Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Elements:
1. Offender is a judge
2. He renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
Unjust judgement- An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by
the evidence or both.
1. Error;
2. Ill-will or revenge; or
3. Bribery.
It must be shown by positive evidence that the judgment was rendered by the judge with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
Case
it was stated here that It is also well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally, for any error he commits, provided he acts in
good faith.
Elements:
1. Offender is a judge;
2. He performs any of the following acts:
a. Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order or decree; or
b. Rendering a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through
inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
If the order leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case, it is interlocutory. If it does not, it is final.
The unjust interlocutory order must have been issued by the judge with
deliberate intent to cause damage to the party concerned.
Case
In the case of Kapisaan ng mga Mangagawa vs. Yard crew union it was said here that
The test in determining whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is "Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. Having in view the avowed purpose of the orders in
question, as heretofore exposed, one should not stretch his imagination far to see that they are
clearly interlocutory, as they leave something more to be done in the trial court and do not
decide one way or the other the petitions of the respondent unions
Elements:
1. Offender is a judge;
2. There is a proceeding in his court;
3. He delays in the administration of justice;
4. The delay is malicious, that is, with deliberate intent to inflict damage on
either party in the case.
Malice must be proven. Malice is present where the delay is sought to favor
one party to the prejudice of the other.
Modes
1. Maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution against violators of the
law;
2. Maliciously tolerating the commission of offenses.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer or officer of the law who has a duty to cause the
prosecution of, or to prosecute, offenses;
2. There is a dereliction of the duties of his office, that is, knowing the
commission of the crime, he does not cause the prosecution of the criminal,
or knowing that a crime is about to be committed, he tolerates its
commission;
3. Offender acts with malice and deliberate intent to favor the violator of the
law.
Officer of the law – those who, by reason of the position held by them, are
duty-bound to cause prosecution and punishment of offenders, i.e. chief of
police, barrio captain
Liability of the public officer who, having the duty of prosecuting the offender,
harbored, concealed, or assisted in the escape of the latter, is that of a
principal in the crime of dereliction of duty in the prosecution of the offense.
Elements:
Modes of Commission:
1. Maliciously causing damage to his client through a breach of his
professional duty.
Punishable acts:
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer within the scope of Article 203;
2. Offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted, or gift or present received by the public
officer –
a. With a view to committing some crime; or
b. In consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime, but the act must be unjust; or
c. To refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do.
4. The act which offender agrees to perform or which he executes be
connected with the performance of his official duties.
The crime of bribery has no frustrated stage. If one party does not concur, then
there is no agreement and not all the acts necessary to commit the crime
were present.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He accepts gifts;
3. The gifts are offered to him by reason of his office.
The principal distinction between direct and indirect bribery is that in the
former, the officer agrees to perform or refrain from doing an act in
consideration of the gift or promise. In the latter case, it is not necessary that
the officer do any act. It is sufficient that he accepts the gift offered by reason
of his office.
If after receiving the gift, the officer does any act in favor of the giver which is
unfair to the others, the crime continues to be indirect bribery.
Precisely the evil of indirect bribery is in its tendency to produce future,
unspecified, and unwarranted favors from the official.
CASE DISCUSSION:
In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan found accused
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty ofdirect bribery, sentenced him to four
months and twenty days of arresto mayor with temporary
specialdisqualification for eight years and one day and a fine of
P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency and to pay the
costs. In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. Manipon's guilt for the
crime of direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner here seems to be suggesting in the conclusion to his petition that
judgment was rendered against him because he happens to be a tax collector,It
suffices to observe that he was convicted not because he is a tax collector but
because he accepted a bribe.
Article211-A–Qualified Bribery
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer entrusted with law enforcement;
2. He refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death;
3. Offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift, or present.
Elements:
1. Offender makes offers or promises or gives gifts or presents to a
public officer;
2. The offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents given to a
public officer, under circumstances that will make the public officer
liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
CASE:
U. S. vs. Matiao
In order that a public official may be convicted of bribery he must have accepted a bribe for his
committing in the discharge of the duties of his office an act constituting a crime. It therefore
becomes necessary to consider whether the official if he had accepted the bribe in the
discharge of his office in the particular case, would have committed an act constituting a crime
as defined in article 354 of the Penal Code.
Article 213 – Fraud against the Public Treasury and Similar Offenses
Modes:
1. Entering into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or
making use of any other scheme, to defraud the government, in dealing
with any person with regard to furnishing supplies, the making of contracts,
or the adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property or
funds;
2. Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or
larger than those authorized by law, in collection of taxes, licenses, fees,
and other imposts;
3. Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of
money collected by him officially, in the collection of taxes, licenses, fees
and other imposts;
4. Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or
otherwise, things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law,
in the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts.
CASE
it may be well to state again that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are public officers and as
such must serve with the highest sense of responsibility and the highest degree of
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and at all times remain accountable to the people and
diligence and integrity and with an overriding concern to promote public interest, 2 and,
to emphasize, with honesty of the highest degree.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He takes advantage of his official position;
3. He commits any of the frauds or deceits enumerated in Article 315 to
318 (estafa, other
forms of swindling, swindling a minor, other deceits).
Case
Whenever a public official commits a crime outside of the exercise of his functions, doing
acts which are not connected with the duties of his office, he should be punished with the
penalty provided by law for the private individual who violates its provisions, without taking
into account the official character with which the accused is invested.
Elements:
1. Offender is an appointive public officer;
2. He becomes interested, directly or indirectly, in any transaction of
exchange or speculation;
3. The transaction takes place within the territory subject to his jurisdiction;
4. He becomes interested in the transaction during his incumbency.
Persons liable:
1. Public officer who, directly or indirectly, became interested in any contract
or business in which it was his official duty to intervene;
2. Experts, arbitrators, and private accountants who, in like manner, took
part in any contract or transaction connected with the estate or property in
the appraisal, distribution or adjudication of which they had acted;
3. Guardians and executors with respect to the property belonging to their
wards or the estate.
Fraud is not necessary. Intervention must be by virtue of the public office held.
The basis here is the possibility that fraud may be committed or that the officer
may place his owninterest above that of the government or party he
represents.
Modes:
1. Appropriating public funds or property;
2. Taking or misappropriating the same;
3. Consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any
other person to take such public funds or property; and
4. Being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property.
The public officer must have official custody or the duty to collect or receive
funds due the government, or the obligation to account for them, because
this provision presupposes abuse of office.
The nature of the duties of the public officer, not the name of the office, is
controlling. Thus, a clerk who receives money or property belonging to the
government, in the course of his employment, for which he is bound to
account, may be liable under Article 217.
If the public officer is not accountable for the funds or property but
someone else is, the crime committed is theft or qualified theft if there is an
abuse of confidence.
It is not necessary that the offender profited for as long as the accountable
officer was remiss in his duty of safekeeping public funds or property. He is
liable for malversation if such funds were lost or otherwise misappropriated
by another.
Case
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds and that he did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made. There is even no need of direct
evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his
account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same.
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a
private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck.
Therefore, when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the
Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution was
in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly
charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below as
well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void
for lack of jurisdiction
Elements:
1. Offender is public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom by
resignation or any other cause;
2. He is an accountable officer for public funds or property;
3. He is required by law or regulation to render account to the Commission on
Audit, or to a provincial auditor;
4. He fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered.
Demand for accounting is not necessary. It is also not essential that there be
misappropriation because if present, the crime would be malversation.
Article 219 – Failure of a Responsible Public Officer to Render Accounts Before Leaving the
Country
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He is an accountable officer for public funds or property;
3. He unlawfully leaves or attempts to leave the Philippine Islands without
securing a certificate from the Commission on Audit showing that his
accounts have been finally settled.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. There are public funds or property under his administration;
3. Such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance;
4. He applies such public fund or property to any public use other than for
which it was appropriated for.
CASE
Abdula vs people
It was stated here that The elements of the offense, also known as technical
malversation, are: (1) the offender is an accountable public officer; (2) he
applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use;
and (3) the public use for which the public funds or property were applied is
different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance. It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that
public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than that
provided for by law or ordinance.12 To constitute the crime, there must be a
diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally
appropriated by law or ordinance.13 Patently, the third element is not present
in this case.
In this case the element in the crime of technical malversation that public fund
be appropriated for a public use requires an earmarking of the fund or property
for a specific project.58 For instance there is no earmarking if money was part
of the municipality’s “general fund,” intended by internal arrangement for use in
paving a particular road but applied instead to the payrolls of
different barangay workers in the municipality. That portion of the general fund
was not considered appropriated since it had not been earmarked by law or
ordinance for a specific expenditure. Here, there is no allegation in the
informations that the P2 million and P6 million grants to COCOFED had been
earmarked for some specific expenditures.
Elements:
1. Public officer has government funds in his possession;
2. He is under obligation to either:
a. make payment from such funds;
b. to deliver any property in his custody or under his administration
3. He maliciously fails to make the payment or refuses to make delivery.
CASE:
The Court, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imputes a
dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, and a conscious doing of a wrong.
UP Diliman Legal Office itself rendered a legal opinion that "confirmed the
authority of Dr. Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as
project director and consultant of the TMC Project." Not only this, the COA
Resident Auditor, who at first thought that the OIC Chancellor had no power to
make the designations, later accepted the Legal Office's opinion and withdrew the
Notices of Suspension of payment that he issued. All these indicate a need for the
Court to reexamine its position that Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas acted in bad faith
in the matter of those appointments.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He had in his custody or charge a prisoner, either detention prisoner or
prisoner by final judgment;
3. Such prisoner escaped from his custody;
4. He was in connivance with the prisoner in the latter’s escape. (“shall
consent to the escape”)ArClasses of prisoners involved
1. Those who have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty;
2. Detention prisoners who are temporarily held in legal custody, arrested
for and charged with violation of some law or municipal ordinance.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He is charged with the conveyance or custody of a detention prisoner
or prisoner by final judgment;
3. Such prisoner escapes through negligence
This covers only positive carelessness and definite laxity which amounts to
deliberate non-performance of duties.
The fact that the public officer recaptured the prisoner who had escaped
from his custody does not afford complete exculpation.
Case:
It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions
to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will
make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance
of duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions could
plan and make good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary
prudence.
The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under Art. 223 but for evasion
through negligence under Art. 224 of the same Code. It is, therefore, not necessary that
connivance be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoners.
Article 225 – Escape of Prisoner under the Custody of a Person Not a Public Officer
Elements:
1. Offender is a private person;
2. The conveyance or custody of a prisoner or person under arrest is
confided to him;
3. The prisoner or person under arrest escapes;
4. Offender consents to the escape, or that the escape takes place through
his negligence.
The party who is not the custodian but who conspired with the custodian in
allowing the prisoner to escape does not commit infidelity in the custody of the
prisoner.
Art. 225 is not applicable if a private person was the one who made the arrest
and he consented to the escape of the person he arrested.
If the officer was placed in possession of the document but it is not his duty
to be the custodian thereof, this crime is not committed.
Case:
People vs Camacho
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He is charged with the custody of papers or property;
3. These papers or property are sealed by proper authority;
4. He breaks the seal or permits them to be broken.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. Any closed papers, documents, or objects are entrusted to his custody;
3. He opens or permits to be opened said closed papers, documents or
objects;
4. He does not have proper authority.
The act should not fall under Art 227. Damage is also not necessary.
Mode 1: Revealing any secrets known to the offending public officer by reason of
his official capacity;
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He knows of a secret by reason of his official capacity;
3. He reveals such secret without authority or justifiable reasons;
4. Damage, great or small, is caused to the public interest.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He has charge of papers;
3. Those papers should not be published;
4. He delivers those papers or copies thereof to a third person;
5. The delivery is wrongful;
6. Damage is caused to public interest.
Secrets must affect public interest. Secrets of private persons are not
included.
On the other hand, if the papers do not contain secrets, their removal for an
illicit purpose is infidelity in the custody of documents.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He knows of the secrets of a private individual by reason of his office;
3. He reveals such secrets without authority or justifiable reason.
The reason for this provision is to uphold faith and trust in public service.
Article 232 – Disobedience to the Order of Superior Officer When Said Order Was Suspended by
Inferior Officer
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. An order is issued by his superior for execution;
3. He has for any reason suspended the execution of such order;
4. His superior disapproves the suspension of the execution of the order;
5. Offender disobeys his superior despite the disapproval of the suspension.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. A competent authority demands from the offender that he lend his
cooperation towards the administration of justice or other public service;
3. Offender maliciously fails to do so.
The request must come from one public officer to another. If he receives
consideration therefore, bribery is committed.
But mere demand will fall under the prohibition under the provision of
Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Applies whether or not serious damage to the public interest was committed.
Elements:
1. Offender is elected by popular election to a public office;
2. He refuses to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office;
3. There is no legal motive for such refusal to be sworn in or to discharge
the duties of said office.
This is committed only by such public officer charged with direct custody of
the prisoner.
Offender may also be held liable for physical injuries or damage caused.
If the public officer is not the custodian of the prisoner, and he manhandles
the latter, the crime is physical injuries.
The maltreatment does not really require physical injuries. Any kind of
punishment not authorized or although authorized if executed in excess of
the prescribed degree is covered.
Case :
Under Article 235, it is necessary that the maltreated prisoner be under the
charge of the officer maltreating him. There is no such allegation in the
information above quoted. The prisoners, Moises Escueta and Isidro Capino,
according to the information, were simply kept in the Camp of the Philippine
Ground Force in the municipality of Tiaong; but it is not alleged therein that they were
under the charge of Punzalan as Mayor of Tiaong., Hence, one of the essential
elements of the offense under Article 235 was lacking.
Elements:
1. Offender is entitled to hold a public office or employment, either by
election or appointment;
2. The law requires that he should first be sworn in and/or should first give
a bond;
3. He assumes the performance of the duties and powers of such office;
4. He has not taken his oath of office and/or given the bond required by
law.
Article 237 – Prolonging PerformanceofDutiesand Powers
Elements:
1. Offender is holding a public office
2. The period provided by law, regulations or special provision for holding
such office, has already expired
3. He continues to exercise the duties and powers of such office.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer
2. He formally resigns from his position
3. His resignation has not yet been accepted
4. He abandons his office to the detriment of the public service.
Elements:
Elements:
1. Offender is an officer of the executive branch of the governmen
2. That he:
a. assumes judicial powers, or
b. obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any
judge within his jurisdiction.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. A proceeding is pending before such public officer
3. There is a question brought before the proper authority regarding his
jurisdiction, which is not yet decided
4. He has been lawfuly required to refrain fro continuing the proeeding
5. He continues the proceeding.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He nominates or appoints a person to a public office;
3. Such person lacks the legal qualifications therefore;
4. Offender knows that his nominee or appointee lacks the qualification at the
time he made the nomination or appointment.
Modes:
1. Soliciting or making immoral or indecent advances to a woman interested
in matters pending before the offending officer for decision, or with respect
to which he is required to submit a report to or consult with a superior
officer;
2. Soliciting or making immoral or indecent advances to a woman under the
offender’s custody;
3.
Soliciting or making immoral or indecent advances to the wife,
daughter, sister or relative within the same degree by affinity of
any person in the custody of the offending warden or
officer.
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He solicits or makes immoral or indecent advances to a woman;
3. Such woman is –
a. interested in matters pending before the offender for decision, or
with respect to which he is required to submit a report to or consult
with a superior officer; or
b. under the custody of the offender who is a warden or other public
officer directly charged with the care and custody of prisoners or
persons under arrest; or
c. the wife, daughter, sister or relative within the same degree by
affinity of the person in the custody of the offender.
The mother of the person in the custody of the public officer is not included.
If the offender were not the custodian, then crime would fall under Republic
Act No. 3019.
Elements:
1. Person is killed;
2. Deceased is killed by the accused;
3. Deceased is the accused's
a. legitimate/illegitimate father
b. legitimate/illegitimate motherlegitimate/illegitimate child (should not be
ess than 3 days old, otherwise crime is infanticide)
c. legitimate spouse
Case:
People vs Jumawan
A stranger who cooperates and takes part in the commission of the crime
of parricide is not guilty of parricide but only homicide or murder, as the
case may be.
The law does not require knowledge of relationship between offender and
victim
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of
appellant for parricide. The defense fell short of proving all three phases
of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of
Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but
appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the
past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer
sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
A case that the husband has 3 wife and killed the third wife. The best
proof is the marriage certificat. The killing was filed on murder but
relation shall be considered an aggravating circumstances even the
information was not allege in the information.
Elements:
1. A legally married person, or a parent, surprises his spouse or his
daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him in the act
of sexual intercourse with another person;
2. He or she kills any or both of them, or inflicts upon any or both of them
any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter;
3. He has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse.
Not a Felony
This article does not define a felony, rather it serves as a defense for a
person charged with parricide, homicide or serious physical injuries. If all the
requisites have been met, the defendant will be sentenced to destierro instead
of the severe penalty for the aforementioned crimes. If less serious or slight
physical injuries are inflicted, there is no criminal liability. [Reyes]
In this case even assuming that the accused caught his wife rising up
and Isabelo cannot invoke the privilege of article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code, because he did not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act
of committing adultery, but thereafter, if the respective positions of the
woman and the man were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they had
committed the carnal act.
In here the applenat invoke the defense of article 247 . 1. That a legally married
person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age
and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any
serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or
that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
Elements:
1. Person was killed;
2. Accused killed him;
3. Killing attended by any of the following qualifying circumstances
a. with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
b. in consideration of a price, reward or promise;
c. by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding
of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship,
by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin;
d. on occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
e. with evident premeditation;
f. with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering
of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Case.
People vs. Valerio
INTENT TO KILL
When the victim is already dead, intent to kill becomes irrelevant. It is
important only if the victim did not die to determine if the felony is physical
injury or attempted or frustrated homicide.
The person who gave the price or reward or who made the promise is a
principal by induction.
FIRE
When a person is killed by fire, the primordial criminal intent of the offender
is considered. If the primordial criminal intent of the offender is to kill and fire
was only used as a means to do so, the crime is
only murder. If the primordial criminal intent of the offender is to destroy
property with the use of pyrotechnics and incidentally, somebody within the
premises is killed, the crime is arson with homicide, a single indivisible
crime penalized under Art. 326, which is death as a consequence of
arson.
POISON
Treachery and evident premeditation are inherent in murder by poison only
if the offender has the intent to kill the victim by use of poison.
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
Act of the offender manifestly indicating that he clung to his
determination to kill his victim.
The prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined
(conceived) to kill his victim; (2) an act of the offender manifestly indicating
that he clung to his determination to kill his victim; and (3) a sufficient lapse
of time between the determination and the execution of the killing.
CRUELTY
Under Article 14, the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty
requires that the victim be alive, when the cruel wounds were inflicted and,
therefore, there must be evidence to that effect.
Injuries or wounds, not necessary for the killing of the victim, must be
inflicted deliberately by the offender.
Yet, in murder, aside from cruelty, any act that would amount to scoffing or
decrying the corpse of the victim will qualify the killing to murder.
Case:
Cleofe and Leonardo assert that the lower courts' assessment of their
defense of alibi as weak is erroneous because they were properly
supported by the testimonies of witnesses who were with them at the time
of the commission of the crime. The trial judge’s evaluation of the witness’
credibility deserves utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.
Furthermore, conclusions and findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and valid
reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying on the case.
Appellate Courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the Trial Court,
as the latter is in a better position to decide the same, having heard witnesses
themselves and having observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during trial unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value which, if considered, might affect the results of the case
For treachery to exist 2 information should have been found 1. that at time
of attack the victim was not in the position to defend himself 2. the offender
consioucly adopted the particular means method or form of attack
employed by. him
Elements:
1. Person was killed;
2. Offender killed him without any justifying circumstances;
3. offender had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
4. Killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide
INTENT TO KILL
Intent to kill is conclusively presumed when death resulted. Evidence of
intent to kill is important only in attempted or frustrated homicide.
Case:
People vs Bates
When an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self defense, it is
incumbent upon him to prove by convincing evidence that he acted self
defense