PRINCIPLE OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS
MANILA HOTEL v. NLRC Santos was an overseas worker employed in Oman. He
received a letter from Mr. Gerald Shmidt, General
Manager of Palace Hotel, offering him the same position
as printer in China with a higher monthly salary and
increased benefits.
His employment at the Palace Hotel print shop will be
terminated due to business reverses brought about by
the political upheaval in China.
Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC.
The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that
respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel
and MHICL are foreign corporations. The Defendants
were neither residents nor doing business in the
Philippines.
NAVIDA v. JUDGE DIZON A number of personal injury suits were filed in different
Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries,
including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs
sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained
from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a
chemical used to kill worms, while working on farms in
23 foreign countries.
A total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a
Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City.
RAYTHEON v. ROUZIE Brand Marine Services, Inc., a US Corporation, and
respondent Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract to negotiate the sale of services
in several government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
Respondent secured a service contract with the Republic
of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of
rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and
mudflows.
Respondent filed before the NLRC a suit against
petitioners BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney
Gilbert and Walter Browning for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract, "Special
Sales Representative Agreement”, between respondent
and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut.
The trial court ruled that the principle of forum non
conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could
enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
NLRC is not a convenient forum - the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL
are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the
Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-
residents of the Philippines.
The fact that the plaintiffs were all Filipinos. The workers, material witness, and the
doctors were all based in the Philippines. The place where they claimed to have been
exposed to the pesticide were located in the Philippines.
The alleged cause of action also took place in the Philippines. The Philippine court
was the convenient forum.
A court, in Conflict of Law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is
not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere. But Forum non conveniens cannot be a ground for a
motion to dismiss unless the circumstances that would show that the Philippine
court is an inconvenient forum is established as a fact.
There are three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-
laws problems, namely:
(1) jurisdiction
(2) choice of law, and
(3) recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve
controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.
1
PHILSEC v. CA, Respondent Drago Daic, assumed Ducat's obligation
under an Agreement whereby 1488, Inc. executed a
Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien by which it sold to
petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. a parcel of land in
Texas.
PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA in the
amount of US$2.5 million as initial payment of the
purchase price.
ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance.
A party invoking forum non conveniens cannot get a dismissal of the case by filing a
motion to dismiss:
(1) It is not one of the grounds under Rule 16
(2) The dismissal of the dispute involving a foreign element requires factual
determination of the grounds relied upon. The circumstances that would show that
the Philippine court is an inconvenient forum should be established as a fact.

Accordingly, respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners

PHILSEC, AYALA and ATHONA in the United States for
payment of the balance of US$307,209.02 and for
damages for breach of contract.

While the Civil Case was pending in the United States,

petitioners filed a complaint "For Sum of Money with
Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment" against
private respondents in the RTC of Makati.

BANK OF AMERICA v. CA Litonjuas, for brevity filed a Complaint against the Bank
of America alleging that the defendant banks induced
them to increase the number of their ships in
operation, offering them easy loans to acquire said
vessels; thereafter, the defendant banks acquired their
vessels and registered in the names of their
corporations.
The Litonjuas claimed that defendant banks as trustees
did not fully render an account of all the income derived
from the operation of the vessels as well as of the
proceeds of the subsequent foreclosure sale.
The Bank argues that the borrowers and the registered
owners of the vessels are the foreign corporations and
not private respondents Litonjuas who are mere
stockholders. Being mere shareholders, they have no
claim on the vessels as owners since they merely have
an inchoate right to whatever may remain upon the
dissolution.
A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest. In the case at bar, the complaint contains the three
elements of a cause of action. It alleges that:
(1) plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have the right to demand for an
accounting from defendants, as trustees by reason of the fiduciary relationship that
was created between the parties involving the vessels in question;
(2) BANK OF AMERICAs have the obligation, as trustees, to render such an
accounting; and
(3) BANK OF AMERICAs failed to do the same.
A Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so;
provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision." Evidently, all
these requisites are present in the instant case .

PIONEER v. TODARO PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available
to join them in connection with their intention to
establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related
operations in the Philippines.
Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement
wherein the former consented to engage the services of
the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after
which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's
ready-mix concrete operations should the company
decide to invest in the Philippines. Successively, PIL
started its operations in the Philippines. However, it
refused to comply with its undertaking to employ
Todaro on a permanent basis.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine
as a ground.
While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the court's desistance; and that
the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of
defense. In the present case, the factual circumstances cited by petitioners which
would allegedly justify the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens are
matters of defense, the merits of which should properly be threshed out during
trial.

Todaro filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for

Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary
Attachment against five petitioners.

PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the

complaint on the basis, among others, of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.

2
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA v. Nippon Engineering Consultants, entered into an
KITAMURA Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with
respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national
permanently residing in the Philippines.
Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project
manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR)
Project in the Philippines, following the company's
consultancy contract with the Philippine Government.
Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its
International Division, informed respondent that the
company had no more intention of automatically
renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the
company only up to the substantial completion of the
STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the
ICA's expiry.
As he was not able to generate a positive response from
the petitioners, respondent consequently initiated a case
for specific performance and damages with the RTC of
Lipa City.
Nippon moved to dismiss arguing that the ICA had been
perfected in Japan and executed by and between
Japanese nationals. They asserted that the claim for
improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could
only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of
Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis
and lex contractus.
DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
YAO KEE v. SY-GONZALES Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Caloocan City where
he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth P300K more or
less.
The respondents - Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita
Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy – are his children with
common law wife. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee,
allegedly the wife of Sy Kiat in China, and her children.
ASIAVEST v. CA & HERAS Asiavest limited obtained a judgment from the Hong
Kong Courts against Heras. Since Heras was not in Hong
Kong and such judgment could not be enforced against
him there, Asiavest filed the action in the Philippines
(action for enforcement of foreign judgment).
By way of defense, Heras argued that the judgment in
Hong Kong is void because of lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He alleged that the service of summons effected
upon him in the Philippines was not made in accordance
with the laws of Hong Kong. In this case, Heras invoked
Hong Kong law on the service of summons.
Asiavest presented only documentary evidence to show
rendition, existence, and authentication of such
judgment by the proper official’s concerned.On the
Where the only issue in the case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not
only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws
situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of
a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the
existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial
court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy
for, case for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise
as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship
rule."
Doctrine of Processual presumption - When the proper foreign law has not been
properly proved, the court of the forum may presume that said foreign law is the
same as its local or domestic law, which it can now apply; Article 12 of the Civil Code
requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence".
To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely:
(1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and
(2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is
known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage
to Sy Kiat was celebrated, her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized
in this jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court had to rely on the principle of processual presumption and had
to apply Philippine Law in this case.
Under Philippine law on the service of summons, in an action in personam, summons
can only be served personally. Personal service summons presupposes that the
summons was served upon him in the territory of the country where the case was
filed. This means that extraterritorial service of summons is not allowed.
In the case at bar, Heras was not in Hong Kong when the summons was served, so
applying Philippine Law on service of summons in actions in personam, the summons
should have been served on Heras while he was still in Hong Kong. Even though the
rule is that when a defendant is temporarily out of the country, extraterritorial
service can be done, such rule will not apply because Heras was not out of Hong
Kong temporarily, he was out of Hong Kong permanently. Applying Philippine law on
the matter, the extraterritorial service of summons served upon him was invalid and
the judgment cannot be enforced.
3
 other hand, the HERAS presented two witnesses,
namely, Fortunata dela Vega and Russel Warren Lousich.
Unfortunately, he failed to sufficiently prove the
pertinent law of Hong Kong on service of summons..
MANUFACTURERS v. Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against
GUERRERO Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical
Bank for illegally withholding taxes charged against
interests on his checking account with the Bank and
other illegalities.
The Bank alleged that Guerrero's account is governed by
New York law and this law does not permit any of
Guerrero's claims except actual damages.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney,
supported the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Alyssa Walden's affidavit stated that
Guerrero's New York bank account stipulated that the
governing law is New York law and that this law bars all
of Guerrero's claims except actual damages. The
Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the
Walden affidavit.
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS v. Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI,
NLRC and deployed by ESI to work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia for the position of "Computer Specialist."
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy
in his monthly salary — his employment contract stated
USD 850.00; while his POEA Information Sheet indicated
USD 600.00 only. The employment contract signed by
Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will
govern matters not provided for in the contract.
After Gran had been working for about 5 months for
OAB, his employment was terminated.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the
Computer Specialist position because he had
"insufficient knowledge in programming and zero
knowledge of the ACAD system.
RENVOI DOCTRINE
CHRISTENSEN Edward Christensen is from California. He came to the
v. AZNAR Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate),
as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of
a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by:
(1) an official publication
(2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official
publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not
only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York
law on damages.
The employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws
will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties
(lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all
matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of PROVING the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his
"insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD system"
based only on letters, without any other evidence, cannot be given credence. An
allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation. Incompetence may
be shown by weighing it against a standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI
failed to establish any such bases to show how petitioner found Gran incompetent.
Renvoi Doctrine - The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile cannot and
should refer the case back to California, as such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination, because the case will then be tossed back and forth
4
 of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo between the two states.
Aznar was the executor of the estate.
Two rules in California on the matter:
Under California law, the matter is referred back to
the law of the domicile ultimately making Philippine 1.        Internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in Californiaa
law applicable. Therefore, the share of Helen must be 2.        Conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of
increased in view of the successional rights of California.
illegitimate children under Philippine law.
Under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of
the deceased must apply. Under California law, there
are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator
could dispose of any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything and his will
remain undisturbed.

MUST ALLEGE AND PROVE FACT OF FOREIGN LAW

LLORENTE v. CA Deceased Lorenzo Llorente was a naturalized American
citizen.
When Lorenzo returned to the Philippines, he discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.
The SC of the State of California issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce. The divorce decree became final.
Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente in Manila.
In his will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children.
Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of
administration over Lorenzo's estate in her favor. Alicia
also filed in the testate proceeding a petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.
The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Llorente's will and determination of the parties' successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law.

CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE Orlando Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the US from his first provided they are valid according to their national law Court ruled that aliens may
wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
with petitioner Merope Catalan. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven.

Petitioner Merope filed with RTC a Petition for the Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she
issuance of letters of administration for her appointment has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate.
as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is
undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased.
While the special proceeding was pending, respondent
Louella Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from
his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered

an interested person qualified to file a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration. She alleged that a
criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner.

5
SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS Felicisimo San Luis, who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna, contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia who predeceased Felicisimo.
He then Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen, who
then filed a Divorce in the State of Hawaii.Subsequently,
he married respondent Felicidad San Luis.
Respondent Felicidad sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo's estate.
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss.
He claimed, among others, that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because, at the time of
Felicisimo’s death, he was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
FUJIKI v. MARINAY Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the
Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay
met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.
In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
in this case either Maekara or Marinay, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35 (4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either
(1)         an official publication or
(2)         a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
a)        accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and
b)        authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. However, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Therefore, this
case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters
of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic
public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad."
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court through:
1)        an official publication or
2)        A certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginnin g under Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the RPC. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.
6
ATCI v. ECHIN Echin was hired by ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf
of its principal, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait,
for the position of medical technologist under a two-
year contract, denominated MOA. Under the MOA, all
newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period
of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait's Civil Service
Board Employment Contract.
She was terminated from employment on for not having
allegedly passed the probationary period. She filed with
the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI
Corporation.
ATCI Corporations maintain that they should not be held
liable because ECHIN's employment contract specifically
stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
CHARACTERIZATION
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. Attempted rape in Indonesia.
CA
Brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would
merely testify in an investigation of the charges she
made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the
attack on her person while theywere in Jakarta.
As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for
very serious charges. Morada then filed a Complaint for
damages against SAUDIA. Considering that the complaint
in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting
factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places
where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.
And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
GIBBS v. PHILIPPINE Gibbs presented foreign decree to the register of deeds
ISLANDS of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a
"transfer certificate of title".
The register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to
accept as binding sai d decree of court, and refused to
register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property
to Allison D. Gibbs, on
the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had
not been paid.
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to
the lex rei sit 忙 , the respective rights of husband and
wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial
contract, are determined by the law of the place where
the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of
the parties or of the place where the marriage was
celebrated.
A contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can
establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign
law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption
which, in this case, ATCI Corporations failed to discharge. Unfortunately for ATCI
Corporation, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter.
Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated
and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what ATCI
Corporations submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of
the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all
that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti
laws, ECHIN was validly terminated.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category
a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the
"doctrine of qualification." It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts
relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of
"characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered
First aspect: The Factual Problem
The SC first determined that this is a conflict of laws problem involving property, and
not succession. Applying the Philippine conflict of laws rule on property, Article 16,
which is lex rei sitae or lex situs (the law of the place where the property is situated),
the problem should be resolved by applying Philippine law.
Under the laws then existing at the time or before the Family Code
was passed, the Philippines adopted the property regime of conjugal partnership
where the husband and the wife essentially owned the properties. Both of them
have existing interest over the properties belonging to the conjugal partnership.
Unlike the laws in the US where the wife’s interest over the property is only
inchoate, ours in the Philippines, it’s really an existing right. When the wife dies,
following that principle, his or her interest over the property, which was then
existing at the time when she was still alive, will be transmitted to the husband
pursuant to the laws on succession.
Applying our tax laws, estate tax should be paid. By
7
 FOREIGN LAW AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM

CADALIN v. POEA Petitioners are overseas contract workers recruited by As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
respondent AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
Brown & Root.
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true
even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
They were all deployed in Bahrain. The case arose when
their overseas employment contracts were terminated
even before their expiration. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's
public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23
In the State of Bahrain, Article 156 of the Amiri Decree of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the
No. 23 of 1976 provides: "A claim arising out of a
contract of employment shall not be actionable after the public policy on the protection to labor.
lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the
contract"

BANK OF AMERICA v. Bank of America NT & Bank of America International Even if the foreign law should have been applicable pursuant to our Conflict of Law
AMERICAN REALTY Limited (BAIL) on several occasions granted 3 major rules, such application cannot be had if such application would contravene our own
multi-million US Dollar loans to three corporate public policy. In this case, the public policy sought to be protected is the principle
borrowers. proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

When the borrowers failed to pay the loan, they
requested for the restructuring of their loan. As
additional security for the restructured loans,
respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC) as third
party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages
over its parcels of land including improvements in
Bulacan.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work

undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.

The 3 corporate borrowers failed to pay, prompting
petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions for the collection
of the principal loan before foreign courts in England and
HongKong.

During the pendency of the collection suit, petitioner

BANTSA filed before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of
Bulacan an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage. The mortgaged real properties
were then sold at public with ICCS as the highest bidder.

The bank argued that in all the loan contracts between

the bank and the borrowers, it is stipulated that any
dispute that may arise out of the transaction should be
governed by the lawsof England. Under English law,
splitting a single cause of action is not prohibited and
thus the creditor may resort to both remedies: to file an
action for collection and, at the same time, enforce the
security.

ARC invoke the rule enforced in the Philippines which

prohibits the splitting of a single cause ofaction.

LWN VS DUPO
This was an action filed for the recovery of long service SC said that this is contrary to the public policy of the forum, the Philippines.
benefits which are awarded to employees in
recognition of their loyalty and length of service to the

8
 company pursuant to the laws of Saudi. This is the policy that protects labor and like Cadalin Case, the issue on
prescription period shall be resolved by applying the Philippines law which
provides for a three-year prescriptive period.
The employee returned to the Philippines and filed
this action. The Court in the Philippines has
determined that the applicable law on the matter
since this is a contract is the law of Saudi Arabia.
Under this law, this kind of action prescribes in one
year.

PROPERTY

The cases arose from complaints for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against
former President Marcos, members of his family, and
REPUBLIC v. alleged cronies, one of whom is said to be respondent
SANDIGANGBAYAN Roberto Benedicto.
Under a compromise agreement, Benedicto and his group-
controlled corporations ceded to the government certain
pieces of property and assigned rights to the government
over some corporate assets.
The PCGG in turn, lifted the sequestrations over the
property as well as other assets mentioned in the
agreement. The Government also extended absolute
immunity to Benedicto, members of his family, and
officers and employees of the listed corporations such
that there would be no criminal investigation or
prosecution for acts or ommissions prior to February 25,
1986 that may be alleged to have violated penal laws, in
relation to the acquisition of the assets under the
agreement.
The government agreed to recognize the constitutional
right to travel of Mr. and Mrs. Benedicto and to interpose
no objections to the issuance or restoration of their
passports by the government office concerned.
While the rule of lex loci celebrationis generally governs forms and solemnities of
contracts under Article 17 of the Civil Code, the principle of lex rei sitae generally
applies with respect to formalities for the acquisition, encumbrance, and alienation
of real and personal property. And relative to this precept on lex situs, Philippine
substantive law is certainly clear on the matter that contracts are obligatory, in
whatever form they may have been entered into, subject to the existence of all the
essential requisites for their validity (Article 1356, New Civil Code).
The fact that the compromise agreement was not authenticated before the
consular officers abroad, as well as the absence of witnesses, cannot be of much
legal significance under Philippine law inasmuch as the requirement under Article
1358(a) of the Civil Code, that a contract intended to extinguish or transmit real
rights over the immovables must be in a public document is merely designed for
greater efficacy or convenience.
Additionally, PCGG is in estoppel to question the validity of the Compromise
Agreement since it had already received benefits thereunder. After the due
execution of the Agreement by and between PCGG, as representative of plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines, and Benedicto, the same has acquired a binding and res
judicata effect as against the parties thereto. Any change in the administrative
structure and/or personalities within the PCGG cannot defeat the validity and
binding effect thereof between the parties.

Subsequently, however, the new PCGG chairperson

contends that its consent was obtained through fraud and
misrepresentation. That the agreement is congenitally
defective from the mere happenstance that the
agreement was not authenticated before the consular
officials abroad

9
 Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell
LAUREL V GARCIA the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one
of the properties given by the Japanese Government as
reparations for damage done by the latter to the former
during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject
property is property of public dominion. As such, it is
outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be
alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine
Law, shall apply to the case because the property is
located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies
SUCCESSION
Spouses Audrey and Richard Guersey were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30
ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-
years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey
DALAYGON
Hill. Audrey died, leaving a will wherein she
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was
also designated as executor. The will was admitted to
probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A
Richard subsequently married Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon with whom he has two children. When
Richard died, he left a will bequeathing his entire
estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate in
Maryland. Richard’s will was then submitted for
probate before the RTC of Makati
. the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a
project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard
being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the
Makati property, and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest
in the Makati property.
Respondent Guersey-Dalaygon claims that under the
law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his
entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors shares, then his entire
¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be
given to respondent. According to respondent,
petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express
terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of
the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner
is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was
Interpretation of lex rei sitae is misplaced because this is not a conflict of laws
problem. A conflict of law situation arises only when:
(1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined; and
(2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply.
Lex rei sitae will only come into play when there is a dispute in ownership and title
over real property. In this case, the issues are not concerned with validity of
ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose
of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not
apply. Moreover, the invocation of lex rei sitae is inadequate because the
government did not cite the specific Japanese law on the matter
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard
as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of
Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code: Real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate. All these properties passed
on to Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his
entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors shares, which he left to Kyle.
When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then
passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of
of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently
proven in the Special Proceeding filed.
The pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the
CA, and the trial court in the Special Proceeding appropriately took note of the
same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate. Audrey’s
and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and
not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the
entire Makati property belongs to respondent.
10
 his duty to know the relevant laws.
Petitioner contends that he acted in good faith in
submitting the project of partition as he had no
knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate
and intestate succession. That it is to the "best
interests of the surviving children that Philippine law
be applied as they would receive their just shares."
Ruperta Palaganas, a Filipino who became a
PALAGANAS v PALAGANAS naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. In the
last will and testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her
will for she had left properties in the Philippines and
in the US.
Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the
RTC in Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s
will and for his appointment as special administrator
of her estate.
However, nephews of Ruperta opposed the petition
arguing that local courts can only allow probate of
such wills if the proponent proves that:
(a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such
foreign country
(b) the will has been admitted to probate there under
its laws
(c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the
proceedings
(d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign
country and proof of compliance with the same, and
(e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a
will.
NATIONALITY THEORY
VAN DORN v. JUDGE Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
ROMILLO Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hongkong.
Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada.
She returned to the Philippines and started to manage a
business. When the American husband realized that the
business is doing well, he followed his wife in the
Philippines and filed an action that he be allowed to
administer the same business.
PILAPIL v. JUDGE IBAY- Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling
SOMERA were married in Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding.
The local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce
decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent filed two complaints for adultery
alleging that, while still married to respondent,
petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chua and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua”.
REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate
of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local
court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
American jurisprudence on laws in pari material provides that after a divorce has
been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have
the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.
Respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
A Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
11

He learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live
in California.
Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. The OSG, contends that the proper remedy
is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship. He married respondent. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina.
He was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
affair with another man. He returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. Canada granted Gerbert's petition
for divorce.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and
has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines, he went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official
of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable; the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved.
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to
be able to remarry under Philippine law.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. The twin requisites are both
present in this case.
But before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must allege and prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. It must also be shown that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
But the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of
a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by
(1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, SC dismissed the petition
for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
12
 MARRIAGE AND DIVORCES
VAN DORN v. JUDGE Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
ROMILLO Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hongkong.
Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada.
She returned to the Philippines and started to manage a
business. When the American husband realized that the
business is doing well, he followed his wife in the
Philippines and filed an action that he be allowed to
administer the same business.
DACASIN v. DACASIN Herald Dacasin, an American, and respondent Sharon
Dacasin, a Filipina, got married in the Philippines. The
following year, Sharon got pregnant and gave birth to
Stephanie. Sadly, respondent Sharon sought and
obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against
Herald. The Illinois court dissolved the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, awarded to Sharon the sole
custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the
case for enforcement purposes.
Subsequently, petitioner and respondent executed in
Manila an Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie.
Two years after, petitioner Herald sued respondent in
the RTC of Makati City claiming that respondent
exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent Sharon sought the dismissal of the
complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court
holds the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.
Herald sought reconsideration, raising the new argument
that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void.
Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts
exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
Trial court refused to entertain petitioner’s suit believing
that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of
jurisdiction.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
What the Illinois court retained was jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing all and
sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution. Petitioner’s suit
seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the
post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone
of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement
subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.
At the time the parties executed the Agreement, Stephanie was under seven years
old and petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the
United States because of the divorce decree.
Under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother. Upon separation of the spouses,
the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and
any agreement to the contrary is void. Clearly then, the Agreements object to
establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner
over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
13
BAYOT v. BAYOT Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were
married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born
in California.
Years after, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in
Dominican Republic, which was granted. The same court
gave them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over
a year later, the same court settled the couple's property
relations pursuant to an Agreement they which
specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consist only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal
properties in Muntinlupa.
She subsequently filed a declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before RTC of Muntinlupa on the ground of
Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. She sought
dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She
also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent
monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of
P 220,000.
REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
He learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live
in California.
Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. The OSG, contends that the proper remedy
is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
BANK OF AMERICA v. CA Litonjuas, for brevity filed a Complaint against the Bank
of America alleging that the defendant banks induced
them to increase the number of their ships in
operation, offering them easy loans to acquire said
vessels; thereafter, the defendant banks acquired their
vessels and registered in the names of their
corporations.
The Litonjuas claimed that defendant banks as trustees
did not fully render an account of all the income derived
from the operation of the vessels as well as of the
proceeds of the subsequent foreclosure sale.
The Bank argues that the borrowers and the registered
owners of the vessels are the foreign corporations and
not private respondents Litonjuas who are mere
stockholders. Being mere shareholders, they have no
claim on the vessels as owners since they merely have
an inchoate right to whatever may remain upon the
dissolution.
Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen.
Being an American citizen, she was bound by the national laws of the US, a country
which allows divorce. Thus, the Civil Decree issued by the Dominican Republic court
properly adjudicated the ex-couple's property relations.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce
and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is sufficient. Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued
by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca and
Vicente.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by
affirmation by the DOJ Secretary will not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen. In determining
whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of
the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
A Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. The twin requisites are both
present in this case.
But before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must allege and prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. It must also be shown that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest. In the case at bar, the complaint contains the three
elements of a cause of action. It alleges that:
(1) plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have the right to demand for an
accounting from defendants, as trustees by reason of the fiduciary relationship that
was created between the parties involving the vessels in question;
(2) BANK OF AMERICAs have the obligation, as trustees, to render such an
accounting; and
(3) BANK OF AMERICAs failed to do the same.
A Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so;
provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision." Evidently, all
these requisites are present in the instant case .
14
PIONEER v. TODARO PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available
to join them in connection with their intention to
establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related
operations in the Philippines.
Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement
wherein the former consented to engage the services of
the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after
which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's
ready-mix concrete operations should the company
decide to invest in the Philippines. Successively, PIL
started its operations in the Philippines. However, it
refused to comply with its undertaking to employ
Todaro on a permanent basis.
Todaro filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for
Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary
Attachment against five petitioners.
PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the basis, among others, of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
PEREZ v. CA Respondent Tristan Catindig married Lily Gomez. Several
years later, the couple encountered marital problems
that they decided to separate from each other. Upon
advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Subsequently, the civil court in the Dominican Republic
ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily.
Thereafter, the RTC of Makati City ordered the complete
separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.
Tristan married petitioner Elmar Perez in the State of
Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband
and wife. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned
that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage
between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the
Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed
void under Philippine law.
Subsequently, Tristan filed for annulment of his marriage
with Lily. Petitioner Perez filed a motion for intervention
claiming that her status as the wife and companion of
Tristan for 17 years vests her with the requisite legal
interest required of a would-be intervenor under the
Rules of Court.
ANDO v. DFA Edelina Tungul married a Japanese citizen named
Yuichiro Kobayashi. Kobayashi obtained a divorce decree
against Edelina in Japan. Kobayashi later married
someone else.
Later, Edelina married another Japanese citizen named
Masatomi Ando. She tried to renew her passport but
wanted to use her new married name – Ando.
However, the DFA told her that same cannot be issued to
her until she can prove by competent court decision that
her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Ando is
valid until otherwise declared.
She then filed a petition for declaratory relief as she
insists that she should be issued a passport bearing her
married name even without a judicial declaration that
her marriage with Ando is valid because, according to
the law, void and voidable marriages enjoy the
presumption of validity until proven otherwise She also
prayed that the court recognize her second marriage as
valid.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine
as a ground.
While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the court's desistance; and that
the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of
defense. In the present case, the factual circumstances cited by petitioners which
would allegedly justify the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens are
matters of defense, the merits of which should properly be threshed out during
trial.
Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her claim of legal
interest has no basis. When petitioner and Tristan married, Tristan was still lawfully
married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican
Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them.
It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will
be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or
to his or her status, condition and legal capacity.
Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad,
initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually
becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not
recognize such absolute divorce.
First, Edelina failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. When her request for
renewal of passport under her married name was denied, she should have appealed
the denial to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs – pursuant to the Philippine Passport
Act.
Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be “honored” is not proper. The
proper remedy is for her to file a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign
divorce from her first husband.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment,
our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
There appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the
national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree
under that national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can
only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree
and the national law of her alien spouse.
15
 CONTRACTS
RECTO v. DE Esperanza Harden, an American citizen, engaged the
HARDEN services of Atty. Recto to appear and act as her
counsel in the action which she filed against her
husband Fred, an American citizen, for increasing the
amount of support she was receiving and for
preserving her rights in the conjugal partnership
between them.
Mrs. Harden agreed to pay Recto monthly during the
pendency of the litigation and until the termination of
the case, twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total
increase in allowance or pension. She also agreed to
pay said Recto twenty 20% of the value of the share
and participation which she may receive in the funds
and properties of the said conjugal partnership.
But during the pendency of the appeal, Mrs. Harden
and husband agreed to settle and "vacate all orders
and judgments rendered, and abandon and nullify all
her claims to the conjugal partnership existing
between her and Mr. Harden".
Atty. Recto now demands for the amounts Ms. Harden
promised as his attorney’s fees
As defense, Harden spouses argues that Atty. Recto
the contract of services is void its object was unlawful
noting divorce is not allowed in the Philippines. They
claim that the contract is invalid in violation of Articles
1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code.
PHIL EXPORT v. V.P. The Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq
EUSEBIO awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-
Medical Rehabilitation Center in Iraq to Ayjal Trading and
Contracting Company for a total contract price of about
$18M.
Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, a local
contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a
joint venture agreement with Ayjal. SOB required the
contractors to submit a performance bond. To comply with
these requirements 3-Plex and VPECI applied for a guarantee
with Philguarantee, a government financial institution
empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino
contractors.
The construction was not completed as scheduled.
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the Philguarantee
demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-
Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the
procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden
in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to
file in the United States.
What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the
United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to
Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the
time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines — by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In
short, the contract of services is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.
Following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the
marriage, divorce can be granted to the spouses because they are nationals of
country whose laws allow divorce.
The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes
default pertains to the INTRINSIC validity of the contract. No conflicts rule on
essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule
followed by most legal systems is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be
governed by lex contractus (proper law of the contract). This may be:
1. lex loci voluntatis - law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or
2. lex loci intentionis - law intended by them either expressly or implicitly.
In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express
choice of law. The laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction
and one of the parties is the Iraqi government. The place of performance is also
in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether VPECI defaulted may be determined by the
laws of Iraq. But since foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved,
processual presumption will apply.
According to Article 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither
party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply
16
 guarantee.
Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that
it already paid to Rafidain Bank. Philguarantee paid.
Philguarantee sent letters to respondents demanding the full
payment of the surety bond.
Spouses Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 airline
SPS. ZALAMEA v. CA tickets from the Manila agent of Trans World Airlines, Inc
(TWA) for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets
were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their
daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented
confirmed reservations.
Petitioners checked in but were placed on the wait-list
because the number of passengers who had checked in
before them had already taken all the seats available on the
flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names
were eventually allowed to board. Mr. Zalamea, holding the
full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the
plane, while his wife and daughter were denied boarding. The
two could not be accommodated so they had to book in
another flight and purchased 2 tickets from American Airlines.
It was argued that overbooking of flights is common and
accepted practice of US airlines and specifically allowed in the
Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
UNITED AIRLINES v. CA Fontanilla bought from the US, through the Philippine Travel
Bureau in Manila, 3 tickets to the US for himself, his wife and
his minor son. All flights had been confirmed previously by
United Airlines. Having used the first coupon to DC, and while
at the Washington DC Airport, Aniceto changed their
itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was
issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the
words: “Check-in-required.” They were then set to leave but
were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked.
In an action for damages, United Airlines argued that the laws
of the USA on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on
Oversales applies.
KOREA TECH v. LERMA Korea Technologies, a Korean corporation, entered into a
contract with Pacific General Steel, a domestic corporation,
whereby Korea Tech undertook to ship and install in Pacific
General’s site in Carmona, Cavite the machinery and facilities
necessary for manufacturing LPG cylinders, and to initially
operate the plant after it is installed. Subsequently, the
parties executed an Amendment in Korea regarding the terms
of payment.
The plant, after completion of installation, could not be
operated by Pacific General due to its financial difficulties
affecting the supply of materials. The last payments made by
Pacific General to Korea Tech consisted of postdated checks
which were dishonored upon presentment. According to
Pacific General, it stopped payment because Korea Tech had
delivered a hydraulic press which was different in kind and of
lower quality than that agreed upon.
Korea Tech also failed to deliver equipment parts already paid
for by it. It threatened to cancel the contract with Korea Tech
and dismantle the Carmona plant. It also insisted that their
in a proper manner what is incumbent upon him.
In this case, SOB cannot yet demand complete performance from VPECI because
it has not yet itself performed its obligation in a proper manner, particularly the
payment of the 75% of the cost of the Project in US Dollars. The VPECI cannot
yet be said to have incurred in delay. Even assuming that there was delay and
that the delay was attributable to VPECI, still the effects of that delay ceased
upon the renunciation by the creditor, SOB, which could be implied when the
latter granted several extensions of time to the former. Besides, no demand has
yet been made by SOB against the respondent contractor.
Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that
such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in the deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of the said code
was presented.
Even if the claimed US Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was
issued should be applied by the court where the passenger are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Since ticket were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in
this case would be Philippine law.
No, according to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where
a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and
validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to the rule
even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place
where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant.
Although the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the
tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the
tickets were “rewritten” in DC; however, such fact did not change the nature of
the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.
Yes. Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where the
contract is made governs - Lex loci contractus (SC applied Phil. law but
erroneously said that lex contractus is same as lex loci celebrationis). The
contract in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, our laws
ought to govern. Nonetheless, Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the validity
of mutually agreed arbitral clause or the finality and binding effect of an arbitral
award. Art. 2044 provides, “Any stipulation that the arbitrators award or
decision shall be final, is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and
2040.”
The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties.
It has not been shown to be contrary to any law, or against morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. There has been no showing that the
parties have not dealt with each other on equal footing. There is no reason why
the arbitration clause should not be respected and complied with by both
parties.
17
 dispute be settled by arbitration as provided by Article 15 of
their contract — the arbitration clause. Korea Tech initiated
arbitration before the Korea Commercial Arbitration Board in
Seoul, Korea

PCL SHIPPING v. NLRC Rusel was employed as a seaman by manning agency, PCL The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
Shipping, for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the
Marine. Philippines or abroad.

While Rusel was cleaning the vessel’s kitchen, he slipped, and
as a consequence, he suffered a broken or sprained ankle on
his left foot. A request for medical examination was flatly
denied by the captain of the vessel.
Feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the
vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore. He was brought
to a hospital where he was confined for 8 days.
The petitioners fired Rusel without informing him in writing of
the charges against him and that they failed to conduct a
formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side.
Thus, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PCL
Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the NLRC.
Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into by and between
petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the Philippines with
the approval of the POEA. Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing
rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.
Before a seaman can be dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required
that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against him and that he
be afforded a formal investigation where he could defend himself personally or
through a representative. Hence, the employer should strictly comply with the
twin requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the nature and situs
of employment or the nationality of the employer.

In their answer, petitioners alleged that Rusel I guilty of

abandonment and contends that the twin requirements of
notice and hearing applies strictly only when the employment
is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly
observed in cases of international maritime or overseas
employment.

18