Facts: Legal Medicine - Medical Negligence Digest by Bianca Beltran 1

Legal Medicine – Medical Negligence Digest by Bianca Beltran 1
[G.R. No. 118231. July 5, 1996]

BATIQUIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
“At present, the primary objective of the medical profession is the
preservation of life and maintenance of the health of the people.”
FACTS
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital,
Dumaguete City. She was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at the said Hospital.
Mrs. Villegas, a married woman, submitted herself to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal
care as the latter's private patient. One morning, Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance
of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy, also a Resident Physician at the same Hospital, C.I. and
O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses performed a simple cesarean
section on Mrs. Villegas and after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first
child, Rachel Acogido. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained confined at the Hospital
during which she was regularly visited by Dr. Batiquin.
Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains
and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she
consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain
medicines. The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring despite the
medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When the pains become unbearable
and she was rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy
Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City.
Dr. Ma. Salud Kho found Mrs. Villegas to be feverish, pale and was breathing
fast. Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the
umbilicus which she suspected to be either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian
cyst, either of which could be cancerous. She had an x-ray taken of Mrs. Villegas'
chest, abdomen and kidney. She also took blood tests of Plaintiff. A blood count
showed that Mrs. Villegas had an infection inside her abdominal cavity. The result
of all those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to
another surgery to which the latter agreed.
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow
discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave
out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber materials on the
right side of the uterus embedded on the ovarian cyst, 2 inches by 3/4 inch in
size. This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as a "foreign body"
looked like a piece of a "rubber glove" and which is also "rubber-drain like”. It
could have been a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or could have come from
other sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries
and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery.
The piece of rubber allegedly found near private respondent Flotilde Villegas'
uterus was not presented in court, and although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho testified that
she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination, it was not mentioned in
the pathologist's Surgical Pathology Report.
Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of
rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anesthesia Record, a
Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court, however,
regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay.
The trial court deemed vital Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that when she
confronted Dr. Kho regarding the piece of rubber, "Dr. Kho answered that there
was rubber indeed but that she threw it away." This statement, the trial court
noted, was never denied nor disputed by Dr. Kho, leading it to conclude:
There are now two different versions on the whereabouts of that offending
"rubber" — (1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by
Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure
of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions serve only to weaken
their claim against Defendant Batiquin.
RTC - held in favor of the petitioners herein.
CA – reversed the decision. It deemed Dr. Kho’s positive testimony to definitely
establish that a piece of rubber was found near private respondent Villegas’ uterus.
It further noted the fact that Villegas can no longer bear children because her
uterus and ovaries were removed by Dr. Kho is not taken into consideration as it
not shown that the removal of said organs were the direct result of the rubber left
by the appellee Dr. Batiquin near the uterus. What is establishe is that the rubber
left by appellee cause infection, placed the life of appellant Flotilde in jeopardy ad
caused appelants fear, worry and anxiety.
ISSUE
Whether or not the testimony of Dr. Kho should be given credence
Ruling
We agree with the Court of Appeals. The phrase relied upon by the trial court
does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent
Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for
examination by a pathologist. Not even the Pathologist's Report, although devoid
of any mention of a piece of rubber, could alter what Dr. Kho saw. Furthermore,
Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first
hand.
Although hearsay, Dr. Batiquin's claim was not objected to, and hence, the
same is admissible but it carries no probative value. Nevertheless, assuming
otherwise, Dr. Batiquin's statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho found a
piece of rubber near private respondent Villegas' uterus. And even if we were to
doubt Dr. Kho as to what she did to the piece of rubber. On this score, it is
perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some
facts and disbelieve his testimony with respect to other facts. And it has been
aptly said that even when a witness is found to have deliberately falsified in some
material particulars, it is not required that the whole of his uncorroborated
testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be
credited.
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her
positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in private respondent
Villegas' abdomen] prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court has had occasion
to delve into the nature and operation of this doctrine:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the]
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the
accident was one which ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res
ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the] alleged wrongdoer
may be inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident happened provided [the]
character of [the] accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief
that in [the] absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing
which caused injury is shown to have been under [the] management and control
of [the] alleged wrongdoer . . . . Under [this] doctrine . . . the happening of an
injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under [the]
exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was
such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had
been used.
xxx xxx xxx
The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts
and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It
merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The
doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are
present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft
of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object
finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does
not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from
the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation
which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it
stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean
section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to

overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece
of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects
thereof.
As a final word, this Court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the
medical profession plays in the lives of the people, and State's compelling
interest to enact measures to protect the public from "the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies and minds for disease or trauma." Indeed, a physician is bound to
serve the interest of his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them
always his best talent and skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner
endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid
ethical code and in contravention of the legal standards set forth for
professionals, in the general, and members of the medical profession, in
particular.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of 11 May 1994 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 30851 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FE CAYAO-LASAM, G.R. No. 159132

- versus - Promulgated:
SPOUSES CLARO and December 18, 2008
EDITHA RAMOLETE,
FACTS
Respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was brought to
the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal
bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the
LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the
fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation. The following day, Editha’s repeat pelvic sonogram showed
that aside from the fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also
appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner
advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or “raspa.”
Petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from the hospital the
following day.
Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and
severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. Beatriz de la Cruz, Dr. Victor B. Mayo
and Dr. Juan V. Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus
in the latter’s womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a
massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to
undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance to bear
a child.
Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) filed a Complaint for Gross
Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations
Commission (PRC).
Petitioner denied the allegations of negligence and incompetence with the
following explanations: upon Editha’s confirmation that she would seek admission at the
LMC, petitioner immediately called the hospital to anticipate the arrival of Editha and
ordered through the telephone the medicines Editha needed to take, which the nurses
carried out; petitioner visited Editha during her rounds; she performed an internal
examination on Editha and she discovered that the latter’s cervix was already open, thus,
petitioner discussed the possible D&C procedure, should the bleeding become more
profuse; she conducted another internal examination on Editha, which revealed that the
latter’s cervix was still open; Editha persistently complained of her vaginal bleeding and
her passing out of some meaty mass in the process of urination and bowel movement;
thus, petitioner advised Editha to undergo D&C procedure which the respondents
consented to; petitioner was very vocal in the operating room about not being able to see
an abortus; taking the words of Editha to mean that she was passing out some meaty
mass and clotted blood, she assumed that the abortus must have been expelled in the
process of bleeding; it was Editha who insisted that she wanted to be discharged;
petitioner agreed, but she advised Editha to return for check-up which the latter failed to
do.
Petitioner contended that it was Editha’s gross negligence and/or omission in
insisting to be discharged against doctor’s advice and her unjustified failure to return for
check-up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening condition on;
that Editha’s hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal pregnancy known
as placenta increta, which was an extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal
placental implantation. Petitioner argued that whether or not a D&C procedure was
done by her or any other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any stage
of gestation before term, the uterus would rupture just the same.
Board of Medicine (the Board) of the PRC - exonerating petitioner from the
charges filed against her. The Board held that Editha’s case was a case
of Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial. This type of ectopic pregnancy is one that is being
protected by the uterine muscles and manifestations may take later than four (4) months
and only attributes to two percent (2%) of ectopic pregnancy cases. When
complainant Editha was admitted in the hospital due to vaginal bleeding, an ultra-sound
was performed upon her and the result of the Sonogram Test reveals a morbid fetus but
did not specify where the fetus was located. Obstetricians will assume that the pregnancy
is within the uterus unless so specified by the Sonologist who conducted the ultra-
sound. Respondent (Dr. Lasam) cannot be faulted if she was not able to determine that
complainant Editha is having an ectopic pregnancy interstitial. The D&C conducted
on Editha is necessary considering that her cervix is already open and so as to stop the
profuse bleeding. Simple curettage cannot remove a fetus if the patient is having
an ectopic pregnancy, since ectopic pregnancy is pregnancy conceived outside the uterus
and curettage is done only within the uterus. Therefore, a more extensive operation
needed in this case of pregnancy in order to remove the fetus.
Appeal to PRC decision - reversing the findings of the Board and revoking
petitioner’s authority or license to practice her profession as a physician.
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner also dubbed her petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. The CA held that the Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court was an improper remedy, as the enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies in
Rule 43 is exclusive. PRC is not among the quasi-judicial bodies whose judgment or final
orders are subject of a petition for review to the CA, thus, the petition for review of the
PRC Decision, filed at the CA, was improper. Citing Section 26 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
2382 or the Medical Act of 1959, the CA held that the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy under the ordinary course of law which petitioner should have availed herself of
was to appeal to the Office of the President.
ISSUE
1. WHETHER OR NOT PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

REVOKING PETITIONER’S LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE WITHOUT AN
EXPERT TESTIMONY TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION AS TO THE CAUSE OF
RESPONDENT EDITHA RAMOLETE’S INJURY;
2. WHETHER OR NOT PRC COMMITTED AN EVEN GRAVER ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE FINDING OF THE BOARD OF
MEDICINE, WHICH HAD THE NECESSARY COMPETENCE AND EXPERTISE TO
ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF RESPONDENT EDITHA’S INJURY, AS WELL AS THE
TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AUGUSTO MANALO, M.D. ;[AND]
3. WHETHER OR NOT PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

MAKING CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS THAT WERE NOT ONLY UNSUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE BUT WERE ACTUALLY CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
RULING
Anent the substantive merits of the case, petitioner questions the PRC decision for
being without an expert testimony to support its conclusion and to establish the cause
of Editha’s injury. Petitioner avers that in cases of medical malpractice, expert testimony
is necessary to support the conclusion as to the cause of the injury.
Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure

of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill
which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in
like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient
must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or
action caused injury to the patient.
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury
and proximate causation.
A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of

the petitioner. As Editha’s physician, petitioner was duty-bound to use at least the same
level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their
improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in body or
in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice,
the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert
testimony is essential. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to
causation.
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support
their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would have done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo,
who was clearly an expert on the subject.
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special

knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of
recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience.
From the expert witness’ testimony, it is clear that the D&C procedure was
conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt
with Editha.
Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for

damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages,
provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by
an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act
or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the act or omission.
In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine:
When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994,

herein respondent advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days
after the D&C. This advise was clear in complainant’s Discharge
Sheet. However, complainant failed to do so. This being the case, the chain
of continuity as required in order that the doctrine of proximate cause can be
validly invoked was interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could
have examined her thoroughly. x x x (Emphases supplied)
Also, in the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there
was in fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectified if Editha followed the
petitioner’s order to return for a check-up. Dr. Manalo stated:
Granting that the obstetrician-gynecologist has been misled

(justifiably) up to thus point that there would have been ample opportunity
to rectify the misdiagnosis, had the patient returned, as instructed for her
follow-up evaluation. It was one and a half months later that the patient
sought consultation with another doctor. The continued growth of
an ectopic pregnancy, until its eventual rupture, is a dynamic process. Much
change in physical findings could be expected in 1 ½ months, including the
emergence of suggestive ones.
It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of
the petitioner’s advise. Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which
could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation
played a substantial part in bringing about Editha’s own injury. Had Editha returned,
petitioner could have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to
determine Editha’s health condition and applied the corresponding treatment which
could have prevented the rupture of Editha’s uterus. The D&C procedure having been
conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear
that Editha’s omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a
contributory negligence on her part.
Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care

on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which
acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.[ Where
the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own act, which
contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot
recover damages for the injury. Again, based on the evidence presented in the present
case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the
immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was her own omission when
she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioner’s orders. The
immediate cause of Editha’s injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages
from the injury.
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of
care. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences specially so if the
patient herself did not exercise the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated July 4, 2003 in CA-GR SP No. 62206 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Board of Medicine dated March 4, 1999 exonerating
petitioner is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROGELIOP. NOGALES, G.R. No. 142625

- versus -
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER,
DR. OSCAR ESTRADA,
DR. ELY VILLAFLOR,
DR. ROSA UY,
DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ,
DR. PERPETUA LACSON,
DR.NOE ESPINOLA, and Promulgated: December 19, 2006
NURSEJ. DUMLAO
FACTS
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales (“Corazon”) was under the
exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada (“Dr. Estrada”) beginning on her
fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. While Corazon was on
her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood
pressure and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a
dangerous complication of pregnancy.
Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor

pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales (“Spouses Nogales”) to see Dr.
Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her
immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center (“CMC”).
On 26 May 1976, Corazon was admitted at 2:30 a.m. at the CMC after the
staff nurse noted the written admission request of Dr. Estrada. Upon Corazon’s
admission at the CMC, Rogelio Nogales (“Rogelio”) executed and signed the
“Consent on Admission and Agreement” and “Admission Agreement.” Corazon

was then brought to the labor room of the CMC.
Dr. Rosa Uy (“Dr. Uy”), who was then a resident physician of CMC, conducted
an internal examination of Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Dr. Estrada to notify
him of her findings.
Around 3:00 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered several procedures to be done to

Corazon. The following orders are:
a. for 10 mg. of valium be administered immediately by intramuscular injection
b. intravenous administration of syntocinon admixed with dextrose, 5%, in
lactated Ringers’ solution, at the rate of eight to ten micro-drops per minute.
According to the Nurse’s Observation Notes, Dr. Joel Enriquez (“Dr.

Enriquez”), an anesthesiologist at CMC, was notified at 4:15 a.m. of Corazon’s
admission. Subsequently, when asked if he needed the services of an
anesthesiologist, Dr. Estrada refused. Despite Dr. Estrada’s refusal, Dr. Enriquez
stayed to observe Corazon’s condition.
At 6:00 a.m., Corazon was transferred to Delivery Room No. 1 of the

CMC. At 6:10 a.m., Corazon’s bag of water ruptured spontaneously. At 6:12 a.m.,
Corazon’s cervix was fully dilated. At 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to experience
convulsions.
At 6:15 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of ten grams of magnesium
sulfate. However, Dr. Ely Villaflor (“Dr. Villaflor”), who was assisting Dr. Estrada,
administered only 2.5 grams of magnesium sulfate.
At 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to
extract Corazon’s baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue
was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apnic, cyanotic, weak and injured
condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated and resuscitated by Dr.

Enriquez and Dr. Payumo.
At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which

rapidly became profuse. Corazon’s blood pressure dropped from 130/80 to
60/40 within five minutes. There was continuous profuse vaginal bleeding. The
assisting nurse administered hemacel through a gauge 19 needle as a side drip to
the ongoing intravenous injection of dextrose.
At 7:45 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered blood typing and cross matching with
bottled blood. It took approximately 30 minutes for the CMC laboratory, headed
by Dr. Perpetua Lacson (“Dr. Lacson”), to comply with Dr. Estrada’s order and
deliver the blood.
At 8:00 a.m., Dr. Noe Espinola (“Dr. Espinola”), head of the Obstetrics-
Gynecology Department of the CMC, was apprised of Corazon’s condition by
telephone. Upon being informed that Corazon was bleeding profusely, Dr.
Espinola ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made to sign a “Consent
to Operation.”
Due to the inclement weather then, Dr. Espinola, who was fetched from his
residence by an ambulance, arrived at the CMC about an hour later or at 9:00
a.m. He examined the patient and ordered some resuscitative measures to be
administered. Despite Dr. Espinola’s efforts, Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause
of death was “hemorrhage, post partum.”
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr.
Villaflor, Dr. Uy, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr. Espinola, and a certain Nurse J.
Dumlao for the death of Corazon. Petitioners mainly contended that defendant
physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the treatment and management
of Corazon’s condition. Petitioners charged CMC with negligence in the selection
and supervision of defendant physicians and hospital staff.
After more than 11 years of trial, the trial court rendered judgment finding
Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages. The trial court ruled as follows:
The victim was under his pre-natal care, apparently, his fault began
from his incorrect and inadequate management and lack of treatment
of the pre-eclamptic condition of his patient. It is not disputed that he
misapplied the forceps in causing the delivery because it resulted in a
large cervical tear which had caused the profuse bleeding which he also
failed to control with the application of inadequate injection of
magnesium sulfate by his assistant Dra. Ely Villaflor. Dr. Estrada even
failed to notice the erroneous administration by nurse Dumlao of
hemacel by way of side drip, instead of direct intravenous injection,
and his failure to consult a senior obstetrician at an early stage of the
problem.
Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision. Petitioners claimed

that aside from Dr. Estrada, the remaining respondents should be held equally
liable for negligence. Petitioners pointed out the extent of each respondent’s
alleged liability.
On 6 February 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
The Court noted that Dr. Estrada did not appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Accordingly, the
decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court’s judgment, is already
final as against Dr. Oscar Estrada.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling:
In its Decision of 6 February 1998, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ view that the doctrine
in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital applies to this

case. According to the Court of Appeals, the present case differs from
the Darling case since Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor-physician whereas
the Darling case involved a physician and a nurse who were employees of the
hospital.
Citing other American cases, the Court of Appeals further held that the mere
fact that a hospital permitted a physician to practice medicine and use its facilities
is not sufficient to render the hospital liable for the physician’s negligence. A
hospital is not responsible for the negligence of a physician who is an independent
contractor.
The Court of Appeals found the cases of Davidson v. Conole and Campbell v.
Emma Laing Stevens Hospital applicable to this case. Quoting Campbell, the Court
of Appeals stated that where there is no proof that defendant physician was an
employee of defendant hospital or that defendant hospital had reason to know
that any acts of malpractice would take place, defendant hospital could not be held
liable for its failure to intervene in the relationship of physician-patient between
defendant physician and plaintiff.
On the liability of the other respondents, the Court of Appeals applied the
“borrowed servant” doctrine considering that Dr. Estrada was an independent
contractor who was merely exercising hospital privileges. This doctrine provides
that once the surgeon enters the operating room and takes charge of the
proceedings, the acts or omissions of operating room personnel, and any
negligence associated with such acts or omissions, are imputable to the
surgeon. While the assisting physicians and nurses may be employed by the
hospital, or engaged by the patient, they normally become the temporary servants
or agents of the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress, and liability
may be imposed upon the surgeon for their negligent acts under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.
The Court of Appeals concluded that since Rogelio engaged Dr. Estrada as
the attending physician of his wife, any liability for malpractice must be Dr.
Estrada’s sole responsibility.
While it found the amount of damages fair and reasonable, the Court of
Appeals held that no interest could be imposed on unliquidated claims or
damages.
ISSUE
Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.
RULING
On the Liability of CMC
A hospital which is the employer, master, or principal of a physician

employee, servant, or agent, may be held liable for the physician’s negligence
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The Court had the occasion to determine the relationship between a hospital
and a consultant or visiting physician and the liability of such hospital for that
physician’s negligence in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring

and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the
hospital premises. Doctors who apply for “consultant” slots, visiting or
attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency,
their educational qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by
the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most
cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by
members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set

up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. This is
particularly true with respondent hospital.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending
consultant, he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological
conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents,
moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and
responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the
hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital.
In addition to these, the physician’s performance as a specialist is
generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of
mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses,
interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant
who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the
hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real
control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. While
“consultants” are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the
control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing,
we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This
being the case, the question now arises as to whether or not
respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for
petitioner’s condition.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also
for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a

relationship of patria potestas. x x x
While the Court in Ramos did not expound on the control test, such test essentially
determines whether an employment relationship exists between a physician and a
hospital based on the exercise of control over the physician as to
details. Specifically, the employer (or the hospital) must have the right to control
both the means and the details of the process by which the employee (or the
physician) is to accomplish his task.
The Court finds no single evidence pointing to CMC’s exercise of control over
Dr. Estrada’s treatment and management of Corazon’s condition. Throughout
Corazon’s pregnancy, she was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. At
the time of Corazon’s admission at CMC and during her delivery, it was Dr. Estrada,
assisted by Dr. Villaflor, who attended to Corazon. There was no showing that
CMC had a part in diagnosing Corazon’s condition. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff
privileges at CMC, such fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC. CMC
merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities when Corazon was about to give
birth, which CMC considered an emergency. Considering these circumstances, Dr.
Estrada is not an employee of CMC, but an independent contractor.
The question now is WHETHER CMC IS AUTOMATICALLY EXEMPT FROM

LIABILITY CONSIDERING THAT DR. ESTRADA IS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-
PHYSICIAN.
General Rule: A hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent

contractor-physician.
Exception: The hospital may be liable if the physician is the “ostensible”
agent of the hospital.
This exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent authority.” Under

the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether

the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should
have known, that the physician is an independent contractor.
Elements of Doctrine of Apparent Authority

A plaintiff must show that:
1. the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to
be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital;
2. where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the
plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and
acquiesced in them; and
3. the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its
agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The element of “holding out” on the part of the hospital does not
require an express representation by the hospital that the person
alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied
if the hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care
without informing the patient that the care is provided by independent
contractors.
The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is
satisfied if the plaintiff relies upon the hospital to provide complete
emergency room care, rather than upon a specific physician.
Doctrine of Apparent Authority Two (2) Essential Factors To Determine The Liability
Of An Independent-Contractor Physician
1. Hospital’s manifestations. It is sometimes described as an inquiry
whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital
need not make express representations to the patient that the treating
physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be
general and implied.
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of
estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that “*t+hrough estoppel,
an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.” Estoppel rests on this rule: “Whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted
to falsify it.”
*In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its
medical staff. Through CMC’s acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent
authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an
employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority.
First, CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its medical
staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada. Upon Dr. Estrada’s request for Corazon’s
admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily accommodated Corazon and
updated Dr. Estrada of her condition.
Second, CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC
letterhead. Prior to Corazon’s admission and supposed hysterectomy, CMC asked
Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of which reinforced Rogelio’s belief
that Dr. Estrada was a member of CMC’s medical staff. Without any indication in
these consent forms that Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor-physician, the
Spouses Nogales could not have known that Dr. Estrada was an independent
contractor. Significantly, no one from CMC informed the Spouses Nogales that Dr.
Estrada was an independent contractor.
Third, Dr. Estrada’s referral of Corazon’s profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr.
Espinola, who was then the Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of
CMC, gave the impression that Dr. Estrada as a member of CMC’s medical staff was
collaborating with other CMC-employed specialists in treating Corazon.
2. Patient’s reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether

the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or
its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
*The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived
employment relationship with CMC in accepting Dr. Estrada’s services. Rogelio
testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon’s
delivery not only because of their friend’s recommendation, but more importantly
because of Dr. Estrada’s “connection with a reputable hospital, the *CMC+.” In
other words, Dr. Estrada’s relationship with CMC played a significant role in the
Spouses Nogales’ decision in accepting Dr. Estrada’s services as the obstetrician-
gynecologist for Corazon’s delivery. Moreover, as earlier stated, there is no
showing that before and during Corazon’s confinement at CMC, the Spouses
Nogales knew or should have known that Dr. Estrada was not an employee of
CMC.
Further, the Spouses Nogales looked to CMC to provide the best medical care
and support services for Corazon’s delivery. The Court notes that prior to
Corazon’s fourth pregnancy, she used to give birth inside a clinic. Considering
Corazon’s age then, the Spouses Nogales decided to have their fourth child
delivered at CMC, which Rogelio regarded one of the best hospitals at the time.
This is precisely because the Spouses Nogales feared that Corazon might
experience complications during her delivery which would be better addressed
and treated in a modern and big hospital such as CMC. Moreover, Rogelio’s
consent in Corazon’s hysterectomy to be performed by a different physician,
namely Dr. Espinola, is a clear indication of Rogelio’s confidence in CMC’s surgical
staff.
CMC’s defense that all it did was “to extend to *Corazon+ its facilities” is
untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that hospitals, such as
CMC, are in the business of treatment. In this regard, the Court agrees with the
observation made by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Diggs v. Novant
Health, Inc., to wit:
“The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but
undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own
responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present day hospitals, as
their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than
furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis
a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes [sic], as well as
administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for
medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary,
by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of ‘hospital
facilities’ expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that
its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.” xxx
Likewise unconvincing is CMC’s argument that petitioners are estopped from

claiming damages based on the Consent on Admission and Consent to Operation.
Both release forms consist of two parts. The first part gave CMC permission to
administer to Corazon any form of recognized medical treatment which the CMC
medical staff deemed advisable. The second part of the documents, which may
properly be described as the releasing part, releases CMC and its employees “from
any and all claims” arising from or by reason of the treatment and operation.
The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to
Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. Neither do the
consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazon’s death due to
negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release forms, being in the
nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed strictly against hospitals. Besides, a
blanket release in favor of hospitals “from any and all claims,” which includes
claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would be contrary to public policy and
thus void.
Even simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor of

establishments like hospitals but may only mitigate liability depending on the
circumstances.[58] When a person needing urgent medical attention rushes to a
hospital, he cannot bargain on equal footing with the hospital on the terms of
admission and operation. Such a person is literally at the mercy of the
hospital. There can be no clearer example of a contract of adhesion than one
arising from such a dire situation. Thus, the release forms of CMC cannot relieve
CMC from liability for the negligent medical treatment of Corazon.
On the Liability of the Other Respondents
Despite this Court’s pronouncement in its 9 September 2002[59] Resolution

that the filing of petitioners’ Manifestation confined petitioners’ claim only against
CMC, Dr. Espinola, Dr. Lacson, and Dr. Uy, who have filed their comments, the
Court deems it proper to resolve the individual liability of the remaining
respondents to put an end finally to this more than two-decade old controversy.
a) Dr. Ely Villaflor – Not Negligent

b) Dr. Rosa Uy – Not Negligent
c) Dr. Joel Enriquez – Not Negligent
d) Dr. Perpetua Lacson – Not Negligent
e) Dr. Noe Espinola – Not Negligent
f) Nurse J. Dumlao – Not Negligent
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTLY GRANTS the petition. The Court finds
respondent Capitol Medical Center vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Oscar
Estrada. The amounts of P105,000 as actual damages and P700,000 as moral
damages should each earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
computed from the date of the judgment of the trial court. The Court affirms the
rest of the Decision dated 6 February 1998 and Resolution dated 21 March 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45641.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, G.R. No. 126297

INC.,
- versus -
THE COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD and
ENRIQUE
AGANA,
x-------------------x
NATIVIDAD [substituted by her G.R. No. 126467

children Marcelino Agana III,
Enrique Agana, Jr.,
Emma Agana-Andaya,
Jesus Agana and Raymund
Agana] and ENRIQUE AGANA,
- versus -
THE COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN FUENTES,
x-------------------x
MIGUEL AMPIL, G.R. No. 127590

- versus -
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE
AGANA,
Promulgated: February 2, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
FACTS
PSI, together with Dr. Miguel Ampil and Dr. Juan Fuentes, was impleaded
by Enrique Agana and Natividad Agana (later substituted by her heirs), in a
complaint for damages for the injuries suffered by Natividad when Dr. Ampil and
Dr. Fuentes neglected to remove from her body two gauzes which were used in
the surgery they performed on her on at the Medical City General Hospital. PSI
was impleaded as owner, operator and manager of the hospital.
RTC held PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages.
CA absolved Dr. Fuentes but affirmed the liability of Dr. Ampil and PSI,
subject to the right of PSI to claim reimbursement from Dr. Ampil.
ISSUE
Whether a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of physicians-consultants

allowed to practice in its premises.
RULING
This Court holds that PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the principle
of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with Dr.
Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr.
Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure
to perform its duties as a hospital.
While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in

reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of its
business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment. Within that reality, three
legal relationships crisscross: (1) between the hospital and the doctor practicing
within its premises; (2) between the hospital and the patient being treated or
examined within its premises and (3) between the patient and the doctor. The
exact nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent of the liability of
the hospital for the negligence of the doctor.
Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held

vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code or
the principle of respondeat superior. Even when no employment relationship exists
but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its
agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to
Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent
authority. Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital
may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to
follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a
corporation.
This Court still employs the “control test” to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between hospital and doctor. In Calamba
Medical Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. it held:
Under the "control test", an employment relationship exists between a

physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the
details of the process by which the physician is to accomplish his task.
xx xx xx
As priorly stated, private respondents maintained specific work-

schedules, as determined by petitioner through its medical director,
which consisted of 24-hour shifts totaling forty-eight hours each week
and which were strictly to be observed under pain of administrative
sanctions.
That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light

from the undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the operating
room, or any department or ward for that matter, respondents' work
is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge nurses and
orderlies. Without the approval or consent of petitioner or its medical
director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas. For control
test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually supervise
the performance of duties of the employee, it being enough that it has
the right to wield the power.
In the present case, it appears to have escaped the Court's attention that
both the RTC and the CA found no employment relationship between PSI and Dr.
Ampil, and that the Aganas did not question such finding. In its March 17,
1993 decision, the RTC found “that defendant doctors were not employees of PSI
in its hospital, they being merely consultants without any employer-employee
relationship and in the capacity of independent contractors.” The Aganas never
questioned such finding.
In fine, as there was no dispute over the RTC finding that PSI and Dr. Ampil
had no employer-employee relationship, such finding became final and conclusive
even to this Court. There was no reason for PSI to have raised it as an issue in its
petition. Thus, whatever discussion on the matter that may have ensued was
purely academic.
Nonetheless, to allay the anxiety of the intervenors, the Court holds

that, in this particular instance, the concurrent finding of the RTC and the CA that
PSI was not the employer of Dr. Ampil is correct. Control as a determinative factor
in testing the employer-employee relationship between doctor and hospital under
which the hospital could be held vicariously liable to a patient in medical
negligence cases is a requisite fact to be established by preponderance of evidence.
Here, there was insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or
wielded such power over the means and the details of the specific process by
which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the treatment of Natividad. Consequently, PSI
cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under the
principle of respondeat superior.
There is, however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out to the
patient (Natividad) that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two
factors that determine apparent authority: first, the hospital's implied
manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was
the hospital's agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The decision made by Enrique for Natividad to consult Dr. Ampil was
significantly influenced by the impression that Dr. Ampil was a staff member
of Medical City General Hospital, and that said hospital was well known and
prominent. Enrique looked upon Dr. Ampil not as independent of but as integrally
related to Medical City. PSI's acts tended to confirm and reinforce, rather than
negate, Enrique's view. The consent forms signed by Enrique as required by PSI
virtually reinforced the public impression that Dr. Ampil was a physician of its
hospital, rather than one independently practicing in it; that the medications and
treatments he prescribed were necessary and desirable; and that the hospital staff
was prepared to carry them out.
The Court cannot speculate on what could have been behind the
Aganas’ decision but would rather adhere strictly to the fact that, under the
circumstances at that time, Enrique decided to consult Dr. Ampil for he believed
him to be a staff member of a prominent and known hospital. After his meeting
with Dr. Ampil, Enrique advised his wife Natividad to go to
the Medical City General Hospital to be examined by said doctor, and the hospital
acted in a way that fortified Enrique's belief.
This Court must therefore maintain the ruling that PSI is vicariously liable
for the negligence of Dr. Ampil as its ostensible agent.
Moving on to the next issue, PSI made an admission in its Motion for
Reconsideration when it stated that had Natividad Agana “informed the hospital of
her discomfort and pain, the hospital would have been obliged to act on it.”
The significance of the foregoing statements is critical.

First, they constitute judicial admission by PSI that while it had no power to
control the means or method by which Dr. Ampil conducted the surgery on
Natividad Agana, it had the power to review or cause the review of what may
have irregularly transpired within its walls strictly for the purpose of determining
whether some form of negligence may have attended any procedure done inside
its premises, with the ultimate end of protecting its patients.
Second, it is a judicial admission that, by virtue of the nature of its business
as well as its prominence in the hospital industry, it assumed a duty to “tread on”
the “captain of the ship” role of any doctor rendering services within its premises
for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the patients availing themselves of its
services and facilities.
Third, by such admission, PSI defined the standards of its corporate conduct
under the circumstances of this case, specifically: (a) that it had a corporate duty
to Natividad even after her operation to ensure her safety as a patient; (b) that its
corporate duty was not limited to having its nursing staff note or record the two
missing gauzes and (c) that its corporate duty extended to determining Dr. Ampil's
role in it, bringing the matter to his attention, and correcting his negligence.
And finally, by such admission, PSI barred itself from arguing in its second
motion for reconsideration that the concept of corporate responsibility was not
yet in existence at the time Natividad underwent treatment; and that if it had any
corporate responsibility, the same was limited to reporting the missing gauzes and
did not include “taking an active step in fixing the negligence
committed.” An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and is conclusive as to him, and all proofs submitted
by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether or
not objection is interposed by a party.
Given the standard of conduct that PSI defined for itself, the next relevant
inquiry is whether the hospital measured up to it.
PSI could not simply wave off the problem and nonchalantly delegate to Dr.
Ampil the duty to review what transpired during the operation. The purpose of
such review would have been to pinpoint when, how and by whom two surgical
gauzes were mislaid so that necessary remedial measures could be taken to avert
any jeopardy to Natividad’s recovery. Certainly, PSI could not have expected that
purpose to be achieved by merely hoping that the person likely to have mislaid the
gauzes might be able to retrace his own steps. By its own standard of corporate
conduct, PSI's duty to initiate the review was non-delegable.
While Dr. Ampil may have had the primary responsibility of notifying
Natividad about the missing gauzes, PSI imposed upon itself the separate and
independent responsibility of initiating the inquiry into the missing gauzes. The
record taken during the operation of Natividad which reported a gauze count
discrepancy should have given PSI sufficient reason to initiate a review. It should
not have waited for Natividad to complain.
As it happened, PSI took no heed of the record of operation and

consequently did not initiate a review of what transpired during Natividad’s
operation. Rather, it shirked its responsibility and passed it on to others – to Dr.
Ampil whom it expected to inform Natividad, and to Natividad herself to complain
before it took any meaningful step. By its inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own
standard of hospital care. It committed corporate negligence.
It should be borne in mind that the corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is

different from the medical negligence attributed to Dr. Ampil. The duties of the
hospital are distinct from those of the doctor-consultant practicing within its
premises in relation to the patient; hence, the failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as a
hospital corporation gave rise to a direct liability to the Aganas distinct from that
of Dr. Ampil.
All this notwithstanding, we make it clear that PSI’s hospital liability based
on ostensible agency and corporate negligence applies only to this case, pro hac
vice. It is not intended to set a precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold
hospitals liable for every form of negligence of their doctors-consultants under any
and all circumstances. The ruling is unique to this case, for the liability of PSI arose
from an implied agency with Dr. Ampil and an admitted corporate duty to
Natividad.
Other circumstances peculiar to this case warrant this ruling, not the least of
which being that the agony wrought upon the Aganas has gone on for 26 long
years, with Natividad coming to the end of her days racked in pain and
agony. Such wretchedness could have been avoided had PSI simply done what
was logical: heed the report of a guaze count discrepancy, initiate a review of
what went wrong and take corrective measures to ensure the safety of
Nativad. Rather, for 26 years, PSI hemmed and hawed at every turn, disowning
any such responsibility to its patient. Meanwhile, the options left to the Aganas
have all but dwindled, for the status of Dr. Ampil can no longer be ascertained.
Therefore, taking all the equities of this case into consideration, this Court
believes P15 million would be a fair and reasonable liability of PSI, subject to 12%
p.a. interest from the finality of this resolution to full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the second motion for reconsideration is DENIED and the

motions for intervention are NOTED.
Professional Services, Inc. is ORDERED pro hac vice to pay Natividad

(substituted by her children Marcelino Agana III, Enrique Agana, Jr., Emma Agana-
Andaya, Jesus Agana and Raymund Agana) and Enrique Agana the total amount
of P15 million, subject to 12% p.a. interest from the finality of this resolution to full
satisfaction.
[G.R. No. 124354. April 11, 2002]

ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS
SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA
GUTIERREZ
FACTS
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos’ was under a comatose condition after she delivered
herself to De Los Santos Medical Center, Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta
Gutierrez for their professional care and management.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after seeking professional medical help, was advised
to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). She was referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to
perform the operation on her. The operation was scheduled in the morning at
private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Dr. Hosaka
recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez.
Petitioner Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day before the scheduled
operation. By 7:30 in the morning of the following day, petitioner Erlinda was
already being prepared for operation. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was
then Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed to
accompany her inside the operating room.
9:30 am - Dr. Hosaka had not yet arrived. Dr. Gutierrez informed Cruz that the
operation might be delayed due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka.
10:00 am - Dr. Hosaka still not around
12:00 pm - Dr. Hosaka arrived at the hospital or more than three (3) hours after
the scheduled operation.
Cruz was then still inside the operating room, heard about Dr. Hosaka’s arrival.
While she held the hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the
patient. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez utter: “ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.” Cruz noticed a bluish discoloration of
Erlinda’s nailbeds on her left hand. She (Cruz) then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct
someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. When he arrived, Dr.
Calderon attempted to intubate the patient. The nailbeds of the patient remained
bluish, thus, she was placed in a trendelenburg position – a position where the
head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet. At this point, Cruz
went out of the operating room to express her concern to petitioner Rogelio that
Erlinda’s operation was not going well.
Cruz quickly rushed back to the operating room and saw that the patient was
still in trendelenburg position. At almost 3:00 in the afternoon, she saw Erlinda
being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The doctors explained to
petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a
month. She was released from the hospital only four months later or on November
15, 1985. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition
until she died on August 3, 1999
Petitioners filed a civil case for damages against private respondents. After due
trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Essentially, the
trial court found that private respondents were negligent in the performance of
their duties to Erlinda. On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision and directed petitioners to pay their “unpaid
medical bills” to private respondents.
ISSUE
1. WHETHER OR NOT DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ (ANESTHESIOLOGIST) IS
LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE;
2. WHETHER OR NOT DR. ORLINO HOSAKA (SURGEON) IS LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENCE; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HOSPITAL (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER) IS
LIABLE FOR ANY ACT OF NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY THEIR VISITING
CONSULTANT SURGEON AND ANESTHESIOLOGIST.
We shall first resolve the issue pertaining to private respondent Dr.

Gutierrez. Unfortunately, Dr. Gutierrez’ claim of lack of negligence on her part is
belied by the records of the case. It has been sufficiently established that she
failed to exercise the standards of care in the administration of anesthesia on a
patient. Dr. Egay enlightened the Court on what these standards are:
x x x What are the standards of care that an anesthesiologist should do

before we administer anesthesia? The initial step is the preparation of
the patient for surgery and this is a pre-operative evaluation because
the anesthesiologist is responsible for determining the medical status
of the patient, developing the anesthesia plan and acquainting the
patient or the responsible adult particularly if we are referring with the
patient or to adult patient who may not have, who may have some
mental handicaps of the proposed plans. We do pre-operative
evaluation because this provides for an opportunity for us to establish
identification and personal acquaintance with the patient. It also
makes us have an opportunity to alleviate anxiety, explain techniques
and risks to the patient, given the patient the choice and establishing
consent to proceed with the plan. And lastly, once this has been
agreed upon by all parties concerned the ordering of pre-operative
medications. And following this line at the end of the evaluation we
usually come up on writing, documentation is very important as far as
when we train an anesthesiologist we always emphasize this because
we need records for our protection, well, records. And it entails having
brief summary of patient history and physical findings pertinent to
anesthesia, plan, organize as a problem list, the plan anesthesia
technique, the plan post operative, pain management if appropriate,
special issues for this particular patient. There are needs for special
care after surgery and if it so it must be written down there and a
request must be made known to proper authorities that such and such
care is necessary. And the request for medical evaluation if there is an
indication. When we ask for a cardio-pulmonary clearance it is not in
fact to tell them if this patient is going to be fit for anesthesia, the
decision to give anesthesia rests on the anesthesiologist. What we ask
them is actually to give us the functional capacity of certain systems
which maybe affected by the anesthetic agent or the technique that we
are going to use. But the burden of responsibility in terms of selection
of agent and how to administer it rest on the anesthesiologist.
The conduct of a preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an operation,
whether elective or emergency, cannot be dispensed with. Such evaluation is
necessary for the formulation of a plan of anesthesia care suited to the needs of
the patient concerned.
Pre-evaluation for anesthesia involves taking the patient’s medical history,
reviewing his current drug therapy, conducting physical examination,
interpreting laboratory data, and determining the appropriate prescription of
preoperative medications as necessary to the conduct of anesthesia.
Physical examination of the patient entails not only evaluating the patient’s
central nervous system, cardiovascular system and lungs but also the upper
airway. Examination of the upper airway would in turn include an analysis of the
patient’s cervical spine mobility, temporomandibular mobility, prominent central
incisors, deceased or artificial teeth, ability to visualize uvula and the thyromental
distance.
Nonetheless, Dr. Gutierrez omitted to perform a thorough preoperative
evaluation on Erlinda. As she herself admitted, she saw Erlinda for the first time
on the day of the operation itself, one hour before the scheduled operation. She
auscultated the patient’s heart and lungs and checked the latter’s blood pressure
to determine if Erlinda was indeed fit for operation. However, she did not proceed
to examine the patient’s airway. Had she been able to check petitioner Erlinda’s
airway prior to the operation, Dr. Gutierrez would most probably not have
experienced difficulty in intubating the former, and thus the resultant injury could
have been avoided. As we have stated in our Decision:
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for
the first time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date,
no prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by
her. Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the
physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly
informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of
anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez’ act of seeing her patient for the
first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore,
an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures
cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the
physician’s centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical
procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.
Further, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse its finding that it was
the faulty intubation on Erlinda that caused her comatose condition. There is no
question that Erlinda became comatose after Dr. Gutierrez performed a medical
procedure on her. Even the counsel of Dr. Gutierrez admitted to this fact during
the oral arguments:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Mr. Counsel, you started your argument saying that this involves a comatose
patient?
ATTY. GANA:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
How do you mean by that, a comatose, a comatose after any other acts were
done by Dr. Gutierrez or comatose before any act was done by her?
ATTY. GANA:
No, we meant comatose as a final outcome of the procedure.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Meaning to say, the patient became comatose after some intervention,
professional acts have been done by Dr. Gutierrez?
ATTY. GANA:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
In other words, the comatose status was a consequence of some acts
performed by D. Gutierrez?
ATTY. GANA:
It was a consequence of the well, (interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE:
An acts performed by her, is that not correct?
ATTY. GANA:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Thank you.
What is left to be determined therefore is whether Erlinda’s hapless condition
was due to any fault or negligence on the part of Dr. Gutierrez while she (Erlinda)
was under the latter’s care. Dr. Gutierrez maintains that the bronchospasm and
cardiac arrest resulting in the patient’s comatose condition was brought about by
the anaphylactic reaction of the patient to Thiopental Sodium (pentothal). [18] In
the Decision, we explained why we found Dr. Gutierrez’ theory unacceptable. In
the first place, Dr. Eduardo Jamora, the witness who was presented to support her
(Dr. Gutierrez) theory, was a pulmonologist. Thus, he could not be considered an
authority on anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications.[19]
Secondly, there was no evidence on record to support the theory that Erlinda
developed an allergic reaction to pentothal. Dr. Camagay enlightened the Court as
to the manifestations of an allergic reaction in this wise:
DR. CAMAGAY:
All right, let us qualify an allergic reaction. In medical terminology an allergic
reaction is something which is not usual response and it is further qualified
by the release of a hormone called histamine and histamine has an effect on
all the organs of the body generally release because the substance that
entered the body reacts with the particular cell, the mass cell, and the mass
cell secretes this histamine. In a way it is some form of response to take
away that which is not mine, which is not part of the body. So, histamine has
multiple effects on the body. So, one of the effects as you will see you will
have redness, if you have an allergy you will have tearing of the eyes, you will
have swelling, very crucial swelling sometimes of the larynges which is your
voice box main airway, that swelling may be enough to obstruct the entry of
air to the trachea and you could also have contraction, constriction of the
smaller airways beyond the trachea, you see you have the trachea this way,
we brought some visual aids but unfortunately we do not have a projector.
And then you have the smaller airways, the bronchi and then eventually into
the mass of the lungs you have the bronchus. The difference is that these
tubes have also in their walls muscles and this particular kind of muscles is
smooth muscle so, when histamine is released they close up like this and that
phenomenon is known as bronco spasm. However, the effects of histamine
also on blood vessels are different. They dilate blood vessel open up and the
patient or whoever has this histamine release has hypertension or low blood
pressure to a point that the patient may have decrease blood supply to the
brain and may collapse so, you may have people who have this.[20]
These symptoms of an allergic reaction were not shown to have been extant in
Erlinda’s case. As we held in our Decision, “no evidence of stridor, skin reactions,
or wheezing – some of the more common accompanying signs of an allergic
reaction – appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented to the
court.”[21]
Dr. Gutierrez, however, insists that she successfully intubated Erlinda as
evidenced by the fact that she was revived after suffering from cardiac arrest. Dr.
Gutierrez faults the Court for giving credence to the testimony of Cruz on the
matter of the administration of anesthesia when she (Cruz), being a nurse, was
allegedly not qualified to testify thereon. Rather, Dr. Gutierrez invites the Court’s
attention to her synopsis on what transpired during Erlinda’s intubation:
12:15 p.m. Patient was inducted with sodium pentothal 2.5% (250 mg)
given by slow IV. 02 was started by mask. After pentothal injection
this was followed by IV injection of Norcuron 4mg. After 2 minutes
02 was given by positive pressure for about one minute. Intubation
with endotracheal tube 7.5 m in diameter was done with slight
difficulty (short neck & slightly prominent upper teeth) chest was
examined for breath sounds & checked if equal on both sides. The
tube was then anchored to the mouth by plaster & cuff
inflated. Ethrane 2% with 02 4 liters was given. Blood pressure was
checked 120/80 & heart rate regular and normal 90/min.
12:25 p.m. After 10 minutes patient was cyanotic. Ethrane was
discontinued & 02 given alone. Cyanosis disappeared. Blood
pressure and heart beats stable.
12:30 p.m. Cyanosis again reappeared this time with sibilant and sonorous
rales all over the chest. D_5%_H20 & 1 ampule of aminophyline by
fast drip was started. Still the cyanosis was persistent. Patient was
connected to a cardiac monitor. Another ampule of of [sic]
aminophyline was given and solu cortef was given.
12:40 p.m. There was cardiac arrest. Extra cardiac massage and
intercardiac injection of adrenalin was given & heart beat
reappeared in less than one minute. Sodium bicarbonate &
another dose of solu cortef was given by IV. Cyanosis slowly
disappeared & 02 continuously given & assisted positive
pressure. Laboratory exams done (see results in chart).
Patient was transferred to ICU for further management.[22]
From the foregoing, it can be allegedly seen that there was no withdrawal
(extubation) of the tube. And the fact that the cyanosis allegedly disappeared
after pure oxygen was supplied through the tube proved that it was properly
placed.
The Court has reservations on giving evidentiary weight to the entries
purportedly contained in Dr. Gutierrez’ synopsis. It is significant to note that the
said record prepared by Dr. Gutierrez was made only after Erlinda was taken out of
the operating room. The standard practice in anesthesia is that every single act
that the anesthesiologist performs must be recorded. In Dr. Gutierrez’ case, she
could not account for at least ten (10) minutes of what happened during the
administration of anesthesia on Erlinda. The following exchange between Dr.
Estrella, one of the amicii curiae, and Dr. Gutierrez is instructive:
DR. ESTRELLA
You mentioned that there were two (2) attempts in the intubation period?
DR. GUTIERREZ
Yes.
Q There were two attempts. In the first attempt was the tube inserted or was
the laryngoscope only inserted, which was inserted?
A All the laryngoscope.
Q All the laryngoscope. But if I remember right somewhere in the re-direct, a
certain lawyer, you were asked that you did a first attempt and the question
was – did you withdraw the tube? And you said – you never withdrew the
tube, is that right?
A Yes.
Q Yes. And so if you never withdrew the tube then there was no, there was
no insertion of the tube during that first attempt. Now, the other thing that
we have to settle here is – when cyanosis occurred, is it recorded in the
anesthesia record when the cyanosis, in your recording when did the
cyanosis occur?
A (sic)
Q Is it a standard practice of anesthesia that whatever you do during that
period or from the time of induction to the time that you probably get the
patient out of the operating room that every single action that you do is so
recorded in your anesthesia record?
A I was not able to record everything I did not have time anymore because I
did that after the, when the patient was about to leave the operating
room. When there was second cyanosis already that was the (interrupted)
Q When was the first cyanosis?
A The first cyanosis when I was (interrupted)
Q What time, more or less?
A I think it was 12:15 or 12:16.
Q Well, if the record will show you started induction at 12:15?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And the first medication you gave was what?
A The first medication, no, first the patient was oxygenated for around one to
two minutes.
Q Yes, so, that is about 12:13?
A Yes, and then, I asked the resident physician to start giving the pentothal
very slowly and that was around one minute.
Q So, that is about 12:13 no, 12:15, 12:17?
A Yes, and then, after one minute another oxygenation was given and after
(interrupted)
Q 12:18?
A Yes, and then after giving the oxygen we start the menorcure which is a
relaxant. After that relaxant (interrupted)
Q After that relaxant, how long do you wait before you do any manipulation?
A Usually you wait for two minutes or three minutes.
Q So, if our estimate of the time is accurate we are now more or less 12:19, is
that right?
A Maybe.
Q 12:19. And at that time, what would have been done to this patient?
A After that time you examine the, if there is relaxation of the jaw which you
push it downwards and when I saw that the patient was relax because that
monorcure is a relaxant, you cannot intubate the patient or insert the
laryngoscope if it is not keeping him relax. So, my first attempt when I put
the laryngoscope on I saw the trachea was deeply interiorly. So, what I did
ask “mahirap ata ito ah.” So, I removed the laryngoscope and oxygenated
again the patient.
Q So, more or less you attempted to do an intubation after the first attempt
as you claimed that it was only the laryngoscope that was inserted.
A Yes.
Q And in the second attempt you inserted the laryngoscope and now possible
intubation?
A Yes.
Q And at that point, you made a remark, what remark did you make?
A I said “mahirap ata ito” when the first attempt I did not see the trachea right
away. That was when I (interrupted)
Q That was the first attempt?
A Yes.
Q What about the second attempt?
A On the second attempt I was able to intubate right away within two to three
seconds.
Q At what point, for purposes of discussion without accepting it, at what point
did you make the comment “na mahirap ata to intubate, mali ata ang
pinasukan”
A I did not say “mali ata ang pinasukan” I never said that.
Q Well, just for the information of the group here the remarks I am making is
based on the documents that were forwarded to me by the Supreme
Court. That is why for purposes of discussion I am trying to clarify this for
the sake of enlightenment. So, at what point did you ever make that
comment?
A Which one, sir?
Q The “mahirap intubate ito” assuming that you (interrupted)
A Iyon lang, that is what I only said “mahirap intubate (interrupted)
Q At what point?
A When the first attempt when I inserted the laryngoscope for the first time.
Q So, when you claim that at the first attempt you inserted the laryngoscope,
right?
A Yes.
Q But in one of the recordings somewhere at the, somewhere in the transcript
of records that when the lawyer of the other party try to inquire from you
during the first attempt that was the time when “mayroon ba kayong hinugot
sa tube, I do not remember the page now, but it seems to me it is there. So,
that it was on the second attempt that (interrupted)
A I was able to intubate.
Q And this is more or less about what time 12:21?
A Maybe, I cannot remember the time, Sir.
Q Okay, assuming that this was done at 12:21 and looking at the anesthesia
records from 12:20 to 12:30 there was no recording of the vital signs. And
can we presume that at this stage there was already some problems in
handling the patient?
A Not yet.
Q But why are there no recordings in the anesthesia record?
A I did not have time.
Q Ah, you did not have time, why did you not have time?
A Because it was so fast, I really (at this juncture the witness is laughing)
Q No, I am just asking. Remember I am not here not to pin point on anybody
I am here just to more or less clarify certainty more ore less on the record.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And so it seems that there were no recording during that span of ten (10)
minutes. From 12:20 to 12:30, and going over your narration, it seems to
me that the cyanosis appeared ten (10) minutes after induction, is that right?
A Yes.
Q And that is after induction 12:15 that is 12:25 that was the first cyanosis?
A Yes.
Q And that the 12:25 is after the 12:20?
A We cannot (interrupted)
Q Huwag ho kayong makuwan, we are just trying to enlighten, I am just going
over the record ano, kung mali ito kuwan eh di ano. So, ganoon po ano, that
it seems to me that there is no recording from 12:20 to 12:30, so, I am just
wondering why there were no recordings during the period and then of
course the second cyanosis, after the first cyanosis. I think that was the time
Dr. Hosaka came in?
A No, the first cyanosis (interrupted).[23]
We cannot thus give full credence to Dr. Gutierrez’ synopsis in light of her
admission that it does not fully reflect the events that transpired during the
administration of anesthesia on Erlinda. As pointed out by Dr. Estrella, there was a
ten-minute gap in Dr. Gutierrez’ synopsis, i.e., the vital signs of Erlinda were not
recorded during that time. The absence of these data is particularly significant
because, as found by the trial court, it was the absence of oxygen supply for four
(4) to five (5) minutes that caused Erlinda’s comatose condition.
On the other hand, the Court has no reason to disbelieve the testimony of
Cruz. As we stated in the Decision, she is competent to testify on matters which
she is capable of observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician and
surgeon, external appearances and manifest conditions which are observable by
any one.[24] Cruz, Erlinda’s sister-in-law, was with her inside the operating
room. Moreover, being a nurse and Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of
Nursing at that, she is not entirely ignorant of anesthetic procedure. Cruz narrated
that she heard Dr. Gutierrez remark, “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.” She observed that the nailbeds of Erlinda
became bluish and thereafter Erlinda was placed in trendelenburg position. [25] Cruz
further averred that she noticed that the abdomen of Erlinda became
distended.[26]
The cyanosis (bluish discoloration of the skin or mucous membranes caused by
lack of oxygen or abnormal hemoglobin in the blood) and enlargement of the
stomach of Erlinda indicate that the endotracheal tube was improperly inserted
into the esophagus instead of the trachea. Consequently, oxygen was delivered
not to the lungs but to the gastrointestinal tract. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that Erlinda was placed in trendelenburg position. This indicates that there
was a decrease of blood supply to the patient’s brain. The brain was thus
temporarily deprived of oxygen supply causing Erlinda to go into coma.
The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen absent any
negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal
tube. As was noted in our Decision, the instruments used in the administration of
anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control
of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka.[27] In Voss vs.
Bridwell,[28] which involved a patient who suffered brain damage due to the
wrongful administration of anesthesia, and even before the scheduled mastoid
operation could be performed, the Kansas Supreme Court applied the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, reasoning that the injury to the patient therein was one which
does not ordinarily take place in the absence of negligence in the administration of
an anesthetic, and in the use and employment of an endotracheal tube. The court
went on to say that “*o+rdinarily a person being put under anesthesia is not
rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia in the
absence of negligence. Upon these facts and under these circumstances, a layman
would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised.”[29]Considering the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the testimony of Cruz was properly given credence in
the case at bar.
For his part, Dr. Hosaka mainly contends that the Court erred in finding him
negligent as a surgeon by applying the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine.[30] Dr. Hosaka
argues that the trend in United States jurisprudence has been to reject said
doctrine in light of the developments in medical practice. He points out that
anesthesiology and surgery are two distinct and specialized fields in medicine and
as a surgeon, he is not deemed to have control over the acts of Dr. Gutierrez. As
anesthesiologist, Dr. Gutierrez is a specialist in her field and has acquired skills and
knowledge in the course of her training which Dr. Hosaka, as a surgeon, does not
possess.[31] He states further that current American jurisprudence on the matter
recognizes that the trend towards specialization in medicine has created situations
where surgeons do not always have the right to control all personnel within the
operating room,[32] especially a fellow specialist.[33]
Dr. Hosaka cites the case of Thomas v. Raleigh General Hospital,[34] which
involved a suit filed by a patient who lost his voice due to the wrongful insertion of
the endotracheal tube preparatory to the administration of anesthesia in
connection with the laparotomy to be conducted on him. The patient sued both
the anesthesiologist and the surgeon for the injury suffered by him. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the surgeon could not be held liable for
the loss of the patient’s voice, considering that the surgeon did not have a hand in
the intubation of the patient. The court rejected the application of the “Captain-of-
the-Ship Doctrine,” citing the fact that the field of medicine has become
specialized such that surgeons can no longer be deemed as having control over the
other personnel in the operating room. It held that “*a+n assignment of liability
based on actual control more realistically reflects the actual relationship which
exists in a modern operating room.”[35] Hence, only the anesthesiologist who
inserted the endotracheal tube into the patient’s throat was held liable for the
injury suffered by the latter.
This contention fails to persuade.
That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-
the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said
trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this case
justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. From the facts on
record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at
the very least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda.
First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr.
Gutierrez. In effect, he represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed the
necessary competence and skills. Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez had worked together
since 1977. Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he would always engage
the services of Dr. Gutierrez to administer the anesthesia on his patient. [36]
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of
Erlinda. Thus, when Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave
instructions to call for another anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate
Erlinda.[37]
Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the patient, Drs.
Hosaka and Gutierrez worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate
watertight compartments because their duties intersect with each other.[38]
While the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez were secured
primarily for their performance of acts within their respective fields of expertise
for the treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and that one does not exercise control over
the other, they were certainly not completely independent of each other so as to
absolve one from the negligent acts of the other physician.
That they were working as a medical team is evident from the fact that Dr.
Hosaka was keeping an eye on the intubation of the patient by Dr. Gutierrez, and
while doing so, he observed that the patient’s nails had become dusky and had to
call Dr. Gutierrez’s attention thereto. The Court also notes that the counsel for Dr.
Hosaka admitted that in practice, the anesthesiologist would also have to observe
the surgeon’s acts during the surgical process and calls the attention of the
surgeon whenever necessary[39] in the course of the treatment. The duties of Dr.
Hosaka and those of Dr. Gutierrez in the treatment of petitioner Erlinda are
therefore not as clear-cut as respondents claim them to be. On the contrary, it is
quite apparent that they have a common responsibility to treat the patient, which
responsibility necessitates that they call each other’s attention to the condition of
the patient while the other physician is performing the necessary medical
procedures.
It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of
attending to petitioner Erlinda promptly, for he arrived more than three (3) hours
late for the scheduled operation. The cholecystectomy was set for June 17, 1985
at 9:00 a.m., but he arrived at DLSMC only at around 12:10 p.m. In reckless
disregard for his patient’s well being, Dr. Hosaka scheduled two procedures on the
same day, just thirty minutes apart from each other, at different hospitals. Thus,
when the first procedure (protoscopy) at the Sta. Teresita Hospital did not proceed
on time, Erlinda was kept in a state of uncertainty at the DLSMC.
The unreasonable delay in petitioner Erlinda’s scheduled operation subjected
her to continued starvation and consequently, to the risk of acidosis,[40] or the
condition of decreased alkalinity of the blood and tissues, marked by sickly sweet
breath, headache, nausea and vomiting, and visual disturbances.[41] The long
period that Dr. Hosaka made Erlinda wait for him certainly aggravated the anxiety
that she must have been feeling at the time. It could be safely said that her
anxiety adversely affected the administration of anesthesia on her. As explained
by Dr. Camagay, the patient’s anxiety usually causes the outpouring of adrenaline
which in turn results in high blood pressure or disturbances in the heart rhythm:
DR. CAMAGAY:
x x x Pre-operative medication has three main functions: One is to
alleviate anxiety. Second is to dry up the secretions and Third is to relieve
pain. Now, it is very important to alleviate anxiety because anxiety is
associated with the outpouring of certain substances formed in the body
called adrenalin. When a patient is anxious there is an outpouring of
adrenalin which would have adverse effect on the patient. One of it is high
blood pressure, the other is that he opens himself to disturbances in the
heart rhythm, which would have adverse implications. So, we would like to
alleviate patient’s anxiety mainly because he will not be in control of his body
there could be adverse results to surgery and he will be opened up; a knife is
going to open up his body. x x x[42]
Dr. Hosaka cannot now claim that he was entirely blameless of what happened
to Erlinda. His conduct clearly constituted a breach of his professional duties to
Erlinda:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Two other points. The first, Doctor, you were talking about anxiety, would
you consider a patient's stay on the operating table for three hours sufficient
enough to aggravate or magnify his or her anxiety?
DR. CAMAGAY:
Yes.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
In other words, I understand that in this particular case that was the case,
three hours waiting and the patient was already on the operating table
(interrupted)
DR. CAMAGAY:
Yes.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Would you therefore conclude that the surgeon contributed to the
aggravation of the anxiety of the patient?
DR. CAMAGAY:
That this operation did not take place as scheduled is already a source of
anxiety and most operating tables are very narrow and that patients are
usually at risk of falling on the floor so there are restraints that are placed on
them and they are never, never left alone in the operating room by
themselves specially if they are already pre-medicated because they may not
be aware of some of their movement that they make which would contribute
to their injury.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
In other words due diligence would require a surgeon to come on time?
DR. CAMAGAY:
I think it is not even due diligence it is courtesy.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Courtesy.
DR. CAMAGAY:
And care.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Duty as a matter of fact?
DR. CAMAGAY:
Yes, Your Honor.[43]
Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled
operation of petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a physician “to
serve the interest of his patients with the greatest solicitude, giving them always
his best talent and skill,”[44] but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a
person, in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone his
due.
Anent private respondent DLSMC’s liability for the resulting injury to petitioner
Erlinda, we held that respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent
doctors therefor under Article 2180 of the Civil Code[45]since there exists an
employer-employee relationship between private respondent DLSMC and Drs.
Gutierrez and Hosaka:
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting “consultant” staff. While “consultants” are not, technically
employees, x x x the control exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether
such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. x x x[46]
DLSMC however contends that applying the four-fold test in determining
whether such a relationship exists between it and the respondent doctors, the
inescapable conclusion is that DLSMC cannot be considered an employer of the
respondent doctors.
It has been consistently held that in determining whether an employer-
employee relationship exists between the parties, the following elements must be
present: (1) selection and engagement of services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the
power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only the end to be
achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end.[47]
DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage the services of a
consultant, but rather, accredits the latter and grants him or her the privilege of
maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by
the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary qualifications, such as
accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship and
references.[48] Second, it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the
consultant’s fee for services rendered by the latter. [49] Third, a hospital does not
dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter may lose his or her accreditation or
privileges granted by the hospital.[50]Lastly, DLSMC argues that when a doctor
refers a patient for admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes the
treatment to be given to said patient. The hospital’s obligation is limited to

providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation, the nutritional diet
and medications prescribed by the doctor, the equipment and facilities necessary
for the treatment of the patient, as well as the services of the hospital staff who
perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctor’s orders are carried out
strictly.[51]
After a careful consideration of the arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court
finds that respondent hospital’s position on this issue is meritorious. There is no
employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka
which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner
Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
As explained by respondent hospital, that the admission of a physician to
membership in DLSMC’s medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first
decided upon by the Credentials Committee thereof, which is composed of the
heads of the various specialty departments such as the Department of Obstetrics
and Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the department head of the particular
specialty applied for as chairman. The Credentials Committee then recommends
to DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the acceptance or rejection
of the applicant physician, and said director or administrator validates the
committee's recommendation.[52] Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary action is
lodged against a consultant, the same is initiated by the department to whom the
consultant concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee consisting of
the department specialty heads. The medical director/hospital administrator
merely acts as ex-officio member of said committee.
Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants
for medical services rendered by the latter to their respective
patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant in respondent hospital
and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent
hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical
services by the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision
by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory
personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient.
Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by

petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide
for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment.
For these reasons, we reverse the finding of liability on the part of DLSMC for
the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda.
Finally, the Court also deems it necessary to modify the award of damages to
petitioners in view of the supervening event of petitioner Erlinda’s death. In the
assailed Decision, the Court awarded actual damages of One Million Three
Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P1,352,000.00) to cover the expenses for
petitioner Erlinda’s treatment and care from the date of promulgation of the
Decision up to the time the patient expires or survives. [53] In addition thereto, the
Court awarded temperate damages of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,500,000.00) in view of the chronic and continuing nature of petitioner Erlinda’s
injury and the certainty of further pecuniary loss by petitioners as a result of said
injury, the amount of which, however, could not be made with certainty at the
time of the promulgation of the decision. The Court justified such award in this
manner:
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of
litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been
completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect
to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury
might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the
injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to
adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of
trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which
could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other words,
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory
damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of
the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and
temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two
distinct phases.
As it would not be equitable—and certainly not in the best interests of the

administration of justice—for the victim in such cases to constantly come before
the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory
damages previously awarded—temperate damages are appropriate. The amount
given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take
into account the cost of proper care.
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care
for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a
decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount
provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more in
step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages
would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility
which generally specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of
professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore
be reasonable.[54]
However, subsequent to the promulgation of the Decision, the Court was
informed by petitioner Rogelio that petitioner Erlinda died on August 3, 1999. [55] In
view of this supervening event, the award of temperate damages in addition to the
actual or compensatory damages would no longer be justified since the actual
damages awarded in the Decision are sufficient to cover the medical expenses
incurred by petitioners for the patient. Hence, only the amounts representing
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit should be
awarded to petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby modified as follows:
(1) Private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center is hereby absolved from
liability arising from the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda Ramos on June 17,
1985;
(2) Private respondents Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez are hereby
declared to be solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda on June
17, 1985 and are ordered to pay petitioners—
(a) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(d) P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(e) the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 167366 September 26, 2012

DR. PEDRO DENNIS CERENO, and DR. SANTOS ZAFE, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES DIOGENES S. OLAVERE and FE R.
SERRANO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the annulment and setting aside of the 21 February 2005
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 65800. In the assailed
decision, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (R TC),
Branch 22, Nag a City finding herein petitioners Dr. Pedro Dennis Cereno (Dr.
Cereno) and Dr. Santos Zafe (Dr. Zafe) liable for damages.
Culled from the records are the following antecedent facts:
At about 9:15 in the evening of 16 September 1995, Raymond S. Olavere
(Raymond), a victim of a stabbing incident, was rushed to the emergency room of
the Bicol Regional Medical Center (BRMC). There, Raymond was attended to by
Nurse Arlene Balares (Nurse Balares) and Dr. Ruel Levy Realuyo (Dr. Realuyo) —
the emergency room resident physician.
Subsequently, the parents of Raymond—the spouses Deogenes Olavere
(Deogenes) and Fe R. Serrano—arrived at the BRMC. They were accompanied by
one Andrew Olavere, the uncle of Raymond.
After extending initial medical treatment to Raymond, Dr. Realuyo recommended
that the patient undergo "emergency exploratory laparotomy." Dr. Realuyo then
requested the parents of Raymond to procure 500 cc of type "O" blood needed for
the operation. Complying with the request, Deogenes and Andrew Olavere went
to the Philippine National Red Cross to secure the required blood.
At 10:30 P.M., Raymond was wheeled inside the operating room. During that time,
the hospital surgeons, Drs. Zafe and Cereno, were busy operating on gunshot
victim Charles Maluluy-on. Assisting them in the said operation was Dr. Rosalina
Tatad (Dr. Tatad), who was the only senior anesthesiologist on duty at BRMC that
night. Dr. Tatad also happened to be the head of Anesthesiology Department of
the BRMC.
Just before the operation on Maluluy-on was finished, another emergency case
involving Lilia Aguila, a woman who was giving birth to triplets, was brought to the
operating room.
At 10:59 P.M., the operation on Charles Maluluy-on was finished. By that time,
however, Dr. Tatad was already working with the obstetricians who will perform
surgery on Lilia Aguila. There being no other available anesthesiologist to assist
them, Drs. Zafe and Cereno decided to defer the operation on Raymond.
Drs. Zafe and Cereno, in the meantime, proceeded to examine Raymond and they
found that the latter’s blood pressure was normal and "nothing in him was
significant."3 Dr. Cereno reported that based on the xray result he interpreted, the
fluid inside the thoracic cavity of Raymond was minimal at around 200-300 cc.
At 11:15 P.M., Deogenes and Andrew Olavere returned to the BRMC with a bag
containing the requested 500 cc type "O" blood. They handed over the bag of
blood to Dr. Realuyo.
After Dr. Tatad finished her work with the Lilia Aguila operation, petitioners
immediately started their operation on Raymond at around 12:15 A.M. of 17
September 1995. Upon opening of Raymond’s thoracic cavity, they found that
3,200 cc of blood was stocked therein. The blood was evacuated and petitioners
found a puncture at the inferior pole of the left lung.
In his testimony, Dr. Cereno stated that considering the loss of blood suffered by
Raymond, he did not immediately transfuse blood because he had to control the
bleeders first.4
Blood was finally transfused on Raymond at 1:40 A.M. At 1:45 A.M., while the
operation was on-going, Raymond suffered a cardiac arrest. The operation ended
at 1:50 A.M. and Raymond was pronounced dead at 2:30 A.M.
Raymond’s death certificate5 indicated that the immediate cause of death was
"hypovolemic shock" or the cessation of the functions of the organs of the body
due to loss of blood.6
Claiming that there was negligence on the part of those who attended to their son,
the parents of Raymond, on 25 October 1995, filed before the RTC, Branch 22,
Naga City a complaint for damages7 against Nurse Balares, Dr. Realuyo and
attending surgeons Dr. Cereno and Dr. Zafe.
During trial, the parents of Raymond testified on their own behalf. They also
presented the testimonies of Andrew Olavere and one Loira Oira, the aunt of
Raymond. On the other hand, Dr. Cereno, Dr. Realuyo, Nurse Balares and Security
Guard Diego Reposo testified for the defense. On rebuttal, the parents of
Raymond presented Dr. Tatad, among others.
On 15 October 1999, the trial court rendered a decision8 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment:
1. Dismissing the case against Dr. Ruel Levy Realuyo and Arlene Balares for
lack of merit;
2. Ordering defendants Dr. Santos Zafe and Dr. Dennis Cereno to pay the
heirs of Raymond Olavere, jointly and severally the following amounts:
1. P 50,000.00 for the death of the victim;
2. P 150,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P 100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P 30,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and
5. Cost of suit.9
x x x x.
The trial court found petitioners negligent in not immediately conducting surgery
on Raymond. It noted that petitioners have already finished operating on Charles
Maluluy-on as early as 10:30 in the evening, and yet they only started the
operation on Raymond at around 12:15 early morning of the following day. The
trial court held that had the surgery been performed promptly, Raymond would
not have lost so much blood and, therefore, could have been saved.10
The trial court also held that the non-availability of Dr. Tatad after the operation
on Maluluy-on was not a sufficient excuse for the petitioners to not immediately
operate on Raymond. It called attention to the testimony of Dr. Tatad herself,
which disclosed the possibility of calling a standby anesthesiologist in that
situation. The trial court opined that the petitioners could have just requested for
the standby anesthesiologist from Dr. Tatad, but they did not.
Lastly, the trial court faulted petitioners for the delay in the transfusion of blood
on Raymond.
On appeal, the CA in a decision dated 21 February 2005 affirmed in toto the

judgment rendered by the RTC finding herein petitioners guilty of gross negligence
in the performance of their duties and awarding damages to private respondents.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the CA decision on the following grounds:
1. THAT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GROSSLY
NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES;
2. THAT THE CA ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE BICOL REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY AND SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE SHOULD
PETITIONERS BE FOUND LIABLE FOR DAMAGES; and
3. THAT THE CA ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE AWARD OF MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEES EXORBITANT OR
EXCESSIVE.
We grant the petition
It is well-settled that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised. The reason behind this is that this Court is not a trier of facts and
will not re-examine and re-evaluate the evidence on record.11 Factual findings of
the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are therefore generally final and conclusive
on this Court. This rule is subject to the following exceptions: (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the
presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of
the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed
facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the
findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both parties.12 In this case, We find exceptions (1)
and (4) to be applicable.
The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available
to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has
caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must
prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or
that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
done; and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.13 Stated
otherwise, the complainant must prove: (1) that the health care provider, either by
his act or omission, had been negligent, and (2) that such act or omission
proximately caused the injury complained of.
The best way to prove these is through the opinions of expert witnesses belonging
in the same neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant
physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified
physicians stems from the former’s realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating, hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.14
Guided by the foregoing standards, We dissect the issues at hand.
Petitioners Not Negligent
The trial court first imputed negligence on the part of the petitioners by their
failure to perform the operation on Raymond immediately after finishing the
Maluluy-on operation. It rejected as an excuse the nonavailability of Dr. Tatad. The
trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Tatad about a "BRMC protocol" that
introduces the possibility that a standby anesthesiologist could have been called
upon. The pertinent portions of the testimony of Dr. Tatad provides:
Q: Aside from you and Dr. Rebancos, who was the standby anesthesiologist?
A: We have a protocol at the Bicol Medical Center to have a consultant who is on
call.
Q: How many of them?
A: One.
Q: Who is she?
A: Dra. Flores.
Q: What is the first name?
A: Rosalina Flores.
Q: Is she residing in Naga City?
A: In Camaligan.
Q: She is on call anytime when there is an emergency case to be attended to in the
Bicol Medical Center?
A: Yes sir.15
Dr. Tatad further testified:
Q: Alright (sic), considering that you said you could not attend to Raymond Olavere
because another patient was coming in the person of Lilia Aguila, did you not
suggest to Dr. Cereno to call the standby anesthesiologist?
A: They are not ones to do that. They have no right to call for the standby
anesthesiologist.
Q: Then, who should call for the standby anesthesiologist?
A: It is me if the surgeon requested.
Q: But in this case, the surgeon did not request you?
A: No. It is their prerogative.
Q: I just want to know that in this case the surgeon did not request you to call for
the standby anesthesiologist?
A: No sir.16
From there, the trial court concluded that it was the duty of the petitioners to
request Dr. Tatad to call on Dr. Rosalina Flores, the standby anesthesiologist. Since
petitioners failed to do so, their inability to promptly perform the operation on
Raymond becomes negligence on their part.
This Court does not agree with the aforesaid conclusion.
First. There is nothing in the testimony of Dr. Tatad, or in any evidence on the
record for that matter, which shows that the petitioners were aware of the "BRMC
protocol" that the hospital keeps a standby anesthesiologist available on call.
Indeed, other than the testimony of Dr. Tatad, there is no evidence that proves
that any such "BRMC protocol" is being practiced by the hospital’s surgeons at all.
Evidence to the effect that petitioners knew of the "BRMC protocol" is essential,
especially in view of the contrary assertion of the petitioners that the matter of
assigning anesthesiologists rests within the full discretion of the BRMC
Anesthesiology Department. Without any prior knowledge of the "BRMC
protocol," We find that it is quite reasonable for the petitioners to assume that
matters regarding the administration of anesthesia and the assignment of
anesthesiologists are concerns of the Anesthesiology Department, while matters
pertaining to the surgery itself fall under the concern of the surgeons. Certainly,
We cannot hold petitioners accountable for not complying with something that
they, in the first place, do not know.
Second. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that there is such "BRMC protocol"
and that petitioners knew about it, We find that their failure to request for the
assistance of the standby anesthesiologist to be reasonable when taken in the
proper context. There is simply no competent evidence to the contrary.
From the testimony of Dr. Tatad herself, it is clear that the matter of requesting for
a standby anaesthesiologist is not within the full discretion of petitioners. The
"BRMC protocol" described in the testimony requires the petitioners to course
such request to Dr. Tatad who, as head of the Department of Anesthesiology, has
the final say of calling the standby anesthesiologist.
As revealed by the facts, however, after the Maluluy-on operation, Dr. Tatad
was already assisting in the Lilia Aguila operation. Drs. Zafe and Cereno then
proceeded to examine Raymond and they found that the latter’s blood pressure
was normal and "nothing in him was significant."17 Dr. Cereno even concluded that
based on the x-ray result he interpreted, the fluid inside the thoracic cavity of
Raymond was minimal at around 200-300 cc. Such findings of Drs. Cereno and Zafe
were never challenged and were unrebutted.
Given that Dr. Tatad was already engaged in another urgent operation and that
Raymond was not showing any symptom of suffering from major blood loss
requiring an immediate operation, We find it reasonable that petitioners decided
to wait for Dr. Tatad to finish her surgery and not to call the standby
anesthesiologist anymore. There is, after all, no evidence that shows that a
prudent surgeon faced with similar circumstances would decide otherwise.
Here, there were no expert witnesses presented to testify that the course of action
taken by petitioners were not in accord with those adopted by other reasonable
surgeons in similar situations. Neither was there any testimony given, except that
of Dr. Tatad’s, on which it may be inferred that petitioners failed to exercise the
standard of care, diligence, learning and skill expected from practitioners of their
profession. Dr. Tatad, however, is an expert neither in the field of surgery nor of
surgical practices and diagnoses. Her expertise is in the administration of

anesthesia and not in the determination of whether surgery ought or not ought to
be performed.
Another ground relied upon by the trial court in holding petitioners negligent was
their failure to immediately transfuse blood on Raymond. Such failure allegedly led
to the eventual death of Raymond through "hypovolemic shock." The trial court
relied on the following testimony of Dr. Tatad:
Q: In this case of Raymond Olavere was blood transfused to him while he was
inside the operating room?
A: The blood arrived at 1:40 a.m. and that was the time when this blood was
hooked to the patient.
xxxx
Q: Prior to the arrival of the blood, you did not request for blood?
A: I requested for blood.
Q: From whom?
A: From the attending physician, Dr. Realuyo.
Q: What time was that?
xxxx
A: 9:30.
xxxx
Q: Had this blood been given to you before the operation you could have
transfused the blood to the patient?
A: Of course, yes.
Q: And the blood was transfused only after the operation?
A: Because that was the time when the blood was given to us.
xxxx
Q: Have you monitored the condition of Raymond Olavere?
A: I monitored the condition during the time when I would administer anesthesia.
Q: What time was that?
A: 11:45 already.
Q: What was the condition of the blood pressure at that time?

A: 60/40 initial.
Q: With that kind of blood pressure the patient must have been in critical
condition?
A: At the time when the blood pressure was 60/40 I again told Dr. Cereno that
blood was already needed.
Q: With that condition, Doctor, that the patient had 60/40 blood pressure you did
not decide on transfusing blood to him?
A: I was asking for blood but there was no blood available.
Q: From whom did you ask?
A: From the surgeon. According to Dr. Zafe there was only 500 cc but still for cross-
matching.18
From the aforesaid testimony, the trial court ruled that there was negligence on
the part of petitioners for their failure to have the blood ready for transfusion. It
was alleged that at 11:15 P.M., the 500 cc of blood was given to Dr. Realuyo by
Raymond’s parents. At 11:45 P.M., when Dr. Tatad was asking for the blood, 30
minutes had passed. Yet, the blood was not ready for transfusion as it was still
being cross-matched.19 It took another two hours before blood was finally
transfused to Raymond at 1:40 A.M. of 17 September 1995.
Again, such is a mistaken conclusion.
First, the alleged delay in the cross-matching of the blood, if there was any, cannot
be attributed as the fault of the petitioners. The petitioners were never shown to
be responsible for such delay. It is highly unreasonable and the height of injustice
if petitioners were to be sanctioned for lapses in procedure that does not fall
within their duties and beyond their control.
Second, Dr. Cereno, in his unchallenged testimony, aptly explained the apparent
delay in the transfusion of blood on Raymond before and during the operation.
Before the operation, Dr. Cereno explained that the reason why no blood
transfusion was made on Raymond was because they did not then see the need to
administer such transfusion, viz:
Q: Now, you stated in your affidavit that prior to the operation you were informed
that there was 500 cc of blood available and was still to be cross-matched. What
time was that when you were informed that 500 cc of blood was due for
crossmatching?
A: I am not sure of the time.
Q: But certainly, you learned of that fact that there was 500 cc of blood, which was
due for crossmatching immediately prior to the operation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the operation was done at 12:15 of September 17?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was the reason why you could not use the blood because it was being
crossmatched?
A: No, sir. That was done only for a few minutes. We did not transfuse at that time
because there was no need. There is a necessity to transfuse blood when we saw
there is gross bleeding inside the body. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
During the operation, on the other hand, Dr. Cereno was already able to discover
that 3,200 cc of blood was stocked in the thoracic cavity of Raymond due to the
puncture in the latter’s left lung. Even then, however, immediate blood
transfusion was not feasible because:
Q: Now considering the loss of blood suffered by Raymund Olavere, why did you
not immediately transfuse blood to the patient and you waited for 45 minutes to
elapse before transfusing the blood?
A: I did not transfuse blood because I had to control the bleeders. If you will
transfuse blood just the same the blood that you transfuse will be lost. After
evacuation of blood and there is no more bleeding…
Q: It took you 45 minutes to evacuate the blood?
A: The evacuation did not take 45 minutes.
Q: So what was the cause of the delay why you only transfuse blood after 45
minutes?
A: We have to look for some other lesions. It does not mean that when you slice
the chest you will see the lesions already.21
(Emphasis supplied)
Again, the foregoing testimonies of Dr. Cereno went unchallenged or unrebutted.

The parents of Raymond were not able to present any expert witness to dispute
the course of action taken by the petitioners.
Causation Not Proven
In medical negligence cases, it is settled that the complainant has the burden of
establishing breach of duty on the part of the doctors or surgeons. It must be
proven that such breach of duty has a causal connection to the resulting death of
the patient.22 A verdict in malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or
conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability
based upon competent expert testimony.
The parents of Raymond failed in this respect. Aside from their failure to prove
negligence on the part of the petitioners, they also failed to prove that it was
petitioners’ fault that caused the injury. Their cause stands on the mere
assumption that Raymond’s life would have been saved had petitioner surgeons
immediately operated on him; had the blood been cross-matched immediately
and had the blood been transfused immediately. There was, however, no proof
presented that Raymond’s life would have been saved had those things been
done. Those are mere assumptions and cannot guarantee their desired result.
Such cannot be made basis of a decision in this case, especially considering that
the name, reputation and career of petitioners are at stake.
The Court understands the parents’ grief over their son’s death.1âwphi1 That
notwithstanding, it cannot hold petitioners liable. It was noted that Raymond, who
was a victim of a stabbing incident, had multiple wounds when brought to the
hospital. Upon opening of his thoracic cavity, it was discovered that there was
gross bleeding inside the body. Thus, the need for petitioners to control first what
was causing the bleeding. Despite the situation that evening i.e. numerous
patients being brought to the hospital for emergency treatment considering that it
was the height of the Peñafrancia Fiesta, it was evident that petitioners exerted
earnest efforts to save the life of Raymond. It was just unfortunate that the loss of
his life was not prevented.
In the case of Dr. Cruz v. CA, it was held that "[d]octors are protected by a special
law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They
are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences. Furthermore, they are
not liable for honest mistake of judgment…"23
This Court affirms the ruling of the CA that the BRMC is not an indispensible party.
The core issue as agreed upon by the parties and stated in the pre-trial order is
whether petitioners were negligent in the performance of their duties. It pertains
to acts/omissions of petitioners for which they could be held liable. The cause of
action against petitioners may be prosecuted fully and the determination of their
liability may be arrived at without impleading the hospital where they are
employed. As such, the BRMC cannot be considered an indispensible party without
whom no final determination can be had of an action.24
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision dated 21 February 2005 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 65800 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRDDIVISION
DR. EMMANUEL JARCIA, G.R. No. 187926

JR.and DR. MARILOU BASTAN,
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO,* J.,
PERALTA,** Acting Chairperson,
ABAD,
- versus - PEREZ,*** and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, February 15, 2012

Respondent.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Even early on, patients have consigned their lives to the skill of
their doctors. Time and again, it can be said that the most important
goal of the medical profession is the preservation of life and health of
the people. Corollarily, when a physician departs from his sacred duty
and endangers instead the life of his patient, he must be made liable for
the resulting injury. This Court, as this case would show, cannot and will
not let the act go unpunished.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging
the August 29, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its May 19, 2009
Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 29559, dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the
June 14, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila (RTC), finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries.
THE FACTS
Belinda Santiago (Mrs. Santiago) lodged a complaint with the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against the petitioners, Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. (Dr.
Jarcia) and Dr. Marilou Bastan (Dr. Bastan), for their alleged neglect of
professional duty which caused her son, Roy Alfonso Santiago (Roy Jr.), to suffer
serious physical injuries. Upon investigation, the NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a
taxicab; that he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency
medical treatment; that an X-ray of the victim’s ankle was ordered; that the X-ray
result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia; that Dr. Bastan entered the
emergency room (ER) and, after conducting her own examination of the victim,
informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was only the ankle that was hit, there was no
need to examine the upper leg; that eleven (11) days later, Roy Jr. developed
fever, swelling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot; that Mrs.
Santiago brought him back to the hospital; and that the X-ray revealed a right mid-
tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone.
The NBI indorsed the matter to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for
preliminary investigation. Probable cause was found and a criminal case for
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries, was filed against Dr.
Jarcia, Dr. Bastan and Dr. Pamittan,[5] before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 01-196646.
On June 14, 2005, the RTC found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Simple Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical
Injuries. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR.

EMMANUEL JARCIA, JR. and DR. MARILOU BASTAN GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) DAY to TWO (2)
MONTHS and to indemnify MRS. BELINDA SANTIAGO the amount
of ₱3,850.00 representing medical expenses without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
It appearing that Dr. Pamittan has not been apprehended nor

voluntarily surrendered despite warrant issued for her arrest, let
warrant be issued for her arrest and the case against her be ARCHIVED,
to be reinstated upon her apprehension.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC explained:
After a thorough and in depth evaluation of the evidence adduced

by the prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence
of the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to
create that moral certainty in the mind of the Court that accused herein
[are] criminally responsible. The Court believes that accused are
negligent when both failed to exercise the necessary and reasonable
prudence in ascertaining the extent of injury of Alfonso Santiago, Jr.
However, the negligence exhibited by the two doctors does not

approximate negligence of a reckless nature but merely amounts to
simple imprudence. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to
be caused is not the immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The
elements of simple imprudence are as follows.
1. that there is lack of precaution on the part of the

offender; and
2. that the damage impending to be caused is not

immediate of the danger is not clearly manifest.
Considering all the evidence on record, The Court finds the

accused guilty for simple imprudence resulting to physical
injuries. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
provided for is arresto mayor in its minimum period.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed to the CA.
As earlier stated, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The August 29,
2008 Decision of the CA pertinently reads:
This Court holds concurrently and finds the foregoing

circumstances sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the
accused-appellants for the crime of simple imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries. The elements of imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do
that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material
damage results from the imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Whether or not Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan had committed an

“inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of their patient is to
be determined according to the standard of care observed by other

members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical
science. In the case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, the Supreme
Court stated that, in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that,
having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care
and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to
use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the

burden of establishing accused-appellants’ negligence, and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of
duty on the part of the physician as well as a causal connection of such
breach and the resulting injury of his patient. The connection between
the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. Negligence, no
matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of. The proximate cause of
an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred.
In the case at bench, the accused-appellants questioned the

imputation against them and argued that there is no causal connection
between their failure to diagnose the fracture and the injury sustained
by Roy.
We are not convinced.
The prosecution is however after the cause which prolonged the

pain and suffering of Roy and not on the failure of the accused-
appellants to correctly diagnose the extent of the injury sustained
by Roy.
For a more logical presentation of the discussion, we shall first

consider the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the
instant case. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means
“the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of
occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the
absence of some explanation by the accused-appellant who is charged
with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human
experience and, on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of
the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction
with the doctrine of common knowledge.
The specific acts of negligence was narrated by Mrs. Santiago

who accompanied her son during the latter’s ordeal at the hospital.
She testified as follows:
Fiscal Formoso:
Q: Now, he is an intern did you not consult the doctors,

Dr. Jarcia or Dra. Pamittan to confirm whether you
should go home or not?
A: Dra. Pamittan was inside the cubicle of the nurses and
I asked her, you let us go home and you don’t even
clean the wounds of my son.
Q: And what did she [tell] you?

A: They told me they will call a resident doctor, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Was there a resident doctor [who] came?

A: Yes, Sir. Dra. Bastan arrived.
Q: Did you tell her what you want on you to be done?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you [tell] her?

A: I told her, sir, while she was cleaning the wounds of
my son, are you not going to x-ray up to the knee
because my son was complaining pain from his ankle
up to the middle part of the right leg.
Q: And what did she tell you?

A: According to Dra. Bastan, there is no need to x-ray

because it was the ankle part that was run over.
Q: What did you do or tell her?

A: I told her, sir, why is it that they did not examine[x]
the whole leg. They just lifted the pants of my son.
Q: So you mean to say there was no treatment made at

all?
A: None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
A: I just listened to them, sir. And I just asked if I will still

return my son.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And you were present when they were called?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was discussed then by Sis. Retoria?

A: When they were there they admitted that they have
mistakes, sir.
Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following

requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not

occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive

control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would

make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the “control

of the instrumentality” which caused the damage. Such element of
control must be shown to be within the dominion of the accused-
appellants. In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in
addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is
applicable and must establish that the essential elements of the
doctrine were present in a particular incident. The early treatment of
the leg of Roy would have lessen his suffering if not entirely relieve him
from the fracture. A boy of tender age whose leg was hit by a vehicle
would engender a well-founded belief that his condition may worsen
without proper medical attention. As junior residents who only
practice general surgery and without specialization with the case
consulted before them, they should have referred the matter to a
specialist. This omission alone constitutes simple imprudence on their
part. When Mrs. Santiago insisted on having another x-ray of her child
on the upper part of his leg, they refused to do so. The mother would
not have asked them if they had no exclusive control or prerogative to
request an x-ray test. Such is a fact because a radiologist would only

conduct the x-ray test upon request of a physician.
The testimony of Mrs. Santiago was corroborated by a bone

specialist Dr. Tacata. He further testified based on his personal
knowledge, and not as an expert, as he examined himself the child Roy.
He testified as follows:
Fiscal Macapagal:
Q: And was that the correct respon[se] to the medical

problem that was presented to Dr. Jarcia and Dra.
Bastan?
A: I would say at that stage, yes. Because they have
presented the patient and the history. “At sabi nila,
nadaanan lang po ito.” And then, considering their
year of residency they are still junior residents, and
they are not also orthopedic residents but general
surgery residents, it’s entirely different thing. Because
if you are an orthopedic resident, I am not trying to
say…but if I were an orthopedic resident, there would
be more precise and accurate decision compare to a
general surgery resident in so far as involved.
Q: You mean to say there is no supervisor attending the

emergency room?
A: At the emergency room, at the Manila Doctor’s
Hospital, the supervisor there is a consultant that
usually comes from a family medicine. They see where

a certain patient have to go and then if they cannot
manage it, they refer it to the consultant on duty. Now
at that time, I don’t *know+ why they don’t….Because
at that time, I think, it is the decision. Since the x-
rays….
Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience

are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or
operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However,
testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one
may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res
ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge
can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge
and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to
the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence
may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show
not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. In the case at
bench, we give credence to the testimony of Mrs. Santiago by applying
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be

perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon
the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in
malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of

common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if
due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the
failure to secure results and the occurrence of something more unusual
and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed
the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The
latter circumstance is the primordial issue that confronted this Court
and we find application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be in
order.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal in this case is

hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the trial court finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by

the CA in its May 19, 2009 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of both the RTC and
the CA anchored on the following
GROUNDS-
1. IN AFFIRMING ACCUSED-PETITIONERS’ CONVICTION, THE

COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTUAL,
DIRECT, IMMEDIATE, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PHYSICAL
INJURY OF THE PATIENT (FRACTURE OF THE LEG BONE OR TIBIA),
WHICH REQUIRED MEDICAL ATTENDANCE FOR MORE THAN THIRTY
(30) DAYS AND INCAPACITATED HIM FROM PERFORMING HIS
CUSTOMARY DUTY DURING THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME, WAS THE
VEHICULAR ACCIDENT WHERE THE PATIENT’S RIGHT LEG WAS HIT BY
A TAXI, NOT THE FAILURE OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONERS TO SUBJECT
THE PATIENT’S WHOLE LEG TO AN X-RAY EXAMINATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING

ESTABLISHED FACTS CLEARLY NEGATING PETITIONERS’ ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE OR IMPRUDENCE. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE COURT OF
APPEALS UNJUSTIFIABLY DISREGARDED THE OPINION OF THE
PROSECUTION’S EXPERT WITNESS, DR. CIRILO TACATA, THAT
PETITIONERS WERE NOT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE OR IMPRUDENCE
COMPLAINED OF.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

FAILURE OF PETITIONERS TO SUBJECT THE PATIENT’S WHOLE LEG TO
AN X-RAY EXAMINATION PROLONGED THE PAIN AND SUFFERING OF
THE PATIENT, SUCH CONCLUSION BEING UNSUPPORTED BY, AND
EVEN CONTRARY TO, THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
4. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PATIENT EXPERIENCED

PROLONGED PAIN AND SUFFERING, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED PAIN AND SUFFERING WERE DUE
TO THE UNJUSTIFIED FAILURE OF THE PATIENT’S MOTHER, A NURSE

HERSELF, TO IMMEDIATELY BRING THE PATIENT BACK TO THE
HOSPITAL, AS ADVISED BY THE PETITIONERS, AFTER HE COMPLAINED
OF SEVERE PAIN IN HIS RIGHT LEG WHEN HE REACHED HOME AFTER
HE WAS SEEN BY PETITIONERS AT THE HOSPITAL. THUS, THE
PATIENT’S ALLEGED INJURY (PROLONGED PAIN AND SUFFERING) WAS
DUE TO HIS OWN MOTHER’S ACT OR OMISSION.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

NO PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN
PETITIONERS AND PATIENT ALFONSO SANTIAGO, JR., PETITIONERS
NOT BEING THE LATTER’S ATTENDING PHYSICIAN AS THEY WERE
MERELY REQUESTED BY THE EMERGENCY ROOM (ER) NURSE TO SEE
THE PATIENT WHILE THEY WERE PASSING BY THE ER FOR THEIR
LUNCH.
6. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

ACQUITTING ACCUSED-PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.”
The foregoing can be synthesized into two basic issues: [1] whether or not
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case; and [2] whether or not
the petitioners are liable for criminal negligence.
THE COURT’S RULING
The CA is correct in finding that there was negligence on the part of the
petitioners. After a perusal of the records, however, the Court is not convinced
that the petitioners are guilty of criminal negligence complained of. The Court is
also of the view that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
this particular case.
As to the Application of
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means "Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."
The Black's Law Dictionary defines the said doctrine. Thus:
The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference

that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and
that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence
of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby
negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere
fact that the accident happened provided the character of the accident
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which
caused injury is shown to have been under the management and
control of the alleged wrongdoer. Under this doctrine, the happening of
an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that the injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to
the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It
merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked
when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available.[11]
The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur are: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured.[12]
In this case, the circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.’s injury and the
series of tests that were supposed to be undergone by him to determine the
extent of the injury suffered were not under the exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia
and Bastan. It was established that they are mere residents of
the Manila Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the victim at the
emergency room.[13] While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by
the courts below seem doubtless to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of
the petitioners, this conclusion is still best achieved, not through the scholarly
assumptions of a layman like the patient’s mother, but by the unquestionable
knowledge of expert witness/es. As to whether the petitioners have exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in treating patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of
expert opinion.
As to Dr. Jarcia and

Dr. Bastan’s negligence
The totality of the evidence on record clearly points to the negligence of the
petitioners. At the risk of being repetitious, the Court, however, is not satisfied
that Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan are criminally negligent in this case.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the

interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[14]
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without

malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precautionon the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act.[15]
The elements of simple negligence are: (1) that there is lack of precaution on
the part of the offender, and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.[16]
In this case, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the
petitioners are guilty of reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The elements
thereof were not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
The testimony of Dr. Cirilo R. Tacata (Dr. Tacata), a specialist in pediatric

orthopedic, although pointing to some medical procedures that could have been
done by Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan, as physicians on duty, was not clear as to
whether the injuries suffered by patient Roy Jr. were indeed aggravated by the
petitioners’ judgment call and their diagnosis or appreciation of the condition of
the victim at the time they assessed him. Thus:
Q: Will you please tell us, for the record, doctor, what is your
specialization?
A: At present I am the chairman department of orthopedic in UP-PGH
and I had special training in pediatric orthopedic for two (2) years.
Q: In June 1998, doctor, what was your position and what was your
specialization at that time?
A: Since 1980, I have been specialist in pediatric orthopedic.
Q: When Alfonso Santiago, Jr. was brought to you by his mother,

what did you do by way of physicians as first step?
A: As usual, I examined the patient physically and, at that time as I
have said, the patient could not walk so I [began] to suspect that
probably he sustained a fracture as a result of a vehicular accident.
So I examined the patient at that time, the involved leg, I don’t
know if that is left or right, the involved leg then was swollen and
the patient could not walk, so I requested for the x-ray of [the]
lower leg.
Q: What part of the leg, doctor, did you request to be examined?

A: If we refer for an x-ray, usually, we suspect a fracture whether in
approximal, middle or lebistal tinial, we usually x-ray the entire
extremity.
Q: And what was the result?

A: Well, I can say that it was a spiral fracture of the mid-tibial, it is the
bigger bone of the leg.
Q: And when you say spiral, doctor, how long was this fracture?
A: When we say spiral, it is a sort of letter S, the length was about six
(6) to eight (8) centimeters.
Q: Mid-tibial, will you please point to us, doctor, where the tibial is?
(Witness pointing to his lower leg)
A: The tibial is here, there are two bones here, the bigger one is the
tibial and the smaller one is the fibula. The bigger one is the one
that get fractured.
Q: And in the course of your examination of Alfonso Santiago, Jr. did

you ask for the history of such injury?
A: Yes, actually, that was a routine part of our examination that once
a patient comes in, before we actually examine the patient, we
request for a detailed history. If it is an accident, then, we request
for the exact mechanism of injuries.
Q: And as far as you can recall, Doctor, what was the history of that
injury that was told to you?
A: The patient was sideswiped, I don’t know if it is a car, but it is a
vehicular accident.
Q: Who did you interview?

A: The mother.
Q: How about the child himself, Alfonso Santiago, Jr.?

A: Normally, we do not interview the child because, usually, at his
age, the answers are not accurate. So, it was the mother that I
interviewed.
Q: And were you informed also of his early medication that was
administered on Alfonso Santiago, Jr.?
A: No, not actually medication. I was informed that this patient was
seen initially at the emergency room by the two (2) physicians that
you just mentioned, Dr. Jarcia and Dra. Bastan, that time who
happened to be my residents who were [on] duty at the emergency
room.
xxxx
A: At the emergency room, at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, the

supervisor there is a consultant that usually comes from a family
medicine. They see where a certain patient have to go and then if
they cannot manage it, they refer it to the consultant on duty. Now
at that time, I don’t why they don’t … Because at that time, I think,
it is the decision. Since the x-rays…
xxx
Q: You also said, Doctor, that Dr. Jarcia and Dra. Bastan are not even
an orthopedic specialist.
A: They are general surgeon residents. You have to man[x] the
emergency room, including neurology, orthopedic, general
surgery, they see everything at the emergency room.
xxxx
Q: But if initially, Alfonso Santiago, Jr. and his case was presented to
you at the emergency room, you would have subjected the entire
foot to x-ray even if the history that was given to Dr. Jarcia and
Dra. Bastan is the same?
A: I could not directly say yes, because it would still depend on my

examination, we cannot subject the whole body for x-ray if we
think that the damaged was only the leg.
Q: Not the entire body but the entire leg?

A: I think, if my examination requires it, I would.
Q: So, you would conduct first an examination?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And do you think that with that examination that you would
have conducted you would discover the necessity subjecting the
entire foot for x-ray?
A: It is also possible but according to them, the foot and the ankle
were swollen and not the leg, which sometimes normally happens
that the actual fractured bone do not get swollen.
xxxx
Q: Doctor, if you know that the patient sustained a fracture on the

ankle and on the foot and the history that was told to you is the
region that was hit is the region of the foot, will the doctor
subject the entire leg for x-ray?
A: I am an orthopedic surgeon, you have to subject an x-ray of the
leg. Because you have to consider the kind of fracture that the
patient sustained would you say the exact mechanism of injury.
For example spiral, “paikot yung bale nya,” so it was possible that
the leg was run over, the patient fell, and it got twisted. That’s
why the leg seems to be fractured.[17][Emphases supplied]
It can be gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Tacata that a thorough

examination was not performed on Roy Jr. As residents on duty at the emergency
room, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were expected to know the medical protocol in
treating leg fractures and in attending to victims of car accidents. There was,
however, no precise evidence and scientific explanation pointing to the fact that
the delay in the application of the cast to the patient’s fractured leg because of
failure to immediately diagnose the specific injury of the patient, prolonged the
pain of the child or aggravated his condition or even caused further complications.
Any person may opine that had patient Roy Jr. been treated properly and given the
extensive X-ray examination, the extent and severity of the injury, spiral fracture
of the mid-tibial part or the bigger bone of the leg, could have been detected early
on and the prolonged pain and suffering of Roy Jr. could have been prevented. But
still, that opinion, even how logical it may seem would not, and could not, be
enough basis to hold one criminally liable; thus, a reasonable doubt as to the
petitioners’ guilt.
Although the Court sympathizes with the plight of the mother and the child
in this case, the Court is bound by the dictates of justice which hold inviolable the
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court, nevertheless, finds the petitioners civilly liable for
their failure to sufficiently attend to Roy Jr.’s medical needs when the latter was
rushed to the ER, for while a criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.
Taken into account also was the fact that there was no bad faith on their part.
Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan cannot pass on the liability to the taxi driver who hit
the victim. It may be true that the actual, direct, immediate, and proximate cause
of the injury (fracture of the leg bone or tibia) of Roy Jr. was the vehicular accident
when he was hit by a taxi. The petitioners, however, cannot simply invoke such
fact alone to excuse themselves from any liability. If this would be so, doctors
would have a ready defense should they fail to do their job in attending to victims
of hit-and-run, maltreatment, and other crimes of violence in which the actual,
direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the injury is indubitably the act of the
perpetrator/s.
In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine the

extent of Roy Jr.’s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were remiss of their duties as
members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of argument that they
did not have the capacity to make such thorough evaluation at that stage, they
should have referred the patient to another doctor with sufficient training and
experience instead of assuring him and his mother that everything was all right.
This Court cannot also stamp its imprimatur on the petitioners’ contention
that no physician-patient relationship existed between them and patient Roy Jr.,
since they were not his attending physicians at that time. They claim that they
were merely requested by the ER nurse to see the patient while they were passing
by the ER for their lunch. Firstly, this issue was never raised during the trial at the
RTC or even before the CA. The petitioners, therefore, raise the want of doctor-
patient relationship for the first time on appeal with this Court. It has been settled
that “issues raised for the first time on appeal cannot be considered because a
party is not permitted to change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is
unfair to the other party and offensive to the rules of fair play, justice and due
process.”[18] Stated differently, basic considerations of due process dictate that
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court need
not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court.[19]
Assuming again for the sake of argument that the petitioners may still raise
this issue of “no physician–patient relationship,” the Court finds and so holds that
there was a “physician–patient” relationship in this case.
In the case of Lucas v. Tuaño,[20] the Court wrote that “*w+hen a patient
engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated.
And in accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that
he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training, care, and skill in
the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under
a duty to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the
same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily
possess and exercise in like cases. Stated otherwise, the physician has the
obligation to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent physician would use to treat the condition under similar
circumstances.”
Indubitably, a physician-patient relationship exists between the petitioners

and patient Roy Jr. Notably, the latter and his mother went to the ER for an
immediate medical attention. The petitioners allegedly passed by and were
requested to attend to the victim (contrary to the testimony of Dr. Tacata that
they were, at that time, residents on duty at the ER).[21] They obliged and examined
the victim, and later assured the mother that everything was fine and that they
could go home. Clearly, a physician-patient relationship was established between
the petitioners and the patient Roy Jr.
To repeat for clarity and emphasis, if these doctors knew from the start that
they were not in the position to attend to Roy Jr., a vehicular accident victim, with
the degree of diligence and commitment expected of every doctor in a case like
this, they should have not made a baseless assurance that everything was all
right. By doing so, they deprived Roy Jr. of adequate medical attention that placed
him in a more dangerous situation than he was already in. What petitioners should
have done, and could have done, was to refer Roy Jr. to another doctor who could
competently and thoroughly examine his injuries.
All told, the petitioners were, indeed, negligent but only civilly, and not
criminally, liable as the facts show.
Article II, Section 1 of the Code of Medical Ethics of the Medical Profession in
the Philippines states:
A physician should attend to his patients faithfully and

conscientiously. He should secure for them all possible benefits that
may depend upon his professional skill and care. As the sole tribunal to
adjudge the physician’s failure to fulfill his obligation to his patients is,
in most cases, his own conscience, violation of this rule on his part is
discreditable and inexcusable.[22]
Established medical procedures and practices, though in constant

instability, are devised for the purpose of preventing complications. In this case,
the petitioners failed to observe the most prudent medical procedure under the
circumstances to prevent the complications suffered by a child of tender age.
As to the Award of
Damages
While no criminal negligence was found in the petitioners’ failure to

administer the necessary medical attention to Roy Jr., the Court holds them civilly
liable for the resulting damages to their patient. While it was the taxi driver who
ran over the foot or leg of Roy Jr., their negligence was doubtless contributory.
It appears undisputed that the amount of ₱3,850.00, as expenses incurred by

patient Roy Jr., was adequately supported by receipts. The Court, therefore, finds
the petitioners liable to pay this amount by way of actual damages.
The Court is aware that no amount of compassion can suffice to ease the
sorrow felt by the family of the child at that time. Certainly, the award of moral
and exemplary damages in favor of Roy Jr. in the amount of ₱100,000.00 and
₱50,000.00, respectively, is proper in this case.
It is settled that moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed
to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,

social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. Intended for
the restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo ante, the award of
moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.[23]
The Court, likewise, finds the petitioners also liable for exemplary damages in
the said amount. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages
may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated August 29, 2008 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
entered ACQUITTING Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. and Dr. Marilou Bastan of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries but declaring them
civilly liable in the amounts of:
(1) ₱3,850.00 as actual damages;

(2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(4) Costs of the suit.
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the
Information. The rate shall be 12% interest per annum from the finality of
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
DR. RUBI LI, G.R. No. 165279

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA Promulgated:

SOLIMAN, as parents/heirs of
deceased Angelica Soliman, June 7, 2011
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated June
15, 2004 as well as the Resolution dated September 1, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58013 which modified the
Decision dated September 5, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 8 in Civil Case No. 8904.
The factual antecedents:
On July 7, 1993, respondents’ 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman,

underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Luke’s
Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was suffering
from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of
the bone which usually afflicts teenage children. Following this diagnosis and as
primary intervention, Angelica’s right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in
order to remove the tumor. As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining
cancer cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the
disease from spreading to other parts of the patient’s body (metastasis),
chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to
another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died
on September 1, 1993, just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration
of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because SLMC refused to release a
death certificate without full payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought
the cadaver of Angelica to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
at Camp Crame for post-mortem examination. The Medico-Legal Report issued by
said institution indicated the cause of death as “Hypovolemic shock secondary to
multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation.”
On the other hand, the Certificate of Death issued by SLMC stated the cause
of death as follows:
Immediate cause : a. Osteosarcoma, Status Post AKA
Antecedent cause : b. (above knee amputation)
Underlying cause : c. Status Post Chemotherapy
On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr.
Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents
charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelica’s safety, health and
welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to
observe the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood
platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to
hypovolemic shock that caused Angelica’s untimely demise. Further, it was
specifically averred that petitioner assured the respondents that Angelica would
recover in view of 95% chance of healing with chemotherapy (“Magiging normal
na ang anak nyo basta ma-chemo. 95% ang healing”) and when asked regarding
the side effects, petitioner mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness
(“Magsusuka ng kaunti. Malulugas ang buhok. Manghihina”). Respondents thus
claimed that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had
petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects.
In her answer, petitioner denied having been negligent in administering the

chemotherapy drugs to Angelica and asserted that she had fully explained to
respondents how the chemotherapy will affect not only the cancer cells but also
the patient’s normal body parts, including the lowering of white and red blood
cells and platelets. She claimed that what happened to Angelica can be attributed
to malignant tumor cells possibly left behind after surgery. Few as they may be,
these have the capacity to compete for nutrients such that the body becomes so
weak structurally (cachexia) and functionally in the form of lower resistance of the
body to combat infection. Such infection becomes uncontrollable and triggers a
chain of events (sepsis or septicemia) that may lead to bleeding in the form of
Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC), as what the autopsy report showed
in the case of Angelica.
Since the medical records of Angelica were not produced in court, the trial
and appellate courts had to rely on testimonial evidence, principally the
declarations of petitioner and respondents themselves. The following chronology
of events was gathered:
On July 23, 1993, petitioner saw the respondents at the hospital after
Angelica’s surgery and discussed with them Angelica’s condition. Petitioner told
respondents that Angelica should be given two to three weeks to recover from the
operation before starting chemotherapy. Respondents were apprehensive due to
financial constraints as Reynaldo earns only from P70,000.00 to P150,000.00 a

year from his jewelry and watch repairing business. Petitioner, however, assured
them not to worry about her professional fee and told them to just save up for the
medicines to be used.
Petitioner claimed that she explained to respondents that even when a

tumor is removed, there are still small lesions undetectable to the naked eye, and
that adjuvant chemotherapy is needed to clean out the small lesions in order to
lessen the chance of the cancer to recur. She did not give the respondents any
assurance that chemotherapy will cure Angelica’s cancer. During these
consultations with respondents, she explained the following side effects of
chemotherapy treatment to respondents: (1) falling hair; (2) nausea and vomiting;
(3) loss of appetite; (4) low count of white blood cells [WBC], red blood cells [RBC]
and platelets; (5) possible sterility due to the effects on Angelica’s ovary; (6)
damage to the heart and kidneys; and (7) darkening of the skin especially when
exposed to sunlight. She actually talked with respondents four times, once at the
hospital after the surgery, twice at her clinic and the fourth time when Angelica’s
mother called her through long distance. This was disputed by respondents who
countered that petitioner gave them assurance that there is 95% chance of healing
for Angelica if she undergoes chemotherapy and that the only side effects were
nausea, vomiting and hair loss. Those were the only side-effects of chemotherapy
treatment mentioned by petitioner.
On July 27, 1993, SLMC discharged Angelica, with instruction from petitioner
that she be readmitted after two or three weeks for the chemotherapy.
On August 18, 1993, respondents brought Angelica to SLMC for

chemotherapy, bringing with them the results of the laboratory tests requested by
petitioner: Angelica’s chest x-ray, ultrasound of the liver, creatinine and complete
liver function tests. Petitioner proceeded with the chemotherapy by first
administering hydration fluids to Angelica.
The following day, August 19, petitioner began administering three

chemotherapy drugs – Cisplatin, Doxorubicin and Cosmegen –
intravenously. Petitioner was supposedly assisted by her trainees Dr. Leo
Marbella and Dr. Grace Arriete. In his testimony, Dr. Marbella denied having any
participation in administering the said chemotherapy drugs.
On the second day of chemotherapy, August 20, respondents noticed reddish

discoloration on Angelica’s face. They asked petitioner about it, but she merely
quipped, “Wala yan. Epekto ng gamot.” Petitioner recalled noticing the skin
rashes on the nose and cheek area of Angelica. At that moment, she entertained
the possibility that Angelica also had systemic lupus and consulted Dr. Victoria
Abesamis on the matter.
On the third day of chemotherapy, August 21, Angelica had difficulty

breathing and was thus provided with oxygen inhalation apparatus. This time, the
reddish discoloration on Angelica’s face had extended to her neck, but petitioner
dismissed it again as merely the effect of medicines. Petitioner testified that she
did not see any discoloration on Angelica’s face, nor did she notice any difficulty in
the child’s breathing. She claimed that Angelica merely complained of nausea and
was given ice chips.
On August 22, 1993, at around ten o’clock in the morning, upon seeing that
their child could not anymore bear the pain, respondents pleaded with petitioner
to stop the chemotherapy. Petitioner supposedly replied: “Dapat 15 Cosmegen pa
iyan. Okay, let’s observe. If pwede na, bigyan uli ng chemo.” At this point,
respondents asked petitioner’s permission to bring their child home. Later in the
evening, Angelica passed black stool and reddish urine. Petitioner countered that
there was no record of blackening of stools but only an episode of loose bowel
movement (LBM). Petitioner also testified that what Angelica complained of was
carpo-pedal spasm, not convulsion or epileptic attack, as respondents call it
(petitioner described it in the vernacular as “naninigas ang kamay at paa”). She
then requested for a serum calcium determination and stopped the
chemotherapy. When Angelica was given calcium gluconate, the spasm and
numbness subsided.
The following day, August 23, petitioner yielded to respondents’ request to

take Angelica home. But prior to discharging Angelica, petitioner requested for a
repeat serum calcium determination and explained to respondents that the
chemotherapy will be temporarily stopped while she observes Angelica’s muscle

twitching and serum calcium level. Take-home medicines were also prescribed for
Angelica, with instructions to respondents that the serum calcium test will have to
be repeated after seven days. Petitioner told respondents that she will see
Angelica again after two weeks, but respondents can see her anytime if any
immediate problem arises.
However, Angelica remained in confinement because while still in the

premises of SLMC, her “convulsions” returned and she also had LBM. Angelica was
given oxygen and administration of calcium continued.
The next day, August 24, respondents claimed that Angelica still suffered
from convulsions. They also noticed that she had a fever and had difficulty
breathing. Petitioner insisted it was carpo-pedal spasm, not convulsions. She
verified that at around 4:50 that afternoon, Angelica developed difficulty in
breathing and had fever. She then requested for an electrocardiogram analysis, and
infused calcium gluconate on the patient at a “stat dose.” She further ordered that
Angelica be given Bactrim, a synthetic antibacterial combination drug, to combat
any infection on the child’s body.
By August 26, Angelica was bleeding through the mouth. Respondents also
saw blood on her anus and urine. When Lina asked petitioner what was happening
to her daughter, petitioner replied, “Bagsak ang platelets ng anak mo.” Four units
of platelet concentrates were then transfused to Angelica. Petitioner prescribed
Solucortef. Considering that Angelica’s fever was high and her white blood cell
count was low, petitioner prescribed Leucomax. About four to eight bags of blood,
consisting of packed red blood cells, fresh whole blood, or platelet concentrate,
were transfused to Angelica. For two days (August 27 to 28), Angelica continued
bleeding, but petitioner claimed it was lesser in amount and in
frequency. Petitioner also denied that there were gadgets attached to Angelica at
that time.
On August 29, Angelica developed ulcers in her mouth, which petitioner said
were blood clots that should not be removed. Respondents claimed that Angelica
passed about half a liter of blood through her anus at around seven o’clock that
evening, which petitioner likewise denied.
On August 30, Angelica continued bleeding. She was restless as endotracheal

and nasogastric tubes were inserted into her weakened body. An aspiration of the
nasogastric tube inserted to Angelica also revealed a bloody content. Angelica was
given more platelet concentrate and fresh whole blood, which petitioner claimed
improved her condition. Petitioner told Angelica not to remove the endotracheal
tube because this may induce further bleeding. She was also transferred to the
intensive care unit to avoid infection.
The next day, respondents claimed that Angelica became hysterical, vomited
blood and her body turned black. Part of Angelica’s skin was also noted to be
shredding by just rubbing cotton on it. Angelica was so restless she removed
those gadgets attached to her, saying “Ayaw ko na”; there were tears in her eyes
and she kept turning her head. Observing her daughter to be at the point of death,
Lina asked for a doctor but the latter could not answer her anymore. At this time,
the attending physician was Dr. Marbella who was shaking his head saying that
Angelica’s platelets were down and respondents should pray for their
daughter. Reynaldo claimed that he was introduced to a pediatrician who took
over his daughter’s case, Dr. Abesamis who also told him to pray for his daughter.
Angelica continued to have difficulty in her breathing and blood was being
suctioned from her stomach. A nurse was posted inside Angelica’s room to assist
her breathing and at one point they had to revive Angelica by pumping her chest.
Thereafter, Reynaldo claimed that Angelica already experienced difficulty in
urinating and her bowel consisted of blood-like fluid. Angelica requested for an
electric fan as she was in pain. Hospital staff attempted to take blood samples
from Angelica but were unsuccessful because they could not even locate her
vein. Angelica asked for a fruit but when it was given to her, she only smelled
it. At this time, Reynaldo claimed he could not find either petitioner or Dr.
Marbella. That night, Angelica became hysterical and started removing those
gadgets attached to her. At three o’clock in the morning of September 1, a priest
came and they prayed before Angelica expired. Petitioner finally came back and
supposedly told respondents that there was “malfunction” or bogged-down
machine.
By petitioner’s own account, Angelica was merely irritable that day (August
31). Petitioner noted though that Angelica’s skin was indeed sloughing off. She
stressed that at 9:30 in the evening, Angelica pulled out her endotracheal
tube. On September 1, exactly two weeks after being admitted at SLMC for
chemotherapy, Angelica died. The cause of death, according to petitioner, was
septicemia, or overwhelming infection, which caused Angelica’s other organs to
fail. Petitioner attributed this to the patient’s poor defense mechanism brought
about by the cancer itself.
While he was seeking the release of Angelica’s cadaver from SLMC, Reynaldo
claimed that petitioner acted arrogantly and called him names. He was asked to
sign a promissory note as he did not have cash to pay the hospital bill.
Respondents also presented as witnesses Dr. Jesusa Nieves-Vergara, Medico-

Legal Officer of the PNP-Crime Laboratory who conducted the autopsy on
Angelica’s cadaver, and Dr. Melinda Vergara Balmaceda who is a Medical Specialist
employed at the Department of Health (DOH) Operations and Management
Services.
Testifying on the findings stated in her medico-legal report, Dr. Vergara

noted the following: (1) there were fluids recovered from the abdominal cavity,
which is not normal, and was due to hemorrhagic shock secondary to bleeding; (2)
there was hemorrhage at the left side of the heart; (3) bleeding at the upper
portion of and areas adjacent to, the esophagus; (4) lungs were heavy with
bleeding at the back and lower portion, due to accumulation of fluids; (4) yellowish
discoloration of the liver; (5) kidneys showed appearance of facial shock on
account of hemorrhages; and (6) reddishness on external surface of the spleen. All
these were the end result of “hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ
hemorrhages and disseminated intravascular coagulation.” Dr. Vergara opined
that this can be attributed to the chemical agents in the drugs given to the victim,
which caused platelet reduction resulting to bleeding sufficient to cause the
victim’s death. The time lapse for the production of DIC in the case of Angelica
(from the time of diagnosis of sarcoma) was too short, considering the survival
rate of about 3 years. The witness conceded that the victim will also die of
osteosarcoma even with amputation or chemotherapy, but in this case Angelica’s
death was not caused by osteosarcoma. Dr. Vergara admitted that she is not a
pathologist but her statements were based on the opinion of an oncologist whom
she had interviewed. This oncologist supposedly said that if the victim already had
DIC prior to the chemotherapy, the hospital staff could have detected it.
On her part, Dr. Balmaceda declared that it is the physician’s duty to inform
and explain to the patient or his relatives every known side effect of the procedure
or therapeutic agents to be administered, before securing the consent of the
patient or his relatives to such procedure or therapy. The physician thus bases his
assurance to the patient on his personal assessment of the patient’s condition and
his knowledge of the general effects of the agents or procedure that will be
allowed on the patient. Dr. Balmaceda stressed that the patient or relatives must
be informed of all known side effects based on studies and observations, even if
such will aggravate the patient’s condition.
Dr. Jaime Tamayo, the orthopaedic surgeon who operated on Angelica’s

lower extremity, testified for the defendants. He explained that in case of
malignant tumors, there is no guarantee that the ablation or removal of the
amputated part will completely cure the cancer. Thus, surgery is not enough. The
mortality rate of osteosarcoma at the time of modern chemotherapy and early
diagnosis still remains at 80% to 90%. Usually, deaths occur from metastasis, or
spread of the cancer to other vital organs like the liver, causing systemic
complications. The modes of therapy available are the removal of the primary
source of the cancerous growth and then the residual cancer cells or metastasis
should be treated with chemotherapy. Dr. Tamayo further explained that patients
with osteosarcoma have poor defense mechanism due to the cancer cells in the
blood stream. In the case of Angelica, he had previously explained to her parents
that after the surgical procedure, chemotherapy is imperative so that metastasis
of these cancer cells will hopefully be addressed. He referred the patient to
petitioner because he felt that petitioner is a competent oncologist. Considering
that this type of cancer is very aggressive and will metastasize early, it will cause
the demise of the patient should there be no early intervention (in this case, the
patient developed sepsis which caused her death). Cancer cells in the blood
cannot be seen by the naked eye nor detected through bone scan. On cross-
examination, Dr. Tamayo stated that of the more than 50 child patients who had
osteogenic sarcoma he had handled, he thought that probably all of them died
within six months from amputation because he did not see them anymore after
follow-up; it is either they died or had seen another doctor.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable
for damages as she observed the best known procedures and employed her
highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs on
Angelica but despite all efforts said patient died. It cited the testimony of Dr.
Tamayo who testified that he considered petitioner one of the most proficient in
the treatment of cancer and that the patient in this case was afflicted with a very
aggressive type of cancer necessitating chemotherapy as adjuvant
treatment. Using the standard of negligence laid down in Picart v. Smith, the trial
court declared that petitioner has taken the necessary precaution against the
adverse effect of chemotherapy on the patient, adding that a wrong decision is not
by itself negligence. Respondents were ordered to pay their unpaid hospital bill in
the amount ofP139,064.43.
Respondents appealed to the CA which, while concurring with the trial

court’s finding that there was no negligence committed by the petitioner in the
administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that petitioner as
her attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known
side effects of chemotherapy. The appellate court stressed that since the
respondents have been told of only three side effects of chemotherapy, they
readily consented thereto. Had petitioner made known to respondents those
other side effects which gravely affected their child -- such as carpo-pedal spasm,
sepsis, decrease in the blood platelet count, bleeding, infections and eventual
death -- respondents could have decided differently or adopted a different course
of action which could have delayed or prevented the early death of their child.
The CA thus declared:

Plaintiffs-appellants’ child was suffering from a malignant
disease. The attending physician recommended that she undergo
chemotherapy treatment after surgery in order to increase her chances
of survival. Appellants consented to the chemotherapy treatment
because they believed in Dr. Rubi Li’s representation that the deceased
would have a strong chance of survival after chemotherapy and also
because of the representation of appellee Dr. Rubi Li that there were

only three possible side-effects of the treatment. However, all sorts of
painful side-effects resulted from the treatment including the
premature death of Angelica. The appellants were clearly and totally
unaware of these other side-effects which manifested only during the
chemotherapy treatment. This was shown by the fact that every time
a problem would take place regarding Angelica’s condition (like an
unexpected side-effect manifesting itself), they would immediately
seek explanation from Dr. Rubi Li. Surely, those unexpected side-
effects culminating in the loss of a love[d] one caused the appellants so
much trouble, pain and suffering.
On this point therefore, [w]e find defendant-appellee Dr. Rubi Li
negligent which would entitle plaintiffs-appellants to their claim for
damages.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the assailed decision is hereby modified to the extent that defendant-
appellee Dr. Rubi Li is ordered to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the
following amounts:
1. Actual damages of P139,064.43, plus P9,828.00 for funeral
expenses;
2. Moral damages of P200,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages of P50,000.00;
4. Attorney’s fee of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration which the appellate court
denied.
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner assails the CA in finding her guilty of negligence in not explaining

to the respondents all the possible side effects of the chemotherapy on their child,
and in holding her liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. Petitioner emphasized that she was not negligent in the pre-chemotherapy
procedures and in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica.
On her supposed non-disclosure of all possible side effects of chemotherapy,

including death, petitioner argues that it was foolhardy to imagine her to be all-
knowing/omnipotent. While the theoretical side effects of chemotherapy were
explained by her to the respondents, as these should be known to a competent
doctor, petitioner cannot possibly predict how a particular patient’s genetic make-
up, state of mind, general health and body constitution would respond to the
treatment. These are obviously dependent on too many known, unknown and
immeasurable variables, thus requiring that Angelica be, as she was, constantly
and closely monitored during the treatment. Petitioner asserts that she did
everything within her professional competence to attend to the medical needs of
Angelica.
Citing numerous trainings, distinctions and achievements in her field and her
current position as co-director for clinical affairs of the Medical Oncology,
Department of Medicine of SLMC, petitioner contends that in the absence of any
clear showing or proof, she cannot be charged with negligence in not informing
the respondents all the side effects of chemotherapy or in the pre-treatment
procedures done on Angelica.
As to the cause of death, petitioner insists that Angelica did not die of
platelet depletion but of sepsis which is a complication of the cancer itself. Sepsis
itself leads to bleeding and death. She explains that the response rate to
chemotherapy of patients with osteosarcoma is high, so much so that survival rate
is favorable to the patient. Petitioner then points to some probable consequences
if Angelica had not undergone chemotherapy. Thus, without chemotherapy, other
medicines and supportive treatment, the patient might have died the next day
because of massive infection, or the cancer cells might have spread to the brain
and brought the patient into a coma, or into the lungs that the patient could have
been hooked to a respirator, or into her kidneys that she would have to undergo
dialysis. Indeed, respondents could have spent as much because of these

complications. The patient would have been deprived of the chance to survive the
ailment, of any hope for life and her “quality of life” surely compromised. Since
she had not been shown to be at fault, petitioner maintains that the CA erred in
holding her liable for the damages suffered by the respondents.
The issue to be resolved is whether the petitioner can be held liable for
failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the parents of the child patient who
died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding that
petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment.
The petition is meritorious.
The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available
to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has
caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must
prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or
that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by
opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in
the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The
deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the
former’s realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability
of expert testimonies.
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts concurred in finding that the
alleged negligence of petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy drugs to
respondents’ child was not proven considering that Drs. Vergara and Balmaceda,
not being oncologists or cancer specialists, were not qualified to give expert
opinion as to whether petitioner’s lack of skill, knowledge and professional
competence in failing to observe the standard of care in her line of practice was
the proximate cause of the patient’s death. Furthermore, respondents’ case was
not at all helped by the non-production of medical records by the hospital (only
the biopsy result and medical bills were submitted to the court). Nevertheless, the
CA found petitioner liable for her failure to inform the respondents on all possible
side effects of chemotherapy before securing their consent to the said treatment.
The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient

relationships goes far back into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors
were charged with the tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with
a patient) if they had not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a
surgery or procedure. In theUnited States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital which involved unwanted treatment performed by a
doctor. Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s oft-quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a
patient to give consent to any medical procedure or treatment: “Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” From a purely
ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the
medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient
as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of
treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and
faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative
treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably
balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.
Subsequently, in Canterbury v. Spence the court observed that the duty to

disclose should not be limited to medical usage as to arrogate the decision on
revelation to the physician alone. Thus, respect for the patient’s right of self-
determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians
rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves. The
scope of disclosure is premised on the fact that patients ordinarily are persons
unlearned in the medical sciences. Proficiency in diagnosis and therapy is not the
full measure of a physician’s responsibility. It is also his duty to warn of the
dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart information which the
patient has every right to expect. Indeed, the patient’s reliance upon the physician
is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those
associated with armslength transactions. The physician is not expected to give the
patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only requires of him a
reasonable explanation, which means generally informing the patient in
nontechnical terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives open to him,
the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may ensue from particular
treatment or no treatment. As to the issue of demonstrating what risks are
considered material necessitating disclosure, it was held that experts are
unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient’s decision on
treatment, or to the reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the
decision. Such unrevealed risk that should have been made known must further
materialize, for otherwise the omission, however unpardonable, is without legal
consequence. And, as in malpractice actions generally, there must be a causal
relationship between the physician’s failure to divulge and damage to the patient.
Reiterating the foregoing considerations, Cobbs v. Grant deemed it as

integral part of physician’s overall obligation to patient, the duty of reasonable
disclosure of available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of dangers
inherently and potentially involved in each. However, the physician is not obliged
to discuss relatively minor risks inherent in common procedures when it is
common knowledge that such risks inherent in procedure of very low incidence.
Cited as exceptions to the rule that the patient should not be denied the
opportunity to weigh the risks of surgery or treatment are emergency cases where
it is evident he cannot evaluate data, and where the patient is a child or
incompetent. The court thus concluded that the patient’s right of self-decision can
only be effectively exercised if the patient possesses adequate information to
enable him in making an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician’s
communications to the patient, then must be measured by the patient’s need, and
that need is whatever information is material to the decision. The test therefore
for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to the
patient’s decision.
Cobbs v. Grant further reiterated the pronouncement in Canterbury v.

Spence that for liability of the physician for failure to inform patient, there must be
causal relationship between physician’s failure to inform and the injury to patient
and such connection arises only if it is established that, had revelation been made,
consent to treatment would not have been given.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice

action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: “(1) the physician had a duty
to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those
risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient
consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4)
plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.” The gravamen in an informed
consent case requires the plaintiff to “point to significant undisclosed information
relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.
Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate

disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed
with the consent of Angelica’s parents. Respondents could not have been
unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower
extremity, that her immune system was already weak on account of the malignant
tumor in her knee. When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the
side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red
blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin
darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the
respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be
the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature
of the disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-
treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician. That
death can possibly result from complications of the treatment or the underlying
cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy
drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical
procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side
effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.
As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have

considered the variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter
afflicted with a life-threatening illness. On the other hand, it is difficult to give
credence to respondents’ claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of
recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were
dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of
chemotherapy’s success rate. Besides, informed consent laws in other countries
generally require only a reasonable explanation of potential harms, so specific
disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary.
The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical
treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all
instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed
consent, “the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty
through expert testimony. Such expert testimony must show the customary
standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant
doctor.
In this case, the testimony of Dr. Balmaceda who is not an oncologist but a
Medical Specialist of the DOH’s Operational and Management Services charged
with receiving complaints against hospitals, does not qualify as expert testimony
to establish the standard of care in obtaining consent for chemotherapy
treatment. In the absence of expert testimony in this regard, the Court feels
hesitant in defining the scope of mandatory disclosure in cases of malpractice
based on lack of informed consent, much less set a standard of disclosure that,
even in foreign jurisdictions, has been noted to be an evolving one.
As society has grappled with the juxtaposition between personal
autonomy and the medical profession's intrinsic impetus to cure, the
law defining “adequate” disclosure has undergone a dynamic evolution.
A standard once guided solely by the ruminations of physicians is now
dependent on what a reasonable person in the patient’s position
regards as significant. This change in perspective is especially
important as medical breakthroughs move practitioners to the cutting
edge of technology, ever encountering new and heretofore unimagined
treatments for currently incurable diseases or ailments. An adaptable

standard is needed to account for this constant progression.
Reasonableness analyses permeate our legal system for the very reason
that they are determined by social norms, expanding and contracting
with the ebb and flow of societal evolution.
As we progress toward the twenty-first century, we now realize

that the legal standard of disclosure is not subject to construction as a
categorical imperative. Whatever formulae or processes we adopt are
only useful as a foundational starting point; the particular quality or
quantity of disclosure will remain inextricably bound by the facts of
each case. Nevertheless, juries that ultimately determine whether a
physician properly informed a patient are inevitably guided by what
they perceive as the common expectation of the medical consumer—“a
reasonable person in the patient’s position when deciding to accept or
reject a recommended medical procedure.”
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The

Decision dated June 15, 2004 and the Resolution dated September 1, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58013 are SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated September 5, 1997 of

the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 8904
is REINSTATED and UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Facts: Legal Medicine - Medical Negligence Digest by Bianca Beltran 1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Facts: Legal Medicine - Medical Negligence Digest by Bianca Beltran 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Legal Medicine – Medical Negligence Digest by Bianca Beltran 1

[G.R. No. 118231. July 5, 1996]

section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to

FE CAYAO-LASAM, G.R. No. 159132

1. WHETHER OR NOT PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

2. WHETHER OR NOT PRC COMMITTED AN EVEN GRAVER ABUSE OF

3. WHETHER OR NOT PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure

A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of

Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special

Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for

When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994,

Granting that the obstetrician-gynecologist has been misled

Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

ROGELIOP. NOGALES, G.R. No. 142625

Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor

“Consent on Admission and Agreement” and “Admission Agreement.” Corazon

Around 3:00 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered several procedures to be done to

According to the Nurse’s Observation Notes, Dr. Joel Enriquez (“Dr.

At 6:00 a.m., Corazon was transferred to Delivery Room No. 1 of the

condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated and resuscitated by Dr.

At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which

Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision. Petitioners claimed

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling:

in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital applies to this

Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.

On the Liability of CMC

A hospital which is the employer, master, or principal of a physician

In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring

members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set

for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a

The question now is WHETHER CMC IS AUTOMATICALLY EXEMPT FROM

General Rule: A hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent

This exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent authority.” Under

negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether

Elements of Doctrine of Apparent Authority

2. Patient’s reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether

Likewise unconvincing is CMC’s argument that petitioners are estopped from

Even simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor of

On the Liability of the Other Respondents

Despite this Court’s pronouncement in its 9 September 2002[59] Resolution

a) Dr. Ely Villaflor – Not Negligent

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, G.R. No. 126297

NATIVIDAD [substituted by her G.R. No. 126467

MIGUEL AMPIL, G.R. No. 127590

Whether a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of physicians-consultants

While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in

Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held

Under the "control test", an employment relationship exists between a

As priorly stated, private respondents maintained specific work-

That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light

Nonetheless, to allay the anxiety of the intervenors, the Court holds

The significance of the foregoing statements is critical.

As it happened, PSI took no heed of the record of operation and

It should be borne in mind that the corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is

WHEREFORE, the second motion for reconsideration is DENIED and the

Professional Services, Inc. is ORDERED pro hac vice to pay Natividad

[G.R. No. 124354. April 11, 2002]

We shall first resolve the issue pertaining to private respondent Dr.

x x x What are the standards of care that an anesthesiologist should do

treatment to be given to said patient. The hospital’s obligation is limited to

Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by