PhilFebruary 14, 2015 at 8:51 AM

(1) Searle only pretends that he is arguing with the 'postmodernists'. In fact he
is really arguing against certain forms of idealism and structuralism. I cannot
emphasise this enough. Writers like Foucault simply side-stepped these questions
altogether (Lacan not so much as he was far more structuralist).

(2) It is clear that objective truth can exist for idealists. But it is always
theological and this has massive implications for epistemology that, say, Berkeley
and Hamann drew out in detail. It means that, since the 'supermind' figure is
inaccessible to mortals then we have severely limited abilities to actually grasp
at objective truth. Thus the way that we structure our lives is by and large
arbitrary; it is based on custom and tradition and cannot be 'rationalised'. This
allows a good deal of crossover with 'constructivist' epistemologies because it
recognises that we largely build these things ourselves. Not to say that they are
fully constructed -- there are limits -- but to a very large extent we structure
the world in and through our customs, culture and language; hence, structuralism.

I would say that a very similar argument is inherent in Keynes' arguments

surrounding ontological uncertainty. Indeed, I'm fairly convinced that many of
Keynes' ideas on uncertainty, animal spirits and so forth can be traced through GE
Moore back to the British Hegelians.

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LKFebruary 14, 2015 at 9:26 AM

(1) I find this very strange. Postmodernists are forever trying to say words and
language cannot refer to an external reality, and then attempting to deny truth on
this basis

(2) "It means that, since the 'supermind' figure is inaccessible to mortals then we
have severely limited abilities to actually grasp at objective truth. "

But you need not know any details about your postulated supermind: in fact you
could remain agnostic, and merely observe that overwhelming empirical evidence that
there is a world of experience/objects of perception (with a high degree of
regularity, consistency and order). Even if you throw aside any belief in or need
for an external material world, from the reality of a world of experience/objects
of perception come a clear argument for objective truth.

Words and sentences can refer to objects of perception and their properties and
relations: when there is correspondence between what a sentence asserts and
observed reality, you have objective empirical truth.

PhilFebruary 14, 2015 at 10:04 AM

(1) These are structuralist and idealist arguments. Those are the ones that you are
angry about. It really has nothing to do with 'postmodernism' per se.

(2) Now you're just restating your own argument and ignoring the implications of
the alternative argument.

LKFebruary 14, 2015 at 10:25 AM

On (2), I have shown how you do not even need to accept any supermind even under an
idealist ontology: you can say we do not know why we live in an idealist world, but
the argument for objective truth still works.

Not to say that they are fully constructed -- there are limits
What are the "limits"?

Is the scientific description of many diseases caused by pathogenic microorganisms

objectively true and not socially constructed? Is the germ theory of disease
objectively real and not socially constructed? Is malaria an objectively real
disease and not some socially constructed fiction that oppresses people because it
is "privileged" by a powerful medical profession?

PhilFebruary 14, 2015 at 10:46 AM

(1) Yes, you can. By engaging in mysticism where 'objective truth' rests on an
unspecified, mystical 'ding an sich'. I find this ridiculous.

(2) All of the things you list are obviously constructed. The medical conditions
are brought into being through a language of taxonomic classification and so on.

The limits I would tend to think of as empirical and anthropological. For example,
every society seems to have an incest taboo in place. This seems to be culturally
universal.

In terms of such anthropological limits it might be worth considering that

Foucault's first major work was an introduction and exploration of Kant's views on
anthropology.

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23945-introduction-224-l-anthropologie-published-in-one-
volume-with-foucault-s-translation-of-emmanuel-kant-s-anthropologie-d-un-point-de-
vue-pragmatique/

This is what I mean by these thinkers being so far beyond the curve. Kant raised
these issues hundreds of years ago and the Anglophones haven't even begun to try to
tackle them. That is why analytic philosophy and has produced nothing of interest
while, say, Foucault has produced massive shifts in contemporary historiography.

LKFebruary 14, 2015 at 11:04 AM

(1) you must know that "Ding an sich" is the Kantian term for the real external
world, but I have eliminated that concept from the arguments I offered you and
shown how -- even on idealist ontology -- the case for objective truth can be
strongly made: because words can and do refer to objects of perception, and
sentences can and do accurately describe things and events we experience in our
sensory world, and there is an accurate relationship of correspondence (truth).

(2) "All of the things you list are obviously constructed."

If you contracted malaria, would you think you are rationally justified in choosing
a scientific medical treatment for it, instead of, say, exorcism, faith healing, a
witch doctor or leech-treatment?

If you would you choose modern medicine over these things, why? Do you think it is
a rational choice? Or do you think it is merely irrational?

If it is irrational, why not choose a witch doctor?

PhilFebruary 14, 2015 at 11:16 AM

(1) I already pointed out that the objects of perception are constructed through
language. Malaria is a construction of a certain taxonomic structure; demon
possession is the construction of another. You keep confusing what in philosophy
are called 'objects' and what is called 'sensory perceptions'.

(2) It is a choice. That is all. What choice you make will produce different
results. Just like wearing a coat will produce different results in cold weather
than walking around naked. Which is the 'correct' or 'rational' thing to wear?
Depends on your own subjective evaluation of the situation and what you aim to
achieve.

Me drinking quantities of alcohol that are likely not good for my health, for
example, is an 'irrational' choice from the perspective of medicine; i.e. in purely
biological terms. But in terms of how I live my life it is not 'wrong' in any way.
And anyone who tells me otherwise is just an idiotic moralist cloaking themselves
in the language of Science rather than of Religion.

LKFebruary 14, 2015 at 12:04 PM

I leave the discussion here for today:

(1) note I already showed how idealist objects of perception can exist without
language, e.g., as they clearly do for infants who come to learn to associate words
with things. We also have very strong evidence higher animals with visual systems
similar to ours see the same objects of perception we do, even if, say, some of
them see in black and white. Yet animals clearly do not have language.

No, "objects of perception are constructed through language" is wrong: they exist
independently of language.

You have not refuted this.

(2) "What choice you make will produce different results."

Bingo.

But you are just faced with the same question: yes, modern medicine has different
results: it has overwhelming evidence on its side that it actually cures diseases,
when exorcism, faith healing, a witch doctor or leech-treatment does not.

You appear to be telling me that your choice (if you choose modern medicine when
you have all the symptoms of what doctors call malaria) has no rational basis: but
it clearly does. All the evidence demonstrates modern medicine cures this disease
and other things do not.

Apparently you cannot even make the reasonable statement that your choice is
rational, on the basis of overwhelming evidence.

Frankly this speaks volumes about where postmodernism will take you: to total
intellectual disaster and irrationality.

As I said to Unlearningeconomics, the postmodernist epistemology will actually

undermine and destroy any coherent Left economic or political program -- even a
Post Keynesian one.

If we have no rational reason to think Post Keynesian theories are true and that
Post Keynesian policies would work, nobody has any business advocating Post
Keynesianism to anyone. Or indeed any economic theory whatsoever.

CalgacusFebruary 14, 2015 at 3:54 PM

Phil:It means that, since the 'supermind' figure is inaccessible to mortals then we
have severely limited abilities to actually grasp at objective truth. That is not
what Post-Kantian Idealists, who almost all rejected the ding-an-sich, thought. The
main stream, e.g. to Hegel and beyond did not believe in any inaccessibility or
particular limitation of grasp on truth, or cosmic arbitrariness of the way our
lives are structured. You are probably right on Keynes, Moore & the British
Hegelians.

PhilFebruary 14, 2015 at 4:32 PM

(1) If you don't understand what in philosophy we mean by 'objects' then I can't
help you.

(2) You don't get this at all. Take an example. A Christian scientist refuses
treatment for cancer because it is against his belief structure. Is this
'irrational'? You and your moralist friends would like to believe it is. But its
not. They choose to live their life one way; you choose to live your life another.
The fact that many 'rationalists' don't see this shows that they are the same as
the old Christian missionaries.

The fact of the matter is that the Christian scientist would rather die than accept
treatment. You think that this is 'irrational'. But that's just a judgement you
pass on the way they choose to live their lives.

Personally I would prefer to see them not live like this. But at least I recognise
my judgement for what it is in this regard. I don't patronise the person with high
moralistic nonsense where I am 'rational' and they are 'irrational'. I literally
find that attitude sickening.

(3) I find it enormously amusing that the people who tell me that postmodernism
will ruin Post Keynesian policies tend to not be remotely involved in the policy
debate. Nor do they make any attempts to actually get the policies in place through
political action. The phrase 'hot air' comes to mind; as it so often does with the
'rationalist' crowd.

Varoufakis is inclined toward what you would consider 'postmodern' ideas and I'd
imagine that you'd give him the same lecture. Good luck with that.

LKFebruary 14, 2015 at 11:20 PM

(1) I use "objects of perception" in Berkeley's sense of mental entities in my
argument to you (and where, for the sake of argument, I assume a real external
world does not exist).

Do infants without language see objects of perception? Please answer this question.

(2) There is nothing moral/ethical about the argument rationality: this an argument
about justification, and about whether the success of science is an argument for
the idea that science gets at a real reality.

(3) Varoufakis is inclined toward what you would consider 'postmodern' ideas

Phil,
Here is what Mr Varoufakis has said about Postmodernism:

"Without wishing to discuss the 'postmodern condition' generally, I shall

concentrate entirely on its likely effects on the struggle to 'civilise' economics.
In this regard, the problem with postmodern thinking is that it stands no chance of
success. .... For despite its considerable oeuvre, postmodern criticisms of
economics are doomed to shrivel and be absorbed by mainstream economics; the
predator turning into unsuspecting prey. I risk this prediction for two reasons.
First, postmodernists allow economics to parade as equally scientific as the
natural sciences (albeit on the grounds that no discipline is truly scientific).etc
"
Yanis Varoufakis, "Postmodernism: conspiring with the orthodoxy," 10 June, 2002 -
11:00
http://evatt.org.au/news/postmodernism-conspiring-orthodoxy.html

Read the whole thing. It is a damning indictment of postmodernism and a commitment

by Mr Varoufakis to some kind of realism.

See Y. Varoufakis, 2002. "Deconstructing Homo Economicus? Reflections on an

Encounter between Postmodernity and Neoclassical Economics," Journal oj Economic
Methodology, 9.3: 389-396.

regards,
LK