ACCRETION-process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers, denotes

the process
ALLUVION- increment, which lands abutting rivers gradually receive as a result of the
current of the waters, refers to the soil deposit itself. It is brought by accretion which the
terms are used interchangeably.
-deposit is gradual (dahan dahan, hndi biglaan)
-made due to effects of the water (natural no human interference)
*must be the exclusive work of nature and not human intervention
*rivers and their natural beds are property of the State and if it became dried-up river in
some other person, it must continue to belong to the State.
RIPARIAN OWNER-riparian refers to any property having a water frontage. It embraces
littoral owners whose lands are bordered by the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal
waters.

REQUISITES OF ALLUVION
a. Deposit must be gradual and imperceptible (not caused by floods,
earthquake)

BINALAY VS MANALO, 195 SCRA 374

FACTS:
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2
different people (the latter’s daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots were
later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot was beside the
Cagayan River, which, due to flooding, would place a portion of the land underwater
during the rainy season (September to December). On sunny days, however, the land
would be dried up for the entire dry season (January to August). When a survey of the
land was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land that Manalo bought was
then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed and excluded from Lot 307.
Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two
braches (western and eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a
narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through Lot 307, and is
flooded during the rainy season. The unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed
of the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only during the rainy season while the
“island”/elongated strip of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and
perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth. The strip of land in
the middle of the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is
directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern branch of the river’s fork.
Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged
portion of the land to which it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the
Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They occupy the other edges of the
lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products) and also cultivate the western strip during the summer.
Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he
filed a complaint for quieting of title, possession, and damages against petitioner. The
trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and Lot 307 cannot
be considered separate and distinct from each other. They reasoned that when the land
dries up for the most part of the year, the two are connected.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion
RULING: No.
The SC held that the disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy
rains that cause the highest ordinary level of waters of the Cagayan River during the
rainy season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered property of
public domain.
The SC observed the following:
a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a river bed. The dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m)
on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It was
called “Rio Muerte de Cagayan.”
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420 of
the civil code states that rivers are property of public dominion. The word “river” includes
the running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller never actually owned that part of
the land since it was public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually
bought. It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable area could have been brought about
by accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied.
These are: 1) that the deposition of the soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and 3) the land
where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast).
The accretion should’ve been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its ownership.
BUT, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but
directly opposite it – across the river. Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which were
very steep may only be formed by a sudden and forceful action like flooding. The steep
slopes could not have been formed by the river in a slow and gradual manner.

b. Alluvion is the result of the action of the current of the waters of the river, lake
or creek and not by the sea, and not man made

REPUBLIC V CA, 131 SCRA 532

Facts:
The subject lot is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay. It was purchased by
Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 1909. It was registered with the Registry of
Deed of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, was declared for tax purposes in 1918 and has been paid
since 1948. When Benedicto died, his heir partitioned the estate and the subject parcel
was passed to Santos.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to
construct duck houses on the land in question. There was no definite commitment to
rentals but some of them paid to Santos. However, private oppositors constructed
residential houses on the land which prompted Santos to file an ejectment suit against
them.
Santos del Rio filed his application for registration of said parcel on May 1966. During
the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their
respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed
Santos del Rio’s application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna
dismissed the application for registration.
Santos appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of
said decision.
Petitioner Director of Lands claims that the land is part of the public domain and
therefore not registerable. Private oppositors on the other hand, allege that they
reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells thereon, and that they have been in
possession of the same for more than twenty (20) years.
Issue: Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land
Ruling:
NO. It is not a public land.
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been
described as those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of private
ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. The New Civil Code enumerates
properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof.
Article 420 provides:
“The following things are property of public dominion:
(1)Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2)Those which belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.”
Article 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:
“(1)Rivers and their natural beds;
(2)Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds
and the beds themselves;
(3)Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4)Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;
The Court used Art. 74 of the Law of the Waters of 1866 to define the extent of a lake
bed:
“The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their
waters when at their highest ordinary depth.” (Italics supplied)
The phrase “highest ordinary depth” was interpreted to be the highest depth of the
waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the “regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year.” This was
the interpretation used by the CA and the SC sees no reason to disturb it.
Laguna de Bay is a lake. The gravitational force, that causes tides in seas and oceans,
is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. It is the rains which bring about
the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which
causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months a
year) than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be
considered as the “highest ordinary depth” of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land
sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it
be considered as foreshore land.
The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains “falling
directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. Since the inundation of
a portion of the land is not due to “flux and reflux of tides” it cannot be considered a
foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands.
The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay,
nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and
therefore capable of registration as private property.

ZAPATA V DIR OF LANDS, 6 SCRA 335 (creek)

Topic: The alluvion must be the result of the action of the current of the waters of the
river, lake (like the Laguna de Bay)

FACTS: Juliana Zapata owns two parcels of land adjoining a non-navigable and non-
floatable river called the Candalaga Creek.

When the cadastral survey of San Fernando began, the width of the Candalaga Creek
adjoining the two parcels of land owned by Juliana Zapata was about 90 or to 100
meters.

At present, the width is 15 meters because soil had been accumulated by the water
current of the river on the banks of the lots owned by Juliana Zapata. Later on, the said
accreted land was designated as lots 1,2, and 3.

Zapata filed a petition claiming that the lot belongs to her by accretion, as provided in
Article 457 of the Civil Code, because the accretion was not due to the natural effect of
the current but was artificially induced on account of the erection of the fish traps on the
creek.

ISSUE: Whether the accretion or deposit of alluvial soil belongs to Zapata pursuant to
Article 457 of the NCC

RULING: NO. The court held the right of the riparian owner is not necessarily affected
by the erection of fish traps in the creek.

Where the accreted land had been formed gradually due to the effect of the water
current of the creek, the riparian owner may invoke the benefit of the provisions of
article 457 of the Civil Code to support his claim of title.
In this case, although fish traps might have slowed down the current of the Candalaga
Creek and might have brought about or caused the accretion, there is no evidence to
show that the setting up or erection of the fish trap was expressly intended or designed
to cause or bring about the accretion.

VDA DE NAZARENO V CA, 257 SCRA 589 (not manmade)

FACTS: Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses
stood from Antonio Nazareno. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly
stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for
ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court. A decision was rendered against Salasalan
and Rabaya, which was later affirmed by the Regional Trial Court.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of a
survey plan with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by
him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it
was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.
Upon investigation. a report to the Regional Director recommended that the Survey Plan
in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed
to file appropriate public land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered a
decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno
by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if
qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective portions.
Director of Lands ordered Navareno to vacate the portions adjudicated to private
respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He
also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de
Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC for annulment of the
following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by
respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming
the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad. The
RTC dismissed the complaint. for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which
resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether subject land is an accretion to his titled property.

HELD: No, the subject land is not an accretion.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring
property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites :
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are
called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters.
However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and
other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River
bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such
boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from
the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.
In Hilario v. City of Manila, this Court held that the word "current" indicates the
participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.
Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on
alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by
the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill, therefore, the accretion was man-
made or artificial. In Republic v. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the
deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v.
Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of
the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the
direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as
such, part of the public domain.

c. Land must be adjacent to the bank of the river, not when the land is opposite
the bank

AVULSION (459-460)
-is the process where the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate
on its bank a known portion of land and transfer it to another estate.
-the owner has 2 years for the estate and 6 months for the uprooted trees to recover the
transferred estate/uprooted trees. Otherwise, they shall belong to the owner of the land
which the said property may be cast.

ISLAND
-when formed in a non-navigable or non-floatable river, it belongs to the owner of the
land along the nearer margin and no specific acts of possession is required (matic)

DRIED UP RIVER BEDS

-belong to the state unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river
beds should belong to some other person

ADJUNCTION, MIXTURE AND SPECIFICATIONS (Art 466-475)

QUIETING OF TITLE (Art. 476-481)

Nature and Concept:
a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property
- must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to
or interest in real property

VDA DE AVILES V CA , 264 SCRA 473

FACTS: The disputed property was mortgaged by Eduardo Aviles with the Rural Bank
and Phil. National Bank, upon inspection of the bank representative with the presence
of the boundary owners Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles, and Juana and Apolonio
Joaquin. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property was sold at public
auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs' mother and the land was subsequently
transferred and declared in her name.

Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property by
constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby
molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for quieting of title instituted by the petitioners
against private respondent before the court a quo is not the proper remedy but rather, it
should be a case for ejectment

RULING: No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.

The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to
real property or any interest therein.

In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is
an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a
cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property.
Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the
disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts"
which can be removed in an action for quieting of title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of
settling a boundary dispute

TITONG V CA, 287 SCRA 102

FACTS: Titong filed an action for quieting of title which he claims that he is the owner of
an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less and
declared for taxation purposes in his name. Titong also claims on three separate
occasions with their hired laborers,forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an
area of approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing. Laurio denied this
allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare
agricultural land of Espinosa.

Titong alleged that there was no controversy had sprouted between him and
Espinosa for 20 years until the latter sold the lot to Laurio which corroborated by his
worker before its sale to Espinosa. On the contrary, Laurio denied his claim of
ownership, since the area and boundaries of disputed land remained unaltered during
the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands.

The first survey 14 was made for petitioner, while the second was the relocation
survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between the
two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner's allegation in his complaint that he is
the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total
areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining
to Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares
sold by petitioner to him.

The court rendered a decision in favor of Laurio, declaring him as the true and
absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering Titong to respect Laurio’s title and
ownership over the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for quieting of title instituted by the Titong against
Laurio is valid.

RULING: No.The court ruled that instant petition must be denied for the reason that the
lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title.

The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances

enumerated in the Civil Code:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.

Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question
or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for
filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding." Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius,
these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these
reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.

A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and so
a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land. A survey
under a proprietary title is not a conveyance.

Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in
accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended
by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original
field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of
property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. 41 A survey plan not
verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due
execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence
without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the
courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it
subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented
by the parties

Prescription of an action to quiet title

Quieting of Title (Art. 476-477)

In order for it to prosper, the 2 indispensable requisites must concur:
 1. Plaintiff or complaint has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and

2. The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on

his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Action to quiet title: Quasi in Rem, governed by the rules of special proceedings
Cloud is the doubt in the title
TITLE-registered ownership
An action for reconveyance: based in Land Registration Law

CO-OWNERSHIP (Art. 484-501)

Concept & Definition-ownership of an individual thing or right belongs to different
persons
-it is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
-unity of the property and plurality of the subjects. Owner of the whole and undivided
aliquot part thereof.

Sources of co-ownership
a. By law (marriage-conjugal partnership
b. By contract (contract of sale)
c. By chance (hidden treasure, confusion)
d. By occupation or occupancy
e. By succession or will

4 Kinds of Co-Ownership
a. As to Subject matter
CO of an undivided thing
CO of undivided right
b. As to Source
Contractual CO
Non-contractual CO
 c. As to rights of the CO
Tenancy in common
Joint tenancy

*In cases for repair for preservation, co-owner need only to first notify the other co-
owners and may compel other to contribute expenses.
*May a co-owner incur expenses for improvement or embellishment even without the
consent of the other co-owners?
- This is a matter of administration that needs the consent of majority of
the co-owners.

*May a co-owner alter a property owned in common even without the consent of the
other co-owners?
- The unanimous consent of the other co-owners is required (Art. 491).

Sale/mortgage by a co-owner of the whole property

Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one (1) co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void; only
the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.

Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.

Remedy: Co-owners remedy is an action for partition in case of sale of entire property
or undivided portion without their consent.

*Conjugal property sold without the consent of the other spouse is null and void.

RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

AVILA V ARABAT, 485 SCRA 8 MARCH 17 2006

FACTS: Benjamin Barabat leased a portion of the house owned by Avila.
Avila subsequently relocated to Cagayan de Oro City. She came back to Toledo City in
July 1979 to sell her house and share in the lot to her siblings but no one showed
interest in it. She then offered it to respondents who agreed to buy it. Their agreement
was evidenced by a private document dated July 17Barabat then took possession of the
propert as owner and assumed payment of taxes
Sometime in early 1982, respondents were confronted by petitioner Januario Adlawan
who informed them that they had until March 1982 only to stay in Avila’s place because
he was buying the property. Respondents replied that the property had already been
sold to them by Avila. They showed Adlawan the July 17, 1979 document executed by
Avila.
Considering the sale to the spouses Adlawan as prejudicial to their title and peaceful
possession of the property, they demanded that Avila execute a public document
evidencing the sale of the property to them but Avila refused.
Barabat filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the
complaint was subsequently amended to include annulment of the deed of sale to the
spouses Adlawan, specific performance, partition and damages as additional causes of
action. Respondents anchored their claim over the property to the July 17, 1979 private
document which they presented.
Avila denied having offered to sell her property to respondents. She claimed that
respondents gave her an P8,000 loan conditioned on her signing a document
constituting her house and share in lot no. 348 as security for its payment. She alleged
that she innocently affixed her signature on Exhibit "A" which was prepared by
respondents and which they now claim as a private deed of sale transferring ownership
to them.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Barabat. It declared the document as a
valid and lawful deed of sale. It nullified the subsequent deed of sale between Avila and
the spouses Adlawan. Avila was ordered to execute a formal and notarized deed of sale
in favor of respondents. It also held petitioners liable for moral damages and attorney’s
fees.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In its July 30, 1999
decision, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Petitioners sought
a reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Avila et al has a right to redeem the property.
HELD: No, the respondents has no right to redeem the property.
Art. 1620 states that,
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the
other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation
is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
In ruling, the Court held that the Petitioners’ right to redeem would have existed only
had there been co-ownership among petitioners-siblings. But there was none. For this
right to be exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is made by a
co-owner and the redemption is demanded by the other co-owner or co-owner(s).
However, by their own admission, petitioners were no longer co-owners when the
property was sold to respondents in 1979. The co-ownership had already been
extinguished by partition.
In the instant case, petitioners admitted that they already segregated and took
possession of their respective shares in the lot. Their respective shares were therefore
physically determined, clearly identifiable and no longer ideal. Thus, the co-ownership
had been legally dissolved. With that, petitioners’ right to redeem any part of the
property from any of their former co-owners was already extinguished. As legal
redemption is intended to minimize co-ownership, once a property is subdivided and
distributed among the co-owners, the community ceases to exist and there is no more
reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.
Hence, the petition is denied and the decision of CA is affirmed.

TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
-if property become indivisible or physical indivisible, the property may be allotted to one
of the co-owners who shall indemnify the others, or be sold at public auction distributing
the proceeds among the co-owners.

*If the property has been judicially or extra judicially partitioned, the respective shares
were physically determined dissolving now the idea of co-ownership.

ORAL PARTITION
-valid supported by exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions following
their oral partition

PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN AGAINST A CO-ONWER AS RULE

- does not run in favor of a coheir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership
REPUDIATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or
the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed un-
equivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other
co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear
and convincing.

POSSESSION (523)
-The holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right
-Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession. The following cannot be appropriated and hence, cannot be
possessed: property of the public dominion common things (res communes) such as
sunlight and air, and things specifically prohibited by law

Nature and concept:

*Possession does not mean that a man has to have his feet in every square meter of
the ground. It is sufficient that one was able to subject the property to the action of his
will.
*Occupancy is not the same as actual possession
*Possession no matter how long could not ripen into ownership.

Owner may possess through another: owner occupying the property is not necessary

Squatters have no right to possession as they were considered trespassers or intruders.

Time of occupancy is immaterial, entered in bad faith.

Possession vs Occupation
-P is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain (P and O
dapat)
-P is broader than O because it includes constructive possession.
Rights of a possessor

Possessor in good faith

-honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another.

Delivery of possession is equivalent to the delivery of the property

Tacking (of possession)

The term is applied especially to the process of establishing title to land by adverse
possession, when the present occupant and claimant has not been in possession for
the full statutory period, but adds or “tacks” to his own possession that of previous
occupants under whom he claims. That doctrine which permits an adverse possessor to
add his period of possession to that of a prior adverse possessor in order to establish a
continuous possession for the statutory period.

The term is also used in a number of other connections, as possessions, disabilities, or

items in accounts or other dealings. In these several cases the purpose of the proposed
tacking is to avoid the bar of statute of limitations. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed.)

Possession by tolerance

Petitioner was able to establish that respondents’ possession was by tolerance of his
predecessors. As such, they are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them
Professor Tolentino defines and characterizes “tolerance” in the following manner
. […] acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity,
the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property;
they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can
give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits out of
friendship or courtesy.
TYPWRITTEN, SEND VIA TELEGRAM

FILE NAME: ASHLE QUIROS_PROPERTY