Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Land Bank v. CA G.R No. 118712
Land Bank v. CA G.R No. 118712
*
G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
150
151
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 151
FRANCISCO, J.:
______________
1 Gelos v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608, 615 (1992), quoting Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy.
2 Ibid, p. 616.
152
_________________
3 Rollo, p. 7.
4 Rollo, pp. 122-123.
153
________________
5 Rollo, p. 149.
6 Which provides formulas for the valuation of land expropriated under RA
6657.
7 Which provides for the opening of trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of
depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land
expropriated by the DAR.
154
155
_________________
x x x x x x x x x
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
10 Rollo, p. 111.
156
_________________
11 Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations.—The PARC and the DAR shall have
the power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or
procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules
shall take effect ten (10) days after the publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
12 Rollo, pp. 111-112.
13 Rollo, p. 112.
14 Rollo, p. 107.
15 Rollo, p. 149.
16 Rollo, p. 63.
17 Rollo, p. 67.
157
ing the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just
compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain
that the word “deposit” as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657
referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way
excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of
deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account
as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative
Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to
promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the
declared policies of RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657
provides as follows:
158
18
a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed
that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of
administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing
the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot19
extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy
between the basic law and an implementing 20
rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails.
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the
limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it
issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in
allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because, as
heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in
“LBP bonds.” In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke
LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear
provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not
commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular
No. 9 for being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private
respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts
deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final
resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their
properties, petitioners assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction
between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 and
_______________
18 Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425, 432 (1992).
19 Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission, 202 SCRA 507, 54 (1991) citing
Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 (1970), citing Santos vs. Estenzo, 109
Phil. 419 (1960); Animos vs. Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214,
223-224 (1989).
20 Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 162 SCRA
628 (1988).
159
payment
21
of final compensation as provided under Section
18 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of
the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his
behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon
by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged
by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the
trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection
by the landowner because the latter amount is only
provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the
property pending final valuation. To further bolster the
contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in
the case of “Association of Small Landowners
22
in the Phil.
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform.”
______________
21 Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation.—The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR and LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.
22 175 SCRA 343.
160
_______________
161
______________
162
——o0o——