Globalization and Inequality PDF

Globalization and Inequality.
Issues of Conceptualization and Explanation

Author(s): Göran Therborn
Source: Soziale Welt, 52. Jahrg., H. 4 (2001), pp. 449-476
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Globalizationand Inequality
Issues of Conceptualizationand Explanation
By Goran Therborn
The titleof thispaperrefersto threesetsof fundamentalissueswhichare stillcontroversial

andunsettled notto speakof social citizens.Two arebasicallycon-
amongsocial scientists,
ceptualortheoretical,one is bothconceptualandempirical.
- First,whatis globalization?How shoulditbe conceptualized?
- Second,whatkindsofinequality ones,and
whatarethemostpertinent
canbe distinguished,
ofinequality?
whatbasicsocialprocessesareinvolvedin theproduction
- Third,andmostimportant thatwe are
ofall,howshouldtheglobaloutcomesofinequality
and be What
observing experiencing explained? forces
and can
processes account
forthem?
None of thethreequestionsabove has,and maybe expectedto get,one straight answer.
to a clarification
The aims of thispaperare to contribute and theirimplica-
of alternatives
tions,to arguea certainconceptual viewpoint,
-analytical and to providesomeempiricalar-
guments approachtotheproduction
fora multi-faceted ofinequality in theworld.Globaliza-
tionand inequalityare twocrossroadsof thesocial sciencesand of social philosophy. The
presentauthorapproachesthemfromhisbackground as a sociologistanda politicalscientist.
1. WhatIs Globalization?
Basically,therearethreeanswersto thisquestion.The mostobviousandthemostsimpleis:
globalization youwantitto be. Thisis a consistently
is whatever nominalist answer.A con-
ceptis a tool,notan essence.However,thatansweris subjecttotwoimmediate reservations,
one withregardto communication, theotherto cognition.Firstly, ifyouwantto communi-
catewithotherpeople,an idiosyncraticallyoriginaldefinition
is oflittlevalue.Secondly,the
use ofnewconceptsshouldbe motivated bytheircontribution to newknowledge.The con-
ceptofglobalization hadbetterindicatesomethingnewinthisworld.
A secondgood answerwouldbe to situatetheconceptin actualcurrent discourses,and
fromthereperhapscontinueto specifyindividual Sincethelate1980s,thenotion
definitions.
ofglobalizationhas emergedin at leastfivesubstantialtypesofdiscourse.The centralone is
economic,referring to new patternsof trade,investment, production,and enterprise.A sec-
ond commonone, usuallyderivedfromthefirst,is socio-political, focusingon thedimin-
ishedroleof thestateandthestate-bound society.Thirdly, globalizationhas emergedas the
centreof a socio-critical
discourseandprotest - as thenew,or thecurrent formof,inimical
forces,as theenemyof socialjusticeand culturalvalues.Morespecialized,butalso signifi-
cant,are twootherdiscourses.Thereis a culturalone of anthropology and culturalstudies,
highlightingglobalizationas culturalflows,culturalencounters, and culturalhybridity.Fi-
nally,intheformofglobalresponsibility, globalizationis partofan ecologicaldiscourseand
of planetaryenvironmental concerns.Each of thesediscoursestendsto be drivenby a dy-
namicofitsown,withlittleorno side-glances at theothers.
A thirdanswerto thequestion"Whatis globalization?" wouldbe a reflexiveone,saying
that"globalization is beingconceivedindifferent
ways,butforthepurposesof social scien-
tificanalysisI thinkthisone is themostfruitful,
forthefollowing
reasons."
In thisvein,we mayproposethefollowingdefinition.
As an instrumentof social theory
andanalysistheconceptof globalization
shouldmeetthreecriteria. it shouldhavea
Firstly,
Soziale Welt52 (2001), S. 449 - 476

450 GöranTherborn
precisemeaning, preferablynota semantically one. Secondly,it shouldbe useable

arbitrary
andit shouldhave a widerangeofpossibleapplication.
in empiricalinvestigations, Finally,
and shouldnotcontainanya prioristatements
it shouldbe abstract of concretecontent. On
thebasisof theseconsiderations,I regardit as fruitful
to defineglobalizationas referring to
tendenciestowardsa worldwide reach,impact,or connectedness ofsocialphenomena or to-
wardsa world-encompassing awarenessamongsocial actors.Thisdefinition is close to the
etymology of theword.It makestheconceptan empiricalvariable,thepresenceof which
maybe ascertained orrefutedandin principle measured.Anditis agnosticandwideopenas
to thepossibleconcretepatternsofglobalization, as wellas non-committed a priorias to the
questionwhether is goodorbad.
globalization
Butglobalization is morethana concept.It is also an analytical- andmorebroadlya dis-
cursive- focusor perspective. As suchit is used in somemajorviewsof theworld,which
maybe capturedwiththehelpof twodimensions or variableswhichare thencross-tabulat-
ed. One ofthemmaybe called"dimensionality". It refersto howthecurrent contentof glo-
balizationis perceived:as overwhelmingly, fundamentally, primarilyone- economic,cul-
tural,or ecological- , or as irreducibly,
possiblycontradictorily multifaceted.The otherone
couldbe named"historicity". Globalizationmaybe takenas constituting a basic rupturein
modernhumanhistory andin thissenseas unique,or,alternatively, as eithera newwave of
an olderhistoricalphenomenon oras a currentmanifestation ofalwaysongoingprocessesof
socialchange.
Table 1: ViewsofGlobalization
^--^ Unidimensional Multidimensional

Historicity -^^^
1. Economic/Cultural 2. SociologicalRupturalists
Uniqueness
* n ,. .
Rupturalists
Recurrence 3. EconomicHistorians 4. SociologicalHistorians
Note:Thislayout bya similar

wasinspired byJohn
ideaputforward Goldthorpe 2000atour
inOctober
workshop on"GlobalProcesses
ofInequality".
Of thosefourmainpositionson globalization thefourth one holdsthegreatestcognitive

promise. Its historical
approach leads to historical
fruitful comparisons, so farperhapsmost
clearlyto a comparison of current
globalization processeswiththeglobalizingwave lasting
fromthesecondhalfof the 19thcentury untilWordWarII, butas well withearlierwaves,
fromtheestablishment of the"worldreligions"and theconquestof theAmericasonwards.
How muchrupture thecurrent wave entailsis leftopenas an empiricalquestionrather than
assertedfromtheoutset.True,complexity and circumspectionare notalwaysscientific vir-
tues- thetreesmayobscuretheforest - , butby focusingon theglobalization of onlyone
kindofphenomena one loses sightoftheoccurrence ofdifferent, globalprocess-
conflicting
es, e.g.,ofcapitalism,ofculture, ofnormativity (humanrights).
numberof aspectsof social life.It can
can coveran infinite
As a variable,globalization
in
vary degree of from
extension, multi-continental
only to strictly
planetary.Andit can be
drivenby differentdynamics.In sum,theconceptrefersto a plurality of social processes,
andthewordhadtherefore be usedin theplural:globalizations.
better
The multidimensional^ of globalizationmaybe illustrated somekeyso-

byhighlighting
cial variableswhichI havefoundusefulas a simplecompassofsystematicityin comparative
socialanalysis(e.g.,Therborn mayentail:
1995).In thisvein,globalization

andInequality
Globalization 45 1
- processesof social structuring,

i.e.,thedivisionoflabour,theallocationof rights,
thedis-
ofwealthandincome,thepatterning
tribution ofrisksandopportunitiesovertime.
- Itmayalso includeprocessesofenculturation,
oftheshapingofidentities,ofdefinitions
and
of knowledge,of theconstitution
distributions of
of values and the institutionalization
norms,oftheconstructionandreceptionofsymbolicforms.
- Thirdly, mayinvolvesocial action,be it one-wayactionor interaction,
globalization dis-
persedindividualactionorcollectiveaction,concertorconflict.
maybe seenas eitherinteractive
The dynamicoftheseglobalizations or systemic,enacted
or
byexogenously byendogenously shaped or
actors, as
alternatively a mixture of both(see
further
Therborn2000a).
However,in orderto understand globalizationas a causal forcewe had betterspecifyit
processes.Forthepurposeofexplaining
intoa setofglobalortransnational inequalityin the
worldat leastthreekindsof suchprocessesseemcrucial:first, themouldingof bothactors
and theirconditionsby past transnational
history, second,current flowsof trade,capital,
people,andinformation,andthird,current
entanglements or imbrications
oflocal andglobal
Moreaboutthesekindsofglobalprocessesbelow.
actorsandinstitutions.
Current globalizations unique,otherthanin thetrivialsensethatevery
arenothistorically
eventmaybe calledunique.Takenin thesenseof tendencies towardsa globalreachor im-
waves,thefirstbeingthediffusion
pact,I thinkwe candiscernat leastsixmajorhistorical of
worldreligionsandtheestablishment oftranscontinental concentrated
civilizations, inthe4th
CE. So farall thewavespeteredoutaftersometime.Theywerefollowedby
to 7thcenturies
longeror shorter But thewaves did notfollowupon or from
periodsof de-globalization.
each other,whichmeansthatthecontraction of one wave mayhave coincidedin timewith
theriseofanother.
Thereis, as faras I can see,no evidenceofanything properly cyclicalin thewavesofglo-
buttheydo tendtohavecertaincommonfeatures.
balization, Theywereall multidimension-
economic,and culturalforcesand processes,whileeach had
al, involvingpolitico-military,
onedominant dynamic.So far,theriseofthewavesderivedfromautonomous actorsextend-
ingtheirinfluence and impact,notfroman intensification of systemicprocesses.But each
wave tendedto createa certainglobalsystemness, be itof a worldreligiousculture, an em-
pire,a worldmarket, ora systemofworldconflict. Whenthewavesubsided,andevenmore
whenit was followedby a phaseof de-globalization, thatsystemness was weakenedor lost
(Therborn 2000a). Thereis, in otherwords,littlereasonto considercurrent as
globalization
theendoftheroadofsocialhistory.
2. (In)EqualityofWhat?BetweenWhom?How?
These are hardlytimesin whichequalityis a self-evident
good amongthenon-privileged.
havetoarguetheircase,infaceofindividualandculturalvariety,
Egalitarians andin relation
to individualism,
difference, and to a comebackof geneticism.
multiculturalism,
pluralism,
A fullethicalargumentwillnotbe attemptedhere,andthefollowing startsoutfroma moral
axiom- theaxiomofthefundamentally equal valueofeachandeveryhumanbeing,qua hu-
manbeing.However,giventhisethicalpremiseofequal humanvalueand giventheempiri-
cal factofimmensehumanvariety, whatinequalitiesaresociallyandmorallyimportant?
The bestanswersto thatquestion,I think, derivefromthehumancapabilityof function-
ingsand doings,and fromsocial designability.The former concepthas beendevelopedby
Amartya Sen (1992;2000) as an individualist alternative
egalitarian itrefers
toutilitarianism;
toinequality
withregardto thequalityoflife,thebeingsanddoingsthata personis capable

452 GöranTherborn
of.The latterconcepthas notyetbeenexplicitly

theorized
as a principle,
butitrefersto the
suprageneticculturalcapacityofhumanstocreatea widevarietytoviablesocieties.1
Whatis worthstressinghereas a conclusionfromthenewcapabilitiesapproachis thefun-
ofbasicinequality.
damentalmultidimensionality In thesamewayas globalizationis notre-
ducibletoworldtradeandcapitalflows,globalprocessesofpertinent arenotre-
(in)equality
of nationalGDP per capitaor of individualor householdincome,
ducibleto distributions
howeverimportant thesemaybe. FromSen's generalargument one mayproceedin thedi-
rectionof specifying
concreteindicators,as in theUN HumanDevelopment Reportsand
theirHumanDevelopmentIndex,2or of drawingup "listsof centralcapabilities"3 (Nuss-
baum2000,pp. 78-80)oralternatively of"leveloflivingcomponents"4.
Butwe mayalso fora moment chooseto moveto a lowerlevelofabstraction whilestay-
ing on thegroundsof generalanalyticaltheory, aimingat something moregeneraland/or
manageablethana setof indicators or a lengthylistof elements.The inequalityofcapabili-
ties- oroflifechances,touse a classicalconcept- maythenbe takenas thesumofresourc-
es and environments. Both resourcesand environments are pertinent
to the capabilityto
achievebeingsanddoingsthata personhas reasontovalue.Butwhileresourcesmaybe dis-
tributedindividually,environments indicatetheabsenceor presenceof contextsof access
of choice.The pertinent
and of possibilities environments, in turn,maybe subdividedinto
vitalandexistentialones,theformer pertainingto theenvironment ofhumanorganisms, the
lattertothemilieuofhumanexistence.
then,I wouldarguethattherearethreekindsofinequalities
In brief, amonghumanswhich
aremostimportant:
- Vitalinequality
referstoinequality oflifeexpectancy
andhealthinthefirstplace,butitmay
also refertoothervitalqualitiesofenvironmentsandtheirdistribution.
- Existential
inequality andpolitically
is socially,morally, - anddistinguishable
significant
fromtheexistentialdifference betweenhumanindividuals - to theextentthatitis catego-
Racism,sexism,social hierarchies
rizedand institutionalized. of casteor class are telling
examples.
1) In structuralmarxism, theclass structure withitscoreofexploitation has alwaysbeenthefocusof

theorizingaboutinequality, as clearlydistinguished fromindividualchancesofmobility within a giv-
en structureofpositions."Designability" is a morepolicy-orientedformulation ofthesameidea,al-
ludingtoa recentmajorrestatement ofvariablesocialstructurationofinequality (Fischeretal. 1996).
2) The HumanDevelopment Indexis a compoundof lifeexpectancy, educationalattainment (literacy
plusenrolment in secondary andtertiaryeducation),and(a discounted valueof) GDP percapita(at
purchasing powerparities).
3) Nussbaum'slistcomprises:life,ofnormallength;bodilyhealth;bodilyintegrity, againstassaultand
againstsexualorreproductive discrimination; andthought,
senses,imagination, i.e.,beingabletouse
thesein a "trulyhumanway";emotions,i.e., beingable to have attachments, freedomfromover-
whelming fearandtrauma;practicalreason,i.e.,beingable to formconceptions ofthegood; affilia-
tion,including thesocialbasesof self-respect andnon-humiliation;otherspecies,i.e.,beingable to
live withconcernfornature;play,i.e., beingable to laugh,play,andrecreateoneself;controlover
one's environment, politicalandmaterial.
4) FromtheSwedishandScandinavian Level ofLivingSurveysa relevant, empirically manageablelist
of(in)equalitiescan also be drawn,withtencomponents: healthandaccessto healthcare;
nutrition;
employment andconditions ofwork;economicresources; knowledge andaccesstoeducation;family
and social relations;housingand neighbourhood services;recreationandculture;safetyof lifeand
property;politicalresources.

andInequality
Globalization 453
- Resourceinequalityrefers ofresourcesheldvaluablein a social system,

to thedistribution
money,power,etc.It can also includesocialdrawingrights,
be itland,camels,education,
whether suchrights or welfarestateentitlements.
arekinshipobligations
Amongscholarsof theglobalincomedistribution thereis an ongoingdebateon whether

thelattershouldbe measuredaccordingto currency exchangeratesor accordingto domestic
purchasing power,estimatedby so-calledpurchasing powerparities(PPS). This is a more
thantechnicalissue sincethetwo measuresprovideverydifferent picturesof whatis cur-
rentlyhappening to income inequalityin theworld. In terms of exchangerates,thegap be-
tweenrichandpoornationshas widenedenormously in thelastdecadesof the20thcentury.
In 1960GNP percapitain thecountries makingup therichestfifth of theworldpopulation
was 30 timesthatofthepoorestfifth, in 199060 times,andin 199774 times(UNDP 1999,p.
3). Butcalculatedin PPS, thefactorofmultiplication betweenrichandpoordecreasedfrom
15 in 1965to 13 in 1998(calculatedfromMelchioret al. 2000,p. 45). For mostpurposesof
comparing theeconomicresourcesofhouseholdsthedomesticpurchasing poweris thebest
measure,butits estimation is open to methodological questioning,and forsome analyses,
sayofdebtburdensandconditions ofinternationaltradeandtravel,theactualexchangerates
aremoreadequate(cf.Wade 2001).
2.1. InequalityBetweenWhom?
All talkaboutinequalityrefersto inequalitybetweencertaincategoriesof people.This is

worthnoticingbecause thepertinent categoriesare variable,and have indeedvariedover
timeand space. Inequalitybetweendescentgroups,families,lineages,races,and between
broadoccupational groupings,castes,estates,classeshas beenofancientattention.
Inequali-
tiesbetweennations,genders,age groups,regions,andamonghumankind as a wholeare of
muchmorerecentpublicinterest. Onlya relatively smallnumberofcategories, outofan al-
mostlimitlesssupplyof potentialones,have becomerelevant.Skincolouryes,buthardly
hairor eye colour;descentin termsof ethnicgroupsyes,buthardlyin termsof territorial
groupssuchas differentprovincesor cities.Inequalitybetweenindividualoccupationsis of-
tenheldto be important,buthardlybetweenannualbirthcohorts - say,betweenthoseborn
in 1940andthosebornin 1946- ; betweenbroadage groupsandgenerations yes,butnotbe-
tween,say,twenty-nine-year-olds and thirty-seven-year-olds.
Nevertheless, thenumberof
frequentlyused categoriesof comparison has becomesufficiently largeto arousecompeti-
tionforattention.
The implication
ofglobalization amonga globalhumankind
is,ofcourse,thatinequality is
comingmoreintofocus.Post-WorldWarII developmentalism broughtintopublicattention
betweenthenationsof theworld.The current
theinequality wave of globalization
is begin-
ningto bringotherhumancategoriesintothereachof globalcomparison: women,thechil-
drenoftheworld,householdsacrosstheglobe,etc.
of worldincomeis notnecessarilythesame if we conceptualizeit as a

The distribution
betweennations,say of GNP per capita,or if we look at householdincome
distribution
acrosstheglobe.Between-country and within-country
developments maywell be different.
From1965to 1992between-country increased
inequality considerably,whilewithin-country
on thewholetendedtodecline.The former
inequality ofthetwo(Ko-
trendwas thestronger
rzeniewics/Moran1997,p. 16). In the1990s,themaindevelopment was theopposite,with
themostpopulouspoorcountries - Chinaand SouthAsia- catchingup somewhatthrough
vigorousnationalgrowththereby reducingbetween-country butwithincreasing
inequality,
internal
inequalityoutgrowingthattrendand pushingworldinequality upwards(Milanovic
2000; Cornia2001; UN 2000,tableAl).

454 GöranTherborn
However,thereare also otherissues. Individualsand householdsare partof communi-

ties- ethnically, or otherwisely
religiously,territorially defined- , and inter-community
equalityis an importantpartofmanypeople'sconception ofjustice,albeitoftenneglectedin
theinternationalacademicandpolicyliterature (Kanbur2000,p. 825). On theotherhand,in-
creasinginternationalattentionhas recently paidtointra-household
been equality,inparticu-
larbetweenboysandgirls,menandwomen.
A concernwithinequality, in contrastto one withpoverty, is a concernwithhow society
as a wholeis structured,
notjustwiththeoutcomeforthosewhoare worstoff.5As suchthe
former is moregearedto theself-organization and mobilization of thedisadvantaged them-
selves,tosocialconflict
andlarge-scalesocialchange,thanis thelatterwithitsmorenatural-
In egalitarian
orientation.
ly philanthropic politicsit maybe easierto focusprimarilyon the
inequalityoftherichas a targetof social criticism.However,froman egalitarian moralper-
spectiveitmaybe heldthattheinequality of thepooris themoreimportant one and consti-
tutesthemostimportant taskforeffort to change,as theinequality of thepoortendsto ex-
cludethemfromfullparticipation in mainstream society.
To theextentthatyouagreewiththisargument, thishas someanalyticalimplications. It
makesmeasuresofrelativepoverty particularly
pertinentas measuresofinequality. On a na-
tionallevel,thisis nowoftengaugedbytheproportion ofthepopulation havinga disposable
incomeof less thanhalfof thenationalmedian.Sometimesit is also tappedby theratioof
themedianincometo thatoftheninetieth percentile.
Although theydo tendto correlate sig-
theinequality
nificantly, oftherichandtheinequality of thepoorcan varyindependently of
each other.The extraordinaryinequalityof LatinAmericais, above all, an inequalityof the
poorestthirty percent,receiving(relatively)less thantheircounterpartsin Africaor else-
where,butitis also,especiallyin somecountries likeChileandMexico,an inequality ofthe
mostprivileged tenpercent(Inter- AmericanDevelopment Bank 1998,pp. 11, 16).
2.2. Formsand MechanismsofInequality

Fundamental shouldnotonlybe takenas a starting-point
questionsof inequality forethical
on justiceand freedom.Theyalso raiseempiricalissuesof social organization.
reflections
Thatis: Whatformsofinequality do we face?How aretheyproduced?We maycall thisthe
modeofvalueproduction, to processesofdefining
referring valuableresourcesandenviron-
mentsandpatterning theirgeneration.
Key questionswithregardto themodeof valueproduction thenumberof

include,firstly,
achievements or possessionsheldto be of highvalue,and,secondly,thequestionwhether
and to whatextentvaluesare convertible intoeach other.If thereis one supremevalue,say
money,or if moneyand all othervaluesare easilyconvertible intoeach other,we getonly
one scale ofinequality,
a verticalmonetary ladder.Iftherearetwoor morevalueswhichare
to convertintoeach other,suchas, e.g.,in PierreBourdieu's(1979)distinction
difficult be-
tweeneconomicand culturalresources, we getdiffering,segmented formsof inequality
(cf.
Walzer1983).
5) It needsto be emphasizedthattheincreasing oftheissueofpoverty

recognition in-
byinternational
is notperse thesamethingas a concernwithinequality
stitutions andthesocialfabricas humanen-
vironment. Chile underthePinochetdictatorshipwas in manyways an international beacon of
neoliberalism, and theChileanregime'shandlingof thedomesticeconomiccrisisof 1982-84is a
noteworthy case. Thegovernment's favoured
policies,unsurprisingly, decileof
ofall therichest
first
thepopulation. Bailingthemoutoftheirdebtsamounted to fivepercentofGDP. Atthesametime,
foodsubsidieshelpedthepoorestdecileas well.The big losersweretheunemployed andothersin
thesecondandthirddeciles(Bourguignon /Morrisson in Chilejumpedfrom
1992,p. 43). Inequality
a Giniindexof53 in 1980to59 in 1989(Londoño/Székely 1997,p. 40).

andInequality
Globalization 455
The resultingformsof inequalitymaybe distinguishedaccordingto thenumberof social

closuresand accordingto whether vertical,closingtheinferiors
theclosureis primarily off
fromthesuperior, closingtheinsidersofffromtheoutsiders.The latterdis-
or horizontal,
ofcoursetendsto havesomeoverlap,theoutsiders
tinction butthisis
tendingto be inferior,
notalwaysthecase, and thedifferent emphases are nevertheless
distinguishable. By cross-
thenumberof closureson theone handand thecharacter
tabulating of theclosure(vertical
orhorizontal) formsofinequality.
on theotherwe geta tableofthedifferent
Table2: Basic Formsof Inequality
^^-^^ PrimaryOrdering
fí , ^"^'^^ Vertical(Superior/Inferior)Horizontal(Inside/Outside)
Closures
^>v^'^
Single(Monopoly) /Polarization
Domination Exclusion/Marginalization
Multiple(Differentiation) Hierarchy Segmentation
Whiledomination usuallyconnotesa politicaldivisionof powerandpolarizationone of

economicresourcesandactors'orientations,
hierarchy maybe bothan organizationalstruc-
ladder,forinstanceofincome.
tureandan informal
of exclusionmay,of course,excludea numberof differ-
The singleclosurecharacteristic
entsetsofpeoplefromtakingpartin a prosperous them.Citizenship,
society,or marginalize
or rather
denizenship - has becomea major
- thelegal rightof residencein a giventerritory
formof exclusion,notjust of segmentation,dividingaliensfromtheproperinhabitants,in-
creasinglyimportant because of the morehierarchical interconnected
and hierarchically
world.
Segmentationis yetanotherformof inequality, horizontal

primarily ratherthanvertical
andnotnecessarilyrequiring closure.
anycategorical Multiculturalismmayfunction byseg-
mentation,andso maylife-style
differentiation. politicscan be segmented
Identity as wellas
exclusive.
look like?,but:How is
However,thecrucialquestionoftenis not:Whatdoes inequality
produced?Whatsocial mechanisms
inequality areoperative?Whyis theretheinequality
we
see?
Whatwe needtogeta handleon is thekindofsocialinteraction whichyieldsa certaindis-
outcome.Thisinteraction
tributive seemsto be hungbetweentwopoles.Attheone pole we
have thedistanceproducedby A running ahead of B because of A' s betterpreconditions,
moretraining,luckystart,orhardereffort.
No interactionbetweenA andB producesthedis-
tancebetweenthem,butA and/orB, as well as theironlookers,mayfindit important. We
Attheotherpole A obtainshisinequal-
mayrefertotheprocessat thatpole as distanciation.
ityoverB becauseofthevaluesthatB provideshimwith.Atthispole we haveinequality by
Exploitation
exploitation. (see further
Tilly1998)involvesa categorical divisionbetweenthe
andtheinferior,
superior thelatterhavingto producevaluesfortheformer, or,alternatively,
thestronger fromtheweakeran unfairamountofvalue,accordingto somebench-
extracting
mark(Miller1999,p. 5).
Whatis inbetweendistanciation andexploitation
is notjusta continuum.
We maydiscern
twootherkindsofmechanisms producing Exclusionmeansbarring
inequalities. theadvance
oraccess ofothers.As an explanatorymechanism, exclusionhadbetterbe seenas a variable
rather
thanas a category,as a setofhurdlesbeingplacedinfront ofsomepeople,a setwhich

456 GöranTherborn
includeshindrancesof varioussortsas wellas closedgates.We mayalso havea kindofin-

equalityderivingfromsomeinstitutionalizedranking ofsocialactors,somehigh,otherslow.
Thisis inequality
bysuper-and subordination.
Thosefourmechanisms arecumulative.
Theyforma step-by-step staircaseintothehellor
paradiseof inequality,dependingon fromwhoseend you look at it: fromthatof thepun-
ishedorthatoftherewarded. Exclusionmaymeanno morethanbarring access tothosewho
do notbelong,thosewhoare notmembers anynecessaryverticalrank-
or citizens,without
ing.For inequalitiesotherthansheersegmentation, however,themechanism of exclusion
becomeseffective andimportant to theextentthattheexcludingbarriersorhindering obsta-
cles aresetup bythosein somesenseaheadoftheothers, orbythoseinsidesomething valu-
able to thoseoutside.A commonaspectof exclusionis themarginalizationof thoseexclud-
ed,theirbeingpushedawayfromthecentreofvaluestothemarginsofsociety.
Forsuper-andsubordination tobe institutionalized
somebarring dividebetweenthesupe-
riorand theinferior mustbe in place. This does notimplyanynecessarychronological se-
quence. The orderis ratherlogical:whileexclusion without super-/subordinationis conceiv-
able, this is not truethe otherway round.Subordination entailsbeing excludedfrom
something. Exploitation,finally,presupposesdistanciation, exclusion,and institutionalized
andthenaddson topofall thatan extraction
superiority/inferiority, ofresourcesfromthein-
ferior.In contrastto plunderand robbery, exploitation formof social
is an institutionalized
interaction.
andexploitation
Exclusion,super-/subordination, mechanisms
areall transitive ofinequal-
ity,mechanisms which,incontrast todistanciation,
directly thedisadvantaged.
disadvantage
we shouldexpectthereto be mechanisms
Since equalityis theoppositeof inequality, of
orequalization,
equality, corresponding tothoseofinequality.We maytabulatethemtogeth-
er.
Table3: Mechanisms
of(In)Equality
Mechanisms
ofInequality Mechanisms
ofEquality
Distanciation, ahead
i.e.,running Capacitation
Compensatory
ÏÏSbarriers'hu*' **^ ~~
g^cSSìniSm11^ "EntiU^nt,
Empowerment
ofresources
extraction
Exploitation: Redistribution
For a fullyfledgedtheoryof theproduction of inequalitiesthoseconceptualizations will

certainlyrequirefurther
elaboration, We needto under-
of theirinterrelations.
in particular
standtherelationsoperatingbetweenthemechanisms producing inequalityandtheformsof
in
inequality, thesense for
that, instance, distanciation
may create a wellas hier-
polarization
archy.Butthistaskwillbe leftto otherpapers.Insteadwe shallheretakea firstlookat how
thetoolsdevelopedso farmaythrowsomeexplanatory lighton theinequalitiesoftheworld.

andInequality
Globalization 457
3. GlobalOutcomes:Nationalor GlobalProcesses?
Thereis no doubtthatthisworldis starkly unequal.Global outcomesare veryunequal,of
nationalGDP percapita,ofhouseholdincome,ofgenderincome,ofnational,class,andgen-
derlifeexpectancy, Withregardto a
of national,class,and gendereducation,and so forth.
largenumber of resources,environments, and of
prospectsglobal rankings advantageand
disadvantagecan be made.6In themid-1990s theincomeofthemostprosperous tenthofthe
world'shouseholdshad morethaneightytimesthepurchasing powerof thatof thepoorest
tenth(calculatedfromWade 2001, table3). Notewell thatwe are nottalkingaboutthesu-
per-richnorabouta groupofoutcastpaupers,butabout(a littlemorethan)six hundred mil-
lionpeopleon topandsix hundred millionat thebottom.
However,it is quitea different questionwhether or nottheseglobaloutcomesare there-

sultof globalprocesses.Global outcomesneed notbe globallyproduced.Whetherand to
whatextenttheyare is an empiricalquestion.A prioritheycouldas wellbe theresultof lo-
cal or nationalprocesses,providing local ornationalactorswithdifferent resources,energy,
skill,andluck.Globalinequality wouldthenresultfromdistanciation on a globalscale,from
somelocal actorsoutrunning all theothers.If I rana race againsta setof globalathletes,I
wouldcertainly comelast.Butthatwouldbe theeffectof myownlife-course, as a non-ath-
leticscholar,andnotofanyglobalprocessofathletics.
Subsuming, forreasonsofmanageablecomplexity,all subnational

processesundertheru-
bricof"national" - , globalinequalities
- in thesenseofstate-bounded maybe thought ofas
emergingfromvariouscombinations oftheglobalandthenational.Let us listonlythemajor
alternatives.
Table4: MajorGlobal-NationalCombinations GlobalInequality

Producing
/.MainlyNationalForcesofInequality:
intra-state
processesof inequality
plus inter-state by unequalgrowthand
distanciation,
advance,but also includingthe possibilitiesof global processesof inequality,
or of
equality,weakerthanthenationalonesofinequality.
2. GlobalHistoryandNationalInequality:
forthepresentas in case 1,buttakingintoaccountthatvirtually
all existingstateshave
beenshapedbytransnational processes.
3. MainlyTransitive GlobalProcessesofInequality:
processesofexclusion,supe^/subordination,
and/or exploitation,
overwhelming nation-
al efforts
at equality,alternatively
further
supported bynationalforces
of inequality.
Each of thethreesetsof combinations is capableof producingthesameglobalpictureor

outcomeof inequality.Whichof themis thecorrectexplanationforexistinginequalities
thereforehas greatimplications,
bothmorallyand politically,althoughstarkinequalitiesin
theworldof whatever originshouldbe of moralconcernto everybody believingthatevery
humanbeingshouldhave a chanceto a decentlife.The issue is further complicatedby the
recognitionthatinequalitycan be of different
kinds.We have no reasonto assumea priori
that,say,vital,existential
and resourceinequalitiesin theworldare producedby thesame
dynamic.
6) In a paperparalleltothisI applythetencomponents
oftheSwedishleveloflivingstudiestotheglo-
A draftofthatpaperwas presented
bal situation. at a conference
at SaltsjöbadenoutsideStockholm
inOctober2000 (Therborn 2000b).

458 GöranTherborn
3.1. An ExplanatoryFramework
In ordertogetan initialhandleon howtoexplainglobalinequality, we havetostartfromthe
nation-stateand state-boundednationaleconomyand societyas theprimary immediate de-
terminant ofpeople'slevelsofliving.A nationin thissenseis byno meansa closedsystem,
andtheprimacyofthenationmaywellbe erodingandmaywellhavebeenoutweighed as a
determinant oftheleveloflivingofcertainsocialcategories. However,thenationstillseems
tobe themostadequatebuildingblockfromwhichtoconstruct a causalchain.Boundariesof
citizenshipand, even more,of denizenship- therightof legal residence - cruciallyaffect
people's life-chances.Economicand non-economic social relationsare significantlypat-
ternedbystate-bounded economiesandsocieties.The current nation-statehas a greatcapaci-
tyof resourceallocationand redistribution, controlling
directly betweenone thirdand two
thirdsoftheGNP all thehighlydevelopedcountries.
Globalityaffects
thisnationaldetermination
ofhumancapabilitiesfromthreeangles:from
fromglobalextension,
globalhistory, andfromglobalentanglement.
All currentnation-statesand all nationaleconomiesand societieshave been populated,
cultured, bounded,and locatedin theworldby extra-national forcesand processes.Global
history weighsheavilyuponall ofthem.Thisis whereworldsystemsanalysisandtheanaly-
sis of different
routesto modernity enterthepicture.However,alongone roador another,
and in one formor another,thisglobalhistory has led to theexistenceof state-bounded
so-
cial systemswithpolitical,economic,social,and culturalproperties and dynamicsof their
own,including specificcapacitiesto makeuse oftheirlocationintheworld.Thesedynamics
makeup nationalprocessesofallocationanddistribution.
In theircurrent
functioning in theworldnationsareaffected bytwokindsof ongoingglo-
bal processes.Moststraightforward flows- ofgoodsand
areglobal,or at leasttransnational,
services,ofcapital,ofpeople,and,notto be forgotten, flowsofinformationand ideas.With
respectto vitalinequalitytransnational flowsof disease,like the plague historically
and
AIDS today,mayalso be important. Such flowshave theirown characteristic generaldy-
namic,whichis intrinsicallythesame whatever theirextension:local,national,regional,or
global.Examplesare themarket dynamicsof tradeandfinance,thepushandpullalongmi-
gratorychains,or thediffusion of knowledge.Those flowshave directdistributive effects,
suchas exploitative and includingor excludingexchange;buttheymayalso be
extraction;
followedin theirindirecteffectsuponnationaleconomies,societies,and states,including
uponthelatters'redistributivecapacity.
A secondkindof globalprocessmaybe calledglobalentanglement. to theimbri-
It refers
cationof institutions,
theintertwining setsof actors,nationaland global,local
of different
andglobal.The mosttangibleformofthisentanglement is theemergence ofresourcefulglo-
bal organizations and interacting
affecting withnationaland local governments, politicians,
andmovements. The mostpowerful amongthemaretheWorldBankandtheIMF, butthere
amongwhichtheWHO, theUnicef,theFAO, the
is also theUN familyof organizations,
ILO, and the UNESCO are the mostsignificant. In thedomainof the richcountriesthe
OECD is a significantplayer,in EuropetheEU and theCouncilof Europe,and globally
thereare thesuperpower alignments,whichwereveryimportant in theperiodof theCold
War.Non-negligible,albeitrelatively
marginal,aretheregionaldevelopment banks.
of globalinequality
We maylay outtheproduction - in a simple
- and of globalequality
modelfigure.

andInequality
Gbbalization 459
Figure1: Determinants
ofGlobal(In)Equalities
GlobalRows:
ofGoods,Capital,People,Information
/ ^f ^'
GlobalHistory: ► NationalProcesses: ► Global(In)Equalities
NaturalEndowments * State
Civilization Economy
Road toModernity Society
GlobalEntanglements:
oftheNationalandtheGlobal
The nextstepin approaching thedauntingly difficult

questionof how globalinequality is
to be explainedconsistsin sketching ofthesetsofexplanatory
a firstordering variableswith
regardto theirlikelyimportance fordifferentkindsof inequality. In ordernotto makethis
toocomplicated fromthebeginning, letus hereconcentrate on vital(lifeexpectancy)andre-
source(income)inequalities.
The issueofexistential thethirdfundamental
inequality, inequality, enteredtheglobalpo-
liticalstagein thesecondhalfof the20thcentury. The UN UniversalDeclarationof Human
Rightsof1948,theUN Convention on theEliminationofall FormsofRacialDiscrimination
of 1965,and theUN Convention on theElimination of all Formsof Discrimination against
Womenof 1979marktheentryintomainstream worldpoliticsof at leasttheconcernwith
existential Butdiscrimination
inequality. andhumanrights violationshavebyno meansbeen
eliminated.
3.2. TheWeight
ofHistory
Thatglobalhistory mouldedcontemporary
has significantly nationalpolity,economy,socie-
ty,and cultureneednotbe spelledoutat lenght,althoughsomecrucialhistorical moments
maybe specified.First,"naturalendowments" are notjust geologicalhistory; theirsignifi-
cance in worldproduction anddistributionhas beenshapedbytheavailabletechnology. As
outomesI tendto thinkthat"civilization"
to theanalysisofdistributive as a large-scalecul-
turalformation,withreligionat itshistorical
core,andthe"roadtomodernity"7 aretheother
mostimportant historical
variables.
Clearly,a majority
oftoday'snation-states
owe theiroriginstovariousexternal trans-ocean-
ic,inter-continental
forces:all theAmericas, all ofAfrica,virtually
virtually all ofAsia,witha
fewpartialexceptions,mostsignificantly
ChinaandJapan.The traumatic anddurableeffects
of colonialconquest-cum-social - characteristic
of ethniccolonialexploitation
destruction, of
boththeheartlandsofHispanicAmericaandthecoloniesofthe19th and20thcenturies,butnot
7) On the major historicalroads to modernitysee furtherTherborn1995, ch. 1.

460 GöranTherborn
ofthegenocidalsettlements inNorthAmerica, theSouthern partoftheAmericas,andAustral-

ia- , and of plantation are
slavery well established.
True,their
traceshave oftenbeenerased
frommemory amongtheirbeneficiaries,whofromtheirbases aroundtheNorthAtlantic and
on theshoresoftheNorth-EasternPacificdominate contemporarysocialscience.8
The historical legacycouldalso be analyzedin termsof differentroutesto modernity:
the
endogenous Europeanroute(embodiedin North- WesternEuropeabove all), thesettlerNew
Worlds,differentiated bygenocideor by settler theColonialZone,and thechal-
coloniality,
lengedcountries of ReactiveModernization (Therborn 1999).Withthisapproachpathsof
comparative intotheoriginsofcontemporary
investigation regionalcharacteristics
areopened
up, e.g., of theextraordinary in (ex-colonial,non-genocidal)
inequality LatinAmerica,the
particular elitismofSouthAsianeducation, thespecificallyAfricanchasmbetweenurbanand
ruralsociety, ortheexceptionallystrongAfricantendency towardspredatory states.
Buttocapturetheweightofhistoryuponcontemporary ofdistribution
patterns we needto
be moresystematic.
One approach,then,mightbe to look at therecordof the20thcentury
withregardto someparticular Let us herechoosevitaland economic
aspectsof inequality.
outcomesaround2000 resemblethoseof 1900,
The moretheglobaldistributive
inequality.
themoreweighthistoryhas haduponthem.
Life-tableswithcalculationsof life expectancyat birthdo not reachback veryfarfor
manycountries. But we do have longerseriesof infantmortality - a decisivecompo-
rates
nentoflifeexpectancy -
atbirth , albeit,likeall historical
data,subjecttoa certainmarginof
error.Data fromselectedcountries are presented in table3. (Ratesare calculatedperthou-
sand.The scarcityand unreliabilityof mostThirdWorlddata made decadal comparisons
necessaryin somecases.)
Table5: RelativeInfantMortality SelectedCountries
Rates,1900-1999,
(distancefroma benchmark,Franceeach year= 0)
I Í9ÕÕ I Í95Õ I 1999
France (162 =)0 (52 =) 0 (6=)0
Spain 52 12~ T
Russia 90 29" Ï2~
USA Ã9 ^Ï3~ r
Argentina 22a> 16 16
Mexico 180b> 44 25~
Egypt 53^~ 78" 45~

India 83^ 85~ 66~
Japan 64*T 8 -2
Sri Lanka 32^ 30" 12~
Notes:a) 1920-25comparedto Francein 1920-25.b) 1900scomparedto Francein the 1900s.c) 1920s

comparedto Francein the 1920s,d) 1910scomparedto Francein the 1910s,e) 1901-05comparedto
Francein 1901-05.
0.95
Correlations:1900-1950:0.52; 1900-1999:0.39; 1950-1999:
Sources:Chesnais1992,tablesA4.2-5;UN 2000a.
8) On pertinent
basicmechanismsinvolvedheresee Tilly1998;on categorical andthelast-
exploitation
ingeffects slaverysee Patterson
ofplantation 1998.

andInequality
Globalization 46 1
In thecourseof the20thcenturyinfantmortality,and withit lifeexpectancy,

has become
less unequalin theworld.Atthebeginning ofthe20thcentury thetotal(nine-country)
global
ofdeaths,in relationtoFrance- as a proxyforWesternEurope-
in proportions
difference,
was 597 perthousandpoints,in 1950it was 305, and in 1999,180.The standarddeviation
wentfrom55.5 via 32.1 to 21.9.
Relativemovements ofcountries werelimited,

andhistorical
background weighedheavily
upontherelativefateofinfants in thecentury
justended.Southern Europe,hererepresented
bySpain,andJapancaughtup andgotto thetop.The US lostitslead,and Mexicowas more
successfulthanmanyotherThirdWorldcountries, althoughit shouldbe noticedthatthe
Egyptianfigurein thetableis fromthe 1920s and wouldprobablyhave beenconsiderably
higherin 1900,andfurther thatthelargedistancebetweenMexicoandIndiaat thebeginning
of thecentury evenif othertimesseriesindicatethattheoveralldeathratein
is uncertain,
Mexicoin the1920sand 30s was higherthanin India.The absolutedeclineafterWorldWar
II occurredin historical
furrows.The 1950datacorrectlypredictninetypercentof the1999
data.
The weightof history is, of course,also trueforglobalincomedevelopments (and in this

respecteconomichistorians havemademuchmoreestimates thanhistorical
demographers).
As can be seenfromtable6 below,globalhistory is verymuchwithus today.The richestre-
gions in theworld in the 21st
early century arethe same as in 1820:AngloNorthAmericaand
North- WesternEurope,followedby SouthernEurope.Japanin thesecondhalfof the20th
century is theonlynewcountry tojoin theRichClub.9The 19thcentury saw thespectacular
rise of theNew Worldsof Europeansettlement, includingArgentina, and theeven more
spectacular stagnationofAsia,whileEuropeleaptahead,followingitsoverseasoffshoots. It
is worthnoticing thatJapanwas partofthegeneralAsianrelativefallback,albeitless so than
ChinaandIndia.The otherEast Asiansuccessstoriesofthelate20thcentury hadalso assert-
ed themselves betterby1900thanthetwoclassicalcentresof SouthandEast Asianciviliza-
tion.Indo-CreoleandAfro-Creole LatinAmericaalso lostoutin the19thcentury. Africabe-
fore1900defiedeventheheroicefforts of AngusMaddison,butit was clearlyverypoorby
1900,and Sub-SaharanAfricawas clearlyrelatively impoverished in thesecondhalfof the
The
century. chronology in the tablebelow does not quite justiceto theeffectsof Com-
do
munismin Russia.In spiteofbeingthevictimofdevastating warsRussiaachieveda certain
catch-up. Whereasin 1913RussianGDP percapitawas 28 percentofthatoftheUS, in 1973
itcameup to 36 percent(Maddison1995).
True,relativemovement ofcountries werepossiblein the20thcentury. BritainandArgen-

tinadeclinedsignificantly,
likeSub-SaharanAfrica,whileFinlandand Korea rose,likeJa-
pan. Chinaand otherAsian countries are currentlybouncingback.The recentriseof East
Asia accountsforthefactthattheweakesthistorical is thatbetweenGDP in 1950
correlation
andin 1999.Buton thewholewe stilllive in a globalincomepattern whichwas established
in the 18thand early19thcenturies.
Our data from1820correctly predict72 percentof the
1999situation,and withour1900figureswe can predict67 percentof thepattern a century
- a pattern
later withtheWesternEuropeanand Europeansettlement New Worldson top,
theex-ColonialZones of Africaand Asia at thebottom, and thenon-colonized countriesof
ReactiveModernization and mixturesof settlement and colonialism,like mostof Latin
America,inbetween, butwitha significantlate20thcenturyadvantageoftheEast Asianarea
ofReactiveModernization. Dispersionincreasedfroma standard deviationof25.8 in 1900to
29.3 in 1999.
9) Thatis,disregarding
sometinyoil sheikdoms
likeKuwaitandQataras wellas theentrepôt
city-state
ofSingapore.

462 GöranTherborn
Table6: RelativeGDP perCapitaintheWorld,1820-1999

(index:USA eachyear= 100)
I 1820 I 1900 I 1950 I 1999
USA 100 100 100 100
WesternEurope^ 95 71 58 76
Spain 83 50 25 55
Russia 58 30 30 21
Turkey .. 18b> 14 20
Latin America^ .. 32 36 23
Argentina .. 67 52 37
Brazil 52 17 17 21
Mexico 59 28 22 25
China 40 16 6 11
India 41 15 6 7
Indonesia 48 18 9 8
Japan 55 28 20 79
South Korea .. 21 9 48
Thailand .. 20 9 18
Egypt .. 12 5 11
Ghana .. 11 12 6
Nigeria .. .. 13 2
averagesofAustria,
Notes:a) Arithmetic Belgium,Denmark, Finland,France,Germany, Italy,theNeth-
erlands,Norway,Sweden,Switzerland, and theUK, i.e., of a mid-20thcenturyeconomicdefinitionof
"WesternEurope",b) 1913comparedto theUSA in 1913.c) Arithmetic averagesof Argentina,Brazil,
Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Peru,andVenezuela.
Correlations:1820-1900:0.96; 1820-1950:0.89; 1820-1999:0.85; 1900-1950:0.96; 1900-1999:0.82;
1950-1999:0.77
Sources:Calculationsfor1820-1950:Maddison1995,tables1-3;for1999:WorldBank2000a,table1.
3.3. TheForceofFlows
History, of course,is notreproduced by itself.The historicallocationsof countriesin the
globaldistributionhave been reproduced by transnational flowsand entanglements and by
nationalprocesses.Thereare severalwaysforinitialadvantages, of whatever origin,to be
maintained andtocumulateovertime.Once an economyhas reacheda certainlevel,onceit
has "takenoff, itcan sustaina highrateofsavingsandinvestment. Healthy,well-nourished,
and well-educated parentstendto producesimilaroffspring. A good economicsituationis
morelikelythana poorone to generate andmaintain andpoliticalstability
politicalstability,
in turnis morelikelyto spawninvestment andproduction thanis socialstrife.

andInequality
Globalization 463
Economicgeographers havelongnoticed,withstillcontinuing bafflement,theheavycon-

of specificeconomicactivities
centration in certainlocationsin a country withoutanyobvi-
ous naturaladvantages. In thelatterpartofthe20thcentury thisidea was takenup andelabo-
ratedby some international economistswho spelled out and, in economists'fashion,
modelleddynamicprocessesof economicpolarization (Krugman1993;Krugman/Venables
1995).Theyshowedthatincreasingreturns due to economiesof scale and sinkingcostsof
combinedwiththedecreaseddependenceon fixednaturalresources,
transportation, generate
advantagesat one pole anddisadvantages at theother,i.e,theyoperate as mechanisms ofex-
clusion.Krugman' s core-periphery distinctionmightbe regarded of Im-
as one specification
manuelWallerstein's(1974-)earlier,somewhatunderspecified, highlightingof thecontrast
betweenthecoreand theperiphery of themodernworldsystem.10 A good partof history's
weightconsistsofvirtuous orviciousspiralsofcausation.
The classicaleconomicflowsarethoseoftrade,capitalmovements, andmigration.Due to
theelaboration of moresophisticatedtrademodelsandto a recently arisingsimultaneousat-
tentionto all threekindsof flows,thecomplexand ambiguousdistributive impactof these
flowsis increasinglybeingrecognized.It has also becometheobjectofa livelycontroversy.
In therealworldinternational have theconvergent,
tradedoes notgenerally inclusiveef-
fectsthatliberalScandinavianeconomistsand economichistorians - like Wicksell,Heck-
scher,and Ohlin- theorizedand couldobservein theNorthAtlanticregion.Whilethepro-
tectionist
import-substitutingLatin Americaneconomies,for instance,did converge(in
GDP) fromtheDepressionuntiltheearly1980s,theexport-oriented East Asian economies
actuallydivergedfrom1960to 1989(Rodriguez/Rodrik 2000,p. 52). The greatest partof the
economicconvergence amongEuropeanUnioncountries tookplace beforetheyjoined the
Union,whereupon convergence sloweddown(Therborn 1995,pp. 196-197).The short-term
effectsof a country'sopeningto internationaltradeand competition has been subjectto
sharppolemics,as tradeglobalizationis vigorouslypushedby international organizations
liketheWorldBank.In theroundof thatdebatewhichtookplace in Stockholmin October
2000, Dani Rodrik(2000) effectively demolishedDavid Dollar's and ArtKraay's (2000)
claimthatthe"globalizing"economiesof the1980shad higherratesof growthbecauseof
theiropening.Non-controversial,on theotherhand,was theirfinding thatthereis no signifi-
cantcorrelation
betweenthesize ofinternationaltradeanddomesticinequality, whichmeans
thatin somecases,likein South-EastAsia,theeconomicopeninghas littleor no polarizing
effectwhilein others,likein severalLatinAmericancountries, it does sometimelater(cf.
Wood1997;WorldBank2000a,pp. 70-71).
Worldtradeoverwhelmingly takesplaceamongrichcountries. The G7 groupaccountsfor
halfoftheglobaltrade,theOECD foralmostthreefourths. Neitherhas beenaffectedbythe
export advances of East and South-East Asia. The share
trade of bothis roughlythesamein
2000 as it was in 1982(even discounting therecentextensionof theOECD, thereby two
thirdsof worldtrade)(OECD 2000, AnnexTable 47; WTO 2000). Non-OPEC,non-OECD
importsintotheOECD club have grownmodestly, from1.6% of OECD GDP in 1962to
2.4% in 1982 and 3.4% in 1999. However,the compositionof richcountryimportshas
changedfundamentally since theclassicalperiod.In 1998 two thirdsof theimportsfrom
low-and middle-income countriesintohigh-income OECD countriesconsistedofmanufac-
tures,intheUS eventhreefourths (WorldBank2000b,table6.3).
Thisnewpatternof tradehas givenriseto arguments
aboutthedistributive ofglo-
effects
bal wagecompetition
(Wood 1994).RonJones(2000) showedthatevenplausibletrademod-
10) One shouldexpectthataboutthesameprocessesunderlietheconcentration

of scienceand scholar-
shipin a smallnumber
ofeliteinstitutions.

464 GöranTherborn
els are ambiguousin theireffects.The latestresultof thisdebateseemsto be thatin a com-

parisonamong the richOECD countriesthereis a significant
statistical
inequalityeffectof
imports fromdevelopingcountries, butthatthiseffect disappearsifWesternEuropealoneis
studied.That is, it does not hold amongdevelopedwelfarestates(Gustafsson/Johansson
1999).
The effects ofsuccessfulexportsuponthedomesticdistributionin theSouthseemto vary
as well. Althoughhis fairlybroadoverviewof thedata looks ratherinconclusive, Adrian
Wood (1994,chs. 6.2-6.4) inclinestowardsthehypothesis thatNorth-bound manufactured
exportshaveegalitarian in theSouth.On theotherhand,BhanojiRao (1999),sifting
effects
thevarioussourcesof earningsand incomein South-EastAsia, presents a picturepredomi-
nantlyconsisting ofpersistent variation
national,intra-regional withfewnationaltrendsover
In othermiddle-income
time,i.e.,fromthelatesixtiesto thelatenineties.11 countriesof the
South,suchas Mexicoand Turkey,tradeopeningshave actuallyincreasedearningsdisper-
sionand incomeinequality (WorldBank2000a,p. 71). A globalanalyticalapproachto this
issueis stillembryonic.
In a majorhistorical economiesKevinO'RourkeandJeffrey
studyofAtlantic Williamson
(1999) brought ina comparative
theflowsofgoods,capital,andpeopletogether study.Their
maindependent variablewererealwagesfrom1870to 1910,andtheirmainfinding was that
factormobilityaccountsforthebulkoftheconvergence. Aboveall massivemigrationfrom
Europeto theNew Worlddecreasedthewage gap acrosstheAtlantic. The influxof capital
intoScandinaviaalso playedan important tradehadonlya minor,
role.By comparison, orin
somecases no,effect.
An important researchagendaemerging, then,willbe to bringtradeand bothlabourand
capitalmobility globalflows.Recentlytheseflowshavesubstan-
intotheanalysisofcurrent
fromthepatterns
tiallychangedtheirdirection whichreproduced theeconomicworldmapof
thefirsthalfof the 19thcenturydruingtherestof the 19thand thegreatestpartof the20th
centuries.
The late 19th
centurywaveofglobalization aboveall createdmutuallyadvantageous flows
betweenthenew richeconomies.Europeexporteda sizeable portionof its population -
aboutsixtymillion- to thede-populated,land- and but
resource-rich, capital-pooroverseas
settlements.Althoughtherewereothermigratory movements duringthatperiod,mostim-
portantlyofChinesefanning outin South-East Asia,migrationfromEuropeto Americawas
by farthepredominant one. The capitalflowsof theworld'sleadinginvestor, Britain,also
wentmainlyin thesame direction, whereasFrenchand Germancapitalfirstof all wentto
EasternEurope.The tradepattern was predominantly - agrarian/mining,
industrial within-
dustrialEuropeexporting manufactures and importing raw materials
food and industrial
fromtheNew WorldandEasternEurope.The colonialempiresandtheirinternal flowswere
marginal (cf.Hobsbawm1987,pp.73-74).
tothispattern
WorldWarI was succeededbytwodecadesofde-globalization withtrade,migration, and
all and
capitalmobility contracting by world
another war. The post-
gradual Word War II re-
constructionof a globalizedeconomytookplace undersomewhatnew conditions, suchas
theriseof theSovietUnionintoa globalsuperpower headingtheCommunist bloc,thefull
entryof Japanintothecircleofdevelopedeconomies,thesurgeforward of all WesternEu-
rope,and world- However,by and largethepre-1914interlocking
wide de-colonization. of
11) Taiwanis nowpartofthecomparable Luxemburg IncomeSurvey.Itsdatashowonlya slightincrease

between1981and1995,froma Giniindexof26.7 to27.7.Thisis a measureofinequality
ofinequality
somewhere in betweentheScandinaviancountriesand therestof WesternEurope,or,putanother
way,veryclose to whattheUK was beforethearrivalofMrs.Thatcher(LIS internet
database).

andInequality
Globalization 465
WesternEuropeand theNew WorldEuropeansettlereconomieswithregardto capital-

nowprimarily flowingfromtheUSA to WesternEurope- , people,andtradeflowswas re-
albeiton a lowerlevelofintegration.
established,
The firstmajorchangein theflowpattern occurredwiththeconversion of Europefroma
continent ofout-migrationtoone ofimmigration, whichtookplaceintheearly1960s.Turkey,
NorthAfrica,andSouthAsia (to theUK) werethemajorproviders ofimmigrants then,while
in the1990sitwas EasternEurope.Duringthe1980sUS immigration begantopickup again,
butit was no longerfedfromEurope.LatinAmericaturned froma destinationintoa source
of migration. Racistdiscrimination was scrappedfromNorthAmericanand, in the1970s,
Australian immigrationpolicy,openingup tosignificantAsianimmigration.In brief,theclas-
sical NorthAtlanticmigration flowwas replacedby a South-to-North flow,albeitof lesser
proportions thantheformer.Thisnewmigratory shouldhaveeffects
pattern inthedirection of
globalequalization- as shouldthenew PersianGulfcentreof immigration and theregional
migration systems ofSouthernAfrica,South-East Asia,andWestAfrica - , evenifofmodest
size. So farthereseemsto be littlesystematicknowledgeof sucheffects.In somecases the
numbers EightpercentoftheMexican-born
involvedare substantial: population livedin the
UnitedStatesinthe1990s,andabouttenpercentoftheFilipino/a/s liveabroad.In thesmaller
nationsoftheCaribbeanthediasporaamountsto 10-15percentofthepopulation (Binational
Studyon Migration OfficeofMigration
1998;Castles2000; International 2000).
Capitalstillmovesoverwhelmingly betweenNorthAmericaand WesternEurope,mop-
pingup threefifths to twothirdsofall flowsofforeign directinvestment.
Butthesoaringof
foreigndirectinvestment duringthelastdecade of the20thcentury saw whatmightbe the
beginning of a revisedpattern,witha moresubstantial partgoingto developingcountries.
The shiftwas mainlydue totheemergence ofChinaas an attractor
offoreigncapital,receiv-
ing 1.8% ofglobalinflowsin 1990and7% in 1998,andtotherenewedattractiveness ofLatin
America,increasing itsshareof worldcapitalflowsfrom4.2% to 11% (WorldBank2000a,
p. 21; UNCTAD 1999,figure2, table6). To whatextenttheAsian crisisof 1997-98has
stoppedthistendency remainsto be seen,buta majoreffectis perhapsnotthatlikely.The
crisiscloudsstilllingeredin 1999whentheEast and South-EastAsianshareofa vigorously
grownforeigndirectinvestment flowwas down to elevenper centof the worldtotal(of
whichfourwentto China),i.e., to aboutthesameas theLatinAmericanshare,fromalmost
one fourth(23%) in 1996.In absoluteterms, however,thenetflowofdirectinvestment into
developingcountries almostquintupled in1999comparedto theannualaveragesfor1985-95,
fromaboutthirty toone hundred andforty billionUS dollars.Putanother
way,foreign direct
investment grewfromfiveto elevenpercentof thegrossfixedcapitalformation of these
countries(UNCTAD 2000).
Whilea partialchangeofthedirectionof capitalflowsmayhave short-term
effectsof in-
in thereceiving
ternalpolarization itseffects
countries, on theeconomicgrowthin theSouth
can be expectedtoreduceworldinequality.
On theotherhand,theliberalization of short-termcapitalmovements pushedby theIMF
andneoliberaleconomicseverywhere has createda newfinancialinstability,
andensuingfi-
nancialcrisesusuallylead to increasedpovertyand inequality. The financialcrisisin East
Asia in 1997-98pushedtenmillionpeopledownintoextreme poverty(WorldBank2000,p.
23; see furtherCornia2001,pp. 32ff.).Thereweresimilareffects duringtheMexicanfinan-
cial crisesin 1994-95and in theearly1980s.The enormousburdenof foreigndebtincurred
byLatinAmericain the1980sandbyAfricain the80s and90s, anditsservice,havesignifi-
cantlycontributed toinequality.
Much less studiedis thetransnationalflowof knowledge,althoughJohnMeyer(2000)
and his associateshave studiedthe diffusion
of conceptsof organization
and institutions

466 GöranTherborn
whichserveas social"scripts"fortheactorsofa globallyinterconnected society.The spread

of education,of educationalsystemsand curriculahas beenstudiedfromthisangle(Meyer
et al. 1992). Partof thiswas thedevelopment of massliteracyin mostpartsof theworldin
thecourseof thesecondhalfof the20thcentury, whichwas a significant
contribution to a
moreequal distribution of humancapabilitiesin theworld.Butof courseit was also, and in
heavy-weight cases suchas Communist Chinaand someindependent ex-colonies,mainlya
nationaleffort.
Morespecificis theglobalflowofmedicalknowledge - a flowwhichhadandno less still
has to faceconsiderableobstaclesderivingfromtheskeweddistribution of property
rights
and researchresources.Nevertheless, it is to a greatparttheflowof medicalknowledge
whichaccountsforthefactthatmortality risksand lifeexpectancyare muchmoreevenly
distributedin theworldthanis income.Spraying(e.g.,againstmalariaflies),vaccines,pen-
cilinandotherantibiotics
treatments,as wellas moreknowledgeoftheroleofsanitation and
hygienein thecontainment of infectiousdiseases- all thisis knowledgeand techniquesbe-
ingspreadthroughout theworldwhichhavehaddramatic effectson mortality
rates.
A crucialperiodinthisrespectwas rightafterWorldWarII, andthemostspectacular case
was Ceylon(today'sSri Lanka) and itspost-waranti-malaria campaign,whichwas crucial
butnotsingular.In 1945thecrudedeathratein Ceylonwas 21.5 (deathsperthousand popu-
lation),almostexactlythesameas in 1939.In 1947 it was downto 14,forthefirstand the
lasttime.By 1950itstoodat 12.4,andin thelate1950sitfellbelow 10. Also theIndianrate,
whichfortheperiodof 1930-1945had oscillatedbetween21 and 25, wentdownto 16 in
1949-50.Hong Kong in 1939had a deathrateof 30, in 1946of 11. (Chesnais1992,table
A3.11) Similarchangesoccurred inotherpartsofEasternAsia. ForAfricatherearefewreli-
able dataof historical
demography. Whatappearsto be themostreliabledata fromTunisia
andEgyptshowsa declineofthemortality ratefrom27-28duringWorldWarII to 18-19in
1960(Allman1978,p. 12; WorldBank 1978,table 15).12In East Africadeathratesin the
twenties seemtohavebeenestablished duringthe1950s,witha low of 18 in Kenyain 1962.
BelgianCongoprobably hada deathrateof26 in1955-57andtheIvoryCoastone of29. But
Westand CentralAfricatendedto havedeathratesabove thirty perthousandpopulationon
theeve ofindependence (Coale/Lorimer1968,table4.2; WorldBank1978,table15).
In partsof theCaribbean,likeCuba andJamaica,deathratesalreadywentdownbetween
theworldwars,buttheexactfigures arenottrustworthy.
statistically
reported it
Forinstance,
does notsoundquiteconvincing thattheCubandeathratein 1930shouldhave been lower
thaninall Europeancountries save theNetherlands(Chesnais1992,tablesA3.4,A3.9). More
representative wherethedeathratesankfromaround22
is probablytheMexicantrajectory,
duringWorldWarII toabout15-16in 1950-53.
To sumup, theflowof medicalknowledgehas playedan outstanding role,if nota solo
in
performance,bringing aboutthe most importantprocessof equalizationoftheworld.An-
otherimportantexamplecouldbe thediffusion also bearingsignificantly
of contraceptives,
of percapitalifechancesin theworld;or thehigher-yielding
on thedistribution cropspro-
ducedbytheGreenRevolution ofthe1960s,veryimportant especiallyin Southern Asia.- In
1900thegap in lifeexpectancy 24
at birthbetweenIndiaand Francewas years, which then
meantthata Frenchman livedtwiceas longas an Indian.By mid-century,justbefore theef-
fectivespreadofnewmedicalknowledgeto Asia,thegap was evenwider,around34 years.
By theendofthe20thcentury itwas downto 15-16years(MariBhat1989,p. 92; UN 1951,
table29; WorldBank2000,table2). From1960to 1997lifeexpectancy amongall so-called
low
below20 forall the1950s,andtheunbelievably
12) Chesnais(1992,p. 568) givesEgyptianfigures
of8 for1952-54and 10 for1960.
Tunisianfigures

andInequality
Globalization 467
developingcountriesrosefrom46 to 62, whilethegap separatingthemfromtherichindus-

declinedfrom24 to 12 years.Lifeexpectancy
trialcountries was one of thefewlong-term
successstoriesof independentAfrica.Between1960and 1998Sub-Saharanlifeexpectancy
hasjustbeenmaintained
has increasedfrom40 to 50 years,butthegap to therichcountries
at 28 years(UNDP 1996,table47; UNDP 1999).
For theworldpopulationas a whole,lifeexpectancyat birthrose from55 yearsto 66.6
yearsbetween1962and 1997.The Gini coefficient - a measuremostlyused withregardto
incomeinequality, thenrangingbetweenabout0.2 forthemostequal countries and 0.6 for
themostunequalcountries - fortheinequalityof lifeexpectancy among the nationsof the
worldfellfrom0.24 to0.1 1.13Thisvitalequalizationis strikingandan important positivein-
dicatorofglobaldevelopment pointofview.It shouldbe qualified,how-
froman egalitarian
ever,by taking noticeof some negativeturnsin the 1990s:in post-Communist EasternEu-
rope,in particularin theex-USSR and theBalkans,and in AIDS-stricken Africa,especially
in itssouthern part.Male Russianlifeexpectancy at birthfellfrom64 to 58 yearsbetween
1991and 1994,climbingbackto 61 yearsin 1997(Cornia/Panicciá 2000,p. 6; McKee 2001,
p. 28). So fartheselatestdevelopments haveonlysloweddown,butnotstopped,thedecline
oftheglobalinequality of lifeexpectancy.
The Africanexperiencein thelastdecademayheralda turnin theflowof knowledgefor
theworse.Whilethetraditional economicflowsmaybe turning the
towardsless inequality,
flowofknowledgemaybe changingin theoppositedirection. Thisis indicatedbya newand
stillmysterious flowofdisease,thespreadofAIDS, whichhas hitSouthern andEasternAf-
rica particularly hard.While thereare substantialinternational in combatingit
aid efforts
brakemedicineavailabletoAfricansufferers.
thereis stillno affordable The AIDS epidemic
has catastrophic consequencesin someAfricancountries. Duringthelastdecadelifeexpect-
ancy at birth was shortened
by 21 (!) yearsin Botswana,by 8 yearsin Kenya,by 2 yearsin
Mozambique,by5 yearsin Tanzania,by 10 yearsin Zambia,andby 12 yearsin Zimbabwe
(WorldBank 1990,table 1; WorldBank2000a, table2). This meansthatthegap between
Sub-SaharanAfricaas a wholeand therichworldhas widenedagain,from25 yearsin the
lateeightiesto 28 yearsin thelatenineties.
The AIDS questionhas brought thepowerand thepricingof thepharmaceutical industry
intothelimelight,and moregenerally theexcludingeffectsof theUS-imposedinternational
Agreement on Trade-Related AspectsofIntellectual
PropertyRights,"Trips".The big phar-
maceuticalcorporationsoftheNortharetrying topreventgovernments andcompaniesofthe
South- in India,SouthAfrica,and Brazil- to providemoreaffordable brakemedicinesto
theirHIV-infected South
populations. Africaand Brazilhavescored somegoalsinthisbattle
in thefirsthalfof 2001, butTripsand patentsremaincrucialissuesfortheflowof medical
andagriculturalknowledge.
The centresofproduction knowledgearelocatedin therichpartoftheworld,
of scientific
in particular
in theUnitedStates.Out of 371 Nobel Laureatesin scienceand economicsfor
theyears1946-2000,218 or fifty-nine per centwerebased at US institutions,and 139 or
thirty-sevenpercentat Western Europeanones.The US dominancehas evenincreasedin re-
centyears.Among61 laureatesin 1994-2000,45 werebased in theUSA and 13 in Western
Europe.(The remaining threeincludeone physicistin Canada,anotherone in Russia,and
one chemistin Japan;see Nobele-Museum.)These scientific centresprovidehighereduca-
tionalso forstudentsfromotherpartsof theworld,whichis a benefitto thelatterto theex-
tentthatthescientists
andscholarsreturn. To whatextenttheydo andto whatextentthevery
13) CalculationsmadebyMelchioret al. 2000,p. 79. Theirdatasourceis the1999editionoftheWorld

BankDevelopment Indicators.

468 GöranTherborn
bestareskimmed offbyUS andEuropeaninstitutions is knownonlyin frag-

andenterprises
ments.Buttheriskofa seriousbraindrainoutofthepoorworldhas beenraisedin thelatest
WorldMigrationReport,whichinforms us thatcurrently
about23,000 academicsa year
OfficeofMigration
leave Africa(International 2000).
The spreadofneoliberaleconomicsbackedbytheentangling musclesandthe
institutional
creditorpoweroftheIMF andtheWorldBank,whicharein turnbuttressed bytheUS gov-
ernment, mayaccountfora goodpartoftherecentincreaseofwithin-country economicine-
quality.GiovanniAndreaCornia(2001,pp. 36-7) was able to showa significant
disequaliz-
ingeffectof theadoptionof policyreforms
pushedby the"Washington Consensus"of the
IMF andtheWorldBank.
3.4. ThePowerofGlobal Entanglements

The post-WorldWarII proliferationofnation-stateswas accompaniedbyan increasingly in-
tricate
entanglement oftheseformallysovereignstatesin a variety ofinternational
networks.
regional,suchas theEuropeanUnion,and someare informally
Some are institutionally re-
of whichtheSouth-EastAsiancrisisof 1997-98is
gional,suchas regionalcrisiscontagion,
thelatestmajorexample.Some arecategorical, liketherichcountry clubOECD. Othersare
globalentanglements
global,constituting in a stricter
sense,likethesuperpower clientelesof
theCold Warortheoperations ofimportant
theatres andresourceful globalinter-state
organ-
izations,liketheIMF andtheWorldBank,UN organizations, or dittoNGOs, liketheInter-
nationalPlannedParenthood Federation.
of nationalsovereignty
It is thisinterlinking and extra-national
dependency whichmakes
forentanglements. As a rule,ifnotby intrinsic dependency
principle, is asymmetric,butit
wouldbe a moral-political mistakeas well as an analyticalone to thinkaway thenational
government evenin relationto powerful
anditsresponsibility, externalforcesliketheIMF.
Evenexternal debtis ofnationalorigin,in decisionstoborrowandin waysofusing,orwast-
ing,loans.
Global entanglement and networking patternthe flows of trade,capital,and people,
the
through pathways of transnationalcorporationsand,forinstance,alongex-colonialcon-
nections(cf. Kritzet al. 1992).The nestingof globalflowsand connections in locales,in
"globalcities",diasporiccommunities, orimmigrant also producesglobal-cum-local
ghettos,
entanglements, generating But hereI wouldliketo singleout
local processesof inequality.
someotherspecificmechanisms. Threein particular
appearimportant.
One of themis theglobal (or international) settingof nationalagendae. A globalnorm
sourcedirectsa criticalfocuson a nationalsituation and bringsit ontothenationalagenda
through its specialaccess to thenationalpolicy-making process.The OECD has used this
procedureto pushforlabourmarketflexibility, forthecompetitive management of public
services,andforlowertaxrates.The UN globalmachinery uses itforpromoting egalitarian
purposes,forsetting distributive
targetsconcerning, e.g.,waterand sanitationservices,vac-
cination,nutrition,girls'education,andpoverty reductionin general.Thesetargets haveof-
tenbeen missed,buttheattempts at theirattainment have usuallyinvolveda transnational
deployment ofresourcesandsomepressure on nation-states.
Focusing-cum-targeting usually
aimsat a less unequaldistribution, althoughin principleit could,of course,as all theother
mechanisms workeitherway.
in thiscontext,
A secondmechanismof global entanglement i.e., devisingand
is institution-modelling,
In therecentpastglobalmodelling
certainspecifickindsofnationalinstitutions.
prescribing
has takentwomajorforms, tendingtowardsoppositedistributive The firstvari-
orientations.
oftheworld,pushingforde-regulation,
antdrivesfora liberalization privatization,andbor-

andInequality
Globalization 469
deropening.Removingbarriers to firmsand marketsis its mainthrust.

(A seriouscritical
is Cornia1999.)The IMF and theWorldBank,and behindthemthe
overviewof itseffects
US government (cf.Wade 2000), arethemainforcesbehindthismodel.
The othervarianthas grownintheUN familyandhas beenconcerned withloweringbarri-
ersto individuals,
withdismantling social exclusionandloweringhierarchies.
Thishas been
themovement forhumanrightsin general,andmorespecifically forgroupswhichare weak
and discriminatedagainst,suchas women,children, or migrant
ethnicminorities, workers.
UN Conferences andUN Conventions havebeenimportant instrumentsof thisside.Gender
equalityandtheempowerment ofthepoorhaveveryrecently also beenincorporated intothe
agendaoftheWorldBank(2000a,PartIII).
A thirdmechanismis concretepolicyprescription. This mechanismwas developedand
deployedon a largescale duringthe1980sin the"structural
adjustmentpolicies"prescribed
to AfricanandLatinAmericancountries bytheIMF andtheWorldBank.It was putintoan-
othermajoroperationbytheIMF in theEast Asia crisis,fromThailandto Korea,in 1997-98.
Buttherewereimportant andeffective beforethat.The mostsignificant
policyprescriptions
fromtheearly1960sonwardsby the
case werebirthcontrolpolicies,pushedinternationally
WorldBank,theUS andProtestant Europeangovernments, and bypertinentNGOs likethe
PlannedParenthood
International Birthcontrolpoliciesfinallywon world-wide
Federation.
acceptancebetweenthePopulationConferences ofBucarestin 1974andin Mexicoin 1984.
The mechanisms of agenda-setting,
institution-modelling,and policy-prescription
operate
through tangibleformsof pressure, through - invitedor imposed
advisers - , througheco-
nomicincentives and aid, and throughsanctionsof creditrefusal,membership exclusion,or
Theirnetdistributive
publiccriticism. impactis difficultto assess.UN targeting
andpopula-
tionpolicieshave clearlyhad an equalizingeffect,even thoughtargetswereoftenmissed.
Womenwerewinnersofthiskindofglobalization. The immediate economicimpactof IMF
includingthelatestone in Asia, is usuallyregressive(Cornia2001), while
interventions,
theirmid-term growtheffectsare inconclusive or perhapsevennegative(Przeworski/Vree-
land2000; Easterly2001). Recentlytherehas been increasing is-
concernoverdistributive
sues in thesepowerfulinternational organizations, but the recentresignationsfromthe
WorldBankof thetwomostdistinctive advocatesof thisconcern,JosephStiglitzand Ravi
Kanbur,indicateitslimits.
at leastshort-term
Directofficialaid has had substantial, effects
on severalpoorcountries.
In 1990directaid amountedto a tenthof theGNP of Sub-SaharanAfrica.By 1998it had
gonedownto fourpercent,and forall theworld'slow-incomecountries foreign aid makes
up onlyone percentof thenationalincome.However,forindividualcountries thefigureis
Directaid made up 28% of theNicaraguanand theMozambiquean
stillquitesignificant:
GNP in 1998,a fourth of Malawi's,a fifth of Eritrea'sand of Mongolia's,an eighthofTan-
zania's,anda tenthofHaiti'sandSenegal's(WorldBank2000a,table21).
3.5. TheResilienceand theDifference

ofNations
As arguedabove mechanisms of inequalityneednotbe globalat all, althoughwe can read
theireffects as a globaloutcome,as a worldpattern of inequality.We mayhave to do with
nationalmechanisms, nationalfactorendowments andtheirutilizationanddevelopment, na-
tionalinstitutions,nationalpowerrelations,and nationaldecisionsand strategies. In such
cases thereis no globalcausalityinvolvedat all, althoughtheoutcomeis a globaldistribu-
tion- producedbythemechanism ofdistanciation- as well as a setof nationaldistribution
patterns.In so faras thereareinternationaltransactionsthesetofothernationsconstitutes a
stagein theformof an opportunity structure
whicheach nationalactorcan avail him/herself
of,withvariableluckand skill.Thosenationalmechanisms seemto be impliedin common

470 GöranTherborn
indifferent
analysesanddiscussionsofeconomicgrowth nationsandtheyforman important
partofexplanations
ofworldincomedistribution.
In thefirststudyofglobalindividual inequalityon thebasisofhouseholdsurveys, Branko
Milanovic(1999) concludesthat75% of worldinequality(betweenindividuals)can be
shownto be due tothecountry an individuallivesin ifa Theilindexdecomposition is used,
and 88% of worldinequality ifa decomposition of theGiniindexis used.True,froma na-
tion-state
perspectivethatfigureis an exaggeration sincein Milanovic's studya numberof
largecountries- suchas China,India,Indonesia,Bangladesh,Egypt - werepre-divided into
urbanandruralareas,a prodecure whichmaybe fruitful forotherpurposes.
The mostunequalnationalsocietiesin theworldharbouramongtheircitizensalmostas
mucheconomicinequality as theworldas a whole.For1993Milanovic(1999)calculatedthe
Giniindexof inequality fortheworldto 0.66. For Brazilin 1998thecorresponding valueis
SouthAfricaand a fewsmallcountries
0.60 (Paes de Barroset al. 2000). Post-apartheid -
theCentralAfricanRepublic,Guatemala,Panama,and Paraguay - showa similardistribu-
tion,i.e.,theyharbourwithinthemselves almostas muchinequalityas thereis in thewhole
world(WorldBank2000a,table5; Inter-American Development Bank1998,p.16).
Thereare,ofcourse,a number betweenglobalflowson one handandnation-
ofinterfaces
processeson theother.Let us just mention
al political,economic,and socio-cultural a few.
Globalflowsmayinteract withor affect:
- theoperation ofthenationaleconomyanditsdistributive
mechanisms,
- thestatecapacitytoact,fororagainstinequality,
- theaspirations andtheoptionsofnationalactors.
A potentiallyveryimportant mechanisms
effectof globaldistributive could be theirim-
pact on theredistributive
capacityof institutions.
national Whilethisis a seriouspossibility
it is somethingwhichthecurrent debatehas,on fragilegrounds,tendedto blow up intoan
established fact.
Withregardto statesseriouslyconcernedwithredistribution - whichafterthecollapseof
EasternEuropeanCommunism are mainlytheWesternEuropeanwelfarestates - thereare
good reasonsfornottakinga decreaseof redistributive capacityfora general,necessaryef-
fectofeconomicopening.One ofthesereasonsis theactuallysignificantly positivecorrela-
tionbetweenopennessto theworldmarketon one handand theproportion of GDP con-
sumedby generalgovernment expenditure or publicsocial expenditureon theother.The
former connectionhas been shownfortheworldat largein the1980sand thelatterforthe
OECD in the1990s(ILO 1997,pp. 78-79;Therborn 2000c). For theold OECD countries in
1990-97thesize of exportsin proportion to GDP correlated withr = 0.26 withthesize of
whereasit was negatively
social transfers, correlatedwithinequality(theGini index)with
r= -0.34 (LuxemburgIncomeStudydata on disposableincome).At least fortheOECD
countries thereasonforthatis a positivespiralling
effectstartingfroma luckycombination
of somedomesticegalitarianism and someinternational tradingasset,wherebythesuccess
of thelatterprovideshigherlevels formutuallybeneficialclass compromises concerning
workers'commitment toproductivityandemployers' acceptanceoftaxationandhighwages.
Another reasonfornotdumping without
thenation-state veryhardevidencelies inthefact
thatpreviousto therecentsurgeof globalization therewas a spectacular
growthofthestate
in OEDC countries, measurablei.a. in thegrowthoftheshareofpublicexpenditure. Wheth-
er measuredin publicexpenditure or inpublicrevenue,thepublicsectorintherichestcoun-
at a peakor topplateaulevelever.FortheOECD countries
triesof theworldis historically
ofWestern Europe,NorthAmerica,Japan,andOceaniatheaverageoftotalgovernment out-
layswas 25% of GDP in 1960.By theendof thepreviouscentury, in 1999,publicexpendi-

andInequality
Globalization 47 1
turehadgrownto47%. Forthemajorsevencountries, theG7, publicoutlaysincreasedfrom

28% of totalGDP to 37%. True,theexpenditure sharein bothcases was severalpercentage
pointslowerat theboomingendofthedecadethanitwas in therecessionyearsoftheearly
1990s,butthatshouldbe interpreted oscillation.In termsofgovern-
as mainlya conjunctural
mentalreceiptsthefinaldecade of the20thcentury was themostrevenue-earning ever.For
theOECD totalthismeansthat37% of GDP flowedintopubliccoffers,and fortheEU,
44-45% (OECD 1999,tables6.5,6.6; OECD 2000,Annextable28).
Bothin theOECD as a wholeand in theEU 15 thestateactuallygrewfasterthanforeign
- a relationusuallyignoredin globali-
tradeduringthelastfourdecadesof the20thcentury
zationtalk.The rapidgrowthof thedependency on externaltradein the1990shas notyet
overtakenthecumulatedgrowthof theOECD statesas well as theEU statessince1960,or
since 1974.Japanwas actuallyrathermoredependenton exportsin theperiodof 1960-73
thanitwas in the1990s.
Table5: StateGrowthandForeignTradeGrowth, 1960-1999
(total government and exportsas proportions
expenditure of GDP; percentage
points since1960)
Government
Expenditure Exports
OECD I EU 15 OECD I EU 15
1974 6.5 8.4 4.7 6.6
1987 12.9 16.7 4.7 7.2
1999 13.1 18.5 10.6 14.0
Sources:OECD 1999,tables6.5.,6.12; OECD 2000.
then,current
Historically, statesin themostdevelopedworldare well equippedwithre-
sourcesoffinance,ofadministrativecompetence, andofpolicyexpertise.14It is truethatthe
newvolatilityof globalfinancialmarketshas broughtabouta generalincreasein economic
and uncertainty,
unpredictability as well as forstates.However,as the
forprivateinvestors
1997-98Asianfinancialcrisisand otherrecentcriseshave shown,publiccapacityto handle
suchprivatecrisesis muchlargernowthanitwas in 1929-31.
The distributiveimportance and nationaldistrib-
ofnationalpolicies,nationalinstitutions,
utivenormshas recently beenstressedin a persuasivewaybytheBritishspecialistAnthony
Atkinson (1999a;1999b).His mosttellingstoryis aboutthecontrasting ofdispos-
trajectories
able householdincomein theUSA and Canada overtwenty years,1977-1998.Whereasthe
US graphshowsmounting in the1980s,particularly
inequality in thefirsthalfofthem,and a
highbuttrendless inequalityinthe90s,theCanadianneighbour kepta muchmoreequal dis-
basicallystable,withminoroscillationstendingsomewhatdownwards(towards
tribution
moreequality)in the80s (Atkinson 1999a,p. 4).
The pictureis, of course,different
if we look at theweak and poor statesof theThird
Worldand of post-Communist Europe.Transnational crisesand imposed"structural
adjust-
ment"policieshavehadstrong negativedistributive Buttheevidencesuggeststhatit
effects.
is thecrises,theexternaldependency theylead to,and theentanglement withtheIMF and
14) In hismodelof theimpactof manufactured imports fromtheSouthupontheriseof unemployment

in theNorth,between1969-73and 1986-90,AdrianWood (1994,pp. 314ff.)gota rathergood fit
(R2 = 0.60),usingan interactive
modelinwhichtheunemployment effect
ofan increaseofthoseim-
portscan be cancelledeitherbyfullwageflexibility
or bystronglabourmarket policies.

472 GöranTherborn
thelatter'
s crisispolicieswhichmakefortheincreaseofinequality, rather
thantheincreased
globalflows of tradeand capitalperse (cf. section3.3. above). On theotherhand,thecon-
poornationalregimesis exemplified
tinuingresiliencealso of relatively by thesurvivalof
Communist Cuba, thedistinctiveness of theIranianrevolution, and Malaysia's successful
autonomous standin therecentSouth-East Asiancrisis.
Nationalor regionalpopulationdevelopments have considerableimpactupontheglobal
economicdistribution. From1991 to 1999AfricanGDP percapitadeclinedby six percent
(measuredbypurchasing had a SouthAsiandemographic
power).Had thecontinent trajec-
torywhilekeeping its own modestpath of economicgrowth,percapitaincomewouldin-
steadhaveincreasedbytwopercent.Witha Chinesepopulation policyandan Africaneco-
nomicgrowth rate,percapitaincomewouldevenhavegrownbyninepercent(calculations
fromUN 2000a,tableAl).
Conclusions
tra-
or globalprocesses.Theyalso havedifferent
Inequalitiesare plural,likeglobalizations
jectories.Untilrecently, beforetheAIDS disasterin Africaand theEasternEuropeantrau-
mataof post-Communism, themostelementary humancapabilityto surviveexperienceda
significantequalizationupwardsin thecourseof thesecondhalfof the20thcentury. Global
vitalinequalitydeclined.
Existential in theworldwas on thewholeincreasing
inequality duringthe 19thand early
withEuropeanimperialism
20thcenturies, and colonialismand withAtlanticsocial Darwin-
ism,althoughslave-tradewas stoppedand slaverywas abolishedsometimelater.The de-
featedNazi experiencethengave a pushtowardsexistentialequalityin thelasthalfof the
20thcentury,further
supported bytheUS SupremeCourt(in 1954),bydecolonization, andby
UN organizations.
thepost-colonial
Internationaleconomicinequalitymeasuredin GNP per capita,on theotherhand,has
been on almostconstantincreaseforthe past 200 years.Measuredin purchasing power
(PPS), however,theinternational disequalizationprocessstoppedin thelastthirdofthe20th
century,bendingslightly in a less inegalitarian there
Withinnations,by contrast,
direction.
was a wave of equalizationin theNorthAtlanticregionfromtheDepressionto about1950,
andthenanother wavefromthe1960still1975-80,followedbya tendency, unevenlydistrib-
utedamongnationsandnotuniversal, towardsmoreinequality.
The inequalitiesof thisworldare producedby a numberof different processes.We have
distinguishedfourbasic mechanisms of inequalities:distanciation,
exclusion,super/subor-
andexploitation.
dination, we havetriedtodisentangle
Further, globaland sub-globalorna-
tionalforces,specifyingtheweightof: firstly,
globalhistory; secondly,theforceof global
flowsofgoodsandservices,ofcapital,ofpeople,andofinformation andideas,in thedirec-
nationalmechanisms
tionof equalityor inequality;thirdly, of equalityand inequalityand
theirinterfaceswithglobalflows;and finally,globalentanglements of nationaland global
andorganizations.
institutions
The conclusionsfromthisexplanatory complexcan onlybe verypreliminary. So farthe
causalmodelis spelledoutonlyverbally, a fatewhichhardenedstudents ofsocialcomplexi-
ty,likemosthistorians arerather
and sociologists, usedto. But someroughrelativeweight-
ingseemspossible.Thus,withthenecessarycaveats,it seemsthatglobal history and cur-
rentnationalprocessesare the mostpotentproducersof the current global outcomesof
of theworldare producednationally
The inequalities
inequality. as wellas globally.Recent
globalflows,onlyone or two of which the
occupy limelight of themainstream discourseon
appearclearlysecondaryto bothhistorical
globalization, formation andnationalinstitutions

andInequality
Globalization 473
andideas is seriously
of theflowof information
andprocesses,eventhoughthesignificance
underestimatedinconventional
argumentation.
thatsome nationalsocieties,even small ones like Guatemalaor Panama
It is striking
alongsidelargeones like Brazil,harbouralmostas muchinequalitywithintheirbordersas
does thewholeworld.It is also true,however,thatcitizenship in
in richor poorcountries,
otherwords:inter-country inequality,accountsforthebulkof globalinequality.
Citizenship
ofinequality
is a majorinstitution in theworld.
ThatWesternEuropeexploitedAmerica,Africa,and Asia fromthe16thcentury onwards
is beyonddoubt.But how muchthathistoryhas contributed to currentinequalitiesin the
However,one enduring
worldis stillunclearandmostcontroversial. legacyseemsclear.Im-
nationalmechanisms
laterspawnedpost-imperial,
perialistexploitation Préda-
of inequality.
tionleftitslastingimprint,albeitwithsomewhatchangingallocationsofpredatorsandprey.
flowscan workin exclusionary,
The forceoftrans-territorial asymmetricwaysas wellas in
ways.The mostdevelopedtheory
inclusionary ofsuchflows,international
tradetheory, is cur-
rentlymovingaway fromtheinclusionary view- won by theextrapolation of 19thcentury
Scandinavianexperienceand expressedin theso-calledHeckscher-OhlinTheorem - towards
whilegeographical
an agnosticuncertainty, of tradeprovideformalmodelsof exclu-
theories
sionarydynamics. transnational
Historically, migrationwas a majormechanism of egalitarian
But how thelowerrateof generalmigration
inclusion. today,compared to theone a century
ago,andthehigherrateofhighly skilledmigrants
currently known.
operateseemsinsufficiently
The flowofinformation andideasofall kindshas tendedtohavean inclusive, empowering
of actorshave becomemoreequal,undermining
theaspirations
impact.Indirectly, local and
traditional
deference Moredirectly,
andself-abnegation. thediffusion ofmedicalandhygienic
knowledge acrosstheworldbeginning around1900andaccelerating since1945hascontributed
decreaseofvitalinequality
to thesubstantial
significantly in theworld.The GreenRevolution
knowledgewas also quitesignificant
of new agricultural in reducingpovertyin ruralSouth
andSouth-East Asia. However,theflowofinformation is nowthreatened bypatentrights.
Ideas can be ofdifferent
kinds,though, andithas beenarguedwithconsiderable plausibil-
ityand empiricalclout(Cornia2000) thattheneoliberal"Washington Consensus"has con-
tributed to theturntowardsmoreinequality
significantly in theworldduringthelastquarter
of the20thcentury, boththrough its generalideologicalimpactand throughtheeconomic
musclesoftheIMF andtheWorldBankandtheirentanglements withweaknation-states.
But the analysisabove also founda remarkable even under
resilienceof nation-states,
strong international
pressure. The independent, clearlymoreegalitarianpathofCanadavis-à-
vis itshugesouthernneighbour and withinan intensifyingNAFTA framework is one telling
example. Anotherexample is the fact Finland
that to
managed keep one of theworld's most
egalitarian of disposableincomein the1990sin spiteof a deep depressionwith
distributions
suddentwo-digit unemployment (Atkinson1999b,p. 20). The cloutoftheFinnishstoryis not
affected bythefactthatitwas Finlandwhichinthesamedecadeproducedtheworld'sleading
manufacterer ofmobilephones,Nokia,although inequalityincreasedsomewhat then.
The 20thcentury was thehistoricalcenturyof thenation-state,
whichhad beenon itsway
up throughthe 19th century,risingfurtherwiththeend of thedynasticempiresafterWorld
WarI, spreadingall overtheworldduringtheprocessofde-colonization afterWorldWarII,
fuelledfurther
by thebreak-upof Communist internationalism
and strengthened
by therise
of thewelfarestate,above all in WesternEurope,butto someextenteverywhere in therich
world.The recent,ongoingwave of globalizationhas not undonethisera of the nation-
- contrary
state to manyassertions, bothnostalgicand triumphalist.
The new century may
see thenation-state
beingcutdown,butthishas nothappenedyet,save in post-Communist

474 GöranTherborn
havealwaysbeenweak,poor,
ofIMF interventions
EasternEurope.The ThirdWorldtargets
andexternally
dependent.
Inequalityis an importantthing,and takingit seriouslymeansrecognizing thatit is no
pursuitof inequality
simplething.Inequalityhas becomea globalissue,and a scholarly has
toenterintothefullcomplexity oftheglobalworld - a worldhistorically
mouldedas wellas
currently
produced.
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Globalization and Inequality.

Issues of Conceptualization and Explanation

This content downloaded from 128.122.77.198 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:50:18 PM

The titleof thispaperrefersto threesetsof fundamentalissueswhichare stillcontroversial

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precisemeaning, preferablynota semantically one. Secondly,it shouldbe useable

^--^ Unidimensional Multidimensional

Note:Thislayout bya similar

Of thosefourmainpositionson globalization thefourth one holdsthegreatestcognitive

The multidimensional^ of globalizationmaybe illustrated somekeyso-

This content downloaded from 128.122.77.198 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:50:18 PM

- processesof social structuring,

This content downloaded from 128.122.77.198 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:50:18 PM

of.The latterconcepthas notyetbeenexplicitly

1) In structuralmarxism, theclass structure withitscoreofexploitation has alwaysbeenthefocusof

This content downloaded from 128.122.77.198 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:50:18 PM

- Resourceinequalityrefers ofresourcesheldvaluablein a social system,

Amongscholarsof theglobalincomedistribution thereis an ongoingdebateon whether

All talkaboutinequalityrefersto inequalitybetweencertaincategoriesof people.This is

of worldincomeis notnecessarilythesame if we conceptualizeit as a

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However,thereare also otherissues. Individualsand householdsare partof communi-

2.2. Formsand MechanismsofInequality

Key questionswithregardto themodeof valueproduction thenumberof

5) It needsto be emphasizedthattheincreasing oftheissueofpoverty

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The resultingformsof inequalitymaybe distinguishedaccordingto thenumberof social

Multiple(Differentiation) Hierarchy Segmentation

Whiledomination usuallyconnotesa politicaldivisionof powerandpolarizationone of

Segmentationis yetanotherformof inequality, horizontal

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includeshindrancesof varioussortsas wellas closedgates.We mayalso havea kindofin-

For a fullyfledgedtheoryof theproduction of inequalitiesthoseconceptualizations will

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However,it is quitea different questionwhether or nottheseglobaloutcomesare there-

Subsuming, forreasonsofmanageablecomplexity,all subnational

Table4: MajorGlobal-NationalCombinations GlobalInequality

Each of thethreesetsof combinations is capableof producingthesameglobalpictureor

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The nextstepin approaching thedauntingly difficult

7) On the major historicalroads to modernitysee furtherTherborn1995, ch. 1.

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ofthegenocidalsettlements inNorthAmerica, theSouthern partoftheAmericas,andAustral-

Egypt 53^~ 78" 45~

Notes:a) 1920-25comparedto Francein 1920-25.b) 1900scomparedto Francein the 1900s.c) 1920s

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In thecourseof the20thcenturyinfantmortality,and withit lifeexpectancy,

Relativemovements ofcountries werelimited,

The weightof history is, of course,also trueforglobalincomedevelopments (and in this

True,relativemovement ofcountries werepossiblein the20thcentury. BritainandArgen-

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Table6: RelativeGDP perCapitaintheWorld,1820-1999

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Economicgeographers havelongnoticed,withstillcontinuing bafflement,theheavycon-

10) One shouldexpectthataboutthesameprocessesunderlietheconcentration

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els are ambiguousin theireffects.The latestresultof thisdebateseemsto be thatin a com-

11) Taiwanis nowpartofthecomparable Luxemburg IncomeSurvey.Itsdatashowonlya slightincrease

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WesternEuropeand theNew WorldEuropeansettlereconomieswithregardto capital-

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whichserveas social"scripts"fortheactorsofa globallyinterconnected society.The spread