Essence, Ground, and Explanation

Essence, Ground, and Explanation
The Modal-Explanatory Nexus:

A Dialogue between the Contemporary and the Early Modern Era
HU Berlin — August 13, 2019
Michi Wallner (University of Graz)
Austrian Science Fund (FWF): P 29050
Michi Wallner 1
Essence, Ground, and 3 Reductive and Non-Reductive FE
1 Introduction 4 Non-Transmissiveness and the
Explanation 2 The Essence-Modality-Gap (EMG) Axiomatic Solution
Finean Essentialism
(FE) Essentialist truths ground/metaphysically explain metaphysically

necessary truths.
Cf. the modal account of essence (MA): essences = de re modality
“Old” criticism of (FE): We don’t need (FE) for Fine’s (1994) (alleged)
counterexamples to (MA) can be accommodated in (MA). (Della Rocca 1996,
Gorman 2006, Zalta 2006, Wildman 2013)
“New” criticism of (FE): (FE) is false. Or: One cannot consistently argue
for (FE). (Noonan 2018, Romero 2019, Mackie ms.)
à respond to “new” criticism by appealing to the distinction between

Reductive Finean Essentialism (RFE)
Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism (NRFE)
Michi Wallner 2
Romero : Essences cannot explain Necessity

(2019)
Romero (2019, 125): Essences could explain necessity, if there were an

obvious problem with the supposition that a thing might have a
different essence.
Romero: Hale’s (2013, 133) argument for this fails.
The supposition that a might have had a different nature is the supposition
that it might not have been the case that Fa, and might have been that F’a
instead. […] This is equivalent to the supposition that for some b, it might
have been the case that b = a Ù ¬Fb Ù F’b. But how could this be possibly
true? Given that Fa tells us what it is for a to be the thing that it is, and
that ¬Fb, b lacks what it takes to be that thing, it must be that b ≠ a. In
short, the supposition that a thing’s nature might have been different breaks
down because it is indistinguishable from the supposition that something
else lacks that nature. (Hale 2013, p. 133)
Michi Wallner 3

(2019)

different essence.
(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

(H2) So, possibly there is a b=a, such that b has a different nature than a.
(H3) Yet, the nature of a tells us what it is for a to be a.
(H4) So, b lacks what it takes to be a.
(H5) But then, it is not possible that b=a.
(H6) Thus, we have to reject (H1).
Michi Wallner 4

(2019)

different essence.

(H4) So, b lacks what it takes to be a. GA P ero
Rom
Michi Wallner 5
The Essence-Modality-Gap (EMG)
(EMG) Essences are what it is for something to be what it is; it doesn’t

follow that they are what it must be. (Romero 2019, p. 126)
Romero: The EMG can only be filled by the additional premise that
essences are necessary. → circular!!

(H4) So, b lacks what it takes to be a. GA P ero
Rom
2 ways to vindicate Hale’s argument: a) Find a better hidden premise!

b) Reject (EMG)!
Michi Wallner 6
Find a Better Hidden Premise
… that (i) bridges the gap, (ii) is unproblematic, (iii) doesn’t create a circle
Idea of (EMG): the essence of a only fixes what a actually is, not what
it must be

(H4) So, b lacks what it takes to be a.
GA P ero
Rom
Michi Wallner 7
it must be

(H4*) So, b lacks what it actually takes to be a.
Michi Wallner 8
it must be

(H5) But then, it is not possible that b=a. GA P ero
Rom
Michi Wallner 9
it must be

(H5*) But then, it is not actual that b=a.
Michi Wallner 10
it must be

(H5) But then, it is not possible that b=a. GA P ero
Rom
Michi Wallner 11
it must be

(HP) If it is not actual that b=a, then it is not possible that b=a.
g ed
r i d llne
r
PB
Wa
GA
Michi Wallner 12
it must be

g ed
r i d llne
r
PB
Wa
GA
Michi Wallner 13
it must be

g ed
r i d llne
r
PB
Wa
GA
Michi Wallner 14
Does accepting (HP) presuppose accepting that essences are necessary?
(HP) has a modal consequent.
If all modal truths have their source in essentialist truths (FE), accepting
(HP) might require accepting (HP*).
(HP*) If it is not actual that b=a, then it is essential to some x that b≠a.
Michi Wallner 15
Does accepting (HP) presuppose accepting that essences are necessary?
(HP) has a modal consequent.
If all modal truths have their source in essentialist truths (FE), accepting
(HP) might require accepting (HP*).
(HP*) If it is not actual that b=a, then it is essential to some x that b≠a.
GA P ero
à Romero: to bridge this gap: assumption: essences are necessary! Rom
Michi Wallner 16
Reject (EMG)
… by (i) pumping some intuitions, (ii) refuting Romero’s argument for

(EMG), (iii) pumping intuitions again.
I’m a philosopher; that’s what I am.
Yet, this has no bearing on my modal profile.
So, there is a gap between what I am and what I can and can’t be.
But this is because being a philosopher is not essential to me!
Being human is what I am essentially, which means that it has bearing

on what I can and can’t be!
So, there is no gap between what I am essentially and what I can and
can’t be.
Michi Wallner 17
Reject (EMG)

(EMG): the essence of a only fixes what it actually takes to be a
Hence, “a further premise is needed to infer from this that b lacks […]
what it takes to be a at the imagined situation” (Romero 2019, 126)
(EMG): what it actually takes to be a ≠ what it takes to be a at the

imagined situation.
Romero denies that being essential is reason enough for a fact or

proposition to be held fixed in an imaginative evaluation of a
counterfactual.
However, this seems to be wrong.
Michi Wallner 18
Reject (EMG)

Williamson (2007): we evaluate counterfactuals by

imaginatively supposing their antecedents and
developing the supposition, adding further judgements and background
knowledge by using our imagination
Question: Which further judgements and background knowledge do we add?

Which are cotenable w/ the supposition & must be held fixed?
Williamson (2007, 164): We are to hold fixed the constitutive, i.e. essentialist
facts, simply because they are essential.
à If this is so, then what it actually takes to be a (the essence of a) is

what it takes to be a in the imagined situation.
à No further premise is needed here, (EMG) is false.
Michi Wallner 19
Reject (EMG)

I. It follows from (EMG) that we need an additional premise to conclude

that b lacks (at the imagined situation) what it takes to be a at the
imagined situation.
II. This consequence of (EMG) is tantamount to saying that the

essentiality of f alone does not suffice for f to be held fixed in a
counterfactual development.
III. Yet, the essentiality of f does suffice for f to be held fixed in a

counterfactual development.
IV. Hence, (EMG) has false consequences and should therefore be

rejected.
Michi Wallner 20
Reject (EMG)

The essence of MW is what it actually takes for MW to be him.
Any change in the essence → MW is not what he is and doesn’t exist.
(EMG): This does not preclude MW from existing in a different possible

world (or imagined situation).
BUT: For imagined MW to be MW he must have the essence of MW.
So, without his essence it’s not possible for MW to exist, hence,
essences are necessary.
Michi Wallner 21
Reject (EMG)


e nt
um ero
rg
Rom
a r A
ul
C irc
Michi Wallner 22
Reject (EMG)


e nt
Unpacking
um llne
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rg
Wa
Intuitions n A
Wallner
No ta
Michi Wallner 23
Reject (EMG)

Assuming (EMG), there might be no non-circular argument to the effect

that essences are necessary.
However, if we don’t assume (EMG), we are not in need of such a

deductive argument for the necessity of essence in the first place.
Intuitively: no gap; necessity of essence is part of the notion of essence.
Plus, Romero’s argument for the gap fails.
Hence, reject (EMG)!
à Romero disagrees that intuitions speak against the gap.

à Intuition-Standoff
Michi Wallner 24
Reductive and Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism
Asking whether or not there is an EMG = asking whether or not the real
definition of a has bearing on the modal profile of a.
Intuitively, it lies in the notion of the essence of a that a cannot shake

off its essence and still be a.
Hence, essences do have that modal bearing.
However, the fact that essences cannot be shaken off is a modal

feature, so if this is inherent to the notion of essence, Fine’s non-
modal account of essences fails.
Most important point of this criticism:
If the definitional essence of a has bearing on the modal profile of a, i.e. if

we take definitional essences to have this kind of modal oomph, we can no
longer speak of essences as being entirely non-modal.
Michi Wallner 25
Romero’s case for (EMG) seems strongest here:
Suppose that it turns out that a certain waste bin is essentially made out of iron.
I claim that this fact stops short of explaining why is it that the waste bin is
necessarily made out of iron. If the metaphysical necessity of real definitions is a
modal posit, then the necessity of the waste bin’s constitution is not explained
just by the fact that the waste bin’s definition includes its constitution: the
modal posit is needed. (Romero 2019, p. 126)
Entirely non-modal essences need an additional modal posit to explain

necessities.
My point: this “modal posit” is not something external to essences but

built into the very notion of essences.
But then, essences are in a sense modal and the explanation in (FE)
cannot be a reductive one.
Michi Wallner 26
What Romero’s criticism teaches us: (FE) fails if (FE) is a reductive

explanation of modality in terms of entirely non-modal notions.
(RFE) Essences are entirely non-modal.
(NRFE) Essences are in some sense modal.
(NRFE) ≠ a return to the the modal account (essence = de re necessity)

“[T]he notions of essence and essential property, even if not definable in terms
of de re necessity, are to be regarded as modal notions.” (Hale 2013, 61 fn. 1)
“In claiming that the notion of essence was not to be understood in modal terms
I had in mind the familiar metaphysical modalities, i.e. the familiar notions of
metaphysical necessity, metaphysical possibility and the like. […] [I]t was not my
intention to argue against an account of essence in terms of any modal notions
whatever.” (Fine 2007, 85)
Michi Wallner 27
How does (NRFE) help us vindicate that essences can explain necessity?
Mackie (ms): “It looks as if the account of essence in terms of real

definition is intended to deliver a modal rabbit out of a non-modal hat.
And I don’t see how this can be done.”
Romero: we need a modal posit for real definitions in order to explain

necessity.
(NRFE): This modal posit (modal bearing) is built into definitional

essences. (The hat is not non-modal!)
(NRFE) can concede the underlying point of this “new” criticism while
simultaneously saving (FE) from the criticism.
In other words, the criticism only hits (RFE), not (NRFE).
Michi Wallner 28
Intuition-Standoff
The essentialist might claim that the introductory examples of real definitions
‘wear their necessity on their sleeve’: we see that they are necessary just by
understanding them. But I don’t think that the usual examples—like ‘Socrates is a
man’ or ‘a natural number is a finite ordinal’—are like that. I think that they are
aptly understood as saying what the object is—and this is, furthermore,
necessary. Under this second view, the necessity of real definitions does not
follow merely from their being real definitions: it is a further posit, a separate
modal fact: a fact not just about essences, but also about modality. And this
second view is compatible with whatever intuitions are pumped by the bare
examples. (Romero 2019, 127; emphasis added)
Romero’s “second view” = (RFE)
If Romero is right, our intuitions are compatible with (RFE).
But still, they are also compatible with (NRFE)! à Standoff
Michi Wallner 29
Intuition-Standoff
There are 2 different notions of definitional essence:

(RFE)-notion vs. (NRFE)-notion
Standoff: it’s not clear whether intuition supports (RFE) or (NRFE).
In favor of (NRFE): in evaluating counterfactuals we hold fixed

essences, just because they are essences. (Williamson 2007)
Also: The Standoff leaves untouched the point that if we endorse

(NRFE), we can
avoid the criticism,
view the reason why essences can explain necessity as being inherent to the
notion of essence, and
we can concede the important point to the critic that, indeed, entirely non-
modal essences might not be capable of explaining necessity.
Michi Wallner 30
How do essences explain necessity on (NRFE)?
The necessity of essence explains why essences can explain modality.

Yet, the necessity of essence is not how essences explain modality.
Transmissive Explanation of £p: The necessity of the explanans

plays an explanatory role.
Non-Transmissive Explanation of £p: The necessity of the explanans

plays no explanatory role.
Hale: (FE) is non-transmissive: Even though Ex p is indeed necessary, it is

Ex p rather than £Ex p that explains £p.
Idea behind (FE): is that essences are special.

Something about them that makes them explain necessity.
If this feature would be merely the necessity of essentialist propositions, any
kind of proposition could explain necessity so long as they would only be
themselves necessary.
Michi Wallner 31
The Non-Transmissiveness of Essentialist Explanations of Necessity
Importantly, the modal component of essence is not what does the

actual work in essentialist explanations of necessity.
‘£Ex p’ explains (‘Ex p’ explains ‘£p’)
This does not entail that ‘£Ex p’ plays a role in the explanation of ‘£p’.
It only plays a role in the explanation of (‘£x p’ explains ‘£p’).
So, the necessity of essences cannot be what makes essences special.
Michi Wallner 32
The Axiomatic Solution
What, then, is it that makes essences special?
Again, the necessity of essences is why essences have this necessity-

conferring capacity.
(Q1) But what exactly is this necessity-conferring capacity?

Answer: Essentiality
(Q2) How do essences explain necessity?

Answer: They simply do!
Clarification: (Q1) and (Q2) ask for an analysis or characterization of this

necessity-conferring capacity of essences in maybe more familiar terms.
à However, essence and the necessity-conferring capacity are

fundamental and primitive.
Michi Wallner 33
The Inference Problem (IP) for non-Humean accounts of lawhood
Non-Humeanism: e.g. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong (DTA): a law is a

fundamental necessitation relation N<F, G> (being F necessitates being
G) that goes beyond the regularities ("x (Fx → Gx))
(IP) How could N<F, G> entail "x (Fx → Gx)?
Lewis (1983, 366) famously complains that he “cannot see how it could be
absolutely impossible to have N(F, G), and Fa without Ga”.
Axiomatic Solution (Schaffer 2016): Lewis’s complaint rests on a confusion.
DTA is positing a fundamental notion ‘N’ that should capture their idea
of a law, according to which it is the business of laws to govern.
DTA should just equip ‘N’ with the appropriate axioms for them to be
able to do the work they are intuitively supposed to do.
In this case they should add the axiom that N<F, G> entails "x (Fx → Gx).
Michi Wallner 34
The Axiomatic Solution
Essences are metaphysically fundamental (and ideologically primitive)
So, we should be granted an Axiomatic Solution to the question of how

essences explain necessity.
An axiomatic solution would indeed neatly fit my point that we can’t

have a non-circular argument that essences explain necessity.
On (NRFE) we should be allowed to equip our notion of essence with an

axiom according to which essences explain necessity.
This would license the following non-substantive (lack of an) answer to

the question of how essences explain necessity: They simply do! It just
is the business of essences to explain necessity.
Michi Wallner 35
Conclusion
Romero: (FE) is false, due to (EMG).
I admit: assuming the gap, it isn’t bridgeable via deductive argument.
Yet, I reject (EMG), i.e. the assumption that there is such a gap
on intuitive grounds and by
refuting Romero’s argument for (EMG), using Williamson on counterfactuals
Non-substantive answer to the question of why essences can explain

necessity: it’s built into the notion of essence that they are necessary.
This commits me to (NRFE), on the ground of which I can concede: it’s

weird how entirely non-modal essences should explain necessity.
Non-substantive answer to the question of how essences explain

necessity: They just do! (modelled after Schaffer’s Axiomatic Solution)
Michi Wallner 36
Conclusion
The (NRFE)-picture of essentialist explanations of necessity
Why are essences capable of explaining necessity?
How do essences explain necessity?
The answers to both questions are built into the very notion of essence.
I hold that two “axioms” drop out of Fine’s notion of definitional essence:
‘Ex’
Ex ϕ(x) → £Ex ϕ(x) (essences are necessary)
Ex ϕ(x) < £ϕ(x) (essences explain necessity)
Thank you for your attention!

Michi Wallner 37
References
Della Rocca, M. (1996): “Essentialism: Parts 1 & 2”, in: Philosophical Books, 37, 1-13,81-89.
Fine, K. (2007): “Response to Fabrice Correia”, in: Dialectica, 61 (1), 85-88.
Gorman, M. (2006): “The Essential and the Accidental”, in: Ratio, 18, 276-189.
Hale, B. (2013): Necessary Beings. An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations
Between Them. Oxford: OUP.
Lewis, D. (1983): “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, in: Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 61, 343–377.
Mackie, P. (ms): “Can metaphysical modality be based on essence?”
Noonan, H. (2018): “The New Aristotelian Essentialists”, in: Metaphysica, 19 (1), 87-93.
Romero, C. (2019): “Modality is not explainable by essence”, in: The Philosophical
Quarterly, 69(274), 121-141.
Schaffer, J. (2016): “It is the Business of Laws to Govern”, in: Dialectica, 70(4), 577-588.
Wildman, N. (2013): “Modality, Sparsity, and Essence”, in: The Philosophical Quarterly, 63,
760-782.
Wildman, N. (2018): “Against the reduction of modality to essence”, in: Synthse.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1667-6
Williamson, T. (2007): The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Zalta, E. (2006): “Essence and Modality”, in: Mind, 116, 659-693.
Michi Wallner 38

Essence, Ground, and Explanation

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Essence, Ground, and Explanation

The Modal-Explanatory Nexus:

Michi Wallner (University of Graz)

Austrian Science Fund (FWF): P 29050

(FE) Essentialist truths ground/metaphysically explain metaphysically

 Cf. the modal account of essence (MA): essences = de re modality

à respond to “new” criticism by appealing to the distinction between

Romero : Essences cannot explain Necessity

 Romero (2019, 125): Essences could explain necessity, if there were an

 Romero: Hale’s (2013, 133) argument for this fails.

Romero : Essences cannot explain Necessity

 Romero (2019, 125): Essences could explain necessity, if there were an

 Romero: Hale’s (2013, 133) argument for this fails.

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Romero : Essences cannot explain Necessity

 Romero (2019, 125): Essences could explain necessity, if there were an

 Romero: Hale’s (2013, 133) argument for this fails.

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

The Essence-Modality-Gap (EMG)

(EMG) Essences are what it is for something to be what it is; it doesn’t

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

2 ways to vindicate Hale’s argument: a) Find a better hidden premise!

Find a Better Hidden Premise

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

(H1) Suppose, a might have had a different nature.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

 Does accepting (HP) presuppose accepting that essences are necessary?

 (HP) has a modal consequent.

Find a Better Hidden Premise

 Does accepting (HP) presuppose accepting that essences are necessary?

 (HP) has a modal consequent.

… by (i) pumping some intuitions, (ii) refuting Romero’s argument for

 I’m a philosopher; that’s what I am.

 Yet, this has no bearing on my modal profile.

 But this is because being a philosopher is not essential to me!

 Being human is what I am essentially, which means that it has bearing

… by (i) pumping some intuitions, (ii) refuting Romero’s argument for

 (EMG): the essence of a only fixes what it actually takes to be a

 (EMG): what it actually takes to be a ≠ what it takes to be a at the

 Romero denies that being essential is reason enough for a fact or

 However, this seems to be wrong.

… by (i) pumping some intuitions, (ii) refuting Romero’s argument for

 Williamson (2007): we evaluate counterfactuals by

Question: Which further judgements and background knowledge do we add?

à If this is so, then what it actually takes to be a (the essence of a) is

… by (i) pumping some intuitions, (ii) refuting Romero’s argument for

I. It follows from (EMG) that we need an additional premise to conclude

II. This consequence of (EMG) is tantamount to saying that the

III. Yet, the essentiality of f does suffice for f to be held fixed in a

Cf. the modal account of essence (MA): essences = de re modality

Romero (2019, 125): Essences could explain necessity, if there were an

Romero: Hale’s (2013, 133) argument for this fails.

Romero (2019, 125): Essences could explain necessity, if there were an

Romero: Hale’s (2013, 133) argument for this fails.

Romero (2019, 125): Essences could explain necessity, if there were an

Romero: Hale’s (2013, 133) argument for this fails.

Does accepting (HP) presuppose accepting that essences are necessary?

(HP) has a modal consequent.

Does accepting (HP) presuppose accepting that essences are necessary?

(HP) has a modal consequent.

I’m a philosopher; that’s what I am.

Yet, this has no bearing on my modal profile.

But this is because being a philosopher is not essential to me!

Being human is what I am essentially, which means that it has bearing

(EMG): the essence of a only fixes what it actually takes to be a

(EMG): what it actually takes to be a ≠ what it takes to be a at the

Romero denies that being essential is reason enough for a fact or

However, this seems to be wrong.

Williamson (2007): we evaluate counterfactuals by

The essence of MW is what it actually takes for MW to be him.

Any change in the essence → MW is not what he is and doesn’t exist.

(EMG): This does not preclude MW from existing in a different possible

BUT: For imagined MW to be MW he must have the essence of MW.

The essence of MW is what it actually takes for MW to be him.

Any change in the essence → MW is not what he is and doesn’t exist.

(EMG): This does not preclude MW from existing in a different possible

BUT: For imagined MW to be MW he must have the essence of MW.

The essence of MW is what it actually takes for MW to be him.

Any change in the essence → MW is not what he is and doesn’t exist.

(EMG): This does not preclude MW from existing in a different possible

BUT: For imagined MW to be MW he must have the essence of MW.

Assuming (EMG), there might be no non-circular argument to the effect

However, if we don’t assume (EMG), we are not in need of such a

Intuitively: no gap; necessity of essence is part of the notion of essence.

Plus, Romero’s argument for the gap fails.

Hence, reject (EMG)!

Intuitively, it lies in the notion of the essence of a that a cannot shake

Hence, essences do have that modal bearing.

However, the fact that essences cannot be shaken off is a modal

Romero’s case for (EMG) seems strongest here:

Entirely non-modal essences need an additional modal posit to explain

My point: this “modal posit” is not something external to essences but

What Romero’s criticism teaches us: (FE) fails if (FE) is a reductive

(NRFE) ≠ a return to the the modal account (essence = de re necessity)

Mackie (ms): “It looks as if the account of essence in terms of real

Romero: we need a modal posit for real definitions in order to explain

(NRFE): This modal posit (modal bearing) is built into definitional

In other words, the criticism only hits (RFE), not (NRFE).

Romero’s “second view” = (RFE)

If Romero is right, our intuitions are compatible with (RFE).

But still, they are also compatible with (NRFE)! à Standoff

There are 2 different notions of definitional essence:

Standoff: it’s not clear whether intuition supports (RFE) or (NRFE).

In favor of (NRFE): in evaluating counterfactuals we hold fixed

Also: The Standoff leaves untouched the point that if we endorse

The necessity of essence explains why essences can explain modality.

Hale: (FE) is non-transmissive: Even though Ex p is indeed necessary, it is

Idea behind (FE): is that essences are special.

Importantly, the modal component of essence is not what does the

‘£Ex p’ explains (‘Ex p’ explains ‘£p’)

So, the necessity of essences cannot be what makes essences special.

What, then, is it that makes essences special?

Again, the necessity of essences is why essences have this necessity-