Relevance of R.A. No.
8371 review classes, receiving handout
An act to recognize, protect and
promote the rights of indigenous
cultural communities/ indigenous
peoples, creating a national commission
on indigenous peoples, establishing
implementing mechanisms,
appropriating funds therefore, and for
other purposes"
Also known as: The Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997
Section 26 contains provisions that ICC/
IP women shall enjoy land rights and
opportunities with men in all spheres of
life. It provides for her participation in
the decision-making process in all levels
as well, full access to education,
maternal and child care, health,
nutrition, housing services and training
facilities.
3 Powers of the State
1. Police Power- power of the State
to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare.
2. Power of Eminent Domain-
enables the State to forcibly acquire
private property, upon payment of just
compensation, for some intended public
use.
3. Power of Taxation- the State is
able to demand from the members of
society their proportionate share or
contribution in the maintenance of the
Government.
Due Process - An established course for
judicial proceedings or other
governmental activities designed to
safeguard the legal rights of the
individual.
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S.
MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA,
ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P.
CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO,
JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS,
JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL
CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION,
respondent.  them, with the Regional Trial Court of
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same
category as the Professional Regulation
Commission so that it cannot pass upon
the validity of the administrative acts of
the latter? Can this Commission lawfully
prohibit the examiness from attending
Respondent PRC filed a motion to
materials, tips, or the like three (3) days
before the date of the examination?
Theses are the issues presented to the
court by this petition for certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulagated on January 13,
1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, *
declaring null and void the other dated
Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil
Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L.
Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional
Regulation Commission."
The records shows the following
undisputed facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein
respondent Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No.
105 as parts of its "Additional
Instructions to Examiness," to all those
applying for admission to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy.
The resolution embodied the following
pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review
class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-
out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned
or similars institutions during the three
days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination
day.
Any examinee violating this instruction
shall be subject to the sanctions
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules
and Regulations of the Commission. 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners,
all reviewees preparing to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy
schedule on October 25 and November
2 of the same year, filed on their own
behalf of all others similarly situated like
Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for
injuction with a prayer with the issuance
of a writ of a preliminary injunction
against respondent PRC to restrain the
latter from enforcing the above-
mentioned resolution and to declare the
same unconstitution.
dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the
ground that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the
enforcement of its resolution. In an
Order of October 21, 1987, the lower
court declared that it had jurisdiction to
try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing
and giving effect to Resolution No. 105
which it found to be
unconstitutional.The Court of Appeals, in
deciding that the Regional Trial Court of
Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain
the case and to enjoin the enforcement
of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its
basis its conclusion that the Professional
Regulation Commission and the Regional
Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it
held —
That the petitioner Professional
Regulatory Commission is at least a co-
equal body with the Regional Trial Court
is beyond question, and co-equal bodies
have no power to control each other or
interfere with each other's acts. 3
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals as provided for in Section 9,
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to
be a final order or ruling which resulted
from proceedings wherein the
administrative body involved exercised
its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law
Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a
term applied to the action, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action,
and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. To expound thereon, quasi-
judicial adjudication would mean a
determination of rights, privileges and
duties resulting in a decision or order
which applies to a specific situation .
This does not cover rules and regulations
of general applicability issued by the
administrative body to implement its
purely administrative policies and
functions like Resolution No. 105 which
was adopted by the respondent PRC as a
measure to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations.
In view of the foregoing, We hold that
the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and
enjoin the respondent PRC from
enforcing its resolution.
Although We have finally settled the
issue of jurisdiction, We find it
imperative to decide once and for all the
validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to
provide the much awaited relief to those
who are and will be affected by it.
Of course, We realize that the
questioned resolution was adopted for a
commendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of the
licensure examinations." However, its
good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal
its constitutional infirmities. On its face,
it can be readily seen that it is
unreasonable in that an examinee
cannot even attend any review class,
briefing, conference or the like, or
receive any hand-out, review material,
or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor,
official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions. ...
The unreasonableness is more obvious
in that one who is caught committing
the prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking
future examinations conducted by the
respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can
manage to have a watchful eye on each
and every examinee during the three
days before the examination period.
It is an axiom in administrative law that
administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be
valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end
in view. If shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they
are authorized to be issued, then they
must be held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only
unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
Respondent PRC has no authority to
dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations. They cannot be
restrained from taking all the lawful
steps needed to assure the fulfillment of
their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to
make use of their faculties in attaining
success in their endeavors. They should
be allowed to enjoy their freedom to
acquire useful knowledge that will
promote their personal growth. As
defined in a decision of the United
States Supreme Court:
The term "liberty" means more than
mere freedom from physical restraint or
the bounds of a prison. It means
freedom to go where one may choose
and to act in such a manner not
inconsistent with the equal rights of
others, as his judgment may dictate for
the promotion of his happiness, to
pursue such callings and vocations as
may be most suitable to develop his
capacities, and give to them their
highest enjoyment.
Another evident objection to Resolution
No. 105 is that it violates the academic
freedom of the schools concerned.
Respondent PRC cannot interfere with
the conduct of review that review
schools and centers believe would best
enable their enrolees to meet the
standards required before becoming a
full fledged public accountant. Unless
the means or methods of instruction are
clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption,
review schools and centers may not be
stopped from helping out their students.
At this juncture, we call attention to Our
pronouncement in Garcia vs. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, regarding academic
freedom to wit:
... It would follow then that the school or
college itself is possessed of such a right.
It decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them.
It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students. This constitutional
provision is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.
Needless to say, the enforcement of
Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee
that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at
least minimized. Making the examinees
suffer by depriving them of legitimate
means of review or preparation on those
last three precious days-when they
should be refreshing themselves with all
that they have learned in the review
classes and preparing their mental and
psychological make-up for the
examination day itself-would be like
uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten
branch. What is needed to be done by
the respondent is to find out the source
of such leakages and stop it right there.
If corrupt officials or personnel should
be terminated from their loss, then so
be it. Fixers or swindlers should be
flushed out. Strict guidelines to be
observed by examiners should be set up
and if violations are committed, then
licenses should be suspended or
revoked. These are all within the powers
of the respondent commission as
provided for in Presidential Decree No.
223. But by all means the right and
freedom of the examinees to avail of all
legitimate means to prepare for the
examinations should not be curtailed.
In the light of the above, We hereby
REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
10591 and another judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Resolution No. 105
null and void and of no force and effect
for being unconstitutional. This decision
is immediately executor. No costs.
Joson vs. Torres
It appearing that respondent failed to
submit his answer to the complaint
despite the grant to him of three (3)
extensions, such unreasonable failure is
deemed a waiver of his right to present
evidence in his behalf pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 4 of Administrative Order
No. 23 dated December 17, 1992, as
amended. Respondent is hereby
declared in default, meanwhile,
complainants are directed to present
their evidence ex-parte. However,
considering the prohibition on the
conduct of administrative investigation
due to the forthcoming barangay
elections, complainants will be notified
on the date after the barangay election
for them to present their evidence.
The records show that on August 27,
1997, petitioner submitted his Answer
Ad Cautelam where he disputed the
truth of the allegations that he barged
into the session hall of the capitol and
committed physical violence to harass
the private respondents who were
opposed to any move for the province to
contract a P150 million loan from PNB.
In his Order of October 8, 1997,
Undersecretary Sanchez admitted
petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam but
treated it as a position paper. On
October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a
Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation.
Petitioner reiterated this motion on
October 29, 1997. Petitioner's motion
was denied on November 11, 1997.
Secretary Barbers found petitioner guilty
as charged on the basis of the parties'
position papers. On January 8, 1998,
Executive Secretary Torres adopted
Secretary Barbers' findings and
recommendations and imposed on
petitioner the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay.
In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an
elective official of the province of Nueva
Ecija. The letter-complaint against him
was therefore properly filed with the
Office of the President. According to
petitioner, however, the letter-
complaint failed to conform with the
formal requirements set by the Code. He
alleges that the complaint was not
verified by private respondents and was
not supported by the joint affidavit of
the two witnesses named therein; that
private respondents later realized these
defects and surreptitiously inserted the
verification and sworn statement while
the complaint was still pending with the
Office of the President. 38 To prove his
allegations, petitioner submitted: (a) the
sworn statement of private respondent
Solita C. Santos attesting to the alleged
fact that after the letter-complaint was
filed, Vice-Governor Tinio made her and
the other members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan sign an additional page
which he had later notarized; and (b) the
fact that the verification of the letter-
complaint and the joint affidavit of the
witnesses do not indicate the document,
page or book number of the notarial
register of the notary public before
whom they were made.39 We find no
merit in the contention of the petitioner.
The absence of the document, page or
book number of the notarial register of
the subscribing officer is insufficient to
prove petitioner's claim. The lack of
these entries may constitute proof of
neglect on the part of the subscribing
officer in complying with the
requirements for notarization and
proper verification. They may give
grounds for the revocation of his notarial
commission.40 But they do not
indubitably prove that the verification
was inserted or intercalated after the
letter-complaint was filed with the Office
of the President.
Executive Secretary Torres found that all
the requisites for the imposition of
preventive suspension had been
complied with. Petitioner's failure to file
his answer despite several opportunities
given him was construed as a waiver of
his right to file answer and present
evidence; and as a result of this waiver,
the issues were deemed to have been
joined. The Executive Secretary also
found that the evidence of petitioner
Joson's guilt was strong and that his
continuance in office during the
pendency of the case could influence the
witnesses and pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the evidence against
him.
The rejection of petitioner's right to a
formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A.
O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating
Authority shall summon the parties to
consider whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not
give the Investigating Authority the
discretion to determine whether a
formal investigation would be
conducted. The records show that
petitioner filed a motion for formal
investigation. As respondent, he is
accorded several rights under the law, to
wit:
"Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. -- The
respondent shall be accorded full
opportunity to appear and defend
himself in person or by counsel, to
confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, and to require
the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documentary evidence in
his favor through compulsory process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum
The provisions for administrative
disciplinary actions against elective local
officials are markedly different from
appointive officials.87 The rules on the
removal and suspension of elective local
officials are more stringent. The
procedure of requiring position papers in
lieu of a hearing in administrative cases
is expressly allowed with respect to
appointive officials but not to those
elected. An elective official, elected by
popular vote, is directly responsible to
the community that elected him. The
official has a definite term of office fixed
by law which is relatively of short
duration. Suspension and removal from
office definitely affects and shortens this
term of office. When an elective official
is suspended or removed, the people are
deprived of the services of the man they
had elected. Implicit in the right of
suffrage is that the people are entitled to
the services of the elective official of
their choice.88 Suspension and removal
are thus imposed only after the elective
official is accorded his rights and the
evidence against him strongly dictates
their imposition.
John Doe warrant is a warrant for the
arrest of a person whose name is
unknown. For example, a John Doe
warrant can be issued for arrest of a
person known by sight but not by name.
John Doe warrant can also be used when
crime scene evidence yields a DNA
profile but the individual corresponding
to the DNA profile is unknown. Instead
of the suspect's name, the warrant will
be filed as "John Doe" and cite the DNA
profile. This type of warrant is permitted
in a few states, but not in federal defendant Veloso. Veloso asked description of the person accused as will
practice. Townsend what he wanted, and the enable the officer to identify him when
latter showed him the search warrant. found.
Warrantless searches are searches and Veloso read it and told Townsend that A warrant for the apprehension of a
seizures conducted without search he was Representative Veloso and not person whose true name is unknown, by
warrants. In the United States, John Doe, and that the police had no the name of "John Doe" or "Richard
warrantless searches are restricted right to search the house. Townsend Roe," "whose other or true name in
under the Fourth Amendment to the
answered that Veloso was considered as unknown," is void, without other and
United States Constitution, part of the
Bill of Rights, which provides that "The John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was further descriptions of the person to be
right of the people to be secure...against bulging, as if it contained gambling apprehended, and such warrant will not
unreasonable searches and seizures, utensils, Townsend required Veloso to justify the officer in acting under it. Such
shall not be violated, and no Warrants show him the evidence of the game. a warrant must, in addition, contain the
shall issue, but upon probable cause, About five minutes was consumed in best descriptio personae possible to be
supported by oath or affirmation, and conversation between the policemen obtained of the person or persons to be
particularly describing the place to be
and the accused the policemen insisting apprehended, and this description must
searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting be sufficient to indicate clearly the
in his refusal to submit to the search. proper person or persons upon whom
PEOPLE VS VELOSO -At last the patience of the officers was the warrant is to be served; and should
48 PHIL. 169 (1925) exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took state his personal appearance and
hold of Veloso only to meet with his peculiarities, give his occupation and
Facts:
resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the place of residence, and any other
-In May, 1923, the building located at
right forearm, and gave him a blow in circumstances by means of which he can
No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
another part of the body, which injured be identified.
was used by an organization known as
the policeman quite severely. Through In the first place, the affidavit for the
the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso
the combined efforts of Townsend and search warrant and the search warrant
was at that time a member of the House
Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down itself described the building to be
of Representative of the Philippine
on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of searched as "the building No. 124 Calle
Legislature. He was also the manager of
reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
the club.
chips were taken from his pockets. Islands." This, without doubt, was a
-The police of Manila had reliable
-All of the persons arrested were sufficient designation of the premises to
information that the so-called
searched and then conducted to the be searched.
Parliamentary Club was nothing more
patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to As the search warrant stated that John
than a gambling house. Indeed, on May
obey and shouted offensive epithets Doe had gambling apparatus in his
19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the
against the police department. It was possession in the building occupied by
gambling squad, had been to the club
necessary for the policemen to conduct him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
and verified this fact. As a result, on May
him downstairs. At the door, Veloso Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose
25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of
resisted so tenaciously that three Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the
the secret service of the City of Manila,
policemen were needed to place him in police could identify John Doe as Jose
applied for, and obtained a search
the patrol wagon. Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
warrant from Judge Garduño of the
Issue: WON the search warrant and the
municipal court. Thus provided, the
arrest of Veloso was valid.
police attempted to raid the
Ruling: Yes.
Parliamentary Club a little after three in
RD: It is provided, among other things, in
the afternoon of the date above-
the Philippine Code on Criminal
mentioned. They found the doors to the
Procedure that “a search warrant shall
premises closed and barred. Accordingly,
not issue except for probable cause and
one band of police including policeman
upon application supported by oath
Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so
particularly describing the place to be
as to enter a window of the house.
searched and the person of thing to be
Other policemen, headed by Townsend,
seized.”
broke in the outer door.
The name and description of the
-Once inside the Parliamentary Club,
accused should be inserted in the body
nearly fifty persons were apprehended
of the warrant and where the name is Freedom of religion is a principle that
by the police. One of them was the
unknown there must be such a supports the freedom of an individual or
community, in public or private, to
manifest religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship, and observance; the
concept is generally recognized also to
include the freedom to change religion
or not to follow any religion.[1] The
freedom to leave or discontinue
membership in a religion or religious
group —in religious terms called
"apostasy" —is also a fundamental part
of religious freedom.
Freedom of religion is considered by
many people and nations to be a
fundamental human right.[2][3] Thomas
Jefferson said (1807) "among the
inestimable of our blessings, also, is
that ...of liberty to worship our Creator
in the way we think most agreeable to
His will; ... In a country with a state
religion, freedom of religion is
generally considered to mean that the
government permits religious practices
of other sects besides the state
religion, and does not persecute
believers in other faiths. For a current
overview, see section Contemporary
situation of religious freedom in the
world.
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent
of Schools of Cebu
These two special civil actions for
certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition
were consolidated because they raise
essentially the same issue: whether
school children who are members or a
religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school
(both public and private), for refusing,
on account of their religious beliefs, to
take part in the flag ceremony which
includes playing (by a band) or singing
the Philippine national anthem,
saluting the Philippine flag and reciting
the patriotic pledge.
All the petitioners in these two cases
were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by Republic
Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by
Department Order No. 8 dated July 21,
1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the
flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach
their children not to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem, and recite
the patriotic pledge for they believe
that those are "acts of worship" or
"religious devotion" (p. 10, Rollo) which
they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to
anyone or anything except God" (p. 8,
Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's
command to "guard ourselves from
idols — 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They
consider the flag as an image or idol
representing the State (p. 10, Rollo).
They think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and
invades the sphere of the intellect and
spirit which the Constitution protect
against official control (p. 10, Rollo).
Moreover, the expulsion of members
of Jehovah's Witnesses from the
schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens,
under the 1987 Constitution, to receive
free education, for it is the duty of the
State to "protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality education . . .
and to make such education accessible
to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
Although the Court upholds in this
decision the petitioners' right under
our Constitution to refuse to salute the
Philippine flag on account of their
religious beliefs, we hope,
nevertheless, that another foreign
invasion of our country will not be
necessary in order for our countrymen
to appreciate and cherish the
Philippine flag.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
and prohibition is GRANTED. The
expulsion orders issued by the public
respondents against the petitioners are
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order which was
issued by this Court is hereby made
permanent.