Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games

Robert D. Putnam

Introduction
 Bonn summit conference involving Germany, Japan, U.S.
 “Within each country, one faction supported the policy shift being demanded
of its country internationally, but that faction was initially outnumbered
[429-430]”
 International pressure was a necessary condition for these policy shifts
[430]
 On the other hand, without domestic resonance, international forces
would not have sufficed to produce the accord, no matter how balanced and
intellectually persuasive the overall package
 Each leader believed that what he was doing was in his nation’s best interest
—and probably in his own political interest, too, even though not all his aides
agreed
 Bonn deal successfully meshed domestic and international pressures
 We must aim for “General equilibrium”: theories that account simultaneously
for the interaction of domestic and international forces
 This article suggests a conceptual framework for understanding how
diplomacy and domestic politics interact
 A more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and
international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest
groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and even public
opinion and elections [432]
 Central executives have a special role in mediating domestic and
international pressures precisely because they are directly exposed to both
spheres, not because they are united on all issues nor because they are
insulated from domestic politics [432-433]
 The state-centric literature is an uncertain foundation for theorizing about
how domestic and international politics interact [433]
 We need to move beyond the mere observation that domestic factors
influence international affairs and vice versa
>> What we need: Theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for the
areas of entanglement between them

Two-level games: a metaphor

- Politics of international negotiations:
 National level: domestic group pursue their interests by pressuring the
government to adopt favorable policies and politicians seek power
through constructing coalitions among groups [434]
Actors: party members, parliamentary figures, spokespersons for
domestic agencies, and representatives of interest groups, leader’s own
political advisors.
  International level: national governments seek to maximize their own
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse
consequences of foreign developments
 Actors: diplomats, international advisors
- Players will tolerate some differences in rhetoric between the two games, but
in the end either energy prices rise or they don’t

Towards a theory of ratification: The importance of ‘win-sets’

 Two levels in negotiations [436]:
1. Bargaining between negotiators
2. Discussion within each group of constituents about whether to
ratify the agreements
> Actors here represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups,
social classes, or even public opinion
 The requirement that any level I agreement must, in the end, be
ratified at level II imposes a crucial theoretical link between the two
levels
 Ironically, democracies cannot cooperate at times because they are
democracies and politicians need to secure electoral majorities at home
[436-437]
 Any modification to the level I agreement counts as a rejection, unless
modification is approved all other parties to the agreements [437]
 Win-set: set of all possible level I arrangements that would win in the
level II constituencies
 Larger win-sets makes level I agreements more likely
 The smaller the win-set, the greater the risk that the negotiations will
break down [438]
 Failed ratification: either involuntary defection or voluntary
 Credibility at level I is enhanced by a negotiator’s ability to deliver at level
II [439]
 The smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk of involuntary defection
 The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be
‘pushed around’ by other level I negotiators [440]
 Smaller domestic win-set can be an advantage because you can say
that you want a set-up in level I, you just can’t get it done in level II
>> Bargaining tool

Determinants of the Win-set size

1. Level II preferences and coalitions [442]
- Depends on the distribution of power between isolationalist/ anti-
cooperation forces and the internationalists [443]
- Domestic divisions can be classified into a) wanting for less from the
agreement, b) wanting for more from the agreement, c) wanting no
agreement at all [444]
 - A government that is internally divided is more likely to be able to strke a
deal internationally than one that is firmly committed to a single policy [445]
- Some constituents do not participate
- Politicization affects active level II constituency
- Level II group with most at stake are more likely to have an extreme position
on the issue [446]
- The chief negotiator faces tradeoffs to make across different issues
2. Level II institutions
- Ratification procedures clearly affect the size of the win-set; harder
procedures/more veto players of ratification= smaller win-set [448]
- Domestic political practices can affect the size of the win-set [449] i.e.
Japanese wanting consensus or American veto-players or disciplined
parties
- The greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their level
II constituents, the larger their win-set and greater the likelihood of
achieving international agreement
- However, the stronger a state is in terms of autonomy from domestic
pressures, the weaker its relative bargaining position internationally
 Negotiators from other countries know your countries position
- “For simplicity of exposition, my argument is phrased throughout in
terms of only two levels. However, many institutional arrangements
require several levels of ratification, thus multiplying complexity.”
 At each stage, cleavage patterns, issue linkages, ratification
procedures, side-payments, negotiator strategies would need to be
considered [449-450]
3. Level I negotiators’ strategies
- The larger the win-set of a negotiator, the more easily he can conclude
an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining position vis-à -vis
other negotiators [450]
- What counts at level II is not the total national costs and benefits, but
their incidence, relative to existing coalitions and proto-coalitions
- Specific concessions to possible swing votes and not across-the-board
side payments are instrumental
- Esteem and popularity of a chief negotiator is also important for the
expansion of win-set and ratification [451]
 Media attention and publicity are advantages as well [452]

Uncertainty and bargaining tactics

 Level I negotiators are often badly misinformed about level II politics,
particularly on the opposite side
 Uncertainty about the opposing win-set increases the risk of involuntary
defection [453]
 Feigning uncertainty about a negotiator’s win-set or ability to deliver may
extract a more generous offer
  Another strategy is giving a trial agreement for ratification to show that it is
not in his win-set

Restructuring and reverberation

- Theoretically, game-theoretic analysis requires that the structure of issues
and payoffs be specified in advance [454]
 However, in reality, much of what happens in any bargaining situation
involves attempts by the players to restructure the game and to alter one
another’s perceptions of the costs of no-agreement and the benefits of
proposed agreements
- In some cases, international pressures reverberate within domestic politics
tipping the domestic balance and influencing international negotiations
- Reverberation implies a interconnectedness among utility functions of
independent actors, albeit across different levels of the game [455]
- Two rationales may be offered to explain reverberation among utility-
maximizing egoists:
1) Offending foreigners may be costly in the long run
2) Given the pervasive uncertainty that surrounds many international
issues, messages from abroad can change minds, move the undecided,
and hearten those in domestic minority
 More likely among countries with close relations and more
frequent in economic than in political-military negotiations
 Reverberation can also be a negative as foreign pressure may
create a domestic backlash [456]

The Role of the Chief Negotiator

 Empirically, the preferences of the chief negotiator may diverge from those
of his constituents
 Motives of the chief negotiator [457]:
 Enhancing his political standing in level II/ domestic politics through
successfully winning allies or minimizing potential losses
 Shifting the balance of power in level II in favor of domestic policies that
he prefers for exogenous reasons
 Pursue his own conception of the national interest in the international
context
 If made to choose between pro-domestic and pro-international decision, the
chief negotiator will most likely choose the pro-domestic decision
 Chief negotiator may be a veto of possible agreements
 Chief negotiator as inherently influenced by his existing domestic coalition
[458]
 “Any political entrepreneur has a fixed investment in a particular pattern
of policy positions and a particular supporting coalition”
 Focus on central executives is a point of affinity between the two-level game
model and the state-centric literature
Conclusion
 Most important development in the fields of comparative politics and
international relations is the dawning recognition among practitioners of the
need to take into account entanglements between the two [459]
 Unlike state-centric theories, the two-level approach recognizes the
inevitability of domestic conflict about what the national interest requires
[460]
 Two-level game approach highlight the following links between diplomacy
and domestic politics:
(a) Distinction between voluntary and involuntary defection
(b) Difference of having domestic interests that are homogenous and
when domestic interests are heterogeneous
(c) Synergistic issue linkage: strategic moves at one game-table facilitate
unexpected coalitions at the second table
(d) Paradoxical fact that strong domestic institutions strengthen decision-
makers at home but may weaken their international bargaining
position
(e) Strategic use of uncertainty about domestic politics
(f) International pressure and reverberation
(g) Divergence of interest between national leaders and his domestic
coalition
 Need empirical testing