The function of the
HELD: Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in
1. NO. nature. The acting register of deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s
the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the
arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. 
government is required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of
the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the presentor or such denial
reserves. in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and again, with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in
we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or
name appears thereon. other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to reopen or the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of
revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. However, the Republic in this case failed to prove that there is Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest through the Register of Deeds.”
actual and extrinsic fraud to justify a review of the decree. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that
respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title.
Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from
properly presenting its case by reason of such fraud.
2. YES. Guerrero’s title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was vested with th garment of
indefeasibility.
NB: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not
run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is
worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have
to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued
thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to lands,
justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and
inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.
AL MIROL VS. REGISTER OF D EEDS OF AGU SA N

( G.R. NO. L-22486, MARCH 20,  1968) NOBLEZA V. NUEGA

FACTS: Josefina Nobleza v. Shirley Nuega

G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.

1. Teodoro Almirol bought a parcel of land in Esperanza, Agusan from Arsenio Abalo. FACTS:

2. Almirol then went to the Register of Deeds (ROD) of Agusan to have the Deed of Sale registered and to
secure a transfer certificate in his name. However, the ROD refused.
3. It was based on the ground that the said property was conjugal and it is necessary that both spouses sign
the document. However, since the wife was dead when the sale was made, the husband cannot dispose the
whole property without first liquidating and transferring it in his name and the heirs by means of extrajudicial
settlement. The consent of the heirs must also be procured.
4. Aggrieved, Almirol went to the RTC of Agusan to have the ROD be compelled to register the Deed of Sale
and issue the transfer certificate of title.
5. However, the RTC dismissed the petition saying that the adequate remedy is the one provided for under
Sec. 4 of RA 1151 – that is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration. Hence,
petition.
ISSUE: Was the RTC correct?
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on September 1, 1990. Upon the
request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him money for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina where they had planned to
eventually build their home. The following year, or on September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house and
lot for One Hundred Two Thousand Pesos (P102,000.00) from Rodeanna Realty Corporation. Shirley claims that upon
her arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity over the subject property with the
developer through SSS8 financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations.
On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The following year, Shirley
returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received information that Rogelio had brought home another woman,
Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned and was able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in
May 1992, that Rogelio had been introducing Escobar as his wife.
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Rizal, and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City. In between the filing
of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling the subject property. Shirley then advised the
interested buyers one of whom was their neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) – of the existence of
the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property until the cases are
closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the
subject property to petitioner without Shirley’s consent in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P380,000.00), including petitioner’s undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on the property with the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and to pay the real property taxes due thereon.
ISSUE:

Is the Deed of Sale null and void for lack of the consent of the wife?
RULING: Yes. But the ROD should have registered it still.
HELD:

Yes. The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely
1. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the ROD to determine; this function belongs properly to a court relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.

of competent jurisdiction. The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s financial contribution in the purchase
of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community
2. However, where any party in interest does not agree with the ROD, the question shall be submitted to the property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
Commissioner of Land Registration (Sec. 4, RA 1151). Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist
of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
3. The lower court’s resolution was affirmed.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code; and
(2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.

Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse and the fruits as well as the income
thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the
 community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community
property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and
the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it, therefore, forms part of
the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition
before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio’s name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is
owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
REPUBLIC V. SAYO, 191 SCRA 71: It was held that in the absence of proof that property is privately
owned, the presumption is that it belongs to the State. Thus, where there is no showing that the land had
been classified as alienable before the title was issued, any possessi on ther eof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot ripen into ownership. And all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. (Seville v. National Development Company, 2001)
LEE HONG KOK VS. DAVID
G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972
o Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM
o Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.
FACTS:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous sales
application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales
patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant
HELD:
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers
but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void
since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings
after claiming it as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or
not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant
cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:
The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty
comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution.
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983
FACTS: These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the CA which declared the disputed
property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons. These petitions have their genesis in an application for
confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be
registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters.
Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui
filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of
Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of
Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for
registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square
meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to
Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land
containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the
possession of private persons for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be
the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the
Land Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The
Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of
Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain.
The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot
when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested
but is a “mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.
RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears emphasizing
that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest
such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912,
the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as
1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was
strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose
Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be
done because it was classified as “public forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions
were DISMISSED.