[G.R. No. 24569. February 26, 1926. ] determining the question. The testimony of 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — To constitute a sound and
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner and appellant,
and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant, v.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, Opponent-Appellee.
Araneta & Zaragoza for Appellants.
Marcaida, Capili & Ocampo and Thomas
Cary Welch for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY;
DEFINITION. — Testamentary capacity is the
capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction in which the testator is engaged at
the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would
naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in
which the instrument will distribute his property
among the objects of his bounty. (Bugnao v.
Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163; Bagtas v. Paguio
t1912], 22 Phil., 227; and Jocson v. Jocson
[1922], 46 Phil., 701.)
2. ID; ID.; TIME AS OF WHICH CAPACITY TO BE
DETERMINED. — The mental capacity of the
testator is determined as of the date of the
execution of his will.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTS OF CAPACITY. — Neither old
age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind,
weakness of the memory, the appointment of a
guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly
or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. The
nature and rationality of the will is of some
practical utility in determining capacity. Each
case rests on its own facts and must be decided
by its own facts.
4. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE. — On the issue of
testamentary capacity, the evidence should be
permitted to take a wide range in order that all
facts may be brought out which will assist in
subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the
testator’s mental condition is entitled to great
weight where they are truthful and intelligent.
The evidence of those present at the execution
of the will and of the attending physician is also
to be relied upon.
5. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS. — The
presumption is that every adult is sane. But
where the question of insanity is put in issue in
guardianship proceedings, and a guardian is
named for the person alleged to be
incapacitated, a presumption of the mental
infirmity of the ward is created; the burden of
proving sanity in such case is cast upon the
proponents of the will.
6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF APPOINTMENT OF
GUARDIAN. — The effect of an order naming a
guardian for an incapacitated person is not
conclusive with respect to the condition of the
person, pursuant to the provisions of section
306 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree
does not conclusively show that the
testamentary capacity of a person under
guardianship is entirely destroyed. The
presumption created by the appointment of a
guardian may be overcome by evidence proving
that such person at the time he executed a will
was in fact of sound and disposing mind and
memory.
7. ID.; ID.; MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE;
INSANITY. — A will to be valid must, under
sections 614 and 634 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, be made by a testator of sound
mind. The question of mental capacity is one of
degree. There are many gradations from the
highest degree of mental soundness to the
lowest conditions of diseased mentality which
are denominated as insanity and idiocy. (Bagtas
v. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227, and Bugnao v.
Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163.)
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the
testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties. The question is not so
much, what was the degree of memory
possessed by the testator, as, had he a
disposing memory? (Buswell on Insanity, sec.
365; Campbell v. Campbell [1889], 130 Ill.,
466, and Bagtas v. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil.,
227.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SENILE DEMENTIA." —
Senile dementia is childishness. In the first
stages of the disease, a person may possess
reason and have will power.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE CASES ON
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY EXAMINED. — An
examination of the Philippine cases on
testamentary capacity discloses a consistent
tendency to protect the wishes of the deceased
whenever it be legally possible. These decisions
also show great tenderness on the part of the
court towards the last will and testament of the
aged.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — On
January 3, 1924, when the testator, Tomas
Rodriguez, made his will, he was 76 years old,
physically decrepit, weak of intellect, suffering
from a loss of memory, had a guardian of his
person and his property, and was eccentric, but
he still possessed that spark of reason and of
life, that strength of mind to form a fixed
intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts
to enforce that intention, which the law terms
"testamentary capacity." Two of the subscribing
witnesses testified clearly to the regular manner
in which the will was executed, and one did not.
The attending physician and three other doctors
who were present at the execution of the will
expressed opinions entirely favorable to the
capacity of the testator. Three other members
of the medical profession expressed opinions
entirely unfavorable to the capacity of the
testator and certified that he was of unsound
mind. Held, That Tomas Rodriguez on January
3, 1924, possessed sufficient mentality to make
a will which would meet the legal test regarding
testamentary capacity; that the proponents of
the will have carried successfully the burden of
proof and have shown him of sound mind on
that date; and that it was reversible error on the
part of the trial court not to admit his will to
probate.
12. ID.; UNDUE INFLUENCE; DEFINITION. —
Undue influence as used in connection with the
law of wills, may be defined as that which
compels the testator to do that which is against
the will from fear, the desire of peace, or from
other feeling which he is unable to resist.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Field, That
the theory that undue influence was exercised
by the persons benefited in the will in
conjunction with others who acted in their
behalf, and that there was a preconceived plan
on the part of the persons who surrounded
Tomas Rodriguez to secure his signature to the
testament, must be rejected as not proved.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
This case concerns the probate of the alleged
will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez.
Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, on February 25, 1924,
leaving a considerable estate. Shortly
thereafter, Manuel Torres, one of the executors
named in the will, asked that the will of
Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered
by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the
deceased, on the grounds: (1) That the testator
lacked mental capacity because at the time of
the execution of the supposed will he was
suffering from senile dementia and was under
guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been
exercised by the persons benefited in the
document in conjunction with others who acted
in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of
Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained
through fraud and deceit. After a prolonged
trial, judgment was rendered denying the
legalization of the will. In the decision of the trial
judge appeared, among others, these
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All this evidence taken together with the
circumstance that before, and at, the time
Tomas Rodriguez was caused to sign the
supposed will, Exhibit A, and the copies thereof,
there already existed a final judgment as to his
mental condition, wherein he was declared
physically and mentally incapacitated to take
care of himself and manage his estate, shows in
a clear and conclusive manner that at the time
of signing the supposed will, Tomas Rodriguez
did not possess such mental capacity as was
necessary to enable him to dispose of his
property by the supposed will.
"But even supposing, as contended by
petitioner’s counsel, that Tomas Rodriguez was
at the time of executing the will, competent to
make a will, the court is of the opinion that the
will cannot be probated, for it appears from the
declaration of the attesting witness Elias Bonoan
that when the legatee Luz Lopez presented the
supposed will, Exhibit A, to Tomas Rodriguez,
she told him to sign said Exhibit A because it
was a document relative to the complaint
against one Castito, which is Exhibit 4, then
pending in the justice of the peace court, and
for the further reason that said Tomas
Rodriguez was then under guardianship, due to
his being mentally and physically incapacitated,
and therefore unable to manage his property
and take care of himself. It must also be taken
into account that Tomas Rodriguez was an old
man 76 years of age, and was sick in the
hospital when his signature to the supposed will
was obtained. All of this shows that the
signature of Tomas Rodriguez appearing in the
will was obtained through fraudulent and
deceitful representations of those who were
interested in it." (Record on Appeal, p. 23.)
From the decision and judgment above-
mentioned, the proponents have appealed. Two
errors are specified, viz: (1) The court below
erred in holding that at the time of signing his
will, Tomas Rodriguez did not possess the
mental capacity necessary to make the same;
and (2) the court below erred in holding that the
signatures of Tomas Rodriguez to the will were
obtained through fraudulent and deceitful
representations, made by persons interested in
the execution of said will.
The record is voluminous — close to two
thousand type-written pages, with a varied
assortment of exhibits. One brief contains two
hundred seventy-four pages, the other four
hundred fifteen pages. The usual oral argument
has been had. The court must scale this
mountain of evidence more or less relevant and
of argument intense and prolific to discover the
fertile valleys of fact and principle.
The topics suggested by the assignments of
error — Testamentary Capacity and Undue
Influence — will be taken up separately and in
order. An attempt will be made under each
subject, first, to make findings of fact quite
separate and apart from those of the trial judge,
and, second. to make findings of law. Finally, it
is proposed to consolidate the facts and the law
by rendering judgment.
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
A. Facts. — For a long time prior to October,
1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble health. His
breakdown was undoubtedly due to organic
weakness, to advancing years, and to an
accident which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6).
Ultimately, on August 10, 1923, on his own
initiative, Rodriguez designated Vicente F.
Lopez as the administrator of his property
(Exhibit 7).
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila
to name a guardian for Tomas Rodriguez
because of his old age and pathological state.
This petition was opposed by Attorney Gregorio
Araneta acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for
the reason that while Rodriguez was far from
strong on account of his years, he was yet
capable of looking after his property with the
assistance of his administrator, Vicente F.
Lopez. The deposition of Tomas Rodriguez was
taken and a perusal of the same shows that he
was able to answer nearly all of the questions
propounded intelligently (Exhibit 54-G). A trial
was had at which considerable oral testimony
for the petitioner was received. At the
conclusion of the hearing, an order was issued
by the presiding judge, declaring Tomas
Rodriguez incapacitated to take care of himself
and to manage his property, and naming
Vicente F. Lopez as his guardian. (Exhibit 37.)
Inasmuch as counsel for the appellee make
much of one incident which occurred in
connection with the guardianship proceedings,
it may as well be mentioned here as later. This
episode concerns the effort of deputy sheriff
Joaquin Garcia to make service on Tomas
Rodriguez on October 31, 1923. We will let the
witness tell in his own words what happened on
the occasion in question:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I found him lying down on his bed . . . And
when it (the cleaning of his bed) was finished, I
again entered his room and told him that I had
an order of the court which I wanted to read as
I did read to him, but after reading the order he
asked me what the order meant; ’I read it to
you so that you may appear before the court,
because you have to appear before the court’ —
’I do not understand,’ then I read it again, but
he asked what the order said; in view of that
fact I left the order and departed from the
house." (S. R., p. 642.)
To return to our narrative possibly inspired by
the latter portion of the order of Judge Diaz,
Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine
General Hospital on November 27, 1923. There
he was to remain sick in bed until his death. The
physician in charge during this period was Dr.
Elias Domingo. In the clinical case record of the
hospital under the topic "Diagnosis (in full)," we
find the following: "Senility; Hernia inguinal;
Decubitus" (Exhibit 8).
On the door of the patient’s room was placed a
placard reading — "No visitors, except father,
mother, sisters, and brothers." (Testimony of
head nurse Carmen Baldonado, S. R., p. 638.)
By order of the attending physician, there were
permitted to visit the patient only the following
named persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel
Ramirez, Romana Lopez, Luz Lopez de Bueno,
Remedios Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad
Vizcarra, Apolonia Lopez, Antonio Haman, and
Gregorio Araneta (Exhibit 9). The list did not
include the names of Margarita Lopez and her
husband Antonio Ventura. Indeed the last
named persons experienced considerable
difficulty in penetrating into the room of
Rodriguez.
Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion
when he was visiting Tomas Rodriguez in the
hospital, Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to
make a will and suggested that the matter be
taken up with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R., p. 550).
This information Santiago Lopez communicated
to Vicente F. Lopez, who then interviewed
Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City
of Manila, for the purpose of securing him to
prepare the will. In accordance with this
request, Judge Mina conferred with Tomas
Rodriguez in the hospital on December 16th and
December 29th. He ascertained the wishes of
Rodriguez and wrote up a testament in rough
draft. The attorney expected to return to the
hospital on December 31st to have the will
executed but was unable to do so on account of
having to make a trip to the provinces.
Accordingly, the papers were left with Santiago
Lopez.
In corroboration of the above statements, we
transcribe a portion of Judge Mina’s testimony
which has not been challenged in any
way:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARANETA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q. Will you please tell your motive for holding
an interview with Vicente Lopez?
"MAXIMINO MINA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. When I arrived in the house of Vicente
Lopez, after the usual greetings and other
unimportant things, he consulted me or
presented the question as to whether or not D.
Tomas could make his will, having announced
his desire to do so. I told him that it seemed
that we were not called upon to decide or give
an opinion as to whether or not he can make a
will; it is a question to be submitted to the court,
but as he had announced his desire, it is our
duty to comply with it. Then he requested me to
do what was necessary to comply with his
wishes; I told him I was to see him; then we
agreed that on the morning next to the following
evening, that is, on the 16th, I should go to the
General Hospital, and so I did.
"Q. Did you go to the hospital in the evening of
the 16th?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you meet D. Tomas.? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did D. Tomas tell you his desire to make a
will?
"OCAMPO: Leading.
"ARANETA: I withdraw. What, if anything, did D.
Tomas tell you on that occasion when you saw
him there?
"A. He told me that.
"Q. Please tell us what conversation you had
with D. Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. The conversation I had with him that
evening — according to my best recollection —
I cannot tell the exact words and perhaps the
order. After the usual greetings, ’Good evening,
D. Tomas,’ ’Good evening,’ ’How are you,’ ’How
do you do?’ ’Very well, just as you find me.’
Then I introduced myself saying, ’I came here
in the name of D. Vicente Lopez, because
according to him you stated your desire to make
a will.’ ’Yes,’ he said, ’and where is Vicente
Lopez, why does he not come.’ ’He cannot come
because he has many things to do, and besides
it is hard for him and makes him tired, so he
told me to come.’ Then he asked me, ’Who are
you?’ ’I am Maximino Mina, your tenant,
attorney.’ ’Are you an attorney?’ ’Yes.’ ’Where
do you live?’ ’I live in Quiapo.’ ’Oh, in Quiapo, a
good district, it is gay, a commercial place, you
must have some business there because that is
a commercial place.’ ’Unfortunately, I have
none, D. Tomas.’ ’Well, you must have because
the profession alone does not give enough.
Where is your office?’ ’I work in the office of Mr.
Chicote.’ ’That-Mr. Chicote must be rich, it
seems to me that he is.’ ’The profession gives
almost nothing, it is better to have properties. I
am an attorney but do not depend upon my
profession.’ I interrupted D. Tomas saying,
’since you want to make a will, when and to
whom do you want to leave your fortune?’ Then
he said, ’To whom else? To my cousin Vicente
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez.’ ’Which
properties do you want to give to your cousin
and niece?’ ’All my properties.’ ’Won’t you
specify the property to be given to each of
them?’ ’What for?, all my property.’ ’Don’t you
have any other relatives?’ ’Yes, sir, I have.’
’Won’t you give any to those relatives?’ ’What
for?,’ was his answer.’Well do you want to
specify said properties, to say what they are?’
and he again said, ’What for?, they know them,
he is my attorney-in-fact as to all my property.’
I also said, ’Well and as a legacy, won’t you give
anything to other persons?’ The answer, ’I
think, something, they will know it.’ After being
asked, ’Whom do you think, whom do you want
to be your executor?’ After hesitating a little,
’This Torres, Manuel or Santiago Lopez also.’
Then I asked him, ’What is your religion?’ He
answered, ’Roman Apostolic Catholic,’ and then
he also asked me, ’And yours?’ ’Also Roman
Apostolic Catholic.’ ’Where have you studied?’
’In the University of Santo Tomas.’ ’It is
convenient to preserve the Catholic religion that
our ascendants have left us.’ ’And you, what did
you study in the university,’ he asked. I said,
’Do you have anything more to say as to your
testamentary dispositions?’ ’No,’ he answered.
Then I reminded him, ’You know that Vicente
Lopez has sent me to get these dispositions of
yours,’ and he said, ’Yes, do it.’ I asked him,
’When do you want it done?’ ’Later on, I will
send for you.’ After this, believing to have done
my duty, I bade him good-bye.
"Q. Did you have any other occasion to see him?
"A. Yes.
"Q. When?
"A. On December 29, 1923, also in the evening.
"Q. Why did you go to see him?
"A. Because as I had not received any message
either from Vicente Lopez or from Tomas
Rodriguez, and as I had received notices in
connection with the few cases I had in the
provinces, particularly in Tayabas, which
compelled me to be absent from Manila until
January 1st at least, for I might be there for
several days, so I went to the General Hospital
of my own accord — since I had not received
any message from them — with a rough draft
which I had prepared in accordance with what
he had told me in our conversation. After the
greetings, I told him, ’Here I am, D. Tomas; this
is the rough draft of your will in accordance with
your former statements to me in order to submit
it to you. Do you want to read it?’ ’Please do me
the favor of reading it.’ I read it slowly to him in
order that he could understand it. After reading,
’It is all right, that is the way, — few words —
you see it takes only a few minutes; now I can
execute the will.’ ’We can do it, it takes only a
few minutes.’ In view of that statement of his, I
called his attention, ’But we don’t have
witnesses, D. Tomas.’ I looked out through the
door to see if I could call some witnesses, but it
was late then and it was thought better to do it
on the 31st of December, and so I told D. Tomas
that I would be coming on the 31st of
December. Then we talked about other things,
and he -again asked, ’Where were you born?’ I
told him in Quiapo.’Ah, good district, and
especially now that the fiesta of Quiapo is
coming near,’ and then I interrupted him, ’Yes,
the fiestas of the Holy Child and of Our Lady of
Mount Carmel’ because we also talked about the
fiesta of San Sebastian. I again reminded him
that we could not do it because the witnesses
were not there and he explained, ’Good "A. With the exception of the words ’3 de enero
Christmas present, isn’t it?’ I did not tell him de 1924’ it seems to be literally identical." (S.
anything, and in view of that I did not deem it R., pp. 244-249.)
necessary to stay there any longer.
As the witness stated, the will which was
"Q. With whom did you make the arrangement prepared by him is identical with that signed by
to make the will on the evening of the 31st of the testator and the attesting witnesses with the
December — you said that it was agreed that single exception of the change of the date from
the will be executed on the evening of December 31, 1923, to January 3, 1924. Two
December 31st? copies besides the original of the will were
made. The will is brief and simple in
"A. With Santiago Lopez and Don Tomas. terminology.
"Q. Was the will executed on the 31st of For purposes of record, we copy the will as here
December? translated into English:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. What happened is this: In view of that "ONLY PAGE
agreement, I fixed up the rough draft which I
had, dating it the 31st of December, putting "In the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, this
everything in order; we agreed that Santiago January 3, 1924, I, Tomas Rodriguez, of age
Lopez would meet me on said 31st day between and resident of the City of Manila, Philippine
five and six in the evening or a little before, but Islands, do freely and voluntarily make this my
it happened that before the arrival of that date will and testament in the Spanish language
Santiago Lopez came and told me that I need which I know, with the following
not trouble about going to the General Hospital clauses:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
because it could not be carried out for the
reason that certain requisites were lacking. In "First. I declare that I am a Roman Apostolic
view of this and bearing always in mind that on Catholic, and order that my body be buried in
the following day I had to go to the provinces, I accordance with my religion, standing, and
told Santiago Lopez that I would leave the circumstances.
papers with him because I might go to the
provinces. "Second. I name my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and
his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as my only and
"Q. What may be the meaning of those words universal heirs of all my property.
good Christmas present?
"Third. I appoint D. Manuel Torres and D.
"A. They are given as a Christmas present when Santiago Lopez as my executors.
Christmas comes or on the occasion of
Christmas. "In witness whereof I sign this typewritten will,
consisting of one single page, in the presence of
"Q. I show you this document which is marked the witnesses who sign below.
Exhibit A, tell me if that is the will or copy of the
will which you delivered to Santiago Lopez on (Sgd.) "TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
December 31, 1923?
(Left marginal signatures:)
"TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
"ELIAS BONOAN
"V L. LEGARDA
"A. DE ASIS"
"We hereby certify that on the date and in the
place above indicated, Don Tomas Rodriguez
executed this will, consisting of one single
typewritten page, having signed at the bottom
of the will in the presence of us who saw as
witnesses the execution of this will, and we
signed at the bottom thereof in the presence of
the testator and of each other.
(Sgd.) "V. L. LEGARDA
"ELIAS BONOAN
"A. DE ASIS"
(Exhibit A.)
On the afternoon of January 3, 1924, there
gathered in the quarters of Tomas Rodriguez in
the Philippine General Hospital, Santiago Lopez,
his relative; Mr. V. L. Legarda, Dr. Elias Bonoan,
and Dr, A. de Asis, attesting witnesses; and Dr.
Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo, and Dr.
Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for
purposes of observation. (Testimony of Elias
Bonoan, S. R., p. 8; testimony of V. L. Legarda,
S. R., p. 34.) Possibly also Mrs. Luz Lopez de
Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at
least they were hovering in the background.
As to what actually happened, we have in the
record two absolutely contradictory accounts.
One emanates from the attesting witness,
Doctor Bonoan. The other is the united
testimony of all the remaining persons who
were there.
Doctor Elias Bonoan was the first witness called Tomas Rodriguez, Mrs. Nena Lopez, and Dña.
at the trial. He testified on direct examination as "Q. When did Luz Lopez talk to you in connection Luz Lopez.
to formal matters, such as the identification of with your going to the hospital?
the signatures to the will. On cross- "Q. Were those the only persons?
examination, he rather startled the proponents "A. On the morning of the 3d she called me up
of the will by stating that Luz Lopez de Bueno by telephone. "A. Yes, sir.
told Tomas Rodriguez to sign the document
because it concerned a complaint against "Q. On the morning? "Q. What time approximately did you go to the
Castito and that nobody read the will to the General Hospital on January 3d?
testator. Doctor Bonoan’s testimony along this "A. On the morning.
line is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A. A quarter to 3.
"Q. Before January 3, 1924, when the will of
"QUESTIONS. Tomas Rodriguez was signed, did Luz Lopez talk "Q. After you, who came?
to you?
"MARCAIDA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A. Antonino de Asis, Doctor Herrera, later on
"A. Yes, sir. Doctor Calderon arrived with Doctor Elias
"Q. Why were you a witness to the will of Tomas Domingo, and lastly Santiago Lopez came and
Rodriguez? "Q. How many days approximately before was then Mr. Legarda.
it?
"ARANETA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library "Q. When you entered the room of the patient,
"A. I cannot tell the day, it was approximately D. Tomas Rodriguez, in the General Hospital in
I object to the question as being immaterial. one week before, — on that occasion when I was what position did you find him?
called up by her about the deceased Vicente
"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Lopez. "A. He was Lying down.

Objection overruled. "Q. What did she tell you when you went to the "Q. Did you greet D. Tomas Rodriguez?
house of Vicente Lopez one week approximately
"ARANETA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library before signing the will? "A. I did.

Exception. "A. That Tomas Rodriguez would make a will. "Q. Did D. Tomas Rodriguez answer you?

"Dr. BONOAN:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Q. Don’t you know where the will of Tomas "A. Dña. Nena immediately answered in
Rodriguez was made? advance and introduced me to him saying that
"A. Because I was called up by Mrs. Luz by I was the brother of his godson.
telephone telling me to be in the hospital at 3 "A. In the General Hospital.
o’clock sharp in the afternoon of the 3d of "Q. Did other persons whom you have
January. "Q. Was that document written in the hospital.? mentioned, viz, Messrs. Calderon, Herrera,
Domingo, De Asis, and Legarda, greet Tomas
"Q. Who is that Luz whom you have mentioned? "A. I have not seen it. Rodriguez?

"A. Luz Lopez, daughter of Vicente Lopez. "Q. When you went to the General Hospital on "ARANETA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
January 3, 1924, who were the persons you met
"Q. What day, January 3, 1924? in the room where the patient was? I object to the question as being improper cross-
examination. It has not been the subject of the
"A. Yes, sir. "A. I met one of the nieces of the deceased direct examination.
 "Q. And it was then, was it not, when Exhibits
"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library "Q. Was the will signed by Tomas Rodriguez A, A-1, and A-2 were written?
lying down, on his feet, or seated?
Objection overruled. "A. Yes, sir.
"A. Lying down.
"ARANETA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library "Q. Do you know where it was written?
"Q. Was the will read by Tomas Rodriguez or
Exception. any person present at the time of signing the "A. In the General Hospital.
will, did they read it to him?
"A. No, sir, they joined us. "Q. Did any time elapse from your making the
"A. Nobody read the will to him. suggestion that the document which you
"Q. What was D. Tomas told when he signed the delivered to Santiago Lopez be rewritten until
will? "Q. Did not D. Tomas read the will? those three exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were
presented to you?
"A. To sign it. "A. I have not seen it.
"A. About nine or ten minutes approximately.
"Q. Who told D. Tomas to sign the Will? "Q. Were you present?
"Q. The time to make it clean.?
"A. Luz Lopez. "A. Yes, sir." (S. R., p. 8.) As it would be quite
impracticable to transcribe the testimony of all "A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What did Luz Lopez tell Tomas Rodriguez in the others who attended the making of the will,
order that he should sign the Will? we will let Vicente L. Legarda, who appears to "Q. Where were you during that time?
have assumed the leading role, tell what
"A. She told him to sign the document; the transpired. He testified in "A. In the room of D. Tomas Rodriguez.
deceased Tomas Rodriguez before signing the part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
document asked what that was which he was to "Q. Were you talking with him during that time?
sign. "ARANETA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What did anybody answer to that question Q. Who exhibited to you those documents,
of D. Tomas? Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2? "Q. About what things were you talking with
him?
"A. Luz Lopez told him to sign it because it ‘LEGARDA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
concerned a complaint against Castito. D. "A. He was asking me about my health, that of
Tomas said, ’What is this?’ And Luz Lopez "A. Santiago Lopez. my family, how my family was, my girl, whether
answered, ’You sign this document, uncle we were living in Pasay, he asked me about the
Tomas, because this is about the complaint "Q. Did he show you the same document? steamer Ildefonso, he said that it was a pity that
against Castito.’ it had been lost because he knew that my
"A. First, that is to say the first document he father-in-law was the owner of the steamer
"Q. Then Tomas Rodriguez signed the will? presented to me was a rough draft, a tentative Ildefonso.
will, and it was dated December 31st, and I
"A. Yes, sir. called his attention to the fact that the date was x x x
not December 31, 1923, and that it was
"Q. Who had the will? Who was holding it? necessary to change the date to January 3,
1924, and it was done. "Q. When those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and
"A. Mr. Vicente Legarda had it in his own hands. A-2, that is, the original and the two copies of
the will signed by D. Tomas Rodriguez were
written clean, will you please tell what
happened?
"A. When Santiago Lopez gave them to me
clean, I approached D. Tomas Rodriguez and
told him: ’Don Tomas, here is this will which is
ready for your signature’
"Q. What did D. Tomas do when you said that
his will you were showing to him was ready?
"A. The first thing he asked was: ’the
witnesses?’ Then I called the witnesses —
’Gentlemen, please come forward,’ and they
came forward, and I handed the documents to
D. Tomas. D. Tomas got up and then took his
eyeglasses, put them on and as he saw that the
electric lamp at the center was not sufficiently
clear, he said: ’There is no more light;’ then
somebody came forward bringing an electric
lamp.
"Q. What did D, Tomas do when that electric
lamp was put in place?.
"A. The eyeglasses were adjusted again and
then he began to read, and as he could not read
much for a long time, for he unexpectedly felt
tired and took off the eyeglasses, and as I saw
that the poor man was tired, I suggested that it
be read to him and he stopped reading and I
read the will to him.
"Q. What happened after you had read it to him?
"A. He said to me, ’Well, it is all right. It is my
wish and my will. Don’t you have any pen?’ I
asked a pen of those who were there and
handed it to D. Tomas.
"Q. Is it true that Tomas Rodriguez asked at that
time ’What is that which I am going to sign?’
and Luz Lopez told him: ’It is in connection with
the complaint against Castito?’
Santo Tomas, suffice it to say that Luz Lopez de
"A. It is not true, no, sir. Bueno denied categorically the statements
attributed to her by Doctor Bonoan (S. R., p.
"Q. During the signing of the will, did you hear 568). In this stand, she is corroborated by
Luz Lopez say anything to Tomas Rodriguez? Doctor De Asis, an attesting witness, and by
Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera, the
"A. No, sir, she said nothing. at- tending physicians. On this point, Doctor
Calderon, the Director of the Philippine General
"Q. According to you, Tomas Rodriguez signed Hospital and Dean of the College of Medicine in
of his own accord? the University of the Philippines,
testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. Yes, sir.
"Mr. ARANETA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Did nobody tell him to sign?
"Q. What have you seen or heard with regard to
"A. Nobody. the execution of the will?
"Q. What happened after the signing of the will "Dr. CALDERON:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
by Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. Mr. Legarda handed the will to D Tomas
"A. I called the witnesses and we signed in the Rodriguez. D. Tomas asked for his eyeglasses,
presence of each other and of Tomas Rodriguez. wanted to read, and it was extremely hard for
him to do so. Mr. Legarda offered to read the
"Q. After the signing of the will, did you have will, it was read to him and he heard that in that
any conversation with Tomas Rodriguez? will Vicente Lopez and Luz Lopez were appointed
heirs; we also saw him sign that will, and he
"A. Doctor Calderon asked D. Tomas Rodriguez signed not only the original but also the other
some questions. copies of the will and we also saw how the
witnesses signed the will; we heard that D.
"Q. Do you remember the questions and the Tomas asked for light at that moment; he was
conversation held between Doctor Calderon and at that time in a perfect mental state. And we
D. Tomas after the signing of the will? remained there after the will was executed. I
asked him, ’How do you feel, how are you?’
"A. I remember that afterwards Doctor Calderon ’Well, I am well,’ he answered.’How is the
talked to him about business. He asked him how business?’ ’There is a crisis, but there is one
the business was going on, — ’everything is good business, namely, that of making loans at
going wrong, except the business of making the rate of 18 per cent,’ and he answered, ’That
loans at 18 per cent.’ It seems that Tomas is usury.’ When a man answers in that way,
Rodriguez answered: ’That loan at 18 per cent ’That is usury,’ it shows that he is all right.
is illegal, it is usury.’" (S. R., p. 38.)
"Q. Were you present when Mr. Legarda handed
In addition to the statements under oath made the will to him?
by Mr. Legarda, an architect and engineer in the
Bureau of Public Works and professor of "A. Yes, sir.
engineering and architecture in the University of
"Q. Did any person there tell Don Tomas that which should here be mentioned. It is that on
that was a complaint to be filed against one "A. With no hesitation. January 7, 1923 (1924), Luz Lopez de Bueno
Castito? signed a document in favor of Doctor Bonoan in
"Q. Did he sign without anybody having the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000).
"A. No, sir, I have not heard anything of the indicated to him where he was to-sign? This paper reads as
kind. follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. Yes, without anybody having indicated it to
"Q. It was said here that when the will was him. "Be it known by these
handed to him, D. Tomas Rodriguez asked what presents:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
that was which he was to sign and that Luz "Q. Do you know whether D. Tomas Rodriguez
Lopez answered, ’That is but a complaint in asked for more light before signing? "That I, Luz Lopez de Bueno, in consideration of
connection with Castito.’ Is that true? the services which at my instance were, and will
"A. He asked for more light, as I have said when necessary be, rendered by Dr. Elias
"A. I have not heard anything of the kind. before. Bonoan in connection with the execution of the
will oF my uncle, Don Tomas Rodriguez, and the
"Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, "Q. Do you remember that detail? due probate thereof, do hereby agree to pay
would you have heard it? said doctor, by way of remuneratory donation,
"A. Yes, sir, they first lighted the lamps, but as the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000),
"A. Yes, sir. the light was not sufficient, he asked for more Philippine currency, as soon as said services
light. shall have been fully rendered and I shall be in
"Q. Was Luz Lopez there? possession of the inheritance which in said will
"Q. Do you remember very well that he asked is given to me.
"A. I don’t remember having seen her; I am not for light?
sure; D, Santiago Lopez and the three witnesses "In witness whereof, I sign this document which
were there; I don’t remember that Luz Lopez "A. Yes, sir." (S. R., p. 93.) was freely and spontaneously executed by me
was there. in Manila, this January 7, 1923.
A clear preponderance of the evidence exists in
"Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, favor of the testimony of Vicente Legarda, (Sgd.) "LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO"
would you have heard it? corroborated as it is by other witnesses of the
highest standing in the community. The only (Exhibit 1)
"A. Yes, sir. explanation we can over relative to the There is a sharp conflict of testimony, as is
testimony of Doctor Bonoan. is that possibly he natural, between Doctor Bonoan and Luz Lopez
"Q. Did D. Tomas sign of his own accord? may have arrived earlier than the others with de Bueno relative to the execution of the above
the exception of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and that document. We shall not attempt to settle these
"A. Yes, sir. Luz Lopez de Bueno may have made some sort differences, as in the final analysis it will not
of an effort to influence Tomas Rodriguez. There affect the decision one way or the other. The
"Q. Do you remember whether he was given a is, however, no possible explanation of the most reasonable supposition is that Luz Lopez
pen or he himself asked for it? statement of Doctor Bonoan to the effect that de Bueno imprudently endeavored to bring over
no one read the will to Rodriguez, when at least Doctor Bonoan to her side of the case by signing
"A. I don’t know; it is a detail which I don’t five other persons recollect that Vicente Legarda and giving to him Exhibit 1. But the event
remember well; so that whether or not he was read it to him and recall the details connected cannot easily be explained away.
given a pen or he himself asked for it, I do not with the reading.
remember. Tomas Rodriguez passed away in the Philippine
There is one curious occurrence which General Hospital, as we have said, on February
"Q. But did he sign without hesitation? transpired shortly after the making of the will 25, 1924. But even prior to his demise, the two
factions in the Lopez family had prepared
themselves for a fight over the estate. The Luz
Lopez faction had secured the services of Doctor
Domingo, the physician in charge of the
Department of Insane of the San Lazaro
Hospital and Assistant Professor of Nervous and
Mental Diseases in the University of the
Philippines, as attending physician; had
associated with him for purposes of
investigation Dr. Fernando Calderon, the
Director of the Philippine General Hospital, and
Dr. Florentino Herrera, a physician in active
practice in the City of Manila; and had arranged
to have two members of the medical fraternity,
Doctors De Asis and Bonoan, as attesting
witnesses. The Margarita Lopez faction had
taken equal precautions by calling as witnesses
in the guardianship proceedings Dr. Sixto de los
Angeles, Professor and Chief of the Department
of Legal Medicine in the University of the
Philippines, and Dr. Samuel Tietze, with long
experience in mental diseases; thereafter by
continuing Doctors De los Angeles and Tietze to
examine Tomas Rodriguez, and by associating
with them Dr. William Burke, a well-known
physician of the City of Manila. Skilled lawyers
were available to aid and abet the medical
experts. Out of such situations, do will contests
arise.
An examination of the certificates made by the
two sets of physicians and of their oral
testimony shows that on most facts they concur.
Their deductions from these facts disclose a
substantial divergence of opinion. It is a
hopeless task to try to reconcile the views of
these distinguished gentlemen who honestly
arrived at definite but contradictory conclusions.
The best that we can do under the
circumstances is to set forth the findings of the
Calderon committee on the one hand and of the
De los Angeles committee on the other.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera
examined Tomas Rodriguez individually and
jointly before the date when the will was
executed. All of them, as we have noticed, were
present at the signing of the will to note the
reactions of the testator. On the same day that
the will was accomplished, the three doctors
signed the following
certificate:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned, Drs. of Medicine, with offices
in the City of Manila, and engaged in the
practice of their profession, do hereby
certify:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That they have jointly examined Mr. Tomas
Rodriguez, confined in the General Hospital,
floor No. 3, room No. 361, on three different
occasions and on different days, and have found
that said patient is suffering from anaemia,
hernia inguinal, chronic dyspepsia, and senility.
"As to his mental state, the result of the
different tests to which this patient was
submitted is that his intellectual faculties are
sound, except that his memory is weak, which
is almost a loss for recent facts, or events which
have recently occurred, due to his physical
condition and old age.
"They also certify that they were present at the
time he signed his will on January 3, 1924, at
3.25 p. m., and have found his mental state in
the same condition as was found by the
undersigned in their former examinations, and
that in executing said will the testator had full
understanding of the act he was performing,
and full knowledge of the contents thereof.
"In testimony whereof, we sign in Manila this
January 3, 1924.
(Sgd.) "FLORENTINO HERRERA
"Tuberias 1264
"Quiapo
(Sgd.) "Dr. FERNANDO CALDERON
"General Hospital
"Manila
(Sgd.) "Dr. ELIAS DOMINGO
"613 Remedios
"Malate"
(Exhibit E in relation with Exhibits C and D.)
Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand
expressed a definite opinion as to the mentality
of Tomas Rodriguez. What follows is possibly
the most significant of the doctor’s
statements:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Dr. CALDERON testifying after
interruption:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. I was naturally interested in finding out the
true mental state of Tomas Rodriguez, and that
was the chief reason why I accepted and gave
my cooperation to Messrs. Elias Domingo and
Florentino Herrera because had I found that
Tomas Rodriguez was really insane, I should
have ordered his transfer to the San Lazaro
Hospital or to other places, and would not have
left him. in the General Hospital. Pursuant to my
desire, I saw Tomas Rodriguez in his room alone
twice to have interviews with him, he being a
person whom I knew since several years ago; at
the end of the interviews I became convinced
that there was nothing wrong with him; I had
not seen anything indicating that he was insane
and for this reason I accepted the request of my
companions and joined them; we have been on
five different occasions examining Tomas
Rodriguez jointly from the physical standpoint,
but chiefly from the standpoint of his mental
state; I have been there with Messrs. Herrera
and Elias Domingo, examining Tomas Rodriguez
and submitting him to a mental test on the 28,
29, 30 and 31 of December and the 2d of
January, 1924 — five consecutive days in which
we have been together besides my particular
visits.
"Q. Will you please state the result of the
observation you made alone before those made
by the three of you jointly?
"A. I asked Tomas Rodriguez some questions
when I went alone there, I asked him where he
was living formerly and he well remembered
that in Intramuros, Calle Real; I asked him
whether he remembered one Calderon who was
living in the upper floor of the house, and then
he told me yes; then I asked him about his
tenant by the name of Antonio Jimenez and he
told me yes, — now I remember that he had two
daughters, Matilde and Paz. Then I told him that
I had been living in the house of that gentleman,
Antonio Jimenez, already dead — in the upper
story of the house which belonged to Tomas
Rodriguez; I told him that Antonio Jimenez was
his tenant of the upper story, that is, that he
was living on the ground floor and Antonio
Jimenez upstairs, and he remembered all of
this; I also began to talk of my brother, Felipe
Calderon, whom he said of course that he knew;
he remembered him because he was his
companion and was a successful attorney. This
was when I had an interview with him. Then in
order to observe better and to be sure of my
judgment or opinion about the mental state of
Tomas Rodriguez, I saw him again and we
began to speak of something which I don’t
remember now. In fine, we talked of things of
interest and as I had finally accepted the
request of Drs. Elias Domingo and Florentino
Herrera to join them, the first and second time
that Herrera, Domingo and myself went there,
no stenographic notes were taken of what
happened there.
"Q. So that before joining Doctors Herrera and
Domingo you had already paid two visits to the
patient?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. From the result of the conversation you had
with Tomas Rodriguez on those two visits, what
is your opinion as to his mental capacity?
"A. That he was sick; that he was weak, but I
have found absolutely no .incoherence in his
ideas; he answered my questions well, and as I
was observing him, there were times when he
did not remember things of the present —
because this must be admitted — but on the
other hand he had a wonderful memory for past
events; in talking with him, you would not
notice in the conversation any alteration in his
mind nor that that man had lost the reasoning
power or logic.
"Q. Did you notice any loss of memory, or that
his memory was weakening about things of the
past?
"A. About things of the past, I mean that you
talk to him now about specific matters, and after
about five or ten minutes he no longer
remembers what had been talked of.
x x x
"Q. Do you remember the conversation you had
with him for the first time when the three of you
paid a visit to the patient?
"A. I don’t remember the details, but I do
remember the questions I put to him. I asked
D. Tomas Rodriguez: ’You are an old man, aged,
sick, why don’t you think of making your will?’
and he said: ’Yes, I am thinking to make a will.’
’But why don’t you decide?’ ’There is no hurry,
there is time to make a will,’ he said.’Then in
case you decide to make a will, to whom are you
going to leave your property? Don’t you have
any relatives?’ ’I have a relative, Vicente Lopez,
my first cousin, and Margarita Lopez, my first
cousin, they are brothers.’ ’In that case, to
whom do you want to leave your property?’
’Why, I don’t have much, very little, but I am
decided to leave it to my cousin, Vicente Lopez,
and his daughter Luz Lopez.’ ’Why would you
not give anything to Margarita Lopez?’ ’No
because her husband is very bad,’ to use his
exact language, ’is very bad.’
"Q. Did you talk with him on that occasion about
his estate?
"A. Yes, sir, he told me that he had three
estates, — one on Calle Magallanes, another on
Calle Cabildo, and the third on Calle Juan Luna,
and besides he had money in the Monte de
Piedad and Hogar Filipino.
x x x
"Q. From the questions made by you and the
answers given by Mr. Tomas Rodriguez on that
occasion, what is your opinion as to his mental
capacity.
"A. The following: That the memory of Tomas
Rodriguez somewhat failed as to things of the
present, but is all right with regard to matters
or facts of the past; that his ideas were
coherent; that he thought with logic, argued
even with power, and generally in some of the
interviews I have arrived at the conclusion that
Tomas Rodriguez had an initiative of his own,
did not need that anybody should make him any
suggestion, because he answered in such a way
that if you permit me now to show you my
stenographic notes, they will prove to you
conclusively that he had an initiative of his own
and had no need of anybody making him any
question." (S. R. p. 72.)
Doctor Elias Domingo, who was the attending
physician for Tomas Rodriguez throughout all "Q. Did you really examine his mental condition
the time that Rodriguez was in the hospital and or capacity during the months of October and
who even prior to the placing of Rodriguez in the November?
hospital had examined him, was likewise certain
that Rodriguez possessed sufficient mentality to "A. Yes, sir.
make a will. Among other things, Doctor
Domingo testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Q. How many times did you visit him?
"ARANETA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A. I don’t remember exactly but I visited him
about five or six times.
"Q. Have you known D. Tomas Rodriguez?
x x x "Q. Did you ask him about his property?
"Dr. DOMINGO:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. Yes, sir. "Q. Please tell us the result of your examination
during those months of October and November?
"Q. Did you attend D. Tomas Rodriguez as
physician? "A. I examined him physically and mentally; I
am not going to tell here the physical result but
"A. Yes, sir. the result of the mental examination, and that
is: General Conduct: In most of the times that I
"Q. When did you begin to attend him as have seen him, I found him Lying on his bed,
physician? smoking a cigarette and asked for a bottle of
lemonade from time to time; I also observed
"A. On November 28, 1923, until his death. that he was very careful when throwing the ash
of the cigarette, seeing to it that it did not fall
"Q. Where did you attend him? on the blankets; he also was careful not to
throw the stub of the cigarette in any place to
"A. In the General Hospital. avoid fire; I made more observations as to his
general conduct and I found that sometimes
"Q. On November 28 or October 28, 1923, do Don Tomas could move within the place
you remember? although with certain difficulty. On two
occasions I found him seated, once seated at
"A. I had been attending him as physician from the table, seated on the chair, and the other on
November 28th although it is true that I had had a rocking-chair. I also examined his manner of
opportunity to see and examine him during the talking and to all questions that I put to him he
months of October and November. answered with a fair coherence and in a relevant
manner, although sometimes he showed
"Q. What was the object of your visits or meagerness and certain delay. I based these
attendance during the months of October and points of my declarations on the questions
November? which are usually asked when making a mental
examination, for instance I asked him, ’What is
"A. It was for the purpose of observing his your name,’ and he correctly answered Tomas
mental state. Rodriguez; I asked him if he was married and
he answered ’No;’ I asked him his profession
and he answered that formerly he was an
attorney but that at the time I was making the
examination he was not practicing the
profession; I asked him with what he supported
himself and he said that he lived upon his
income, he said verbatim, ’I live on my income.’
I also asked him what the amount of his income
was and he answered that it was about P900; I
asked him what the source of this income was
and he said that it came from his property.
"A. No, at that time.
"Q. Proceed.
"A. I also observed his emotional status and
affectivity. I found it rather superficial, and he
oftentimes got angry due to his physical
disease; I asked him if he had any relatives and
he answered correctly saying that he had. He
mentioned Vicente Lopez, Margarita Lopez, and
Luz Lopez. As to his memory. His memory for
the past. He very easily remembered past
events and when he described them he did it
with such pleasure that he used to smile
afterwards — if it was a fact upon which one
must smile. His memory for recent facts was
very much lessened. I say this because on
various occasions and not having known me
when he had a better memory, after I had seen
him thrice he remembered my name and he
recognized me. Insight and judgment. I arrived
at the conclusion that he had fair knowledge of
himself because he knew that he was sick and
could not be moving with ease, but he believed
that he could perform with sufficient ease
mental acts; his judgment was also all right
because I asked him this question: ’Supposing
that you should find a bill of P5 in the vestibule
of a hotel, what would you do with it?’ He told
me that he would take the bill and give it to the
manager in order that the latter may look for
the owner if possible. His reasoning. I found that
he showed a moderate retardation in the flow of
his thought, especially with regard to recent
events, but was quite all right as to past events.
His capacity. He believed that he was capable of
thinking properly although what did not permit
him to do so was his physical decrepit condition.
The conclusion is that his memory is lost for
recent events tho not totally and diminution of
his intellectual vigor. This is in few words the
result of my examination." (S. R., p. 345.)
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined
thoroughly by Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze,
and Burke. Doctor De los Angeles had been a
witness in the guardianship proceedings and
had seen the patient on November 6 and 7,
1923. Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in
the guardianship case and had visited the
patient on November 9 and 12, 1923, and on
January 15, 1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke
together examined Rodriguez on January 17,
20, and 24, 1924. The three physicians
conducted a joint examination on January 27
and 28, and February 10, 1924. As a result, on
March 15, 1924, they prepared and signed the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
"In the Matter of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez,
male, 76 years of age, single and residing or
being confined in the Philippine General
Hospital.
"We, the undersigned Doctors, Sixto de los
Angeles, W. B. Burke, and Samuel Tietze, do
hereby certify as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That we are physicians, duly registered
under the Medical Act, and are in the actual
practice of the medical profession in the
Philippines.
"2. That on January 27th and 28th and February
10th, 1924, at the Philippine General Hospital,
we three have with care and diligence jointly
and personally examined the person of said
Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez; and previous to these
dates, we have separately and partly jointly
observed and examined said patient on various
occasions; Dr. Sixto de los Angeles, at the
patient’s home, 246 Magallanes St., Manila, on
November 6th and 7th, 1923; Dr. Samuel
Tietze, at the patient’s home on November 9th
and 12th, 1923, all at the Philippine General
Hospital on January 15th, 1924; and Dr. W. B.
Burke together with Dr. Samuel Tietze at the
Philippine General Hospital on January 17th,
20th, and 24th, 1924; and as a result of the
medical examinations and the history of the
case we found and hereby certify to the
following conclusions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) That he was of unsound mind suffering
from senile dementia, or of mental impairment
exceeding to a pathologic extent the usual
conditions and changes found to occur in the
involutional period of life.
"(b) That he was under the influence of the
above condition continuously, at least from
November, 1923, till the date of our joint
reexamination, January 27th and 28th, and
February 10th, 1924; and that he would
naturally have continued without improvement,
as these cases of insanity are due to organic
pathological changes of the brain. This form of
mental disease is progressive in its pathological
tendency, going on to progressive atrophy and
degeneration Of the brain, the mental
symptoms, of course, running parallel with such
pathological basis.
"(c) That on account of such disease and
conditions, his mind and memory were so
greatly impaired as to make him unable to know
or to appreciate sufficiently the nature, effect,
and consequences of the business he was
engaged in; to understand and comprehend the
extent and conditions of his properties; to
collect and to hold in his mind the particulars
and details of his business transactions and his
relations to the persons who were or might have
been the objects of his bounty; and to free
himself from the influences of importunities,
threats, and ingenuities, so that with a relatively
less resistance, he might had been induced to
do what others would not have done.
"3. We have diagnosed this case as senile
dementia of the simple type, approaching the
deteriorated stage upon the following detailed
mental examinations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Disorder of memory. — There was almost
an absolute loss of memory for recent events,
to the extent that things and occurrences seen
or observed only a few minutes previously were
completely forgotten. Faces and names of
persons introduced to him were not
remembered after a short moment even without
leaving his bedside. He showed no
comprehension of the elemental routine
required in the management of his properties, i.
e. : who were the lessees of his houses, what
rents they were paying, who was the
administrator of his properties, in what banks
he deposited his money or the amount of money
deposited in such banks. Regarding his personal
relations, he forgot that Mr. Antonio Ventura is
the husband of his nearest woman cousin; that
Mrs. Margarita Lopez was married, saying that
the latter was single or spinster, in spite of the
fact that formerly, during the past twenty-five
years, he was aware of their marriage life. He
did not know the names of the sons and
daughters of Mr. Vicente Lopez, one of his
nearest relatives, even failing to name Mrs. Luz
Lopez de Bueno, a daughter of said Vicente
Lopez, and who now appears to be the only
living beneficiary of his will. He also stated that
Mr. Vicente Lopez frequently visited him in the
hospital, though the latter died on January 7th,
1924. He did not recognize and remember the
name and face of Doctor Domingo, his own
physician. However, the memory for remote
events was generally good, which is a
characteristic symptom of senile dementia.
"(b) Disorientation of time, place, and persons.
— He could not name the date when asked (day
or month); could not name the hospital wherein
he was confined; and failed to recognize the fact
that Doctor Domingo was his physician.
"(c) Disorders of perception. — He was almost
completely indifferent to what was going on
about him. He also failed to recognize the true
valle of objects shown him, that is, he failed to
recognize the ’Saturday Evening Post’ nor would
he deny that it was a will when presented as
such. He also failed to show normal intellectual
perception, making no effort to correlate facts
or to understand matters discussed in their
proper light.
"(d) Emotional deterioration. — The patient was
not known during his time of physical incapacity
to express in any way or lament the fact that he
was unable to enjoy the happiness that was due
him with his wealth. As a matter of fact, he
showed complete indifference. He showed loss
of emotional control by furious outbreaks over
trifling matters and actually behaved like a
child; for example, if his food did not arrive
immediately or when his cigar was not lit soon,
he would become abusive in his language and
show marked emotional outburst. If the
servants did not immediately answer his call, he
would break down and cry as a child.
"(e) Symptoms of decreased intellectual
capacity. — There was a laxity of the internal
connection of ideas. The patient has shown no
insight regarding his own condition. He did not
appreciate the attitude of the parties concerned
in his case; he would on several occasions
become suspicious and fail to comprehend the
purpose of our examination. He was
inconsistent in his ideas and failed to grasp the confiaria usted la defensa del mismo? — R. Al
meaning of his own statements. When Sr. Marcaida, como conocido antiguo.
questioned whether he would make 1 will, he
stated to Doctor Tietze that he intended to "P. ¿ Ha hablado usted y colferenciado alguna
bequeath his money to San Juan de Dios vez o varias veces en estos dias, o sea desde el
Hospital and Hospicio de San Jose. When he was 25 de octubre de 1923 hasta hoy, con algun
informed, however, that he had made a will on abagado para que le defendiera algun asunto
January 3d, 1924, he denied the latter ante el Juzgado le Primera Instancia de Manila?
statement, and failed to explain the former.
Although for a long time confined to bed and "R. Con ninguno, porque en caso de nombrar,
seriously ill for a long period, he expressed nombraria al Sr. Marcaida. (p. e, deposition,
himself as sound physically and mentally, and in Nov. 19, 1923.)
the false belief that he was fully able to
administer his business personally. "ARANETA: P. ¿ No recuerda usted que usted
me ha encomendado como abogado para que
"His impairment of the intellectual field was me oponga a que le declaren a usted loco o
further shown by his inability, despite his incapacitado? — R. Si, senor, quien ha
knowledge of world affairs, to appreciate the solidtado? (P. 9, deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
relative value of the statement made by Doctor
Tietze as follows: ’We have here a cheque of "Dr. DOMINGO:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
P2,000 from the King of Africa payable to you
so that you may deposit it in the bank. Do you "P. ¿ Don Tomas, me conoce usted? ¿ Se
want to accept the cheque?’ His answer was as acuerda usted que soy el Doctor Domingo?
follows: ’Now I cannot give my answer. It may
be a surprise.’ Such answer given by a man "R. Si. (P. 7, sten n., Jan. 28, 1924.)
after long experience in business life, who had
handled real estate property, well versed in the "P. ¿ Quien soy, Don Tomas, usted me conoce?
transaction of cheques, certainly shows a
breaking down of the above field. No proper "R. No se. (P. 6, sten. n., Feb. 10, 1924.)
questions were asked why the cheque was given
by the King who the King was, why he was "Dr. ANGELES:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
selected by the King of Africa, or if there is a
King of Africa at present. He further shows "P. ¿ Me conoce usted, D. Tomas?
doubt in his mental capability by the following
questions and answers:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "R. Le conozco de vista. (P. 6, sten. n., Jan. 28,
1924.)
"MARCAIDA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"P. Nos vamos a despedir ya, Don Tomas, de
"P. Tiene ustedactualmente algun asunto en los usted. Yo soy el Doctor Angeles, ¿ me conoce
tribunales de justicia de Manila? usted?
"R. No recuerdo en este momento. "R. De nombre.
"P. De tener usted algun aslnto propio en los "P. Este es el Doctor Burke, ¿ le conoce usted?
tribunales de justicia de Manila, ¿a que abogado
"R. De nombre. "I. Family history. — His parents were noted to the habit for no reason at all of calling "Maria,
be of nervous temper and irritable. where are my 50 centavos, where is my key."
"P. Este es el Doctor Domingo, ¿ le conoce In explanation of the observations made by the
usted? "II. Personal history. — He was a lawyer, but did nurses, the nurse Apolonio Floreza
not pursue his practice, devoting the greater testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"R. De vista. part of his life to collecting antiquities. He was
generally regarded by his neighbors as miserly "Direct questions of Attorney
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, ¿recuerda usted su and erratic in the ordinary habits of life. He lead OCAMPO:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
nombre? a very unhygienic life, making no attempt to
clean the filth or dirt that was around him. He "Q. Among your observations on the 1st of
"R. No. (P. 10, sten. n., Jan. 28, 1924.) was neglectful in personal habits. On April, January, 1924, you say ’with pains all over the
1921, he suffered an injury to his forehead, body, and uttered some incoherent words of the
"P. ¿Usted conoce a este Doctor? (Senalando al from which he became temporarily unconscious, same topics whenever is awakened.’ How could
Doctor Burke). and was confined in the Philippine General you observe that he had pains all over the body?
Hospital for treatment. He frequently
"R. De vista; su nombre ya lo he olvidado, ya no complained of attacks of dizziness and "APOLONIO FLOREZA,
me acuerdo. headache, following this injury; suffered from a nurse:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
large hernia; and about two years ago, he was
"P. ¿Usted nos ve a los tres? (Doctores Angeles, fined for failure in filing his income tax, from "A. I observed that by the fact that whenever I
Burke y Tietze). which incident, we have reason to believe, the touched the body of the patient he complained
onset of his mental condition took place. This of some pain.
"R. Ya lo creo. incident itself can most probably be considered
as a failure of memory. His condition became "Q. On what part of the body did you touch him?
"Dr. BURKE:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph progressively worse up to his death.
"A. On all the parts of his body.
"P. ¿ Que profesion tenemos? (Senalando a los "4. The undersigned have stated all the above
Sres. Angeles, Burke y Tietze). facts contained in this certificate to the best of "Q. How did you touch him, strongly or not?
our knowledge and belief.
"R. Yo creo que son doctores. "A. Slightly.
"Manila, P. I., March 15, 1924.
"P. ¿Y los dos? (Senalando a los Doctores "Q. When you touched him slightly, what did he
~ngeles y Tietze). (Sgd.) "SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES do?

"R. No. se. "W. B. BURKE, M. D. "A. He said that it was aching.

"P. ¿Y este senor? (Senalando al Doctor "SAMUEL TIETZE" "Q. What words did he say when, according to
Angeles). your note, he uttered incoherent words
(Exhibit 33 in relation with Exhibits 28 and 29.) whenever he awakes?
"R. No me acuerdo en este momento. (Pp. 4 and
5, sten. n., Feb. 10, 1924.) Another angle to the condition of the patient on "A. As for instance, ’Maria,’ repeating it ’Where
or about January 3, 1924, is disclosed by the are my 50 centavos, where is my key?’
"(f) Other facts bearing upon the history of the treatment record kept daily by the nurses, in
case obtained by investegation of Doctor which appear the nurse’s remarks. (Exhibits 8- "Q. Did you hear him talk of Maria?
Angeles:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph A, 8-B, and 8-C.) In this connection, the
testimony of the nurses is that Rodriguez was in "A. Only the word ’Maria.’
 "Q. On that date January 2j 1924, did you together with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze,
"Q. How long approximately was he talking, answer him when he said ’Maria?’ and Burke, further declare that his memory was
uttering the name of ’Maria,’ ’Where are my 50 almost an absolute loss for recent events. His
centavos,’ and ’where is my key?’ "A. No, sir. memory, however, for remote events was
generally good. He was given to irrational
"A. For two or three minutes. "Q. In this observation of yours appearing on exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.
page 8-C, you say, among other things, ’with
"Q. Can you tell the court whether on those pains all over the body and shouted whenever While, however, Doctors Calderon, Domingo,
occasions when he said the name of ’Maria’ he he is given injection.’ Did you really observe this and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties
said other words and was talking with in the patient? of the patient are "sound, except that his
somebody? memory is weak," and that in executing the will
"A. Yes, sir. the "testator had full understanding of the act
"A. He was talking to himself. he was performing, and full knowledge of the
"Q. How did he shout? contents thereof," Doctors De los Angeles,
"Q. This remark on Exhibit 8-B, when was it Tietze, and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez
written by you? "ARANETA: Objection as being immaterial. "was of unsound mind" and that they
"diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the
"A. On January 2, 1924. "COURT: Overruled. simple type, approaching the deteriorated
stage." Without attempting at this stage to pass
"Q. In the observation corresponding to January "ARANETA: Exception. in judgment on the antagonistic conclusions of
2, 1924, you also say, ’With pains all over the the medical witnesses, or on other disputed
body,’ and later on, ’talked too much whenever "A. In a loud voice. points, insofar as the facts are concerned, a
patient is awakened.’ How did you happen to resolution of the case comes down to this: Did
know the pain which you have noted here? "Q. Besides shouting, do you remember Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess
whether he said anything? sufficient mentality to make a will, or had he
"A. The pains all over the body, I have observed passed so far along in senile dementia as to
them when giving him baths. "A. He repeated the same words I have said require the court to find him of unsound mind?
before ’Maria, the 50 centavos, the key.’ We leave the facts in this situation to pass on to
"Q. Besides saying that it ached when .you a discussion of the legal phases of the case.
touched the body, do you know whether he did "Q. When did this observation occur which
any extraordinary thing? appears on page 8-C? B. Law. — The Code of Civil Procedure
prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a
"A. You mean to say acts? "A. On January 3, 1924." (S. R., p. 595.) will that the testator be of "sound mind" (Code
of Civil Procedure, sec. 614). A "sound mind" is
"Q. Acts or words? On certain facts pertaining to the condition of a "disposing mind." One of the grounds for
Tomas Rodriguez, there is no dispute. On disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane
"A. Yes, sir, like those words which I have January 3, 1924, Rodriguez had reached the or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution
already said which he used to say — ’Maria, the advanced age of 76 years. He was suffering of such an instrument at the time of its
key, 50 centavos.’ from anaemia, hernia inguinal, chronic execution." (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634
dyspepsia, and senility. Physically he was a [2].) Predicated on these statutory provisions,
"Q. You say that he called Maria. What did he wreck. this court has adopted the following definition of
say about Maria on that date, January 2, 1924? testamentary capacity:" ’Testamentary capacity
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on is the capacity to comprehend me nature of the
"A. He used to say, ’Maria, where is Maria?’ January 3, 1924, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, transaction in which the testator is engaged at
and Herrera admit that he was senile. They, the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would
naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in
which the instrument will distribute his property
among the objects of his bounty.’" (Bugnao v.
Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163, followed in Bagtas
v. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227, and Jocson v.
Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701.) The mental
capacity of the testator is determined as of the
date of the execution of his will (Civil Code, art.
666).
Various tests of testamentary capacity have
been announced by the courts only later to be
rejected as incomplete. Of the specific tests of
capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities,
feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory,
the appointment of a guardian, nor
eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to
show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests
on its own facts and must be decided by its own
facts.
There is one particular test relative to the
capacity to make a will which is of some
practical utility. This rule concerns the nature
and rationality of the will. Is the will simple or
complicated? Is it natural or unnatural? The
mere exclusion of heirs will not, however, in
itself indicate that the will was the offspring of
an unsound mind.
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the
evidence should be permitted to take a wide
range in order that all facts may be brought out
which will assist in determining the question.
The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will
concerning the testator’s mental condition is
entitled to great weight where they are truthful
and intelligent. The evidence of those present at
the execution of the will and of the attending
physician is also to be relied upon. (Alexander
on Wills, vol. I, pp. 433, 484; Wharton & Stille’s
Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I, pp. 100 et seq.)
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It
is only when those seeking to overthrow the will
have clearly established the charge of mental
incapacity that the courts will intervene to set
aside a testamentary document. (Hernaez v.
Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas v. Paguio,
supra.)
Counsel for the appellee make capital of the
testator being under guardianship at the time
he made his will. Citing section 306 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they
insist that the effect of the judgment is
conclusive with respect to the condition of the
person. To this statement we cannot write down
our conformity. The provisions of the cited
section were taken from California, and there
the Supreme Court has never held what is now
urged upon us by the appellee. The rule
announced that in some states, by force of
statute, the linding of insanity is conclusive as
to the existence of insanity during the
continuance of adjudication, is found to rest on
local statutes, of which no counterpart is found
in the Philippines. (32 C. J., 647; Gridley v.
Boggs [1882], 62 Cal., 190; In the matter of the
Estate of Johnson [1881], 57 Cal., 529.) Even
where the question of insanity is put in issue in
the guardianship proceedings, the most that can
be said for the finding is that it raises a
presumption of incapacity to make a will but
does not invalidate the testament if competency
can be shown. The burden of proving sanity in
such case is cast upon the proponents.
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind
of the testator was the result of senile dementia.
This is the form of mental decay of the aged
upon which wills are most often contested. A
Newton, a Paschal, a Cooley suffering under
"the variable weather of the mind, the flying
vapors of incipient lunacy," would have proved
historic subjects for expert dispute. Had
Shakespeare’s King Lear made a will, without
any question, it would have invited litigation and
doubt.
Senile dementia, usually called childishness, has
various forms and stages. To constitute
complete senile dementia, there must be such
failure of the mind as to deprive the testator of
intelligent action. In the first stages of the
disease, a person may possess reason and have
will power. (27 L. R. A., N. S. [1~310], p. 89;
Wharton & Stille’s Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I,
pp. 791 et seq.; Schouler on Wills, vol. I, pp.
145 et seq.)
It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all
the leading cases which have gone forth from
this court, relating to the testator having a
sound and disposing mind, and which have been
brought to our notice by counsel, every one of
them has allowed the will, even when it was
necessary to reverse the judgment of the trial
court. A study of these cases discloses a
consistent tendency to protect the wishes of the
deceased whenever it be legally possible. These
decisions also show great tenderness on the
part of the court towards the last will and
testament of the aged. (See Hernaez v. Hernaez
[1903], 1 Phil., 689, per Arellano, C.J. ; In the
matter of the will of Butalid [1908], 10 Phil., 27,
per Arellano, C.J. ; Bugnao v. Ubag [1909], 14
Phil., 163, per Carson, J., Macapinlac v.
Alimurong [1910], 16 Phil., 41, per
Arellano, C.J. ; Bagtas v. Paguio [1912], 22
Phil., 227, per Trent, J., Galvez v. Galvez
[1913], 26 Phil., 243, per Torres, J., Samson v.
Corrales Tan Quintin [1923], 44 Phil., 573, per
Ostrand, J., and Jocson v. Jocson [1922], 46
Phil., 701, per Villamor, J.) Because of their
peculiar applicability, we propose to make
particular mention of four of the earlier cases of
this court.
In the case of Hernaez v. Hernaez, supra, the
subject of the action was the will executed by
Doña Juana Espinosa. The annulment of the will
was sought, first, upon the ground of the
incapacity of the testatrix. She was over 80
years of age, so ill that three days before she
executed the will she received the sacraments
and extreme unction, and two days afterwards
she died. Prior thereto she walked in a stooping
attitude, and gave contradictory orders, "as a
result of her senile debility." The Chief Justice
reached the conclusion that neither from the
facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the
documents presented "can the conclusion be
reached that the testatrix was deprived of her
mental faculties." The will was held valid and
efficacious.
In the case of In the matter of the will of Butalid,
supra, the will was contested for the reason that
Dominga Butalid at the date of the execution of
the document was not in the free use of her
intellectual powers, she being over 90 years of
age, lying in bed seriously ill, senseless, and
unable to utter a single word, so that she did
not know what she was doing when she
executed the will, while the document was
claimed to have been executed under the
influence and by the direction of one of the heirs
designated in the will. Yet after an examination
of the evidence, the Chief Justice rendered
judgment reversing the judgment appealed
from and declaring the will presented for
legalization to be valid and sufficient.
In the case of Bugnao v. Ubag, supra, the court
gave credence to the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses who swore positively that
at the time of the execution of the will the
testator was of sound mind and memory. Based
on these and other facts, Mr. Justice Carson,
speaking for the court, laid down the following
legal principles:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Between the highest degree of soundness of
mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that
degree of mental aberration generally known as
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees
of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on
one hand it has been held that ’mere weakness
of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of
body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble
minded person may make a valid will, provided
he has understanding and memory sufficient to
enable him to know what he is about, and how
or to whom he is disposing of his property’
(Lodge v. Lodge, 2 Houst. [Del. ], 418); that,
’To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is
not necessary that the mind should be unbroken
or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or
otherwise’ (Sloan v. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563);
that ’It has not been understood that a testator
must possess these qualities (of sound and
disposing mind and memory) in the highest
degree . . . Few indeed would be the wills
confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness,
debility of body, from age or infirmity, would,
according to its violence or duration in a greater
or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or
derange the mind, but the derangement must
be such as deprives him of the rational faculties
common to man’ (Den. v. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L.,
680); and, that ’Sound mind does not mean a
perfectly balanced mind. The question of
soundness is one of degree’ (Boughton v.
Knight, L. R., 3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on
the other hand, it has been held that
’testamentary incapacity does not necessarily
require that a person shall actually be insane or
of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect,
whether it arises from extreme old age, from
disease, or great bodily infirmities or suffering,
or from all these combined, may render the
testator in — capable of making a valid will,
providing such weakness really disqualifies her
from knowing or appreciating the nature,
effects, or consequences of the act she is
engaged in’ (Manatt v. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68
Am. St. Rep., 293, 302)."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In the case of Bagtas v. Paguio, supra, the
record shows that the testator for some
fourteen or fifteen years prior to the time of his
death suffered from a paralysis of the left side
of his body, that a few years prior to his death,
his hearing became impaired, and that he had
lost the power of speech. However, he retained
the use of his sight hand and could write fairly
well. Through the medium of signs, he was able
to indicate his wishes to his family. The will was
attacked on the ground that the testator lacked
mental capacity at the time of its execution. The
will was nevertheless admitted to probate. Mr.
Justice Trent, speaking for the court, announced
the following pertinent legal
doctrines:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . There are many cases and authorities
which we might cite to show that the courts
have repeatedly held that mere weakness of
mind and body, induced by age and disease do
not render a person incapable of making a will.
The law does not require that a person shall
continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
pristine physical and mental powers in order to
execute a valid will If such were the legal
standard, few indeed would be the number of
wills that could meet such exacting
requirements. The authorities, both medical and
legal, are universal in the statement that the
question of mental capacity is one of degree,
and that there are many gradations from the
highest degree of mental soundness to the
lowest conditions of diseased mentality which
are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
"The right to dispose of property by
testamentary disposition is as sacred as any
other right which a person may exercise and this
right should not be nullified unless mental
incapacity is established in a positive and
conclusive manner. In discussing the question
of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume
28, page 70, of the American and English
Encyclopedia of Law, that —
"‘Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression,
perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. A testator may be
afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses,
disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in
law of executing a valid will.’ (See the numerous
cases there cited in support of this statement.)
"The rule relating to testamentary capacity is
stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and
quoted with approval in Campbell v. Campbell
(130 Ill., 466), as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is
not necessary that the mind shall be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease or otherwise, or that the testator should
be in the full possession of his reasoning
faculties.’
"In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘The question is not so much, what was the
degree of memory possessed by the testator,
as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to
remember the property he was about to
bequeath, the manner of distributing it, and the
objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind
and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to
know and understand the business in which he
was engaged at the time when he executed his
will.’ (See authorities there cited.)
"In Wilson v. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the
following facts appeared upon the trial of the
case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102
years. In his early years he was an intelligent
and well informed man. About seven years prior
to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and
from that time his mind and memory were much
enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and
in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he
was affected with senile cataract causing total
blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his
habits, although formerly he was observant of
the proprieties of life. The court, in commenting
upon the case, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme
distress, nor debility of body will affect the
capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence
remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient
to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or
extend to his immediate family or property . . .
x x x the person and subject-matter, and that the
"‘Dougal (the testator) had lived over one
hundred years before he made the will, and his
physical and mental weakness and defective
memory were in striking contrast with their
strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind;
not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted
slowly, he was forgetful of recent events,
especially of names, and repeated questions in
conversation; and sometimes, when aroused
from sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered.
It is not singular that some of those who had
known him when he was remarkable for vigor
and intelligence, are of the opinion that his
reason was so far gone that he was incapable of
making a will, although they never heard him
utter an irrational expression.’
"In the above case the will was sustained. In the
case at bar we might draw the same contrast as
was pictured by the court in the case just quoted
. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The particular differences between all of the
Philippine cases which are cited and the case at
bar are that in none of the Philippine cases was
there any declaration of incompetency and in
none of them were the facts quite as
complicated as they are here. A case in point
where the will was contested, because the
testator was not of sound and disposing mind
and memory and because at the time of the
making of the will he was acting under the
undue influence of his brothers, and where he
had a guardian when he executed his will, is
Ames’ Will ([1902] 40 Ore., 495). Mr. Justice
Moore, delivering the opinion of the court, in
part said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is contended by contestant’s counsel that, on
the day said pretended -will purports to have
been executed, Lowell was declared
incompetent by a court which had jurisdiction of
decree therein appointing a guardian of his
person and estate raises the disputable
presumption that he did not possess sufficient
testamentary capacity at that time, to overcome
which required evidence so strong as to leave
no reasonable doubt as to his capacity to make
a valid will, and, the testimony introduced by
the proponent being insufficient for that
purpose, the court erred in admitting it to
probate . . .
"The appointment of a guardian of a person
alleged to be non compos mentis, by a court
having jurisdiction, must necessarily create a
presumption of the mental infirmity of the ward;
but such decree does not conclusively show that
the testamentary capacity of the person under
guardianship is entirely destroyed, and the
presumption thus created may be overcome by
evidence proving that such person at the time
he executed a will was in fact of sound and
disposing mind and memory: Stone v. Damon,
12 Mass., 487; Breed v. Pratt, 18 Pick., 115; In
re Slinger’s Will, 72 Wis., 22 (37 N. W., 236). .
. .
". . . The testimony shows that the testator
retained a vivid recollection of the contents of
the books he had read and studied when he was
young, but that he could not readily recall to his
mind the ordinary incidents of his later life. The
depth and intensity of mental impressions
always depend upon, and are measured by, the
degree of attention given to the perception of
facts, which requires observation, or to the
conception of truths, which demands reflection;
and hence the inability of a person to recollect
events occurring recently is evidence of mental
decay, because it manifests a want of power of
concentration of the mind. The aged live in the
past, and the impressions retained in their
minds are those that were made in their
younger days, because at that period of their
lives they were able to exercise will power by
giving attention. While the inability of a person
of advanced years to remember recent events
distinctly undoubtedly indicates a decay of the
human faculties, it does not conclusively
establish senile dementia, which is something
more than a mere loss of mental power,
resulting from old age, and is not only a feeble
condition of the mind, but a derangement
thereof. . . The rule is settled in this state that
if a testator at the time he executes his will
understands the business in which he is
engaged, and has a knowledge of his property,
and how he wishes to dispose of it among those
entitled to his bounty, he possesses sufficient
testamentary capacity, notwithstanding his old
age, sickness, debility of body, or extreme
distress.
x x x testamentary
"It is contended by contestant’s counsel that if
Lowell, at the time he executed the pretended
will, was not wholly lacking in testamentary
capacity, he was, in consequence of age, ill
health, debility of body, and infirmity of will
power, susceptible to persuasion by his friends,
and that his brothers, Andrew and Joseph,
having knowledge thereof, took advantage of
his physical and mental condition, and unduly
influenced him to devise and bequeath his
property in the manner indicated, attempting
thereby to deprive the contestant of all interest
therein except such as was given her by statute.
. . Assuming that he was easily persuaded, and
that his brothers and the persons employed by
them to care for him took advantage of his
enfeebled condition and prejudiced his mind
against the contestant, did such undue influence
render the will theretofore executed void? . . .
When a will has been properly executed, it is the
duty of the courts to uphold it, if the testator
possessed a sound and disposing mind and
memory, and was free from restraint and not
acting under undue influence, notwithstanding
sympathy for persons legally entitled to the
testator’s bounty and a sense of innate justice
might suggest a different testamentary
disposition.
"Believing, as we do, that the findings of the
circuit court are supported by the weight of the
testimony, its decree is affirmed."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Insofar as the law on testamentary capacity to
make a will is concerned, and carrying alone one
step further the question suggested at the end
of the presentation of the facts on the same
subject, a resolution of the case comes down to
this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924,
possess sufficient mentality to make a will which
would meet the legal test regarding
capacity, and have the
proponents of the will carried successfully the
burden of proof and shown him to be of sound
mind on that date?
II. UNDUE INFLUENCE
A. Facts. — The will was attacked on the further
ground of undue influence exercised by the
persons benefited in the will in collaboration
with others. The trial judge found this allegation
to have been established and made it one of the
bases of his decision. It is now for us to say if
the facts justify this finding.
Tomas Rodriguez voluntarily named Vicente F.
Lopez as his administrator. The latter
subsequently became his guardian. There is
every indication that of all his relatives Tomas
Rodriguez reposed the most confidence in
Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez who, on
the suggestion of Rodriguez, secured Maximino
Mina to prepare the will, and it was Luz Lopez
de Bueno who appears to have gathered the
witnesses and physicians for the execution of
the will. This faction of the Lopez family was also
shown a favor through the orders of Doctor
Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the
patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion that
there existed "a preconceived plan on the part
of the persons who surrounded Tomas
Rodriguez" to secure his signature to the
testament. The trial judge may be correct in this
supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that
men of the standing of Judge Mina, Doctors
Calderon, Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis, and
Mr. Legarda would so demean themselves and
so sully their characters and reputations as to
participate in a scheme having for its purpose to
delude and to betray an old man in his dotage.
Rather do we entertain the opinion that each of
the gentlemen named was acting according to
the best of his ability to assist in a legitimate act
in a legitimate manner. Moreover, considering
the attitude of Tomas Rodriguez toward
Margarita Lopez and her husband and his
apparent enmity toward them, it seems fairly
evident that even if the will had been made in
previous years when Rodriguez was more nearly
in his prime, he would have prepared somewhat
a similar document.
B. Law. — One of the grounds for disallowing a
will is that it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of
the beneficiary or some other person for his
benefit (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634[4]).
Undue influence, as here mentioned in
connection with the law of wills, and as further
mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be
defined as that which compels the testator to do
that which is against the will from fear, the
desire of peace, or from other feeling which he
is unable to resist.
The theory of undue influence is totally rejected
as not proved.
III. JUDGMENT
To restate the combined issue of fact and law in
this case pertaining to testamentary capacity:
Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924,
possess sufficient mentality to make a will which
would meet the legal test regarding
testamentary capacity, and have the
proponents of the will carried successfully the
burden of proof and shown him to be of sound
mind on that date?
Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one
a physician, testified clearly to the regular
manner in which the will was executed and to
the testator’s mental condition. The other
subscribing witness, also a physician, on the
contrary testified to a fact which, if
substantiated, would require the court to
disallow the will. The attending physician and
three other eminent members of the medical
fraternity, who were present at the execution of
the will, expressed opinions entirely favorable to
the capacity of the testator. As against this we
have the professional speculations of three
other equally eminent members of the medical
profession who, however, were not included
among those present when the will was
executed. The advantage on these facts is all
with those who offer the will for probate.
The will was short. It could easily be understood
by a person in physical distress. It was
reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take
into account the evident prejudice of the reach after an exhaustive and exhausting study
testator against the husband of Margarita of a tedious record, after weighing the evidence
Lopez. carefully and conceding all good faith to the
witnesses for the oppositors, and after giving to
With special reference to the definition of the case the serious consideration which it
testamentary capacity, we may say this: On deserves.
January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez, in our
opinion, comprehended the nature of the The judgment of the trial court will be set aside
transaction in which he was engaged. He had and the will of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez will be
had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge admitted to probate, without special
Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He
signed the will and its two copies in the proper Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Villamor,. Johns,
places at the bottom and on the left margin. At Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
that time the testator recollected the property
to be disposed of and the persons who would
naturally be supposed to have claims upon him.
While for some months prior to the making of
the will he had not managed his property, he
seems to have retained a distinct recollection of
what it consisted and of his income.
Occasionally his memory failed him with
reference to the names of his relatives.
Ordinarily, he knew who they were. He seemed
to entertain a predeliction towards Vicente F.
Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was
nearest to his own age. The testator
comprehended the manner in which the
instrument distributed the property among the
objects of his bounty. His conversations with
Judge Mina disclosed an insistence on giving all
of his property to the two persons whom he
specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may
have been of advanced years, may have been
physically decrepit, may have been weak of
intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory,
may have had a guardian, and may have been
extremely eccentric, but he still possessed that
spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind
to form a fixed intention and to summon his
enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention,
which the law terms "testamentary capacity."
That in effect is the definite opinion which we
[Adm. Case No. 8075. March 25, 1946.]
TRINIDAD NEYRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
ENCARNACION NEYRA, Defendant-
Appellee.
Alejandro M. Panis for Appellant.
Lucio Javillonar for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY;
INSOMNIA, TUBERCULOSIS, DIABETES, NOT
SUFFICIENT TO DESTROY MENTAL CAPACITY.
— Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two
doctors, who testified for the opponents to the
probate of a will, to the effect that it tended to
destroy mental capacity, was held not to affect
the full possession of the mental faculties
deemed necessary and sufficient for its
execution. (Caguioa v. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.)
The testatrix was held to have been compos
mentis, in spite of the physician’s testimony to
the contrary, to the effect that she was very
weak, being in the third or last stage of
tuberculosis. (Yap Tua v. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap
Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony of the
attending physician that the deceased was
suffering from diabetes and had been in a
comatose condition for several days, prior to his
death, was held not sufficient to establish
testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive
statement of several credible witnesses that he
was conscious and able to understand what was
said to him and to communicate his desires.
(Samson v. Corrales Tan quintin, 44 Phil., 573.)
2. ID; ID; OLD AGE OF ILL HEALTH
INSUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE WILL. — Where
the mind of testator is in perfectly sound
condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the
fact that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate
his will.
3. ID; ID; EVIDENCE OF SOUND MIND. —
Where it appears that a few hours and also a
few days after the execution of the will, the
testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed
with other persons, although lying down and
unable to move or stand up unassisted, but
could still effect the sale of property belonging
to him, these circumstances show that the
testator was in a perfectly sound mental
condition at the time of the execution of the will.
4. ID; ID; SLEEPING SICKNESS (ADDISON’S
DISEASE) DOES NOT IMPAIR MENTAL
FACULTIES. — The mental faculties of persons
suffering from Addison’s disease, like the
testatrix in the case, remain unimpaired, partly
due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they
enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of
physical and mental rest. And that like patients
suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or
diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties
until the moments of their death.
5. ID; SIGNING BY THUMBMARK; PRESENCE OF
ATTESTING WITNESSES; TEST OF. — The
contention that the attesting witnesses were not
present, at the time E. N. thumbmarked the
agreement and will in question, on her bed, in
the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in
the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown
that said witnesses were present, at the time of
the signing and execution of the agreement and
will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix
was lying on her bed. The true test is not
whether they actually saw each other, at the
time of the signing of the documents, but
whether they might have seen each other sign,
had they chosen to do so; and the attesting
witnesses actually saw it all in this case.
(Jaboneta v. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the
thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the
agreement and will in question is equivalent to
her signature. (Yap Tua v. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap
Ca Llu, supra.)
DECISION
DE JOYA, J.:
On October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra filed a
complain against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra,
in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila, for the recovery of one-half (1/2) of the
property mentioned and described therein,
which had been left by their deceased father,
Severo Neyra, and which had been previously
divided equally between the two extrajudicially,
demanding at the same time one-half (1/2) of
the rents collected on the said property by the
defendant Encarnacion Neyra.
The defendant filed an answer admitting that
the property mentioned and described therein
was community property, and at the same time
set up counterclaims amounting to over P1,000,
for money spent, during the last illness of their
father, and for money loaned to the plaintiff.
After the trial of the case, the court found that
the plaintiff was really entitled to one-half (1/2)
of the said property, adjudicating the same to
her, but at the same time ordered said plaintiff
to pay to the defendant the sum of P727.77,
plus interests, by virtue of said counterclaims.
Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from said
decision, to the Court of Appeals for Manila,
alleging several errors, attacking the execution
and validity of said agreement; and on
November 10, 1942, said appeal was dismissed,
pursuant to an agreement or compromise
entered into by the parties, as shown by the
corresponding document, dated November 3,
1942, which was filed in the case the following
day, November 4, 1942.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra, who had
been sickly for about two years, unexpectedly
died, on November 4, 1942, at the age of 48,
allegedly from heart attack, as a consequence
of Addison’s disease from which, it was claimed,
she had been suffering from sometime.
In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the
appeal, by virtue of said agreement or
compromise, Atty, Lucio Javillonar, claiming to
represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died
since November 4, 1942, and other relatives of
hers, filed a petition, dated November 23, 1942,
asking for the reconsideration of said decision of
the Court of Appeals, dismissing the appeal,
claiming that the alleged compromise or
agreement, dated November 3, 1942, could not
have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as
she was already then at the threshold of death,
and that as a matter of fact she died the
following day; and that if it had been signed at
all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumb mark
appearing on said document must have been
affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra’s attorney,
against Encarnacion’s will; and that the court
had no more jurisdiction over the case, when
the alleged agreement was filed on November
4, 1942, at the instance of Trinidad Neyra, as
Encarnacion was already dead at the time.
The principal question to be decided, in
connection with said petition for
reconsideration, is whether or not said
compromise or agreement had been legally
executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra, on
November 3, 1942. Trinidad Neyra maintains
the affirmative.
The voluminous evidence, testimonial and
documentary, adduced by the parties, in this
case, has fully established the following
facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of
Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain
properties and two children, by his first
marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and
Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second
marriage; that after the death of Severo Neyra,
the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad
Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in
connection with the properties left by their
deceased father, and so serious were their
dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had
two litigations in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, concerning said properties. In the first
case, filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra
and others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra
and others the annulment of the sale of the
property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila,
which was finally decided in favor of the
defendants, in the court of first instance, and in
the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.
R. No. 8162); and the second is the instant
case.
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained
single, and who had no longer any ascendants,
executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked
Exhibit 16, disposing of her properties in favor
of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen
Maria" and her other relatives, named Teodora
Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda.
de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in
said will, in favor of her only sister of the whole
blood, Trinidad Neyra, who had become her
bitter enemy; that when the said will was
brought to the attention of the authorities of
said Congregation, after due deliberation and
consideration, said religious organization
declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion
Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation
was duly communicated to her; that in order to
overcome the difficulties encountered by said
religious organization in not accepting the
generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter
decided to make a will, and for that purpose,
about one week before her death, sent for Atty.
Ricardo Sikat, and gave him instructions for the
preparation of a new will; that Atty. Sikat,
instead of preparing a new will, merely prepared
a draft of a codicil, amending said will, dated
September 14, 1939, again naming said
religious organization, among others, as
beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also
forwarded to the authorities of said religious
organization, for their consideration and
acceptance; but it was also rejected.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had
become seriously ill, suffering from Addison’s
disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for
her religious adviser and confessor, Mons.
Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to
make confession, after which she requested that
holy mass be celebrated in her house at No. 366
Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might
take holy communion; that Mons. Fernandez
caused the necessary arrangements to be
made; and, as a matter of fact, on November 1,
1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house
by Father Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo
Church, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra,
who remained in bed, took holy communion;
that after the mass, Father Garcia talked to
Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation
between the two sisters, Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said
advise and, at about noon of the same day
(November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza
to fetch her sister Trinidad, who came at about
2.30 that same afternoon; that the two sisters
greeted each other on a most affectionate
manner, and became reconciled and the two
had a long and cordial conversation, in the
course of which they also talked about the
properties left by their father and their
litigations which had reached the Court of
Appeals for the City of Manila, the instant case
being the second, and they agreed to have the
latter dismissed, on the condition that the
property involved therein should be given
exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter
should waive her share in the rents of said
property collected by Encarnacion, and that
Trinidad had no more indebtedness to
Encarnacion. They also agreed to send for Atty.
Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary
document embodying the said agreement, but
Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon
of the following day, November 2, 1942, when
Encarnacion gave him instructions for the
preparation of the document embodying their
agreement, and other instructions for the
preparation of her last will and testament; that
Attorney Panis prepared said document of
compromise as well as the new will and
testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and
Eustaquio Mendoza as beneficiaries therein,
pursuant to Encarnacion’s express instructions,
and the two documents were prepared, in
duplicate, and were ready for signature, since
the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the
afternoon of that day, November 3, 1942,
Attorney Panis read said document of
compromise and last will and testament to
Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice,
in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr.
Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad
Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if
their terms were in accordance with her wishes,
or if she wanted any change made in said
documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not
suggest any change, and asked for the pad and
the two documents, and, with the help of a son
of Trinidad, placed her thumb mark at the foot
of each one of the two documents, in duplicate,
on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the
attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr.
Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis,
after which said witnesses signed at the foot of
the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra,
and of each other. The agreement was also
signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr.
M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protege,
as witnesses.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the
signing of the two documents, at the request of
Encarnacion Neyra.
The foregoing facts have been established by
the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, who
are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely
no interest in the final outcome of this case. Two
of them are ministers of the Gospel, while three
of the attesting witnesses are professional men
of irreproachable character, who had known and
seen and actually talked to the testatrix.
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of
Encarnacion, and her young daughter Ceferina
de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter
of petitioner Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco,
substantially corroborated the testimony of the
witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, with
reference to the signing of documents, in the
bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon
of November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and
Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however, that
when the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was
affixed to the agreement in question, dated
November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed
in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses
were not present, as they were in the caida.
But Ceferina de la Cruz also stated that the
attesting witnesses signed the documents
thumb marked by Encarnacion Neyra, in the
sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and
Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion
Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also testified that
Encarnacion Neyra’s thumb mark was affixed to
the will, only in the morning of November 4,
1942, by Trinidad Neyra and one Ildefonso del
Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged
medical expert, as to the nature and effects of
Addison’s disease, is absolutely unreliable. He
had never seen or talked to the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra.
According to medical authorities, persons
suffering from Addison’s disease often live as
long as ten (10) years, while others die after a
few weeks only, and that as the disease
progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per
cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop
tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also
appear. (Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed.,
1935, pp. 1250-1253; McCrae, Osler’s Modern
Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V, pp. 272-279.)
And it has been conclusively shown that
Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1942,
due to a heart attack, at the age of 48, after an
illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with mental capacity, in several
cases, this court has considered the testimony
of witnesses, who had known and talked to the
testators, more trustworthy than the testimony
of alleged medical experts.
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two
doctors, who testified for the opponents to the
probate of a will, to the effect that it tended to
destroy mental capacity, was held not to affect
the full possession of the mental faculties
deemed necessary and sufficient for its
execution. (Caguioa v. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.)
The testatrix was held to have been compos
mentis, in spite of the physician’s testimony to
the contrary, to the effect that she was very
weak, being in the third or last stage of
tuberculosis. (Yap Tua v. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap
Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony of the
attending physician that the deceased was
suffering from diabetes and had been in a
comatose condition for several days, prior to his
death, was held not sufficient to establish
testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive
statement of several credible witnesses that he
was conscious and able to understand what was
said to him and to communicate his desires.
(Samson v. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.)
Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly
sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health,
nor the fact that somebody had to guide his
hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to
invalidate his will. (Amata and Almojuela v.
Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Where it appears that a few hours and also a
few days after the execution of the will, the
testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed
with other persons, although lying down and
unable to move or stand up unassisted, but
could still effect the sale of property belonging
to him, these circumstances show that the
testator was in perfectly sound mental condition
at the time of the execution of the will. (Amata
and Almojuela v. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-
examination, frankly admitted that, in the
morning and also at about 6 o’clock in the
afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion
Neyra talked to her and that they understood
each other clearly, thus showing that the
testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time
of signing and execution of the agreement and
will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that
the mental faculties of persons suffering from
Addison’s disease, like the testatrix in this case,
remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that,
on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and
mental rest. And that like patients suffering
from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they
preserve their mental faculties until the
moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the
logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was
of sound mind and possessed the necessary
testamentary and mental capacity, at the time
of the execution of the agreement and will,
dated November 3, 1942.
The contention that the attesting witnesses
were not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra
thumb marked the agreement and will in
question, on her bed, in the sala of the house,
as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable.
It has been fully shown that said witnesses were
present, at the time of the signing and execution
of the agreement and will in question, in the
sala, where testatrix was lying on her bed. The
true test is not whether they actually saw each
other, at the time of the signing of the
documents, but whether they might have seen
each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and
the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this
case. (Jaboneta v. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the
thumbmark placed by testatrix on the
agreement and will in question is equivalent to
her signature. (Yap Tua v. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap
Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are
all interested parties, as they are children of
legatees named in the will, dated September 14,
1939, but eliminated from the will, dated
November 3, 1942.
Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra
and her witnesses, to the effect that there could
have been no reconciliation between the two
sisters, and that the thumbmark of Encarnacion
Neyra was affixed to the document embodying
the agreement, while she was sleeping, on
November 3, 1942, in their presence; and that
her thumbmark was affixed to the will in
question, when she was already dead, in the
morning of November 4, 1942, within their
view, is absolutely devoid of any semblance of
truth. Said testimony is contrary to common
sense. It violates all sense of proportion.
Teodora Neyra and her witnesses could not have
told the truth; they have testified to deliberate
falsehoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely
unworthy of belief. And to the evidence of the
petitioners is completely applicable the legal
aphorism-falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
(Gonzalez v. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.)
To show the alleged improbability of
reconciliation, and the execution of the two
documents, dated November 3, 1942,
petitioners have erroneously placed great
emphasis on the fact that, up to October 31,
1942, the two sisters Encarnacion and Trinidad
Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking
evidently on the common belief that the hatred
of relatives is the most violent. Terrible indeed
are the feuds of relatives and difficult the
reconciliation; and yet not impossible. They
have forgotten that Encarnacion Neyra was a
religious woman instructed in the ancient
virtues of Christian faith, and hope and charity,
and that to forgive is a divine attribute. They
had also forgotten that there could be no more
sublime love than that embalmed in tears, as in
the case of a reconciliation.
It was most natural that there should have been
reconciliation between the two sisters,
Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is
the nearest relative of the former, her only
sister of the whole blood. The approach of
imminent death must have evoked in her the
tenderest recollections of family life. And
believing perhaps that her little triumphs had
not always been just to her sister, who had been
demanding insistently what was her due,
Encarnacion finally decided upon reconciliation,
as she did not want to go to her eternal rest,
with hatred in her heart or wrath upon her head.
It was, therefore, most logical that Encarnacion
should make Trinidad the beneficiary of her
generosity, under her last will and testament,
and end all her troubles with her, by executing
said agreement, and thus depart in perfect
peace from the scenes of her earthly labors.
It having been shown that the said compromise
or agreement had been legally signed and
executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3,
1942, in the presence of credible and
trustworthy witnesses, and that she was
compos mentis and possessed the necessary
testamentary and mental capacity at the time;
the petition for reconsideration filed by Atty.
Lucio Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on
behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had
been dead since November 4, 1942, and some
relatives, who have appeared, in accordance
with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the
decision of the Court of Appeals for Manila,
dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the
appeal, is hereby re-affirmed, without costs. So
ordered.

Ozaeta, Perfecto, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ.,

concur.
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912
JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., Defendants-
Appellants.
Salas and Kalaw for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellee.
TRENT, J. :chanrobles virtual law library
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Bataan,
admitting to probate a document which was
offered as the last will and testament of
Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to
have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar,
Province of Bataan, on the 19th day of April,
1908. The testator died on the 28th of
September, 1909, a year and five months
following the date of the execution of the will.
The will was propounded by the executrix,
Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the
opponents are a son and several grandchildren
by a former marriage, the latter being the
children of a deceased
daughter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The basis of the opposition to the probation of
the will is that the same was not executed
according to the formalities and requirements of
the law touching wills, and further that the
testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use
of his mental faculties and was without the
mental capacity necessary to execute a valid
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto
Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior
to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis
of the left side of his body; that a few years prior
to his death his hearing became impaired and
that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the
paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one
side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained
the use of his right hand, however, and was able
to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs
he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife
and to other members of his
family.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
At the time of the execution of the will there
were present the four testamentary witnesses,
Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro
Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one
Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the
attorney have since died, and consequently
their testimony was not available upon the trial
of the case in the lower court. The other three
testamentary witnesses and the witness
Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in
which the will was executed. According to the
uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses
the will was executed in the following
manner: chanrobles virtual law library
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on
pieces of paper notes and items relating to the
disposition of his property, and these notes
were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form. The
witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon
which the notes were written are delivered to
attorney by the testator; that the attorney read
them to the testator asking if they were his
testamentary dispositions; that the testator
assented each time with an affirmative
movement of his head; that after the will as a
whole had been thus written by the attorney, it
was read in a loud voice in the presence of the
testator and the witnesses; that Señor Marco
gave the document to the testator; that the
latter, after looking over it, signed it in the
presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and
that they in turn signed it in the presence of the
testator and each
other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
These are the facts of record with reference to
the execution of the will and we are in perfect
accord with the judgment of the lower court that
the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure
have been fully complied
with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
This brings us now to a consideration of
appellants' second assignment of error, viz, the
testator's alleged mental incapacity at the time
of the execution of the will. Upon this point
considerable evidence was adduced at the trial.
One of the attesting witnesses testified that at
the time of the execution of the will the testator
was in his right mind, and that although he was
seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his
head what his wishes were. Another of the
attesting witnesses stated that he was not able
to say whether decedent had the full use of his
mental faculties or not, because he had been ill
for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was
not a physician. The other subscribing witness,
Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a
witness for the opponents. He was unable to
state whether or not the will was the wish of the
testator. The only reasons he gave for his
statement were the infirmity and advanced age
of the testator and the fact that he was unable
to speak. The witness stated that the testator
signed the will, and he verified his own
signature as a subscribing
witness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting
witness, stated that he was present when the
will was executed and his testimony was
cumulative in corroboration of the manner in
which the will was executed and as to the fact
that the testator signed the will. This witness
also stated that he had frequently transacted
matters of business for the decedent and had
written letters and made inventories of his
property at his request, and that immediately
before and after the execution of the will he had
performed offices of his character. He stated
that the decedent was able to communicate his
thoughts by writing. The testimony of this
witness clearly indicates the presence of mental
capacity on the part of the testator. Among
other witnesses for the opponents were two
physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado.
Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the
testator some four or five years prior to his
death and that the latter had suffered from a
cerebral congestion from which the paralysis
resulted. The following question was
propounded to Doctor Basa:
Q. Referring to mental condition in which
you found him the last time you attended him,
do you think he was in his right
mind? chanrobles virtual law library
A. I can not say exactly whether he was in
his right mind, but I noted some mental
disorder, because when I spoke to him he did
not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the
substance of his testimony is that the testator
had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed
some mental disorder. He does not say that the
testator was not in his right mind at the time of
the execution of the will, nor does he give it at
his opinion that he was without the necessary
mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not
state in what way this mental disorder had
manifested itself other than that he had noticed
that the testator did not reply to him on one
occasion when he visited
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never
seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to
a hypothetical question as to what be the
mental condition of a person who was 79 years
old and who had suffered from a malady such
as the testator was supposed to have had
according to the testimony of Doctor Basa,
whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He
replied and discussed at some length the
symptoms and consequences of the decease
from which the testator had suffered; he read in
support of his statements from a work by a
German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In
answer, however, to a direct question, he stated
that he would be unable to certify to the mental
condition of a person who was suffering from
such a
disease.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
We do not think that the testimony of these two
physicians in any way strengthens the
contention of the appellants. Their testimony
only confirms the fact that the testator had been
for a number of years prior to his death afflicted
with paralysis, in consequence of which his
physician and mental strength was greatly
impaired. Neither of them attempted to state
what was the mental condition of the testator at
the time he executed the will in question. There
can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities
were of a very serious character, and it is quite
evident that his mind was not as active as it had
been in the earlier years of his life. However, we
can not include from this that he wanting in the
necessary mental capacity to dispose of his
property by
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The courts have been called upon frequently to
nullify wills executed under such circumstances,
but the weight of the authority is in support if
the principle that it is only when those seeking
to overthrow the will have clearly established
the charge of mental incapacity that the courts
will intervene to set aside a testamentary
document of this character. In the case
of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the
question of testamentary capacity was
discussed by this court. The numerous citations
there given from the decisions of the United
States courts are especially applicable to the
case at bar and have our approval. In this
jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of
the mental capacity of the testator and the
burden is upon the contestants of the will to
prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the
matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep.,
463; in the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil.
Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep.,
689.) chanrobles virtual law library
The rule of law relating to the presumption of
mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been
adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it
is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper
evidence. This we think they have failed to do.
There are many cases and authorities which we
might cite to show that the courts have
repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind
and body, induced by age and disease do not
render a person incapable of making a will. The
law does not require that a person shall continue
in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine
physical and mental powers in order to execute
a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few
indeed would be the number of wills that could
meet such exacting requirements. The
authorities, both medical and legal, are
universal in statement that the question of
mental capacity is one of degree, and that there
are many gradations from the highest degree of
mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated as
insanity and
idiocy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The right to dispose of property by testamentary
disposition is as sacred as any other right which
a person may exercise and this right should not
be nullified unless mental incapacity is
established in a positive and conclusive manner.
In discussing the question of testamentary
capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the
American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
- habits, although formerly he was observant of
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression,
perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. A testator may be
afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses,
disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in
law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous
cases there cited in support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is
stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and
quoted with approval in Campbell vs.
Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is
not necessary that the mind shall be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease or otherwise, or that the testator should
be in the full possession of his reasoning
faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus
stated:
The question is not so much, that was the
degree of memory possessed by the testator,
as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to
remember the property he was about to
bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the
objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind
and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to
know and understand the business in which he
was engaged at the time when he executed his
will. (See authorities there cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the
following facts appeared upon the trial of the
case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102
years. In his early years he was an intelligent
and well informed man. About seven years prior
to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and
from that time his mind and memory were mush
enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and
in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he
was affected with senile cataract causing total
blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his the nature of the business was in which he was
engaged. The evidence show that the writing
the properties of life. The court, in commenting and execution of the will occupied a period
upon the case, said: several hours and that the testator was present
during all this time, taking an active part in all
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at
nor debility of body will affect the capacity to bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions
make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. are those of a rational
The failure of memory is not sufficient to create person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to virtual law library
his immediate family or property. . . .
For the reasons above stated, the order
xxxxxxxxx probating the will should be and the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one
hundred years before he made the will, and his against the appellants.
physical and mental weakness and defective Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson
memory were in striking contrast with their and Moreland, JJ., concur.
strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind;
not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted
slowly, he was forgetful or recent events,
especially of names, and repeated questions in
conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for
sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is
not singular that some of those who had known
him when he was remarkable for vigor and
intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason
was so far gone that he was incapable of making
a will, although they never heard him utter an
irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the
case at bar we might draw the same contrast as
was pictured by the court in the case just
quoted. The striking change in the physical and
mental vigor of the testator during the last years
of his life may have led some of those who knew
him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to
his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think
that the statements of the witnesses to the
execution of the will and statements of the
conduct of the testator at that time all indicate
that he unquestionably had mental capacity and
that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time
of the execution of the will it does not appear
that his conduct was irrational in any particular.
He seems to have comprehended clearly what
[G.R. No. 174489 : April 07, 2012]
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. Resolution[6] which denied the Motion for
BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, Reconsideration thereto.
ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO,
VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., AND RAFAEL Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed
TITCO, PETITIONERS, VS. LORENZO LAXA, Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the
RESPONDENT. RTC which disallowed the notarial will of
Paciencia.
DECISION
Factual Antecedents
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she
made her last will and testament entitled “Tauli
Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala”[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the
probate of a will to clearly establish that the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin
decedent was not of sound and disposing mind (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia
at the time of the execution of said will. twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the
Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute document is her last will and testament. She
his estate in the manner provided in his will so thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the
long as it is legally tenable.[1]cralaw said document on page 3[8] and then on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.[9]
Before us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, 2006 The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia
G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
September 30, 2003 Decision[4] of the Regional (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, execution by affixing their signatures below its
Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G- attestation clause[10] and on the left margin of
1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,[11] in the presence of
petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge
Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit: Limpin who acted as notary public.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the
Childless and without any brothers or sisters,
appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision
Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his
2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one
wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna
entered GRANTING the petition for the probate
Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.[5]
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable
services to me since then up to the present by
the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F.
LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE
all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5
unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and
CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA
LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa
both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at
Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and
their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE
ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and
living with their parents who would decide to
bequeath since they are the children of the
spouses;
x x x x
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may
be discovered aside from the properties
mentioned in this last will and testament, I am
also bequeathing and giving the same to the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa
and their two children and I also command them
to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul
and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania
Regala and their spouses and with respect to the
fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise
command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a
Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her
testament as stated in my testament. x x x [12]
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia
remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s
nephew whom she treated as her own son.
Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated
Paciencia as his own mother.[13] Paciencia lived
with Lorenzo’s family in Sasmuan, Pampanga
and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo
since his birth. Six days after the execution of
the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia
left for the United States of America
(USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his
family until her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody
of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of
Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a
petition[14] with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga
for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for
the issuance of Letters of Administration in his
favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-
1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after
its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on
June 13, 2000[15] allowing Lorenzo to present
evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra.
Limpin testified that she was one of the
instrumental witnesses in the execution of the
last will and testament of Paciencia on
September 13, 1981.[16] The Will was executed
in her father’s (Judge Limpin) home office, in
her presence and of two other witnesses,
Francisco and Faustino.[17] Dra. Limpin
positively identified the Will and her signatures
on all its four pages.[18] She likewise positively
identified the signature of her father appearing
thereon.[19] Questioned by the prosecutor
regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental
fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had
a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain
surgery.[20] The judge can walk but can no
longer talk and remember her name. Because
of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can
no longer testify in court. [21]
The following day or on June 23, 2000,
petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an
opposition[22] to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio
averred that the properties subject of
Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest;
hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them
to Lorenzo.[23]
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000,
Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M.
Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco,
Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo
(Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a
Supplemental Opposition[24] contending that
Paciencia’s Will was null and void because
ownership of the properties had not been
transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her
death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of
the Civil Code.[25] Petitioners also opposed the
issuance of Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a
citizen and resident of the USA.[26] Petitioners
prayed that Letters of Administration be instead
issued in favor of Antonio. [27]
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners
filed an Amended Opposition[28] asking the RTC
to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the
following grounds: the Will was not executed
and attested to in accordance with the
requirements of the law; that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of
its execution; that she was forced to execute the
Will under duress or influence of fear or threats;
that the execution of the Will had been procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence
by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his
benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the
Will was forged; that assuming the signature to
be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or
trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the
document to be her Will. Simultaneously,
petitioners filed an Opposition and
Recommendation[29] reiterating their opposition
to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator
of the properties and requesting for the
appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order[30] denying the requests of both Lorenzo
and Antonio to be appointed administrator since
the former is a citizen and resident of the USA
while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the
properties subject of the Will has not yet been
established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the
probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was
recalled for cross-examination by the
petitioners. She testified as to the age of her
father at the time the latter notarized the Will of
Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia
at the time of the execution of the Will; and the
lack of photographs when the event took
place. [31]
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico
Mercado (Monico) also took the witness
stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his
father’s condition. According to him his father
can no longer talk and express himself due to
brain damage. A medical certificate was
presented to the court to support this
allegation. [32]
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944
until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he
lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and
his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to
the USA and lived with him and his family until
her death in January 1996; the relationship
between him and Paciencia was like that of a
mother and child since Paciencia took care of
him since birth and took him in as an adopted
son; Paciencia was a spinster without children,
and without brothers and sisters; at the time of
Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any
mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not
blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody
of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after
Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was
already residing in the USA when the Will was
executed.[33] Lorenzo positively identified the
signature of Paciencia in three different
documents and in the Will itself and stated that
he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature
because he accompanied her in her
transactions.[34] Further, Lorenzo belied and
denied having used force, intimidation,
violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to
execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines
when the same was executed.[35] On cross-
examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia
informed him about the Will shortly after her
arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the
Will only after her death. [36]
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented
in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother
and Paciencia were first cousins.[37] She
claimed to have helped in the household chores
in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her
to stay therein from morning until evening and
that during the period of her service in the said
household, Lorenzo’s wife and his children were
staying in the same house.[38] She served in the
said household from 1980 until Paciencia’s
departure for the USA on September 19,
1981.[39]
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she
saw Faustino bring “something” for Paciencia to
sign at the latter’s house.[40] Rosie admitted,
though, that she did not see what that
“something” was as same was placed inside an
envelope.[41] However, she remembered
Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for
money before she signs them.[42] A few days
after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went
to the house of Antonio’s mother and brought
with her the said envelope.[43] Upon going
home, however, the envelope was no longer
with Paciencia.[44] Rosie further testified that
Paciencia was referred to as “magulyan” or
“forgetful” because she would sometimes leave
her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it
moments later.[45] On cross examination, it was
established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor
a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia
was “magulyan” was based on her personal
assessment,[46] and that it was Antonio who
requested her to testify in court.[47]
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that
Paciencia was his aunt.[48] He identified the Will
and testified that he had seen the said
document before because Paciencia brought the
same to his mother’s house and showed it to
him along with another document on September
16, 1981.[49] Antonio alleged that when the
documents were shown to him, the same were
still unsigned.[50] According to him, Paciencia
thought that the documents pertained to a lease
of one of her rice lands,[51] and it was he who
explained that the documents were actually a
special power of attorney to lease and sell her
fishpond and other properties upon her
departure for the USA, and a Will which would
transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family
upon her death.[52] Upon hearing this, Paciencia
allegedly uttered the following words: “Why will
I never [return], why will I sell all my
properties?” Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only
[son] of God? I have other relatives [who
should] benefit from my properties. Why
should I die already?”[53] Thereafter, Antonio
advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if
she does not want to, to which the latter
purportedly replied, “I know nothing about
those, throw them away or it is up to you. The
more I will not sign them.”[54] After which,
Paciencia left the documents with
Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on
September 18, 1981.[55]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision[56] denying the petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the
petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows
the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of
Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.[57]
The trial court gave considerable weight to the
testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the
time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no
longer possessed of sufficient reason or
strength of mind to have testamentary
capacity.[58]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision
and granted the probate of the Will of
Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree
with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of
unsound mind when she executed the Will. It
ratiocinated that “the state of being ‘magulyan’
does not make a person mentally unsound so
[as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a
Will.”[59] Moreover, the oppositors in the
probate proceedings were not able to overcome
the presumption that every person is of sound
mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or
events were given to prove the allegation that
Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the
Will.[60]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration[61] but the
motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution[62] dated August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of
Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon
the CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE
RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF to execution. – No will shall pass either real or
COURT; personal estate unless it is proved and allowed
in the proper court. Subject to the right of
II. appeal, such allowance of the will shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON pertains to whether the testator, being of sound
RECORD; mind, freely executed the will in accordance
III. with the formalities prescribed by law.[65] These
formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806
of the New Civil Code, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic
TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS the testator himself or by the testator's name
ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED[63] written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and in the presence of the testator and of one
due execution of the notarial Will was another.
sufficiently established to warrant its allowance
for probate. The testator or the person requested by him to
write his name and the instrumental witnesses
Our Ruling of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
We deny the petition.
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid of each page.
down
The attestation shall state the number of pages
by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more
thereof, or caused some other person to write
than the extrinsic validity of a
his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and
Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is expressly
that the latter witnessed and signed the will and
provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules
all the pages thereof in the presence of the
of Court, which states:
testator and of one another.
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will If the attestation clause is in a language not
Necessary. known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted
to them.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the
Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of
the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present
and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement
that the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one
another and that the witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the
testator and of one another. In fact, even the
petitioners acceded that the signature of
Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although
they question her state of mind when she signed
the same as well as the voluntary nature of said
act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound
mind at the time of the execution of the will lies
on
the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim
that Paciencia was “magulyan” or forgetful so
much so that it effectively stripped her of
testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in
their Motion for Reconsideration[66] filed with
the CA that Paciencia was not only “magulyan”
but was actually suffering from paranoia.[67]
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the
state of being forgetful does not necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a
Will.[68] Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being
of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the
New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at
the time of making the will to know the nature
of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie
pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is
no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise,
that would show that Paciencia was of unsound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On
the other hand, we find more worthy of
credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the
soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter
went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily
executed the Will. “The testimony of
subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the
testator’s mental condition is entitled to great
weight where they are truthful and
intelligent.”[69] More importantly, a testator is
presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will and the burden to prove
otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of
the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is
of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of
sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the
probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that
the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was
publicly known to be insane one month or less
before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the
burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
mind lies upon the shoulders of
petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned,
no substantial evidence was presented by them
to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s
finding that petitioners failed to discharge such
burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia
was aware of the nature of her estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty
and the character of the testamentary act. As
aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia]
was aware of the nature of the document she
executed. She specially requested that the
customs of her faith be observed upon her
death. She was well aware of how she acquired
the properties from her parents and the
properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to
his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children.
A third child was born after the execution of the
will and was not included therein as devisee. [70]
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear
or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as
basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is
the willingness of the testator or testatrix to
execute the document that will distribute
his/her earthly possessions upon his/her
death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was
forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats; that the execution
of the Will had been procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or
by some other persons for his benefit; and that
assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it
was obtained through fraud or trickery. These
are grounded on the alleged conversation
between Paciencia and Antonio on September
16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly
repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact
that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her
own son and that love even extended to
Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of
relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not
unheard of in our culture for old maids or
spinsters to care for and raise their nephews
and nieces and treat them as their own
children. Such is a prevalent and accepted
cultural practice that has resulted in many
family discords between those favored by the
testamentary disposition of a testator and those
who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged
fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo
and his family is different from her relationship
with petitioners. The very fact that she cared
for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both
here and abroad, even if the latter was already
married and already has children, highlights the
special bond between them. This unquestioned
relationship between Paciencia and the devisees
tends to support the authenticity of the said
document as against petitioners’ allegations of
duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and
improper influence, pressure, fraud, and
trickery which, aside from being factual in
nature, are not supported by concrete,
substantial and credible evidence on record. It
is worth stressing that bare arguments, no
matter how forceful, if not based on concrete
and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move
the Court to uphold said
allegations.[71] Furthermore, “a purported will is
not [to be] denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, for even if a will has been duly
executed in fact, whether x x x it will be
probated would have to depend largely on the
attitude of those interested in [the estate of the
deceased].”[72]
Court should be convinced by the evidence
presented before it that the Will was duly
executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of
Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied
with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or
accounted for where will contested. – If the will
is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and
the notary in the case of wills executed under
the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the
Philippines and not insane, must be produced
and examined, and the death, absence, or
insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily
shown to the court. If all or some of such
witnesses are present in the Philippines but
outside the province where the will has been
filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or
all of them testify against the due execution of
the will, or do not remember having attested to
it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the
will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is
satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses
and from all the evidence presented that the will
was executed and attested in the manner
required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall
be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who
know the handwriting of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator; in the absence of
any competent witnesses, and if the court deem
it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted
to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and
the notary public should have been presented in
court since all but one witness, Francisco, are
still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge
Limpin to appear and testify before the court
was satisfactorily explained during the probate
proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino
had a heart attack, was already bedridden and
could no longer talk and express himself due to
brain damage. To prove this, said witness
presented the corresponding medical
certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified
that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke
in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At
that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and
could not even remember his daughter’s name
so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such
condition, her father could no longer testify. It
is well to note that at that point, despite ample
opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any
objections to the testimonies of said witnesses
nor challenged the same on cross
examination. We thus hold that for all intents
and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily
account for the incapacity and failure of the said
subscribing witness and of the notary public to
testify in court. Because of this the probate of
Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of
Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and
the due execution of the Will, as well as on the
proof of her handwriting. It is an established
rule that “[a] testament may not be disallowed
just because the attesting witnesses declare
against its due execution; neither does it have
to be necessarily allowed just because all the
attesting witnesses declare in favor of its
legalization; what is decisive is that the court is
convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily
from the attesting witnesses, although they
must testify, that the will was or was not duly
executed in the manner required by law.” [73]
Moreover, it bears stressing that “[i]rrespective
x x x of the posture of any of the parties as
regards the authenticity and due execution of
the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of
the law that it is the evidence before the court
and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that
is controlling.”[74] “The very existence of [the
Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the
supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate
be distributed in the manner therein provided,
and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally
tenable, such desire be given full effect
independent of the attitude of the parties
affected thereby.”[75] This, coupled with
Lorenzo’s established relationship with
Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total
lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart
from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us
to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of
the Will and its allowance for probate.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the
Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19910 May 31, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE
OF MARIE GARNIER GARREAU. LIRIO
PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
JOSE MA. RAMIREZ, oppositor-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Associates for oppositor-
appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
At issue in this appeal is the due execution of
the last will and testament of Maria Gamier
Garreau, which was denied probate by the Court
of First Instance of Manila in its order of August
15, 1961 (Special Proceeding No. 39365) on the
ground of the testatrix' lack of testamentary
capacity.
Maria Gamier Garreau, widow of Ramon
Ramirez, was a native of Asnier Paris, France,
but a Filipino citizen residing in Madrid, Spain,
where she died childless at the age of 84 on
January 11, 1959. The will in question was an
"open" one, executed before a notary public in
Madrid on May 24, 1958, and instituting her
niece Lirio (Lily) Pfannenschmidt now appellant,
as sole and universal heir. Lirio is one of the four
children of Jose Ramirez, brother of the testatrix
husband Ramon, the other three being Elsa,
Esperanza and Horacio. Ramon had a half-
brother, Jorge P. Ramirez, whose son, Jose
Maria Ramirez, now appellee, opposed the
petition for probate filed by Urio on February 20,
1959, alleging in his opposition, inter alia, that
there was a prior will executed by the testatrix
in Manila in 1949. The photostat copy of that
will, marked in the record as Exhibit D and
Exhibit 2-J, shows that the testatrix instituted
her husband as her universal 'heir, and in the
event that he should predecease her (which he
did), named her niece Lily Ramirez and her
nephews Horacio Ramirez and Jose Ma. Ramirez
as substitute heirs to all her properties in equal
shares. This previous will, however, is not
involved in this case, and has been referred to
by the parties only in relation to the background
circumstances concerning the execution of the
"open" will in 1958.
Ironically enough — and certainly not without
some overtones of poetic justice — the order of
the trial court denying probate is based in no
small part on a number of letters written by the
petitioner herself, in which she used quite
strong terms to describe the mental infirmity of
the testatrix. Those letters were written by her
in 1956 and 1957 to her uncle, Jose Eugenio
Ramirez de la Cavada, another brother of the
testatrix husband, Ramon Ramirez. Even before
then, however, the testatrix' mental condition
was already the object of serious concern
among her close relatives. The testimony of
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, given in the form of
deposition and submitted as Exhibit 3, discloses
the following facts:
He arrived in Madrid in 1954. His niece Lily who
was then residing there, came to him and said
that she could not accept the fact that Jose
Maria Ramirez (herein oppositor-appellee) had
been named as heir in the will of her aunt, not
being a member of the same family group. Lily,
obviously referring to the 1949 will, then
suggested to her uncle that he do something to
correct the same, which suggestion he turned
down, pointing out that the testatrix had the
right to name her nephew Jose as one of her
heirs. When he arrived in Madrid he found his
sister-in-law "ya una mujer muy incapacitada."
In 1955 he consulted a physician, Dr. Romero
de Arcos and asked him to examine her. Dr. de
Arcos had been treating the patient for various
ailments, and it was he who suggested, after
conducting his examination, that Dr. Jose
Germain, competent specialist, be called to
make his own diagnosis. The medical opinions
of these two doctors will be discussed later. But
from his own observations, Jose Eugenio
Ramirez declared that his sister-in-law was even
then mentally incapacitated, citing by way of
example her attitude and personal reaction
when her husband died in 1956. She was
present at his death and saw his body just
before he was buried; but when she went to her
room after the funeral and saw that his bed was
no longer there she came out crying asking
where her husband was and saying that she was
going to look for him. She had totally forgotten
that he had passed away. Apart from that, she
was easily susceptible to any suggestion from
others, particularly those close to her, and after
doing what she was told would promptly forget
all about it.
Another deponent, Julio Escribano Langa, a
resident of Madrid who had known the spouses
Ramon Ramirez and Maria Gamier Garreau for
about nine years, testified to the same mental
condition of the testatrix: her susceptibility to
another person's influence; her lack of memory
for recent events, her lack of understanding of,
or volition for deciding, certain matters such as
the making of a last will.
Dr. Manuel Ramon de Arcos was first called to
the Ramirez household in 1953 to treat Ramon
Ramirez, and after that his wife, on a number of
occasions until 1958. The material statements
in his deposition are as follows:
... Alla por 1953 debia tener 77 o 78 años de
edad, y en esa señora se notaba cada vez mas
falta de memoria, eso mucho, y a veces tenia
cosas extranas, como imaginarse que habia
hecho un viaje que no habia hecho o de escribir
cosas como sobre la casa de un cunado suyo en
Palma donde nunca habia estado, y con el
tiempo fue siguiendo la cosa asi pero motives
de alarma en cuanto a su vida no.
xxx xxx xxx
Desde hacia tiempo ya que esta senora no tenia
lucidez mental y antes se me pidio que yo
certificara de su estado exacto y yo me encontre
poco competente para ello, y efectivamente due
que yo queria Ilevar adelante una exploracion
en el sentido neurologico y yo necesitaba que
alguien que se dedique a esa especialidad venga
conmigo y entonces se Ilamano al Dr. Germain,
y esto fue en marzo de 1955.
El diagnostico a que Ilegamos, que despues fue
confirmado, era de una involucion cerebral senil
que Ilamanos a una involucion regresiva debido
a defectos cerebrales de arteriosclerosis, y
cuando se tiene eso cuando las cosas son asi
realmente, la enfermedad no retrocede y la
involucion avanza; es posible que algana vez yo
la saludara y ella me contestara con mas afecto
y pareciese que estaba mejor pero en realidad
la involucion avanzaba como es normal.
Dr. Jose Germain, who had been called in
consultation by Dr. de Arcos in April 1955,
presented an impressive curriculum
vitae attesting to his qualifications as a
psychiatrist. The conclusions he arrived at after
his examination of the patient are set forth in
his deposition as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
P. Quiere usted explicar la naturalization de los
servicios prestados por usted?
R. Sencillamente estudiar a la enferma bajo el
punto de vista psiquiatrico y analizar sus
reacciones ante las preguntas normales de
orientation del tiempo y del espacio y
contestaciones a una serie de pruebas o tests, y
sobre esto forme un juicio que transmiti al Dr.
Romero.
P. Que juicio forms usted?
R. Que esta senora padecia un proceso
arterioesclerotic cerebral con alteracion del
pensamiento y de la conducta que evidenciaba
un estado de demencia presenila en evolucion.
P. Ese estado de demencia presenilla la
incapacitaba para realizar actos como un
testamento con lucidez?
R. Indudablemente.
P. La evolucion de la enfermedad hace suponer
posible que sea curable?
R. No, señor, es un proceso irreversible y
progresivo.
P. Que experiencias hizo usted con la enferma?
R. No recuerdo, pero eran las usuales.
P. Tenia memoria?
R. Si señor, pero perturbada.
P. Gravemente perturbada?
R. Perturbada para las circumstancias normales
de la vida.
P. Un sujeto en esas condiciones, tiene voluntad
libre o es facilmente presionable de ser llevado
por personas extranas a resoluciones no
personales del enfermo?
R. Todos estos enfermos lo que tienen es una
disminucion del criterio personal y, por tanto,
son susceptibles de ser influenciados.
P. Normalmente por personal de su intimidad?
R. Por cualquier persona, el primero que venga.
P. Ha expedido usted un certificado?
R. Si senor.
P. Podia esta persona tener intervalos lucidos
para que fueran validos?
R. Repito que es un proceso irreversible y, por
tanto, la sintomatologia tenia que seguir mas o
menos en el primer plano de su personalidad.
SR. GALLARDON: Nada mas.
xxx xxx xxx
P. Pero usted conoce los requisitos para una
incapacitacion?
R. Si senor.
P. Esta senora incurria en todos los elementos
para ser incapacitada totalmente?
R. Si senor.
P. Al reconocer a ella, tenia usted algun
prejuicio?
R. No, senor.
P. Usted dijo que era una enfermedad
irreversible, es decir que no tiene curacion?
R. Exacto.
P. Pero puede mejorarse?
R. No, senor, irreversible y progresiva es un
proceso degenerativo cerebral.
In the light of the foregoing expert medical
opinions the letters written by herein appellant
to her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez, assume a
vital significance on the issue of testamentary
capacity, and of her own credibility as
proponent of the probate of the will. In her letter
of January 8, 1956 (Exh. 2-A) she wrote:
I am trying to do all I can for poor Tia Marie who
refuses to be helped. Poor dear she is getting
worse and worse everyday. Her mind does not
register anything y es terriblemente dura de
cabeza.
In another letter (Exh. 2-B) dated July 15, 1956,
she said to her uncle:
I think it is my duty to look after her (Doña
Marie) now that she is alone especially since the
poor dear is completely in Irene's hands. *
You will remember that Irene was with them
when the thousands of pesos the Tios had for a
rainy day were spent in two shakes of a lamb's
tail.
Appellant's letter of January 17, 1957 (Exh. 3-
C) contained the following postcript:
P.S. Everyday several times a day she (Doña
Marie) tells me she is going back to Paris. This
morning she asked me where Tio Ramon (who
had died the previous year) was.
On January 29, 1957 appellant again wrote a
letter to her uncle, in which she said:
Tia Marie has completely forgotten Irene from
the second day she left.
Irene must have told Tia Marie to ask Mr. Collard
for the 40,000 telling her that with that money
they would go to Paris and if Mr. Collard would
have had the money to send, she would have
kept it for herself, as Tia Marie would have
forgotten about the money no sooner having
collected it. Tia Marie signed for the money I
went to collect and when I came back from the
bank she did not ask me for it. She must have
done that with Irene.
Appellants, having suspected the maid Irene of
taking advantage of Doña Marie's susceptibility
to extraneous influence, succeeded in leaving
her dismissed from the service; and Doña Maria
had "completely forgotten (her) from the
second day after she left."
Such was the testatrix' mental condition that as
early as 1956 appellant, in her letter of January
8, told her uncle that she was thinking of having
her aunt judicially pronounced incapacitated
and asked him to send her "the papers of the
doctors who declared Tios Ramon and Marie
incapaces."
Jose M. Cavanna, the Philippine administrator of
the family of the testatrix, had the same idea,
and so expressed it in his letter to appellant
(Exh. 3-F) dated May 4, 1957, making reference
to the fact that the testatrix had very little
memory or almost none at all. He had deposited
for her account in a bank in Madrid the sum of
100,000 pesetas so that she could draw
regularly thereon which she did. However, when
after a year he again went to Madrid Doña
Marie, in the presence of her brother-in-law,
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, denied ever having
received any money from Cavanna. Referring to
that incident, Cavanna continued in his letter to
appellant:
Recordandoles la suma que les habia dejado en
mi visita el ano anterior, me lo negaron y
aseguraron no haber recibido de mi ninguna
cantidad de dinero. Estaba entonces presente D.
Pepe Eugenio que habiendo oido sus insistentes
protestas de no haber recibido el ano anterior
cantidad alguna mia a exepcion de los giros
mensuales, note que llego dudar de mis
afirmaciones y entonces le invite ir al Banco en
donde habia hecho el deposito para cerciorarse
de aquellos hechos, en que trataban de negar
mis afirmaciones. Al dia siguiente nos
constituimos en el Banco D. Pepe Eugenio y yo
y alli se corroboro todas mis afirmaciones y
quedo probada la poca o casi ninguna memoria
que existia en Da Marie, en vista del hecho de
que ella misma habia firmado todos los cheques
y no pudo seguir negando el hecho, confeso que
se habia olvidado y no se volvio a hablar de ese
asunto. Pero este hecho dio lugar que desde
entonces los familiares comprendiendo el
exceso de gastos que hacia y la suma tan gruesa
que se habia gastado en aquel ano acordaron
designar como en efecto se designo a Dn. Pepe
Eugenio para que actuara en sus intereses en
Espana y les enviara los fondos que se recibian
de Manila en forma tal que no les hiciera falta
nada para que no se les perdiera tantos fondos,
pues Ilego a suspecharse de una sirvienta que
entonces tenian que resultaba mas que sirvienta
una ama de compania. Tambien entonces habia
hecho constar que se les enviaba
trimestralmente las cuentas de sus fondos por
duplicado con objeto de que despues de
estudiada, dieran su conformidad y devolviesen
uno de los ejemplares. No solo no devolvian el
duplicado sino que no acusaban recibo de ella y
en muchisimas ocasiones no sabian en donde lo
habia dejado. En otra occasion anterior a estos
acontecimientos tambien me aseguraron no
haber recibido uno de los giros de $300.00
enviados y hechas las correspondientes
avariguaciones resulto haber sido cobrador por
Da Marie.
Legal a pensarse la conveniencia de promover
un expediente de tutela pero no se Ilevo a cabo
para que no sufrieran en vida la vajacion de ser
judicialmente declarados incapacitados por su
avanza da edad.
Lamenting the fact that her aunt was
"completely in Irene's hands," and that "Irene
has taken complete possession of every penny
and gives Tia Marie no account of
anything," * appellant expressed herself quite
strongly in this wise:
After all if the worst comes to the worst it is
better that I who am a member of the family
should cheat Tia Marie rather than an absolute
stranger.
The same fear was reiterated in her letter of
February 2, 1957 (Exh. 3-E);
... Que chasco y disgusto tendriamos si
resultase Irene la heredera de los Tios. Cosa
muy posible conociendo las cosas que ha hecho
y lo engañados que tenia a los pobres Tios.
A subsequent letter of appellant, dated April 9,
1957 (Exh. 2-K), this time addressed to her
brother Horacio, reveals a significant
development. Apparently the 1949 will, wherein
Jose Maria Ramirez, appellee herein, was
mentioned as one of the heirs, had been
changed with a new one eliminating him.
Appellant wrote to her brother:
Enclosed am sending Tia Marie's letter to you.
As you will note the date is Feb. 2nd. I am doing
this so that the letter appears to have been
written before her new will. Keep her letter
where it will be clear to see that the reason why
Boby (appellee) does not appear in her new will
is because he intended to take Tio Ramon to the
"Tribunates," so if Boby by any chance tries to
contend it you will have her letter as a farther
proof that is what she had every intention to do.
So Cillo (Horacio) for goodness sake keep it in a
safe or in the bank until you will have use of it.
Tear this letter no sooner read in case it falls
into wrong hands. The less people know of the
new will the better in case action should be
taken against it.
The foregoing letter appears quite
conspiratorial, as, though the will referred to in
it had been obtained by appellant in order to cut
off Boby (appellee) from any share in the
inheritance, and the enclosed letter of the
testatrix had been antedated to February 2 so
that it would appear "to have been written
before her new will." For some reason not
disclosed in the record, that will never came to
light. Evidently Horacio was also an heir therein,
but then was subsequently eliminated in the
1958 will which was actually presented for
probate by appellant.
The evidence hereinabove discussed,
cumulatively considered, leads to the definite
conclusion that Marie Gamier Garreau was
indeed mentally incapacitated to make a will,
that is, "to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of (her) bounty,
and the character of the testamentary act" (Art.
799, Civil Code). As early as 1955, when she
was examined by the family physician, Dr.
Romero de Arcos and by a qualified psychiatrist,
Dr. Jose Germain, she was already suffering
from pre-senile dementia, a degenerative
mental, infirmity that was described by them as
"a progressive and irreversible process." The
manifestations of this condition are amply
illustrated in the letters written by appellant
herself as well as in the testimony of her uncle,
Jose Eugenio Ramirez. In fact these two were
convinced that the testatrix should be placed
under judicial guardianship, and actually took
the initial steps towards that end. Appellant's
subsequent turn-about in her opinion of the
testatrix' mental condition is of course
understandable, considering that in the will she
is named as sole and universal heir. But
precisely for this reason not much reliance can
be placed upon her testimony to the effect that
the testatrix was possessed of the necessary
testamentary capacity.
The most pertinent evidence in behalf of
appellant is the testimony of the notary public
before whom the will in question was executed
and the testimony of two of the three
instrumental witnesses. The notary public,
Braulio Nolasco Carrasquedo, gave the following
statements on the subject of the testatrix'
mental condition:
17. Sabe usted cual era el estado mental de
dicha senora cuando otorgo el testamento
anexo 1?
R. A mi juicio estaba bien.
18. Haga usted el favor de explicar su
contestacion a la pregunta anterior.
R. No selo que quieren decir con esa pregunta.
Yom juzgo que ella estaba capacitada y hay una
clausula all de que esta capacitada legalmente.
19. Diga usted si Doña Maria Garnier Garreau
se daba cuenta de que estaba otorgando un
testamento?
R. Se contesta con la repuesta anterior, pues si
estaba capacitada sabia lo que hacia.
20. Diga usted si la testadora recordaba sus
propriedades?
R. Supongo que si aunque el en testamento no
se permite a menos que se hagan legados, pero
aqui es un testamento en terminos generales.
21. Diga usted si la testadora recordaba sus
parientes?
R. No puedo decir eso pero ella estaba con su
sobrina, aunque supongo que recordara a sus
parientes.
As may be noted, the foregoing statements of
the notary public are far from satisfactory. They
are vague and evasive, and tend to beg the very
issue. Thus the witness could not say, but
merely supposed, that the testatrix had a
recollection of her properties or of the relatives
who would logically inherit from her and when
asked to explain his answer to the question
concerning her mental state, he simply referred
to the certification in the will on that point. It
would seem that he was aware that he had no
sufficient basis for a categorical opinion on the
subject, and so declined to fully commit himself.
Manuel Gomez Tortajada was one of the
instrumental witnesses. He affirmed that the
testatrix was in "perfect" mental condition at the
time of the execution of the will; that she knew
"perfectly" that he was executing a will; that on
another occasion she had even told him about
certain properties of hers, and about her
relatives, who were a niece and a sister of that
niece. The testimony of this witness on
deposition gives the distinct impression of
officiousness, of pretending to be more
intimately familiar with the affairs of the
testatrix than their casual acquaintance
justified. In any case his affirmation of the
testatrix "perfect" mental condition was so
obviously an exaggeration in the face of the
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
that it only serves to weaken his credibility.
The other instrumental witness was Antonio
Fernandez Caballero. He likewise affirmed the
good condition of the testatrix' mental faculties,
saying that she had a recollection of her
properties as well as of her relatives. The
affirmation is rather strange' not to say
incredible, considering that he met the testatrix
for the first and only time in the office of the
notary public on the occasion of the execution
of the will, and that all that took place then was
that the said will was read by the notary and
then signed by the testatrix, the witnesses and
the notary himself. And according to the latter
he did not ask her anything about her properties
or her relatives. Indeed this instrumental
witness admitted that he did not understand the
language spoken by the testatrix on that
occasion:
R. Yo quicro decir que esta senora como hablaba
algo diferente de nosotros todo lo que pudiera
hablar no me entraba bien si ella hablaba con la
sobrina, pero el lenguaje de ellas no lo entendia
y no se si podian hablar de propiedades u otras
cosas.
P. But did the testatrix talk about her relatives
on that occasion?
R . Yo oi que ella hablaba con la senorita que le
acompafiaba y creo que tenian parentezco pero
hablaban en el idioma de ellas.
Three additional witnesses, by way of rebuttal,
were presented by appellant. The first was Dr.
Suils Perez, whose deposition is marked Exhibit
Q. He said that as a neurologist and a
psychiatrist he was called several times in 1957
to Marie Garnier Garreau. His diagnosis was that
she had a "brain lesion" "(lesion en el cerebro),
but had a mentality corresponding to her age.
"Era una mujer que en interes o atencion dejaba
mucho que desear salvo en las cosas que le
interesaban ... En un test que se hubiera hecho
con ella hubieramos visto resultados
contradictorias segun el momento de atencion
en que se lo hicieramos que era muy variable."
The foregoing testimony leaves much to he
desired insofar as the issue of testamentary
capacity is concerned: no reference whatsoever
was made therein to the very elements of that
issue, such as capacity to comprehend the
nature of the testamentary act, the recollection
of the properties to be disposed of and of the
relatives who might have a claim upon the
testatrix' generosity.
Salustiano Reyero, a priest, was the second
rebuttal witness for appellant, whose testimony
was given in the form of deposition. The
testatrix, he said, was in possession of her
mental faculties, reacted well to questions
directed at her, and even told him that she had
a house in Paris. His impression was that she
was not susceptible to suggestion coming from
or influence exerted by other persons. However,
he qualified his assertions as follows: algunos
ratos parecia que estaba alelada, "algunes
veces note" eso cuando fui, y estaba como si no
tuviera interest." Asked whether the testatrix
remembered things normally, this witness
answered: "Algunas veces no, cuando estaba ya
Lily con ella que fue cuando la vi, porque no iba
a ver a la difunta precisamente sino a Lily, y
despues cuando volvia yo ya no se acordaba de
que habia estado yo alli."
Gonzalo Conejos Fernandez was the third
rebuttal witness, also by deposition. A lawyer by
profession, he said he was consulted by the
testatrix, after he came to know her in 1956,
about certain personal matters, among them
the revocation of a power-of-attorney given to
Jose M. Cavanna and the designation of another
in his place as well as the proceedings for the
adoption of appellant by the said testatrix. She
consulted him also about what kinds of wills
were permitted under the Spanish law, and told
him that she had previously made a will in
Manila where she was leaving her properties to
her niece Lily, to a brother or a sister of the
latter and to a "senor Ramirez," (evidently
referring to appellee), but that because of
certain actuations of appellee which did not
please her she did not consider him deserving
of being her heir. The witness was present at
the execution of the will in question on May 24,
1958, and he noted, he said, that she was aware
of the nature of the act in which she was
engaged and that she had a recollection of her
relatives and properties. From the tenor of his
testimony the testatrix was a completely normal
person during the period of their acquaintance;
she was never absent-minded (alelada); and he
did not know that she was suffering from
cerebral arteriosclerosis or from pre-senile
dementia.
The testimony of this witness was not given
weight by the trial court. It does suffer from the
view point of credibility. He was presented as a
rebuttal witness, who had been present during
the taking of the depositions of the previous
witnesses for appellant. He was therefore in a
position to cure, as he apparently tried to do,
the weaknesses in their statements. Although
he was present when the will was executed, he
actually remained in another room, the
"antesala," which was separated by a glass
partition from the room where the testatrix, the
notary public and the instrumental witnesses
transacted the business at hand.
The witness was quite elaborate about the
motive behind the execution of the new will
making appellant the sole heir. He said:
... esta Senora (testatrix) me dijo que tenia
otorgado un testamento en Manila
distribuyendo la herencia entre Lily, una
hermana o hermano, y un Señor Ramirez
(appellee), y que el motive de decidir que toda
su herencia fuera de Lily, rectificando su
anterior testamento, era debido aparte de las
consideraciones de tipo afectivo a que me he
referido al hecho de que ella estuvo casada con
un Senor Ramirez, hijo natural de su padre, y
que este Senor tenia un hijo legitimo, y a pesar
de Ilevarse en buenas relaciones, cuando murio
el hijo (evidently referring to appellee) de este
hijo legitime quiso anular las disposiciones de su
padre que no distinguio entre Ia condicion
natural or legitimo, y por esta razon, a quien
habia procedido de esa forma, que era sobrino
de la difunta no le consideraba acreedora ser
heredero de ella.

If the foregoing were true, and had indeed been

confided to the witness by the testatrix, it is
strange that she should cut off from her new will
not only the appellee but also the other nephew,
Horacio Ramirez, appellant's full brother who
was one of the heirs mentioned in the previous
will executed in Manila and against whom the
testatrix entertained no grievance.

The issue here is essentially one of fact, and

involves an appraisal of the conflicting evidence
presented by the parties. That issue was
addressed in the first instance to the trial Judge,
and we cannot say that his conclusion as to the
testamentary incapacity of the testatrix is
erroneous. It is based mainly on expert medical
testimony to the effect that her mental infirmity
was observed by the family physician as far
back as 1953 and confirmed in 1955 by a
competent psychiatrist, who described the
process of the mental degeneration as
progressive and irreversible; on the written
admissions and declarations of appellant
herself, who would have no motive then to
falsify the facts; and on the testimony of the
testatrix' brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio Ramirez.
On the question of credibility, we find no ground
to disregard such evidence in favor of the
vague, inconclusive statements of the notary
public who authenticated the will and of the two
instrumental witnesses, nor even of the
testimony of the rebuttal witnesses, the more
categorical character of whose affirmations only
serve to weaken their credibility, conflicting as
they do not only with the evidence for appellee
but also with that given by the other witnesses
for appellant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING

CONSIDERATIONS, the order appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant.
G.R. No. L-39033 November 13,
1933
In re will of the late Matea Abella. MONS.
SANTIAGO SANCHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant.
Sotto and Astilla for appellant.
B. Quitoriano for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the opponent
Marciana Abella from the judgment rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, this court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the opposition filed by Marciana
Abella is without merit and, therefore, it is
hereby denied. The application filed herein is
granted and the document, Exhibit A, is hereby
ordered and decreed probated as the last will
and testament of the late Matea Abella. So
ordered.
In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns
the following alleged errors in the decision of the
court a quo, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that Matea
Abella was in the full enjoyment of her mental
faculties and executed the document, Exhibit A,
as a true expression of her last will.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the
requirements of the law have been complied
with in the execution of the will, Exhibit A.
3. The lower court erred in holding that when
the late Matea Abella affixed her alleged
signatures to the will, Exhibit A, she did not act
under the illegal and undue influence of certain
legatees.
4. The lower court erred in decreeing the
probate of the will, Exhibit A.
The following facts have been proven by a
preponderance of evidence presented during
the trial, to wit:
The testatrix, Matea Abella, resident of the
municipality of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, had been
informed that Dr. Antonio Querol of San
Fernando La Union, was a good physician. On
April 13, 1932, she left her home situated in the
said municipality of Sinait, accompanied by her
niece, Filomena Inay, to consult the said
physician in his clinic in San Fernando, La Union,
stopping at the convent of the parish church of
the said municipality, in charge of Father
Cordero with whom she was acquainted he
having been the parish priest of Sinait. During
her stay in the said convent, she went to Dr.
Antonio Querol's clinic twice within the period of
one week accompanied by her aforesaid niece,
Filomena Inay, to consult the said physician
who, after submitting her to a general medical
examination, found that she was suffering from
dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach.
On or about April 26, 1932, Matea Abella
ordered a sexton of the convent to call Attorney
Teodoro R. Reinoso to whom she expressed her
desire to make a will, in the presence of the
Father Cordero's sister, Father Zoilo Aguda,
Macario Calug and the fiscal of the convent.
Inasmuch as the aforesaid attorney had to
attend to other business, he could not finish his
interview with the testatrix on the first day and
had to continue it the following day, also in the
presence of Father Cordero, his sister, Filomena
Inay and some children who were then at the
convent. Inasmuch as he did not finish the
interview on the second day, the said attorney
returned again on the afternoon of the 28th and
continued it in the presence of the same persons
who entered and left the sala. At the end of the
interview, Matea Abella ordered he niece,
Filomena Inay, to bring her some papers which
were in her trunk, which she delivered to the
said attorney. After the will had been drafted in
Ilocano, the dialect of the testatrix, Macario
Calug read it to her and she approved it. When
the will had been copied clean, it was again read
to the testatrix and she express her approval
thereof, but inasmuch as it was rather late at
night, she did not care to sign the same
suggesting that it be postponed to the following
day, April 29, 1932, which was done. At about
7:30 o'clock on the morning of April 29, 1932,
the signing of the will took place in the corridor
of the convent. The testatrix Matea Abella was
the first to sign it on a table in the presence of
each and every one of the instrumental
witnesses thereto and of other persons,
including Father Cordero. After the testatrix,
each of the instrument witnesses signed in the
presence of the testatrix and of each and every
one of the other witnesses. After the will had
been signed, Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso
delivered the original and the copies thereof to
the testatrix, retaining one for his file. On July
3, 1932, Matea Abella died of the senile debility
in the municipality of Sinait at the age of 88
years.
The opponent herein attempted to prove that
the testatrix was deaf and that her eyesight was
defective; that when one moved away from her
and again approached her she was unable to
recognize him; that it was necessary to shout
into her ear to call her for meals; that she used
to urinate on her clothes without being aware of
it; that she had a very poor memory inasmuch
as she used to try to collect from her debtors in
spite of the fact that they had already paid their
debts; that once, although she had sold a parcel
of land for P60 she said she had sold it for P160;
that she was unable to go downstairs without
assistance; that when she was called at
mealtime she used to answer: "Why, I have
already eaten"; that she could not remember
her properties nor the names of her tenants;
that she could no longer read; that she often
repeated to her tenants the same questions
regarding their crops; that she had been
suffering from the disabilities for more than two
months previous to her death; that the
deceased complained of headache and of
stomachache; that she already began to be
dotty five years before, and particularly a few
days previous to her death; that in her will she
bequeathed properties which she had already
donated to other persons.
We are face to face with two divergent theories
regarding the mental state of the testatrix
Matea Abella at the time of the execution of her
will, Exhibit A. The opponent claims that,
inasmuch as the testatrix was 88 years of age
when she made her will, she was already
suffering from senile debility and therefore her
mental faculties were not functioning normally
anymore and that she was not fully aware of her
acts. As an indication of her senile debility, she
attempted to prove that the testatrix had very
poor memory in connection with her properties
and interest; that she could not go downstairs
without assistance, and that she could not recall
her recent acts.
On the other hand, as to the mental sanity of
the testatrix at the time of the execution of her
will, we have the undisputed fact of her having
left her home in Sinait, Ilocos Sur, on April 13,
1932, in order to go to San Fernando, La Union,
to consult Dr. Antonio
Querol — of whose ability she had heard so
much — regarding her headaches and stomach
trouble, stopping at the convent of the parish
church; the fact of her having walked twice to
the aforesaid doctor's clinic, accompanied by
her niece, Filomena Inay; the fact that she had
personally furnished the aforesaid doctor with
all the necessary data regarding the history of
her illness the fact of her having brought with
her in her trunk the deeds to her properties; the
fact of her having called for Attorney Teodoro R.
Reinoso; the fact of her having personally
furnished said attorney all the data she wished
to embody in her relative to her properties and
the persons in whose favor she wished to
bequeath them; the fact of her not wishing to
sign her will on the night of April 28, 1932, but
the following day, in order to be able to see it
better, and the fact of her having affixed her
signature, in her own handwriting, to the
original as well as to the copies of her will which
consisted of nine pages. All these data show
that the testatrix was not so physically weak,
nor so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in
intelligence that she could not, with full
understanding thereof, dispose of her properties
and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor
blindness, nor deafness, nor poor memory, is by
itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for
making his ill (Avelino vs. De la Cruz, 21 Phil.,
521; Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil., 227;
Jocson vs. Jocson, 46 Phil., 701; Amata and
Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485; Torres and
Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772; 28
R.C.L., p. 94, par. 44). The mere fact that in her
will Matea Abella disposed of properties, which
she had already donated to other persons at a
prior date, is not an indication of mental
insanity. At most it constitutes forgetfulness or
a change of mind, due to ignorance of the
irrevocability of certain donations.lawphil.net
It is insinuated that the testatrix has been
unduly influenced in the execution of her will.
There is nothing in the records establishing such
claim either directly or indirectly. The fact of her
having stopped at the convent of the parish
church of San Fernando, La Union, is not
unusual in the Philippines where, due to lack of
hotels, the town convents are usually given
preference by strangers because they are given
better accommodations and allowed more
freedom. In the present case, the testatrix
Matea Abella was a stranger in San Fernando,
La Union. Inasmuch as Father Cordero, the
parish priest of the said town, was well known
to her having served in the church of Sinait,
Ilocos Sur, in the same capacity, she did not
have any difficulties in obtaining
accommodations in his convent. The fact that
Matea Abella stopped at a convent and enjoyed
the hospitality of a priest who gave her
accommodations therein, nor the fact that the
will was executed in the convent in question in
the presence of the parish priest and witnessed
by another priest, could certainly not be
considered as an influence which placed her
under the obligation to bequeath of her property
to the bishop of said diocese.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are
of the opinion and so hold: (1) That neither
senile ability, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor
poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish
the presumption that the person suffering
therefrom is not in the full enjoyment of his
mental faculties, when there is sufficient
evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the
execution of the will; and (2) that neither the
fact of her being given accommodations in a
convent, nor the presence of the parish priest,
nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes
undue influence sufficient to justify the
annulment of a legacy in favor of the bishop of
a diocese made in her will by a testatrix 88 years
of age, suffering from defective eyesight and
hearing, while she is stopping at a convent
within the aforestated diocese.
Wherefore, not finding any error in the
judgment appealed from, it is hereby
affirmed in toto, with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O.
BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.
RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his
guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law
Office for private respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 54492-
R and 54493-R which reversed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Albay allowing the
probate of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in Special
Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case 3068 after declaring the
two deeds of sale executed by Don Jesus Alsua
legal and valid. The respondent court 1 denied
the probate of the will, declared null and void
the two sales subject of the complaint and
ordered the defendants, petitioners herein, to
pay damages to the plaintiffs, now the private
respondents, the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), to render an accounting of the
properties in their possession and to reimburse
the latter the net gain in the proportion that
appertains to them in the properties from the
date of the firing of the complaint up to
complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as attorney's fees and costs.
The antecedent events leading to the filing of
these two consolidated actions are the
following.
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and
his wife, Doñ;a Florentina Rella, both of Ligao,
Albay, together with all their living children,
Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando
Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde
Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje,
entered into a duly notarized
agreement, Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present
and existing properties of the spouses Don
Jesus and Doñ;a Florentina enumerated in a
prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential
features of which are stated in private
respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to
wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A)
of all the properties of the Alsua spouses, which
inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them
signed by the spouses and all the above named
heirs in the left margin of every page (parafo
primers).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all
the properties described in the inventory (Annex
A) are conjugal properties with the exception of
five parcels of land Identified with the figures of
1 to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery
stock which are paraphernal properties of the
late Doñ;a Tinay (segundo parafo).
(3) An acknowledgment that during their
marriage, they had nine children but five of
them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y
cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of
Article 1056 of the Civil Code (old) to avoid
Possible misunderstanding among their children
concerning the inheritance they are entitled to
in the event of death of one of them they have
decided to effectuate an extrajudicial partition
of all the properties described in Annex "A"
thereto under the following terms and
conditions: (Parafo quinto):
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts
were allotted or assigned all the real properties
with the improvements thereon specifically
described from pages 1-12 of said inventory or,
34 parcels of land with a total land area of
5,720,364 sq. meters, with a book or appraised
value of P69,740.00.
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were
allotted or assigned all the real properties with
the improvements thereon specifically described
from pages 12-20 of said inventory or, 26
parcels of land with a total land area of
5,679,262 sq. meters, with a book or appraised
value of P55,940.00.
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson
were allotted or assigned all the real properties
with the improvements thereon specifically
described from pages 20-33 of said inventory
or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of
6,639,810 sq. meters, with a book or appraised
value of P89,300.00.
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando
Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon
specifically described from pages 33-47 of said
inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land
area of 5,630,715 sq. meters, with a book or
appraised value of P58,830.00. têñ.£îhqwâ£
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named
above acknowledge and admit that the totality
of the properties allotted and adjudicated to the
heirs as described in the preceding paragraph,
constitute one half of the properties described
in Annex "A", including any amount of cash
deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit
that all the properties assigned to them as their
hereditary portion represent one-half not only
of the conjugal properties but includes the
paraphernal properties — waiving now and
forever any complaint or claim they have or they
may have concerning the amount, value,
extension and location of the properties that are
allotted to each and everyone. They also waive
any claim they have or they may have over the
remaining portion of the properties, which
spouses reserved for themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses,
each and everyone of the heirs acknowledge
that the properties which are left in the
possession of the surviving spouse, including
any amount in cash, are even less than the one-
half that should correspond in absolute
ownership as his legitimate participation in the
conjugal properties. In consequence they waive
any claim that they have or may have over said
portion of said properties or any amount in cash
during the lifetime of the surviving spouse,
including any right or claim they have or they
may have over the paraphernal properties of
Doñ;a Tinay in the event the surviving spouse
is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of
any one of them, the surviving spouse waives
any claim he or she may have over the
properties assigned or adjudicated to the heirs
under and by virtue of this deed. The properties
which were reserved for them (the spouses)
should be considered as his or her legitimate
participation in the conjugal properties and the
fair compensation of his or her usufruct on the
properties that the surviving spouse reserved
for himself or herself which shag be distributed
in equal shares among the heirs upon his or her
death unless said properties of some of them
have been disposed of during the lifetime of the
surviving spouse.
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity
and legitimacy of the provision contained herein
shall be under obligation to pay to the other
heirs, in the concept of damages and prejudice,
the sum of P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees.
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the
successors of the herein heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses,
the properties assigned or adjudicated to each
and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as
his share or participation in the estate or as his
inheritance left by the deceased and each heir
shall become the absolute owner of the
properties adjudicated to him under this deed.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doñ;a
Florentina, also known as Doñ;a Tinay
separately executed their respective
holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the
provisions of which were in conformity and in
implementation of the extrajudicial partition of
November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills
similarly provided for the institution of the other
to his or her share in the conjugal properties,
the other half of the conjugal assets having
been partitioned to constitute their legitime
among their four living children in the
Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also
declared that in the event of future acquisitions
of other properties by either of them, one-half
thereof would belong to the other spouse, and
the other half shall be divided equally among
the four children. The holographic will of Doñ;a
Tinay written in Spanish reads, as
translated: têñ.£îhqwâ£
TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old,
Filipina, married to Don Jesus Alsua, resident of
and with postal address in the Municipality of
Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines, being in
the full possession of my mental and physical
faculties freely and spontaneously execute this
my last will and testament in my handwriting
and signed by me and expressed in the Spanish
language which I speak, write and understand,
this 5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality
of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which I ordain
and provide:
First: That in or about the year 1906 I was
married to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and
begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of
whom are still living and they are Francisco
Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo
Alsua. The other five (5) died during their
minority, single and without children.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband
Don Jesus Alsua and during our conjugal union,
and as a result of our efforts and industry, we
were able to acquire conjugal properties
consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao lands
and urban lands registered in the office of the
Registry of Property of the Province of Albay and
in the City of Manila.
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to
inherit the following- my spouse Don Jesus
Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and
personal, and the other half, to my children
Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts,
Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde
Samson, and Amparo Alsua, married to
Fernando Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to be
understood, however, that the other half that
corresponds as legitime to my above named
children have already been given to them,
pursuant to a document dated November 25,
1949 and ratified on the same day, month and
year before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores
(Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. 11; Series of 1949)
enjoining each and everyone of them to respect
and faithfully comply with each and every clause
contained in the said document.
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties
after the execution of this testament, the same
shall be partitioned among my spouse and
above named children or the children mentioned
in above par. 3 in the same proportion that is,
one-half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the other
half to my children in equal parts.
Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband
Don Jesus Alsua without having to post any
bond.
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own
handwriting this testament on this 5th day of
January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao,
Province of Albay, Philippines. têñ.£îhqwâ£
(SGD.) FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R.
No. 54492-R)
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed
a separate but similar holographic will on the
same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same
terms and conditions as the above will of his
wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and
Doñ;a Tinay filed before the Court of First
Instance of Albay their respective petitions for
the probate of their respective holographic wins
which were docketed as Special Proceedings No.
484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special
Proceedings No. 485 (Doñ;a Florentina Ralla de
Alsua, Petitioner).
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and
Doñ;a Tinay executed their mutual and
reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing
their respective holographic wins. Again, the
codicils similarly acknowledged and provided
that one-half of all the properties of the
spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been
disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among
their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de
Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that they
reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus
and Doñ;a Tinay) the other half or those not
disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under
the above agreement of partition, and that they
mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each
other their participation therein as well as in all
properties which might be acquired
subsequently. Each spouse also declared that
should she or he be the surviving spouse,
whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain
to him or her, would be divided equally among
the four children. It was also declared in both
codicils that upon the death of either of the
spouses, the surviving spouse was designated
mutually and reciprocally as the executor or
administrator of all the properties reserved for
themselves.
The codicil executed by Doñ;a Tinay, written in
Spanish reads, as translated: têñ.£îhqwâ£
CODICIL
This codicil supplements and amends the
preceding testament. That my spouse and I
have agreed to divide the properties which we
have acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would
correspond to me covers all the properties that
I have partitioned among my children in the
Document of Partition dated November 25,
1949 before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores,
Jr. (Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11;
Series of 1949) (and) even as the properties
which by reason of this testament I leave to my
husband as his share and the other half that
corresponds to my husband constitutes an the
properties that up to now have not been
disposed of, particularly the urban lands
situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province
of Albay and in the City of Manila, with the
exception of that portion that I bequeath to my
husband as his inheritance and his legitimate.
That I institute as my heirs with the right to
inherit my husband Don Jesus Alsua and my
children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando
Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I leave to my
aforecited children all the properties described
in the above mentioned Document of Partition
dated November 25, 1949 which correspond to
each one of them and in the profits (fruits)
expressed in the same, and in the event that the
properties granted to one or any of my children
should exceed in quantity or value those
corresponding to another or others, I hereby
declare that it is my will that the same be
divided among my children as their inheritance
from the free portion of my property.
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his
legitime and as Ws inheritance the part of the
free portion of my property which have not been
allocated in favor of my children in the
Document of Partition aforecited and that which
should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property of
gains that pertains to him as above stated,
including all those properties which we shall
acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my
spouse, I hereby declare that it is my will that
any and all kinds of property that pertain to me
or would pertain to me, which have not been
disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be
divided equally among my above-mentioned
heirs after my death. Ligao, Albay, Philippines,
August 14,1956. têñ.£îhqwâ£
(SGD.) FLORENTINA RALLA DE ALSUA
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R.
No. 54492-R)
And as stated previously, on the same day,
August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a
separate but similar codicil in exactly the same
terms and conditions as the above codicil of his
wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956,
the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay both
filed their respective supplemental petitions for
the probate of their respective codicils in the
probate proceedings earlier filed. On February
19, 1957, their respective holographic wins and
the codicils thereto were duly admitted to
probate.
Upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay on October 2,
1959, Don Jesus was named executor to serve
without bond in an order issued by the probate
court on October 13, 1959. Letters
testamentary having been issued in favor of Don
Jesus, he took his oath of office and performed
his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959,
Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the
presence of his bookkeeper and secretary,
Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to
make a list of all his remaining properties with
their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer,
Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then instructed
to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don
Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November
14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This
notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don
Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had
three essential features: (a) it expressly
cancelled, revoked and annulled all the
provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of
January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14,
1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his
properties donated to his four living children by
virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra.
judicial" of 1949, and that such properties be
taken into account in the partition of his estate
among the children; and (c) it instituted his
children as legatees/devisees of certain specific
properties, and as to the rest of the properties
and whatever may be subsequently acquired in
the future, before his death, were to be given to
Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as
executrix to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other
expenses of the estate of Doñ;a Tinay had been
paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus,
submitted to the probate court for approval a
deed of partition executed on December 19,
1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and which essentially
confirmed the provisions of the partition of
1949, the holographic will and codicil of Doñ;a
Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved the
partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961
declared the termination of the proceedings on
the estate of Doñ;a Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca
Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the will
of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the
probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua
before the Court of First Instance of Albay and
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 699.
Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo
and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde
Samson, on the following grounds: (a) that Don
Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at
the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b)
that the will was executed under duress or
influence of fear or threats; or it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the main beneficiaries and of
person or persons in collusion with them, or the
signature of the testator was secured by or thru
fraud; (c) that the will was not executed
according to the formal requirements of the law;
and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate
contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949
agreed upon by him, his deceased spouse,
Doñ;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco,
Pablo, Amparo and Fernando thru his judicial
guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened
Don Jesus' own probated holographic will and
codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively,
essentially confirming and implementing the
said partition of 1949 which had already been
partially executed by all the signatories thereto
in the partition of the estate of Doñ;a Tinay in
December, 1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as
executrix in the new will dated November 14,
1959, the Probate Court appointed her
Administratrix of the estate of her late father,
Don Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the Probate
Court an inventory of the properties of the
estate which, according to the oppositors
therein (the private respondents now) did not
include some properties appearing in the
agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the
inventory attached thereto as Annex "A" and in
the "Escritura de Particion" of December 19,
1959 as belonging to or should pertain to Don
Jesus. According to the oppositors, these
properties consist of thirty- three (33) premium
agricultural lots with a total land area of
1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119
hectares and with a total assessed value of
P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of
P238,000.00 at only P2,000.00 per hectare, and
four (4) commercial urban lots Ideally located in
the business section of Legazpi City including
the lot and the building presently occupied by
the well-known "Mayon Hotel" with an assessed
value of approximately P117,260.00 or a
probable market value at the time of
P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will
that these properties were bequeathed to Pablo
Alsua and Francisco Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3
parcels of the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and
the rest to Francisco, the oppositors also raised
in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in
the inventory of the estate of their late father.
In answer, Francisco claimed ownership over
the same, alleging that she bought the
properties from their father and presenting the
two Deeds of Sale now being assailed, one
dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show the
sale of the 33 parcels of agricultural land to
Francisco by their father for the price of
P70,000.00 and the other dated November 26,
1962 evidencing the sale of the four urban lots
for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the
sales, the oppositors filed Civil Case No. 3068,
seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two
deeds of sale, with damages, which upon
agreement of the parties was then jointly heard
and tried with Special Proceedings No. 699 for
probate of the Last Will and Testament of Don
Jesus executed on November 14, 1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two
cases, the Court of First Instance of Albay
promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973,
the dispositive portion of which
states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby
APPROVES and ALLOWS the Will executed by
Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on November
14, 1959, which had been marked as Exhibit A,
consisting of nine (9) pages, and orders that the
same be made the basis for division and
distribution of the estate of said testator;
2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby
dismisses the complaint and holds that the sale
on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale on
November 26, 1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and
valid sales and accordingly conveyed title to the
VENDEE thereof. The Plaintiffs in Civil Case
3068. are ordered jointly and severally to pay
to the defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for
attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to pay the
costs.
On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of
Appeals, the court reversed the appealed
decision in a judgment rendered on April 4,
1977, the dispositive portion of which states, as
translated, thus —têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds
itself constrained to set aside as it hereby sets
aside the decision appealed from in the
following manner: (1) in Special Proceedings
699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is hereby
denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068, Exhs. U and
W and the titles issued on the basis thereof are
hereby declared null and void, ordering the
appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to
pay to the plaintiffs in the concept of fixed
damages, the sum of P5,000.00 and to render
an accounting of properties in their possession
and to reimburse the plaintiffs the net gain, in
the proportion that appertains to them in the
properties subject of litigation in Civil Case No.
3068 from the date of the filing of this
complaint, up to the complete restoration of the
properties pertaining to (plaintiffs) pursuant to
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, paragraph
11, ordering them in addition to pay to the
plaintiffs and oppositors the sum of P50,000.00
as attorney's fees, and the costs.
Hence, the petition at bar assailing the
respondent court's decision on four assigned
errors, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
affirming the findings of the probate court
(Special Proceedings No. 699) that private
respondents, oppositors to the probate of the
will, are in estoppel to question the competence
of testator Don Jesus Alsua.
II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly
erred in holding that testator Don Jesus Alsua
cannot revoke his previous will.
III. The respondent court's finding is grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
resulting in a gross misapprehension of facts.
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in
annulling the sales of August 26, 1961 (Exh. U),
and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
On the first issue of estoppel raised in the
assignment of errors, We hold that the same is
of no moment. The controversy as to the
competency or incompetency of Don Jesus
Alsua to execute his will cannot be determined
by acts of the herein private respondents as
oppositors to the will in formally agreeing in
writing jointly with the petitioner Francisca
Alsua de Betts that their father, Don Jesus
Alsua, be appointed by the court executor of the
will of their mother in Special Proceedings No.
485, Testate Estate of Doñ;a Florentina Ralla de
Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court
not to require Don Jesus Alsua to file any
accounting as executor in the proceedings,
which petitioners claim and was upheld by the
trial court as constituting estoppel on the part
of the private respondents from questioning the
competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in
probate proceedings, a ruling laid down in the
case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia
Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios
Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, an eminent and recognized authority on
Civil Law when he was still in the Court of
Appeals, and We quote: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Finally, probate proceedings involve public
interest, and the application therein of the rile
of estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment
of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding
the execution of a testament, would seem
inimical to public policy. Over and above the
interest of private parties is that of the state to
see that testamentary dispositions be carried
out if, and only if, executed conformably to law.
The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re
Canfield's Will, 300 N.Y.S., 502: têñ.£îhqwâ£
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to
establish the existence of the right of any living
person, but to determine whether or not the
decedent has performed the acts specified by
the pertinent statutes, which are the essential
prerequisites to personal direction of the mode
of devolution of his property on death. There is
no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a
proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of
the departed, and he may and frequently does
receive no personal benefit from the
performance of the act.
One of the most fundamental conceptions of
probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to
effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with
the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of
a deceased person (Matter of Watson's Wilt 262
N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E., 787; Matter of
Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208,
N.Y.S., 672; Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div.,
733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S., Matter of
Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 593, 290,
N.Y.S., 581). To that end, the court is, in effect,
an additional party to every litigation affecting
the disposal of the assets of the deceased.
Matter of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc.
295, 298, N.Y.S., 219.'
The next issue that commands Our attention is
whether the respondent court erred in not
allowing the probate of the last will and
testament of Don Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim
that the disallowance was based on
speculations, surmises or conjectures,
disregarding the facts as found by the trial
court. The Civil Court is very clear and explicit
in providing the cases where a will may be
disallowed under Article 839 which provides as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of
the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not
been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise
mentally incapable of making a wilt at the time
of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under
duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured
by fraud,
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not
intend that the instrument he signed should be
his will at the time of affixing his signature
thereto.
The issue under consideration appears to Us to
have been answered by the respondent court
itself when it accepted the findings of the trial
court on the due execution of the questioned will
and testament of Don Jesus,
declaring: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... and going back to the previous question,
whether the questioned will and testament of
November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in
accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil
Code, this Tribunal from the very beginning
accepts the findings of the inferior court
concerning the question, têñ.£îhqwâ£
On October 2, 1959, Doñ;a Florentina died at
Ligao, Albay. About 2 weeks after said death of
his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a new
will, thereby revoking and cancelling his
previous holographic will which he made on
January 5, 1955 and also its codicil dated
August 14, 1956. In the presence of his
bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez,
he crossed out in ink each and every page of
said page he wrote on each page the word
"cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon
(Exh V-5, V-6, consecutively up to and including
Exh. V-14). He then instructed Ramirez to make
a list of all s properties with their corresponding
descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer,
Don Gregorio Imperial, Sr. and the latter came
accompanied by his son, Atty. Jorge S, Imperial,
who, incidentally, is now a judge of the Court of
First Instance of Naga City, Camarines Sur. Don
Jesus informed his lawyers that he wanted to
make a new will, and accordingly gave more
detailed instructions as to how he wanted to
divide his properties among his four children. He
handed to them a list and on the left he
indicated the name of the child to whom the
listed properties shall pertain. Atty. Jorge
Imperial took notes of the instructions of Don
Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his major
language, as in fact his conversations with Don
Gregorio are always in Spanish. A few days
before November 14, 1959, Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final
draft of the will and after reading it Don Jesus
said that it was as directed by him, and after
making a few minor corrections, he instructed
Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the win in final
form. He further told Atty, Jorge Imperial that
the signing of the will should be at his home in
Ligao, in the morning of November 14, 1959,
and that the witnesses should be Mr. Ramon
Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr.
Jose Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and
Mr. Jose Gaya who is a sort of employee of Don
Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don
Gregorio and Atty. Jorge S. Imperial, riding in a
sedan, stopped at the Legaspi residence of Mr.
Ramon Balana, and informed the latter that Don
Jesus was requesting him to be one of the
attesting witnesses to his will. Mr. Balana,
having a very high regard for Don Jesus,
considered it an honor to be so asked, and
gladly went with the Imperials. They arrived at
the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao; Albay,
almost ten o'clock of that morning, and they
were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter
requested them to be seated at the usual
receiving room on the ground floor while he
announced their arrival to Don Jesus who was
on the second floor. Soon Don Jesus came
down, carrying with him the will to be signed
placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted Don
Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty. Imperial and
immediately joined them in conversation. Mr.
Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose
residence is just across the road from the house
of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already
informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact of
signing the will that morning, and so, on being
advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials had
already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the
residence of Don Jesus, without much delay.
With the coming of Madarieta and the coming
back of Gaya, there were now six people
gathered in the living room, namely: Don Jesus
Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta,
and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the witnesses who
testified for the petitioner declared that Don
Jesus was in bright and lively conversation
which ran from problems of farming and the
merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock,
Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about
time to do what they were there for, and this
was followed by a more or less statement from
Jesus, who said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a ustedes
que esten presentes para ser testigos de rni
ultimo voluntad y testamento que ha sido
preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial
segun mis instrucciones cuyo documento tengo
aqui conmigo y encuentro que, despues de lo he
leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
instrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo
cuatro (4) hijos todos egos.' (pp. 43-44, t.s.n.,
hearing of December 7, 1967, Sarte.
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to
the big round table on another part of the same
sala for convenience in signing because there
were chairs all around this table. The will which
consisted of nine pages, with a duplicate, and
triplicate was laid on the round table and the
signing began, with Atty. Jorge S. Imperial
assisting each person signing by indicating the
proper place where the signature shall be
written. Don Jesus, as testator, signed first.
After signing the original and the two other sets,
the three sets were then passed to Mr. Ramon
Balana who signed as attesting witness. After
Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed next as
another attesting witness, and when Mr.
Madarieta finished signing all the three sets, the
same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who also
signed as the third attesting witness. On each of
the three sets, Don Jesus signed ten times, —
one on the margin of each of the nine pages,
and at the end of the instrument proper. Each
of the three attesting witnesses (Balana,
Madarieta and Gaya) signed eleven times on
each set, — one on the margin of each of the
nine pages, one at the end of the instrument
proper and one below the attestation clause.
The original will was marked as Exh. A (or set
A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K) and the
triplicate of Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr.
Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were Identified by Mr.
Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge)
imperial. It was also clearly established that
when Don Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr.
Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and
witnessed said signing, and that when each of
these three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus
and the two other attesting witnesses were
present and Witnessing said Signing. The
signing by the testator and the attesting
witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge
S. Imperial as Notary Public with commission for
the entire province of Albay, notarized the wilt
and sealed it with his notarial seat which seal he
brought along that morning. After all the three
sets were notarized, they were all given back to
Don Jesus who placed them inside the same
folder. At that moment, it was already about
12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus invited all of them to
lunch, which invitation was gladly accepted by
all of then-L (pp. 474-480, Joint Record on
Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
which findings are supported by the evidence, -
it is quite difficult to conclude that the same had
not complied with the requirements of Arts.
804- 806 of the New Civil Code. ... (CA Decision,
pp. 13-16, as translated).
This cited portion of the appealed decision
accepts as a fact that the findings of the lower
court declaring the contested will as having
been executed with all the formal requirements
of a valid will, are supported by the evidence.
This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal and
We cannot alter, review or revise the same.
Hence, there is no further need for Us to dwell
on the matter as both the lower court and the
respondent appellate court have declared that
these are the facts and such facts are fully borne
and supported by the records. We find no error
in the conclusion arrived at that the contested
will was duly executed in accordance with law.
We rule that the questioned last will and
testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully complied
with the formal requirements of the law.
Respondent court, however, denied probate of
the will after ,'noting certain details which were
a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary
course of things and of life." First was the fact
that the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay
together with their four children Francisco,
Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had executed the
Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949
(Exh. A) which divided the conjugal properties
of the spouses between the spouses themselves
and the children under the terms and conditions
and dispositions herein before stated and to
implement its provisions, Don Jesus and Doñ;a
Tinay subsequently executed separately their
respective holographic wigs both dated January
5, 1955 and codicils dated August 14, 1956 with
the same terms and conditions as reproduced
herein earlier. Both holographic wills and
codicils having been probated thereafter and
upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay, Don Jesus was
appointed executor of the will and in due time
the partition of the properties or estate of Doñ;a
Tinay was approved by the probate court on July
6, 1960.
The respondent court ruled that the
Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949
was an enforceable contract which was binding
on Don Jesus Alsua as the surviving spouse,
barring him from violating said partition
agreement, barring him from revoking his
holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his
codicil of August 14, 1956, and further barring
him from executing his new will and testament
of November 14, 1959, now the subject of the
probate proceedings elevated to this Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of
Appeals. We hold that the Extrajudicial Partition
of November 25, 1949 is null and void under
Article 1056 in relation to Article 1271 of the old
Civil Code which are applicable hereto. These
Articles provide as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a
partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced
heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which
are not excluded from the commerce of man,
may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into
with respect to future inheritances, except those
the object of which is to make a division inter
vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article
1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good
morals may also be the subject- matter of
contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator"
from which the clear intent of the law may be
deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's
estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only to
one who has made a prior will or testament. In
other words, Article 1056 being an exception
cannot be given a wider scope as to include in
the exception any person whether he has made
a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article
concluded that under both the old and new Civil
Code, a person who executes a will is permitted
at the same time or a little thereafter or even
before as long as he mentions this fact in the
will, to partition his properties pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code.
The court further added that jurisprudence is to
the effect that the partition presupposes the
execution of the will that it ratifies or
effectuates, citing the case of Legasto vs.
Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court
held the opinion that the extrajudicial partition
of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the
holographic will executed by Don Jesus on Jan.
5, 1955 and in the codicil of August 14, 1956.
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the
respondent court. In Legasto vs.
Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court
categorically declared the necessity of a prior
will before the testator can partition his
properties among his heirs, and We quote the
pertinent portions of the decision: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The first question to decide in the instant appeal
is whether the partition made by Sabina
Almadin of her property among her nieces, the
defendants and appellants herein, was valid and
enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a
partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced
heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision
rendered on June 13, 1903, laid down the
following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056
cannot be interpreted to mean that a person
may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property
referred to in the section wherein said article is
found, without the authority of a testament
containing an expression of his last will, or the
authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus
made would be tantamount to making a will in
a manner not provided for, authorized, nor
included in the chapter referring to testaments,
and especially, to the forms thereof, which is
entirely different from the legal consequences of
a free disposition made by parents during their
lifetime, whereby they give to their children the
whole or a part of their property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second
paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to
the aforesaid article, in providing that no
contracts may be entered into with respect to
future inheritances except those the object of
which is to make a division inter vivos of the
estate in accordance with article 1056, it is
evident that said difference likewise leads to the
conclusion that a partition thus made should be
on the basis of a testamentary or legal
succession and should be made in conformity
with the fundamental rules thereof and the
order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because
neither of the two provisions could be given a
wider meaning or scope than that they simply
provide for the division of the estate during the
lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would
have to be done upon the death of the testator
in order to carry into effect the partition of the
estate among the persons interested.
Manresa comments on the same article as
follows:
A distinction must be made between the
disposition of property and its division; and the
provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator
to dispose of his property by acts inter vivos or
by last will, must be understood in accordance
with this distinction. The Idea is to divide the
estate among the heirs designated by the
testator. This designation constitutes the
disposition of the properties to take effect after
his death, and said act must necessarily appear
in the testament because it is the expression of
the testator's last will and must be surrounded
by appropriate formalities. Then comes the
second part, to wit, the division in conformity
with that disposition, and the testator may
make this division in the same will or in another
will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words,
the law, in article 1056 as well as in article 1057,
which we shall hereafter examine, makes
allusion to the forms or manner of making the
partition and not to the effects thereof, which
means that, for purposes of partition the formal
solemnities which must accompany every
testament or last will are not necessary. Neither
is it necessary to observe the special for.
realities required in case of donations, because
it is not a matter of disposing gratuitously of
properties, but of dividing those which already
have been legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme
Court and the learned and authoritative
commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a
testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his
property, but he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided for by law. And it could
not be otherwise, for without a will there can be
no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of
the partition inter vivos made by a testator of
his property, it necessarily refers to that
property which he has devised to his heirs. A
person who disposes of his property gratis inter
vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In
employing the word "testator," the law evidently
desired to distinguish between one who freely
donates his property in life and one who
disposes of it by will to take effect after his
death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the
respondent court that the extrajudicial partition
of November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil
Code was expressly prohibited as against public
policy had been validly ratified by the
holographic will of Don Jesus executed on
January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14,
1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that
a person who executes a will is permitted to
partition his properties pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code
even before executing his will as long as he
mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted
under the ruling of Legasto vs.
Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa
as quoted above. We rule, therefore, that the
respondent court erred in denying probate to
the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959;
it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party
to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was
contractually bound by the provisions thereof
and hence could not revoke his participation
therein by the simple expedience of making a
new will with contrary provisions or dispositions.
It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial
partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a
partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable
contract because it involved future inheritance;
it may only be given effect as a donation inter
vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by
the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial
partition of November 25, 1949, contained
specific designation of properties allotted to
each child, We rule that there was substantial
compliance with the rules on donations inter
vivos under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On
the other hand, there could have been no valid
donation to the children of the other half
reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus and
Doñ;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was
to be divided equally among the children for the
simple reason that the property or properties
were not specifically described in the public
instrument, an essential requirement under
Article 633 which provides as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real
property be valid it must be made by public
instrument in which the property donated must
be specifically described and in the amount of
the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee
expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift
or in a separate public writing; but it shall
produce no effect if not made during the lifetime
of the donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public
instrument, authentic notice thereof shall be
given the donor, and this proceeding shall be
noted in both instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the
disposable free portion of the spouses which
may be disposed of in such manner that either
of the spouses would like in regards to his or her
share in such portion, unencumbered by the
provision enjoining the last surviving spouse to
give equally to the children what belongs or-
would pertain to him or her. The end result,
therefore, is that Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay, in
the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid
donations of only one-half of their combined
properties which must be charged against their
legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless
inofficious; the other half remained entirely at
the free disposal of the spouses with regards to
their respective shares.
Upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay on October 2,
1959, her share in the free portion was
distributed in accordance with her holographic
will dated January 25, 1955 and her codicil
dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here
that the distribution of her properties was
subject to her holographic win and codicil,
independently of the holographic will and codicil
of Don Jesus executed by him on the same date.
This is fundamental because otherwise, to
consider both wills and codicils jointly would be
to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code
on joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly because
upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay, only her estate
was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of
the holographic will and codicil of Doñ;a Tinay
and We find no indication whatsoever that
Doñ;a Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted
both the husband and her children as heirs to
her free portion of her share in the conjugal
assets. In her holographic will, mention of her
children as heirs was made in the fourth clause
but it only provided that, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase
propiedades despues de otorgado este mi
testamento seran las mismas repartados entre
mi esposo o hijos arriba mencionada en el
parrafo tercero su la misma proporcion o sea: la
mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra mitad (1/2)
para mis hijos en partes iguales.
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this
fourth clause provided that "Should I acquire
new properties after the execution of this
testament, the same shall be partitioned among
my spouse and above named children or the
children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same
proportion, that is, one- half (1/2) to my
spouse; and the other half to my children in
equal parts." From the above-quoted provision,
the children would only inherit together with
Don Jesus whatever new properties Doñ;a Tinay
would acquire after the execution of her will.
Likewise, the codicil of Doñ;a Tinay instituted
her husband as sole heir to her share in the free
portion of the conjugal assets, and We quote
that part of the codicil: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima
y como herencia que se sacara de ni cuenta de
libre disposicion todos aquellos bienes de los
que no he dispuesto aun en favor de mis hijos
en la escritura de reparticion precitada y que
excedieran de la mitad de gananciales que le
corresponds tal como arriba declare, incluyendo
todos aquenos bienes que se adquiriesen por
nosotros despues de otorgado por mi este
testamento.
Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo
sobreviviera a mi esposo declaro que es mi
voluntad que todas las propiedades de todo
genero que me pertenecen y me pudieran
pertenecer, no dispuestas aun en la reparticion,
se dividan por igual entre mis herederos
mencionados despues de mi muerte.
Again for purposes of clarity and convenience,
the above portion states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his
legitime and as his inheritance the part of the
free portion of my property which have not been
allocated in favor of my children in the
Document of Partition aforecited and that which
should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property of
gains that pertains to him as above stated,
including all those properties which we shall
acquire after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my
spouse, I hereby declare that it is my will that
any and all kinds of property that pertains to me
or would pertain to me, which have not been
disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be
divided equally among my above-mentioned
heirs after my death.
The children, therefore, would only receive
equal shares in the remaining estate of Doñ;a
Tinay in the event that she should be the
surviving spouse. To stress the point, Doñ;a
Tinay did not oblige her husband to give equally
to the children, upon his death, all such
properties she was bequeathing him.
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last
will and testament executed on November 14,
1959 in view of Our holding that Doñ;a Tinay's
wig and codicil did not stipulate that Don Jesus
will bestow the properties equally to the
children, it follows that all the properties of
Doñ;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under her
holographic win and codicil became part of Don
Jesus' estate unburdened by any condition
obligation or proviso.
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by
the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949
and had in fact conformed to said Partition by
making a holographic will and codicil with
exactly the same provisions as those of Doñ;a
Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We
rule, however, that Don Jesus was not forever
bound thereby for his previous holographic will
and codicil as such, would remain revokable at
his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is
clear: "A win may be revoked by the testator at
any time before his death. Any waiver or
restriction of this right is void." There can be no
restriction that may be made on his absolute
freedom to revoke his holographic will and
codicil previously made. This would still hold
true even if such previous will had as in the case
at bar already been probated (Palacios v.
Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first place,
probate only authenticates the will and does not
pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions
therein. And secondly, the rights to the
succession are transmitted only from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Article
777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus
retained the liberty of disposing of his property
before his death to whomsoever he chose,
provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not
prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is
undisputed that only the free portion of the
whole Alsua estate is being contested.
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus
was named as sole heir instituted to the
remaining estate of Doñ;a Tinay in her
holographic will and codicil resulting in all such
properties becoming the properties of Don Jesus
alone, and after clearly pointing out that Don
Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous
holographic will and codicil, by making another
win expressly cancelling and revoking the
former, the next issue for the Court's resolution
is the validity of the provisions of the contested
will. Though the law and jurisprudence are clear
that only questions about the extrinsic validity
of the will may be entertained by the probate
court, the Court had, on more than one
occasion, passed upon the intrinsic validity of a
will even before it had been authenticated. Thus
We declared in Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA
499: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The parties shunted aside the question of
whether or not the will should be allowed to
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
intrinsic validity of the wilt Normally this comes
only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. ...
... If the case were to be remanded for probate
of the wilt nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation win be protracted and for
ought that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will probability
exists that the case win come up once again
before us on the issue of the intrinsic validity or
nullity of the wilt Result: waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a
behalf that we might as well meet head-on the
time of the validity of the provisions of the will
in question. ...
The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus
executed on November 14, 1959 contained an
express revocation of his holographic wig of
January 5, 1955 and the codicil of August 14,
1956; a statement requiring that all of his
properties donated to his children in the Deed of
1949 be collated and taken into account in the
partition of his estate; the institution of all his
children as devisees and legatees to certain
specific properties; a statement bequeathing
the rest of his properties and all that may be
acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo
and Francesca; and a statement naming
Francesca as executrix without bond.
Considering these testamentary provisions, a
close scrutiny of the properties distributed to
the children under the Deed of 1949 and those
distributed under the contested will of Don Jesus
does not show that the former had in fact been
included in the latter. This being so, it must be
presumed that the intention of Don Jesus in his
last win was not to revoke the donations already
made in the Deed of 1949 but only to
redistribute his remaining estate, or that portion
of the conjugal assets totally left to his free
disposal and that which he received as his
inheritance from Doñ;a Tinay. The legitimes of
the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact,
not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated
otherwise. The properties that were disposed of
in the contested will belonged wholly to Don
Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be diamond
of by him to whomsoever he may choose.
If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed
by private respondents, or Pablo as in fact he
was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment
upon the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus
in doing so. We have clearly laid down this rule
in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to
wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the
court to advance its own Idea of a just
distribution of the property in the face of a
different mode of disposition so clearly
expressed by the testatrix in the latter will. ...
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the
interpretation of a will in order to effect what the
court believes to be an equitable division of the
estate of a deceased person. The only functions
of the courts in these cases is to carry out the
intention of the deceased as manifested in the
wig. Once that intention has been determined
through a careful reading of the will or wills, and
provided the law on legitimes has not been
violated, it is beyond the place of judicial
cognizance to inquire into the fairness or
unfairness of any devise or bequeast. The court
should not sit in judgment upon the motives and
sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as
already stated, nothing in the law restrained her
from disposing of her property in any manner
she desired, and secondly, because there are no
adequate means of ascertaining the inward
process of her conscience. She was the sole
judge of her own attitude toward those who
expected her bounty. ...
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the
will of Don Jesus which allegedly benefited and
favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the
other heirs who would have been entitled to an
equal share under the extrajudicial partition of
1949, faced two alternatives-one, to consider
Don Jesus as a man of culture and honor and
would not snow himself to violate the previous
agreement, and the other as one whose mental
faculties or his possession of the same had been
diminished considering that when the will was
executed, he was already 84 years of age and
in view of his weakness and advanced age, the
actual administration of his properties had been
left to his assistant Madarieta who, for his part
received instructions from Francisco and her
husband, Joseph Betts. According to the court,
the better explanation is the latter, which is not
legally tenable. Under Article 799 of the New
Civil Code which provides as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at
the time of making the will to know the nature
of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act,
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time
of the making of the win. Mere weakness of
mind or partial imbecility from disease of body
or from age-does not render a person incapable
of making a will. têñ.£îhqwâ£
Between the highest degree of soundness of
mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that
degrees of mental aberration generally known
as insanity or Idiocy, there are numberless
degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and
while on one hand it has been held that mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from
disease of body, or from age, will not render a
person incapable of making a will; a weak or
feebleminded person may make a valid will,
provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is
about to do and how or to whom he is disposing
of his property. To constitute a sound and
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not necessarily
require that a person shall actually be insane or
of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil.
163).
The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798
that in order to make a will, it is essential that
the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution, and under Article 800, the law
presumes that every person is of sound mind in
the absence of proof to the contrary. In the case
at bar, the acceptance by the respondent court
of the findings of fact of the trial court on the
due execution of the last win and testament of
Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to
the contrary that the will was not executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
But more than that, gleaned from the quoted
portions of the appealed decision, the described
behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a mentally
incapacitated person nor one suffering from
"senile dementia" as claimed by private
respondents. From these accepted facts, We
find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who gave
detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he
wanted to divide his properties among his
children by means of a list of his properties
should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the
contested will prepared by his lawyer w-as even
corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the
signing of the will at his house in Ligao, "Don
Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading
in the conversation which ran from problems of
farming and the merits of French-made wines";
(d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his
attesting witnesses was made after a statement
from Don Jesus of the purpose of their meeting
or gathering, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a
ustedes que eaten presentes para ser testigos
de mi ultima voluntad y testamento que ha sido
preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial
segun mis instrucciones cuyo documents tengo
aqui con migo y encuentro que, despues de lo
he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun
mis ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo
cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.
Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his
actions were and the fun implications thereof.
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court
further pointed out other details which, in the
words of the decision "are a little bit difficult to
reconcile with the ordinary course of things and
of fife" such as the fact that Don Jesus had
sought the probate of his will of January 5, 1955
and his codicil of August 14, 1956 during his
lifetime but insofar as the will of November 14,
1959 is concerned, he had no intention of
seeking the probate thereof during his lifetime,
the alleged redundant and unnecessary
proceedings undertaken by Don Jesus in the
properties under question to petitioner Franciso
Alsua-Betts when the same properties had
already been bequeathed to her in the will of
November 14, 1959 and that "nothing,
absolutely nothing, could be made the basis for
finding that Don Jesus Alsua had regarded his
other children with less favor, and that he was
more sympathetic to Francisca so as to or forget
the former depriving them of benefits already
given to them and rewarding the latter with
disproportionate advantages or benefits, to
such an extreme as to violate his previous
disposition consecrated in the previous
extrajudicial partition, Exh. 8."
We agree with the petitioner that these details
which respondent court found difficult to
reconcile with the ordinary course of things and
of life are mere conjectures, surmises or
speculations which, however, do not warrant or
justify disallowance of the probate of the win of
Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not cause
his will to be probated during his lifetime while
his previous holographic win and codicil were
duly probated when he was still alive is a mere
speculation which depends entirely on the
discretion of Don Jesus as the testator. The law
does not require that a will be probated during
the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so
there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable
consequence therefrom. The parties cannot
correctly guess or surmise the motives of the
testator and neither can the courts. Such
surmise, speculation or conjecture is no valid
and legal ground to reject allowance or
disallowance of the wig. The same thing can be
said as to whatever reason Don Jesus had for
selling the properties to his daughter Francisca
when he had already assigned the same
properties to her in his will. While We can
speculate that Don Jesus desired to have
possession of the properties transferred to
Francisca after the sale instead of waiting for his
death may be a reasonable explanation or
speculation for the act of the testator and yet
there is no certainty that such was actually the
reason. This is as good a conjecture as the
respondents may offer or as difficult to accept
which respondent court believes. A conjecture is
always a conjecture; it can never be admitted
as evidence.
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised
anent the civil case for annulment of the two
Deeds of Sale executed by and between Don
Jesus and petitioner Francisco is their validity or
nullity. Private respondents mainly contend that
the sales were fictitious or simulated, there
having been no actual consideration paid. They
further insist that the issue raised is a question
of fact and, therefore, not reviewable in a
certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, petitioners herein maintain
that it was error for the respondent court to set
aside on appeal the factual findings of the trial
court that the two sales were valid.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in
cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
law imputed to it, its findings of fact being
conclusive; and this same principle applies even
if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with
the lower court as to the weight of evidence with
a consequent reversal of its findings of fact. But
what should not be ignored by lawyers and
litigants alike is the more basic principle that the
"findings of fact" described as "final" or
"conclusive" are those borne out by the record
or those which are based upon substantial
evidence. The general rule laid down by the
Supreme Court does not declare the absolute
correctness of all the findings of fact made by
the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to
the general rule, where We have reviewed and
revised the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals cannot
be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257);
2. When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna vs.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2927);
4. When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs. Sosing, L-
4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April 30, 1957);
and
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto
Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139, April 23, 1958;
Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967,
19 SCRA 289).
In the case at bar, We find and so declare that
the respondent court's conclusion as to the
nullity of the contested sales was not supported
by the evidence on record and adduced during
the trial.
Evident from the records are the following
documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit U, a deed of
sale over agricultural lands executed on August
26, 1961 by Don Jesus in favor of Francisca for
the consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P70,000.00), which document bears the
signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as a
forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an
instrumental witness, again not assailed as a
forgery nor alleged as done thru fraud, force or
threat. (2) Exhibit "W", a deed of sale over
urban lots executed on November 16, 1962 for
the consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P80,000.00), which document also bears the
signature of Don Jesus, also admittedly not a
forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a document dated
August 26, 1961 and signed by Don Jesus and
Pablo Alsua as witness, acknowledging receipt
of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No. 0252 in
the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of
agricultural land to Francisco under the same
date; again, Pablo did not deny the genuineness
of his signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the
Philippine Islands Check No. D-6979 dated
November 26, 1962, in the amount of
P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca,
payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X-1", a
second Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D-
6980) also dated November 26, 1962 in the
amount of ?47,355.29, drawn by Francisco and
payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-
5 ", endorsements on the back of the last two
checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures
thereon were not assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in the
annulment case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue
Receipt (No. 2347260) dated November 29,
1962 with a notation acknowledging the receipt
of BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of
P47,355.29 from Don Jesus Alsua in payment of
Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-
19 plus interest. We are convinced and satisfied
from this array of documentary evidence that in
fact, Don Jesus sold the subject properties to his
daughter, Francisca for the total consideration
of P150,000.00.
The claim of the private respondents that the
sales were fictitious and void for being without
cause or consideration is as weak and flimsy as
the ground upon which the respondent court
upheld said claim on the basis that there was no
need for funds in Don Jesus' old age aside from
the speculation that there was nothing in the
evidence that showed what motivated Don
Jesus to change his mind as to favor Francesca
and discriminate against the other children. The
two contracts of same executed by Don Jesus in
favor of Francesca are evidenced by Exhibits "U"
and "W", the genuineness of which were not at
all assailed at any time during this long drawn-
out litigation of 15 years standing. That the
consideration stated in the contracts were paid
is also sufficiently proved as the receipts thereof
by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the
private respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness.
The latter cannot now deny the payment of the
consideration And even of he now allege that in
fact no transfer of money was involved, We find
his allegation belied by Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5
", which show that the checks of Francisco made
payable to Don Jesus. were in fact given to Don
Jesus as he endorsed them on the back thereof,
and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the
annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus
actually used Exhibit "XI " to complete payment
on the estate and inheritance tax on the estate
of his wife to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Private respondents further insist that the sales
were fraudulent because of the inadequacy of
the given price. Inadequacy of consideration
does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven
which in the case at bar was not, that there was
fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article
1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the
stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the
court's conscience, considering that the price
paid was much higher than the assessed value
of the subject properties and considering that
the sales were effected by a father to her
daughter in which case filial love must be taken
into account.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay
in Special Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case
No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with costs
against respondents.

SO ORDERED.