THIRD DIVISION
 
 
FRANCEL REALTY G.R. No. 154684
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Corona,
Carpio Morales,* and
Garcia, JJ.
Promulgated:
RICARDO T. SYCIP,

Respondent. September 8, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- x

 
DECISION
 

PANGANIBAN, Acting CJ:
 
I
n general, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised

at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. This defense may

be determined from the factual allegations of the complaint,

regardless of the answer or even before the answer is filed.

__________________
* On official business.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, assailing the February 2, 2001 Decision[2] and

August 14, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV

No. 55127. The CA disposed as follows:

 
It is not disputed that [petitioner] filed an illegal detainer case
against [respondent] docketed as Civil Case No. 1310 before the
Municipal Trial Court [MTC] of Bacoor, Cavite, which was
accordingly dismissed by the MTC (See answer, p. 28, record). The
filing of the instant case is another blatant attempt by [petitioner] to
circumvent the law. For it is well-settled that where a complaint
arises from the failure of a buyer [of real property] on installment
basis to pay based on a right to stop monthly amortizations under
Presidential Decree No. 957, as in the case at bench, the
determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (Francel Realty Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 127 [1996]).
  
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[4]
 

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

 
x x x [I]n November, 1989, [petitioner] and [respondent] entered into
a contract to sell a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-281788.
Upon execution of the contract to sell, [respondent] made a down
payment of P119,700.00, which was considered as monthly rentals
at the rate of P2,686.00 per month. On March 16, 1990, the
townhouse subject of the contract to sell was transferred in the
name of [respondent] as evidenced by TCT No. T-281788. Despite
the transfer of the title in the name of [respondent], the latter refused
to pay the balance of P250,000.00. By applying the down payment
of P119,700.00 to defendants monthly rental starting from December
1989, said amount has been reduced to nothing. Despite several
demands made by [petitioner] to [respondent], including the demand
dated December 12, 1991 made by [petitioners] counsel, the
[respondent] refused to reconvey the subject property to [petitioner].
The [petitioner] suffered actual damages in the form of repairs
amounting to not less than P100,000.00 as well as moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. x x x.
 
 The [respondent] filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction but the court below denied the motion stating that the
ground relied upon by [respondent did not appear to be] indubitable.
 
Denying the material allegations of the complaint, the [respondent]
again invoked the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case. Further, there is a pending case between the same
parties and involving the same townhouse before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board for unsound real estate business
practices. Likewise, the [respondent] justified his refusal to pay the
amortizations alleging that the [petitioner] sold and delivered to him
a defective townhouse unit under Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No.
[957].
After trial, the court below dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the trial court, the CA held that the case involved

not just reconveyance and damages, but also a determination of the

rights and obligations of the parties to a sale of real estate under PD 957;

hence, the case fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the HLURB.

The appellate court observed that respondent and other buyers of the

townhouses had notified petitioner of their intention to stop paying

amortizations because of defective structures and materials used in the

construction; they had in fact filed other cases, also before the HLURB,

against petitioner for unsound real estate business practice.

 Noting that petitioners illegal detainer case against respondent had

been dismissed by the MTC, the appellate court concluded that the filing

of the instant case was another blatant attempt to circumvent the law.

Hence this Petition.[6]

Issues
 

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

 
A. Whether or not the lower court can dismiss, after full blown
trial, Civil Case No. BCV-94-2 of the RTC, Imus, Cavite, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 
B. Whether or not the lower court can dismiss this case in spite
of the indisputable fact that respondent never secured HLURB
authority or clearance to stop payment of monthly rentals.[7]

 
 

The Courts Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

  
 

First Issue:
Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction
 
 
 

Before going into the jurisdictional question, we must at the outset

point out that, contrary to petitioners assignment of errors, the trial

courts Decision is not the proper subject of this Rule 45 Petition. Rather,

it is the Decision of the CA that is up for review by this Court. This

mistake in stating the issues could have been fatal to petitioners case,

had it not correctly restated them in its arguments and discussion.[8] That

said, we now proceed to the main issues.

Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts

dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial

had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of

jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial

had ensued and ended.

 
 The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has

been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals

based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[9] in which this

doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning

a courts jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief

against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of

jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant

whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has

actively participated.[10]

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due

diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a

presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or

declined to assert it.[11]

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is,

however, the exception rather than the rule.[12] Estoppel by laches may

be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which

the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such

controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of

jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the

presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined

to assert it. [13] That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional

circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez,[14] which we quote:

 
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in
the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that
the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoywhich justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[15]

 
 
 Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may

be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.[16] The reason

is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very

authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on

the action.[17] Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of

the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.[18] 

From the very beginning, the present respondent has been

challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court and asserting that the

HLURB is the entity that has proper jurisdiction over the case.

Consonant with Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, he had raised

the issue of lack of jurisdiction in his Motion to Dismiss. Even when the

Motion was denied, he continuously invoked lack of jurisdiction in his

Answer with affirmative defenses, his subsequent pleadings, and

verbally during the trial. This consistent and continuing objection to the

trial courts jurisdiction defeats petitioners contention that raising other

grounds in a Motion to Dismiss is considered a submission to the

jurisdiction of the court.[19]

 We stress that Rule 9 of the Rules of Court requires that all

defenses and objections -- except lack of jurisdiction over the subject

matter, litis pendentia, bar by prior judgment and/or prescription -- must

be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer; otherwise, they are

deemed waived. [20] As to the excepted grounds, the court may dismiss a

claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the

evidence on record that any of those grounds exists.

In the present case, the trial court at first denied the Motion to

Dismiss filed by respondent, because the grounds he had relied upon did

not appear to be indubitable. The ruling was made under the pre-1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, which then provided that the court, after

hearing x x x may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of

pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until

the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable.
[21]
 Moreover, the factual allegations of the Complaint[22] that petitioner

filed below for reconveyance and damages sufficiently conformed to

the jurisdictional requisites for the exercise of the MTCs authority.

Thus, in accord with the procedures then prescribed, the court conducted

trial to allow all arguments and evidence to surface.

Significantly, petitioner has previously sued respondents brother and co-

complainant before the HLURB over the same subdivision project.

In Francel Realty v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip,

[23]
 petitioners Complaint for unlawful detainer was premised on the

failure of respondents brother to pay monthly amortizations on the basis

of his right to stop paying them under PD 957. In that case, the Court

had ruled that the issue involved a determinative question x x x

exclusively cognizable by the HLURB; that is, a determination of the

rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. 957.[24]

Because an earlier Complaint had been filed by Sycip before the

HLURB against Francel Realty Corporation for unsound real estate

business practices, the Court dismissed petitioners cause of action. The

reason for the dismissal was that the Complaint should instead be filed

as a counterclaim in [the] HLURB [case] in accordance with Rule 6,

Section 6 of the Rules of Court x x x.[25] For the same reason, this Court
has ruled that a suit to collect on a promissory note issued by a

subdivision lot buyer involves the sales of lots in commercial

subdivisions; and that jurisdiction over such case lies with the HLURB,

not with the courts.[26]

Further, the rules governing counterclaims[27] and the prohibition on the

splitting of causes of action (grounded on the policy against a

multiplicity of suits)[28]should effectively bar the Complaint for

reconveyance and damages filed by petitioner. Its Complaint came at the

heels of its unlawful detainer suit that had previously been dismissed by

the MTC of Imus, Cavite, and of the litigation filed by respondent

against Francel Realty before the HLURB. Petitioner avers that the

present controversy is not cognizable by the HLURB, because it was

filed by the developer rather than by the buyer, as provided under PD

No. 1344.[29] Such pretension flies in the face of the ruling of the Court

in Francel Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip,

[30]
 which we quote:
 

x x x. In the case of Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v.

Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte the developer filed a complaint to collect the
balance of the price of a lot bought on installment basis, but its complaint was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed the
order to this Court. In dismissing the appeal, we held:
 
 The action here is not a simple action to collect on a
promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization payments
arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under
P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade
and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate
business practices. Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is
still pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as
yet no order from the HLURB authorizing suspension of payments
on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make good its
warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of
collecting amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is
necessarily tied up to the complaint against the plaintiff and it
affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a
subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as
amended. It must accordingly fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the motion to
dismiss was properly granted on the ground that the regular court
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.[31]

Petitioners strategy, if allowed, would open a convenient gateway for a

developer to subvert and preempt the rights of buyers by the mere

expediency of filing an action against them before the regular courts, as

in this case. Fortunately, the CA saw through the ruse. Contrary to

petitioners contention, the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear

and decide a case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the

developer and not by the buyer.

Petitioner cites Ayala Corporation v. Ray Burton Development

Corporation[32] and Fajardo Jr. v. Freedom to Build, Inc.,[33] which do

not further its cause either. These cases pertain to deed restrictions and

restrictive covenants in the sale of subdivision units; hence, they do not

fall under any of the cases over which the HLURB exercises exclusive

jurisdiction. Naturally, there was every reason for the courts in the said

cases to assume and exercise their jurisdiction.

 

Second Issue:
Authority to Stop Payment
of Monthly Rentals

The next proposition relates to the absence of a clearance from the

HLRUB authorizing respondent to stop payment of his amortizations. It

is petitioners position that under Section 23 of Rule VI of the Rules

implementing PD 957, clearance must first be secured from the Board

before the buyer of a subdivision lot or a home can lawfully withhold

monthly payments.

This contention is also unmeritorious.

 

First, Section 23 of PD 957 -- the law upon which the

Implementing Rule cited was based -- requires only due notice to the
owner or developer for stopping further payments by reason of the
latters failure to develop the subdivision according to the approved plans
and within the time limit. Section 23 provides as follows:
 
SECTION 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment
payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for
the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the
owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or
developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the
owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for
complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but
excluding [delinquency] interests, with interest thereon at the legal
rate. (Italics supplied)
 
 
 

To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform,

not contradict, the provisions of the enabling law.[34] An implementing

rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is

intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute

itself is null and void.[35] Thus, the Court in People v.

Maceren[36] explained as follows:
  
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority
by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. x x x.
 
The rule making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it
has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. x x x.
 
 
 

Plainly, therefore, Section 23 of Rule VI of the Implementing

Rules cannot rise higher than Section 23 of PD 957, which is the source

of its authority. For that matter, PD 957 would have expressly required

the written approval of the HLURB before any stoppage of amortization

payments if it so intended, in the same manner that the decree

specifically mandates written consent or approval by the NHA (now the

HLURB) in Section 18.[37]

Section 18 has been held by the Court to be a prohibitory law;

hence, acts committed contrary to it are void,[38] pursuant to the intent of

PD 957 to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may

fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed unscrupulous

subdivision and condominium sellers.[39] The Court stressed that such

construal ensures the attainment of the purpose of the law: to protect lot

buyers, so that they do not end up still homeless despite having fully

paid for their home lots with their hard-earned cash.[40]

Apropos, to require clearance from the HLURB before stopping

payment would not be in keeping with the intent of the law to protect

innocent buyers of lots or homes from scheming subdivision developers.

To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to

stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the

owner or developer or upon filing a complaint before the HLRUB

against the erring developer. Such course of action would be without

prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety and

consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found

improper.

 
 Significantly also, the Court has upheld the reliance of a buyer on

Section 23 of PD 957 when he ordered his bank to stop payment of the

checks he had issued, so that he could suspend amortization payments

until such time as the owner or developer would have fulfilled its

obligations.[41] In Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing

Authority,[42] the exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment

payments was considered a valid defense against the purported

violations of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 by the petitioner in that case.

Such right negated the third element the subsequent dishonor of the

check without valid cause. With more reason, then, should the buyers

right to suspend installment payments be considered a valid defense

against the suit for reconveyance and damages.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed

Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

 
 

SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
 ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Acting Chief Justice

WECONCUR:
 
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
(On official business)  
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of

the Courts Division.

 
 
 ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Acting Chief Justice
 

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 8-14.
[2]
 Penned by Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Justices Ramon A.
Barcelona (then Division chair) and Alicia L. Santos.
[3]
 Rollo, pp. 25-31.
[4]
 CA Decision, p. 3; id., p. 19.
[5]
 Id., pp. 1-2 & 17-18.
[6]
 This case was deemed submitted for decision on June 21, 2004, upon the Courts receipt
of respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Melamarisa L. Mauricio. Petitioners
sparse 7-page Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rosendo G. Tansinsin Jr., was
received by the Court on June 18, 2004.
[7]
 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 132. Original in uppercase.
[8]
 While the issues, as stated, referred to the trial court, the arguments and discussions
that followed did in fact assail the CA Decision; hence, we overlooked the mistake
in the Statement of the Issues on p. 3 of petitioners Memorandum.
[9]
 23 SCRA 29, April 15, 1968, per Dizon, J.
[10]
 Id., pp. 35-36. See also Emin v. De Leon, 428 Phil. 172, 185, February 27, 2002;
Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, 352 SCRA 316, 326, February 20,
2001; Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 374 Phil. 879, 894-895, October 12, 1999.
[11]
 Ibid.; Oca v. CA, 428 Phil. 696, 702, March 7, 2002; Westmont Bank v. Ong, 425 Phil.
834, 846, January 30, 2002; Uy v. CA, 342 Phil. 329, 341, July 28, 1997.
[12]
 Lopez v. David Jr., 426 SCRA 535, 543, March 30, 2004; Uy v. CA, supra; Oca v. CA,
supra, 701-702.
[13]
 In Sibonghanoy, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a Motion to
Dismiss filed almost fifteen years after a ruling had been rendered.
[14]
 204 Phil. 25, November 19, 1982.
[15]
 Id., pp. 34-35, per Vasquez, J. (Italics supplied)
[16]
 Lopez v. David, supra, p. 543; Oca v. CA, supra; Duero v. CA, 424 Phil. 12, 23,
January 4, 2002; Gumabon v. Larin, 422 Phil. 222, 231, November 27, 2001.
[17]
 Gumabon v. Larin, supra, Arcelona v. CA, 345 Phil. 250, 265, October 2, 1997.
[18]
 Lopez v. David, supra, p. 520; Javellana v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Manila,
443 SCRA 497, 506 & 508, November 23, 2004 (citing Sps. Kakilala v. Faraon,
 440 SCRA 414, 421, October 18, 2004); Roxas v. CA, 439 Phil. 966, 978-979,
October 29, 2002; Gochan v. Young, 354 SCRA 207, 216, March 12, 2001.
[19]
 See Avon Insurance PLC v. CA, 343 Phil. 849, 863-864, August 29, 1997. Petitioner
had cited this case in support of his argument that respondent should be deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court. However, a contrary ruling
was in fact adopted by the Court.
[20]
 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. See Obando v. Figueras, 379 Phil. 150,
161, January 18, 2000.
[21]
 Section 3, Rule 16 of the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the amended 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, deferment of the resolution of a motion to dismiss, if the
ground relied upon is not indubitable, is now disallowed in view of the provision
requiring presentation of all available arguments and evidence.  Thus, there is no
longer any need to defer action until the trial, because the evidence presented --
and such additional evidence as the trial court may require -- will already enable
the trial court to rule on whether the ground alleged is dubitable or not. Under the
amended Rules, there are now three courses of action that the trial court may take
to resolve a motion to dismiss: to grant, to deny or to allow amendment of the
pleading. See Lu Ym v. Nabua, GR No. 161309, February 23, 2005, p. 11,
per Tinga, J.
[22]
 Rollo, pp. 91-94.
[23]
 322 Phil. 138, January 22, 1996.
[24]
 Id., p. 143, per Mendoza, J.
[25]
 Ibid.
[26]
 Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. CA, 213 SCRA 353, 358, September
2, 1992, per Nocon, J.
[27]
 2 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[28]
 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 138, March 27, 1971.
[29]
 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 6.
[30]
 Supra.
[31]
 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
[32]
 355 Phil. 475, August 7, 1998.
[33]
 391 Phil. 799, August 1, 2000.
[34]
 SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, 393 Phil. 697, 703, August 30,
2000.
[35]
 Ibid., GMCR Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Phils., Inc., 338 Phil 507, 525, April 30,
1997.

[36]
 79 SCRA 450, 458, October 18, 1977.
[37]
 SEC. 18. Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or
developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not
be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used
for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective
measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each
lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if
any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option,
pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply
the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the
particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain
title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
[38]
 Home Bankers Savings & Trust Co. v. CA, GR No. 128354, p. 14, April 26, 2005, per
Austria-Martinez, J. (citing Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Marquez, 420 SCRA
349, 355, January 20, 2004).
[39]
 Id., pp. 14-15 (citing Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, 322 Phil. 9,
13, January 18, 1996, per Panganiban J.).
[40]
 Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Marquez, supra, p. 355, per Panganiban, J.
[41]
 Sycip Jr. v. CA, 385 Phil. 143, 157, March 17, 2000.
[42]
 153 SCRA 399, 409-411, August 31, 1987, per Feliciano, J.