TRINIDAD NEYRA VS.

ENCARNACION NEYRA

DOCTRINE: Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the
execution of the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other
persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still
effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator
was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the will.

FACTS:
Encarnacion Neyra and her sister, Trinidad Neyra had a litigation in the Court of First
Instance regarding the properties left by their father.

During the course of the litigation, Encarnacion Neyra had been suffering from
Addison’s disease and on the day before her death, Encarnacion and Trinidad
reconciled and had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which they talked
about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court
of Appeals, they then agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that the
property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter
should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion.

On November 3, 1942, Attorney Panis prepared a document of compromise embodying

their agreement and prepared Encarnacion’s last will and testament.

On November 4, 1942, Encarnacion unexpectedly died allegedly from heart attack, as a

consequence of Addison’s disease.

Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, and other relatives of
hers, filed a petition claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement could not have
been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold of
death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day.

ISSUE: Was Encarnacion Neyra of sound mental condition at the time of the execution
of the compromise and of her last will and testament?

RULING: YES.
Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the
compromise and of her last will and testament.

Presentacion Blanco, niece of Encarnacion, in the course of her cross-examination,

frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other
clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing
and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering
from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to
the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of
physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or
diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.

The logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the
necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the
agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.

EULALIO HERNAEZ VS. ROSENDO HERNAEZ

DOCTRINE: The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in
a stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some
days before making her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by
proof could no lead the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness
of a person who is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties
until the contrary is conclusively proven.

FACTS:
Eulalio Hernaez, one of the sons of the testatrix Doña Juana Espinosa, filed an action
for annulment of the will executed by the latter, which will disposes those of the third
part of the hereditary estate of free disposal to her eldest son, Rosendo, and the
distribution of the remaining third in six equal parts among her five children and two
grandchildren.

One of the grounds Eulalio presented was the incapacity of the testatrix to make a will.
That on the day of the execution of her will, Doña Juana was over 80 years of age and
was so ill that three days before she had received the sacraments and extreme unction,
and that two days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she walked in a stooping
attitude, and gave contradictory orders, as a result of her senile debility.

ISSUE: Does the testatrix have the use of the necessary mental faculties for the
purpose of the execution of the will?

RULING: YES.

The testatrix have the use of the necessary mental faculties for the purpose of the
execution of the will.
It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the
documents presented with the complaint can the conclusion be reached that the
testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties.

The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a stooping
position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some days before
making her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by proof could no
lead the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person
who is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the
contrary is conclusively proven.

The notary certifies that in his judgment the testatrix had the necessary legal capacity
and the use of the necessary mental faculties for the purposes of the execution of the
will. "The Code might have adopted either one of two systems [with respect to the
mental capacity of the testator] — that of establishing as a general rule the presumption
of soundness of the mental faculties until the contrary be proven, or that of presuming
mental weakness in the absence of proof that the act was performed while the mental
faculties were in their normal condition. Under the first presumption a will made should
be declared valid in all cases, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Under the
second it would have to be considered as void upon the presumption that it was
executed by a person demented, unless the contrary is shown. The Code has adopted
the first system as being the most rational, by accepting the principle that mental
soundness is always to be presumed with respect to a person who has not been
previously incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated and proven by the proper
person and the correctness of this choice is beyond doubt; in the meantime the
intervention of the notary and the witnesses constitutes a true guaranty of the capacity
of the testator, by reason of their knowledge of the matter.

SANTIAGO GALVEZ, V. CANUTA GALVEZ

DOCTRINE: In order to hold that a testator, as the result of cholera, was not of sound
mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and was incapable of executing a valid
will, it is indispensable that the proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental
incapacity and of his lack of reason and judgment at the time he executed his will in due
form.

FACTS:
This case deals with the probate of the second will executed by Victor Galvez and
signed in his presence by the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J.
Leoquinco, and, as the testator was no longer able to sign on account of his sickness,
Lorenzo Galvez, at his request, affixed his own signature to the instrument, for him and
below his written name.

The other will was presented during the proceedings; it was the first one the testator
executed on the same date, and, for the purpose of correcting an error contained in this
first will, he executed another will, the second, which is the one exhibited for probate.
Canuta Galvez, the testator’s daughter, opposed on the probate of the will alleging that
her father, owing to his very serious sickness with cholera, lacked the intellectual
capacity and clear judgment requisite for making a will.

ISSUE: Does Victor Galvez by having a very serious sickness with cholera lacked the
capacity and clear judgment for making a will?

RULING: NO.

The record sufficiently proved that the subscribing witnesses to the will affirmed under
oath that they were present when Victor Galvez, then such in his house, stated to them
that the document read before them by Lorenzo Galvez contained his last will and
testament, and that, as the testator was no longer able to sign, he charged his nephew
Lorenzo to do so in his stead, which the latter did by affixing his own signature to the
document, after having written at the foot of the same the name and surname of the
testator, Victor Galvez, who, as these witnesses observed, was of sound mind and in
the full enjoyment of his mental faculties; he talked intelligently and with perfect
knowledge of what was taking place. They further testified that they all, including
Lorenzo Galvez, signed the will in the presence of the testator, Victor Galvez, who was
at the time lying on his bed.

In order to hold that Victor Galvez, on account of serious sickness, was not then of
sound mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and, therefore, was incapable to
execute a will, it is necessary that the proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his
mental incapacity and of his evident lack of reason and judgment at the time he
executed his will in the presence of the witnesses whose signatures appear at the foot
thereof, for these witnesses positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on executing his will,
showed that he was in full possession of his intellectual faculties and was perfectly
cognizant of his acts.

The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects and results
of cholera on a patient in ordinary cases and in the regular course of this disease; but
his statements, taken in general, cannot, in the present suit, serve as a ground upon
which to predicate incapacity, for the reason that he did not examine Victor Galvez, nor
did he even see him between the hours during which period the testator ordered his will
drawn up and the attesting witnesses signed it.

It may be true that cholera patients do, in the majority of cases, become incapacitated in
the manner described by the witnesses; but there may be exceptions to the general
rule, and to judge from the testimony of the witnesses who saw and communicated with
the patient Victor Galvez at the time he executed his will, his physical and mental
condition must have been an exception, since he demonstrated that he had sufficient
energy and clear intelligence to execute his last will in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents of the will
and the testator’s positive determination to rectify the error he incurred in the execution
of this first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his sound mind and was perfectly aware
of his duties in respect to the legal, inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir,
Canuta Galvez.

Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second will, signed in the name of the
testator by Lorenzo Galvez and the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J.
Leoquinco, the formalities prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
were observed, for the testator’s name appears written at the foot of the will and under
this name Lorenzo Galvez signed by direction of the testator himself, and the instrument
was also signed by the attesting witnesses before mentioned who affirmed that they
heard and attested the dispositions made by the testator and witnessed the reading of
the will, that they were present when the said Lorenzo Galvez signed the will in the
name of the testator and that they signed it in the presence of all the persons
assembled in the latter’s house, the conclusion is inevitable that Victor Galvez, in
executing his will, did so with a sound mind and the full use of his mental faculties;
therefore, the will must be admitted to probate.

JUANA CAGUIOA vs Calderon

DOCTRINE: WILLS; UNDUE INFLUENCE; MENTAL CAPACITY; LAWFUL WILL -
Under the facts stated in the opinion, that the will in question, was duly and legally
authorized by the deceased, he being of sound mind and memory, and that the same
was not executed under threats or fear.

FACTS:
Caguioa presented a petition in the CFI of the Province of Pangasinan, praying
for the probation of the last will and testament of Emigdio Zarate, deceased, in
conformity with section 630 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions. Due notice of
said petition was given in accordance with law, and the hearing for the probation of said
will was fixed. Subsequently, said Maria Calderon appeared, by her attorney, and
opposed the probation of said will upon one of the following grounds:

“That the said Emigdio Zarate was mentally incapacitated at the time he
authorized and signed his will.”

Caguioa prays the court to annul the will alleged to have been executed by
Zarate, and to order that its probate be disallowed. Thereafter, the court overruled the
opposition, sustained the petition, and held that the same is legal in all its parts as the
last will and testament of the deceased Zarate.
ISSUE: Was Emigdio Zarate in the full possession of his mental faculties at the time of
the execution of his will?

RULING: YES.
After hearing the evidence, the lower court found that Emigdio Zarate, at the time
of the execution of the said will, was in the possession of his faculties. Two of the
witnesses who signed the will, as well as others who were present in the house at the
time the said will was executed, testified that in their opinion Emigdio Zarate was of
sound mind and memory at the time he signed the said will.

The appellant attempted to show that Emigdio Zarate for some months prior to
his death had been troubled with insomnia, as well as some other physical infirmities.
The two doctors who appeared on behalf of the opponents testified that insomnia
tended to destroy the mental capacity, but that there were times, even during the period
while they were suffering from insomnia, when they would be perfectly rational.

Even admitting that there was some foundation for the supposition that Emigdio
Zarate had suffered from the alleged infirmities, we do not believe that the testimony
was sufficiently direct and positive, based upon the hypothetical questions, to overcome
the positive and direct testimony of the witnesses who were present at the time of the
execution of the will in question.

The evidence adduced during the trial of the case, shows a large preponderance
of proof in favor of the fact that Emigdio Zarate was in the full possession of his mental
faculties at the time he executed his last will and testament.

JOCSON vs JOCSON
Facts:
On June 10, 1920, Rafael Jocson Manlaque and Goza presented a
petition in th court for the probate of the document, as the last will and
testament of the the deceased Marcelo Jocson. This petition was
opposed by Rosauro, Asuncion, and Dominga Jocson alleging that the
testator was not of sound mind and was seriously ill at the time of its
execution
Issue: Was the testator was not of sound mind at the time of its
execution
Ruling: No, the testator was of sound mind. To constitute a sound
mind and disposing memory it is not necessary that the mind shall be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, and unshattered by disease or
otherwise, or that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties. Failure of memory is not sufficient unless it be total or
extends to his immediate family or property.

JUNQUERA vs BORROMEO
FACTS:
Vito Borromeo died on March 13, 1952, in Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88
years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.

Junquera, filed with the CFI of said province a petition for the probate of a one
page document as the last will left by said deceased, devising all his properties to
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares,
and designating Junquera as executor thereof.

Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate of the will based on several
grounds, one of which is that the testator was mentally incapable of making a will at the
time of its execution. Subsequently, the Court removed Junquera as special
administrator and appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran in his place.

On October 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave to
intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the probate of the will, on the ground
that, should the estate be adjudicated the latter by intestacy, it stood to collect a
considerable amount by way of estate and inheritance taxes.

After a prolonged trial, the Court rendered a decision denying the probate of the
will and declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the question of ownership over
the thirteen lots which the Cebu Arcade etc. claimed as its own.

The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the three
attesting witnesses, Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and Eusebio Cabiluna,
sought to prove the following facts:
 Vito Borromeo executed first, the document Exhibit "F", witnessed by Gandionco
and Cabiluna. Later, Vito Borromeo, being of sound and disposing mind, and without
pressure or influence exerted on him, dictated the substance of his will to Tomas
Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it in proper legal language. The document was then
read by Vito Borromeo, who later signed and thumbmarked it.

The trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as
a result, denied the petition for probate, because, in its opinion, they appeared not to be
"wholly disinterested persons" and because of the serious discrepancies in their
testimonies with respect to the number of copies made of the disputed document.

The court also found that the physical condition of the deceased at the time of
the execution of the questioned document was such that it was highly improbable, if not
impossible, for him to have affixed his signatures on the documents in the spontaneous
and excellent manner they appear to have been written. Thus, the court was also led to
believe the testimony of the handwriting experts for oppositors, - adverse to the
genuineness of the signatures of Vito Borromeo on the questioned document - more
than that of the handwriting expert presented by the proponents of the will.

ISSUE: Is the evidence of record sufficient to prove the due execution of the will in
question?

RULING: NO.
The subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded as the best witnesses
in connection with its due execution. It is similarly true, however, that to deserve full
credit, their test, testimony must be reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case
of any other witness, their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence —
direct or circumstantial.

We cannot see our way clear to holding that the trial court erred in refusing to
give full credit to the testimony of the three subscribing witnesses.

It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or
did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to mislead the court or favor
one party to the prejudice of the other.
 This cannot be said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned
document itself. Both, albeit silently, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing,
forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. For this reason, independently of the
conflicting opinions expressed by the handwriting experts called to the witness stand by
the parties, we have carefully examined and considered the physical appearance and
condition of the original and two copies of the questioned will found in the record —
particularly the signatures attributed to the testator — and We have come to the
conclusion that the latter could not have been written by him.

MANUEL TORRES vs LOPEZ

DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.

FACTS:
Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez died on February 25, 1924 leaving all his estate to
Vicente Lopez. Subsequently, Tomas Rodriguez designated Vicente Lopez as
administrator of his property due to his feeble health, such was opposed by Margarita
Lopez, CFI of Manila concluded Vicente Lopez as Tomas Rodriguez’s guardian.

Tomas Rodriguez voiced out the need to form a will, and Vicente Lopez has
procured Judge Maximino Mina. Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will,
asked the will to be allowed. Such was contested by Manuel Lopez on the grounds that
the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of institution he was suffering
“senile dementia” and was under guardianship; that undue influence had been
exercised by the persons benefited; and that the signature of Rodriguez was obtained
through fraud and deceit.

Luz Lopez allegedly deceived Tomas Rodriguez to sign by stating that such
document he was about to sign was in connection with a complaint against Dr. Boanan,
one of the witness of the signing of the will.

The trial court denied legalization of the will on the ground of “lack of mental
capacity” at the signing of the will by the testator.
ISSUE: Did Tomas Rodriguez possessed the sufficient mentality to make a will which
would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity?

RULING: YES.
Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to constitute a will. Drs. Calderon,
Domingo, Herrera claimed that testator had full understanding of the acts he was
performing and that they were witnesses in the said signing of the will.

Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been physically
decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may
have had a guardian and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed
the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to
summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms
"testamentary capacity." That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an
exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing the evidence for the
oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious consideration which it deserves.

The Code of Civil procedure prescribes a requisite that the testator be of “sound
mind”, a sound mind is a disposing mind. One of the grounds of disallowing a will is if
the testator is insane or otherwise incapable of the execution.

The Court has adopted a definition of “testamentary capacity” as the capacity to

comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to
recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.

The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the
courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document

RAMIREZ vs RAMIREZ

DOCTRINE: Pre-senile Dementia incapacitated testator from making a will. The

evidence hereinabove discussed, cumulatively considered, leads to the definite
conclusion that Marie Garnier Garreau was indeed mentally incapacitated to make a
will, that is, "to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of
(her) bounty, and the character of the testamentary act" (Art. 799. Civil Code).

FACTS:
Maria Gamier Garreau, widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of Paris, France,
but a Filipino citizen residing in Madrid, Spain, where she died childless at the age of 84
on January 11, 1959.

The will in question was an "open" one, executed before a notary public in
Madrid on May 24, 1958, and instituting her niece Lirio (Lily) Pfannenschmidt now
appellant, as sole and universal heir. Lirio is one of the four children of Jose Ramirez,
brother of the testatrix husband Ramon, the other three being Elsa, Esperanza and
Horacio.

Ramon had a half-brother, Jorge P. Ramirez, whose son, Jose Maria Ramirez,
now appellee, opposed the petition for probate filed by Urio, alleging in his opposition,
inter alia, that there was a prior will executed by the testatrix in Manila in 1949.

Even before then, however, the testatrix' mental condition was already the object
of serious concern among her close relatives. Depositions were taken from by Julio
Escribano Langa, a resident of Madrid who had known the spouses Ramon Ramirez
and Maria Gamier Garreau for about nine years, testified to the same mental condition
of the testatrix: her susceptibility to another person's influence; her lack of memory for
recent events, her lack of understanding of, or volition for deciding, certain matters such
as the making of a last will.

The most pertinent evidence in behalf of appellant is the testimony of the notary
public before whom the will in question was executed and the testimony of two of the
three instrumental witnesses. As may be noted, the foregoing statements of the notary
public are far from satisfactory. They are vague and evasive and tend to beg the very
issue.

ISSUE: Are the testimonies rendered in court sufficient to establish the testamentary
capacity?
RULING: NO.
We find no ground to disregard such evidence in favor of the vague, inconclusive
statements of the notary public who authenticated the will and of the two instrumental
witnesses, nor even of the testimony of the rebuttal witnesses, the more categorical
character of whose affirmations only serve to weaken their credibility, conflicting as they
do not only with the evidence for appellee but also with that given by the other
witnesses for appellant.

The Supreme Court did not give much credit to the testimony of the notary public
because the statements were far from satisfactory, vague, evasive, and tend to beg the
very issue. The notary public could not say with certainty but could merely suppose that
the testator possessed the requisite qualifications that she had a recollection of her
properties or the relatives that would logically inherit from her.

As early as 1955, when she was examined by the family physician. Dr. Romero
de Arcos, and by a qualified psychiatrist. Dr. Jose Garmain she was already suffering
from pre-senile dementia, a degenerative mental infirmity that was described by them
as "a progressive and irreversible process." The manifestations of this condition are
amply illustrated in the letters written by appellant herself as well as in the testimony of
her uncle. Jose Eugenio Ramirez: In fact, these two were convinced that the testatrix

should be placed under judicial guardianship and actually took the initial steps
towards that end.

The issue here is essentially one of fact and involves an appraisal of the
conflicting evidence presented by the parties. That issue was addressed in the first
instance to the trial Judge, and we cannot say that his conclusion as to the testamentary
incapacity of the testatrix is erroneous.

It is based mainly on expert medical testimony to the effect that her mental
infirmity was observed by the family physician as far back as 1953 and confirmed in
1955 by a competent psychiatrist, who described the process of the mental
degeneration as progressive and irreversible; on the written admissions and
declarations of appellant herself, who would have no motive then to falsify the facts; and
on the testimony of the testatrix' brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio Ramirez.
SAMSON vs. CORRALES TAN QUINTIN

DOCTRINE: Weakness of the mind is not equivalent to an unsound mind. Evidence

on the soundness of mind must be testified by the Attending Physician

FACTS:
A document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Corrales
Tan is to be probated. This was opposed by the son of the deceased, on the ground
that the will is incomplete, fraudulent, and does not express the true intent of the
testator; that the testator acted under duress and under undue influence, and that at the
time of the execution of the will he was not of sound and disposing mind.

The physician, Dr. Tee Han Kee, testified that the deceased was suffering from diabetes
and had been in comatose condition for several days prior to his death. He died about
eight or nine o'clock in the evening of December 26, 1921, and the will is alleged to
have been executed in the forenoon of the same day. However, all of the witnesses
presented by Samson, five in number, testify that the deceased was conscious, could
hear and understand what was said to him and was able to indicate his desires. Four of
these witnesses state that he could speak distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen, says that the
deceased only moved his head in answer to questions.

ISSUE: Was the decedent of sound mind when he executed his last will and
testament?

RULING: YES.

That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will was
executed is evident, but if the witnesses presented in support of the petition told the
truth there can be no doubt that he was of sound mind and capable of making his will.

There is no reason to discredit any of the witnesses; the discrepancies found between
their respective versions of what took place at the execution of the document are
comparatively unimportant and so far from weakening their testimony rather lend
strength to it by indicating the absence of any conspiracy among them.

As against their testimony are only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr. Tee Han
Kee. The former is not a disinterested witness. As to the testimony of the latter, it is
sufficient to say that mere professional speculation of a non-attending physician cannot
prevail over the positive statements of five apparently credible witnesses whose
testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.

CUYUGAN v. BARON

DOCTRINE: There is testamentary incapacity when the alleged testator harbors the
belief that she did not execute a will nor judge the propriety of revoking such will.
Testamentary Incapacity invalidates the whole will.

FACTS:
Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933, leaving an estate exceeding in value the sum
of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932. She died single
without forced heirs. The will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor.
The petition for probate recites that on the date of the execution of said will on
December 17, 1932, the said testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and was
found in disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue
influence, and was in every respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.

Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased,
allege, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally
and physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature
and alleged consent to the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the
document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.

ISSUE: Did the testator possess testamentary capacity at the time of the making of the
will?

RULING: NO.

An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the

formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the
burden of the evidence passed to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible
evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary
capacity at the time or that the document was not the free and voluntary expression of
the alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law.

She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred forty-
four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his
possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however,
credible evidence in the record that before her death she had denied to several persons
that she made any will. This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains
her failure to do any act of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in
this life. The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will
subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no
change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony
of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of
testamentary capacity

ORTEGA vs VALMONTE

DOCTRINE: The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence
of fraud at the time of its execution. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise.

FACTS:
Placido Valmonte died on October 8, 1984. He executed a notarial last will and
testament in favor of his wife alone, named Josefina, who is thrice lower his age. The
will was written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but
acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. Notary Public Floro Sarmiento testified that
before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, he explained to them
each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and
understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the
testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been
executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9,
1983. The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public.

Oppositors Leticia and Mary Jane Ortega declared that Josefina should not inherit alone
because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just
as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator,
declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83
years old and was no longer of sound mind.

They also contend that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life
to almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x
and who happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado," thus casting doubt on the
intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly
"defies human reason, logic and common experience" for an old man with a severe
psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

ISSUE: Did Placido Valmonte possess testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the subject will?

RULING: YES.

The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will
only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than
the self-serving allegations of Leticia, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the
following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound
mind at the time of its execution.

"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.

"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of
his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.

"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the
time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate
of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know
to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the
testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, Placido had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
BALTAZAR v. LAXA

DOCTRINE: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to
being of unsound mind.

FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled
"Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect
on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G.
Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page
3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco
Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s
due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and
of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children
Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa.

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for
Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house. Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what
that "something" was as same was placed inside an envelope. However, she
remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs
them. A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of
Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope. Upon going home, however,
the envelope was no longer with Paciencia. Rosie further testified that Paciencia was
referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her wallet
in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. On cross examination, it was
established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that
Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on her personal assessment, and that it was
Antonio who requested her to testify in court.
ISSUE: Was the testator of sound mind when she executed her last will and
testament?

RULING: YES.

The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as
to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound
mind.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness,
there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia
was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find
more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of
Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the
Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of
the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month
or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia
was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier
mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby,
petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
SUROZA v. HONRADO

DOCTRINE: Lack of knowledge cannot be cured by interpretation or explanation of

the contents of the will to the testator.

FACTS:
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was
73 years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was
illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked
by her. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter
Marilyn ( an “anak-anakan” allegedly begot by the deceased Agapito from Arsenia, but
in reality, the child was the daughter of the Spouses Sy and was merely entrusted to
Arsenia when the baby was only days old).

Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will
(the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband),
filed with the Court a petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was
assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado, who appointed Marina as administratrix.

The wife of Agapito, Nenita, filed an opposition thereto only after learning of the
existence of the testamentary proceeding (when an order for ejectment was issued by
said judge upon motion of Marina). One of the grounds for her opposition was that the
alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is
written in English which is not known to the deceased. However, this was denied by the
judge. This prompted Nenita to file a complaint charging Judge Honrado for having
probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina.

ISSUE: Being merely interpreted or translated to the testator, was the will valid?

RULING: NO.

Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper
disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice
because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win should
have inherited the decedent's estate.
Judge Honrado, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the
will is void.

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated
that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could
only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and,
therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code
that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial
acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the
"testator" instead of "testatrix".

Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the
anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in
instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her
supposed father who was still alive.