Photo credit: IFRC, Eric Quintero

Preface
Kay koule twompe soley soley men li pa twompe lapil.
A leaky house can fool the sun, but it can’t fool the rain. (Haitian proverb)

M
any of us left Haiti after our completing our work on post-earthquake recovery with
feelings of regret. These regrets had much to do with leaving Haiti and its people behind.
But they had also to do with our acknowledgment that the results we had accomplished
did not reflect the effort we had made.

Moreover, we faced criticism from some Haitians and perplexed questions in our home
countries that we sometimes struggled to answer: “Where did the money go?” “Is there as much
corruption as they say?” “Why couldn’t they do it themselves?” “Why did you stay so long?” “Why did
you leave so soon?”

These questions, and many others that we asked ourselves, do not have easy answers. Perhaps the
experience should be stored away with the files and mementos we brought back. But for some of us,
examining the experience in detail, and discussing it collectively, seemed like it could be useful both
to ourselves and to others who may participate in future recovery efforts.

The agencies involved in this initiative, led by the World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster
Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), graciously provided the time and resources to allow this
analysis to be carried out. The Steering Committee provided invaluable support. A large number of
individuals and organizations, Haitian and foreign, gave their time, feedback, and materials (see the
Acknowledgments).

Hopefully this report conveys the good intentions that motivated the work on recovery in Haiti, while
explaining how it was often undermined by the complex situation that faced Haitians and external
actors alike. It describes successes and failures, including the difficulty of thinking long term while
dealing with so many urgent requirements. It shows how, in the effort to show results, equity and
accountability were too often sacrificed. And it demonstrates that urban disaster recovery will require
new approaches and skills.

This is one of many reports produced by agencies hoping to better understand the impact of their
involvement in Haiti in the aftermath of the devastating January 2010 earthquake and how to apply
the lessons taken from this experience to future recovery programs. My hope is that it contributes
something uniquely useful, and that the observations, findings, and recommendations included here
will be taken in the constructive spirit in which they are offered.

Priscilla M. Phelps
Consultant, World Bank Group and GFDRR
Report Project Manager

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