apeiron 2019; aop

José Antonio Giménez*

Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity
in Lysis
https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2019-0008

Abstract: Plato’s characterization of philia in Lysis, on one hand, as one-sided

belonging to the ultimate object of our desire and, on the other, as interpersonal
reciprocal belonging appears problematic. Yonesawa has recently claimed that
one can make sense of both uses of “belonging” if we assume that one is the
other’s friend when each one coincides in being the ultimate object of the other’s
desire. This paper proposes instead that Lysis’ ‘reciprocity’ of friendship results
from friends’ right wanting, which presupposes their souls are well-disposed to
a true object of desire. To prove this, I will argue that (i) the action and the
argument of the dialogue exhibit this kind of reciprocity, (ii) there is a ‘unique’
ultimate object of desire (‘teleological monism’), that consists of a ‘knowledge
about the good life’ and (iii) only the common longing for such knowledge can
make possible friends’ reciprocal belonging.

Keywords: Lysis, friendship, reciprocity, desire, belonging

Introduction
Plato’s Lysis, on account of its short length and aporetic nature, has habitually
been treated as a primarily propaedeutic dialogue for accessing the theories of
love in the Phaedrus and the Symposium.1 However, recent decades have seen a
flourishing of studies that coincide (to a greater or lesser extent) in emphasizing
positive results in Lysis, and in recognizing therein a ‘friendship theory’ that can
be differentiated to a certain extent from the positions defended in the later

1 Guthrie concludes that Lysis is a failed exercise whose inconclusive theses would be found in
pristine condition in the erotic dialogues (cf. Guthrie 1975, 143). Price, for his part,
while acknowledging that Lysis is the inevitable starting point even for the treatment of friend-
ship in Aristotle, believes that this dialogue does not develop an authentic theory of friendship
(cf. Price 1990, 14).

*Corresponding author: José Antonio Giménez, Department of Philosophy, Universidad de Los

Andes, Monseñor Álvaro del Portillo 12455, Santiago 7550000, Chile,
E-mail: jagimenezs@gmail.com

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2 José Antonio Giménez

erotic dialogues.2 However, even with this constructive attitude, it is far from
easy to answer the question of “what the friend is” (218b7: ὃ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον) in
this dialogue.3 Within this question, one of the most difficult problems to solve –
and the problem to which I would like to dedicate my attention herein – is the
function of ‘reciprocity’ in this theory of friendship. Preliminarily, it is worth
noting two causes of this difficulty: (i) The term φιλία is used in the dialogue to
characterize both symmetric and asymmetric relations, which may not even give
rise to any kind of affective reciprocity; (ii) the treatment of friendship is
interwoven here with a theory of desire (ἐπιθυμία) – which is also the basis of
erotic love (ἔρως) –, according to which the subject that desires is ‘unilaterally’
related to the desired object.
In contrast, we find the Socratic affirmation that friends must “naturally
belong the one to the other” (221e5–6). “Belong” translates here to the term
οἰκεῖον (to be family, of one’s own, or belonging to), which has been previously
identified with the “first friend” (πρῶτον φίλον), that is, the ultimate object of
desire (218d5–220b7). In some way, the affirmation of reciprocity allows us to
clear up difficulty (i): (reciprocal) friendship designates a qualified type of φιλία
(general love or affection).4 Difficulty (ii), however, persists: how can we recon-
cile the one-sidedness of desire with reciprocal friendship? Different answers
have been offered for this: (1) friends coincide in being the ultimate object of the
other’s desire5; (2) friends coincide in being the means for the obtaining the
ultimate object of desire of each6; (3) reciprocal friendship does not require the
participation of both parties’ desire (or needy love), but only of one of them,

2 Bordt justifies this line of interpretation by appealing to the fact that the dialogue’s final
aporia is the consequence of only one of the alternatives Socrates proposes to his interlocutors,
leaving the attentive reader with an exit to the aporia (cf. Bordt 1998, 229–231). For a similar
strategy, cf. also Gadamer (1985, 185), González (2000, 393–394), Rudebusch (2004, 77), Penner
and Rowe (2005, 174–177) and, in part, Yonesawa (2018, 11–12). In reaction to these interpreta-
tions that try to reconstruct Lysis as a euporetic dialogue, there have emerged voices that warn
of the danger of overinterpretation: cf. Dancy (2006, 334–336) and Belfiore (2012, 87–88).
3 Sedley challenges the idea that Lysis is a ‘dialogue of definition,’ arguing rather that it
examines the ‘identity’ of the friend (cf. Sedley 1989, 108). For a critique of this opinion, cf.
Bordt (1998, 77) and Dancy (2006, 328).
4 The difficulty, however, as to whether this reciprocal relationship must be symmetric and
proportional persists.
5 For example, Yonesawa (2018, 2 and 9).
6 In this case there will be reciprocal as well as nonreciprocal friendships, to the extent that
here the subject of the friendship does not expect reciprocity from the friend, but only for the
friend to be a means for the achieving of the subject’s own happiness. Cf. Penner and Rowe
(2005, 272 and 289–291). For this position, cf. also Vlastos (1981, 7).

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 3

awaking the benevolence (or giving love) in the other party7 and (4) the coin-
cidence between friends is born of the common longing for the same object of
desire.8
For alternatives (1) and (2) reciprocity is the result of accidental coincidence
of two unilateral desires. We call this type of reciprocity ‘weak.’9 For (3) and (4)
the coincidence is not merely accidental but is required for the participants of
the relationship. We will call this ‘strong’ reciprocity, insofar as it not only
qualifies the relationship itself, but also the way in which the reciprocation is
required by the individuals who take part in the relationship.
However, the requirement of reciprocation is different in these alternatives.
For (3) – insofar as here friendship is symmetrical, but unequal – it is only the
desiring lover who requires the beloved’s reciprocity, whereas for (4) – insofar as
in this case friends are equals – reciprocity demands not only a common interest
in the object of desire, but too a right wanting based on the ordering of the soul
to a true ultimate object of desire. In this regard, the cause of reciprocity is here,
lastly, not one or the other’s desire, but the common spring of both sides’
desires.
In my opinion, it is this last type of strong reciprocity that is fundamentally
at stake in Lysis. This position, for its part, requires the possibility of defining the
ultimate object of desire as a sole type of object that is capable, for its part, of
nurturing a common friendship. Most interpreters agree that ‘knowledge’ fulfills
this function in the dialogue.10 Yonesawa, however, has recently called into
question both the ‘teleological monism’ of Lysis (and the consequent identifica-
tion of πρῶτον φίλον with knowledge) as well as reciprocity in the strong sense,
proposing instead a ‘pluralism’ of types of friendships and a reciprocity founded
on the mere meeting of two unilateral desires.
My intention in this article is to defend the notion of strong equal reciprocity
while taking Yonesawa’s objections into account. This will allow me to textually

7 Cf. Rudebusch (2004, 77–78, 2006, 193).

8 Cf. Bordt (1998, 93), González (1995, 86, 2000, 394–396, 2003, 32–36) and Bosch-Veciana
(2003, 395–396). Kreft recognizes that the theory of οἰκεῖον gives rise to this form of reciprocity.
However, this conflicts with an ‘utilitarian’ conception of friendship (cf. Kreft 2012, 211), a
tension only resolved in the Phaedrus (220–221).
9 Keeping distance between the two theories of friendship, Aristotle seems to understand
reciprocity – as one of the conditions of friendship – in this sense, namely, as the coincidence
between two benevolent affections (NE VIII 1155b27–1156a5: ἀντιφίλησις; εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις).
10 One exception is Nichols, who, even assuming the centrality of reciprocity in the οἰκεῖον
theory, ends up maintaining that this notion of reciprocal friendship serves as a paradigm for
friendship based on knowledge (philosophical friendship) and not vice versa (cf. Nichols 2009,
154 and 191–192).

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4 José Antonio Giménez

and argumentatively justify the understanding of friendship in Lysis as the

common longing of friends for knowledge, understanding this as ‘knowledge
of the good life.’ This approach not only has an exegetical interest (the con-
structive and not merely methodological interpretation of an early or Socratic
dialogue), but also proposes that the contemporary reader understand the friend
as part of the project of a good life, that is, assuming above all the existence of a
‘shared value.’ While the importance of ‘common interests’ is evident in con-
temporary theories of friendship, this community is first interpreted as a neces-
sary condition rather than as the true cause of friendship.11
To achieve this, (i) I will reconstruct the plot and the general argument of
Lysis to show the centrality of the problem of reciprocity in the dialogue, (ii) I
will endeavor to determine the nature of πρῶτον φίλον (218d5–220b7), respond-
ing to Yonesawa’s objections to knowledge as the sole ultimate object of desire;
(iii) focusing on passage 221d7–222b3, I will endeavor to show, in opposition to
Yonesawa, that reciprocal friendship is based on the common ‘belonging’ to the
authentic ultimate object of desire, i. e. knowledge of the good life; (iv) lastly, I
will conclusively present the results of this investigation.

Argument and Action in Lysis

In this section I will attempt to reconstruct the central lines of Lysis’ argument in
connection with its dramatic aspects.12 The work can be divided into three
dramatic sections: (I) a prologue (203a–207d), (II) the encounter and dialogue
between Socrates, Lysis and Menexenus (207d1–222d8) and (III) an epilogue
(222e1–223b8). The encounter in turn comprises four conversations interrupted

11 Cf. Helm (2017, esp. 1.3).

12 Understanding the interaction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what happens’ in the Platonic
dialogues is especially important in the case of Lysis, where action is intimately intertwined
with reasoning. Gadamer puts this principle of interpretation of Lysis into practice, alluding to
the Spartan ideal of consequence between logos (word) and ergon (action) (cf. Laches 193e) (cf.
Gadamer 1985, 171–174). Also, assuming this hermeneutical principle, González interprets the
change of meaning of the term οἰκεῖον (from “traditional belonging” [family] to “non-tradi-
tional,” i. e. philosophical) in the light of the dramatic close: the tutors, as representatives of the
parents, interrupt the philosophical dialogue that endangers the institution of the traditional
φιλία (cf. González 2000, 396). Finally, Bosch-Veciana interprets the full dialogue as the
“narrative of a Socratic dialogic συνουσία” (cf. Bosch-Veciana 2003, 25), that is, as an “encoun-
ter” that shows the absolute dependence between philosophical life and face-to-face practice of
friendship (28–29). Even though here I will focus more on the arguments than on the dramatic
aspects, attention to the drama will also serve to reinforce my interpretation.

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 5

respectively by an aporia: (II1) a first conversation between Socrates and Lysis

(207d1–210d8), (II2) a conversation between only Socrates and Menexenus
(211d8–213d5), (II3) a second between Socrates and Lysis (213d6–216b10) and
(II4) a third between the latter pair (216c1–222d8). In the following sections I
describe the argument, taking a succinct look at each of these parts.
(I) Socrates, as the dialogue’s narrator, tells us of his fortuitous encounter – on
his way from the Academy to the Lyceum, following the city’s outer wall – with
Hippothales, Ctesippus and other young people who are going to a newly built
palaestra. After being invited to join them, Socrates asks Hippothales “whom he
seeks” in the palaestra, which starts a first conversation about love (ἔρως) that will
serve as the framework for the dialogue’s central discussion.13
Hippothales, as Ctesippus relates in light of Hippothales’ mute embarrass-
ment, loves the boy Lysis.14 The young man has composed poems praising Lysis’
beauty, nobility and social status. From this description Socrates concludes that
Hippothales (a) hides, behind his supposed love, a love for himself, while at the
same time he (b) inevitably fails to flatter his beloved (205d5–e1). With Socrates
having revealed himself as an expert in the amorous art of recognizing beloved
and lover (204b7–c2), Hippothales asks Socrates to teach him how “to say and
do what is pleasing (προσφιλὴς) to the beloved” (206c3).
I would like to point out some consequences of this prologue for the
dialogue’s argument. Hippothales’ misfortune is that there is no reciprocation
from his beloved. The passage suggests two causes for this lack of reciprocity:
(a) love for oneself and (b) flattery. The overcoming of the first implies a
profound change of attitude (perhaps ceasing to value appearances – beauty,
nobility and social position – in the other).15 The overcoming of the second, on

13 The verb ἐράω (as well as the nouns and adjectives associated with it) is used during the
prologue (204b–206a) in Socrates’ self-declaration as a “lover of friends” (211d) and in the
application of the theory of desire to interpersonal relationships – in direct reference to
Hippothales (221b–222a). In the dialogue’s central passages, the verb φιλέω is used instead. It
does not seem to me that Lysis treats ἔρως and φιλία indifferently; I think rather that the first
serves as a dramatic framework for the treatment of the second. It is important to add, however,
that insofar as the term φιλία is not exclusive of ἔρως, it is possible to apply the friendship
model as belonging to the erotic relationship (since this can also be φιλία). Cf. for this Phaedrus’
speech in the Symposium (179b4–d3), where Alcestis’ ἔρως for Admetus presupposes a relation
of φιλία.
14 For an analysis of the cultural context and practice of Greek paiderastía, cf. Bordt (1998,
108–119).
15 Penner & Rowe interpret Hippothales’ deception as a confusion between the real good (the
true reference of desire) and apparent goods (cf. Penner and Rowe 2005, 210). For a critique of
this interpretation, cf. Dancy (2006, 337–342). It does not seem to me—as Penner & Rowe
suggest (206)—that Hippothales is deceived by “believing to love another when in fact he

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6 José Antonio Giménez

the other hand, just implies a change of strategy. Although these causes are
connected for Socrates, Hippothales seems to recognize only the second cause
(b), based on how much interest Socrates evokes in Lysis with this refutation.16
The question of reciprocity is thus established as a central point in the dialogue,
which will reach its resolution only when the understanding of friendship is
proposed as οἰκεῖον (221d7–222b3).
(II1) Based on the preceding passage, the first conversation between
Socrates and Lysis (207d1–210d8) bears witness to the success of the ‘refutation’
over ‘flattery’ in the art of loving. Both the description of Menexenus as Lysis’
“best companion” (μάλιστα ἑταῖρος) (206d4–5) and Socrates’ unsuccessful
attempt to start a conversation about friendship with Menexenus (207b8–c9)
herald a shift from Hippothales’ ἔρως (“erotic love”) to the treatment of φιλία in
general. The text seems to suggest that the friendship between Lysis and
Menexenus constitutes the paradigm of friendship that Socrates has in mind,
due to its being here – among equals – where reciprocity is typically expected.17
This does not mean, of course, that the term φιλία is not first approached in a
general way to refer to the relations between parents and children, and even to
unilateral affections, such as one might have for wine (212d7: φίλοινοι).18
In this first conversation, Socrates asks whether Lysis’ parents love their
son (207d6: φιλεῖ). One who seeks the happiness of the other allows the other to
do as he or she wishes (207e8: ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῇς); Lysis’ parents, however,
only allow him freedom of action in matters of which he has some knowledge
(209c1–2: ἐπίσταμαι) and can master himself (209d2–3: ἑαυτοῦ φρονεῖν).
Consequently, Socrates concludes, for being useless (ἄχρηστος) in some
respects, Lysis is not loved by his father. If, however, Lysis becomes wise
(σοφὸς), then all will be his friends and family (οἰκεῖοι), for his being useful
(χρήσιμος) and good (ἀγαθὸς) (210c7–d5).
Here, our attention should be directed to two points: (i) knowledge is
portrayed as a condition of happiness. The parents let the child act with

loves himself,” but rather because, by loving “false friends” (apparent goods) in the other, he is
not capable of truly loving the other.
16 Based on his final reaction, we can assume that Hippothales views himself as a genuine
lover and, as such, believes he is worthy of Lysis’ reciprocation. For a different interpretation of
this scene, cf. Gadamer (1985, 185).
17 Cf. for this also 211e8–212a7, where Socrates associates the boys with having experience
(ἔμπειρον) of a reciprocal friendship (σύ τε τοῦτον […] καὶαὖ οὗτος σέ). Although Rudebusch
affirms that in the Lysis Socrates does not propose an equality friendship based on his theory of
desire, he recognizes that here Socrates “does emphasize the equality between the boyhood
friends Lysis and Menexenus” (2006, 196).
18 This type of case leads Aristotle to differentiate φιλία from φίλησις. Cf. NE VIII, 1155b29–31.

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 7

autonomy when the child understands what he or she does and can ‘take
advantage’ of this knowledge for him/herself19; (ii) the conclusion of the pas-
sage, according to which Lysis is not loved by his parents due to his uselessness,
should be taken with some reservation.20 First, in this initial exchange, Socrates
attempts to take Lysis down a notch in order to show Hippothales how one’s
beloved should be treated and at the same time spark the boy’s interest in the
dialogue (210e–211a). The preponderance of these objectives alerts us to the
‘seriousness’ of the conclusion. Second, this conclusion is based on the state-
ment that “happiness is doing whatever you wish or desire” (207d8–208a1),21 a
statement that is right only if what you decide to do is truly a means to obtain
what you really want, that is, to be happy.22 And the only thing that guarantees
our making a right decision is knowledge. Therefore, insofar as Lysis does not
properly know through which means he will become happy, regardless of
whether his parents allow him to do whatever he wants or not, he is in fact
not really free to do whatever he wants. He cannot be truly happy until he learns
to master himself. It is thus clear that the fact that his parents do not let him do
whatever he wants does not imply that they do not love him, because they do
not restrict their son’s will when Lysis decides (with knowledge) to do what
benefits him. It is more reasonable to think that Lysis’ parents do desire his
happiness: they do not let him do what he wants only when leaving him to his
own devices would harm him. And if his parents want his happiness, Lysis must
be loved by them (207d6–7).23
(II2) Rather than being confused by the refutation, Lysis prompts Socrates to
perform the same dialogic exercise with his friend Menexenus. The question that

19 Jowett translates ἄχρηστος as “useless by them” (the parents would love Lysis for the
benefits that he provides). As Vlastos keenly points out, this translation overlooks the fact
that ἄχρηστος can mean both useless to others and to oneself (cf. Vlastos 1981, 8).
20 While some defend this conclusion (e. g. González 2000, 380–381; Rudebusch 2006, 190),
others interpret it as a reductio ad absurdum (e. g. Penner and Rowe 2005, 25–36; also, to a
certain extent Price 1990, 2–3).
21 Cf. Penner and Rowe (2005, 31–32).
22 The distinction between what you (really) want (boulesthai) and whatever seems best
(dokein) as means to achieve the first can be found in Gorgias (e. g. 466d6–e2). Even though
there is not such an explicit distinction in Lysis, it is, however, stated that if “we do whatever
seems best” (ποιεῖν τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα,) without having any knowledge, we will not obtain any
benefit (210b7–c4). Consequently, happiness (viz., what we really want) does not coincide
necessarily with whatever seems best in every case. If Lysis does whatever he wishes or desires
(in this passage the verbs boulesthai and epithymein are used indistinctly), that is, whatever he
thinks is the best way to become happy, it is of course not evident that he will with those means
obtain a happy life.
23 In opposition to this conclusion, cf. Dancy (2006, 327).

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8 José Antonio Giménez

will guide this new conversation is: is the friend the one who loves, the one who
is loved or both at the same time? (212a8–b2). The aporetic end of this exchange
seems to be explained by the lack of differentiation between relations of uni-
lateral love and reciprocal friendship.24 At this point in the dialogue there
appears at least one aspect of the reciprocity that friendship requires: it is not
possible to love the enemy, that is, the one who hates us – and, therefore, wants
to harm us (213b2–4) –. In a certain sense, as we shall see, the ultimate object of
desire ‘reciprocates,’ insofar as obtaining this object does us well. This ‘recipro-
city’ is not, however, what is expected of the friend who is a person: in this case
we want the ‘desire’ of the other to correspond to our same desire.
(II3) Faced with this new failure, Socrates turns again to Lysis, announcing a
change of perspective (213e3), and resorting to the authority of the poets and
cosmologists. The new discussion will focus on the type of relationship between
friends. Without entering into a discussion of the two theses in this passage
(“the like loves the like” and “the opposite loves the opposite”) (214a1–216b10),
there are two consequences that I want to emphasize: (i) the rejection of rela-
tions of opposition – and, therefore, relations of utility –, requires that there be a
certain equality in the sought-after friendship model25; (ii) to the extent that
‘self-sufficiency’ produces an absence of desire, equality of friends does not
seem to be an equality in perfection.26
(II4) The new aporia gives rise to the central argument of the dialogue
(216c1–222b2).27 The positive balance of the preceding discussion is that “the
beloved has to be good,” to which Socrates adds that “the subject of love is
neither good nor bad” (216e1–3).28

24 Price, following in the footsteps of Robinson (1986, 65–68), distinguishes three uses of the
term philos/on in this passage: (i) as ‘reciprocal’ friendship when using the term with a pair of
correlative pronouns (212a6: φίλος ἕτερος ἑτέρου), through the conjunction of the active and
passive modes of the verb philein (213a6–7: ὁ φιλῶν φίλος (…) ὁ φιλούμενος) or in plural (213a7:
ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν φίλων); (ii) meaning simply ‘loved’ or ‘dear’ in neutral and passive use, followed by
a personal dative (212e6: τὸ φιλούμενον ἄρα τῷ φιλοῦντι) or as a compound with phil- (212d5:
φίλιπποί); (iii) finally, the masculine and active use, followed by a genitive (213b5–6: τὸ φιλοῦν
ἂν εἴη φίλον τοῦ φιλουμένου) (1990, 3–4).
25 Cf. the connection that Aristotle makes between his love-utility and the relations between
opposites: Ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία (NE VIII 8,
1159b12–14). Cf. Price (1990, 12).
26 It is a mistake to interpret the friendship model in Lysis under Aristotelian categories, since
none of the three forms of friendship in this conception correspond to the Platonic model.
27 Socrates appeals here to an “inspiration” (216d4–6: ἀπομαντευόμενος (…) μαντεύομαι). This
resource serves Plato in some cases to introduce fundamental premises in the discussion
without needing to justify them. Cf. e. g. Philebus 20b6–7.
28 Cf. Gorgias 467e1–468a3. Henceforth: ‘the intermediate.’

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 9

We love the good because of the presence of evil in us (220d5–6: διὰ τὸ

κακὸν ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν) in relation to our bodies and souls (218b8–c1: κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν
καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα). So it is, for example, with those who love knowledge
(φιλοσοφοῦσιν) as a result of their awareness of their own ignorance (an evil
of the soul). Thus, those who investigate in such a way are neither good –
because they are not wise like the gods – nor bad – because at least they know
they do not know (218a3–b5).29
At this point of the argument Socrates introduces the doctrine of the ‘first
friend.’ He who loves something always loves it “because of something” (διά τι)
and “for the sake of something” (ἕνεκά του) (218d5–7). For example, a sick man
(who is ‘intermediate’) is the friend of the physician (or rather, the art of
medicine) because of his disease (a bad thing) and for the sake of health
(a good thing) (218e7–219a4). However, I can ask again: for the sake of what
do I love health?30 For this mode of questioning to end at some point, there
must be some first friend (πρῶτον φίλον) for the sake of which we love other
things (219c8). This, concludes Socrates, cannot be anything other than the good
(τὸ ἀγαθόν) (220b1–7).
Socrates will continue to refine the model presented, discarding the idea
that ‘the bad’ is the cause of love of the good. Rather, its origin is in “desire”
(221d2–3: ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία), which is ‘intermediate,’ in that it can lead
to both benefit and harm (221a7–b1). The cause of love thus is the “desire for the
good.” Now, one who desires is not only lacking (ἐνδεὲς) something but has had
something taken away (τι ἀφαιρῆται) that is his/her own or belongs to him/her
(τοῦ οἰκείου) (221d7–e5). Only here does Socrates pick back up the question of
reciprocity, referring to the boys’ friendship (221e6–7: ὑμεῖς ἄρα εἰ φίλοι ἐστὸν
ἀλλήλοις).31 One who desires, wants or loves another has to “in some way,
belong (οἰκεῖός) to the one he is feeling passion for, either in relation to the
soul or in relation to some characteristic of the soul, or ways or form (κατὰ τὴν
ψυχὴν ἢ κατά τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος).”32

29 Cf. Apology 21d-e; Symposium 204a-b.

30 Bordt holds that health (as well as virtue) is loved “both for itself and for happiness” (cf.
Bordt 1998, 207). The use of this Aristotelian distinction seems, however, out of place in Lysis.
31 The interpretation of these lines is important in order to understand the difference between
my interpretation of Lysis’ ‘strong’ reciprocity and Rudebusch’s. In accordance with the text, I
understand that the theory of desire that has been developed is now applied directly to Lysis’
and Menexenus’ friendship and, indirectly, to Hippothales as well. In this regard (in addition to
other considerations that will arise later), it seems reasonable to me to take the boys’ friendship
of equality as fundamental in the following explanation of reciprocal friendship.
32 Translation of Penner and Rowe (2005, 349).

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10 José Antonio Giménez

Socrates suggests that they test out this conclusion, taking into account the
aporias resulting from the previous analysis of the love between likes and
between opposites.33 Assuming that those who belong to each other can be
alike or not, he offers the boys two alternatives: (1) either “the good belongs to
everything and the bad to nothing” (2) or “the bad belongs to the bad,” “the
good to the good” and “the intermediate to the intermediate.” Lysis and
Menexenus lean towards (2), an alternative susceptible of all the criticisms of
friendship between those who are similar (214a1–215c2).34 However, as some
interpreters have rightly emphasized,35 alternative (1) can be broken down into
three variants: (1a) the good belongs to the good, (1b) the good belongs to the
bad and (1c) the good belongs to the intermediate, so that, if the boys had opted
for the last variant (1c) the internal contradiction would have been avoided.
(III) The epilogue connects the argumentative failure with the dialogical
one. Before Socrates can continue the conversation with an older youth, the
tutors of Lysis and Menexenus – irritated, speaking terrible Greek and possibly
drunk – dissolve the meeting (συνουσία). Socrates concludes the dialogue by

33 This test seems to be justified, because those who belong to each other have something in
common and, in this way, seem to be to some extent similar.
34 Rudebusch, however, distinguishes here three ‘disjunction eliminations’, that is, (1) either (a1)
there is or (b1) there is not a difference between what is οἰκεῖον and what is alike (222b3–6), (2)
either (a2) the good is οἰκεῖον to all and bad οἰκεῖον to nothing or (b2) good is οἰκεῖον to good, bad
to bad and what is intermediate to what is intermediate (222c3–7) and (3) premise a2 either (a3)
does not or (b3) does entail that none are friendly with the good but the good (222d5–d6)
(Rudebusch 2006, 194). I do not concur with this division for two reasons: first, even though
Lysis and Menexenus accept the option a1 presented in (1), Socrates eliminates the alternative
position (b1) before he offers the boys the disjunction; they simply give him the point. Therefore,
this disjunction is not relevant to understanding at which point Lysis and Menexenus (and
not Socrates) lead the dialogue into aporia. Second, the third and (for Rudebusch) decisive
disjunction (3) does not seem to be a new one (these lines do not have, as in (2), the structure
πότερον … ἢ), but rather a second argument against the alternative b2. If we suppose (as can be
derived from πρῶτον φίλον’s identification with the good [221c] and with what is οἰκεῖον
[221e]) that “being good and οἰκεῖον are the same thing” (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἂν ταὐτὸν
[…] εἶναι) – which does not mean the same thing as “the good is οἰκεῖον to all” (τἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον
[…] παντί), as Rudebusch assumes without justification, because the fact that only the good can
be the ultimate object of our desire does not entail that all are friends of the good (only the neither
good nor bad can be friend to the good) –, then from the three statements of b2 only the statement
that “the good is οἰκεῖον to good” (222d5–6) can be true, but this statement turns out to be as
incompatible with the earlier conclusions as the statement that “the bad is οἰκεῖον to the bad”
(222d3–4). Finally, I think it is incorrect to judge the alternative a2 (without any distinction) as
compatible with the Socratic theory of love. Rudebusch seems to acknowledge this when he adds
that “all – that is all who lack wisdom and know their lack – are φίλον to the wise” (2006, 195).
35 Cf. e. g. Yonesawa (2018, 10–13).

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 11

suggesting that the failure (in both senses) puts in question the self-declaration
of friendship of those present: “we think we’re friends of one another – for I
count myself too as one of you – but haven’t yet been able to find out what the
friend is.” (223b5–8).36
It seems to me that the final scene does not suggest that ‘knowledge’ of
friendship is a condition of its exercise, but rather that the ‘search’ for this
knowledge (as of other types of knowledge) is in itself friendship. To prove this
point we must analyze the central arguments in more detail.

Desire, Good and Wisdom

If we only stay with the Lysis, it remains unclear what the πρῶτον φίλον really
is. This has led some to ‘complement’ the description in the dialogue with other
Platonic works.37 Glaser, for example, identifies the πρῶτον φίλον with the Idea
of the Good in the more mature dialogues (e. g. Glaser 1935, 56–57). At the other
end of the spectrum, authors like Irwin – and, in a way, Yonesawa –, in trying to
free Lysis from the influence of other works, interpret the object of desire in a
purely formal way, so that it is possible to postulate a multiplicity of candidates
for it.38
The majority of the interpreters, however, agree on the possibility of a Socratic
candidate for πρῶτον φίλον that could also serve as predecessor to the ‘erotic rise’
of Platonic metaphysics. Three candidates have been proposed: happiness, virtue
and knowledge (e. g. Bordt 1998, 204–206). There is no doubt with regard to the
importance of these concepts for the so-called ‘Socratic ethics.’ Socrates bases his
ethics on the human desire for ‘happiness’. ‘Virtue’ is thus, on the one hand, not
only a good that must be chosen (Crito 48b3–c1; Apology 28b5–9), but also a
necessary and sufficient condition for happiness (Euthydemus 280a6–8; Gorgias
470e8–11). For its part, virtue consists of nothing other than the ‘knowledge’ of
living well (Protagoras 360d1–5; Charmides 165c4–6; Laches 194d1–2). In this
regard, it seems to me that, more than the choice of a certain candidate of desire
(in the strict sense, happiness is this candidate), what is at stake here is the

36 Translation of Penner and Rowe (2005, 351).

37 Cf. Bosch-Veciana (2003, 150–153) for this.
38 Only in the Euthydemus, Irwin believes, will the πρῶτον φίλον be identified with a single
candidate, namely, happiness (cf. Irwin 1995, 54–55). Cf. also Dancy (2006, 334).

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12 José Antonio Giménez

understanding of how a good life (i. e. a life of knowledge about the good) not
only leads to a happy life (as a means) but can also be identified with it.39
Let us now consider whether these concepts play a lead role in Lysis. First, it
should be noted that in 207d1–210d8 not only (i) is love placed in connection
with happiness, but also (ii) happiness is described as a result of knowledge.
Happiness and knowledge are thus interwoven in this theory of love, even
though it is not entirely clear here if ‘knowledge’ has only an instrumental
function with respect to happiness, and if it should be examined in a general
or specific way (such as knowledge of the good life). Second, we find the
contested digression on the love of wisdom (218a3–b5). This particular passage
has been used both (i) to defend the connection between knowledge and the
πρῶτον φίλον and (ii) to interpret friendship in Lysis from the paradigm of the
‘philosophical life.’40 For the purpose of this essay, I take on only the first of
these claims. To do so, I will concentrate next on Yonesawa’s recent challenge to
the consideration of this passage as a key to understanding the dialogue’s
argument.
The author’s first objection is based on three statements41: (i) the philoso-
phical digression (Ex. 3) must be read in the same way as the two examples that
accompany it (the presence of disease in the body [Ex. 1] and white in the hair
[Ex. 2]); (ii) ‘health,’ loved due to the presence of disease (Ex. 1), is not a πρῶτον
φίλον but one of its images (219d3: εἴδωλα); and (iii) whereas in the philoso-
phical digression the cause of love of knowledge is the presence (παρουσία) of
an evil (ignorance), the cause of love of the πρῶτον φίλον is the ‘intermediate’
desire.42 Of these statements, only (ii) is undeniable. For that which is affirmed
in (ii), for its part, to also be attributed to the philosophical digression, we must
suppose (i). However, even if (i) is affirmed, it is not yet clear why these
examples would be images or simulations of the πρῶτον φίλον. Only (iii) gives
a reason for this.
Even though Socrates upholds (iii), he then retracts this assertion. If the bad
were ‘the cause’ of love, without the bad there would be ‘nothing loved.’
Because this cannot be so – since human needs are natural and not always
forced by evil – the cause of love is desire and not evil. Socrates is not thinking

39 For the connection between the thesis of the coincidence between happiness and virtue, and
the intellectualist thesis, cf. Gómez-Lobo (1998, 146–148). On the other hand, for a more
instrumental conception of virtue, cf. Irwin (1995, 68).
40 As Bordt, González and Bosch-Veciana do. Cf. above n. 8.
41 I will not take into account Yonesawa’s objection to the way that Penner & Rowe interpret
passage 207d1–210d8, insofar as it seems to me that the former is correct in accusing the latters
of taking their interpretation too far.
42 Cf. Yonesawa (2018, 16).

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 13

(as Yonesawa suggests) that there are good things that are loved as a result of
evil and others that are loved as a result of desire, but rather that all are loved
because of the latter (220e6–221d6). The differentiation that Socrates really
seems to make here is one between the desire that is awakened by an accidental
evil (e. g. a disease) and the one that is born of a natural ‘evil or deprivation’
(e. g. hunger). Only in this last case can we consider it ‘intermediate,’ in that the
desire will be harmful or beneficial according to its satisfaction; but in neither
case will the cause be evil or deprivation, even when the desire requires the
perception of a ‘need’ to be woken up.43 Thus, it is clear that knowledge is also
loved because of desire.
At this point, it is worth asking if ignorance is a natural or accidental
deprivation. To answer this, we must pay attention to the equating of the
examples proposed by Yonesawa (i). The case of dyed or white hair (Ex. 2)
should be separated from the others, because it is not strictly speaking a case of
“love,” but rather a distinction between the ‘presence’ that (completely) affects
the nature of the recipient and that which does not (217c3–e3). Only in the
second case is it possible to love, because the desire of the opposite state can
be awakened. What remains, therefore, is to consider the remaining examples.
They are analogous, one in relation to the body (Ex. 1) and the other to the soul
(Ex. 3).
In fact, in what follows Socrates will treat ‘body and soul’ as the two
realities in relation to which we as ‘intermediates’ love the good (218b8–c2;
220c1–4). These realities are not, however, on the same level, insofar as – as we
shall see later – only what is ‘related to the soul’ is relevant for determining the
true friend.44 In this regard, the reduction of health to an “image or false friend”
(ii) is not only due its origin as disease, but also to the fact that it is the
elimination of a bodily need – it seems clear that the ‘satiety’ of hunger cannot
be taken for a πρῶτον φίλον, either. On the other hand, the ‘ignorance of the
soul’ – when it is not stupidity (218a7: ἀγνώμονες) – seems to correspond to the
natural state of the human soul (we are born without knowing), which is
emphasized by the contrast with divine nature (218a3). In this way, love for
knowledge is caused by a desire of the soul, awakened by the ‘awareness’ of not
knowing, which is the condition of human nature.
Let us pay a short look at Yonesawa’s second objection. At this point, he
rejects the identification of knowledge with the πρῶτον φίλον because
(a) “knowledge is a permanent possession of the gods” and (b) “there is nothing
better in the universe than the gods” (argument by Penner and Rowe 2005, 275).

43 A systematic development of this causal process can be found in Philebus 34d1–35d10.

44 Cf. Lysis 222a2–3.

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14 José Antonio Giménez

While it is true that these theses are not explicit in the dialogue, it is striking that
Yonesawa rejects them so easily and later emphasizes the consistency of Lysis
with the Apology, where it is suggested that divinity possesses real knowledge in
contrast to limited human knowledge (23a5–6: τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι)45 and
is superior to man (29b6–7; 29d2–4). I agree with Yonesawa, however, that one
cannot conclude from the brief reference to divinity in Lysis – with Penner &
Rowe – that “the ultimate object of human desire is divinization,” a thesis that is
based on presuppositions from later Platonic metaphysics (e. g. Theaetetus
176a5–b2). But neither should it be overlooked that ascribing ‘knowing’ to the
gods gives this candidate a dignity superior to that of the other possible candi-
dates that appear in the dialogue.
Considering these passages together (207d1–210d8 and 218a3–b5) makes
knowledge the most suitable candidate to fulfill the function of πρῶτον φίλον.
The various examples presented do not permit us to join Yonesawa and Irwin in
deducing that there is a “plurality of first friends,” because more than being
cases of the ‘first friend,’ these serve an analogous understanding (220a7: “Does
not the same argument [λόγος] then apply to the [first] friend?”). It is true that
the text is not completely clear and explicit about the nature of πρῶτον φίλον.
However, if it is about determining the most likely candidate, it seems difficult to
propose a better one than knowledge.

Belonging and Reciprocity

The reference to οἰκεῖον as the ultimate determination of the ‘first friend’ coincides
in the dialogue with the return to the issue of reciprocity. Socrates again directs
his attention to the ‘paradigmatic friendship’ of Lysis and Menexenus (221e5–6).
Now, to understand how this concept is used in the final dialogue’s argument, it is
necessary to undertake two preliminary considerations: (i) οἰκεῖον is already used
in 210c7–d5 with a meaning different from the common one, which has caught the
attention of some interpreters46: while οἰκεῖοι refers here, on the one hand (as a
noun), to relationships with natural ‘belonging’ (i. e. relatives), on the other (as an
adjective), it goes beyond this field of belonging – only the ‘wise’ become the
‘family’ of another –. This relationship of ‘unnatural belonging’ is finally revealed
as a “(new) relation of natural belonging” (φύσει οἰκεῖον) (221d7–222b3). (ii) In this
passage οἰκεῖον ends up explaining two ‘relations of belonging:’ that of the

45 Cf. Yonesawa (2018, 21) and Apology 42a3–5. For this parallel cf. also Rudebusch (2004, 71).
46 Cf. González (2000, 379, n. 4).

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 15

subject of the friendship with the πρῶτον φίλον and that of the latter with the
beloved person.47 This double relation of belonging is what allows Socrates to
move from a general model of desire to one of friendship as a relationship of
reciprocal love.
Now let us consider these types of relationships. The πρῶτον φίλον as an
object of desire ‘belongs’ to the one who desires it to the extent that he or she
has been deprived of it. To understand this, Pindar’s maxim helps: “become who
you (really) are” (Pythians 2.72).48 The ultimate object of desire, as the definitive
realization of your possibilities, ‘belongs’ to your own being.49 And, it seems, as
we have tried to show, what satisfies this desire is a life of knowledge.
It is more difficult, however, to explain the relationship of belonging in
interpersonal relationships. Vlastos, for example, proposes a ‘selfish explana-
tion’ of this phenomenon: the ‘friend’ would not properly be an οἰκεῖον, but
rather a means in the chain of ‘false friends’ that lead to the πρῶτον φίλον.50
Rudebusch, as we already mentioned, contends that the path from non-symme-
trical desire to symmetrical belonging can be explained if we assume that
although the beloved as ‘good’ cannot reciprocate the other’s desire with
needy love, he could reciprocate to the lover with benevolence or giving love.
Other interpreters, in contrast, have recognized in the ‘double relation of belong-
ing’ – rather than a means-ends relation or a required reciprocation of a uniteral
desire – friends’ ‘common’ belonging to the same object of desire.51 Friends
share the ‘same deprivation’ and, in this way, the ‘same longing.’ As noted in
the introduction, this position requires that the third party among the friends be
of a character that allows them to belong to each other. We defended in the
previous section that this candidate is knowledge. Now it is appropriate to

47 Cf. Robinson (1986, 76).

48 The coined maxim does not express exactly the same as Pindar’s text: “becomes as you are,
just as you have learned” (γένοι᾽ οἷος ἐσσὶμαθών).
49 In the Republic we find the description of the relationship between the soul and “its (own)
good” as a relation of ‘belonging’ (IX 586d4–587a1).
50 Cf. Vlastos (1981, 7). Vlastos (1981, 26 and 30) interprets the erotic rise of the Symposium in a
similar way. This has earned him the recent criticism of Sheffield, who proposes we understand
Diotima’s discourse as an explanation of desire rather than as a justification of interpersonal
love (cf. Sheffield 2012, 127–130). Regarding Lysis (even if Sheffield does not consider this
dialogue in her critique nor does she recognize its euporetic results [cf. Sheffield 2017, 96]),
the same precision could be made: in a theory of desire, interpersonal relations are not at stake
the way that individual self-realization is. However, it would be possible to note a difference
with regard to the Symposium’s project: Lysis seeks a way to coordinate the desire for happiness
with reciprocal friendship.
51 For example, Bordt (1998, 93) and González (2000, 394–395). A variation of this position is
found in Schleiermacher (1996, 95) and in Gadamer (1985).

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16 José Antonio Giménez

consider how this third party gives rise to reciprocal friendship. Insofar as
Yonesawa has also directed his criticisms against this notion of reciprocity
(2018, 17–20), in what follows I will confront his different objections.
I think it is possible to synthesize Yonesawa’s objections (addressed to
different authors) into three: (i) the text does not indicate that the subjects of
desire (in this case, Lysis and Menexenus) are deprived of the same object;
(ii) even if the object of desire is the same, it is also not justified to affirm that
those who desire the same thing belong to each other, since the desire of the
οἰκεῖον is always one-sided. Moreover, if the love of the οἰκεῖον demands recipro-
city, the (unreciprocated) love of parents for their children cannot be explained.
And (iii) for many, the pursuit of the same goal makes them competitors rather
than friends. In particular, the pursuit of knowledge in Lysis and other dialogues
does not seem to increase the friendship of the participants. In contrast, other
shared activities, such as war and politics, can be just as or more successful in
this regard. In what follows I will make reference to each of these points.
(i) Yonesawa argues that there are multiple ultimate objects of desire. We
know, however, that not everything can fulfill this function: (a) not ‘health,’ as a
corporal good, (b) nor the object of an accidental evil, (c) nor the satisfaction
that does not benefit the subject of desire (221a8–b1: ὠφελίμως ἐπιθυμεῖν) can
be identified as the ‘first friend.’ Assuming these limitations, Yonesawa justifies
the existence of multiple objects of desire in the affirmation that the friend
belongs to the other “either in relation to the soul (in general) or in relation to
some characteristic of the soul, ways or form” (222a2–3: κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατά
τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος).52 The author assumes here, in line with
the Penner & Rowe translation, that the different items listed are qualifications
of the soul.53 Although Yonesawa does not try to determine the content of these
items, we must look for some clue in the dialogue to understand their meaning.

52 Cf. Yonesawa (2018, 20–21).

53 Penner & Rowe have τῆς ψυχῆς depend not only on ἦθος, but also on τρόπους ἢ εἶδος. (For
the predication of τρόποι and ἤθη as components of the soul, cf. Symposium 207e2). However, it
is clear that the term εἶδος can also refer to the ‘physical appearance,’ that is, to beauty. This is
in fact the meaning of the term in the description of Lysis in 204e5–6 (cf. also Charmides 154d4–
e7). Penner & Rowe suggest that Socrates intentionally makes use of this ambiguity (physical
εἶδος and εἶδος relating to the soul) to test the authentic reference of Hippothales’ love (2005,
166–167). Bolotin, for his part, sees in this use a reference to the ‘parts’ of the soul of the middle
dialogues (1979, 61, n. 83). This interpretation seems exaggerated to me. The list seems to be
divided in the consideration of the soul as everything (κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν) and its more specific
consideration (κατά τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος) according to characteristics, modes
and forms. For the ‘non-physical’ use of εἶδος in the early dialogues, cf. Euthyphro 6d9–e6 and
Laches 191d2–3.

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 17

Again, the only textual basis that we have to understand the function of
these items of the soul is the previous reference to the soul as one of the realities
in relation to which the person (the ‘intermediate’), because of the presence of
an evil, is “friend of the good” (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον) (218b–c; 220c). In this
context, the good of the soul is identified with knowledge and its evil with
ignorance. On the other hand, the items of the soul indicated in 222a2–3 refer to
persons (i. e. souls) and, particularly, to the ‘subject of love,’ that is, to that
person who is deprived of οἰκεῖον. This makes it plausible to think that a subject
(A) is friend of a subject (B) without there currently existing οἰκεῖον in B as the
ultimate object of the desire of A. This is the reason, it seems to me, that
interpersonal ‘belonging’ takes place only “in a certain way” (πῃ). In this
sense, the aforementioned items of the soul may correspond to – before the
possession of knowledge itself – certain dispositions of the soul that make the
search for knowledge possible (which is in accordance, in any case, with
‘Socratic knowledge’).54 It is thus possible to agree with Yonesawa regarding
the plurality of items of the soul that set the stage for knowledge (I am thinking
here of the different virtues), save the unity of the ultimate object of desire.
Eventually, those who love justice and those who love bravery (without taking
into account if they are already just and brave) share in the same value, i. e.
knowledge about how to live well. Interpersonal belonging does not consist in
loving someone that possesses our own good (what belongs by nature to us), but
in sharing with the other a deprivation of the same value or good. Therefore, a
friend belongs to us (οἰκεῖον) only “in a certain way”, that is, only because
he/she shares with me in the same value. One who shares with other in the same
value realizes that he/she is deprived of (or belongs to) the same good and, as
we shall see later, is able (with knowledge) to distinguish a false friend from a
true one.
(ii) Yonesawa questions that ‘belonging’ to the ‘first friend’ generates reci-
procity among friends. To address this objection, we must consider the meaning
of οἰκεῖον in lines 221e3–7. After pointing out the ‘deprived’ character of desire,
Socrates argues that (1) love, friendship and desire are “of what belongs to
(them)” (τοῦ οἰκείου) (221e3–5), based on which he concludes (ἄρα) that
(2) “you (Lysis and Menexenus), if you’re friends to each other, in some way
naturally belong (οἰκεῖοί ἐσθ᾽) the one to the other” (221e5–6).55 Yonesawa
recognizes that in (1) and (2) the meaning of οἰκεῖον is not the same: in (1) it

54 Cf. Apology 23a7: ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία.

55 For passage 221e3–222a7, I use Penner & Rowe’s translation.

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18 José Antonio Giménez

is about a unilateral desire of the subject (A) for the object (X), whereas in (2) it
is about a reciprocal desire between subjects (A) and (B).56 To explain this
change, Yonesawa proposes that: A (Menexenus) loves X, because X is οἰκεῖον
of A, so that A will love B (Lysis), if B possesses X; but, insofar as human
friendship should be mutual, B also loves A due to A possessing Y, Y being
οἰκεῖον of B (2018, 8–9). Reciprocal friendship would thus be the product of the
concurrence between two unilateral wishes (viz. A loves X and B loves Y).
In my opinion, Yonesawa’s solution can be refuted if we pay attention to the
passage’s closing lines (221e7–222a7). Socrates adds that it is a condition of love
to be “in some way belong[ing] to the one he is feeling passion for” (οἰκεῖός πῃ
τῷ ἐρωμένῳ) (221e7–222a2). Here οἰκεῖός is not only used in sense (2), but it
refers to the ‘lover’ and not the ‘beloved,’ that is, it is about a ‘requirement’ of
reciprocity.57 The formulation is quite clear in this regard: A would never be (οὐκ
ἄν ποτε) friend of B, if A were not (εἰ μὴ) (in a certain sense) οἰκεῖός of B. This
requirement can, however, be understood in two ways: (a) A is friend of B (that
is, A loves B), but being aware that B does not reciprocate this friendship, he no
longer wants to be his friend; (b) A believes himself to be a friend of B, but when

56 Cf. Yonesawa (2018, 6).

57 Rudebusch, as we know, also recognizes this requirement of reciprocation, but he under-
stands the relations of belonging as relations of ‘dependence’ (cf., 2004, 70, 2006, 193). He
supposes, on the one hand, that the ‘wise’ (or ‘philosopher’: 2006, 197) can be identified with
the ‘good’ as the ultimate object of desire and, on the other, that all who lack wisdom and know
their lack have needy love for the wise. That seems questionable, because the philosopher is
explicitly mentioned as an example of ‘intermediate’ and not of a ‘good’ (218a3–b5). Although
Rudebusch avoids identifying the philosopher in these lines, he recognizes (taking into con-
sideration Socratic wisdom: Apology 23a) that the philosopher has needy love for wisdom and, at
the same time, requited giving love for nonphilosophers. That implies the existence of two
classes of wisdom: a ‘prudential’ wisdom (what philosophers possess) and a ‘divine’ wisdom
(what they lack) (2016, 197). Philosophers would be also both ‘intermediate’ and ‘good’. But if
philosophers are, to some extent, ‘intermediate’, nonphilosophers cannot really satisfy their
desire of being benefited by philosophers, because nonphilosophers will desire something else
(i. e. divine wisdom) as soon as they convert to philosophy. A philosopher is thus a means to
something else and not the ultimate object of desire (the πρῶτον φίλον). ‘Giving love’ is, on the
other hand, not very present in the Lysis – here Rudebusch mostly appeals to other Platonic
dialogues – and when it is, it is not precisely to explain reciprocity (parents’ love for their
children is not always reciprocated: 212e). Moreover, it does not seem convincing that the
motivation to become wise (if we take Socrates’ argumentation of 207d1–210d8 as Lysis’
“explicit doctrine of love” [2006, 188]) consists in being beloved by others, which if true
would encourage Lysis to be a (needy) lover of needy lovers, and not a lover of wisdom.
Taking these difficulties into account, it seems better to explain friendship’s requirement of
reciprocation appealing only to one kind of love (our desire for happiness) and avoiding the
identification of πρῶτον φίλον with persons or their properties.

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 19

finding out that this is not reciprocated, he realizes that he never was a friend of
B. The argument’s conclusion, “the genuine lover, one who’s not pretended (τῷ
γνησίῳ ἐραστῇ καὶ μὴ προσποιήτῳ), is loved (φιλεῖσθαι) by his beloved” (ὑπὸ
τῶν παιδικῶν) (222a5–7), corroborates that the second option better explains the
meaning of this line.58 Reciprocity is explicitly said to be here a ‘result’ of a
particular form of loving (a ‘genuine’ form) and not a mere coincidence of
desires. It is reasonable to think that this love is genuine because it corresponds
to a determined object of love (the ‘true or first friend’) and that, in this sense,
the coincidence in the search for the same object predisposes souls to reciprocal
friendship. Reciprocity will not be required of other types of ‘familiarities or
belongings’ (those based on ‘false friends’), but it will be required of this type.
This requirement may seem radical, but this is what Socrates is proposing
here.59
Regarding the love of parents for their children, it is clear that – as
Yonesawa himself points out – the type of love involved in this passage is one
that requires reciprocity, that is, the friendship relationship (and, in a certain
sense, erotic love). This is the reason that οἰκεῖον applies – beyond its traditional
meaning – to ‘belonging or familiarity’ in the soul. Indeed, a relation of οἰκεῖον,
different from that coined here by Socrates, might not be symmetrical.60
(iii) Finally, let us consider whether the common pursuit of knowledge
especially serves friendship. Yonesawa questions, in particular, whether philo-
sophical activity serves as a paradigm of mutual cooperation. I would like to
consider three things in this regard. Firstly, Socrates seems to associate here the
‘competitiveness’ in friendship with the pursuit of ‘false friends,’ that is, those
goods whose attainment will not make you really happy. We find this associa-
tion in Socrates’ unsuccessful first conversation with Menexenus (207b8–c9),
where the former interrogates the latter about who (he or Lysis) is greater,
nobler, more beautiful and richer. There are two significant revelations in this
brief conversation: first, Menexenus reveals that these (viz. those who are
greater, nobler, etc.) are topics of discussion between them (207c1–2:
ἀμφισβητοῦμεν) and, second, once interrupted, Socrates reveals to us that he

58 In this sense, Hippothales has no reason to be overjoyed, since his love, deceived, has been
directed at the ‘apparent goods’ (or ‘false friends’) in the beloved. Yonesawa does not seem to
consider the meaning of these dramatic details (cf. Yonesawa 2018, 20).
59 Lysis’ clear reticence seems to indicate that he understands the radical consequences of this
passage (222a4).
60 I do not agree in this sense with Bordt, who affirms that parental love plays a paradigmatic
role here for the understanding of true friendship (cf. Bordt 1998, 80), even though it also does
not seem to me, like González, that the transformation of οἰκεῖον implies the subversion of the
traditional institutions of the φιλία (cf. González 2000, 396).

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20 José Antonio Giménez

hoped to ask, “who of the two was the most just and the wisest” (207d1–2). The
underlying “competitiveness” among the friends is corroborated by Lysis’ later
recognition that his friend is “argumentative” (211b8: ἐριστικός) and “not easy”
(211c4: οὐ ῥᾴδιον). Knowledge, on the other hand, as the object of shared desire,
makes the help of the other necessary (via dialogue), even though, at times, the
adversary’s desire to refute replaces a true interest in knowledge.61 Secondly,
while it is true that ‘Socratic dialogue’ can sometimes generate discord rather
than friendship, this is due to the poor character of the interlocutors rather than
to the dialogical exercise itself. Those who become irritated by Socrates reveal
their incapacity for philosophical friendship and those who do not overcome the
discomfort of refutation do not understand that overcoming ignorance, rather
than an evil, is of the greatest benefit – they show therefore that their character
is philonikos not philosophos –. In this sense, Socrates behaves like a true friend
when he leads the interlocutor to the aporia. Thirdly, I agree with Yonesawa that
other forms of life that share common values, such as military life and political
life, can lead to true friendship. But I do not find it necessary to take on another
candidate beyond knowledge to defend this possibility. For this purpose, how-
ever, one must understand ‘knowledge’ in a Socratic sense and not in the strictly
Platonic sense of philosophical life. The Socratic conception of a life of knowl-
edge consists of nothing more than putting one’s own opinions to the test and
constantly seeking a better foundation for them. Now, since all the virtues are
ultimately types of knowledge for a good life, military life (for courage) and
political life (for justice) can constitute true friendships. In this way, the unity of
πρῶτον φίλον can be saved, allowing for a plurality of lives according to the
different virtues, all of them based in knowledge.62

Conclusion
In this paper I have endeavored to present the theory of friendship in Lysis as
one that harmonizes the dependence of all human affection on the desire for
happiness with the intrinsically reciprocal character of friendship. The harmo-
nization of these two principles is possible if happiness is identified as an object

61 The same could possibly be thought of wealth – since “friends have goods in common”
(207c10–11); however, if we take wealth as the ultimate object of friendship, not only will we be
deceived (cf. 220a1–5), but there will be no guarantee of mutual help. The truth is ‘naturally’ of
shared belonging, while (material) goods, on the other hand, are not.
62 Yonesawa approaches an interpretation of this kind but does not recognize the ‘one’ of the
plurality of good things of the soul (cf. Yonesawa 2018, 13).

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 Friendship, Knowledge and Reciprocity 21

of desire for which friends can share a longing, prioritizing cooperation in the
achievement of the common goal over competition. The only suitable candidate
for this objective is knowledge – understood in Socratic terms as knowledge of
the good life.
To defend this interpretation, I decided to respond to the different objections
Yonesawa has recently made. On the one hand, although it is true that the
association of the ‘first friend’ with ‘knowledge’ is not unequivocally evident in
Lysis, the interpretation of some passages of the dialogue in connection with the
central argument and in the light of some fundamental doctrines of the early
dialogues allows justification for this association. Moreover, the objections
against a ‘strong’ conception of reciprocity are not sufficiently convincing if
one reads the passage about οἰκεῖον in detail. In this way, the conception of
friendship as a common longing is shown as the position most consistent with
the requirement of reciprocity in friendship.
My opposition to Yonesawa’s reading does not imply, however, that I do not
share some fundamental questions in his criticism of the ‘teleological monism’
associated with philosophical life. Indeed, the interpretation of Lysis as a ‘pro-
treptic’ dialogue for a philosophical life not only excludes other forms of friend-
ship, but also blurs the differences between a dialogue from the early period and
the erotic dialogues of the middle period. However, as I have pointed out, it is not
necessary to take on a strong (or Platonic) perspective of the ‘intellectual life’ to
sustain the unity of the ultimate object of desire. ‘Knowledge’ in the Socratic
sense, as knowledge of the good life, is not exclusive of non-philosophical ways of
life – which does not prevent philosophical life, as a life dedicated exclusively to
dialogue, from serving as a paradigm for other forms of friendship –. It should be
added, lastly, that a friendship based on the ‘common desire for knowledge’ better
coincides with Socratic knowledge than a friendship arranged based on the
possession of good things in the other. In this way, it is not necessary to use
the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of the middle dialogues to
explain Lysis’ friendship theory.
Lysis is undoubtedly a dialogue of great interest for understanding the
theory of desire that Plato develops in later dialogues. However, the most
valuable part of this dialogue is that it provides a model of understanding of
friendship that, even when it is enveloped in the project of a good life, neither
makes use of the friend as a ‘means’ for obtaining one’s own good nor conceives
of the friend as ‘end’ of one’s own desire for happiness. Its concept of double
belonging (to the object of desire and to the friend) makes the accusation that
Platonic friendship is ‘egoistic’ or ‘utilitarian’ in comparison with Aristotelian

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22 José Antonio Giménez

friendship misplaced.63 While it is clear that here we are not arriving at a

conception of friendship as wanting the good of the other for his own sake,64
‘friendship due to belonging’ cannot be a friendship caused by pleasure or
utility either. In friendship there is always something more at stake (that
which belongs to us or what is ours), which, however, cannot be reached
beyond the friend (since it is, ultimately, a ‘shared value’).65 It is on this
desiderative and affective plane where we can understand the Platonic concep-
tion of friendship.66

Funding: This work was supported by the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo

Científico y Tecnológico, (Grant Number: Fondecyt Post-Doctoral Project N°
3160472, Funder Id: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002850).

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