Asian Education and Development Studies

Learning from Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy: Policy

recommendations for South Korea
Jon S.T. Quah
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Effective
Learning from Singapore’s anti-corruption
effective anti-corruption strategy strategy

Policy recommendations for South Korea

Jon S.T. Quah 17
Anti-corruption Consultant, Singapore
Received 11 July 2016
Revised 20 August 2016
Accepted 5 September 2016
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing corruption and to
recommend three measures for enhancing South Korea’s anti-corruption strategy.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper compares the contextual differences between Singapore and
South Korea before analysing Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy and identifying the weaknesses
of South Korea’s anti-corruption strategy.
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Findings – Singapore’s success in minimising corruption is the result of its government’s strong political will
and the adequate budget, personnel and operational autonomy given to the Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau to enable it to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. To improve South Korea’s anti-corruption
strategy, the Korea Anti-Corruption Agency should be established and adequately staffed and funded to
investigate corruption cases. Those found guilty of corruption offences should be punished according to the
law, without suspending their jail sentences or being pardoned by the president. Finally, the existing public
outreach anti-corruption programmes should be evaluated to identify their weaknesses and improve their
effectiveness.
Originality/value – This paper recommends three measures for South Korean policy-makers to improve
their anti-corruption strategy by learning from Singapore’s success.
Keywords Singapore, South Korea, Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission,
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
Corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries according to Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2015. However, Singapore is an
exception as it is the least corrupt Asian country on the CPI from 1995 to 2015. Singapore
was ranked eighth among 168 countries with a score of 85 on the CPI in 2015. By contrast,
corruption remains a chronic problem in South Korea as it was ranked 37th with a CPI score
of 56 in 2015. Table III in the next section confirms that Singapore’s perceived extent of
corruption is lower than that of South Korea’s, according to eight indicators.
Why has Singapore succeeded in minimising corruption while South Korea has failed to
do so? How can South Korean policy-makers improve their anti-corruption strategy from
analysing Singapore’s experience in combating corruption? This paper addresses these
questions by comparing the policy contexts in both countries before analysing their
anti-corruption strategies.

Policy contexts of Singapore and South Korea

Table I indicates that Singapore’s policy context is more favourable than South Korea’s for
combating corruption for six reasons. First, South Korea is 138 times larger in land
area than Singapore. Second, South Korea’s population of 50.4 million is nine times larger
than Singapore’s population of 5.4 million. Third, both countries were colonised but Asian Education and Development
Singapore was a British colony for nearly 140 years except for the Japanese occupation Studies
Vol. 6 No. 1, 2017
pp. 17-29
The author would like to thank Professor Jin-Wook Choi and Professor Robert Gregory for their © Emerald Publishing Limited
2046-3162
constructive feedback on an earlier version of this paper. DOI 10.1108/AEDS-07-2016-0058
 AEDS Indicator Singapore South Korea Difference
6,1
Land area 719.1 sq. km 99,274 sq. km × 138 times
Population 5,469,724 50,423,955 × 9 times
Colonial legacy British (1819-1959) Mongols (1259-1392) –
Japanese (1942-1945) Japanese (1905-1945)
GDP per capita US$56,284 US$27,970 × 2 times
18 Political system Parliamentary democracy Presidential democracy –
Voice and accountability −0.1 (45.3) 0.7 (69.0) − 23.7
Political stability 1.2 (92.2) 0.2 (53.9) + 38.3
Government effectiveness 2.2 (100) 1.2 (86.5) + 13.5
Rule of law 1.9 (95.2) 0.98 (80.8) + 14.4
Regulatory quality 2.2 (100) 1.11 (83.7) + 16.3
Table I.
Corruption control 2.1 (97.1) 0.49 (69.7) + 27.4
Policy contexts of
Singapore and South Governance (total percentile rank) 529.8 443.6 + 86.2
Korea, 2014 Sources: World Bank (2015a, b)
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(February 1942-August 1945) while South Korea was colonised by the Mongols for
113 years and the Japanese for 40 years (Quah, 2011, pp. 202, 311). Fourth, Singapore’s GDP
per capita of US$56,284 is double that of South Korea’s GDP per capita of US$27,970. Fifth,
both countries have democratic political systems, with Singapore being a parliamentary
democracy while South Korea is a presidential democracy. Finally, the total percentile rank
for Singapore for the World Bank’s six governance indicators in 2014 is 529.8, which is
much higher than South Korea’s 443.6. Except for voice and accountability, Singapore’s
performance on the other five indicators is much better than South Korea’s performance.
Singapore’s policy context is conducive for curbing corruption because Singapore is
smaller than South Korea in land area and population, which means that, there would be fewer
corruption cases to investigate and easier to enforce the anti-corruption laws in Singapore
than South Korea. Singapore has benefited from British colonial rule with the introduction of
meritocracy in recruiting and promoting civil servants with the Public Service Commission’s
formation in January 1951. British colonial rule also introduced anti-corruption measures
in Singapore, beginning with making corruption an offence in 1871, followed by enacting
the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance in December 1937, and culminating in replacing the
Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Singapore Police Force with the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in October 1952 (Quah, 2007, pp. 6, 9-16).
The most important difference between Singapore and South Korea is the quality of their
governance. Shah (2007, p. 243) contends that a country’s incidence of corruption is related
to its quality of governance as “countries with high corruption have a low quality of
governance, those with medium corruption have fair governance, and those with low
corruption have good governance”. Table II confirms that Singapore’s quality of governance
is better than South Korea’s because its total percentile rank for the World Bank’s six
governance indicators from 2012 to 2014 is higher and South Korea’s CPI scores have

Governance (total percentile rank) CPI rank and score

Year Singapore South Korea Singapore South Korea
Table II. 2012 526.05 435.88 5/176 (87/100) 45/176 (56/100)
Governance quality
2013 540.21 436.30 5/177 (86/100) 46/177 (55/100)
and CPI performance
of Singapore and 2014 529.81 443.53 7/175 (84/100) 43/175 (55/100)
South Korea, 2012-2014 Sources: Transparency International (2016) and World Bank (2015a)
 lagged behind Singapore’s CPI scores by 29 to 31 for the same period. Singapore’s good Effective
governance is reflected in its lower incidence of corruption and its effectiveness in anti-corruption
minimising corruption. Conversely, South Korea’s fair quality of governance is reflected in strategy
its higher incidence of corruption and its limited effectiveness in corruption control.
The lower incidence of corruption in Singapore is also confirmed by its performance on
six other indicators, as shown in Table III. Singapore was ranked first among 16 countries
with a score of 1.67 in the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) 2016 survey on 19
corruption. South Korea was ranked eighth with a score of 6.17 in the same survey.
Singapore’s rankings and scores on the five indicators in The Global Competitiveness Report
2015-2016 are also higher than those of South Korea’s.

Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy

Singapore has minimised corruption because of the People’s Action Party (PAP)
government’s strong political will and the provision of adequate personnel, budget and
operational independence to enable the CPIB to enforce the Prevention of Corruption Act
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(POCA) impartially, regardless of the offenders’ status, position or political affiliation.

Unlike South Korea, corruption offenders in Singapore are punished according to the law,
without suspending their jail sentences or being pardoned by the president.

PAP government’s strong political will

The PAP government’s strong political will is reflected in the increase in the CPIB’s
personnel and budget from 2008 to 2014. Table IV shows that the CPIB’s per capita

Indicator Singapore South Korea

Control of corruption 2014a 2.1 (97.1) 0.49 (69.7)

PERC annual survey 2016b 1/16 (1.67) 8/16 (6.17)
c
Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 8/168 (85) 37/168 (56)
Diversion of public funds 2015d 6.1/7 (4/140) 3.4/7 (66/140)
Irregular payments and bribes 2015d 6.6/7 (3/140) 4.5/7 (46/140)
Organised crime 2015d 6.5/7 (5/140) 4.6/7 (83/140)
e
Ethical behaviour of firms 2015 6.1/7 (4/140) 3.6/7 (95/140)
e
Public trust in politicians 2015 6.3/7 (1/140) 2.5/7 (94/140)
Notes: aThe score ranges from − 2.5 to + 2.5, with the percentile rank indicated in brackets; bthe score ranges
from 0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt) among the 16 countries; cthe score ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to Table III.
100 (very clean) among the 168 countries; dthe score ranges from 1 (high) to 7 (low) among the 140 countries; Perceived extent of
e
the score ranges from 1 (low) to 7 (high) among the 140 countries corruption in
Sources: Asian Intelligence (2016, p. 1), Schwab (2015, pp. 223, 321), Transparency International (2016) and Singapore and
World Bank (2015a) South Korea

CPIB 2008 2010 2012 2014

Personnel 86 90 138 222

Budget US$11.2 million US$15.4 million US$20.8 million US$31.1 million
Per capita expenditure US$2.32 US$3.05 US$4.00 US$5.68 Table IV.
CPIB’s per capita
Staff-population ratio 1:56,163 1:56,408 1:37,681 1:24,638
expenditure and
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the CPIB’s budget and personnel in Republic of staff-population
Singapore (2008/2014) ratio, 2008-2014
 AEDS expenditure has increased from US$2.32 to US$5.68 and its staff-population ratio has
6,1 improved from 1:56,163 to 1:24,638 during the same period.
Corruption was a serious problem inherited by the PAP government when it assumed
office in June 1959. To avoid making the same mistake as the British colonial government
which failed to provide the CPIB with sufficient legal powers, manpower and budget during
its first eight years, the PAP government enacted the POCA in June 1960 to enhance the
20 CPIB’s powers and provide it with the required personnel and budget for performing its
functions effectively (Quah, 2015a, p. 78).
Corruption was widespread in Singapore during the Japanese occupation as rampant
inflation made it difficult for civil servants to survive on their low salaries. Trading in the
black market became a way of life as many persons depended on “some sort of black
marketing” and nepotism and corruption were “perfectly acceptable” because they resorted
to “connections, friends and relatives” to get jobs (Lee, 2005, p. 142). Bribery “worked
wonders” as “gifts and money smoothed the way” and “nothing was impossible with the
right connections” (Lee, 2005, p. 205).
As guanxi (connections) is contextual, gift-giving is an acceptable cultural practice but is
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viewed as a bribe if the government official is expected to provide assistance for accepting
the gift (Luo, 2007, p. 11). In China, the gift-giving tradition enables government officials to
solicit bribes either directly or indirectly (Wang et al., 2003, p. 171). As Singapore has a
multi-racial population consisting of 74.3 per cent Chinese, 13.3 per cent Malays, 9.1 per cent
Indians and 3.3 per cent “others” (Department of Statistics, 2015, p. 26), gift-giving is an
important social tradition. During the Lunar New Year, gift-giving is practised among
Chinese parents and their relatives who give children ang pows or small red envelopes
containing money. This practice was also extended during this period to low-ranking civil
servants, including postmen, deliverymen and garbage collectors, who were given ang pows
by the public in appreciation for their services (Quah, 2011, p. 216).
When Lee Kuan Yew became the first Prime Minister of Singapore in June 1959, he
received many gifts from well-wishers who wanted to ensure favourable consideration for
their future requests. However, Lee did not accept these gifts to set an example for his
colleagues and all civil servants (Quah, 2011, p. 216). A former senior civil servant, Eddie
Teo, revealed that “public servants watched and followed the example” of Lee and his
colleagues and “were incorruptible because they were incorruptible”. Teo and his colleagues
were “motivated by the exemplary conduct set by our bosses” because “they lived simple,
frugal and unostentatious lives” and the anti-corruption law was applied to everyone,
regardless of position, by the CPIB (Quah, 2015b, pp. 382-383).
Unlike China, gift-giving has not contributed to bribery in Singapore because of the strict
enforcement of the regulations prohibiting the acceptance of gifts by civil servants and political
leaders. To prevent gift-giving from contributing to corruption in Singapore, the PAP
government introduced regulations to prohibit civil servants from accepting gifts and
entertainment from members of the public. Section 2 of the POCA defines corruption explicitly in
terms of the various forms of gratification, which include, “money or any gift, loan, fee, reward,
commission, valuable security, or other property or interest in property of any description,
whether movable or immovable”. Section 5 specifies that those found guilty of giving or
accepting any form of gratification would be fined S$100,000 and/or imprisoned for five years
(Quah, 2011, p. 219). To prevent corruption among civil servants, Instruction Manual 2’s Section
L on “Staff Conduct and Discipline” includes regulations forbidding them and their families from
receiving gifts or entertainment from members of the public (Quah, 2011, pp. 219-220).

CPIB’s total approach to enforcement

Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are specialised organisations formed by governments to
minimise corruption in their countries. There are two types of ACAs: Type A: those
 dedicated ACAs that perform only anti-corruption functions; and Type B: those diffused Effective
ACAs which perform both anti-corruption and non-corruption-related functions. Type A anti-corruption
ACAs are usually more effective than Type B ACAs for two reasons: their focus on strategy
performing only anti-corruption functions; and the provision of adequate budget and
personnel by the government to perform their functions.
Type A ACAs perform these anti-corruption functions: policy development, research,
monitoring and coordination of implementation measures; prevention of corruption in 21
power structures; education and awareness raising; and investigation and prosecution of
corruption cases (Klemencic et al., 2008, pp. 9-10). The CPIB is a Type A ACA because it
performs only the functions of investigating corruption cases in the public and private
sectors, corruption prevention and corruption education (Quah, 2011, pp. 221-222).
South Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) is a Type B ACA
which performs the four functions of “complaint handling, corruption prevention,
administrative appeals, and institutional improvement” (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights
Commission (ACRC) Korea, 2015, p. 4). Apart from being a Type B ACA, the ACRC, like
its predecessor, the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC), is not a
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de jure ACA because it does not perform the primary function of investigating corruption
cases, which is the raison d’être of an ACA.
The CPIB is effective not only because of its legal powers and adequate human and
financial resources, but also because the PAP government provides it with the operational
autonomy to investigate anyone without fear or favour, regardless of their status, position
or political affiliation (Quah, 2011, p. 232). Gregory (2015, p. 131) attributes the CPIB’s
de facto independence to “political self-denial by Singapore’s politicians”, which has
sustained “its reputation for impartiality, and thus, its popular legitimacy”.
The CPIB’s “total approach to enforcement” deals with both “big and small cases” of
public and private sector corruption, regardless of the amount of money involved, as well as
“both giver and receiver of bribes” and “other crimes uncovered in the course of [the]
corruption investigation” (Soh, 2008, pp. 1-2). A former CPIB Director, Soh Kee Hean (2008,
pp. 2-3), attributes the CPIB’s successful enforcement to its reliance on skilful interview
techniques, careful planning and execution of field operations, and computer forensics.
The CPIB’s effective enforcement capacity results from its emphasis on the capability
building of its enforcement officers, its building networks and partnerships with other
public agencies in Singapore, and its organisational excellence (Quah, 2015a, pp. 78-79).

Impartial enforcement of the POCA

Singapore’s experience confirms the importance of punishing those found guilty of corruption
offences, regardless of their status, position or political affiliation, in order to deter others from
engaging in corrupt activities. During the British colonial period, corruption was a “low risk,
high reward” activity as the probability of being detected and punished for corruption
offences was low because of the ACB’s ineffectiveness (Quah, 2007, pp. 14-15). However, the
POCA’s enactment in June 1960 not only strengthened the CPIB but also increased the penalty
for corruption to imprisonment for five years and/or a fine of S$10,000, which was further
raised to S$100,000 in 1989. Sections 11 and 12 of the POCA specify that Members of
Parliament (MPs) and members of public bodies found guilty of corrupt offences would be
fined S$100,000 and imprisoned for seven years (Quah, 2011, p. 221).
Consequently, corruption is perceived as a “high risk, low reward” activity in Singapore
today because those persons convicted of corruption offences are punished according to the
law. Singapore was ranked first among the 12 Asian countries in PERC’s 1996 corruption
survey, which attributed Singapore’s top ranking to its strict and consistent enforcement of
anti-corruption laws as “corrupt officials, particularly high-ranking ones, are dealt with in
Singapore with a severity rarely seen elsewhere” (Straits Times, 1996, p. 3). The CPIB has
 AEDS enforced the POCA impartially by not hesitating to investigate allegations of corruption
6,1 against political leaders and senior civil servants in Singapore.
The CPIB has investigated five PAP leaders during 1966-2016. First, Tan Kia Gan,
Minister for National Development, was stripped of all his public appointments in
November 1966 after being accused of assisting his friend in the sale of Boeing aircraft to
Malaysian Airways. Second, Wee Toon Boon, Minister of State for Environment, was
22 found guilty of bribery and sentenced to four and a half years of imprisonment and
ordered to pay a penalty of S$7,023 in April 1975. Third, Phey Yew Kok, a PAP MP for
Boon Teck Constituency and President of the National Trades Union Congress, was
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in January 2016. He jumped bail in January 1980
after being accused of criminal breach of trust in May 1979 and remained a fugitive
abroad until he surrendered at the Singapore Embassy in Bangkok in June 2015. Fourth,
Teh Cheang Wan, Minister for National Development, was accused in November 1986 of
accepting S$1 million in bribes from two property developers. He was investigated by the
CPIB but committed suicide in December 1986 before he could be charged in court. Finally,
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Choo Wee Khiang, a PAP MP from 1988 to 1999 resigned from the PAP before pleading
guilty to cheating in 1999. He was sentenced to two weeks’ jail and fined S$10,000
(Quah, 2015a, p. 80; Seow, 2016).
Similarly, eight senior civil servants were investigated by the CPIB and the
Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) from 1991 to 2014. First, Glenn Knight, the CAD’s
Director, was sentenced to three month’s jail in 1991 for attempted cheating and giving
false information for a government car loan. He was sentenced to three months’
imprisonment in 1997 for misappropriating S$2,720 and fined S$10,000 and jailed for a
day for another offence in 1998. Second, Yeo Seng Teck, Chief Executive Officer of the
Trade Development Board, was found guilty of cheating and forgery involving
S$2 million worth of Chinese antiques and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment in 1993.
Third, Choy Hon Tin, Deputy Chief Executive (Operations) of Public Utilities Board, was
found guilty in 1995 of accepting bribes from contractors and sentenced to 14 years’ jail
and ordered to pay back S$13.85 million. Fourth, Koh Seah Wee, a Deputy Director at the
Singapore Land Authority, was found guilty of cheating and money laundering offences
amounting to S$12.5 million and sentenced to 22 years imprisonment in November 2011.
Fifth, Ng Boon Gay, Director of the Central Narcotics Bureau, was accused in June 2012 of
corruptly obtaining sexual favours from a female sales manager. He was acquitted in
February 2013 because there was no evidence of his offence. Sixth, Peter Lim, Director of
the Singapore Civil Defence Force, was found guilty of receiving sexual favours from three
female executives and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment in June 2013. Seventh,
Edwin Yeo, a CPIB Assistant Director, was found guilty of misappropriating
S$1.76 million from 2008 to 2012 and sentenced to ten years’ jail in February 2014.
Finally, Lim Cheng Hoe, Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was found guilty of
cheating the government of S$88,997 and sentenced to 15 months’ jail in February 2014
(Quah, 2015a, p. 81).
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reaffirmed his government’s policy of zero tolerance for
corruption during the CPIB’s 60th anniversary celebrations on 18 September 2012 thus:
We will never tolerate corruption and we will not accept any slackening. Anyone who breaks the
rules will be caught and punished – no cover ups, no matter how senior the officer or how
embarrassing it may be. It is far better to suffer the embarrassment and keep the system clean, than
to pretend that nothing went wrong and let the rot spread (Lee, 2012, p. A23).

The CPIB’s impartial enforcement of the POCA means that, unlike the governments in some
Asian countries, the PAP government has not used corruption allegations as a weapon
against its political opponents. Recently, “corruption has been increasingly politicised” in
 Cambodia, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand, where politicians use “accusations of Effective
corruption” to discredit their rivals and “even to remove them from the political playing anti-corruption
field” (Asian Intelligence, 2014, pp. 1-2). strategy
South Korea’s ineffective anti-corruption strategy
By contrast, South Korea’s ineffectiveness in curbing corruption is the result of its
government’s weak political will, the low risk of detecting and punishing corruption 23
offences, and the population’s tolerance for corrupt practices like gift-giving and paying
chonji or bribe money.

Weak political will

The South Korean Government’s weak political will in combating corruption is
reflected in the establishment of the KICAC on 25 January 2002 and the ACRC on 29
February 2008. Originally, the draft legislation initiated by the People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy and supported by other civil society organisations proposed the
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creation of the KICAC based on Hong Kong’s independent commission against

corruption (ICAC). But the KICAC’s formation met with stiff resistance in the National
Assembly and was also opposed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) and the
National Police Agency (NPA) because both agencies wanted to perform the anti-
corruption function themselves (Quah, 2011, p. 330). However, according to Choi (2011, p.
43), the lack of freedom of the PPO and NPA from the president’s influence has hindered
“neutral law enforcement”.
Consequently, the Anti-Corruption Act’s enactment on 24 July 2001 resulted in the
KICAC’s formation as a “poor cousin” of the ICAC because it could not investigate
corruption cases (Quah, 2010, pp. 41-42). The KICAC’s inability to investigate corruption
cases was its Achilles’ heel and meant that it was not a full-fledged ACA because
it could not perform the primary function of investigating corruption cases and focussed
instead on the other functions of corruption prevention and education. Furthermore, the
KICAC was only responsible for dealing with public sector corruption but not private
sector corruption.
The KICAC’s anti-corruption functions were further diluted by President Lee Myung-bak
when he merged it with the Ombudsman and Administrative Appeals Commission in
February 2008 to form the ACRC in order to enhance their effectiveness. However, Choi
(2009, p. 209) contends that the ACRC’s creation, which resulted from the merger of three
agencies with “weak functional relevancy and coherence” has blurred its anti-corruption
role. The ACRC has inherited the KICAC’s weaknesses because it also cannot investigate
corruption cases and deals only with public sector corruption. The stated objective of the
ACRC’s formation was to improve its effectiveness. However, the unintended (or intended?)
consequence of the KICAC’s merger with the Ombudsman and Administrative Appeals
Commission is the dilution of the emphasis given by the previous governments to
combating corruption by according lower priority to this objective.
In short, the ACRC’s creation by President Lee’s administration reflected the lower
priority given to fighting corruption. The South Korean Government’s weak political will in
combating corruption is reflected in the marginal increase in the ACRC’s per capita
expenditure from US$0.97 to US$1.15 during 2008-2014 and its highly unfavourable
staff-population ratios during the same period, as shown in Table V. The CPIB’s
per capita expenditure is higher than the ACRC’s per capita expenditure during 2008-2014
by comparing Tables IV and V. The CPIB’s per capita expenditure rose from US$2.32 to US
$5.68 while the ACRC’s per capita expenditure increased marginally from US$0.97 to 1.15
during the same period. The CPIB’s staff-population ratio also improved from 1:56,163 to
1:24,638 but the ACRC’s staff-population ratio deteriorated from 1:105,021 to 1:108,430
 AEDS during 2008-2014. Similarly, Choi (2011, p. 39) found that the ACRC and Indonesia’s Komisi
6,1 Pemberantasan Korupsi (or Corruption Eradication Commission) were “under-staffed and
under-financed” to perform their functions.

Low risk of detection and punishment

Corruption thrives where it is perceived as a “low risk, high reward” activity because
24 offenders are unlikely to be caught and punished. However, corruption is not a serious
problem where it is perceived as a “high risk, low reward” activity as those involved in
corrupt activities are likely to be caught and severely punished (Quah, 2011, p. 18).
Corruption in South Korea is a “low risk, high reward” activity because of the lenient
punishment received by those found guilty of corruption offences. The ACRC’s 2008
Corruption Perceptions Survey found that “lenient punishment for corruption” was
identified as an important cause of corruption in South Korea by 24.1 per cent of citizens,
21 per cent of opinion leaders, 18 per cent of business people, 14.5 per cent of foreign
residents and 12.9 per cent of public servants (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission
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(ACRC) Korea, 2009, p. 21).

According to the law, those persons found guilty of accepting bribes greater than
50 million won (US$50,000) would be imprisoned for longer than ten years, while those who
had accepted bribes between 10 and 50 million won (US$10,000-50,000) would be jailed for
more than five years. However, in reality, the courts are unusually lenient and do not impose
the stricter sentences required by the law. Table VI shows that for the 35 guilty public
officials who accepted bribes exceeding 50 million won, only 17 (48.6 per cent) were
imprisoned and 18 (51.4 per cent) received suspended sentences. Thus, more than half of the
public officials found guilty of grand corruption were not punished for their misconduct.
Corruption is also “a low risk, high reward” activity in South Korea because those found
guilty of corruption offences are not punished severely as they can be pardoned by the
president. Former President Chun Doo-hwan was sentenced by the Seoul district court in
August 1996 to death for mutiny, treason and corruption. His successor, former President
Roh Tae-woo, was sentenced to 22.5 years’ imprisonment on similar charges. Both Chun and
Roh were fined US$270 million and US$350 million, respectively. However, in December

ACRC 2008 2010 2012 2014

Personnel 466 466 465 465

Budget US$47.6 million US$51.05 million US$55.1 million US$58.3 million
Table V. Per capita expenditure US$0.97 US$1.03 US$1.10 US$1.15
ACRC’s per capita
Staff-population ratio 1:105,021 1:106,030 1:107,527 1:108,430
expenditure and
staff-population Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the ACRC’s budget and personnel. The author is
ratio, 2008-2014 grateful to Ms Ire Gwak of the IMD Centre in Seoul for obtaining these data from the ACRC

Served actual
Type of case Guilty verdict prison sentence Suspended sentences

Corruption cases 131 41 (31.3%) 90 (68.7%)

Table VI.
Punishment of South Aggravated crimes below 50 million won 62 13 (21.0%) 49 (79.0%)
Korean public officials Aggravated crimes over 50 million won 35 17 (48.6%) 18 (51.4%)
for corruption Aggravated crimes Total 97 30 (31.0%) 67 (69.0%)
offences, 1993-2004 Source: Kim (2009, p. 147)
 1997, President Kim Young-sam granted amnesty to both of them after serving only 16 Effective
months in jail (Quah, 2011, p. 324). anti-corruption
President Lee Myung-bak granted special pardons on 29 January 2013 to 55 persons who strategy
were imprisoned for bribery. Among those pardoned were Lee’s confidant and former
minister, Choi See-joong; his friend and businessman Chun Shin-il; former parliamentary
speaker, Park Hee-tae; and his former senior political affairs aide. This latest round was the
seventh time that Lee exercised his right to pardon guilty offenders during his term of office 25
(Straits Times, 2013a). He was criticised for “using pardons to let off friends and family at
the end of one’s presidency is more than shameless – it is a deliberate insult to the Korean
people” (Ahn, 2013).

Cultural tolerance for corruption

Culture contributes to corruption when traditional practices like gift-giving and
family ties influence individuals to give or receive bribes, and make them tolerate corrupt
practices. The ACRC’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Survey also found that the
“social culture tolerant of corruption” was identified as another important cause of
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corruption by 34.5 per cent of foreign residents, 28.4 per cent of opinion leaders,
25 per cent of business people, 23 per cent of citizens and 19.6 per cent of public servants
(ACRC Korea, 2009, p. 21).
In South Korea, gift-giving contributes to corruption because an expensive gift is a bribe
if it is given to an important individual in order to receive a favour. Chonji is a way of life in
South Korea as mothers give chonji to teachers to ensure that their children do well at
school, young lecturers get jobs at colleges by paying chonji, and drivers pay chonji to avoid
speeding tickets. Small businesses give chonji frequently to those civil servants demanding
money in exchange for every stage of administrative action related to their trade (Kim, 1998,
p. 53). Rich persons and large companies also pay chonji for the services and cooperation
provided by civil servants.
This “deeply entrenched custom” is practised by government ministries and agencies
that pay chonji to journalists and editors for favourable coverage of their activities.
De Mente (1994, p. 30) observes that the “chonji system makes the various government
offices hostage to the reporters who cover them” because reporters write critical articles
about government officials if they “fail to hand over acceptable amounts”. Press coverage of
scandals committed by public officials is “frequently linked to the failure of officials to hand
over enough chonji to ensure a cover-up”. Senior executives of major corporations usually
pay reporters chonji of one million won for a favourable interview.
The exposé of the bribery scandal in South Korea involving the reliance on fake safety
tests for critical nuclear plant equipment in April 2013 reflects the “culture of collusion” that
has endangered the safety of the nuclear programme because “honouring personal ties is
often viewed as more important than following rules” (Straits Times, 2013b, p. A18).
As South Korean business persons, politicians and senior government officials frequently
host dinner banquets, give expensive presents during holidays and make cash donations at
weddings and funerals, these practices reinforce the culture of collusion and pose
serious corruption risks because it is difficult to distinguish gifts from bribes. After many
years of debate, the National Assembly passed the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act on
3 March 2015, which imprisons those journalists, teachers and civil servants for up to three
years for accepting single cash donations or gifts worth more than one million won
(Straits Times, 2015, p. A13).

Policy recommendations for South Korea

Singapore’s success in combating corruption is the result of the PAP government’s strong
political will and the allocation of adequate personnel, budget and operational autonomy
 AEDS to the CPIB to enable it to enforce the POCA impartially and effectively. Three policy
6,1 measures are recommended in this section for South Korean policy-makers to improve their
anti-corruption strategy if they have the political will to do so.

Establish the Korea Anti-Corruption Agency (KACA)

South Korea’s reliance on the KICAC, a Type A ACA (from 2002 to 2008), and the ACRC, a
26 Type B ACA (since 2008) reflects the lack of political will respectively of Kim Dae-jung and Lee
Myung-bak. President Kim established the KICAC in January 2002 as a “toothless” ACA
without the ability to investigate corruption cases because of strong opposition from the
National Assembly, PPO and NPA. President Lee further weakened the KICAC in February
2008 by merging it with the Ombudsman and Administrative Appeals Commission to form the
ACRC, which also inherited the KICAC’s Achilles’ heel of being unable to investigate corruption
cases. He was also criticised by the opposition Democratic United Party for making the PPO his
own “political weapon” by appointing loyalists to important positions. The Prosecutor-General,
Han Sang-dae, who was appointed by President Lee in August 2011, resigned on 30 November
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2012 following the revelations of a sex scandal by a junior prosecutor and the acceptance of
bribes from businessmen by a senior prosecutor (Straits Times, 2012, p. A19).
After his inauguration in February 1998, President Kim Dae-jung initiated a
comprehensive anti-corruption strategy to ensure “clean and upright public office,
transparent and reliable government, and a just and fair society” in South Korea.
An important target was to improve South Korea’s ranking on Transparency International’s
CPI from 43rd position in 1998 to 20th position in 2003 (Republic of Korea, 1999, p. 6). Using
this criterion, Kim’s anti-corruption strategy has failed as South Korea was ranked 50th
among the 133 countries included in the 2003 CPI. As the number of countries included in
the CPI varies every year, it would be more useful to focus on South Korea’s CPI scores from
2012 to 2015 than the ranking as an indicator of its perceived extent of corruption.
South Korea’s CPI scores have remained at 55-56 during these four years in contrast to
Singapore’s higher CPI scores of 84-87 for the same period.
As the strategy of relying on the KICAC and ACRC for the past 14 years as ACAs that
cannot investigate corruption cases is ineffective, this futile strategy should be abandoned
by President Park Geun-hye if she is sincerely committed to minimising corruption in
South Korea. She should replace the ACRC with a Type A ACA to be called the KACA to
perform the functions of investigating corruption cases, preventing corruption, and
educating citizens on the adverse consequences of corruption to reduce their tolerance for
corrupt practices. The ACRC’s Anti-Corruption Bureau should be moved to the KACA and
the ACRC should be renamed the Ombudsman and Civil Rights Commission. Learning from
the CPIB’s success, the KACA should be adequately staffed and funded by the government,
unlike the KICAC and ACRC. Furthermore, unlike the ACRC that was heavily influenced by
President Lee (Choi, 2011, p. 39), the KACA should also be given operational autonomy to
enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially without fear or favour.

Make corruption a “high risk, low reward” activity by punishing offenders

Corruption is perceived as a “low risk, high reward” activity in South Korea because of the
lenient punishment of those persons found guilty of corruption offences. For South Koreans
to view corruption as a “high risk, low reward” activity, those convicted of corruption
offences must be punished according to the law, without suspending their jail sentences or
being pardoned by the president. Accordingly, the president should refrain from pardoning
convicted corrupt politicians and officials and granting them amnesty as this makes
corruption a “low risk, high reward” activity.
To minimise corruption and deter South Koreans who are not involved in corrupt practices
from doing so, honesty and incorruptibility among civil servants and political leaders must be
 recognised and rewarded instead of being punished. The lenient punishment of corrupt civil Effective
servants and political leaders in South Korea sends the wrong signal to their honest counterparts anti-corruption
and the population at large because it makes a mockery of the anti-corruption laws and strategy
encourages others to become corrupt as the probability of being caught and punished is low.
In short, corruption is widespread in South Korea because those who are corrupt are
rewarded while those who are honest are punished. Consequently, the existing system of
reward and punishment in South Korea should be reversed by punishing the corruption 27
offenders and rewarding those who have abstained from being corrupt.

Reduce population’s tolerance for corruption by enhancing corruption education and

enforcing impartially the gift-giving regulations
As corruption in South Korea is also caused by the “social culture that tolerates corrupt
practices”, the KACA should evaluate the effectiveness of the ACRC’s public outreach
programmes to ascertain how these programmes can be improved to reduce the
population’s tolerance for corrupt practices. The KICAC and ACRC conducted an impressive
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total of 158 training programmes with 532 sessions for 28,929 public officials, teachers, civic
group employees and private company employees from 2003 to 2014 (ACRC Korea, 2015,
p. 77). In addition, 1,954,344 public officials participated in the online Anti-corruption
Training Course conducted by the ACRC and other organisations in South Korea from 2008
to 2014 (ACRC Korea, 2015, p. 78). As these extensive public education programmes have
not reduced the citizens’ tolerance for corrupt practices during 2003-2014, it is necessary for
the KACA to identify the reasons for their limited impact so that appropriate improvements
can be introduced to enhance their effectiveness.
On 9 May 2016, the ACRC announced that the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act would
be implemented on 28 September 2016. This law prohibits: the acceptance of a gift worth
50,000 won (US$42.85) or receiving more than 100,000 won (US$85.70) in cash for a wedding or
funeral; the acceptance of a gift worth more than one million won (US$857) or accumulated
gifts worth more than three million won (US$2,571) a year; and public officials, journalists and
teachers from being treated to a meal by their job-related contacts if the meal costs more than
30,000 won (US$25.71) (Ser, 2016). However, critics of this law contend that the “tough limits
on accepting meals and gifts” may have adverse effects on the economy (Straits Times, 2016,
p. A26). The enactment of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act in March 2015 and its
implementation in September 2016 would reduce the South Koreans’ tolerance for corrupt
practices if the new gift-giving regulations are enforced impartially by the public agencies.
Finally, corruption can be minimised if South Koreans abhor corruption and do not tolerate
corrupt practices by anyone. This means that no one is above the law and anyone found guilty
of corruption offences is punished according to the law, without special treatment or amnesty
granted by the president. If corrupt leaders and public officials are leniently punished for
committing corrupt acts and pardoned by the president, it would be difficult to encourage South
Koreans to avoid corruption if these corrupt individuals are not punished severely for their
misconduct. In sum, the implementation of these three policy recommendations is only possible
if President Park Geun-hye has the political will to minimise corruption in South Korea.

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About the author

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Jon S.T. Quah, PhD, is a retired Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore
and an Anti-corruption Consultant based in Singapore. His latest books include: Hunting the Corrupt
“Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-corruption Campaign (November
2012 to March 2015) (Carey School of Law, University of Maryland, 2015) and editor, The Role of the
Public Bureaucracy in Policy Implementation in Five ASEAN Countries (Cambridge University Press,
2016). Jon S.T. Quah can be contacted at: jonstquah@gmail.com

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