An Assignment

On

Operation Searchlight

Course Title: History of the Emergence of Bangladesh

Course Code: 212

Submitted To:

Name: Sakiba Haque

Assistant Professor

Bangladesh Islamic University

Submitted By:

Name: Sanjida Islam Sohaly

ID: BBARF40191015
Dept: Business Administration
Bangladesh Islamic University
Introduction
The genocide committed in Bangladesh in 1971 is widely considered to be one of the worst genocides in recent
history. But this genocide, despite the indiscriminate killings of a huge number of innocent men, women and
children was also very much target oriented. Hence the fact that this military operation was code-named Operation
Search Light is self explanatory in the definition and the scope of the operation itself. But this is in no way to imply
that because it was a targeted killing, it was any less than genocide rather on the contrary it was the worst kind of
genocide for two very specific reasons. Firstly the targets were mostly civilians and secondly although Bengali
paramilitary forces (East Pakistan Rifles) and police were attacked right on the night of March 25 1971 when the
operation started, the attack was an undeclared war on the basis of ethnic identity. Therefore although the objectives
and operation were well defined and the target of killings and tortures of all degree and dimensions were preplanned,
this in no way reduces the responsibility of causing genocide in Bangladesh from March 25,1971 till December 16,
1971.It must be remembered that the broader target was the entire Bengali population in the erstwhile East Pakistan.
According to Asia Times, ' at a meeting of the military top brass Yahya Khan declared," Kill three millions of them ,
the rest will eat of our hands". Accordingly on the night of 25 March , the Pakistani Army launched Operation
Searchlight to crush Bengali resistance in which Bengali members of military services were disarmed and killed,
students and the intelligentsia systematically liquidated and able bodied Bengali males just picked up and gunned
down. According to various sources three million people were killed by the Pakistani Armed Forces and their
accomplices in Bangladesh. It was one of the largest genocides in the modern known history. I must admit that the
scope of discussion on this genocide is too wide to be encompassed in this discussion within this short time. I will,
therefore, specifically focus on two targets of Operation Searchlight namely the students and the women.

Background
After the Awami League had won a decisive majority (capturing 167 out of 313 seats) in the 1970 Pakistan
parliamentary elections, the Bengali population expected a swift transfer of power to the Awami League based on
the Six Point Programme. On 28 February 1971, Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan, under the pressure of PPP
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, postponed the national assembly meeting scheduled for March. The Pakistan Peoples
Party had already started lobbying to weaken the stand of Sheikh Mujib, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was heard saying
that he wanted the Bengalis to stay away. The Awami League, in response to the postponement, launched a program
of non-co-operation (largely outlined in the 7 March Awami League rally) which was so successful that the
authority of the Pakistan government became limited to the cantonments and government institutions in East
Pakistan. Clashes between civilians and the Pakistani Army, and between Bengali and Bihari communities erupted
and became commonplace. President Yahya Khan flew to Dhaka to hold talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader
of the Awami League, in March, and was later joined by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the leader of Pakistan Peoples
Party, which had secured the second largest share of seats (81 out of 300) in the elections. Unwilling to transfer
power to East Pakistan as demanded by Awami League (fearing a transfer of power would weaken or destroy the
federation), or to lose face by backing down in face of the non-co-operation movement, the Pakistani generals, most
of which including Gul Hassan Khan supported the Pakistan Peoples Party, finally decided on a military crackdown.
After the convening of the National Assembly was postponed by Yahya Khan on 1 March, ethnic Biharis in East
Pakistan, who supported West Pakistan, were targeted. In early March 1971 300 Biharis were killed in rioting by
mobs in Chittagong. The Government of Pakistan used the 'Bihari massacre' to justify its military intervention in
East Pakistan on 25 March, when it initiated Operation Searchlight.
Prior to the launch of the operation, a final meeting was held in General Headquarters (GHQ). Governor of East
Pakistan Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan objected to the planned operation. Air Officer Commanding (AOC)
of Dhaka airbase Air Commodore Mitty Masud also objected to the operation, fearing that violence would provoke
East-Pakistan into more violence. However, under pressure during the meeting from Pakistan's Army and Air
Force's general, General Yahya Khan gave orders to his Army and Air Force commanders to launch the
operation. Admiral Ahsan was relieved of his post. When the operation came into effect, Air-Commodore Mitty
Masud refused to use airstrikes and was relieved from his post on March 31.
Economic Exploitation

In 1947, Eastern Pakistan was economically stronger than its Western part but as latter’s discriminatory policy
continued in each and every sphere of economy, it lagged far behind the pace of development in united Pakistan.
During two and a half decades of being part of Pakistan, Bangladesh was exploited by West Pakistanis almost in the
same fashion, as had been by the British. The continued economic disparity finally brought forth the concept of two-
economy to the forefront. The two-economy thesis was propounded by some East Pakistani economists and rested
primarily on two points: first, because of its geographical peculiarity. Pakistan did, in fact, have two separate and
distinct economy; and second, the economic policy of the Government of Pakistan always worked against the
interest of East Pakistan and gave rise to the economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan.

Although East Pakistan had a larger population, West Pakistan dominated the divided country politically and
received more money from the common budget. According to the World Bank, there was much economic
discrimination against East Pakistan, including higher government spending on West Pakistan, financial transfers
from East to West and the use of the East's foreign exchange surpluses to finance the West's imports.
The discrimination occurred despite fact that East Pakistan generated a major share of Pakistan's exports.

Spending on West Spending on East

Amount spent on East
Year Pakistan (in millions Pakistan (in millions of
as percentage of West
of Pakistani rupees) Pakistani rupees)
1950–55 11,290 5,240 46.4
1955–60 16,550 5,240 31.7
1960–65 33,550 14,040 41.8
1965–70 51,950 21,410 41.2
Total 113,340 45,930 40.5
Source: Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970–75, Vol. I,
published by the planning commission of Pakistan.

The annual rate of growth of the gross domestic product per capita was 4.4% in the West Pakistan versus 2.6% in
East Pakistan from 1960 to 1965. Bengali politicians pushed for more autonomy, arguing that much of Pakistan's
export earnings were generated in East Pakistan from the exportation of Bengali jute and tea. As late as 1960,
approximately 70% of Pakistan's export earnings originated in East Pakistan, although this percentage declined as
international demand for jute dwindled. By the mid-1960s, East Pakistan was accounting for less than 60% of the
nation's export earnings, and by the time Bangladesh gained its independence in 1971, this percentage had dipped
below 50%. In 1966, Mujib demanded that separate foreign exchange accounts be kept and that separate trade
offices be opened overseas. By the mid-1960s, West Pakistan was benefiting from Ayub's "Decade of Progress"
with its successful Green Revolution in wheat and from the expansion of markets for West Pakistani textiles, while
East Pakistan's standard of living remained at an abysmally low level. Bengalis were also upset that West Pakistan,
the seat of the national government, received more foreign aid.
Economists in East Pakistan argued of a "Two Economies Theory" within Pakistan itself, which was founded on the
Two Nation Theory with India. The so-called Two Economies Theory suggested that East and West Pakistan had
different economic features which should not be regulated by a federal government in Islamabad.
Trade caused economic disparities between East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan exports were the main source of
foreign exchange and which was used for the imports of consumer goods and industrial machinery in West Pakistan.
During the period of 1947-1958, East Pakistan's exports ranged from fifty per cent to sixty per cent of the Pakistani
total exports, on the other hand imports into East Pakistan were around thirty per cent of the total imports. By the
closing years of the sixties, East Pakistan maintained a sufficient surplus in its balance of trade, while West Pakistan
maintained a huge deficit in its trade balance. So, a large part of the trade deficit in West Pakistan was, therefore,
consistently financed by East Pakistan
Consumer goods and machines for industry were imported into West Pakistan; the eastern wing was substantially
bearing the expenses. The measurement of the magnitude of this is complicated by the fact that Pakistan's currency
was consistently overvalued in this period. For example, according to the official figures, the annual average trade
surplus of the eastern wing in the 1950-5 period was Rs. 424 million. But as the Advisory panel for the Fourth Five
Year Plan pointed out, the domestic prices of both exportable and importable and hence foreign exchange earnings
or receipts are worth more in rupees than their equivalents valued at the official rate. Assuming, quite reasonably,
the extent of overvaluation to be 120 per cent, the trade surplus of East Pakistan in the 1950-5 period may be
estimated at Rs. 1141 million per year. It appears that the resource transfer via international trade (in real terms) was
nearly Rs. 1000 million per year during the fifties. However, it radically declined in the sixties. In fact, towards the
end of the sixties the eastern surplus had turned into a deficit in the first ten years. West Pakistan's economic
development therefore owes a great deal to the contribution made by the economy of the eastern wing.

Before 1947, jute was the main export of Bengal and after partition East Pakistan used to produce 73 per cent of the
jute of this region, but 75 per cent of the exportable raw jute was pressed into bales in India, and the province did not
possess a single jute mill. By the end of 1950, jute contributed 45 per cent of total export earnings of Pakistan. The
main consumer of jute was India, which was also the main supplier of essential goods to East Pakistan. Trade with
India was thus vital to East Pakistan. Unfortunately, the irreversible economic break with India came in September
1949, when Pakistan refused to devalue its currency. India, which had devalued its rupee, did not accept the per
value of Pakistan currency and trade between the countries came to an end. The immediate impact of non-
devaluation on the jute of East Pakistan was colossal and it remained a burning question between East Pakistan and
the Central Government. In September when devaluation plan was announced the market was disturbed and the jute
trade came practically to a standstill due to Government of Pakistan decision to maintain the value of her rupee at
the existing level. The aid flow from abroad was disproportionately allocated to the two wings, through various
agencies such as Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment
Corporation (PICIC), Industrial Development Bank (IDB), 77% of foreign resources were made available to West
Pakistan as against mere 23% to East Pakistan.16 Fiscal and commercial policies directed towards supporting private
sector and on the same token it was the main underline motive of the establishment of PIDC. Moreover, most of the
foreign aid flow to the centre was actually spent in West Pakistan, specially the U.S military aid worth $1.5 million
to 2 billion for the period from 1954 to 1965. Whether it was revenue or developmental expenditure, foreign
assistance, and loans or foreign exchange, East Pakistan did not get its fair share, though it contained the majority of
the country’s population.18 Various disparities in the distribution of international aid were the consequence of central
government policies which favored West Pakistan’s interests over East Pakistan. Most of the industries of the
eastern wing were owned by West Pakistanis who were the beneficiaries of financial support from the central
government. Traditional Bengali small-scale and cottage industries wasted away.
A study done by Gustaw Papanek (a president of Boston Institute of Developing Economics and a professor of
economic) in 1959 indicated that Bengalis owned only eleven per cent of the industrial assets of Pakistan. In fact,
the industry that developed in East Pakistan was also substantially owned by non-Bengalis… creation of Bangladesh
noted the number of 'deserted' factories; these studies estimated that fifty to seventy per cent of East Pakistan
industrial assets were foreign-owned, mainly by West Pakistani industrialists. Profits accruing from the industries
owned by West Pakistanis were therefore, another potential resource available to West Pakistan: the size of these
profits, estimated by us in another study, increased from a negligible sum of Rs. 37 million per year in 1950-5 to Rs.
322 million per year in 1965-70.

EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN: DISPARITY IN EXPENDITURE

Rs. In Crores Region Revenue Development Total %

Period expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
1950-51 to East Pakistan 171 100 271 20
1954-54
West Pakistan 720 400 1120 80
1954-55 to East Pakistan 254 270 524 26
1959-60
West Pakistan 898 757 1655 74
1960-61 to East Pakistan 434 270 1404 32
1964-65
West Pakistan 1284 2071 3355 68
1965-66 to East Pakistan 648 1655 2304 36
1969-70
West Pakistan 2223 2970 5193 64

The report shows that in the period before the First Five Year Plan, the Central Government’s non development
expenditure in East Pakistan were only Rs. 171 crores as compared to Rs. 720 crores in West Pakistan. For the
development expenditure, the comparable figures were Rs. 100 crores and 400 crores respectively. In the three plan
periods of 1954-55 to 1959-60, 1960-61 to 1964-65, and 1965-66 to 1969-70, the figures for the total expenditure in
East and West Pakistan were Rs. 524 and 1655 crores, Rs. 1404 and 3355 crores and Rs. 2304 and 5193 crores
respectively. Moreover, the regional disparity was far more endemic in revenue expenditure than in development
expenditure, indicating a thriving permanent establishment for development planning located in West Pakistan,
which benefited that wing at the cost of East Pakistan. Although East Pakistan annual growth rate was increased
from 17 per cent in 1954/55 to 1956/60 to 5.2 per cent for 1959/60 to 1964/5 it lagged considerably behind the
western wing which recorded figures of 3.2 per cent and 7.2 per cent respectively

Social Exploitation
In 1947 the Bengali Muslims had identified themselves with Pakistan's Islamic project but by the 1970s the people
of East Pakistan had given priority to their Bengali ethnicity over their religious identity, desiring a society in
accordance with Western principles such as secularism, democracy and socialism. Many Bengali Muslims strongly
objected to the Islamist paradigm imposed by the Pakistani state. Most members of West Pakistan's ruling elite also
belonged to a liberal society, yet understood a common faith as the mobilising factor behind Pakistan's creation and
the subsuming of Pakistan's multiple identities into one. West Pakistanis were substantially more supportive than
East Pakistanis of an Islamic state, a tendency which persisted after 1971.
Cultural and linguistic differences between the two wings outweighed any religious unity. The Bengalis took great
pride in their culture and language which, with its Bengali script and vocabulary, was unacceptable to the West
Pakistani elite, who believed that it possessed considerable Hindu cultural influences. West Pakistanis, in an attempt
to "Islamise" the East, wanted the Bengalis to adopt Urdu.[43] The events of the language movement brought about a
sentiment among Bengalis in favour of discarding Pakistan's communalism in favour of secular politics. [47] The
Awami League began propagating its secular message through its newspaper to the Bengali readership. [48]
The Awami League's emphasis on secularism differentiated it from the Muslim League. In 1971, the Bangladeshi
liberation struggle against Pakistan was led by secular leaders and secularists hailed the Bangladeshi victory as the
triumph of secular Bengali nationalism over religion-centred Pakistani nationalism.While Pakistan's government
strives for an Islamic state, Bangladesh was established secular. After the liberation victory, the Awami League
attempted to build a secular order and the pro-Pakistan Islamist parties were barred from political participation.
[53]
 The majority of East Pakistani ulama had either remained neutral or supported the Pakistani state, since they felt
that the break-up of Pakistan would be detrimental for Islam.

Political Exploitation
In 1955, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra implemented the One Unit scheme which merged the four western
provinces into a single unit called West Pakistan while East Bengal was renamed as East Pakistan.
Pakistan ended its dominion status and adopted a republican constitution in 1956, which proclaimed an Islamic
republic. The populist leader H. S. Suhrawardy of East Pakistan was appointed prime minister of Pakistan. As soon
as he became the prime minister, Suhrawardy initiated a legal work reviving the joint electorate system. There was a
strong opposition and resentment to the joint electorate system in West Pakistan. The Muslim League had taken the
cause to the public and began calling for implementation of separate electorate system. In contrast to West Pakistan,
the joint electorate was highly popular in East Pakistan. The tug of war with the Muslim League to establish the
appropriate electorate caused problems for his government.
The constitutionally obliged National Finance Commission Program (NFC Program) was immediately suspended by
Prime Minister Suhrawardy despite the reserves of the four provinces of the West Pakistan in 1956. Suhrawardy
advocated for the USSR-based Five-Year Plans to centralize the national economy. In this view, the East Pakistan's
economy was quickly centralized and all major economic planning shifted to West Pakistan.
Efforts leading to centralizing the economy was met with great resistance in West Pakistan when the elite
monopolist and the business community angrily refused to oblige to his policies. The business community in
Karachi began its political struggle to undermine any attempts of financial distribution of the US$10 million ICA aid
to the better part of the East Pakistan and to set up a consolidated national shipping corporation. In the financial
cities of West Pakistan, such as Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, and Peshawar, there were series of major labour strikes
against the economic policies of Suhrawardy supported by the elite business community and the private sector.
Furthermore, in order to divert attention from the controversial One Unit Program, Prime Minister Suhrawardy tried
to end the crises by calling a small group of investors to set up small business in the country. Despite many
initiatives and holding off the NFC Award Program, Suhrawardy's political position and image deteriorated in the
four provinces in West Pakistan. Many nationalist leaders and activists of the Muslim League were dismayed with
the suspension of the constitutionally obliged NFC Program. His critics and Muslim League leaders observed that
with the suspension of NFC Award Program, Suhrawardy tried to give more financial allocations, aids, grants, and
opportunity to East-Pakistan than West Pakistan, including West Pakistan's four provinces. During the last days of
his Prime ministerial years, Suhrawardy tried to remove the economic disparity between the Eastern and Western
wings of the country but to no avail. He also tried unsuccessfully to alleviate the food shortage in the country.
Suhrawardy strengthened relations with the United States by reinforcing Pakistani membership in the Central Treaty
Organization and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Suhrawardy also promoted relations with the People’s
Republic of China. His contribution in formulating the 1956 constitution of Pakistan was substantial as he played a
vital role in incorporating provisions for civil liberties and universal adult franchise in line with his adherence to
parliamentary form of liberal democracy.

Era of Ayub Khan

In 1958, President Iskandar Mirza enacted martial law as part of a military coup by the Pakistan Army's chief Ayub
Khan. Roughly after two weeks, President Mirza's relations with Pakistan Armed Forces deteriorated leading Army
Commander General Ayub Khan relieving the president from his presidency and forcefully exiling President Mirza
to the United Kingdom. General Ayub Khan justified his actions after appearing on national radio declaring that:
"the armed forces and the people demanded a clean break with the past...". Until 1962, the martial law continued
while Field Marshal Ayub Khan purged a number of politicians and civil servants from the government and replaced
them with military officers. Ayub called his regime a "revolution to clean up the mess of black marketing and
corruption". Khan replaced Mirza as president and became the country’s strongman for eleven years. Martial law
continued until 1962 when the government of Field Marshal Ayub Khan commissioned a constitutional bench under
Chief Justice of Pakistan Muhammad Shahabuddin, composed of ten senior justices, each five from East Pakistan
and five from West Pakistan. On 6 May 1961, the commission sent its draft to President Ayub Khan. He thoroughly
examined the draft while consulting with his cabinet.
In January 1962, the cabinet finally approved the text of the new constitution, promulgated by President Ayub Khan
on 1 March 1962, which came into effect on 8 June 1962. Under the 1962 constitution, Pakistan became
a presidential republic. Universal suffrage was abolished in favor of a system dubbed 'Basic Democracy'. Under the
system, an electoral college would be responsible for electing the president and national assembly. The 1962
constitution created a gubernatorial system in West and East Pakistan. Each provinces ran their own separate
provincial gubernatorial governments. The constitution defined a division of powers between the central government
and the provinces. Fatima Jinnah received strong support in East Pakistan during her failed bid to unseat Ayub Khan
in the 1965 presidential election.
Dacca was declared as the second capital of Pakistan in 1962. It was designated as the legislative capital and Louis
Kahn was tasked with designing a national assembly complex. Dacca's population increased in the 1960s. Seven
natural gas fields were tapped in the province. The petroleum industry developed as the Eastern Refinery was
established in the port city of Chittagong.
Six Points
In 1966, Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced the six point movement in Lahore. The
movement demanded greater provincial autonomy and the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Rahman was
indicted for treason during the Agartala Conspiracy Case after launching the six point movement. He was released in
the 1969 uprising in East Pakistan, which ousted Ayub Khan from the presidency. Below includes the historical six
points:-

 The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense based on the Lahore
Resolution, and the parliamentary form of government with supremacy of a Legislature directly elected on the
basis of universal adult franchise.
 The federal government should deal with only two subjects: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other
residual subjects should be vested in the federating states.
 Two separate, but freely convertible currencies for two wings should be introduced; or if this is not
feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be
introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve
should be established and separate fiscal and monetary policy be adopted for East Pakistan.
 The power of taxation and revenue collection should be vested in the federating units and the federal centre
would have no such power. The federation would be entitled to a share in the state taxes to meet its
expenditures.
 There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; the foreign
exchange requirements of the federal government should be met by the two wings equally or in a ratio to be
fixed; indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings, and the constitution should
empower the units to establish trade links with foreign countries.
 East Pakistan should have a separate military or paramilitary force, and Navy headquarters should be in
East Pakistan.

Final years

Ayub Khan was replaced by general Yahya Khan who became the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Khan
organized the 1970 Pakistani general election. The 1970 Bhola cyclone was one of the deadliest natural disasters of
the 20th century. The cyclone claimed half a million lives. The disastrous effects of the cyclone caused huge
resentment against the federal government. After a decade of military rule, East Pakistan was a hotbed of Bengali
nationalism. There were open calls for self-determination.
When the federal general election was held, the Awami League emerged as the single largest party in the Pakistani
parliament. The League won 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan, thereby crossing the half way mark of 150 in the
300-seat National Assembly of Pakistan. In theory, this gave the League the right to form a government under
the Westminster tradition. But the League failed to win a single seat in West Pakistan, where the Pakistan Peoples
Party emerged as the single largest party with 81 seats. The military junta stalled the transfer of power and
conducted prolonged negotiations with the League. A civil disobedience movement erupted across East Pakistan
demanding the convening of parliament. Rahman announced a struggle for independence from Pakistan during a
speech on 7 March 1971. Between 7–26 March, East Pakistan was virtually under the popular control of the Awami
League. On Pakistan's Republic Day on 23 March 1971, the first flag of Bangladesh was hoisted in many East
Pakistani households. The Pakistan Army launched a crackdown on 26 March, including Operation Searchlight and
the 1971 Dhaka University massacre. This led to the Bangladeshi Declaration of Independence.
As the Bangladesh Liberation War and the 1971 Bangladesh genocide continued for nine months, East Pakistani
military units like the East Bengal Regiment and the East Pakistan Rifles defected to form the Bangladesh Forces.
The Provisional Government of Bangladesh allied with neighboring India which intervened in the final two weeks
of the war and secured the surrender of Pakistan.

Role of the Pakistani military

With Ayub Khan ousted from office in 1969, Commander of the Pakistani Army, General Yahya Khan became the
country's second ruling chief martial law administrator. Both Bhutto and Mujib strongly disliked General Khan, but
patiently endured him and his government as he had promised to hold an election in 1970. During this time, strong
nationalistic sentiments in East Pakistan were perceived by the Pakistani Armed Forces and the central military
government. Therefore, Khan and his military government wanted to divert the nationalistic threats and violence
against non-East Pakistanis. The Eastern Command was under constant pressure from the Awami League, and
requested an active duty officer to control the command under such extreme pressure. The high flag rank officers,
junior officers and many high command officers from the Pakistan's Armed Forces were highly cautious about their
appointment in East-Pakistan, and the assignment of governing East Pakistan and appointment of an officer was
considered highly difficult for the Pakistan High Military Command.

East Pakistan's Armed Forces, under the military administrations of Major-General Muzaffaruddin and Lieutenant-

General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, used an excessive amount of show of military force to curb the uprising in the
province. With such action, the situation became highly critical and civil control over the province slipped away
from the government. On 24 March, dissatisfied with the performance of his generals, Yahya Khan removed
General Muzaffaruddin and General Yaqub Khan from office on 1 September 1969. The appointment of a military
administrator was considered quite difficult and challenging with the crisis continually deteriorating. Vice-
Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy, had previously served as political and
military adviser of East Pakistan to former President Ayub Khan. Having such a strong background in
administration, and being an expert on East Pakistan affairs, General Yahya Khan appointed Vice-Admiral Syed
Mohammad Ahsan as Martial Law Administrator, with absolute authority in his command. He was relieved as naval
chief, and received extension from the government.
The tense relations between East and West Pakistan reached a climax in 1970 when the Awami League, the largest
East Pakistani political party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, (Mujib), won a landslide victory in the national
elections in East Pakistan. The party won 160 of the 162 seats allotted to East Pakistan, and thus a majority of the
300 seats in the Parliament. This gave the Awami League the constitutional right to form a government without
forming a coalition with any other party. Khan invited Mujib to Rawalpindi to take the charge of the office, and
negotiations took place between the military government and the Awami Party. Bhutto was shocked with the results,
and threatened his fellow Peoples Party members if they attended the inaugural session at the National Assembly,
famously saying he would "break the legs" of any member of his party who dared enter and attend the session.
However, fearing East Pakistani separatism, Bhutto demanded Mujib to form a coalition government. After a secret
meeting held in Larkana, Mujib agreed to give Bhutto the office of presidency with Mujib as prime minister.
General Yahya Khan and his military government were kept unaware of these developments and under pressure
from his own military government, refused to allow Rahman to become the prime minister of Pakistan. This
increased agitation for greater autonomy in East Pakistan. The military police arrested Mujib and Bhutto and placed
them in Adiala Jail in Rawalpindi. The news spread like a fire in both East and West Pakistan, and the struggle for
independence began in East Pakistan.
The senior high command officers in Pakistan Armed Forces, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, began to pressure General
Yahya Khan to take armed action against Mujib and his party. Bhutto later distanced himself from Yahya Khan after
he was arrested by Military Police along with Mujib. Soon after the arrests, a high level meeting was chaired by
Yahya Khan. During the meeting, high commanders of Pakistan Armed Forces unanimously recommended an
armed and violent military action. East Pakistan's Martial Law Administrator Admiral Ahsan, Governor of East
Pakistan, and Air Commodore Zafar Masud, Air Officer Commanding of Dacca's only airbase, were the only
officers to object to the plans. When it became obvious that a military action in East Pakistan was inevitable,
Admiral Ahsan resigned from his position as martial law administrator in protest, and immediately flew back
to Karachi, West Pakistan. Disheartened and isolated, Admiral Ahsan took early retirement from the Navy and
quietly settled in Karachi. Once Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal commenced, Air Marshal Masud flew
to West Pakistan, and unlike Admiral Ahsan, tried to stop the violence in East Pakistan. When he failed in his
attempts to meet General Yahya Khan, Masud too resigned from his position as AOC of Dacca airbase, and took
retirement from Air Force.
Lieutenant-General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was sent into East Pakistan in emergency, following a major blow of
the resignation of Vice Admiral Ahsan. General Yaqub temporarily assumed the control of the province, he was also
made the corps-commander of Eastern Corps. General Yaqub mobilized the entire major forces in East Pakistan.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made a declaration of independence at Dacca on 26 March 1971. All major Awami League
leaders including elected leaders of National Assembly and Provincial Assembly fled to neighbouring India and
an exile government was formed headed by Mujibur Rahman. While he was in Pakistan Prison, Syed Nazrul Islam
was the acting president with Tazuddin Ahmed as the prime minister. The exile government took oath on 17 April
1971 at Mujib Nagar, within East Pakistan territory of Kustia district and formally formed the government. Colonel
MOG Osmani was appointed the Commander in Chief of Liberation Forces and whole East Pakistan was divided
into eleven sectors headed by eleven sector commanders. All sector commanders were Bengali officers who had
defected from the Pakistan Army. This started the Bangladesh Liberation War in which the freedom fighters, joined
in December 1971 by 400,000 Indian soldiers, faced the Pakistani Armed Forces of 365,000
plus Paramilitary and collaborationist forces. An additional approximately 25,000 ill-equipped civilian volunteers
and police forces also sided with the Pakistan Armed Forces. Bloody guerrilla warfare ensued in East Pakistan.
The Pakistan Armed Forces were unable to counter such threats. Poorly trained and inexperienced in guerrilla
tactics, Pakistan Armed Forces and their assets were defeated by the Bangladesh Liberation Forces. On April 1971,
Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan succeeded General Yaqub Khan as the Corps Commander. General Tikka Khan led
the massive violent and massacre campaigns in the region. He is held responsible for killing hundreds of thousands
of Bengali people in East Pakistan, mostly civilians and unarmed peoples. For his role, General Tikka Khan gained
the title as "Butcher of Bengal". General Khan faced an international reaction against Pakistan, and therefore,
General Tikka was removed as Commander of Eastern front. He installed a civilian administration under Abdul
Motaleb Malik on 31 August 1971, which proved to be ineffective. However, during the meeting, with no high
officers willing to assume the command of East Pakistan, Lieutenant-General Amir Abdullah Khan
Niazi volunteered for the command of East Pakistan. Inexperienced and the large magnitude of this assignment, the
government sent Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff as Flag Officer Commanding of Eastern Naval Command
(Pakistan). Admiral Shariff served as the deputy of General Niazi when doing joint military operations. However,
General Niazi proved to be a failure and ineffective ruler. Therefore, General Niazi and Air Commodore Inamul
Haque Khan, AOC, PAF Base Dacca, failed to launch any operation in East Pakistan against Indian or its allies.
Except Admiral Shariff who continued to press pressure on Indian Navy until the end of the conflict. Admiral
Shariff's effective plans made it nearly impossible for Indian Navy to land its naval forces on the shores of East
Pakistan. The Indian Navy was unable to land forces in East Pakistan and the Pakistan Navy was still offering
resistance. The Indian Army, entered East Pakistan from all three directions of the province. The Indian Navy then
decided to wait near the Bay of Bengal until the Army reached the shore.
The Indian Air Force dismantled the capability of Pakistan Air Force in East Pakistan. Air Commodore Inamul
Haque Khan, Dacca airbase's AOC, failed to offer any serious resistance to the actions of the Indian Air Force. For
most part of the war, the IAF enjoyed complete dominance in the skies over East Pakistan.
On 16 December 1971, the Pakistan Armed Forces surrendered to the joint liberation forces of Mukti Bahini and
the Indian army, headed by Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Arora, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
(GOC-in-C) of the Eastern Command of the Indian Army. Lieutenant General AAK Niazi, the last corps
commander of Eastern Corps, signed the Instrument of Surrender at about 4:31 pm. Over 93,000 personnel,
including Lt. General Niazi and Admiral Shariff, were taken as prisoners of war.
On 16 December 1971, East Pakistan was liberated from Pakistan as the newly independent state of Bangladesh.
The Eastern Command, civilian institutions and paramilitary forces were disbanded.
Operation Search Light

After the Awami League had won a decisive majority (capturing 167 out of 313 seats) in the 1970 Pakistan
parliamentary elections, the Bengali population expected a swift transfer of power to the Awami League based on
the Six Point Programme. On 28 February 1971, Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan, under the pressure of PPP
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, postponed the national assembly meeting scheduled for March. The Pakistan Peoples
Party had already started lobbying to weaken the stand of Sheikh Mujib, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was heard saying
that he wanted the Bengalis to stay away. The Awami League, in response to the postponement, launched a program
of non-co-operation (largely outlined in the 7 March Awami League rally) which was so successful that the
authority of the Pakistan government became limited to the cantonments and government institutions in East
Pakistan.[20] Clashes between civilians and the Pakistani Army, and between Bengali and Bihari communities
erupted and became commonplace. President Yahya Khan flew to Dhaka to hold talks with Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman, leader of the Awami League, in March, and was later joined by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the leader of
Pakistan Peoples Party, which had secured the second largest share of seats (81 out of 300) in the elections.
[21]
 Unwilling to transfer power to East Pakistan as demanded by Awami League (fearing a transfer of power would
weaken or destroy the federation), or to lose face by backing down in face of the non-co-operation movement, the
Pakistani generals, most of which including Gul Hassan Khan supported the Pakistan Peoples Party, finally decided
on a military crackdown.
After the convening of the National Assembly was postponed by Yahya Khan on 1 March, ethnic Biharis in East
Pakistan, who supported West Pakistan, were targeted. In early March 1971 300 Biharis were killed in rioting by
mobs in Chittagong. The Government of Pakistan used the 'Bihari massacre' to justify its military intervention in
East Pakistan on 25 March, when it initiated Operation Searchlight.
Prior to the launch of the operation, a final meeting was held in General Headquarters (GHQ). Governor of East
Pakistan Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan objected to the planned operation. Air Officer Commanding (AOC)
of Dhaka airbase Air Commodore Mitty Masud also objected to the operation, fearing that violence would provoke
East-Pakistan into more violence. However, under pressure during the meeting from Pakistan's Army and Air
Force's general, General Yahya Khan gave orders to his Army and Air Force commanders to launch the operation.
[20]
 Admiral Ahsan was relieved of his post. When the operation came into effect, Air-Commodore Mitty Masud
refused to use airstrikes and was relieved from his post on March 31.
Operation Searchlight was set to be launched at 1pm on March 26, but Awami League President Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman’s proclamation of independence the previous night prompted the Pakistani military junta
to start its well-designed massacre 13 hours ahead of the schedule, so that the Bangalis could not put up a
strong resistance. According to a White Paper published on August 5, 1971 by the Pakistan government,
the Awami League had a plan to stage an armed revolution early on March 26. Maj Gen Khadim Hossain
Raja, General Officer Commanding of 14th Division and Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali Khan, GOC of 57th
Division came to a decision on February 22, 1971 regarding the army expedition named “Operation
Searchlight.” Under orders of the Chief of Staff Gen Abdul Hamid Khan on March 17, Khadim Raja
finalised the plan of the operation. Rao Forman Ali prepared the five-page operation plan.
On the eve of this genocidal campaign, then-president Yahya Khan left Dhaka for Karachi, but Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
then president of the Pakistan People's Party, casually observed the operation from the balcony of his luxurious
presidential suite at the Hotel Intercontinental, Dhaka. He saw Dhaka burning in front of his very eyes, heard the
helpless cries of innocent civilians, the crackle of burning material, the roar of tanks, the boom of guns and the rattle
of machine guns. Yet the very next day, Bhutto, on the eve of his departure, highly appreciated the action of the
army and commented: “Thanks to God that Pakistan could have been saved.”

Sadly, in spite of the overwhelming evidence, footage of the killings, the mass graves, innumerable eyewitness
accounts and the factual coverage by foreign journalists during 1971, the Bangladeshi genocide has still not been
recognised as such by the United Nations. Even more repulsively, the Pakistani government, far from issuing an
official apology, continues to deny that such atrocities even occurred, going as far as showing solidarity for the war
criminals of 1971 and shielding them from prosecution. It is deeply regrettable that while some Pakistani citizens
and academics have acknowledged and condemned this genocide, the Pakistani government has shamelessly chosen
to remain in denial. This is precisely why the truth of the Black Night of March 25, 1971 must be brought to light, so
everyone, both in and outside Pakistan, finally gets to know about the world's most forgotten genocide and us,
Bangladeshis, finally get to see Pakistan's own version of Nuremberg Trials take place.

Aims of the Operation Searchlight

* The operation shall start simultaneously in the entire East Pakistan;

* Maximum number of politicians and student leaders, teachers and “extremist” activists of cultural
organisations will be arrested;
* The operations in Dhaka will have to be a 100% success. To that end Dhaka University shall have to be
captured;
* The security of the Dhaka Cantonment must be ensured;
* All sorts of domestic and international communications must be disrupted. Telephone exchange, radio,
TV, teleprinter service, transmitter in the foreign consulates must be disrupted;
* The soldiers of the EPR must be disarmed and in their places West Pakistani soldiers shall be deputed
to patrol the armoury, and the control of the armoury shall be vested upon them;
* In the first phase, the operational zones will be Dhaka, Khulna, Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rangpur,
Syedpur and Sylhet.

Steps taken under the operation

* 22-Baluch Regiment stationed in Peelkhana shall disarm the 5,000 Bangali EPR soldiers and capture
their radio centre;
* 32-Punjab Regiment shall disarm 1,000 Bangali policemen in Rajarbagh Police Lines which is the main
source of armed strength of the Awami League;
* 18-Punjab Regiment will launch attack on the Hindu majority areas of Nawabpur and in other parts of
Old Dhaka;
* A group of selected soldiers from 22 Baluch, 18 and 32 Punjab Regiment will attack Iqbal Hall
(Zahurul Haq Hall), Jagannath Hall and Liaquat Hall of Buet, which are known as centers of strength of
the Awami League rebels;
* One platoon of commando soldiers of special service group will attack the house of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and will arrest him;
* The field Regiment will control the Second capital and the adjoining settlements (Mirpur-
Mohammadpur);
 * In order to show strength, a small squadron of M 24 tanks will be plying on road and will start shelling,
if necessary;
* The above mentioned soldiers will destroy any kind of barricade or resistance on the road, and will
launch operation in the houses of listed politicians

The planning process

The plan was drawn up in March 1971 by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, GOC 14th Division, and Major
General Rao Farman Ali, as a followup of decisions taken at a meeting of the Pakistan Army staff on 22 February.
[26]
 The 16th infantry division from Quetta and the 9th division from Kharian, West Pakistan, were ordered to
prepare to move to East Pakistan in mid-February also as a result of that meeting.
Before putting the plan into action, senior West Pakistani officers in East Pakistan who were unwilling to support
the military attack on civilians, Lt. General Shahabzada Yakub Khan, GOC East Pakistan, and the governor of East
Pakistan, Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, were relieved of their duties.[25] Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan became the
Governor and GOC of East Pakistan. On 17 March, General Raja was given authority to plan the operation via
telephone by General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army. On the morning of 18 March,
General Raja and Major General Rao Farman Ali wrote the plan at the GOC's office at Dhaka (Dhaka) cantonment.
The plan was written on a "Light Blue Office Pad with a Lead Pencil" by General Farman containing "16 Paragraphs
Spread Over Five Pages".
General Farman defined the operational premises and conditions for success, while General Khadim Raja dealt with
the distribution of forces and tasks assigned to the individual brigades and other units. It assumed that the Bengali
Army and other military units would revolt at the onset of operations[27] and the planners suggested that all armed
Bengali units should be disarmed prior to commencing the operation, and the political leadership arrested during a
planned meeting with the President, General Yahya Khan. No operational reserves were earmarked. The handwritten
plan was reviewed by General Abdul Hamid Khan and Lt. General Tikka Khan on 20 March at the flag staff house.
General Abdul Hamid Khan objected to the immediate disarming of regular army Bengali units, but approved the
disarming of the EPR, armed police and other para-military formations. Yahya Khan refused to sanction the arrest
of Awami League leaders during a meeting with him, as the plan had proposed.[27] The amended plan was approved
and distributed to various area commanders.
The Operation was to start on the night of 25 March 1971 in Dhaka, and other garrisons were to be alerted via phone
about their zero hour to start their activities. General Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of
the province was commanded by General Khadim. Lt. General Tikka Khan and his staff were present in the 31st
field command centre, to supervise and support the command staff of the 14th division. The initial plan to arrest by a
company of No 3 SSG, led by major ZA Khan was scheduled at 0100 on 26 March night.

Zero Hour
The Operation started on the night of 25 March, 1971, technically from zero hours of 26 March. Dhaka and other
garrisons were to be alerted via phone about their zero hour to start their operations.

Gen Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of the province was commanded by Gen Khadim
himself. Lt-Gen Tikka Khan and his staff were present in the 31st field command centre to supervise and support the
command staff of the 14th division inside Dhaka Cantonment.

To the time of leaving Dhaka for Karachi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto accompanied Gen Tikka Khan inside the cantonment.
It is said that Bhutto’s request to inspect a bloodied provincial capital on a military vehicle was turned down by Gen
Tikka Khan at that night.

Shuffling of armed forces personnel

The army also took steps to enhance their chances of success by relocating Bengali officers away from sensitive
areas, and bringing Pakistani troops to the cities. The departure of two Pakistan Army units, the 25th Punjab[44] and
the 20th Baluch[45] was delayed, while the 13th Frontier Force and the 22nd Baluch regiments were flown to Dhaka
from West Pakistan before 25 March. To maintain secrecy, no major reinforcements were initially sent to the other
garrisons in East Pakistan before 25 March.
Brig. Mozumdar, who had refused to fire on Bengali civilians blocking the unloading of MV Swat, was relieved of
his post on 24 March by Gen. Khadim himself on the pretext that he was needed to address 2 EBR at Joydevpur and
Brig. M.H. Ansari (West Pakistani – Station Commander Dhaka) took command of Chittagong area. [46] Maj. Khaled
Musharraf, Brigade Major of the 57th Brigade in Dhaka, was sent to 4th EBR in Comilla as 2IC on 22 March. [47] Lt.
Col. Masudul Hasan (CO 2nd EBR) was relieved of his post on 23 March, and Lt. Col. Quazi A.F.M.A Raquib took
over on 25 March. Pakistanis refrained from mass transfer of Bengali officers, as that might have compromised
security of the plan. Bengali officers were urged to take leave (although all leave had been cancelled since February
1971), while West Pakistani officers were told to stay put. Families of West Pakistani officers and soldiers were
evacuated from East Pakistan, and when possible families of some West Pakistani civilians were brought into the
cities.

Dispersion of Bengali units before 25 March

Denied permission by General Hamid to disarm the regular Bengali army units en masse before the crackdown,]the
Pakistani command employed other ploys to minimise the threat of these formations.
Bengali units were sent out of the cantonments, or were broken into smaller units and deployed away from each
other, and cut off from the main radio and wireless communication grid before or on 25 March. Bengali officers
were sent on leave, or were posted away from command centres or units directly involved in the operation. In some
cases, West Pakistani officers took command of Bengali formations. Some Bengali soldiers were sent on leave, and
some were disarmed on various pretexts whenever possible without raising alarm.[50]
The 1st EBR (at 50% strength), was sent out of Jessore cantonment to Chaugacha near the border for winter training,
where they stayed until 29 March. Companies of the 2nd EBR were disbursed around areas outside Dhaka and their
radio communication net was shut off. The 3rd EBR had its companies disbursed around Ghoraghat, and at
Parvatipur outside the Saidpur cantonment. The 4th EBR units were deployed between Brahmanbaria and
Shamshernagar. Only in Chittagong did the regular Bengali army units remain in their respective bases.
West Pakistani EPR troops were posted in the cities whenever possible, while Bengali EPR troops were sent to the
border outposts. Most EPR units were away from the main action areas, and would need at least a day to reach the
major cities. The EPR wireless net was shut off on the night of 24 or 25 March.

Brutality unleashed

* The Pakistani soldiers came out of the cantonment at 11:30pm, launched indiscriminate attack on the
demonstrating Bangalis in the Farmgate area, and thus initiated the Operation Searchlight;

*They launched simultaneous attacks on Peelkhana and Rajarbagh;

* They arrested Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from his residence;

* At dead of night, they launched operation at the teachers’ residential quarters of Dhaka University and
killed a huge number of students and nine teachers;

* Under the same planning, serious attacks were carried out in Old Dhaka, Tejgaon, Indira Road, Mirpur,
Mohammadpur, Dhaka airport, Ganaktuli, Dhanmondi, Kalabagan and Kanthalbagan.
* In the same night, many people were killed and injured in Chittagong by the firing of the army;

* Under the same plan, the offices of national newspapers like the Daily Ittefaq, the Daily Sangbad and
the Peoples were set on fire for supporting the movement of the Bangalis . A good number of journalists
and media personnel were burnt to death;

* On the eve of the genocide on March 25, then president Yahya Khan left Dhaka for Karachi, but
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then president of the Pakistan People's Party who came to Dhaka for a dialogue with
Sheikh Mujib, observed the operation from the Hotel Intercontinental of Dhaka; * On March 26, Bhutto
on the eve of his departure highly appreciated the action of the army and commented: “Thanks to God that
Pakistan could have been saved;”

* The White Paper published on August 5 termed the operation “inevitable” * The accurate figure of
casualties in the night of March 25 could not be estimated. But foreign journalists working in Dhaka at
that time suggested that the number be between 10,000 and 35,000;

* From the report of journalist Simon Dring published under the caption Dateline Dacca in the Daily
Telegraph of March 29, it was revealed that 200 students of Iqbal Hall (now Shaheed Sergeant Zahurul
Haq Hall), teachers and their family members numbering 12 in Dhaka University residential area had been
killed on that night;

* In Old Dhaka, around 700 people were burnt to death. * The operation ended with the fall of the last
major town in Bengali hands in mid-May

Conclusion

Sadly, in spite of the overwhelming evidence, footage of the killings, the mass graves, innumerable eyewitness
accounts and the factual coverage by foreign journalists during 1971, the Bangladeshi genocide has still not been
recognised as such by the United Nations. Even more repulsively, the Pakistani government, far from issuing an
official apology, continues to deny that such atrocities even occurred, going as far as showing solidarity for the war
criminals of 1971 and shielding them from prosecution. It is deeply regrettable that while some Pakistani citizens
and academics have acknowledged and condemned this genocide, the Pakistani government has shamelessly chosen
to remain in denial. This is precisely why the truth of the Black Night of March 25, 1971 must be brought to light, so
everyone, both in and outside Pakistan, finally gets to know about the world's most forgotten genocide and us,
Bangladeshis, finally get to see Pakistan's own version of Nuremberg Trials take place.