<\ CHAPTER - III !

•
Mimamsa Tradition -
Philosophical, Ritualistic and Linguistic Aspects
Philosophical Aspects
- Epistemology
- Categories
Qualities
Concept of Apurva
Concepts of God, Self, Mind, Heaven,
Liberation and Dharma
Ritualistic Aspects
Types of sacrifices
Eligibility to perform sacrifices
Sacrificial Tradition in Kerala
Linguistic Aspects
- Purvamimamsa Technique of
Programme organisation
Theories of Sentence meaning
Philosophical Aspects

The word *Mimamsa' literally means 'revered thought' and

was originally applied to the interpretation of the vedic rituals which

commanded highest reverance. The word is now used in the sense

of any critical investigation. The school of Mimamsa justifies both

the meanings by giving rules according to which the commandments

of the Veda are to be interpreted and by giving a philosophical

justification for the Vedic ritualism. Mimamsa and Vedanta are

treated with allied systems of thought. Both are based on and both

try to interpret Veda. The earlier portions of Veda ie, the ^Mantra^

and ^Brahmana^ portion is called ^Karmakanda\ while the later

portion ie, the Upanisads is called ^Jnanakanda^ because the former

deals action with the rituals and the sacrifices. While the later deals

with knowledge of reality. Mimamsa deals with the earlier

portion of Veda is there fore called 'Purva Mimamsa^ and also

 109
'Kannamhnamsa.' While Vedanta deals with the later portion of Veda

and is therefore called'UttaraMimamsa* or ^Jnanamimamsa.' The

Piirva Mimamsa deals with dharma and therefore it called as

^Dharma Mimamsa.'

There has been a long line of pre-Sankarite teachers of Vedanta

of whome Mandanamisra seems to be the last, who have regarded

Mimamsa and Vedanta as forming a single system and who have

advocated the combination of action and knowledge - Known as -

'Kanna -jnana Samucchaya Vada.^ According to them the sutras

beginning with the first sutra of Jaimini and ending with the last

sutra of Badarayana, form one compact Sastra. These teachers hold

that Karma (Action) and Upasana (Meditation) were absolutely

essential to hasten the dawn of true knowledge. Even the great

Sankaracharya who treated action and knowledge as being

absolutely opposed like darkness and hght and who relegated iranna

to the sphere of Avidya, had to admit that Karma and Upasana to

purify the soul, though they are not the direct causes of liberation

and that therefore the study of Purva mimamsa though not essential
 110
for the study of Vedanta was a good mean for the purification of

the soul. In this connection it is also important to remember that it

is the great Kumarila Bhatta himself who may be rightly regarded

as the link between the Piirva Mimamsa and Uttara Mimamsa.

The word ^Darsana* is derived from the root ^drs^ (to see). It

ordinarilly means seeing. In its technical sense it means an act of

seeing which is not tained with any falsehood, or a correct

assertainment of something perceptible or imperceptible. To make

it more explicit, it may difine ^Darsana^ as an argumentative

deleberation upon a thing of which some knowledge has been

already obtained by perception or some other means, ending in the

discovery of its actual form. So there must be some previous

conceptions derived either by perception or by some other means

to make a Darsana possible. Without such conceptions mere

argumentation will stand without a basis, and will fail to obtain the

desired discovery. The inference arrived after arguementation must

again correspond to reality for "There can be no formal correctness

as opposed to real representation of truth "^

 Ill
A doubt might arise as to whether the treatment of the

sacrificial injuctions of the Veda which has been made in the Purva

Mimamsa at great length, really form the subject matter of a

Darsana. But this doubt will disappear if it consider the traditional

defenition of Darsana. Sacrifices are regarded as the means of

(sadhana) the attainment of bliss (sadhya) and discussions about

sacrificial injuctions form clearly the subject matter of this darsana.

The main purpose of Mimamsa philosophy was a methodical

interpretation of Dharma, or duty embodied in the ritualistic portion

of Vedas. Its philosophical position aims to provide epistemological,

metaphysical and ethical justification to the ritualistic doctrines. In

view of the above purpose, the Mimamsakas has stressed vedic

testimony as a highest source of valid knowledge, requiring no

external test for its validity. They believe in the reality of the world,

pluralism of souls, heaven, hell, impressions of acts lasting till the

attainment of fruits, potency and acts as the regulating force of the

world.
 112
Epistemology
The best developed aspect of Mimamsa philosophy is its

epistemology and the key to the understanding and proper evaluation

of Mimamsa theories in this field is the dogma, which however the

Mimamsakas have put in their best efforts to establish on a rational

basis, that the Veda is the supreme authority. To justify this dogma

they had to make a detailed and critical enquiry in to the nature

and criteria of valid knowledge and other related problems.

Mimamsakas recognised six pramanas, viz, Pratyaksa,

Anumana, Sabda, Upamana, Arthapatti and Anupalabdhi. But

Prabhakara and his followers refused to recognise the last one.

Perception (Pratyaksa)
Perception is the immediate knowledge of an object arising

through sense - object condact. A sense organ comes in condact

with its object and gets its impression. This knowledge is the

indeterminate knowledge Calocana'^ or ^nirvikalpa^). Then the mind

interprets it by assimilating it to the past experience which

determinates the class, quality, activity and name of the object. It is

 113

called determinate (Savikalpa) knowledge. In the first stage it is

like a perception of a child, a bare awareness, free from the

subjective contributions of the perceiver. That is, the object in it is

not determined as belonging to a class, possessing a name and so

on. In savikalpa stage, the consciousness of the object becomes

more definite and its generic and specific features are apprehended

clearly because of the analytic and synthetic activities of the mind.

It should be noted that such features are not imaginated but

discovered by the assimilative operations of the mind.

But perception is not always valid. Sometimes it misleads us,

as when what we see as a 'snake' turns out to be a mere 'peice of

rope.' This is a case of illusion. The cause in such cases is some

defect in the sense organ or in the condition under which the

perception occurs.

There are two Mimamsa theories offered to explain such

phenomena without giving up realism and yeilding to idealism,

Kumarila's theory is called *" ViparitakhyatP according to which

in illusion real thing existing elsewhere (Snake) is due to some

 114

defects identified with another real thing (rope). Another theory

which is offered by Prabhakara is called ^Akhyati^ or
'Vivekakhyati.^ It says an illusion consists of two cognitions; one
presentative and the other representative, and since the perceiver
forgets the representative charecter of later he cant apprehend their
difference. On thefirsttheory illusion is a misapperehension, while
on the second it is a non-apprehension or incomplete apprehension,
the former being an error of commission and the later that of
omission only.

Inference (Anumana) :-
Inference is the knowledge of one of the relata after perceiving
the other when the invariable association between the two is already
known. It is of two types : - for ones own self and for conceiving
others. The former is informal and does not require all the methodical
steps, while the later consists of three statements - ^Pratijha^
(Statement of the probandum), 'Ae^u' (Probans) and ^drstanta^
(example).

Sahara defines 'anumana^ as the knowledge from the perception

of one term of a well-known relationship of the other term which is
 115
not at the time of the contact with the senses. The first term is
called ^Lihga\ ^Hetu^ etc. The second one is called ^Lingm\
^Sadhya' etc. Their relationship is called ' VyaptP or 'Niyaina\

The usual division ofanumana into 'Svartha^ and ^Parartha^

is not unanimously accepted in Mimamsa. Sahara and Kumarila do
not mention these kinds nor do Kumarila's commentators.

Sahara recognises only two kinds of anumana,

^Pratyaksatodrstasambandha' and ' Samanyatodrstasambandha.'

The former is exemplified in the inference of fire from smoke and

the latter in that of the sun's movement from its change of position.

Kumarilabhatta recognize two kinds of anumamas viz.

^Samanyatodrsta^ and ' Visesatodrsta.^ The latter is excemplified

in the inference by a father of his son's presence from hearing his

voice and the former is that of the hill having fire on the basis of

the general relation of the smoke being accompanied by fire.

Prabhakara recognised the two kinds of anumanas,

'Adrstasvalaksana- visaya^ and ^Drstasvalaksanavisaya."* The

 116
examples are being the same as given by Sabara. In the latter, the

sun's movement from its change of position. The former is the

inference of fire from the smoke.

Verbal Testimany (Sruti) :-

Verbal testimany is the most important source of knowledge,

because it justifies the supreme authority of Vedas as the most

authentic source of knowledge oidharma, which is eternal, absolute

and supreme. It is defined as the statement made by a reliable

authority. Prabhakara restricts it to the scriptural statements only

while Kumarila believes in the authority of worldly persons also.

The Vedas are not composed by any person - human or divine. The

vedic statements give directions for sacrificial ritual or pursuade

persons for the performance of them. The Vedas are eternal and

impersonal in origin and hence are free from all possible mistakes

due to human weakness and are unchallengable and infallible in

authority.
 117

It is knowledge derived from an authoritative statement which

is either factual or imperetive and again secular or Vedic. Kumarila

recognizes both these types of pramanas while Prabhakara thinks

statements of authoritative persons to be reducible to anumana. The

import of Vedic statements is ultimately action and the apparently

factual statements, as of the Upanisads are to be constructed as

arthavada ie, indirectly commending or condemning some action.

Comparison (Upamana) :-

' Upamana^ is the means of knowing the similarity of the object

remembered at the sight of some resembling object. For example a

person having seen a cow in his house happens to come across a

^gavaya^ in the forest and then he comes to know that his cow is

similar to the ^gavaya\ Actually upamana is postulated by the

Mimamsakas to get the knowledge of the sacrificial details of a

ritefromsome other similarrite.Here Prabhakara unlike the Bhatta,

considers similarity to be an independent entity.

 118
Non-Perception {Anupalabdhi) :-
The Bhatta school beUeves in non-perception {anupalabdhi) as

a means of cognition of absence of something. For example 'a jar

on the ground.' The Bhattas argues that absence cannot be perceived

through senses because it cannot come in condact with the sense

organs. It cannot be an object of inference bacause there is not valid

probans to lead to such a conclusion. Nor can it be a case of verbal

testimony or presumption, because the conditions necessary for them

viz. Words and two seemingly contraditory facts are not present in

this case. Prabhakara on the contrary holds that knowledge of

absence arises through perception of the mere location devoid of

the object to the negated.

Prabhakara says that non-perception of a jar on the ground is

perception of the ground alone, but he is unable to explain what

'alone' means.

Postulation (Arthapatti) :-
Postulation is the supposition of some unperceived fact to
explain some otherwise unexplicable facts. For example when a
 119

man Devadatta is observed to be fasting in the day time but still

grawing fat, can be presume his eating at night to explain the
contradictory facts of fasting at day time and grawing fat.

According to Kumarila apparent inconsistency is the peculiar

feature in it which makes it different from anumana. The
Prabhakaras thinks that such feature is the element of doubt in it,
which is obviously wrong.

The Categories
The Bhatta Mimamsa accept five categories. Viz., substance,
quaUty, action. Universal and Negation, ie., dravya, guna, karma,
samanya and abhava. The Prabhakaras accept eight categories ie.,
dravya, guna, karma, samanya, sakti, sadrsya, samavaya and
samkhya.

I. Dravya (Substance)

Dravya is the locus of qualities, action, attributes, etc. The

Bhattas define substance asparimana gunasraya ie. that which has
dimension the quality. According to them, the substance and
qualities are produced simultaneously.
 120

The Battas also admit the nine substances admitted by the

Nyaya-Vysesikas, viz., earth, water, Ught, air, eather, space, time,

atman and manas. They add two more substances, viz., tamas ie.,

darkness and Sabda ie., Varna syllable.

The Prabhakaras do not accept tamas as a seperate category.

They consider sabda as a quality oiakasa.

Time and Space

Time and space are not to be inferred. These are perceived.
The cognitions, this is earlier, that is later etc. are stated to be the
grounds for the inference of time. However, the expressions earlier,
later etc, are not distinct from the time.

These refer to time itself but not to the ground of time. Unless
one cognizes time, one cannot talk of earlier and later. These very
expressions reveal that time is perceived. The time is perceived by
all senses. All experiences have necessarily a reference to time.

Space is also perceived according to Bhattas. The statements

this is here, that is after it and the other is before it. Clearly indicate
that space is also cognized along with the objects. If the perception
 121

of space could be denied, then the perception of the very objects in

those places may also be denied. On these grounds the Bhattas

consider other, time and space as perceptible. According to

Prabhakaras these are to be inferred.

Tamas
Bhattas have a peculiar view that tamas or darkness as a

substance. They argue that darkness have two attributes. Viz., quality

is blue colour and motion which are required for an entity to be a

substance. As it cannot be brought under any other substance it has

to be considered as a seperate substance.^ Bhattas says air has no

colour, it has only touch and even it is considered as a substance.

Similarly, darkness that has colour but no touch, may also be

considered as a substance. It is not necessary that a substance must

have both colour and touch. The presence of one of them is sufficient.

The Prabhakaras do not consider darkness as a separate

substance. They cannot also consider it as the absence of light, since,

they do not accept the category of Abhavdi, ie., absence.

 122
Sabda or Varna
«

The Bhattas consider sabda or vama as a substance because it

is not located in anything else and it is directly cognized by the
sense ie ear. Sabda is all pervasive, for example, one and the same
'ga' is found anywhere. It is not correct to say that there are different
'ga' syllables pronounced by different persons at different times,
since it is recognized as the same 'ga' syllable even when
pronounced by different persons at different times. It is not produced
by the vocal organs. It is only manifested by these. Though the
sabda is all pervasive, it is heard only in such places where it is
manifested. The variation in the manifestion of sabda as strong,
soft etc, is due to the variation in the process of manifestation. A
group of sabdas that convey a meaning, is a word. A group of words,
that conveys a unitary meaning, is a sentence. Mimamsakas do not
accept the concept of sabda for this purpose.

The Prabhakaras consider sabda as a quality of akasa.

II. Guna
According to Bhattas quality is that which is not
Upadanakarana ie., the mateiral cause and which is distinct from
 123

motion. Thefirstcause is intended to distinguish it from substance.

The colour, taste etc., are twenty four qualities.

Twentyone qualities are same as Nyaya Vaisesika. Among

these sabda, dhanna and adharma are dropped and sakti, prakatya

and dhvani are added by Mimamsakas.

The concept of prakatya is a special concept of Bhatta

Mimamsakas. It is a quality invested on objects when the objects

are cognized. It reveals the object. Though it is a quality of

substances it also reveals the qualities, universal etc., present in the

object. It reveals the past and the future objects, and abhava also.

Prakatya is also called as drstata and jnatata. In the instance where

the objects are perceived it is called drstata; where the objects are

revealed by inference etc., is calledjhatata. The Prabhakaras do not

accept this concept.

Sakti (Potency)
Sakti is a quality present in substances, qualities and action.

Bhattas do not accept the contention that a quality is present in

substance only Sakti is of two types: Laukika and Vaidika. Laukika

 124

is established by arthapatti. Sakti of sacrifice that leads to heaven

is second type. This is to be known through Vedic injunctions. Sakti
is also classified as sahaja and adheya. The potency of the fire is
sahaja ie., natural. The potency found in the sacrificial context is
adheya. ie., brought about by the implimentation of the Vedic
injunction. The Prabhakaras consider sakti as a separate category.
They establish it by inference.

III. Karma (action)

Kanna is of the nature of movement. It causes conjuction and
disjunction. It operates in the case of non-all-pervasive entities only
and it is perceptible. The Prabhakaras consider it as inferred.

IV. Samanya
Samanya 's nature is universal. It is an important concept and
it is utilized to reject the Buddhist view of Ksanikatva or
momentariness.

V. Sadrsya (Similarity)
This is a seperate category accepted by Prabhakaras. It is
comprehended by upamana pramana. Prabhakara consider it as
 125

seperate because (1) it cannot be considered as a substance since it

is found in qualities and actions also. (2) It cannot consider as a

quality or action for the same reason. (3) It cannot be included

under Samanya, as it has no continuity. (4) It cannot be included

under Samavaya as it is not a relation.

Bhattas do not consider it as a seperate category. The

Purvamimamsa utilizes the concept of Sadrsya in the context of

sacrifices. For instance, sauiya and agneya have same deity and

dravya. Therefore these lead to the same result. A section of

Navyanayyayikas also accept Sadrsya as seperate category.

VI. Samkhya (Number)

According to Prabhakaras number is also a seperate category

as it is found in all objects. It canot be considered as a substance,

since it is found in qualities, action, etc. It cannot considered as a

quality because it is found in many. It cannot be taken as an action

because it is observed to be quite different from that. It cannot also

be taken as a universal as it is not eternal. Hence it has to be

considered as a seperate category.

 126
VI. Samavaya (Inherence)

The Prabhakara considered samavaya as infered. Bhattas do

not accept samavaya. They replace it by tadatmya. According to

Prabhakaras, if the two relate are eternal then samavaya is eternal.

If one of the relate or both are not eternal then, samavaya also is not

eternal.

VII. Ahhava (Absence)

Bhattas accept abhava as a seperate category. The cognition

asti is bhava, a positive entity. The cognition nasti is abhava, the

absence of an entity. This absence itself is considered a seperate

category. The absence is of four types, viz., (I) Pragabhava (previous

absence) ie. the absence before the object is produced, eg: - absence

of curd in the milk before it is produced from the milk. (2)

Pradhvamsabhava absence after the destruction, eg. absence of milk

when it is made into curd. (3) Atyanthabhava ie. the absence all

along, eg. the absence of colour in the air. (4) Anyonyabhava

(reciprocal absence) eg :- the jar is not the cloth. This is also called

tadatmyabhava.
 127
According to Bhattas absence is cognized by anupalabdhi

pramana. ie., absence of cognition.

The Prabhakaras do not accept the abhava category. According

to them the cognitions are of two types : (1) Samsrsta Visayabudhi

or cognition of two objects together (2) tadeka visayabudhi or

cognition of one only.

The Concept of Apurva :-

It does not appear quite reasonable that momentarily

disappearing actions should bring about any such future effects as

the attainment of heaven and the like. But the fact is that, from

certain vedic passages we come to know of the capability of the

enjoyed and prohibitted actions to bring about certain result, and

inorder to render reasonable the production of future effects by

means of momentarily disappearing actions, it can be assume certain

interveining transcendental agencies in the form of Punya (virtue)

and Papa (vice). Thus, then the causing of the attainment of heaven

by sacrifices is not immediate, but indirect through the unseen

agency of virtue. This is what is called the unseen force (adrsta)

 128

leading to a particular effect, and the cause of this unseen effect is

the primary action, filled up with all its various subsidiaries

preceeding and following it, and not the primary action along by

itself. In that case, the effects (the attainment of heaven etc) too

might be said to be brought about by the primary alone and such a

theory would lead to the inevitable conclusion - the uselessness of

the subsidiaries.

There can be an objection that, is itrightto assert the production

of the unseen agency by the primary action together with all its

subsidiaries. For the primary action is no sooner performed than

destroyed, and as such carmot profit by the aid of its subsidiaries.

To this, the Mimamsakas replies that though no help of the

subsidiaries is possible to the primary by itself, yet such aid would

be quite possible through an (intermediate) unseen force, brought

about by mere origination of the primary action (such force having

the convensional name of ''utpattyapurva'*). Because of the

fulfilment to the production by the primary alone of such an Apurva

interveining between the primary and the final Apurva directly

 129
leading to the final result. In the same manner, the subsidiaries too,

being only conjointly capable of helping the primary, cannot help

one another direclty by themselves, and as such as the fulfilment of

this mutual aid among the subsidiaries also, it can be assume the

production of intermediate unseen forces - Utpattyapurvas - at each

steps, (ie, together with every subsidiary the one subsidiary helping

the one following through the Utpattyapurva produced by itself).

The help of the subsidiary towards the primary as a rule, consists

in turning the primary towards the production of the great Apurva

leading to the final result.

Sacrifices are enjoined by vedic injuctions. And all

performances releases some effects. For example

^^darsapurnamasabhyam svarga kamo yejeta'^ - the performance of

*"darsapumamasa 's result is ^svarga.'' The act of sacrifice come to

an end as soon as all the items of its are completed. But the result

''svarga'* does not immediately emerge. The cause should

immediately proceeded the effect. When it does not happen, to

maintain the continuity some intermediary has to be envisaged.

 130
Hence Apurva is envisaged as an intermediary between the sacrifice

and the result.

The concept is envisaged by Arthapatti pramana. Whenever

there is a conflict between two facts both of which are supported

by appropriate prama/2a5, a third fact has to be emerged to resolve

the conflict. Here, performing sacrifice is enjoined by Srati. A result

for it is also stated in that Sruti. These statements imply the

relationship of cause and effect between the two. This cannot be

worked out unless the two are interconnected. This difficulty is

resolved by envisaging Apurva by arthapatti.

Apurva is a kind of trans - emperical power. It remains with

the performer of the sacrifice. As a trans - emperical power, its

way of functioning is quite different from that of emperical power.

The sacrificial act is emperical. Its continuity, untill the result arises,

cannot be envisaged. However as dharma, it can generate a trans

emperical power and can lead to the result. In Indian philosophical

and religious tradition, the concept of non-emperical power, adrsta

is accepted by all in some or other form at some or other stage. It

 131
remains with the persons concerned. However, it is not cognized

by him like his cognition, joy or sorrow.

Knowledge According to Mimamsakas

According to Mimamsakas, knowledge is the activity of a

cognizer (jnatrvyapara) which is inferred through the effect, viz,

cognizedness characterizing the object cognised. It is of two types,

valid and invalid. The later involves some defect in the totality of

causal conditions and is erroneous in nature. The former is according

to Kumarila, the knowledge which is in agreement with the real

nature of an object, novel and not contradicted by a sublating

knowledge, or according to Prabhakara, the direct experience of an

object as distinguished from remembrance.

Mimamsakas theory of knowledge is realistic. They accept the

view of self validity of knowledge. All knowledge is valid by itself.

It is not validated by any other knowledge. Its validity arise from

those very causes from which knowledge itself arises. Prabhakara

and Kumarila both uphold the intrinsic validity of knowledge.

 132
Concept of God

It is true that Jaimini has not discussed the concept of God in

his sutras, but he has nowhere denied the existence of God. Though

Jaimini has taken great pains for establishing that the fruits of

actions are produced through ^apurva^ still he has recognised God

as the creator or the maker of these fruits.

There are two leading schools belonging to this system; the

school of Kumarila and the school of Prabhakara. Of these two the

school of Kumarila is by far the more prominent. This school does

not admit that one derive the fruits of his action through the favour

of God, but it regards God as the ordainer of fruit in as much God

helps him in obtaining them by creating so many objects of this

world.

Dr. Ganganath Jha has observed in his famous article on the

Prabhakara Misra^ that Kumarila has denied the creation or the

dissolution of the world as a whole. He has referred in the four

verses of the Slokavartika as his authority quoting.

 133

It is true that Kumarila has said that, God, corporal or spiritual,

does neither superintend nor is the couse of this creation and that

the creation or the dissolution of the world at any one time is

impossible. But it can be say that Kumarila does not at all intend to

deny creation by God, but he intend to bringout the logical absurdity

involved in the idea of the creation of the world by a God, who

himself is a product of human imagination.

It is also a mistake to suppose that the system of Kumarila is

not a purely theistic one, because it denied the existence of the

physical forms of the Gods. But Kumarila has not actually denied

the existence of such an object. The truth is that he has not been

very keen about this matter. All that he had wanted to make out is

that one do not desire the fruits of his action through the favour of

Gods, and that Gods need not have bodies for that purpose. He has

put forward the view that a cause and its consequence cling to the

same basis. When a man was performed sacrifice, the result will,

as a matter of course come over him. Now the result do not always

come out at once, they may came out long afterwards, and in order
 134
to show a connection between an act and its result two theories are

generally propounded. According to one theory 'the result comes

through the favours of the Gods who have been propitiated in the

sacrifice," while according to the other "an unseen merit (Apurva)

arises immediately on the performance of the sacrifice which serves

as a connecting link between the performance and its fruits."

Kumarila adopt the latter theory. He says that if we admit this

Apurva, the cause, the medium, and the ultimate consequence - all

three will take place in ones own self, where as the favour of a God

is not in the sacrificer himself, but is an extraneous thing.

Besides in the text of Sruti there is no mention of the favour of

any goal. If any sacrificial injuction be properly constructed, it can

be say that it asks a man to produce a desirable result by means of

performing a sacrifice. Thus it is the performance that is the only

means of producing the fruit, and as the performance does not

continue upto the time of the production of the fruit. An Apurva is

imagined as a link, and, so, the interference of any external God is

 135

not necessary. Moreover the necessity of the favour of a God is not

only not indicated in the srutU but is opposed to its spirit. The sruti

tells that the performance of a sacrifice is the cause or means of

producing a particular fruit. Of now introduce the favour of Gods

as the cause of the production of the fruit, the importance of the

performance as the cause will be ignored and this can by no means

be the intention of the sruti. So there is neither necessity for nor

any advantage in introducing the favour of Gods and Kumarila has

not therefore, introduced it. Kumarila would have no objection to a

God having a body provided that he does not interfere in the

dispensation of the fruit. Thus all the necessary elements of an Astika

darsana is the system of Kumarila, and hence, it should be treated

as much.

Concept of Self of Atma

In the system of Purva Mimamsa very little was discussed

about the real nature of the self of Man. Man is entitled to perform

the ordained acts such as sacrifices (Yajna), offering of oblation in

 136
the consecrated fire (homa), and charity (dana).

Like other duahstic schools of philosophers, Mamamsakas

believe in the seperateness of the self (jivatman) from the body,
sense and mind, and look upon special properties of like,
intelligence, will and effort as the natural attributes of the self.

According to mimamsakas, at the time of sacriice, it is not the

body of the sacrificer that goes to heaven, it is his self ie., atman. In
this context they establish a distinct atman seperate from the body.

According to them; (1) Activities like breathing, winking etc.,

do not belong to body. These are not found after the death even
though the body is found. Therefore these are the attributes of some
other entity that is distinct from the body ie. atman.

(2) Joy, sorrow, etc., are cognized by oneself not by others. The
bodily attributes are perceived by others. Hence These belong to
atman.

(3) Atman can be inferred by the desire also. A person desire

something that is already known to him. Therefore the knower and

 137
desirer should be one and same. This means that there is a permanent

atman.

(4) The experience as aham establishes the atman. The atman is

capable of knowing itself, ie. svasamvedya.

Kumarila discuss the nature and functions of atman under

atmavada in Slokavarttika and in apurvadhikarana in Tantravarttika.

He describes atman as eternal, all-pervasive, that which take

different bodies in different births and serves as the agent and

enjoyer.^

The Prabhakara view of atman is briefly explained by

Salikanatha as : 1) it is distinct from body, manas and senses (2) it

is permanent and all pervasive (3) The atmas are many. (4) It is

cognized as the agent along with the object of cognition.

Prabhakara and Kumarila both admit the plurality of the

individual souls. The mimamsaka thinkers regard the self as distinct

from the body, the senses and the understanding. They adopt the

theory of plurality of selves, to account for the varieties of

 138
6
expenences

Kumarila says the soul is different from the body, which is

eternal and omnipresent. The atman is consciousness itself though

the souls are many 7

Concept of Manas or Mind

Bhattas consider manas as the tenth substance. It is an

instrument to provide joy, sorrow etc., to atman. Bhattas consider

it as all - pervasive. It need not move to be in contact with atman or

senses. It functions within the body as is the case with atman. It is

all pervasive because it has no touch so it has no limit. It is not

produced by anyother. So it is eternal. Manas cannot be equated

with other pervasive objects since it is an instrument for the cognition

of these.

Concept of Svarga
The nature of Svarga is discussed in Svargakamadhikaranam.
Jaimini and Sahara do not seem to be particular in identifying Svarga
with another world. They use the word pri/i to express the meaning
 139
svarga.

For instance, ^candanam svargah,^ sandle wood paste is heaven,

^^Kauseyani svargah^^ means the silk garment is heaven, and so on.

However Sahara cautions that these are not always delightful, nor

are there delightful to all. Therefore the word svarga should be

taken in sence of the dight that is not mized with even a iota of

sorrow.

The concept of Svarga is introduced to induse the undertaking

of sacrifices. The concept of Svarga has psychological, ethical and

spiritual dimensions. It is a complex concept. Such complex

concepts when put into concrete situations take a concrete form in

the context of a particular cultural tradition. In the context of Indian

cultural tradition it has acquired the form of another word, ie., heaven

However Jaimini and Sahara have not given much importance to

this concrete form.

This is clear from their remakrs in Svargakamadhikarana.

Sahara remarks since the svarga in the sence of other world is not

observable it has to be envisaged by arthapatti. Since the delight

 140
unmixed with sorrow is stated to be the result of the sacrifice, and
since, such dehght cannot be realized in this world, the other world,

ie svarga has to be envisaged. However even then, it will only be a

means of svarga. But not svarga in its primary sense, viz, delight

The vedic texts such as "This is he, the performer of sacrifices,

who attains heaven thereby", Mimamsaka concludes that heaven is

the summum bonum of human life. There is no indication in the

works of Jaimini, Kumarila and Sahara as to whether this heaven

(Svarga) is idential with bliss or it is a place, where happiness

unalloyed with pain or grief can be enjoyed. Latter Mimamsakas

understood the term in the latter sense. But most of the Mimamsakas

maintain that heaven does not mean anything, but bliss.

Concept of Moksa
According to Prabhakara, liberation consists in the total
disappearance of dharma and adhanna, whose operation is the cause
of rebirth. It is the absolute cessation of the body, caused by the
disappearance of all dharma and adharma.
 141

According to Kumarila, moksa is the state of atman in itself,

free from all pain (q^^TTc'TSTNc^TciFnTTm).

There is no clear indication in the Mimamsasutra or the

commentary of Sahara about the possibility of emancipation {Moksa)
of the self. According to Kumarila, ^Moksa^ is the supreme end of
the self.

Mimamsakas do not believe in the absolute dissolution

(mahapralaya) of this world. They say that the universe has existed
as it is from eternity.

According to Mimamsa philosophy, work recommended by

the scriptures has been declared to be the source of all blessings. It
is through such work man can fulfils his desire and at last attain to
emanicipation, which is equivalent to the extinction of all misery
and sorrow.

Mimamsa believes in the existence of souls as eternal spiritual

substances. According to the material world evolves out of atoms
in accordance with the law of Karman, the world comprises :
 142
a) Living bodies - in which the souls are subject to the
consequences of their past deeds (bhogayatana).

b) The sensory and motor organs - which are the means of

enjoying or suffering from the above consequences {bhoga
- sadhana).

c) The objects, Which are the fruits to be enjoyed or referred

from {bhogyavisaya)

Mimamsa is a combination of plurahsm and reahsm but not

empiricism. It believes in the non-empirical vedic source of
knowledge which is regarded as even more authoritative than the
testimony of the senses.^ It is non empirical also because it believes
as real potential energy, unseen moral principle heaven, hell etc.
which the senses cannot comprehend.

According to Mimamsa of the early phase, the highest good to

be aimed at was the attainment of heaven where the soul can enjoy
perfect bliss absolutelyfreefromthe touch of pain. When Mimamsa
pronounces the direction ^^svargakamo yejeta*^ (one should perfom
the sacrifices with the desire of getting acers to heaven) it clearly
indicates that heaven is the ultimate end of rituals.
 143
Gradually like the followers of other systems Mimamsakas

also come to consider the liberation from the bondage of flesh.

(nisreyasa). When a person realises the hoUowness of the wordly

pleasure, mixed with pain he ceases from action with desire tries to

controU his passions, and takes to the knowledge of the self. After

leading a life of disinterested action, coupled with the knowledge

of the self, he dies never to be bom again. Thus he is liberated from

the suffering that rebirths ential, the letters of his soul, caused by

the body, including the senses, are snapped. The liberated soul is

unconcious. It is in its own pristine state (svartha) in which there is

absolute cessation of all painful experience.^*'

Concept of Dharma
Mimamsa is primarily concerned with Dharma, the super

structure of the philosophical theories. It is not the ordinary moraUty.

The ordinary moral values are included in ^Aitha^ and ^Kama.^

Which are distinguished from dharma.

Dharma is something transcendental and is concerned with

the individual's good in the life beyond. It's aim is the attainment
 144

of Heaven and hence it can't be known through ordinary empirical

means, not even by mystic intution. The Veda alone can tell what is

^dharma^ and what is ^adharma,^ ie, what action leads to heaven

and what to hell. Thus dhanna comprises religious duties, viz,

^Nityakarmas which are to be performed daily and

^Naimittikakannas which are to be performed on special occation.

There are also ''Kamyakarmas or optional duties which are to be

performed by those desirers of particular results.'Pratisidhakarmas

are those actions which are prohibited by the Veda, for example

injury to animals though killing an animal in a sacrifice is enjoined,

which may create the impression that Mimamsa prescribed a dual

system of morality, one set of rules for ordinary condact and

different set for religious purpose.

The central theme of Mimamsa is stated in the opening verse :

Now is the eunquiry of duty (dhanna)}^ This is the basis for the

interpretation of entire Veda, dhanna is defined in the text as:

"Duty is an object distinguished by a command."^^ The term

dhanna is derived from the root ^dhar\ 'to hold,' 'maintain,'
 145

'preserve.' It has reference therefore, to anything that holds,

supports or preserve. When used in the metaphysical sense, it means

those universal laws of nature that sustain the operation of the

universe and the manifestation of all things, that without which

nothing could be. When applied to the individual, it has reference

to that code of conduct that sustains the soul, and enables man to

fulfill his devine destiny. Here it has reference to the actions,

practices and duties that will benefit man in the world to come;

therefore it is that which produces virtue, morality or religious merit

leading towards the development of man.

All rituals and ceremonies enjoined in the Veda are said to

lead to the enlightment of the mind and the spiritual evolution of

the soul. Therefore it is necessary to understand their importance.

On the surface they appear to be fruitless injuctions, therefore,

Mimamsa endeavours to show how they are all based on dharma

and lead to the spiritual welfare of man. Mimamsa interpret the

Veda on the basis of eternal happiness is attained by the correct

performance ofritualsfounded on dharma, thereby storing up seeds

of virtue to fructify in the next life.

 146

Knowledge of Dharma according to Jaimini can be obtained

only by Verbal testimony (Sabda). The six means of knowledge
employed by the other systems are not infallible when dealing with
the invisible effects of ritual, therefore Jaimini accepts only Sabda
or the word. To support his position he lays down five prepositions :

1. The word' sabda' has an inherent power to convey its meanings

which is eternal.

2. The knowledge derived from the word (Sabda) is called

Upadesa (teachings).

3. In the invisible realm, the word (Sabda) is authoritative.

5. The word is self-sufficient and does not depend upon any other
for its meaning; otherwise it would become involved in the
fallicy of regressus and infinitum.

Jaimini refutes several objections raised against the eternal

character of the word (Sabda).

1. The objector contends that the word (Sabda) is a product of

verbal utterance, therefore it cannot be eternal. Jaimini asserts
that only the pronounciation is the product of effrot, the word
 147

(Sabda) must have existed previously, otherwise it could not

have been pronounced.

2. The word (Sabda) vanishes after it pronounced, therefore it is

not eternal. Jaimini points out that only the sound disappears;

the word (Sabda) still remains as does the drum after the sound

is produced.

3. The verb 'make' is used in connection with the word (Sabda),

therefore it cannot be eternal. Jaimini explains that the verb

'make' has reference only to sound which manifests the word

(Sabda), the word existed previously and the pronounciation

only made it audible.

4. Since the word Sabda is heard simultaneously by several people

standing at an equal distance, there must be many sound and

not one; thereofre it is not eternal. Jaimini contends there is

only one sound as there is only one sun, even though seen by

many people, therefore it is eternal.

5. The word (Sabda) undergoes modifications, therefore it cannot

be eternal. Jaimini answers that changes of letters are not

 148
modifications of the word (Sabda) they are new words and the

original word still exists.

6. When several people utter a sound, there is an increase in

volume, therefore it is not eternal. Jaimini argues that the word
never increases, only the sound which manifests the word
increases. Therefore the word is eternal.

After establishing the eternal character of the word (Sabda)

Jaimini proceeds to show that the use of words in the sentence of
the Vedas have a meaning just as they have in the oridnary language,
then he defends the devine origin of the Veda.

The method of interpretation of Vedic texts used by Jaimini is

best shown by an outline of the terms used at random throughout
the text. For this the contents of Vedas are classified under five
heads:

1. Vidhi (injunctions)
2. Mantra (hymns)
3. Namadheya (names)
4. Nisedha (Prohibitions)
5. Aithavada (explanatory passages)
 149
I. Vidhi - Vidhi is divivded as,

(a). Utpattividhi :- lays down a command with certain object,

thereby creating a desire.

(b). Viniyogavidhi : - lays down the details of a sacrifice. Six

accompaniments for the interpretation of the procedure enjoyed by
the texts.

A. Sruti - Primary sense of a word or a collection of words, not

depending upon any other word for its meaning.

1. Vidhatii - Lidicated by the verb from-lin

2. Viniyotri - On hearing which one immediately sees the

connection of the subsidiary and the principal.

a. Vibhatrirupa :- indicated by an affix of a declension.

b. Ekabhidhanarupa :- denoted by one word.

c. Ekapadarupa :- indicated by one pada or sentence.

3. Abhidatri :- indicates the material used in the sacrifice.

B. Liiiga - The secondary sense of a word inferred from another

word or collection of words.
 150

C. Vakya : - When the meaning of a word or collection of words

is indicated by the sentence in which it is used.

D. Prakarana:- when the meaning of a sentence or a clause depends

upon the centre in which it is used.

1. Mahaprakarana - when the context relates to the rewards of

the principal part of the sacrifice

2. Avantharaprakarana : When the contexts relates to the

rewards of the subordinate parts of the sacrifice.

(E) Sthana : wheathe meaning depends upon the location or word

order.

1. Padarthasadesya - equality of place in the text.

a) Yadhasawkhyapatha: relative enumeration, arranging verbs

with verbs and subjects with subjects.

b) Sannidhipatha : regulated by the text which is near it.

2. Anusthana sadesya : The quality of place according to the

performance.
 151

(F) Samakhya: When it is necessary to break compound words up

into their component parts inorder to assertain their meaning.

Two kinds of actions enjoyed by viniyogavidhi

(a) Principal - That which produces the transcendental fruit

(Apurva), the invisible result to mature in another Ufe.

(b) Subordinate : that which leads up to the completion of the

principal action. These are called Anga and are of two kinds.

1. Sidharupa : an accomplished thing which consists of class,

material number, and the like and has a visible effect.

2. Kriyarupa : This is action.

(A). Pradhanakarma : The primary action.

1. Sannipatyopakaraka : Actions enjoyed with respect to the

substance. They produce visible and invisible results.

2. Aradupakaraka : actions which are enjoyed without any

reference to any substance or divinity. It deals directlty to the
ultimate result. It is the essence of the sacrifice.
 152

(B), Gunakanna - The secondary action

1. Sannipatyopakaraka

2. Aradupakaraka.
(C). Prayogavidhi : The injuction that lays down the order of
performance of the subsidiary or minor parts. The successon or
order {Karma) is of six kinds.

1. Srutikrama - the order determined by a direct text.

a) Kevalakramapara - a text indicating an order or sequence

only.

b) Tadvisista padarthapara - indicating the order or sequence

in the course of lying down certain other things.

2. Arthakrama - the order dertermined by the object.

3.Pathakiama - when the order of the execution of things is governed

by their order in the text. It is of two kinds :

a. Mantra text

b. Brahmana text.
 153
4. Sthanakrama - the transportation of a thing from its proper place

by reson of being proceded by another thing which is followed by

another.

5. Mukhyakrama - the sequence of the subsidiaries or the

subordinate parts according to the order in the principal.

6. PravTttikrama - the order of a procedure, which once begun,

will apply to others as well.

D. Adhikaravidhi - an injuction which creates a right in a person.

n. Mantra - A text which helps one to remember the procedure of a

sacrifice.

A. Apurva: When a text lays down a new injuction for the attainment

of an object which cannot know by any other means.

B. Niyama - the restrictive rule - when the text lays dawn one mode

of doing a thing that could be done in several ways.

C. Parisamkhya : an implied prohibition.

1. Sruti - directly stated by some texts.

 154
2. Laksaniki - inferred prohibition.

m. Namadheya - a proper noun used in defining the matter enjoyed

by it.

A. Matvarthalaksanabhayat - a figure of speech in which the Matup

afix is used.

B. Vakyabhedabhayat - the spUting up of a sentence.

C. Tatprakhya - a convensional name given to a particular sacrifice,

the description of which is given elsewhere in a seperate threatise.

D. Tadvyapadesa - the name given to a sacrifice by reason of its

resemblance to another from which it derives its name.

IV. Nisedha - The opposite of Vidhi. A negative precept which

prevents a man from doing a thing which is injurious or

disadvantages to him.

A. Paryudasa - a negative precept that applies to a person who is

undertaking to perform a sacrifice.

B. Pratisedha - a negative precept of general applicability.

 155
V. Arthavada - passages in praise or blame of a vidhi or Nisedha.

A. Gunavada - a statement made by the text that contradictory to

the existing state of the affair and means of proof.

B. Anuvada - A statement made by the text which is in keeping

with the existing state of facts.

C. Bhutarttiavada - A statement made which is neither against the

existing state of fact nor is it in conformity with it.

Jaimini's defence of the utility of the Vedas will illustrate the

way he interprets the Veda. Nine objections are raised against Vedic
Mantras. The objections are ;

1. Vedic Mantras do not convey any meaning because they stand in

need of other passages to explain and support them.

Jaimini contends that all vedic words have a significance jsut

as they do in ordinary language.

2. Vedic Mantras are held useless because they depend upon a

complicated system of orthoepy and grammar inorder to understand
them.
 156

Jaimini says that vedic sentences have a subject, predicate and

object which are governed by the same rules of grammar as ordinary
language.

3. Vedic Mantras are held useless bacause they teach what is

already known.

Jaimini says that the repitition of things already known is far

the purpose of Gunavada (new qualities), pansamkhya (implied
prohibition), or arthavada (explanation). It is also to produce an
invisible effect (Apurva).

4. Vedic mantras are held useless because they describe what does
not exist. For example it has four horns, it has three feats, two
heads, it has seven hands, the bull being tied three fold, cries ; the
great had entered amongst the mortals, etc.

Jaimini explains that such descriptions are figurative speech,

technically called ^catvari srnga\ For example the sacrifice is
compared with a bull by reason of its producing the desired effects,
it has four horns in the form of four kinds of priests. Its three feet
are the three libations (Savana) (performed three times a day) the
 157

sacrificer and his wife are the two heads, the chandas (desires) are
the seven hands. Beings tied up by the three Vedas, viz, Rg, Yaju,
Sama. It resounds with the roaring sound uttered by the priests.
This great god in the form of the sacrifice is amidst the mortals.

5. Vedic mantras are held to be useless because they are addressed

to inanimate objects as if they pocessed life.

Jaimini says that it is to extol the sacrifice and induce the

adherent to practice it. The principal use is technically called
^Kaibhutikanyaya.^

6. Vedic Mantras are held to be useless because they have many

self contradictory passages.

Jaimini explains that these passages are descriptive of

subordinate qualities.

7. Vedic Mantras are held to be useless because they are learned

without understanding their meaning.

Jaimini explains that this is no fault of the Veda which delas

only with the performance of sacrifices. It is assumed that the
meaning will be learned.
 158
8. Vedic Mantras are held to be useless because there are many
mantras the meaning of which cannot be known.

Jaimini says that every mantra has a meaning. Our ignorance

is due to carelessness and indolence.

9. Vedic Mantras are held to be useless because they mension

transitory things.

Jaimini explains that the common nouns used in the Vedas

were subsequently used by men for proper noun. For the
interpretation of substantives, Jamini mensions three principles.

1. Rudhi - a word, not compounded with any other word and with a
convensional meaning which must be learnedfrompast authorities,
such as Panini, the most eminent of all Sanskrit grammarians. It
has the inherent power to convey a sense.

2. Yaugika - the derivative word, made up of two or three words. It

is a compound word and is used in the sense conveyed by the
component parts of which it is made.

3. Yogarudhi - A compound word which has non convensional

sense.
 159
Jaimini explains that substantives never convey the intention

of the speaker. This requires the use of a verb, which always denoted

action. He classifies action into two kinds.

1. Pradhana or principal - It is that action which produces an invisible

effect called Apurva, such as the attainment of heaven. The

recitation of mantras in prose and poetry at the performance of a

sacrifice is said to produce Apurva, an invisible effect, therefore

they are the principal actions.

2. Guna or subordinate - It is that action which produces visible

effects, such as the use of materials in the sacrifice, eg. kindling of

fire, preparing of cakes or the prounding and thrushing of rice.

For the application of these rules, the Veda is devided into two

broad divisions, Mantra andBrahmana, which are further subdivided

I. Mantra or Samhita : This is the mandatory portion of the Veda. It

is a collection of hymns that regulate, define and create a right,

impelling men to action. It has three parts.

 160
1. Rgveda - a collection of verses which have a metrical arrangement

to convey meaning.

2. Sama Veda - a collection of verses which can be sung at the end

of a sacrifice.

3. Yajur Veda - is in prose and has no metre it is of two kinds :

a. Nigada - those which are pronounced alound.

b. Upamsu - those which are pronounced silently.

n. Brahmanas

l.Hetu -reason

2. Nirvacanam - explanation

3. Ninda - Censure

4. Prasansa - Praise

5. Samsaya - doubt

6. Vidhi - Command

7. Parakriya - the action of one individual

8. Purakalpa - the action of many individuals or a nation. These are

the historical discriptions of one individual or many individuals
and are indicated by the particles 'ift",' 'afta' or, 'Aa.'
 161

9. Vyavadharanakalpana - interpretation of a sentence according to

its context.

10. Upamana - Comparison

The principles which are merely anttined here are used

throughout the Mimamsasutra in the interpretation of the many

sacrifices that are enjoined for the benefit of man.

As a system of philosophy Mimamsa school made a great

contribution to the branch of epistemology. Its theories of self

validity of knowledge, theories of error and cognisedness or

manifestedness of objects shows great philosophical insight.

Epistemology in general provides a method of metaphysical enquiry

in Mimamsa, the truth dealt with the Vedas are determined through

these epistemological notions. In view of the fact that the soul

purpose of Mimamsa is to asertain dhanna. Mimamsa school also

deals with nature of self and God. As a philosophical system

Mimimsa is a combination of pluralism and realism.

 162
Ritualistic Aspects
Vedas consists ofSamhita, Brahmana, Aranyaka and Upanisad.

Among these, Brahmanas describe a large number oiyagas. The

details required for the performance of these yagas are also given.

The Brahmanas of Yajurveda, particularly that of Taittiriya Sakha

describe the major sacrifices. However, these ^ e not described in

an organised way. It is difficult to distinguish in different sacrifices

the main and subordinate positions, procedures etc. Here and there

conflicting statements also seen. There are difference among

different Sakhas in respect of same items and procedure. Probably

the priests reconciled these at the time of actual performance by

discussion. At the time of Brahmanas, the performance of sacrifices

was a living programme and priests were quite conversant with it.

In due course, Srautasutras were formulated to describe the

procedure of the performance of sacrifices. The largest number of

Srautasutras belong to the Yajurveda, which is primarily concerned

with sacrifices. Bauddhayana and Apasthambha Srautasutras of the

Yajurveda give a fairly good account of major sacrifices.

 163
The Srautasutras approach is discriptive. These describe the
details of the sacrifice step by step, following the procedure of the
performance. However, these do not discuss the rational underlying
the introduction of certain items or procedures. These are just a
diary of peformances. In the section called Panbhasasutras some
technical points are explained. However a full discussion and the
interpretation of the statements in the Brahmanas connected with
sacrifice is not found. Mimamsa is formulated to play this role.

Vedas are the means to comprehend Dharma. Mimamsa is an

aid to interpret Vedas.

Giving authoritative rulings on sacrificial matters such as

adhikara, anga, atidesa, uha, badha, tantra etc. andfixingthe correct
procedure and nature of sacrifices, {Karmabbheda and Karma)
Purvamimamsa is also called Kannamimamsa.

Piirvamimamsa regarded Veda as eternal and authorless and

of infallible authority. It is essentially a book of ritual, dealing with
 164

commandments prescribing injuctions or prohibitions. Greatest

impotance is attached to the Brahmana portion of the Veda to which

both the 'Mantras^ and 'Upanisads^ are subordinated. The aim of

the Mimamsa is to supply the principles according to which the

vedic texts are to be interpreted and to provide philosophical

justification for the views contained therein. The work of finding

the principles for the right interpretation of the vedic texts was

undertaken by the Brahmanas themselves and mainly by the Srauta

sutras. Mimamsa continues this work, But it would have been best,

only a commentary on Vedic rituals. The main thing which entitle

it to the rank of a philosophical system is its keen desire to provide

philosophical justification for the Vedic views and to replace the

earlier ideal of the attaintment of heaven {svarga) by the ideal of

obtaining Uberation (apavarga). It undertakes a detailed investigation

on the nature and validity of knowledge and into the various means

which produce valid knowledge and also into other metaphysical

problems.

Dharma is the subject of inquiry in Mimamsa. Jaimini defines

dharma as a command or injunction which implies men to action.^'*

 165
It is the supreme duty, 'the ought', the 'categorical imperative'.

^Aitha^ and ^Kama^ which deal with ordinary common morality

are learnt by wordly intercourse. But Dharma and Moksa which

deal with true spirituality are revealed only by the Veda. Dhaima is

supra sensible and consists in the commands of Veda. Action is the

final import of the Veda which commands us to do certain acts and

refrain from doing certain other. The authoritativeness of the Veda

is supported by social consciousness as well as by individual

conscience, 'dftanna' and 'adhaima^ deal with happiness and pain

to be enjoyed or suffered in the life beyond. Actions perfomed here

produced an unseen potency (apurva) in the soul of the agent which

yeilds fruits when obstructions are removed and time becomes ripe

for its frutification. The Apurva is the link between the act and its

fruit. It is the causal potency (Sakti) in the act which leads to its

fruitification. Actions arefirstdevided in to three kinds:- Obligatory

- which must be performed for their violation results in sin, though

their performance leads to no merit, Optional - which may or

maynot be performed. Their performance leads to merit, though

their nonperformace does not leads to sin. Prohibited - which must

 166
not be perfrmed. Their performace leads to sin though their non

performance does not leads to merit.

According to mimamsakas dharma is identical with yajiia or

sacrifices.^^ T)^es of sacrifices can be classified into five groups.

Viz; Nitya (compulsory) Naimittika (occassional), Kamya

(performed for fulfilling certain material desires or personal

advantages), prayasciYte (expiatory) and Nisidha (prohibitted).

Nitya Sacrifices

As the tenn indicates, Nitya are to be performed regularly.

They are compulsory and not optional. They do not depend upon

any desire of the sacrificer for any personal gain. On the other

hand, if one does not perform the Nitya sacrifices, he incurs sin.

Kamya Sacrifices

Kamya Sacrifices are performed to fulfil some personal desires

of man. The sacrificer should proceed to offer Kamya sacrifices

only if he is able to perform it with all its auxilary rites, because

Kamya sacrifices are not obUgatory ie, compulsory. The performance

 167
of sacrifices referring to their fruits, depend on the desire of the

sacrifices.^^ Sahara says ^^J|id fl ^ ^5^, ^ ^cicriid ie, the fruit has

been delcared to follow from the principal rite performed with all

its auxilaries and not from the principal rite only.

Parthasarathi Misra in his Nyayaratnamala having first refuted

the Gurumata and establishes his own siddanta with respect to Nitya

and Kamya sacrifices.

Naimittika - Occassional Sacrifices

Naimittika sacrifices are held at par with Nitya sacrifices, in

the sense that they are not performed with reference to fulfilling

any personal desire but when occasions occur they are to be

performed compulsory. For example : Taittiriya samhita 2.2.2.

enjoins. ^IFT ipPT 5 ^ - ^ T ^ W^ ^ ^ § t ^itdicbMM f^f^ |'^ ie. if the

sacrificers house catches fire, he should offer a cake baked on eight

potsherds to ^ksamavatagni.^
 168
Prayascitta sacrifices
According to Jaimini and Sahara the expiations are of two

kinds. Some are enjoined for mending the lapses and others are

prescribed as a part of the sacrificial performances to be performed

under certain contigencies. (MWR^TIIPI fl:-a^fjRlf^ 11 cbiPiRid #5'TFf

There are several expiations laid down to correct the same

discrepancy One should optionally undergo one of the several

expiations.^°

Another kind of expiation is not meant to mend the lapses.

Such are not laid dawn for omission of what is enjoined or for

commission of what is forbidden. For example if the sun rises before

the sacrificer has performed the Agnihotra, he should offer the

cooked rise to Mitra, also a cake backed on potshred to Surya. The

sacrificer and his wife should add fuel to fire and restrain their

speech and observe fast during the day. In this case the sacrificer

has not omitted what is enjoined or committed what is forbidden.

There is nothing to be mended here. The vedic texts here describes

 169

some rites when the contigency of the sunrise occures before

Agnihotra. %ci^ v3n^^ \^\^T\ ^ fcr?ft^ P^ In such cases all the

expiations should be undergone by the sacrifice! together.^^

Nisiddha Sacrifices
The Vedas have pointed out such sacrifices, which if performed,

lead to hell. The vedic sentence § ^ ^ >3!te^ ^ ? ^ describes the

-s,

Syena sacrifice is for him who desires to destroy the enemies by

means of abhicara, the black magic. The distruction leads the

sacrificer to hell. Therefore it is prohibitted. Himsa is a cause for

leading the sacrificer to hell.

It may be argued that a goat killing in soma orpasu sacrifices.

If killing leads to hell, these sacrifices are also lead him to hell and

consequently they be regarded as prohibitted. The answer is, killing

ofpasu in Soma ox ninidhapasubandha is the anga of that sacrifice.

Therefore killing does not have the fruit seperate from the soma or

pasu sacrifices. Which is Svarga. (^raf^ ^'^FWJ ^Tfcj^ ^ ^ ^Rcfji ^\^

 170

43dM<l^lcRT 11^^ So sacrifices come under abhicara are nisidha

according to Mimamsakas.

Obligatory actions are of two kinds; those which must be

performed daily -'nitya^- like daily prayers {sandhyavandana) and
which must be performed on specific occassions {naimittika).
Optional actions are called Kamyakarmas and their performance
lead to merit. For example he who wants to go heaven should
perform centain sacrifices ('Svargakamo yajeta"). Prohibitted actions
are called 'pratisidham' their performance incurs sin and leads to
hell. Then, there are expiatery acts {Prayascitta) which are
performed inorder to ward off or atleast mitigate the evil effect of
the performed prohibitted actions.

The earlier Mimamsaka believed only in 'Dharma' not in

'Moksa' and their ideal was the attainment of heaven (Svarga),
But later Mimamsakas believe in ^Moksa^ and substitute the ideal
of heaven by that of Uberation (apavarga). Prabhakara and Kumarila
both believe that the good of human life is liberation, though both
conceive it in a negative maimer like the Nyaya - Vaisesika. The
soul is chained to ^samsara^ on account of its association with the
 171
body, the senses, the mind and the understanding. Through this

association the soul becomes a knower, an enjoyer and an agent.

This association is due to karma which is the couse of the bondage.

When the cause is removed, the effect also ceases to exist. So the

obstention from karma automatically leads to the dissolution of the

bondage of the soul with the body, senses, the mind.etc. and

consequently the return of the soul to its pure nature as a substance

rid of all qualities and modes including consciousness and bliss

also. It is a state of feedom from all sorts of pain, desire and

consciousness, though Kumarila adds that the soul is here

characterized by potential consciousness. Prabhakara and Kumarila

both admit that obstention from Karma does not mean obstention

from all karmas, but obsention from the optional (CRTRT) and the

prohibited (srfclte) kinds of karma, only which leads to demerit and

to hell. The seeker of the liberation has to rise above both merit and

demerit, above both heaven and hell. But even he should perform

the obligatory (nitya and Naimitika) actions enjoyed by the Veda.

Prabhakara believes in 'duty for duty sake'. These actions must be

performed in an absolutely detached manner without any

 172
consideration of reward simply becasuse they are the commands of
the Vedas. Kumarila believes in psychological hedonism and makes
the performance of these actions, a means to realise the ultimate
end, ie liberation by overcoming past sins and by avoiding future
sins which would otherwise surely result from their neglect.
Prabhakara believes in the utter supremacy of an action, though he
admites knowledge also as a means of liberation. Kumarila believes
in "Jnana-karma - samucchayavada ", or in a harmonious
combination of knowledge and action as a means to liberation.

In ''Mimamsadarsana\ a discussion occurs on the relative

importance of the diety, the material offered to the diety and the
actual action of offering. It is from the ritual action that apurva
originates, that causes the required result. So it is apurva that
stimulates ritual action.^"^ In the view of Mimamsakas the ritual
action assumed utmost importance while all the ideas regarding
the dieties came to be considered unimportant or of no use from the
point of view of the result that is to be obtained.

In the view of Mimamsakas, the importance of vedic deities

got diminished to such a level, that they were considered having

 173

only a verbal existence. They have the words or names as their

form (Sabdarupa). A passage of Taittiriya Aranyaka seems to imply

such an idea according to which all vedic deities live ina Brahmana

who is well-versed in Vedas.^^ In refuting the verbal form of Vedic

deities, Sankaracharya says that such a view cannot be accepted

because the word is different from its sense in all cases.^^ It is to be

noted that one of the Mimamsaka's objections to maintaining

physical bodies of the deities is that if they had physical bodies

they would not to be able to present in the sacrifices performed at

different places at the same time.^^ If they had verbal form they

would be able to be present at the time of invocation at different

places. Here, Mimamsakas seem to conceive the deities as abstract

concepts. The concept of point in geometry cannot be understood

without the term point or some other such term. If a point is denoted

by a letter P, it can be imagined anywhere in the space. In the same

way if the deities are conceived as abstract concepts they can be

made present anywhere at any time. Thus mimamsakas maintained

such a view regarding deities to keep the sacrificial tradition alive,

at a time when the vedic deities lost their popularity. Later, however.
 174

the sacrificer came to be viewed as a form of worship of the supreme

God. Say ana begins his commentary on Rgveda saying that it is the

supreme God who is worshipped with all the sacrifices.

Vedas and vedic rituals embodied in them are viewed

divergently from very ancient times. Mimamsakas held that Vedas

are eternal. According to them the relation between the word and

its sense is 'autpattikam\ ^UtpattP is interpreted to mean Bhava.

The relation between the word and sense was not establised, after

the word and sense originated.^^ The sense is the form of the object

denoted by the word. The sense of the word cow is the form of the
29
COW.

This can be explained thus : after seeing several cows the

generalised idea of cow comes to the mind. As soon as such an idea

develops the word 'Gau/?' also comes to the mind and hence their

relationship orginates with the idea and the word denoting it. The

cowness or the form of cow is an absract one, just like a three

dimensional geometric form. The form of cow is connected only

with the space and as such it can be said eternal. Hearing the word
 175
'cow', the idea of all the cows in general comes to the mind and

hence the sense of the word is the form. So, the word also should be

eternal in the sense, otherwise the connection between the word

and the sense would not be eternal. Therefore mimamsakas hold

that sabda revealed by sound is also etemal.^^

According to K.T. Pandurangi sacrifice is a socio-religious

institution in Vedic culture. It represents the world view envisaged

by Piirva Mimamsa.^' According to Purva Mimamsa; (i)The world

is neither created not will it be destroyed. It is ever present, (ii) the

language, particularly the Vedic language, has no beginning nor

end. (iii) For sacrificial activity also no begirmig can be traced in

historical terms. In the first hymn of Rgveda, Agni is described as

Rtvic and Hota. Prayers were offered to him by sages in the past

and will be offered by the sages in future.

"3tf?^ 1 ^ ^[f^fmr fur ^ ^ 1"^'

In Purusasukta it is stated that, "^7#T ^ 3FR^ ^ cTlf^ ^P#r

 176

The deities performed the sacrifices, these were the earUest

sacrifices. The Gita also informs us,

(( W T ^TfTT JTiTTT ^ ^ I

From this it is clear that sacrificial acitivity was ever present.

These were not ever present in an isolated way. Rather they made

an impact on one another.

In the context of Purva Mimamsa, dharma is primarily a

sacrificial activity. This is elevated on two grounds, (i) these are

enjoined by vedic injuction (2) these lead to trans-emperical results.

Jaimini says, sacrificial activities lead to welfare.^^ It leads to

the welfare of men and also the welfare of all others, including the

deities.

In Gita,

CRFR ^Nij-d: ^ M<Hc||LHl^ p^ explains the role of sacrifice in

the form of Yajmcakra.

 177

^i§M 'f^ q^sNt ^TfTT cbiJMtici"qcn- r ^^ (3-15)

Since the sacrifical activity leads to the welfare of all it has to

be carried on forever, generation after generation.

Isavasyopanisad advices to undertake the activities all along

the life.

Eligibility to perform Sacrifices

The eligibility for performing the sacrifice is briefly stated as,

3?FJf ^ m t fclSH ^rflrfp^ I

ie, a person who desires to obtain the result of the sacrifice,

who has the necessary resources, and the knowledge is eligible to

perform the sacrifice. Whether the person have defective senses

such as blind, deaf or dum are not eligible to perform sacrifices

because there are certain items in the sacrifices that have to be

performed utilizing these senses.

 178
Eligibility of Women
Aitisayana, an early Mimamsaka, argues that the expression

Svargakamah is in masculine gender. Therefore it seems the

intention is to convey that only men are eligible to perform

sacrifices.

Another argument deny the eligibility of women is the lack of

resources with them. The sacrifices requires various kinds of grain,

ghee etc. The woman does not own these. Infact she herself purchase

at the time of her marriage by offering to her father the cows, chariot

etc.

These arguments are not sufficient to deny eligibility of women

for sacrifice. At the time of marriage bride and groom enter into a

kind of partnership in respect of persuing all ideals of life. The

desire is common to both male and female, hence both are eligible.

If the sacrifice is performed seperately according the singular word

^yajeta\ certain other items which have to be alone by both will be

wrong. So if a sacrifice is performed, seperately the result will be

incompleted^
 179
Eligibility of Siidra
Jaiminiyasutras and Sahara bhasya strongly argued the right
of Sudras for performing the sacrifices, though it is ultimately not
granted, (i) Mere interest in obtaining the result of the sacrifice
will not entittle and to undertake it, and the knowledge of Veda is
not found in Sudras. (2) Studying Veda without Upanayana is a
wrong procedure. Such study and recetition of hymns at the sacrifice
without proper study will not obtain the result of the sacrifice.^^

The institution of sacrifice is a programme of achieving welfare

not only for the individual but for the whole society. It is for the
welfare of entire world consisting of all living beings and the nature
around. It is also a sacred programme. Therefore it has to be executed
with competent persons with necessary descriptive. The persons
are means for the programme. The programmes are not meant for
them. In view of this, if any individual or group of persons are
denied participation in the programme, the intention is to accomplish
but not to deny the opportunity to participate to that of person or
group of persons. The programme is more important than the
persons.'^
 180
The concept of perfection of socio-religious programmes and

procedure go on changing, suitable social changes also go on. It can

be understand their vahdity in the context in which they are practised

and preached. In due course the change take place. Whether one

like it or not.

Sacrificial Tradition in Kerala

Vedic tradition became poluar in South India with the advent

of Aryans. This had begin in the first centuary of Christian Era. By

the 6* and 7* century many institutions were established to impart

Vedic education. Centres of learning called ^salas^ were started

connected with temples. The ^salas^ were institutions where the

Brahmin youth were taught a variety of subjects including the

Vedas. In course of time the teaching of Veda got localized in the

Brahmaswam Madhams at Trissur and Tirunavaya.

According to legend, Mezhathol Agnihotri is believed to have

conducted exactly nintynine yagas, but the jelous of Indra prevented

himfromdoing the 100* one becasue,tiienhe would have displaced

 181

Indra. It is also believed that expensive ja^as like ''Asvamedham'

had been performed in Kerala,'^^ Friz Stall provided a list of about

80 Nambuthiri families who had conducted such yagas during the

last century. Of the various types of such affairs, Agnistomam,

Agnyadhanam, Athiratram, were most frequently done in Kerala.

The word ^yaga^ among the Namboothiri usually cannotes the

'Agnistomam\ The person who had conducted it was known as

'SomayajT, colloquially named 'Chomathin\ 'Chemathiri\

'Chemaii^ etc. The seond was known as Adhanam and the one who

had conducted it was known as ^Atithid^ / ^atin\ The third was

known as ' Agni' and the one who conducted it was ''AgnihotrP /

^Akkithm\ As a mark of respect the suffix ^padu^ would be added

to their titles.

Significantly it was laid down that such performances should

be done only between the Korapuzha in the North and the Periyar

in the South within Kerala. It is reported that the then Travancore

Raja, inorder to aquire the merit of having been Raksapurusa

(patron) of the ^yaga^ had to have it conducted in Aluva, on the

 182

Northern banks of Periyar, when the area became part of his

territories. He induced the Nambutiries to also by gifting to them

extensive landed properties.

The elaborate ritual performances of the Vedic period and the

supreme importance attached to them in Vedic civilization demand

an explanation or at least an interpretaion. In the earliest Vedic

literature itself rituals along with meters and chants are depicted as

instrumets used by gods and demons to fight and conqure each other,

and sametimes to create even when the aims are not explicit Gods

and demons arefrequentlydescribed as engaged in rituals.

The recitations that accompany the rites often express specific

desires: for health, strength, sons, victory, heaven and immortality.

The list of wishes and desires is not so different from that of modem

man. It is not exclusively spiritual.

The Srautasutras of the late Vedic period offer several

definitions of rituals. The one that is often quoted, characterizes it

as comprising three things : 'Dravya^ - the sustance (used in

oblations); ^Devata^ - the deity (to which oblations are offered and
 183
^Tyaga^- renunciation (of the fruits of the ritual acts). The ''Tyaga'
is a formula pronounced by the ^yajamana^ or patron at the
culmination of each act of oblation. When the priest make oblations
into the fire for one of the gods, eg: -Agni theyajamana says. "This
is for Agni, not for me" ('^STR^ f^ ^ TH'). The reason for performing
a specific ritual is stated to be the disire for particular fruit or
effect."*^ But this effect renounced whenever yajamana utters his
^tyaga^ formula of renunciation. So the effect is not obtained. But
the mimamsa concluded, quite logically that the effect of ritual
activity is temporarily unseen. It will became apparent only later.
for example after death.

There are three kinds of sacrifices, (i) ^Paka Yajnas^ (ii) ^Havir
Yajnas^ (iii)'Somayaga^\ Paka yajnas are Grhya rites. Other two
are Srauta rites.

Seven Havir Yajnas : - agnyadheya, Agnihotra, Darsapuma masau,

Agrayana, Caturmasyani, Daksayana yajna, Kunda -
payinamayanam. According to Baudhayana sutra"^^ seven Yajnas :-
Agnistoma, Atyagnistoma, Ukthya, Sodasi, Vajapeya, Aptaiyama
and Athiratra.
 184

In Soma sacrifice, ^soma^ is pressed and its juise is offered to

the deities, during only one day of the sacrifice. Hence, these soma

sacrifices are caled 'Ekahas^ ie, having the duration of one day.

Agnihotram : The sacrifice performed in fire (agni). Here the three

Agnis, Garhapatyan, Ahavaniya and Anvaharya (Daksinagni) are

keeps firing and perform the Ahuti with milk or curd with chanting

of mantras. There must not have any discontinuation in the

performance, if so from the production of the fire, the sacrifice

have to restart. This yaga is performed for the reception of favours

and refusion of dislikes. The one who performed Agnihotra is

known as ^Agnihotri\ There are eight families of agnihotris -

Poylam, Pukkizhi, Porandaykkadu, Tottupuram, Amayattur, Bhatti,

Cherumukku, Narayana mangalam. The most famous Agnihotri is

Mezhathol Agnihotri.

Somayagam :- The offering is somarasa. The aim is eternity

Camrtatvam^). Generally this known as Jyotistomam. One who

prepare the Agni for yaga known as ^Atittiri^, one who performed

Somayaga is known as ^somayaji\ One who performed Athiratra

 185
is known as 'Akkithiri^ - they have to perform Agnihotra daily till

their death.

In 1984, there performed a Somayaga at Thiruvananthapuram.

Then the yajamana is Amettur Paramesvaran Somayaji. With the

past 50 years seven persons perform adhana and became atithiri.

Kaimukku Raman Atithiri was one among them. Among the eleven

somayajis Kavapramarathu Sankaranarayanan Somayaji and

Cherumukku Cheriyavallabhan Somayaji are famous. Daily

performer is Sankaranarayanan Namboothirippadu.

It take one day for adhanam\ for somayaga, six days and for

Athiratra twelve days.

Kerala has a living sacrificial tradition. The ritualists are highly

respected in the society. In Kerala, at present, four Akkittars

(Agnicits) are there.

Nellikkattil Nilakanthan Akkithar: bom in 1905. He performed

Agnistoma in 1941 and Atiratra v/iihAgnicayana in 1956. He started

his sacrificial performance at the age of seventeeth or eighteenth.

 186

He was well versed in Saman Chanting. He has participated four

Atiratras and twenty Agnistomas. He performed daily Agnihotra

till 1972.

Cerumukku Vasudevan Akkittar : At the age of fourteen he

completed his vedic study and started studying the ritual procedures.

His father Sri Vallabhan Somayaji also was a great sacrificer. At

the age of twenty nine he acted as Adhvaryu in an Agnistoma. He

performed Agnistoma in 1954 and Atiratra with Agnicayana in

1955. He participated in Atiratra at Nellikkatt family in 1956. He

did Hautra in an Agnistoma till 1976.

Puttillat Ravi Akkittar : He is well-versed in/a^a and/^atoa. He

was awarded by Olappamanna award for Veda pandita. He has

done Adhvaryava and Hautra in several sacrifices. He performed

daily Agniliotra.

Taikkatt Nilakanthan Namboothiri : He was bom in 1927.

•• • •

After completion of his Rgvedic study he studied different types of

rituals and manuals of the rituals. He did Adhvaryava in 1955. He

participated in iowriQQn Agnistomas as Vaidika.

 187

C.P. Kuberan Namboothiri: He was bom in a family of vedic

scholars near Talipparamba in Kannur district. He studied Yajurveda

recitation, Sanskrit and Sastra like Tarka and Vyakarana. He

performed many Ottuttus in Malabar.

The Mimamsakas have attempted to answer the question how

a remote result, the attainment of heaven, is obtained by an action

such as a sacrifice, which belongs to and ceases in the present.

Sacrifice is the means to the result, heaven. A sacrifice is of the

nature of an action which is very soon lost. Hence the instrumentality

of the sacrifice to the fruit which is to take place at a distant time is

hardly possible. To establish this instrumentality, which is

propounded by Sruthi, between sacrifice and heaven, an invisible

potency is admitted. This issuesfi^omthe sacrifice and endures till

the fruit is generated and resides in the soul of the character. This

invisible potency is celled Apurva. It ceases on producing the result.

It is a power in the sacrifice. Although a nature of potency inhering

in the sacrifice, it is presumable on account of the result. And is

presumed as existing in the locus of where the result is produced,

ie, in the soul of the sacrificer. If this is not admitted, the sacrifice
 188

can have no causal connection with their result. In the absense of

such a link, men of prudence would have no disposition to perform

them. In such a situation Vedas, as a whole would have no use or

purpose. And they would be open to objections of fraudulance etc.

To avoid such objections Apurva must needs to be admitted.

Linguistic Aspects
Purva Mimamsa is called ' Vakyasastra^ because, it evolves

the rules of interpretation or nayas for interpretation of Vedic

passages.

The word in Sanskrit that comes closet to this general sense is

'Mimamsa' which literally means 'investigation' or 'inquiry.' The

word 'exegesis' is also be taken as a near equivalent. The

Mimamsakas were a school of exegets who were concerned with

the correct determination of the meaning of the Vedic texts and

with the settlement of problematic passages in them. Their method

included not only the fixing of the meaning of particular words,

verbs, names of sacrifices, and so forth but primarily also the larger

task of determining the import of sentences in the light of the overall

 189
purpose or intent of the Vedic texts. Mimamsa is known as the

science of sentences (vakyasastra), as opposed to grammar, which

is the science of words (Padasastra).

The Mimamsa principles of interpretation were derived from

a long tradition of vedic exegesis and were codified for the first

time by Jaimini (Ca.200 BC) in his book of aphorism called

^Mimamsasutras.' This exegetical tradition produced what may be

called a science of interpretation with a body of rules that could be

applied to any linguistic text scriptural or non-scriptural.

According to Jaimini the three major axioms of interpretations

were (1) the autonomy of verbal meaning (ii) its impersonality (iii)

unity of meaning. The first axiom relates to the inherent capacity

of the verbal sign to convey meaning and it is independent of any

external authority or of coroboration by another source of

knowledge. The second relates to the impersonal character of verbal

knowledge and its independence of any passional author who could

give words their significative capacity, or intend their meanings.

 190

The third relates to the univocity of all verbal upset and human

discourse itself would be undermined.

While the principle of unity of meaning was accepted by all

schools, opinion was sharply devided, especially between

Mimamsakas and the logicians, on the question of semantic

autonomy and impersonality and the problem of intention that they

involve.

Vedic exegetes who developed the science of interpretation

were no doubt, dogmatists who believed in the absolute authority

and infallibility of Vedic word. But their observations about the

nature of language and the procedures they set up for the

interpretation of verbal texts were seen to possess a general validity

for all types of discourse. Although they claimed a special status of

infallibility for the words of the scriptures, they admitted that the

validity ascribed to the Vedic word was in no way different from

that demanded of ordinary discourse. The language of the Vedas

was the same as that of common parlance and subject to the same

convention and canons of logic as the other; otherwise, it would

 191
not even comprehend the Vedas. Jaimini declares, "but there is no

difference in the signification of vedic sentences." Not only is the

verbal usage in the Veda the same as the ordinary usage, but the

things spoken of in it are also the same as those of worldly

discourse. Sahara states that vedic usage must derive its sanction

from worldly usage; worldly usage is the only authority as far as

words and meanings are concerned.'*^

It is comparatively less popular system in the scholastic world,

mostly of its connection with the Vedic rituals, which are more or

less obsolate today. But one feeds that today the system of Mimamsa

should be focused at from a different angle and should be studied in

a fresh modem percepective. The reason behind this is : that

Mimamsa has connection with Vedic rituals is a half-truth. To make

it complete one must remember that this connection is not direct

but is only through the Vedic sentences. In other words, Mimamsa

concemes itself to the vedic sentences primarily. Though the aim

of interpreting vedic sentences was to help the performance of the

rituals at one point of time, today, when the importance of rituals

has been faded down one should concentrate on thefirstand foremost

 192
concern of Mimamsa namely interpreting vedic sentences

meaningfully, and should study the principles of interpretation set

forth by the system. Only because these possess a great potential to

interact meaningfully with modem desciplines like discources

analyse philosophy of language etc. hi short, if one study Mimamsa

today as ancient Indian science of sentence interpetation, its

contribution as such and if one try to findout what Mimamsa has to

offer to the modem linguistics, semantics etc. On one hand and to

the fold of machine translation etc. and on the other it will certainly

yeild interesting results.

The term 'Mimamsa' has occured in the Taittiriya Samhita,

Chandogyopanisad etc. and in all these places it means : "coming

to a certain decision after thinking about all the pros and cons about

something doubtful." Thus 'Mimamsa system set a goal before it.

To show that each and every sentence, each and every word ie.,

each and every syllable of the Veda is meaningful and purposeful

by interpeting the Vedas. ie., each and every vedic sentence,

meaningfully. This is the reason why Mimamsa is basically a

science of sentence interpretation and bears the names like,

 193
Vakyasastra, quite significantly. In short the object of Mimamsa

is vedic sentences and the main aim of the system is to systematize

all the vedic sentences in a proper manner and to establish the

validity of the Vedas beyond all possible doubts.

Both these tasks are stupendous which Jaimini, the sutrakara

accepted and he made out some principles of interpreting vedic

sentences and wrote them down in a ^sutra^ form. He devided the

vedic sentences into five types : Vidhi, Mantra, Namadheya,

Nisedha and Arthavada on one hand and set forth the main

presupposition of Mimamsa that the Veda is meant for including

the man into some action or the other. Action or activity is main

and everything else comes in the context of an activity only as

subordinate to it. These two and all principles of sentence

interpretation aim at systematizing the vedic sentences and

interpreting them.

To establish the authority if the Veda beyond all possible doubt

Mimamsa determined and declared its theory of language. It

discussed its philosophy of language in various contexts.

 194
If one wants to put the Mimamsa theory of language in just

one sentence, he may say, language is a beginningless phenomenon.

Words, their meanings, the relation between the two all are eternal.

Jaimini wrote an aphorism : "oil cM 1x1*^ §TQ?FTT^ ^T^^^^ ?TFT

While commenting upon this, the commentator Sabarasvamin

specified, "<3T^ft^^ §T^FT 3 T ^ ^TI^^^" The relation between word

and meaning is not created by any human being.

For example : "^iR^^l^* ^gpRT W^JcblH:" means - one who is

desirous of heaven should perform agnihotra ritual, hi otherwords,

this sentence states the cause and effect relationship between

agnihotra and heaven. It says that agnihotra is the cause and heaven

is its effect.

According to Mimamsakas these sentences are beginningless.

Budhists are aruged such sentences that there is no relation between

the word and meaning. According to them, there could not be the

relation of indentity then when one utters the word 'knife,' his

mouth should be cut and when he utters the word ^modaka^ his
 195

mouth should be full of the sweets. But this does not happen and so

there is no identity between them. Other relationship such as cause

and effect relationship or substraction - superstratum relationship

are quite impossible because word is in the mouth and the meaning

is elsewhere.

Mimamsa answers this question as; the relationship which

subsists between two namely, and named relationship or revealer

and revealed relationship is not mentioned but the relationship

between the two according to Mimamsakas is ^ bodhya-bodhaka-

bhava.^ The word is ^bodhaka^ and the meaning is 'bodhya.'* On

explaining the revealer - revealed relation Mimamsaka says, in every

case experience is proof. They say Sabda is revealer of meaning

because one experience that when a word is uttered a meaning is

revealved. One understand that the word does not reveal its meaning

when it is heard for the first time only because he observe that it so

happens. As many times one requires to know that this is the name

of the particular thing or meaning he understand that after so many

times one understands that meaning from that word only through

such an observation.
 196
To clear it more, the eyes are seers but unless there is sufficient

light they cannot see. Because of this fact it cannot conclude that

eyes do not see. Eyes require the help of other factors. These are

technically called ^sahakarlkaranas.^ In the same manner, a word

is revealer of its meaning only when and if the relationship between

the two is known.

According to Mimamsakas, the relation between the word and

meaning is natural, inartificial and made by someone. It gives strong

logical basis to say this which is really difficult to refute. This

theory has also been upheld by some of the modem linguists.

By accepting such a theory on one hand, the system has

established the validity and authority of the Vedas beyond all

possible doubt and on the other has done away with the necessity of

postulating God as the speaker of the Vedas. This also contributed

to logical simplicity on one hand and saved the task of answering

many difficult questions which arise if God is accepted on the other.

The Theory of language aquisition accepted to be beginningless

and named as (^wfor^RT) Vrdhavyavaharah is nothing else but todays
 197

'direct method of language - aquisition;' which is considered to be

the best one by sincere language teachers.

Thus, Mimamsa, theory of language aims at establishing the

entity of language phenomenon, word, meaning, the relation bewteen

the word and its meaning and vedic sentences.

In Mimamsa darsana there is one' Vyakaranadhikamna,^ where

discussed issues of grammar. The relation between the word and

its meaning is not created by anyone, it is eternal. This can be

proved on the basis of the process of language aquisition by a child.

The ' Vfddhavyavahara^ from which a child leams its language

points to the beginningless of words and their relation with their

meanings.

All words are ^anadP because it is our experience that even

from the words such as gavi we do understand the animal having

dewlap etc. This is our regular experience and from this it can be

said that the same was the case before one hundred years and even

before so this tradition is beginningless. It has already been stated'*^

that there was no maker of relation between word and meaning.

 198

Therefore, all words are standard ones and are may use all words

while speaking. All words make understanding the meaning. For

example hastah, karah, panihi etc.

The main point to be noted is that words are uttered to convey

some meaning and their result is not something invisible like merit

etc. Another point is that there is no sastra, which can regulate the

usage of words and therefore one should never say that one word is

standard and others are its 'apabhramsa^ forms, one word is ^sadhu^

and others are ^asadhu.^

Kumarila Bhatta has raised various fundamental, thought

provoking and interesting points. These help to understand the

function of grammar on one hand and the limitations of the same

on the other. Vedas does not depends upon grammar neither it have

any expectancy towards it.

" 47
cRf^^f^^ll
 199
Sabarasvamin explains the Jaiminiyasutra "§l6^ R^r^rf^psT^

3FRTSTFT ^IRMH I'"*^ as a human being utters words with efforts. He

has given the process how an utterance of a word takes place. The

air comesfromthe navel region, it expands in the chest, then makes

in the throat. Then strikes the cerebrum and reflects and then moving

in mouth manifests various words. In all this process there is every

likelihood that the speaker, or the utterer may commit a mistake.

All sorts of mistakes are possible on the part of a human being.

And so it cannot accept all words are alike.

The Jaiminiyasutra "^F^FT^rn^^KrciH'"^^ also explained there.

It is not proper to accept that to express one and the same meaning,

there are many similar words and all are beginningless. One

understand the meaning from all words because he have knowledge

of the standard word and because there is a similarity of other

words with the standard one, he understand the meaning even from

other words. So one among these words is ^anadi^ or begiimingless

and all others are its apabhramsa forms. There are exceptions like

hasta, kara, pani etc.

 200

To know the words which are beginningless or not, ^^^r^ cTc#

^il1J|[c|?NM ^=m?T "^° It is only from the abhiyuktas that it came to

know the distinction between words, whatever they say is a standard

word, is a beginningless and are whatever they say is not, is not.

According to Vyakaranadhikarana : The function of grammar

is to aquiant a person with the ocean of vocabulary of language

with a pot-ful of rules. The study of these rules gives the capacity

to the student to understand the formation of any word of the

language. It also means without studying grammar one can learn

and master the language in general but the knowledge of grammar

gives the ability to the person to discriminate between

grammatically wellformed words and otherwise.

As a system of interpretation of rules Mimamsa is somewhere

similar to that of smritis and later literature.

The Gautamadharmasutra 1-5 says -

Jaimini says in 'Purvamimamsasutra* Xn-3-10.

 201

The Apasthambhadharmasutra 1-1-4-8- says - ^^'f^. <s|^i|^

oi^iHHKNKid r^^ Jaimini also says the same in 1.3.3: "fcR^ c^R^?t

FTRnfcr ^^HHM l" Which is independent, is more authoritative than

a smrthi text when there is conflict. Apasthambhadharmasutra I-

4.12.1- says-

" ^ g jftrgq^rf^IcTT jT^frn" ^ cT? ^II^HRTI r Jaiminiya siitraIV. 1.2.

resembles this - " q f ^ sftfrrr ^i^NHI CTFT f^RTT^feRFTT fcTHTbc^ld l"^"*

Sahara s view of language :- Sabda and its characteristics :-

The investigation into drsta and adrsta as they are presented

by Sahara, seems to rule out any possibility of any existence which

is beyond the reality which he speeks of. Reality itself is within the

reach of language which cannot be apart from this reality itself.

This is the case because for Sahara the two dimensions of reality as

^drsta' and ^adrsta^ entail and encompass everything. The validity

of his thesis on Dharma is entirely based on the Veda, when he

supports the sutra: Dharma is the object that is indicated by the

vedic injunctions.^^
 202
According to Sabarabhasya one actually knows Dhanjia

bacause there is instructions {upadesas), instructions stands for the

specking of a particular set of words.^^ One also knows acts which

are not known by sense perception and other means of knowledge,

as for example, anumana (inference) upamana (comparision),

arthapatti (perception) and abhava (negation), non existence

(absence).^^ but only through instructions, ie it ultimately implies

vedic injuctions. Hence one could say that the understanding of

reality and especially the knowledge of dhaima and whatever is not

visible ultimately falls within the function of language.

Mimamsa is also known as Vakyasastra. It was this school

that started a detailed study of sentences and developed elaborate

canons of interpretation. This was mainly based on individual words

and the word meanings and consequently the relation between the

word meanings and sentence meanings, remained the central

problem of this school. The Mimamsa school at first express the

factors of akanksa (mutual expectancy) yogyata (Consistancy) and

samnidhi (contiguity) among the word meaning in a sentece as

constituting the basic for unity of the sentence.

 203
According to Mimamsakas, the primary meaning of a word is

the universal (akrti) which is the essential quality common to the

particular instances of the class. Both Jaimini and Sabarasvami used

the word 'afcritf' to refer to the universal, but Kumarila Bhatta

makes it clear that the term is used in the sense of Jati or universal.^^

The Great grammarian Patnjali used the term ^AkitP in this sense.

But later writers in the field of Mimamsa use the term Jati itself.

According to Mimamsakas the relation between a word and

its meaning is 'autpattika^ or permanent, which means a word is a

word; only when it has a meaning. The unit of language is taken as

varna or phonemes, these phonemes are permanent and a collection

of phonemes in a particular order of sequence is a word. The primary

meaning of a word is something permanent and cannot be the

particular instances of the class. In a sentence, it is the particular

(vyakti) that enters into syntactic relationship.

Purva mimamsa Technique of programme organisation

Purva Mimamsa has evolved a systematic method of

programme organisation. Though it is developed for the organisation
 204

of sacrificial programme, it can be applied to any other programme

organisation. The rules for this are a kind of metarules designated

in Sanskrit as 'panbhasa.^ Purvamimamsa has also developed a

method of debate on philosophical issues and on programme

organisation models.

In Indian Philosophy two methods of philosophical debate are

develped.

Pancavayava - Five stepped argumentation method developed

by Nyaya school. It arranges the arguments in five steps.

(a) Pratijna - the statement of the preposition (b) Hetu -

the reason (c) Udaharana - example, (d) Upanaya - the application

of reason to the present case, (e) Nigamana - the conclusion.

Piirva Mimamsa follows the ^Adhikarana^ method. It also

arranged in five steps, (1) Visaya - the subject under discussion. (2)

Samsaya - doubts / the two sides of the discussion. (3) Purvapaksa

- the prima - facie position of the issue. (4) Sidhanta - the final

position (5) Prayojana - the purpose served by the sidhanta. Within

 205
purvapaksa and sidhanta there will be aksepa - some tentative

objections and samadhana - a clearing of tentative objections.

In connection with the organisation of a sacrifice, three

questions are raised. ^Kim bhavayefl what is to be achieved, ^Kena

bhavayet^l by what means it is to be achieved and ^Katham

bhavayet^l What are the other aids or auxilaries to it. In the cases

^Darsapurnamasa,'' there, answers are; Svarga is to be achieved by

means of ^darsapumamasa yaga^ with the performance of the

auxiliaries prayaja. For any other programme these questions are

essential to organize it intelligently.

Mimamsa and Modern linguistics

The contribution of Purva Mimamsa to linguistics is equally

significant. Mimamsa primarily depends upon ^Sabdapramana^ and

therefore it goes deep into ^Sabdapramana.^ ^Apauruseyatva^

concept of Purva Mimamsa has made the language autonomous at

three important levels of the linguistic communications, viz, a).

The relation between the word and meaning, b) The formulation of

 206

the sentence (c) Detennination of the purport of the passage or

discourse.

Purva Mimamsa, also considers the relation between the word

and the meaning as natural and permanent. It is not caused by any
human agencies or artificial device. A meaningful expression is
always associated with its meaning. The relation between the two
is autonomous. A vedic sentence is not formulated by human agency.
The words in a sentence are intended to yeild a syntactically
organised meaning. The action is the centre of semantic
organisation. Such an organised communication is the very nature
and purpose of the words in a sentence. Therefore, no human agency
or any other artificial device is needed for the formulation of a
sentence. Thus at the level of the formulation of the sentence also
language is autonomous.

To ascertain the purport of a passage. Mimamsa has formulated

certain guidelines such as. ^upakrama,^ ^upasamhara^ etc. that are
internal to the language and has made the determination of purport
of passage autonomous. Thus the concept of apauruseyatva has far
reaching linguistic implications.
 207

The two theories of sentence meaning ^Abhihitavayavada^and

''Anvitabhidhanavada* are the most important contribution of Purva

Mimamsa to the linguistics. All other systems of Indian Philosophy

have adopted one of these two theories with some modifications.

The concept of bhavana and its being the centre of semantic

organisation is also an important point.

The primary purpose of Piirva Mimamsa is to interpret Vedic

statements that describe the sacrifices. For this, Mimamsa has

evolved certain rules of interpretation. These are Purva Mimamsa

Nyayas. These are used to determine the nature of sacrifices, its

auxilaries and the procedures. Purva Mimamsa rules of interpretation

is used by Vedantins to interpret srutis to develop their doctrines.

Abhihitanvayavada, Anvitabhidhanavada theories

of sentence meaning:-

A very important contribution of Piirva Mimamsa to linguistic

is the two theories of sentence meaning; ^abhihitanvayavada^ and

' an vitabhidhana vada.'

 208
In Abhihitanvayavada by Bhatta school, words convey their

meaning and these meanings duly associated constitute the sentence

meaning. For example when a person hears the sentence, "the clock

fell on the ground", there the person go on grasping the meaning of

the words 'clock', 'fell', 'down', 'on' 'ground' separately and then

semantically organises them into one unit of thought.

According to Anvitabhidhanavada by Prabhakara school, the

words do not merely convey the objects referred to by them but

also their association with the relevent objects conveyed by the

other words in the sentence. These connected word meaning

constitute the sentence meaning. So in the same sentence, 'the clock

fell on the ground' is grasped as a whole.

The word ^abhihita^ refers to the word meaning expressed.

The word ^anvita^ means the connected word meaning 'anavya,'

ie, the association of word meaning is necessary for constituting

the sentence meaning in both theories. However they differ on the

point whether the association is included in the scope of the meaning

of the word itself or it is developed by the word meaning by way of

 209

laksana ie, etended meaning. ^Abhihitanvaya^ theory is adopted by

Bhatta Mimamsa, Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta, while the

^Anvayabhidhana^ theory is adopted by Prabhakara mimamsa,

Visistadvaita vedanta and Dvaitavedanta. The arguments advanced

for and against these views give deeper insight into the Indian theory

of language.

The idea of these two theories summarised in Manameyodaya

by Narayana Bhatta as:

"Therefore, here the meaning of the words, which are

understood, from the words, after words, enter into mutual relation:
 210

in this way is shown the doctrine, according to those of my way of

thinking, of the relation of what are expressed. When all the other

words expresses its own meaning as related to the meaning of the

other words: this is the doctrine accordance to others, of the

expression of what are related."

Dharmasastra texts are also utilize the rules of interpretation

of Purva Mimamsa, to determine the exact nature of the religious

programmes. To resolve some conflicts in the statement in

connection with religious programmes, Piirva Mimamsa rules of

interpretation are used.

Max well's rules of interpretations closely resemble the Purva

Mimamsa rules of interpretation. In view of this, the study of Purva

Mimamsa is very relevent even today. Mimamsa and Dharma Sastra

have not been static. Rather these have been highly dynamic.

eg :- 1. The golden rule is that the words of statute must prima

faice be given their ordinary meanings - (Maxwell)

((_
'#% q^ 3T% ^^ ^ W^ dcJ^I'^cj" (Mimamsa)
 211

2. Exposition of one act in the language of another in the same

matter - (Maxwell).

- The criterian of Samkhya of Purva Mimamsa.

3. The usage may determine the meaning of language - Maxwell.

" # M ^if^ ^ # ^ " (Purva Mimamsa)

4. The title is no part of law - Max.

^Namadheya^ is not *"Karmavidhih^ (Piirva Mimamsa).

5. Construction has to be made of all parts together (Max)

"c||chM'»^ ^WT" (Piirva Mimamsa).

Kumarila's school of Mimamsa generally accept the

metaphoric usage of language everywhere. According to them literal

sense is followed by the purport or' tatparya' or' vakyartha,^ which

is different from ^vacyartha.^^ According to modem linguistics

also, language is the most metaphoric in nature. There are three

ways to convey ideas through the sign system, of which use of

language for conveying is the most complicated one. In it there is

no direct or indirect relation between sound and sense. The relation

between sound and sense is merely attributed and hence metaphoric.

 212

The conditions for a metaphorical transfer of meaning are discussed

mainly from a synchronix point of view.

The meaning of a word in a sentence is determined by the

context only. This modem view is some what similar of the idea

presented by Prabhakara and others in Indian through. Bhartrhari

in his ^ Vakyapadiya,^ list a number of causes that determine the

contextual elements, as:

Association, dissociation, mutual association, hostility or

opposition, purpose, context, or situation indicatory sing, proximity

with other word, capacity, propriety, place, time, gender and the

like are the determining factors in fixing up the meaning in a

particular context.

According to Purva mimamsa's method every arguement has

five parts : Presentation of subjects under discussion (Visaya),

 213

expression of the existing doubt (Samsaya), the prima facie view

of the opponent (Purvapaksa), the reply to it and the final view

(Sidhanta) and consistency in all related sentecnces (Samgati). This

method is followed by all other schools.

In India the Mimamsakas were interested in interpreting the

utterance to get the intended meaning or tatparya, objectively using

the rules of interpretation and considering the utterance in their

situational contexts. The Mimamsa rules are accepted in legal

interpretations, whether a rule of law is obligatory, semi-obligatory

or optional is to be decided through interpretation. The following

rules of interpretations are accepted by Hindu Law :

(1) When a sentence is complete and explicit in sense and grammar,

no attempt should be made to twist its meaning.

(2) When an expression has more than one meaning, and the normal
meaning does not agree with the context, its meaning is to be
determined by the context.

(3) When words or sentences are not explicitly or clearly

connected, they should be connected in accordance with
grammatical rules so as to form a meaningful sentence.
 214

(4) When a sentence or a clause by itself does not make any

complete sense it should be considered elUptical and necessary
words must be added to make a complete sense, suitable to
the context.

According to Mimamsaka, in language or communication,

sentences are uttered to suggest a possible course of actions. The
ultimate aim is to influence the mind of the listener to do some
action, not merely to convey an idea or a matter of fact. If sentences
are devided into propositional statements and imperative commands,
the latter type is obviously to influence the listner to do some action.
But according to Mimamsakas even the former type of declaratory
statements are ultimately intended to influence the mind of the
listener to do some action and are meaningful only if interpreted
that way. The Mimamsakas refuse to accept that there can be
communication and understanding even without any intention on
the part of the speaker to influence the practical behaviour of the
hearer and without any such actual influence.

Vedas are discussing the nature of 'dftanna.' Dharma is defined

as the process of activating.^^ Like dharma; ^sabda^ or sound is also
 215

of the nature of provocation. Language make some urge in us to do

as directed. There will be no communication and understanding
without an intention on the part of the speaker to influence the
practical behaviour of the hearer. Mimamsaka know this power of
language from the early times and they accepted ^sabda^ as the
only valid means in understanding dharma. The theory of bhavana
presented by Mimamsa with its two fold nature as ''sabdP and
'aithr is really noteworthy as it projects the power of language in
human activities in a psychic way.

According to Prabhakara school of Mimamsa any sentence is

of the nature of potentiality (Karyanvita). Thus a mere statement
like 'this is a good book', may be a potential sentence as it invokes
an urge in us to read or to own that book. Similarly all Vedic
sentences create an urge to do the sacrifices to attain the beneficiary
result of it. And this power resides in the sound itself as far as the
Vedic passages are concerned which are not related to any human
touch.

Mimamsakas admit the functioning {Vyapara) as the most

improtant factor in the meaning of a sentence. In a sentence like

 216
'Rama reads book' is interpreted by Mimamsakas as there is a
process of reading book, which is done by the agent, Rama.
According to grammarians, the functioning is centralized on the
agent (karta) and to the logicians, on the capability (krtf) of the
agent.^^

Prabhakara and his followers accepted only ^abhidha* as the

only power of language. For them, it is an extrensive one like the
functioning of an arrow.^ Accroding to them the acceptance of
Uaksana^ and Wyanjana^ are useless since they are generated
through the readers contemplation only which is noted as
^Santararthanistha'*^ or connected with some other meaning in the
way.

Mimamsa evolves the rules for interpretation of vedic passages.

Which are common and now a days generally used for any such
context. So the name ^ Vakyasastra^ is apt to Mimamsa school. It
contributed a lot to the studies of linguistics and especially to the
modem aspects of language studies. The relevence of the system of
Mimamsa in the field of language studies is yet to be accessed in
the fullest sense.
 217
References

1. Keith A.B. - Indian Logic -1.25.

2. MelputhQr Narayana Bhatta - Manameyodaya P. 161. Adayar
Library Series.
3. Indian Thought. Vol.IV. P.262.
4. "y4$1c|i?|t|aTT ^ W^ ^ci^^Ncbc^HI I
^ ^ ? R f ^ H ^ ^«^^lcbK iclf^H^cll I I

^ rr ^ ^ T ^ HT FTT^ ^ ^ ^ q^lf^l^ I I
cTFTTcT W^ ^ S f ^ ^>s^<mH MciKi|: |
FTTcT dc<i4cbdl ^TFJT ^Id-iJKHcJlRcld I I

- Slokavarttika - w^^^^^U^H: Verses 114-17.

5. Sloka vaittika - P.75.
6. Sarvasidhantasamgraha. VI. 206 and Slokavarttika,
atmavada. P.5-7.
7. Slokavarttika, Atmavada. P.75.
8. Prakaranapahcika, Tattvaloka. P. 156.
9. Slokavarttika 1.1.2, Verse. 72.
10. Sastradipika. P.125.31.
11. The MimamsasUtra of Jaimini. 1.1.1.
12. Ibid., LI.2.
13. Sabarabhasya .1.1.1.
14. "#^^TM?Fit5«it spf: r
 218

15. "iiiMiR ^ ^ r Artbasamgraha of Laugaksi Bhaskara.

16. Sabarahhasya on Jaiminiyasutra. 6.3.9.
17. Nyayaratnamala P. 146. Varanasi ed. 1982.
18. Taittiriya Samhita, 2.2.2.
19. Sabarahhasya on Jaiminiyasutra. 12.3.6.
20. Ibid.
21. Sabarahhasya on Jaiminiyasutra .12.3.17.
22. Ibid.
23. Jaiminiyanyayamalavistara on Jaimini sutra 1.1.2.
24. Sabarahhasya on Jaiminiyasutra.9.1.1. Edited by Ratna Gopal
Bhatta, Vidyavilas Press, Banaras 1910. P.87.
25. Taittiriya aranyak:a.2.15, p.246.
26. Brahmasutra with Sankarabhasya. 1.38-33. edited by J.L.
SastriM.L.B.D. 1980.P.273.
27. Ibid. 13.8. 22 & 24.
28. Mimamsadarsana.l.5,p.5.
29. fllHIIqlqi^l'^cblrl: Ibid.r.ll.

30. "Tft§T^ viT^clR^ ^cj^lRl^ ^rrq^ 5 R ^ McrfcT I <3TcT ^nffrf^TcRtS^ I ^

rll^rMI §F?FT ^ m n ^•R^ c ^ I f ^ g ^ T\\^J^ «s||^c^| viTxiRd

i»»

- Mimamsa darsana with Sabarahhasya 1.1.19, P.21-22.

31. K.T. Pandurang, The percepective and scope of
Piirvamimamsa, History of Science, Philosophy and Culture
in Indian civilization, Vol.II, Part 6 page.3.
 219
32. Rgveda. 1.1-1,1.1.2.
33. Rgveda. X.90.
34. Bhagavad Gita.m. 10.
35. "q4 ^ i ^ ^SFTT 3T?t: ^ "
36. Bhagavad Gita.3.11.
37. Ibid. 3-14.
38. Sabarabhasya.Yu.20.
39. Sabarabhasya VI. 1.7.
40. K.T. Pandurangi - The perceptive and scope of
Purvamimamsa, History of Science, Philosophy and Culture
in Indian Civilization. Gen. Editer D.P. Chadopadhyaya. Life
thought and Culture in Indian (600 BC - 330 AD). Vol.1.
Part.II. 2001 centre of studies on civilization.
41. A Handbook of Kerala edited by T. Madhava Menon.
International School of Dravidian Linguistics. TVM. June
2000, Vol.I. P.234.
42. "oifj^trilAH WJfcblHl ^ 7 ^ " - One who desires heaven shall
sacrifice with agnistoma ritual.
43. BudhayanaSutra.24.4.
44. "^ qcT ^ f ^ c ^ cT ^ ^f^cfTi" Sabarabhasya on
Jaiminiyasutra.l. 3.30. Translated by Jha. I.l 16-117.
45. "§T^T«f§^nf^ crilcbcid" - Jaiminiya siitra 10.3.44. Translated by
Jha. 1.144.
46. The commentary on Jaiminiyasutra.l. 1.5.
47. Kumarilabhatta - Tantravarttika.1.3.24.
48. Ibid.,L3.25.
 220
49. Ibid., 1.3.26.
50. Jaiminiyasutra.I.3.27.
51. Where there is a conflict, two texts of equal authority either
may be accepted (sLspramanas).
52. There is option between two or more subjects which have
the same utility or purpose.
53. Sruti - a vedic text is an authority more powerful than acara
(custom, the authoritativeness of which is inferential.
54. P.V. Kane - Purvamimamsa Systems.P.3. When an action is
due when are he as ready pleasure therefore, there is no inence
of Sastra.
55. Mimamsasutral.1.2., P.127.
56. Sabarabhasya.l.l.5., F.127.
57. Sabarabhasya.1.1.5. the quotation of the Vrittikara in this
context suggests that Sahara has endossed the view of
Vrttikara who referes to six Pramanas.
58. "^5n1r[^cnffcr MI|c4R^<l[pbilc) W - Slokavarttika - akila section
verse. 3.
59. Manameyodaya - P.91.
60. Kavyaprakasa - P. 133.
61. Vakyapadiya-V.n3.32.
62. "rilc{HM§Fit5# ^ " - Mimamsasiitra.1.1.2.
63. "<^U||cb^ul^(ot||dHI ^jcff^ ^lirbRc^rilrl flv^ ^rFT §lRbdi^c|d
"MmRi«iM*iTt)icii^" - P.360.
64. "f 9Ttf^ ^McRt ^ZTNRT cb|oMMcbl$TT" P.429-30.