India’s Ladakh Dilemma

Dr Talat Shabbir
The Express Tribune, July 5, 2020

As the senior commanders met for the second time since the beginning of the Ladakh crisis to find
ways to ease the Himalayan tension caused by the China-India face-off, a large part of India’s
strategic community and public suggested a befitting riposte. The tense face-off turned out to be
the bloodiest since China and India went for a limited war over the same dispute in 1962. Since
both sides seem to have taken up hardline positions over their territorial claims, the issue may
potentially escalate to a dangerous limit.

The Ladakh face-off continues to remain unclear as there are claims and counter-claims by both
sides. Indian media reports suggest that Chinese troops moved to what is considered to be Indian
territory and crossed over to Indian territory, after India built several hundred kilometres of road
that connected to an airstrip. The first confrontation took place in early May. China, as India
claims, intruded several hundred kilometres inside Indian territory and occupied key posts in the
Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Pangong Tso. The June 16 clash between the troops with wooden
staves and nail studded clubs was the severest in decades that left 20 men dead including an
Indian Army colonel.

There is a history of skirmishes and standoffs between China and India. Limited war in 1962,
Nathu La and Cho La clashes in 1967, Tulung La killings in 1975, Sino-India skirmish in 1987, Daulat
Beg Oldi incident in 2013, and Doklam military standoff in 2017, besides other confrontations and
transgressions that have taken place between China and India along the long Line of Actual
Control (LAC), over which both countries have overlapping territorial claims. As reported in a
section of the Indian press, transgressions by Chinese military stand at 273, 426 and 326 in 2016,
2017 and 2018, respectively. This suggests that there is continuous confrontation on LAC by
troops of both countries.

What are the lessons drawn? Some Indian analysts believe that there is “no conceivable solution
to this problem” but there are, of course, some conceivable lessons or conclusions from the
ongoing China-India standoff. First: India’s political leadership was found lacking in dealing with
the crisis. Second: Indian military might stand exposed. Indian military leadership has somehow
come to terms with its military inferiority. They have realised their inability to win an outright war
with China and there is an obvious fact that China’s national defence budget stands at $261 billion
which is almost thrice that of India’s $71.1 billion. Third: the China-India Ladakh face-off has
created a divide amongst the strategic community and public. Those driven by nationalistic
sentiment want a “befitting response” of humiliation caused at the hands of China while saner
elements suggest “calm” as they think war with China would be an unwinnable venture. Fourth:
territorial disputes may be shelved at some cost but must be resolved at all cost. Living with a
flawed status quo or sitting over the dispute will only make matters worse. Fifth: territorial
disputes are dangerous flashpoints and global powers must find an appropriate mechanism to
address them. Sixth: confrontations over disputes give rise to nationalism which negatively
impacts globalisation.

While Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration struggles to regain what they lost on the
political and military fronts, his Ladakh dilemma gets murkier, so do his foreign policy choices. PM
Modi’s dream of spearheading the Asian century together with China has shattered, at least for
the moment, with Ladakh showdown. Whatever may be the outcome of this confrontation, India
has few myths broken and some realities exposed. For an aspiring regional power, there is a dire
need to carry out comprehensive appraisal of its issues with China and other neighbours. Advice:
When you decide to carry out a generous appraisal of issues, begin by first reconciling with your
ego.