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Summary
ACR-1000
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ACRONYMS
Acronym Full Text/Definition
ACR-1000 Advanced CANDU Reactor – 1000
AECL Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable
BOP Balance Of Plant
CAMLS CANDU Annunciation Message List System
CANDU CANada Deuterium Uranium
CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
DBE Design Basis Earthquake
DBT Design Basis Tornado
DCS Distributed Control System
ECC Emergency Core Cooling
EFW Emergency Feedwater
FM Fuelling Machine
HP High-Pressure (turbine)
HSI Human System Interface
HTS Heat Transport System
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
I&C Instrumentation and Control
LEU Low Enriched Uranium
LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LP Low-Pressure (turbine)
LTC Long-Term Cooling
MACSTOR Modular Air-Cooled Storage
MCA Main Control Area
MCR Main Control Room
MOX Mixed Oxide
MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve
MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve
NSP Nuclear Steam Plant
O&M Operation and Maintenance
PAM Post-accident Monitoring
PDS Plant Display System
PORV Power Operated Relief Valve
PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
R&D Research and Development
SAGD Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................1-1
1.1 Historical Basis.................................................................................................1-1
1.2 Features ............................................................................................................1-1
1.3 Safety Philosophy .............................................................................................1-2
2. NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.....................................................................................2-1
2.1 Reactor Assembly.............................................................................................2-2
2.1.1 Reactor Core Design ...................................................................................2-2
2.1.2 Fuel Channel Assembly...............................................................................2-3
2.1.3 Reactor Control...........................................................................................2-4
2.2 Fuel ..................................................................................................................2-4
2.3 Heat Transport and Auxiliary Systems ..............................................................2-5
2.3.1 Heat Transport Pumps.................................................................................2-5
2.3.2 Steam Generators ........................................................................................2-6
2.3.3 Feeder Header Assembly.............................................................................2-6
2.3.4 Pressure and Inventory Control System .......................................................2-6
2.4 Moderator System.............................................................................................2-7
2.5 Fuel Handling System.......................................................................................2-8
2.5.1 New Fuel Transfer and Storage ...................................................................2-8
2.5.2 Fuel Changing.............................................................................................2-8
2.5.3 Spent Fuel Transfer and Storage..................................................................2-8
4. PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE...................................................................4-1
4.1 Intrinsic Features Contributing to Proliferation Resistance ................................4-1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
4.2 Extrinsic Features Contributing to Proliferation Resistance ...............................4-1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
10.2 Reliability and Availability Objectives............................................................10-1
10.3 Operation and Maintenance.............................................................................10-2
10.4 Construction ...................................................................................................10-3
10.4.1 Basis for Construction Strategy .................................................................10-3
10.4.2 Prefabrication/Modularization...................................................................10-3
10.4.3 Parallel Construction.................................................................................10-4
10.4.4 Open-Top Construction.............................................................................10-5
10.5 Provision for Low Fuel Reload Costs..............................................................10-5
TABLES
Table 1-1 Representative CANDU Reactors .....................................................................1-4
FIGURES
Figure 2-1 ACR-1000 Nuclear Systems Schematic ............................................................2-1
Figure 2-2 Reactor Assembly.............................................................................................2-2
Figure 2-3 Fuel Channel Assembly ....................................................................................2-3
Figure 2-4 CANFLEX ACR Fuel Bundle...........................................................................2-4
Figure 2-5 Heat Transport System Layout ..........................................................................2-5
Figure 2-6 ACR-1000 Headers/Upper Feeders Modules.....................................................2-6
Figure 3-1 Shutdown System No. 1 – Shutoff Units ...........................................................3-5
Figure 6-1 Turbine Generator and Auxiliaries Flow Diagram.............................................6-3
Figure 7-1 Control Centre ..................................................................................................7-3
Figure 9-1 ACR-1000 Twin-Unit Power Block ..................................................................9-2
Figure 10-1 Typical Modules of the ACR-1000 Reactor Building ......................................10-4
APPENDICES
Appendix A Summarized Technical Data (HWR) ................................................................A-1
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Advanced CANDU Reactor-1000 (ACR-1000®1) design is Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited’s (AECL) evolutionary, Gen III+, 1200 MWe class pressure tube reactor. It meets the
industry and public expectations for safe, reliable, environmentally friendly, low-cost nuclear
power generation. It has been designed to be licensable internationally by ensuring its
compliance with Canadian nuclear regulations and the fundamental safety objectives of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standard.
The ACR-1000 is a light water cooled, heavy water moderated pressure tube reactor, using low
enriched uranium (LEU) fuel with on-power fuelling.
1.2 Features
The ACR-1000 design retains many essential features of the CANDU plant design, including
horizontal fuel channel core, a low temperature heavy-water moderator, a water filled reactor
vault, two independent safety shutdown systems, a highly automated control system, on-power
fuelling and a Reactor Building that is accessible for on-power maintenance and testing. It is
designed with a focus on operations and maintenance (O&M), drawing on AECL’s experience in
the design, construction and operation of existing CANDU plants for utilities around the world,
as well as on valuable customer input.
The following key differences from the traditional CANDU design are incorporated into the
design of the ACR-1000:
1
ACR-1000® (Advanced CANDU Reactor ®) is a registered trademark of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
(AECL).
2
CANDU® (CANada Deuterium Uranium®) is a registered trademark of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
(AECL).
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3
CANFLEX® is a registered trademark of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL).
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Table 1-1
Representative CANDU Reactors
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2. NUCLEAR SYSTEMS
The major nuclear systems of each ACR-1000 unit are located in the Reactor Building and the
Reactor Auxiliary Building. These nuclear systems include the following:
Reactor assembly, consisting of a calandria with 520 channels in a square lattice pitch.
LEU fuel contained in the CANFLEX-ACR fuel bundle.
Heavy water moderator system.
Heat transport system (HTS) with light water coolant in a two-loop, figure-of-eight configuration
with four steam generators, four heat transport pumps, four reactor outlet headers and four
reactor inlet headers.
Fuel handling system, which consists of two fuelling machines (FMs), each mounted on a FM
bridge and columns, located at both faces of the reactor.
Main steam supply system.
Safety systems, consisting of two shutdown systems, emergency core cooling (ECC) system,
emergency feedwater (EFW) system - defined as the emergency heat removal system, and
containment system plus associated safety support systems.
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An increase in the reliability and effectiveness of the ECC system due to the simplified interface
with the HTS since they both use light water.
A flat, radial flux profile enables the reactor to operate at a very high radial power form factor.
The axial power shape is also relatively flat. This shape results naturally from the characteristics
of the core, coupled with the bidirectional fuelling scheme, and acts to reduce the capital costs by
minimizing the size of the core relative to its power output.
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2.2 Fuel
The 43-element CANFLEX-ACR fuel bundle is used for the ACR-1000, shown in Figure 2-4.
The outer three rings of fuel elements contain enriched uranium pellets while the central fuel
element contains burnable neutron absorber in a stabilized zirconia matrix. A small amount of
burnable poison is incorporated into the LEU fuel elements for control of initial reactivity. A
thin layer of CANLUB (graphite coating) covers the inside surface of the fuel element sheaths to
enhance the fuel elements’ ability to withstand power ramp.
The fuel sheath, endcaps, endplates and appendages are made of Zircaloy-4 for its nuclear
characteristics of low neutron absorption, good corrosion resistance, and low hydrogen pickup.
The same fuel bundle design is used for all stages of the life of the core, from the initial start-up
core to the reference equilibrium core. The level of enrichment of the uranium dioxide in the
fuel pellets for the start-up core is lower than that for the reference fuel. With a much higher
operating margin for initial years of reactor operation, the amount of burnable neutron absorber
in the central element can be reduced to achieve an increase in the exit burnup.
Major features include the use of enriched uranium and neutron absorbers (dysprosium and
gadolinium) in a zirconium oxide matrix in the centre element, and uniform diameter of all
elements except the centre element.
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One of the many advantages of the ACR-1000 design is its unique capability to efficiently burn a
variety of fuel cycles including thorium and mixed oxide (MOX). This will enhance economics,
extend nuclear fuel resources and assure energy security well into the future, while reducing
waste and enhancing proliferation resistance.
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main seals fail, the back-up seal prevents significant leakage of coolant to containment during
depressurization of the HTS. The three mechanical seals and back-up seal are constructed as a
single seal package assembly in a removable cartridge for easy replacement.
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3. SAFETY CONCEPT
3.1.1 Defence-in-Depth
The concept of defence-in-depth is applied throughout the ACR-1000 plant design to provide a
series of levels of defence, including measures to prevent accidents and measures to provide
protection in the event that prevention fails. Consistent with the overall safety concept of
defence-in-depth, the design of the ACR-1000 plant aims to prevent, as far as practicable,
challenges to the integrity of physical barriers; failure of a barrier when challenged, and failure
of a barrier as a consequence of the failure of another barrier. This approach is structured in five
levels, as presented below:
Level 1 – Prevention of abnormal operation and of failures of SSCs by conservative design and
high quality in construction.
Level 2 – Detection and control of deviations from normal operation by controlling plant
behaviour with both inherent and engineered design features.
Level 3 – Control of accidents within the design basis by provision of inherent safety features,
fail safe design, engineered design features, and procedures.
Level 4 – Control of severe plant conditions to manage accidents and mitigate their
consequences, as far as practicable, by the robust containment design, complementary design
features, and severe accident management procedures.
Level 5 – Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant releases of radioactive materials
by emergency support centre and plans for on-site and off-site emergency response.
In particular, four plant states are defined to be consistent with the first four levels of defence:
normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents which include
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external events, and beyond design basis accidents. Probabilistic acceptance criteria are defined
for each plant state.
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The design also provides integration of human factors engineering principles, standards,
requirements, and processes throughout all system design stages.
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4
Defined as one set of essential diesels per unit or one set of common plant diesels.
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system is initiated when any two of the four SDS1 trip channels are tripped by any parameter
or combination of parameters.
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The emergency coolant injection system, which injects high-pressure coolant into the HTS
after a LOCA.
The long-term cooling (LTC) system provides long-term injection including coolant recovery
after a LOCA. The LTC system is also used for long-term cooling after reactor shutdown
following non-LOCA accidents, and during normal shutdown operation to allow for
routine maintenance activities.
Emergency Feedwater System
The emergency heat removal function is accomplished by the EFW system. This system is
designed to provide cooling water to the secondary side of the steam generators to enable
them to transfer the decay heat to the ultimate heat sink when a loss of normal feedwater
supply (main feedwater and start-up feedwater) is detected. The EFW system is designed to
meet regulatory requirements for an emergency heat removal system.
Containment System
The basic function of the containment system is to provide a continuous, pressure-retaining
envelope around the reactor core and HTS. Following an accident, the containment system
minimizes release of resultant radioactive materials to the external environment to below
regulatory limits.
The containment system includes the steel-lined, pre-stressed concrete Reactor Building
containment structure, main and auxiliary airlocks, containment cooling spray for pressure
suppression, and a containment isolation system consisting of valves in certain process lines
or dampers in the ventilation ducts penetrating the containment envelope. The containment
design ensures a low leakage rate while at the same time providing a pressure-retaining
boundary for all design basis accidents causing high pressure and/or temperature inside
containment.
The containment system automatically closes all penetrations open to the Reactor Building
atmosphere when an increase in containment pressure or radioactivity level is detected.
Instrumentation for measurements of containment pressure and radioactivity are
quadruplicated and the system is actuated using two-out-of-four logic.
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Essential cooling water system – Provides demineralized cooling water to systems important to
safety.
Essential service water system – Disposes of the heat from the essential cooling water system to
the ultimate heat sink.
Compressed air system – Provides service air, instrument air, and breathing air to different safety
systems and power production systems in the plant.
Chilled water system – Supplies water to air conditioning and miscellaneous equipment and
provides sufficient cooling capacity during normal operation.
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The severe core damage frequency is 9.5 x 10-8 and 8.7 x 10-8 per reactor year at-power internal
events and shutdown event respectively. Fire and flood events are not expected to be dominant
contributors. The results show that the ACR-1000 summed severe core damage frequency is
more than an order of magnitude less than the RD-337 requirement of 1 x 10-5 per reactor year.
Summed frequency for the sequences resulting in large releases from the plant is between 8 x10-8
and 8 x 10-9 per reactor year which is more than an order of magnitude less than the RD-337
requirement of 1 x 10-6 per reactor year.
The seismic margin assessment shows a plant high confidence of low probability of failure of at
least 0.5g indicating a robust design for seismic events.
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4. PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE
Provisions are made in the design of the ACR-1000 plant for the installation of safeguard
systems. The supply and installation of safeguard instrumentation is the responsibility of the
IAEA through its agreements with the utility. The provisions made for this equipment are based
on the installation of systems similar to the ones that have been previously accepted by the IAEA
on the CANDU 6 plants, with support for increased remote monitoring and real time accounting.
The anticipated instrumentation for safeguard purposes includes spent fuel bundle counters,
surveillance cameras, and other devices. The use of sealable, dry storage ready spent fuel
baskets allows for a considerable simplification of the application of safeguards.
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Dedicated and diverse transmission systems for two-way communication between the security
monitoring room and the response force are provided.
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The condensate system includes two 100% capacity, electrically driven condensate pumps and
an electrically driven auxiliary condensate pump with back-up power from the balance of plant
(BOP) standby diesel generators.
A turbine bypass system can discharge steam directly to the main condenser when the turbine or
the grid is unavailable in order to prevent a reactor poison out.
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7.2.1 General
The ACR-1000 plant uses highly automated control systems which have evolved from previous
CANDU designs. Building from this base, the ACR-1000 design benefits from the application
of modern distributed control, display, and network communication technologies. The key
benefits of the improved instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are:
Reduction in the number of I&C components, leading to improved reliability and reduced
maintenance and construction costs.
Increased automation to free the operations staff from tedious or stressful tasks, thus reducing the
frequency of operator error.
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Improved information and data communications systems that facilitate awareness of the unit
operational state, providing better detection and diagnosis of faults, and reducing plant
outages.
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9. PLANT LAYOUT
The plant layout developed for the ACR-1000 design is based on past experience of CANDU
sites with single, two, and four-unit arrangements. Based on the feedback from operating
CANDU plants and recent site evaluations, the optimum layout from design, capital cost,
construction and O&M considerations is an integrated two-unit ACR-1000 plant arrangement.
The major buildings and structures associated with the overall site arrangement are as follows:
Reactor Building (2). Essential service water pumphouse.
Reactor Auxiliary Building (2). Diesel generator buildings (a total of five
Turbine Building (2). buildings, of which four have safety
support functions).
Crane Hall (2).
Main switchyard.
Main Control Building.
Water treatment facility.
Service Building.
Auxiliary and ancillary structures.
Maintenance Building.
Plant service water & condenser cooling
water pumphouse.
The main structures of each unit define the basic power block of the unit, which consists of the
Reactor Building, the Reactor Auxiliary Building, the Crane Hall, and the Turbine Building.
The area between the two units is dedicated to common services and facilities to support the
operation of the plant. The individual units of the two-unit plant share control, maintenance,
administration, service areas and some common process systems. The buildings comprising the
shared area are the Maintenance Building, Main Control Building, and Service Building.
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to the DBE qualified secondary control area, which is located within each unit’s Reactor
Auxiliary Building remote from the Main Control Building, following an event that causes a loss
of operability or habitability of the MCR.
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qualified for DBE. Also, the basement is a concrete structure that houses heavy water storage
tanks. The building is tornado protected to the extent that it prevents damage to the storage
tanks.
The Maintenance Building houses facilities and shared services for maintenance and operation of
the two-unit plant. The crane hall acts as an internal traffic route and a buffer between the major
buildings (see Figure 9-1). The crane hall is seismically qualified to the extent that it does not
collapse, affecting SSCs important to safety.
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Plant is designed with a major outage lasting less than 365 days for every 30 years of plant
operation to facilitate retubing the reactor.
Plant is designed for an annual forced loss rate (i.e., unplanned shutdowns or load reductions) of
less than 1.5%.
Plant is designed with a low incapability factor (which is a measure of how much a plant is
unable to produce electricity due to plant deratings with ageing), unplanned shutdowns or
outage extensions, by implementing equipment performance and material condition
monitoring programs.
System design changes are incorporated to address lessons learned from operational experience.
The time to enter and exit the guaranteed shutdown state is minimized by utilizing dedicated
rods.
An enhanced maintenance program is used to maximize component life and minimize
component replacement time, thereby minimizing radiation exposure, replacement costs, and
the number of operating and maintenance personnel required.
Information technology and configuration management systems and processes are used to
support O&M.
Proven technology with basic CANDU design features is used, including:
On-power refuelling
Horizontal fuel channel design
Heavy-water-moderated reactor core
CANDU-type fuel bundle (CANFLEX-ACR fuel).
Traditional CANDU design features are enhanced to meet or exceed target reliability and
performance of the systems important to plant availability.
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10.4 Construction
10.4.2 Prefabrication/Modularization
Extensive prefabrication/modularization has been implemented to achieve the ACR-1000
schedule targets. The major reasons for using prefabrication/modularization techniques are to
shorten the schedule resulting from parallel construction activities at site and at the module
fabrication facility, and to move work away from the work face. In addition to reducing site
congestion, this will improve construction sequences, reduce construction costs, and reduce
project schedule. Other advantages of prefabrication/modularization that contribute indirectly to
meeting the construction schedule and cost targets are:
Reduced worksite population.
Improved access to work areas.
Completion of work away from the final construction work face.
Improved safety.
Improved quality.
Elimination of conventional shoring requirements.
Shorter durations of critical activities.
In order to achieve the short construction schedule, a significant portion of construction effort
will be shifted from site work to the assembly of modules away from the work face.
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fabricated in a shop or another location on site while the civil work is progressing towards
getting ready to receive them. Major blocks of work are separated into mini-projects so that they
can be constructed concurrently. Durations for traditional activities are not greatly changed, but
the sequencing is very different.
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and irradiated fuel performance are carried out mainly at AECL’s 3000-person Chalk River
Laboratories. Component and equipment verification tests are mainly carried out at AECL’s
engineering test facilities at Sheridan Park. AECL’s extensive test facilities and research
capabilities are complemented by limited focussed work at external organizations including
thermalhydraulics tests at Stern Laboratories and fuel development at GE-Hitachi Nuclear
Energy Canada Inc.
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13. REFERENCES
[1] IAEA NS-R-1, “Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design”, International Atomic Energy
Agency, 2000.
[2] CNSC RD-337, “Design of New Nuclear Power Plants”, Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission, November 2008.
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Appendix A
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Notes:
1. Assumes a maximum 1% blowdown.
2. In a CANDU reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary is the pressure tubes instead
of a reactor pressure vessel for LWRs/PWRs. The pressure tubes are contained within
calandria tubes which together form the fuel channels. The fuel channels are, in turn,
enclosed in a calandria vessel filled with moderator.
3. The transport weight is dependant on various criteria, including packaging requirements.
4. The long-term containment design temperature is 55oC.
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