ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
CABRAS
1. EXAMPLES OF RULE-MAKING
G.R. No. L-24796           June 28, 1968
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. HON. EMMANUEL
M. MUÑOZ, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch I,
FACTS:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corp
(Piadeco) claims to be the owner of Some 72,000
hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of
Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte,
province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and
Montalban, province of Rizal, and a deed of
absolute sale in its favor. Piadeco applied for
registration as private woodland some 10,000
hectares of this land to the Bureau of Forestry, on
December 4, 1963.
The controversy in these cases began when Acting
Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera issued an
order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required
Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him.
Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had
violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting
trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed
Reservations, expressly excluded from the said
certificate.
On December 28, 1964, Piadeco applied for the
renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland
Registration PWR 2065-New, which would expire
on the last day of that month. Assistant Director of
Forestry J. L. Utleg denied the renewal requested.
He informed Piadeco that its Titulo de
Propiedad 4136 was not registerable under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 12-2 which took
effect on January 1, 1963. The expiration of its
registration certificate and the non-renewal thereof
notwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging
operations. It was about this time that illegal
logging was denounced by some members of
Congress thereby attracting national attention.
On July 8, 1965, the judge came out with an order
declaring that notwithstanding "the expiration of
petitioner's [Piadeco's] license on December 31,
1964, their said property remains registered with
the Bureau of Forestry subject only to renewal, in
which case it can still pursue its logging
operations, conditioned upon the payment by it of
forest charges." The judge thereupon directed the
forestry officials "and all members of the Armed
Forces stationed along the way" to allow Piadeco
"to haul its logs which have already been properly
documented."
This precipitated the filing on July 28, 1965 by the
Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden,
the Armed Forces Chief of Staff 7 of an original
petition with this Court (L-24796, now at bar)
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to annul the order of execution.
ATTY.
ISSUE:
Whether PIADECO’s tite is registrable with the
Bureau of Forestry and whether the Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 is valid
HELD:
PIADECO’s title is not registrable under AO 12-
2.
Forestry Admin. Order no. 12-2 is valid.
PIADECO’s position is that such amendment
contravenes a.) SEC. 1829 of RAC which does not
specify the titles that are registrable and b.)
opinions of officials that titles issued during the
Spanish regime are registrable.
1. True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not
describe with particularity titles that may be
registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Concededly,
too, administrative authorities in the past
considered as registrable, titles issued during the
Spanish regime. In fact, as late as 1962, Forestry
Administrative Order 12-1 was still in force,
authorizing registration of such Spanish titles. But
when Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 came
into effect on January 1, 1963, that order should
be deemed to have repealed all such previous
administrative determinations.
2. There should be no question now that
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the
force and effect of law. It was promulgated
pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised
Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of
Forestry, with the approval of the department
head, to issue regulations "deemed expedient or
necessary to secure the protection and
conservation of the public forests in such manner
as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber
and other forest products for the future, and
regulating the use and occupancy of the forests
and forest reserves, to the same end." Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by
the Director of Forestry, and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It
is no less a valid law. It is an administrative
regulation germane to the objects and
purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by
jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized
the promulgation of administrative rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation, "[a]ll
that is required is that the regulation should
be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes."
2. Quasi-legislative or Rule-making Functions
GOMEZ vs PALOMAR
FACTS:
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This appeal puts in issue the
constitutionality of Republic Act 1635 (Anti-TB
Stamp Law) which provides for the issuance of
semi-postal stamps with regular postage charge
plus the additional amount of 5centavos for the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society. The respondent
Postmaster General, in implementation of the law,
thereafter issued four (4) administrative orders. All
these administrative orders were issued with the
approval of the respondent Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
Petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed a
letter at the post office in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Because this letter, addressed to a
certain Agustin Aquino did not bear the special
anti-TB stamp required by the statute, it was
returned to the petitioner.
Petitioner brought suit for declaratory relief in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, to test the
constitutionality of the statute, as well as the
implementing administrative orders issued,
contending that it violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as well as the rule of
uniformity and equality of taxation.
The lower court declared the statute and the
orders unconstitutional. One of the grounds
relied upon by the court is that the statute is so
broadly drawn that to execute it the respondents
had to issue administrative orders far beyond their
powers; that it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
Hence this appeal by the respondent postal
authorities.
ISSUE:Whether RA 1635 and the assailed
Administrative Orders are valid
RULING: Yes. The Court held that judgment
appealed from must be reversed.
Administrative Order 3, as amended by
Administrative Orders 7 and 10, provides that for
certain classes of mail matters (such as mail
permits, metered mails, business reply cards, etc.),
the five-centavo charge may be paid in cash
instead of the purchase of the anti-TB stamp. It
further states that mails deposited during the
period August 19 to September 30 of each year in
mail boxes without the stamp should be returned
to the sender, if known, otherwise they should be
treated as nonmailable.
It is true that the law does not expressly authorize
the collection of five centavos except through the
sale of anti-TB stamps, but such authority may
be implied in so far as it may be necessary to
prevent a failure of the undertaking. The
authority given to the Postmaster General to raise
funds through the mails must be liberally
construed, consistent with the principle that where
the end is required the appropriate means are
given.
ATTY. CABRAS
It is likewise true that the statute does not
provide for the disposition of mails which do
not bear the anti-TB stamp, but a declaration
therein that "no mail matter shall be accepted
in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal
stamp" is a declaration that such mail matter is
nonmailable within the meaning of section 1952 of
the Administrative Code. Administrative Order 7
of the Postmaster General is but a restatement
of the law for the guidance of postal officials and
employees. As for Administrative Order 9, we have
already said that in listing the offices and entities
of the Government exempt from the payment of the
stamp, the respondent Postmaster General
merely observed an established principle,
namely, that the Government is exempt from
taxation.
3. Central Bank vs Cloribel
Facts:
Respondent Banco Filipino is savings and
mortgage bank which began operations in July
1964. Central Bank seeks annulment of Judge
Gaudencio Cloribel’s order restraining Central
Bank from enforcing CB Circular Nos. 185 and 222
and Monetary Board Resolution Nos. 805 and 1566
in so far as they restrict the payment by Banco
Filipino of “monthly” interest on savings deposits
and “advance” interests on time deposits.
Banco Filipino sets up the defense that the
contested resolutions and circulars are null and
void for a) they were issued without previous notice
and hearing b) they impair vested rights and c) the
statutory power of the Monetary Board to “fix the
maximum rates of interest which banks may pay
on deposits and any other obligation” does not
include the regulation of the manner computing
and paying interest, since this function is not
expressly granted to petitioner Central Bank.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolutions and circulars
issued by Central Bank are null and void?
Ruling:
No. Central Bank is supposed to gather relevant
data and make the necessary study, but has no
legal obligation to notify and hear anybody, before
exercising its power to fix the maximum rates of
interest. Previous notice and hearing, as elements
of due process, are constitutionally required for the
protection of life or vested property rights, when its
limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding., generally
dependent upon a past act or event which has to
be established or ascertained. It is is not essential
for the validity of General rules and regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of
persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise and there is no statutory requirement to
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this effect, in so far as the fixing of interest is
concerned.
That they impair vested rights is obviously
unfounded, for the said resolutions and circulars
operate prospectively and affect only deposits made
and/or interests occurring subsequent to the
promulgation thereof. Furthermore, all contracts
are subject to the police power of the state.
The justification for the inclusion, in the power to
fix the maximum rate of interest, of the Authority
to prescribe the time or manner of payments
thereof springs a) not only from the implied grant
of all powers necessary to carry out those expressly
conferred and b) from the explicit authority of the
Monetary Board to “avoid evasion by likewise fixing
maximum rates” in any other “form” (oy payments
of any sort) but also c) from the reasons underlying
the grant of authority to fix said maximum rates.
One objective is to establish a uniform ceiling
applicable to all banks, in order to avoid
competition in the form or higher rates offered to
depositors resulting in reduction of their profits
impelling them to resort to risky ventures and
more remunerative loans and investments.
From the facts, Banco Filipino as it compounds
monthly and pays advance in time deposits
undertakes to pay its depositors more than the
amount fixed by these resolutions and circulars
when compounded quarterly (by 0.029% higher for
savings deposits and by 0.452% higher for time
deposits), the Central Bank is legally authorized to
demand strict compliance.
4.Conference of Maritime manning Agencies vs
POEA 243 SCRA 666
Facts:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencie
s, Inc., an incorporated
association of licensed Filipino
manning agencies, and its copetitioners, all license
dmanning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino 
seamen for and in behalf of theirrespective foreign
ship-owner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution
No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of
the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No.
05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the
power and authority to fix and
promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's co
mpensation of Filipino seamenworking in ocean-
going vessels; only Congress can. Governing Board
Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board
resolves to amend and increase the compensation
and other benefits as specified under Part
II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard
ATTY. CABRAS
Employment Contract for Seafarers
Issue:
WON the POEA can promulgate rules
by virtue of delegation of legislative power.
 Yes.The constitutional challenge of the rule-
making power of the POEA-based onimpermissible
delegation of legislative power had been, as
correctly contented by the public respondents,
brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
 The governing Board of the Administration (POEA)
shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).
 To many of the problems attendant upon present-
day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from it
sdelegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
While the making of laws is a nondelegable power t
hat pertains exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitution
ally delegate the authority topromulgate rules and 
regulations to implement
a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for
the reason that the legislature finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
to but in conformity with the standards prescribed
by the law. (Principle of Subordinate Legislation)
That the challenged resolution and memorandum 
circular, which merely furtheramended the
previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly
conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair
and equitable employment practices" prescribed in
E.O. No.797 can no longer be disputed
5. 69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional
Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies
ANG TIBAY VS. CIR
FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang
Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union,
Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as
it averred that the said employees laid off were
members of NLU while no members of the rival
labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were
laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company
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dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually,
NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the National Labor
Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
2. Whether or not CIR as administrative body
should comply with the requirements of due procss
HELD: 1. Yes. The records show that the newly
discovered evidence or documents obtained by
NLU, which they attached to their petition with the
SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the
time of the trial that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court
of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered (said newly obtained
records include books of business/inventory
accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously
accessible but already existing).
2. YES. The SC also outlined that administrative
bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by
the Rules of Court must also make sure that they
comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be
complied with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
ATTY. CABRAS
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
6. C. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
No. L-16537. June 29, 1962.
FRANCISCO C. CALO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
DELFIN C. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
In Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitled
Francis C. Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. Delfin C.
Fuertes,applicant-respondent, the Director of
Lands rendered an opinion denying and dismissing
former's claim andcontest against the homestead
application of Delfin C. Fuertes and ordered him to
vacate the premises within60 days from receipt of a
copy of the opinion and stating that, upon finality
thereof, the homestead patentwould be issued to
Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having
been denied by the Director of Lands,Francisco C.
Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources the case, who modified
theopinion of the Director of Lands, ordering
Fuertes to reimburse Calo of the difference
between the value of theimprovements that the
latter introduced on the land in controversy and
the value of the consequentialbenefits derived by
him therefrom.Still dissatisfied with the opinion,
Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines,
but withdrew it before thePresident could act
thereon. He later filed in the Court of First Instance
of Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction
praying that the enforcement of the opinions of
theDirector of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined
among others. For failureto state a cause of action,
for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all
the administrative remediesavailable to the
petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Court
resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismissesthe
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herein petition with costs against petitioner. The
petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the appeal to the President is a condition
precedent to the appeal to the Courts of Justice.
HELD:
Yes. The appellant’s contention that, as the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
the alter ego of the President and his acts or
decisions are also those of the latter, he need not
appeal from the decision of the opinion of the
former to the latter, and that, such being the case,
after he had appealed to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the
decision or opinion of the Director of Lands, he had
exhausted all the administrative remedies, is
untenable. The withdrawal of the appeal taken
to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to
not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is
fatal because the appeal to the President is the last
step he should take in an administrative case.
Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal
from an opinion ororder by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President
of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from had already
become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is
dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-
appellant.
7. Pascual vs Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
(G.R. No. L-11959)
Facts
Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual was the
mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija in 1951 and was
reelected in 1955. During Pascual’s second term,
the Acting Provincial Governor filed three
administrative case with the Provincial Board on
Nueva Ecija against him. Charge No. III was
“Maladministrative. Abuse of Authority, and
Usurpation of Judicial Functions.”
After presenting evidence regarding the first two
charges, Pascual filed with the Provincial Board a
motion to dismiss on the main ground that the
wrongful acts alleged had been committed during
his previous term of office and could not constitute
a ground for disciplining him during his second
term. However, the motion was denied.
Pascual then filed a petition with the SC to enjoin
the Provincial Board from taking cognizance of the
third charge, but the petition was denied by
ATTY. CABRAS
minute resolution of December 21, 1956 "without
prejudice to action, if any, in the Court of First
Instance." Accordingly, the petitioner-appellant
filed with the CFI of Nueva Ecija a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to
inhibit the said Provincial Board from proceeding
with the hearing of Charge No. III, for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Provincial Board moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that it states no cause of action
because the Pascual had not exhausted his
administrative remedies before filing an appeal to
the courts, and because the Provincial Board had
jurisdiction over Charge No. III. CFI dismissed the
petition and Pascual brought the case to the SC on
appeal.
Issue
Whether a municipal mayor may be subjected to
an administrative investigation of a charge based
on misconduct allegedly committed by him during
his prior term.
Held
No. each term is separate from other terms, and
that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the
people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of
such faults or misconduct to practically overrule
the will of the people.
8. ALZATE VS ALDANA, 107 PHIL 298
FACTS: Anacleto Alzate, Principal of the South
Provincial High School in Agoo, La Union Province,
wrote to the Director of Public Schools that
pursuant to RA No. 842, he was entitled to an
automatic salary increase of 4 rates (1 rate for
every 5 years of service) after his salary has been
adjusted to the minimum, and to an additional
automatic salary to the minimum, and to an
additional automatic salary increase of 1 rate,
pursuant to paragraph (b) of the same section and
Act, for having passed the examination for
Superintendent of Private Schools given by the
Civil Service Commission.
The Division Superintendent of Schools for
La Union, denied petitioner's request contending
that in the adjustment of salary of secondary
principals, only the actual number of years of
service as such secondary principal would be
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considered, and he would be entitled only to one
rate of salary increase; and since the examination
taken and passed by petitioner was only for the
Bureau of Private Schools, he was not entitled to
the benefit of paragraph (b) of the Public School
Salary Act.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but
he did not receive a ruling on his request. Fearing
that the amount appropriated for payment of the
salary would be disbursed or expired of the fiscal
year and would be reverted to the general funds of
the government, he filed a mandamus proceeding
in CFI La Union. The latter rendered a decision
directing the Director of Public Schools the sum
claimed by the petitioner. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the same, which was granted.
ISSUE: W/N the petition states no cause of action
in view of the non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
HELD: NO. The fact that the parties had to agree
and the court had to approve the agreement that
the Director of Public Schools shall recommend to
the proper official not later than June 30, 1958
and before the closing of office hours on that date
the commitment of the sum of P840.00 claimed by
petitioner, to accounts payable in order to prevent
its reversion, is a recognition by the parties as well
as the court of the validity and urgency of the
action taken by the petitioner-appellant.
Petitioner contends that if he waited for the final
decision, which in fact did not come, whatever
action may thereafter be taken by respondent, even
if favorable to petitioner, would be of no avail after
the reversion of the funds appropriated for the
purpose of salary adjustment. Hence, he claims,
that to require him to exhaust the administrative
remedies would, in the circumstances of the case,
in effect amount to a nullification of his claim. It
would seem, therefore, that in the particular
circumstances of the present case, petitioner had
sufficient cause of action at the time of the filing of
his petition on June 11, 1958, and a resort to the
court without awaiting for the final decision of the
administrative officers is not, in view of the special
situation, premature. The order appealed from was
set aside and the case remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
9.De Lara Jr. vs Cloribel
No. L-21653 (May 31, 1965)
14 SCRA 269
FACTS:
In this case, the petitioner, De Lara Jr., was
granted a timber license to log over an area for
which he is authorized to cut annually.
Consequently, the during non-renewal of his
ATTY. CABRAS
license, an application for the similar forest
concession was filed by the respondents (P & B
Enterprises Co., Inc.) was approved. After the
grant, P & B procured heavy equipments and
introduced improvements. Meanwhile, the
petitioner’s renewal for license was approved. The
construction of logging roads within the forest area
covered by the license was commenced which
extended not only along the plaintiff’s concession
but partially within the area covered by the latter’s
timber concession which cost the company
approximately P139,000.00. This prompted P & B
to protest against the approval in so far as the
area of conflict is concerned. The protest was
overruled hence the company appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources but
remains pending study and consideration.
However, the petitioner continued his logging
operation and in doing so trespassed and used the
road constructed by P & B. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued an order
prohibiting De Lara from operating and entering
within the contested area. Still, De Lara continued
the operation. A writ of preliminary injuction
enjoining De Lara and his aids from operating was
issued in favor of P & B. De Lara filed a motion to
dissolve the injuction alleging among others that
the plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies appearing that the appeal regarding the
conflict was still pending determination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is correct that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is applicable.
HELD:
No. the rule of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable if it should appear that
an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered
by a party if he should await, before taking court
action, the final action of the administrative official
concerned on the matter. Petition was dismissed.
10. G.R. No. 113357. February 1, 1996.*
BENJAMIN PAREDES, LUZ BUENSUCESO,
AUGUSTO SEVERINO, RODRIGO TABANERA,
STEPHEN SOLIVEN and ROBERTO SANCHEZ,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RIZALINO
S. NAVARRO, as Secretary of Trade and
Industry, and IGNACIO S. SAPAL, Director of
the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, respondents.
TOPIC: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
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FACTS: Public respondents promulgated
Administrative Order, revising the rules of practice
before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) in patent and
trademark cases.
Among the provisions of said administrative orders
increased the fees payable to the BPTTT for
registration of patents and trademarks and
prohibited the filing of multi-class applications,
that is, one application covering several classes of
goods.
Petitioners, who are registered patent agents, filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition
to stop public respondents from enforcing the
aforementioned administrative orders.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
prohibition and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners may proceed
with the petition for prohibition when there are
other remedies available.
HELD: No, Prohibition is granted only in
cases where no other remedy is available which is
sufficient to afford redress.
That the petitioners have another and complete
remedy at law either by appeal or otherwise, is
generally a sufficient reason for dismissing the
writ.
The court dismissed the petition.
11. QUASHA VS. SEC – 83 SCRA 557
Facts: Petitioner had filed on October 10, 1977
and October 17, 1977 his complaints and
continuing opposition with respondent
Commission against the filing of respondent
Manila Polo Club, Inc’s Amended Articles of
Incorporation and Amended By-Laws which would
convert said club into a proprietary club, assailing
the amendments as illegal, inequitable and
immoral, alleging inter alia that “the amendments
have the effect of enabling the members to
appropriate the club’s property and to use it as
their contribution to the new club”; the real estate
assets of Manila Polo Club consists of 25 hectares,
more or less, of prime real estate in the middle of
Forbes Park, Makita, Metro Manila, which are
conservatively valued at present market valuation
of P200 Million and its building, improvements,
ATTY. CABRAS
facilities and other equipment at about 20 Million.
“The more or less 2,000 actual members
who will become proprietary owners of the Club’s
assets under the proposed conversion will
inequitably enrich themselves if this Honorable
Commission will allow the comparatively paltry
sum P12,500.00 to be paid on or before December
28, 1977 for each proprietary membership”;
“the value which the club now commands results
from the accrued contribution of past (and present)
members’ money, time, effort and foresight; and
the conversion plan does not in any way
compensate the predecessors of the present
membership (and also those of the present)
members’ money, time, effort and foresight; and
the conversion plan does not in any way
compensate the predecessors of the present
membership (and also those of the present
membership who do not opt for conversion) who
substantially contributed to making the Club what
it is today” and further claiming that the
amendments had not been duly adopted by the
required two-thirds vote. Petitioner prayed for the
disapproval and cancellation of respondent club’s
articles and by-laws and denial of its application to
register its proprietary shares, and prayed for a
restraining order meanwhile enjoining it from
selling and/or accepting any payments for the
questioned proprietary shares.
On December 22, 1977, the respondent
commission through its hearing office Jose C.
Castro issued its Order of the same date denying
injunctive relief “for lack of sufficient allegations in
support of the prayer for the issuance of the
preliminary injunction and for obvious lack of
merit.
Hence, the petition filed forthwith on
December 23, 1977 by petitioner directly with the
Supreme Court claiming inter alia violation of
petitioner’s right to due process in that the
questioned order allegedly adjudged the main
issues which “should have been resolved (only)
after a full-blown hearing on the merits” and
praying for the issuance of a restraining order.
Issue: Whether there was exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Held: No, In view of the extremely limited time,
with the Commission’s hearing officer having
issued his questioned order denying injunctive
relief only on December 22, 1977 at the height of
the Christmas holidays with just a few days before
the scheduled deadline of December 28, 1977
petitioner properly filed the present petition
directly with the Supreme Court without going
through the prescribed procedure of filing an
appeal with respondent Commission en banc
within the 30-day reglementary period since such
recourse was obviously not a plain, speedy and
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adequate remedy.
The questions raised by petitioner in his
pending complaints with respondent commission
warrant “a full-blown trial on the merits” after
which the main issues may be duly adjudicated as
contended by him, and since respondents likewise
concur in this stand, the case will be remanded to
respondent commission for such trial and
determination on the merits.
12. Under Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies
Valmonte vs. Belmonte
Facts: Petitioner Velmonte represents himself and
co petitioners in the instant case of mandamus
requiring the GSIS to a) furnish petitioners the list
of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of
the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information.
The case arose when a request letter was sent by
Velmonte to respondent Belmonte, the then GSIS
General Manager.
A reply letter was sent by Atty. Meynardo Trio,
Deputy General Counsel. However, said letter was
never received by petitioner which resulted to
another letter stating "(W)e are now considering
ourselves free to do whatever action necessary
within the premises to pursue our desired objective
in pursuance of public interest.” Thereafter
resulting to this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the Doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is applicable.
Ruling: No, the doctrine does not apply.
Defense of Respondent: Respondent claims that
actions of the GSIS General Manager are
reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS.
Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the
GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted
that since administrative remedies were not
exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of
action.
Petitioners Contention: Petitioners claim that they
have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or
not they are entitled to the documents sought, by
virtue of their constitutional right to information.
Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of
the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Court Ruling: Among the settled principles in
administrative law is that before a party can be
allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to
ATTY. CABRAS
have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. The courts for reasons of
law, comity and convenience will not entertain a
case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to settled
exceptions, among which is when only a question
of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106
Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R.
No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210;
Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21,
1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the
scope of the constitutional right to information, is
one which can be passed upon by the regular
courts more competently than the GSIS or its
Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely
legal question. Thus, the exception of this case
from the application of the general rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted.
(WARNING) The issue above is not the main
issue :D it is only the issue based on the syllabus.
Main Issue: whether or not petitioners are entitled
to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS
Ruling: Yes.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right
to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, the people's right to information is
limited to "matters of public concern," and is
further "subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full
disclosure is limited to "transactions involving
public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be
clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.
The information sought by petitioners in this case
is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition
were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election
through the intercession of th eformer First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos. The public nature of the
loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office
held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern. And the same in not
exempted by privacy under the constitution and is
not barred by the confidentiality of the loan
because the same is not based on any law, nor is it
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a private document (loan by GSIS to Public
Officials).
Petition Granted.
13. G.R. Nos. March 29, 1996
11270809
PETITIONER REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented
by PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
RESPONDENTS SANDIGANBAYAN, SIPALAY
TRADING CORPORATION
and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION
Facts:
Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against
private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation
and Allied
Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their sequestration.
Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY
and ALLIED before this Court assailing the
sequestration orders. After the consolidation of
these petitions, this Court referred the cases to
public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper
disposition.
When Sandiganbayan directed the parties to the
case to submit formal evidence in writing.
However, PCGG filed a "Motion To Dismiss" the
petitions of SIPALAY and ALLIED on the ground of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. PCGG
argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first
appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of
the President before challenging them in court,
invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations.
PCGG lost in the two petitions. In the SIPALAY
petition, the Sandiganbayan predicating on PCGG’s
failure to implead the petitioner within the period
mandated under Section 26, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution and for having issued the writ of
sequestration without sufficient evidentiary
foundation because PCGG failed to adduce and
proffer that quantum of evidence necessary for its
validity.
In the ALLIED petition, Sandiganbayan held that
the search and seizure order was issued without
due process and in contravention of the organic
law then in force, the Freedom Constitution, under
which mantle, the Bill of Rights found in the 1973
Constitution was amply protected and enforced.
ATTY. CABRAS
Issue/s:
Whether SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's
motion to dismiss proper
Ruling:
Yes, SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's
motion to dismiss was proper.
Ratio Decidendi:
As a general rule, a direct action in court without
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when
required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on
a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of
action.
However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the
rightful application of the principles aforestated.
The SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions were both filed
on the third quarter of 1986 (September 16 and
August 26, respectively), while the PCGG decided
to file its motion to dismiss only in the middle of
1993 (July 7). Nearly seven (7) years came to pass
in between that so much has already transpired in
the proceedings during the interregnum.
SIPALAY and ALLIED had rested their cases, and
the PCGG had finished presenting all its witnesses,
not to mention other various motions and
incidents already disposed of by the
SANDIGANBAYAN, with special attention to the
numerous postponements granted the PCGG for
presentation of its evidence which prevented an
earlier termination of the proceedings. The motion
to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of
the proceedings where the remaining task left for
the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of
evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN.
With its undenied belated action, seven (7) years in
the making at that, it is only proper to presume
with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned
or declined to assert what it bewailed as the
SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions' lack of cause of
action.
Doctrines Learned:
 A direct action in court without prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies,
when required, is premature, warranting its
dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded
on lack of cause of action.
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 Failure to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. The
only effect of noncompliance with this rule
is that it will deprive the complainant of a
cause of action, which is a ground for a
motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the
proper time, this ground is deemed waived
and the court can take cognizance of the
case and try it.
14.FORTICH V. CORONA
289 SCRA 624
Topic: Factors Affecting Finality of
Administrative Decisions
Facts:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President
(OP) issued a “win-win” Resolution which reopened
case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution
substantially modified its March 29, 1996
Decision. The OP had long declared the said
Decision final & executory after the DAR’s Motion
for Reconsideration was denied for having been
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OP’s act, it
being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion
that the “win-win” Resolution of November 7, 1997
is not void since “it seeks to correct an erroneous
ruling,” hence, the “March 29, 1996 decision…
could not as yet become final and executory as to
be beyond modification”. They further explained
that the DAR’s failure to file their Motion for
Reconsideration on time was “excusable."
Issues:
WON the DAR’s late filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration is excusable.
WON the respondent’s have shown a justifiable
reason for the relaxation of rules.
WON the issue is a question of technicality.
Held:
No, the DAR’s late filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration is NOT excusable.
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated
February 12, 1987, mandates that
‘decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall…become final after the lapse of 15
days from receipt of a copy therof xxx’ unless a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period. The respondent’s explanation that the
DAR’s office procedure ‘made it impossible…to file
its Motion for Reconsideration on time’ since the
said decision had to be referred to its different
departments cannot be considered a valid
ATTY. CABRAS
justification. While there is nothing wrong with
such referral, the DAR must not disregard the
reglementary period fixed by law, rule or
regulation. The rules relating to reglementary
period should not be made subservient to the
internal office procedure of an administrative body.
No, the respondent’s have NOT shown a justifiable
reason for the relaxation of rules.
The final & executory character of the OP Decision
can no longer be disturbed or substantially
modified. Res judicata has set in and the
adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard since they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of
rival claims and in the administration of justice.
The Constitution guarantees that “all persons shall
have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.”
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities,
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly &
speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in
the relaxation of rules was ‘never intended to forge
a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules
with impunity.’
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of
procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
No, the issue is NOT a question of technicality. It is
a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative
body, court or tribunal which is declared void on
the ground that the same was rendered Without or
in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of
Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or
procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and
mandatory requirement before a case or
controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is
still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law
were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules
& settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not
of technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was
declared final and executory, vested rights were
acquired by the petitioners, and all others who
should be benefited by the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA,
et al., “just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his/her case.
Referential Syllabus:
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Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; “Errors
of Judgment” and “Errors of Jurisdiction,”
Compared; Words and Phrases; An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal, while an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction, and which error is
correctable only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.—Anent the first issue, in order to
determine whether the recourse of petitioners is
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line
between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by
an appeal. On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The remedy prescribed
in Rule 43 is inapplicable where the petition
contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is “patently illegal” and was issued with
“grave abuse of discretion” and “beyond the public
respondent’s jurisdiction” when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier decision which
had long become final and executory.—It is true
that under Rule 43, appeals from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-
judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,
including the Office of the President, may be taken
to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition
for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
said judgment, final order or resolution, whether
the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. However, we hold
that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed
in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the
present petition contains an allegation that the
challenged resolution is “patently illegal” and was
issued with “grave abuse of discretion” and
“beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C.
Corona’s) jurisdiction” when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of
March 29, 1996 which had long become final and
executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised
here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error
of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal
under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to
annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an
original special civil action for certiorari under Rule
ATTY. CABRAS
65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. x x
x The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to
truly extraordinary cases—cases in which the act
of the lower court or quasijudicial body is wholly
void.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has the
full discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari filed directly to it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance
of the issues raised, warrant.—The Supreme Court
has the full discretionary power to take cognizance
of the petition filed directly to it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial
policy to be observed and which has been
reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs.
Contreras, et al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De
Guzman, and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we
have further stated in Cuaresma: “x x x. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding
of the Court’s docket.” Pursuant to said judicial
policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over
the present petition in the interest of speedy justice
and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly
put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the
problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be dis cussed later, we
find the assailed resolution wholly void and
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first
with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.
Same; Same; Same; Suspension of the Rules; That
the Supreme Court has the power to set aside its
own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence.—That the Court
has the power to set aside its own rules in the
higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon
vs. Court of Appeals: “Be it remembered that rules
of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended
its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of
justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego
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a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that
should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case.”
Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; A
motion for reconsideration is not necessary when
the questioned resolution is a patent nullity.—As
to the second issue of whether the petitioners
committed a fatal procedural lapse when they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution before seeking judicial
recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is
not necessary when the questioned resolution is a
patent nullity, as will be taken up later.
Same; Same; ‘‘Forum Shopping,’’ Explained; Words
and Phrases. ------‘‘There is forum-shopping
whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The
principle applies not only with respect to suits filed
in the courts but also in connection with litigation
commenced in the courts while an administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to
defeat administrative processes and in anticipation
of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this
case, where the court in which the second suit was
brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
“The test for determining whether a party violated
the rule against forum shopping has been laid
down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145
SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in the other, as follows: ‘There thus
exists between the action before this Court and
RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions, as well as identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and the identity on the
two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res adjudicata in the action under consideration:
all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.’
” entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest
Same; Same; Same; The test for determining
whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration.—It is clear from the above-quoted
rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum
shopping. The test for determining whether a party
has violated the rule against forum shopping is
where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A
cursory examination of the cases filed by the
petitioners does not show that the said cases are
ATTY. CABRAS
similar with each other. The petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of
the DAR Secretary’s order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
subject property. On the other hand, the civil case
in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment
and cancellation of title issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was
based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in
applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC’s
title, used documents which were earlier declared
null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of
NQSRMDC’s title was made without payment of
just compensation; and (3) without notice to
NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The
present petition is entirely different from the said
two cases as it seeks the nullification of the
assailed “Win-Win” Resolution of the Office of the
President dated November 7, 1997, which
resolution was issued long after the previous two
cases were instituted.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Real
Party In Interest” and “Real Interest,” Explained;
One whose interest over land is a mere expectancy
is not a real party in interest.—The fourth and final
preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for
intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their
motion, movants contend that they are the
farmerbeneficiaries of the land in question, hence,
are real parties in interest. To prove this, they
attached as Annex “I” in their motion a Master List
of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged
master list was made pursuant to the directive in
the dispositive portion of the assailed “Win-Win”
Resolution which directs the DAR “to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants
are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.” However, a
perusal of the said document reveals that movants
are those purportedly “Found Qualified and
Recommended for Approval.” In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-
beneficiaries. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a
real party in interest is a party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party
means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
Undoubtedly, movants’ interest over the land in
question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not
real parties in interest.
Administrative Law; Judgments; The act of the
Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its earlier decision which
had already become final and executory, was in
gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept
that accord finality to administrative
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determinations.—When the Office of the President
issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring
the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and
executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion
for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost
its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify
its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office
of the President has no more authority to entertain
the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win”
Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be
filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of
AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse
into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had
already become final and executory, was in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.
Same; Same; The orderly administration of justice
requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court
or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality
set by the law, rules and regulations; A resolution
which substantially modifies a decision after it has
attained finality, is utterly void.—The orderly
administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law,
rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to
write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system,
without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle
must always be maintained by those who wield the
power of adjudication. Any act which violates such
principle must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution which
substantially modified the Decision of March 29,
1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void.
Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice
Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is “a lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain
at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.”
15. Sotto vs. Ruiz (41 Phil 468 [No. 17419], 18
March 1921)
ATTY. CABRAS
Facts: Antonio Ruiz, the Acting Director of the
Bureau of Posts, refused to forward a copy of The
Independent as registered mail on the ground that
it contained a libelous matter. Vicente Sotto, a
public official, at that time, was the proprietor of
the said periodical.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Director of Posts was
wrong in refusing to forward the said copy of The
Independent. (Yes)
Held: To say that the publication of an official
telegram from one public official to another is
printed or written matter of a libelous character,
when such telegram contains no attack upon any
person is manifestly arbitrary and unjust and is
not based upon any reasonable interpretation of
the law. The propriety of periodical distributing
copies of a confidential telegram sent by one official
to another may well be questioned. But to do so is
not libelous per se. Even the squib following the
copy of the telegram is no more than attempted
humor and would not be taken seriously by the
reading public.
The action of the Director of Posts in disbarring
from the mails copies of The Independent on the
ground that they contained matter of a libelous
character was clearly wrong.
16. Antique Sawmills vs Zayco - SANTILLANA
Facts:
On September 30, 1954, a public bidding was
conducted for the award of a 12680-hectare forest
area. Four parties submitted bid applications with
the Bureau of Forestry, namely: the petitioner-
appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc., the 
respondent-appellee, Aquiles Zayco, Crisencio
Milendez and Pedro T. Lo. On November 29, 1954,
the Director of Forestry awarded the bid to the
respondent-appellee, Aquiles R. Zayco. Thereafter,
the losing bidders appealed the above award to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
who, on March 23, 1955, however, affirmed the
same. All the losing bidders filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Secretary of Agricultural
and Natural Resources and issued an order on
July 14, 1955 modifying that the forest area in
question was awarded in equal portions to Aquiles
R. Zayco and the petitioner-appellant, Antique
Sawmills, Inc.
Zayco received a copy of the above-mentioned
order on July 28, 1955, and on August 20, 1955,
he filed against it a motion for reconsideration. On
September 10, 1955, the same was denied. On
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December 19, 1955, Zayco filed with the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources a second
motion for reconsideration which, on February 15,
1956, was resolved by the latter stating that the
second motion for reconsideration was filed too
late, that is, outside the reglementary period of
thirty (30) days prescribed in Section 10 of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 6-2. From the time the
movant received notice of the order sought to be
reconsidered on July 28, 1955, to the time he filed
his first motion for reconsideration on August 20,
1955, twenty-three (23) days had elapsed; and
from his receipt of the order of this Office dated
September 10, 1955, denying the first motion for
reconsideration on November 22, 1955, to the filing
of the instant motion on December 19, 1955,
twenty-seven (27) days had elapsed. All in all, fifty
(50) days had elapsed from his receipt of the order
sought to be reconsidered to the filing of the herein
motion. Consequently, the said order of this office
dated July 14, 1955 had already become final and
executory pursuant to the aforecited regulation.
On February 27, 1956, the respondent-appellee
appealed to the Office of the President.
On August 27, 1956, however, the Executive
Secretary rendered a decision sustaining the
appeal . This order of the Executive Secretary
awarded the entire forest concession in question to
the respondent-appellee, Aquiles B. Zayco.
Petitioner contends that the period provided by the
rules for the perfection of an appeal is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional. Thus, since, the
respondent-appellee failed to perfect his appeal on
time and finality had already set in the order of
July 14, 1955, the Office of the President could not
have required jurisdiction over the same.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the said period is a mere procedural technicality
which, at least in administrative proceedings, may
liberally be relaxed.
ISSUE:
ATTY. CABRAS
1. Whether or not the period for perfecting an
appeal is only procedural and can be
relaxed.
2. Whether or not administrative regulations
have the force and effect of law
RULING:
1. In a long line of cases,1 the Supreme Court
has ruled that compliance with the period
provided by law for the perfection of an
appeal is not merely mandatory but also a
jurisdictional requirement. Thus, in the
case of Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al., 92 Phil.
168, this Court held:
Section 13 of Rule 41 provides that when the
appeal is not perfected within the reglementary
period the appeal shall be dismissed. The
requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal
within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional. Such failure has the
effect of rendering final the judgment of the court,
and the certification of the record on appeal
thereafter cannot restore the jurisdiction which
has been lost.
2. That administrative rules and regulations
have the force of law can no longer be
questioned. ( Valerio vs. Secretary of
Agriculture, et al., G.R. No. L-18587, April
23, 1963)
The appellees' view that the period fixed in
Administrative Order No. 6-2 of the Director of
Forestry cannot bind the Office of the President
since the latter has supervision and control over
the former cannot commend itself to sound public
policy. Even administrative decisions must and
sometime, as fully as public policy demands that
finality be written on judicial controversies (Manila
Electric Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 61
Phil. 456).
In other words, public interest requires that
proceedings already terminated should not be
altered at every step. The rule of non
quieta movere prescribes that what was already
terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs.
San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615).
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17. Uy vs Palomar
27 SCRA 287
Facts:
Manuel Uy filed the complaint with the CFI of
Manila against the Postmaster General, praying for
an injunction to restrain the latter from enforcing
Fraud Order No. 3, dated Nov. 22, 1963, declaring
Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency as conducting a
lottery or gift enterprise and directing all
postmasters and their employees of the Bureau of
Post concerned to return to the sender any mail
matter addressed to Manuel Uy Sweepstakes
Agency or to any of its agents or representatives
with the notation: “Fraudulent” stamped upon the
cover of such mail matter and, prohibiting the
issuance of payment of any money order or
telegraphic transfers to the said representatives.
Issue: Whether appellee’s “Grand Christmas Bonus
Award” plan constitute a lottery, gift, enterprise, or
similar scheme prescribed by the Postal Law as
would authorize the appellant to issue the fraud
order in question.
Held:
The Postal Law contains no provision for
judicial review of decision of the Postmaster
General. This Court, however, had stated that the
action of the Director of Post is subject to revision
by the courts in case he exceeded his authority of
his act is palpably wrong.
For lottery to exist, three elements must concur,
namely: consideration, prize and chance.
In the “Grand Christmas Bonus Award”
plan of the appellee. We do not see the presence of
the element of consideration, that is payment of
something of value, or agreement to pay, for the
chance to win the bonus or award offered. True,
that to be a participant in said plan, one must
have to buy a whole sweepstakes ticket (8 shares)
sold by the Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency or by
its sub agents. But the payment for the price of the
sweepstakes ticket in the consideration for the
chance to win any of the prizes offered by the
PCSO in the sweepstakes draw of December 15,
1953. Wholly or partly, said payment cannot be
deemed as a consideration also for the chance to
win the prizes offered by the appellee. For nothing
is asked of, or received from, the buyer of the ticket
more than the authorized price thereof, and which
price appears on the face of the ticket.
18. MANUEL vs. VILLENA
FACTS: Magno Manuel had been in continuous
possession of a 20-hectare parcel of public land
since 1939; being an ignorant farmer he did not file
ATTY. CABRAS
his Tree Farm application (No. 13312) until June
1954. The Director of Forestry rejected the same
because a prior application (No. 3852) had been
filed by Mariano Villena in November 1955. Manuel
filed two motions for reconsideration of the
rejection order but were turned down. Manuel
thereafter appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, but the appeal was
dismissed the latter. On motion for reconsideration
the Secretary found that the previous investigation
conducted by the District Forester was not in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Bureau, and so ordered another investigation to be
made; but that before said investigation was
terminated the Secretary rendered a decision
dismissing the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the
Secretary of DENR should be set aside.
RULING: No. Under Section 1838 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the function of approval or
rejection of an application for a Tree Farm Permit
falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of
Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The power thus conferred on the Director of
Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is basically
executive or administrative in nature.1 And courts,
as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings
undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in
the exercise of administrative functions. This is so
because such bodies are generally better equipped
technically to decide administrative questions and
that non-legal factors, such as government policy
on the matter, are usually involved in the
decisions.
There are, of course, limits to the exercise of
administrative discretion. Administrative
proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon a
showing that “the board or official has gone beyond
his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional
powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without
regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion”2 or that the decision is vitiated by
fraud, imposition or mistake.
19. SAN LUIS VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant,Berroya, (private respondent
herein) had been the quarry superintendent in the
Province of Laguna. In April and May of 1973,
petitioner-appellant denounced graft and corrupt
practices by employees of the provincial
government of Laguna. Herein respondent-appellee
provincial governor (one of the petitioners herein)
issued an Office Order transferring Berroya to the
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
office of the Provincial Engineer. Berroya
challenged said transfer, and the Civil Service
Commission ruled the same violative and ordered
that Berroya be reverted to his regular position of
quarry superintendent. Instead of complying,
herein respondent-appellee provincial governor
suspended Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy,
inefficiency and insubordination. On petitioner-
appellant’s motion for reconsideration, the Office of
the President rendered a Decision, declaring the
one-year suspension improper, and ordering
payment of back salaries to Berroya. In the
interim, respondent-appellant provincial governor
issued an Order dismissing Berroya for alleged
neglect of duty, frequent unauthorized absences,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and
abandonment of office, which order of dismissal
was appealed by Berroya to the Civil Service
Commission. The Civil Service Commission
resolved said appeal by declaring the dismissal
unjustified, exonerating Berroya of charges, and
directing his reinstatement as quarry
superintendent. Berroya instituted suit in 1980 to
compel petitioner to reinstate him to his former
position and to pay his back salaries. After trial,
the court a quo rendered its decision finding the
transfer of petitioner-appellant sufficiently
warranted. Furthermore, his one-year suspension
was found to be proper and unassailable. Berroya
appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and it was resolved by the respondent Court
of Appeals in his favor. Petitioners moved to
reconsider the decision of the appellate court but
their motion was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decisions of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the President
can be reviewed by the courts.
HELD:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executory, the same can no
longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-
established in our jurisprudence that the decisions
and orders of administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have
upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of
res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids
the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well
to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards
acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments
of courts having general judicial powers. Indeed,
the principle of conclusiveness of prior
ATTY. CABRAS
adjudications is not confined in its operation to the
judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts,
but it extends to all bodies upon whom judicial
powers had been conferred. Hence, whenever any
board, tribunal or person is by law vested with
authority to judicially determine a question, like
the Merit Systems Board of the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the President, for
instance, such determination, when it has become
final, is as conclusive between the same parties
litigating for the same cause as though the
adjudication had been made by a court of general
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the trial court’s act of
reviewing and setting aside the findings of the two
administrative bodies was in gross disregard of the
basic legal precept that accords finality to
administrative findings of facts. The general rule,
under the principles of administrative law in force
in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of
administrative officers shall not be disturbed by
the courts, except when the former have acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. Findings of
administrative officials and agencies who have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but at times even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
20. VETERANS V VELEZ
Facts
Respondent, Philippine Veterans Assistance
Commission (PVAC), filed in the RTC complaint for
foreclosure of mortgage against the petitioners ––
the Philippine Veterans Investment Development
Corporation (PHIVDEC) and PHIVIDEC Industrial
Authority (PIA).
PHIVIDEC and PIA in their answer alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the case and averred that it is
under the arbitration powers of the Government
Corporate Counsel under Presidential Decree No.
242 which prescribed the procedure for the
administrative settlement and adjudication of
disputes, claims, and controversies between or
among government offices, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss of Petitioner on
the ground that PD 242 is unconstitutional as it
impair the power of judiciary to review.
HENCE this petition for certiori
Sections 1, 3-b and 6 of P.D. 242 provide:
Sec. 1. Provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and
controversies solely between or among the
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities of the National Government,
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
including government-owned or controlled
corporations but excluding constitutional offices or
agencies, arising from the  interpretation and
application of statutes, contracts or agreements,
shall henceforth be administratively settled or
adjudicated as provided hereinafter: Provided, That
this shall not apply to cases already pending in
court at the time of the effectivity of this decree.
Sec. 3. . . .
(b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with
respect to disputes or claims or controversies
between or among the government-owned or
controlled corporations or entities being served by
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel;
Sec. 6. The final decisions rendered in the
settlement or adjudication of all such disputes,
claims or controversies shall have the same force
and effect as final decisions of the court of justice.
(Rollo, pp. 29-30.)
ISSUE: W/N PD 242 is unconstitutional?
HELD: No. Since the foreclosure proceeding
filed by PVAC against PHIVIDEC and PIA arose
from the interpretation and application of the
mortgage contract between them, P.D. No. 242
applies to the case.
It does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts
but only prescribes
an administrative procedure for the settlement of
certain types of disputes between or among
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the National Government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations, so that they need not always repair
to the courts for the settlement of controversies
arising from the interpretation and application of
statutes, contracts or agreements. The procedure
is not much different, and no less desirable, than
the arbitration procedures provided in Republic Act
No. 876 (Arbitration Law) and in Section 26, R.A.
6715 (The Labor Code).  and warrant a reassessment of that procedural
 It is an alternative to, or a substitute for,
traditional litigation in court with the added
advantage of avoiding the delays, vexations and
expense of court proceedings
P.D. No. 242 is a valid law prescribing an
administrative arbitration procedure for certain
disputes among offices, agencies and
instrumentalities under the executive control and
supervision of the President of the Philippines.
Since PVAC filed Civil Case No. 11157 against
PHIVIDEC and PIA without first passing through
the administrative channel, the judicial action
was premature for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, hence, dismissible on
that account
21. St. Martin Funeral Homes vs NLRC (1998)
ATTY. CABRAS
G.R. 130866
Facts: Private respondent alleges that he started
working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.
However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner
nor was his name included in the semi-monthly
payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed
from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the
other hand claims that private respondent was not
its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin’s
Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of
Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the
management of the business. Amelita made some
changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed
to participate in the management thereof. As
a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment. The labor arbiter
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring
that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and therefore his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC decisions are appealable to
the CA?
Held:
Yes, In view of The increasing number of labor
disputes that find their way to this Court and the
legislative changes introduced over the years into
the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442
(The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas
Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for
aspect. The Court noted that there may have
been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on R.A. 7902, amending B.P. 129, or
an imprecision in the terminology used therein as
from the records, Congress had intended to provide
for judicial review of the adjudication of the NLRC
in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there
was an inaccuracy in the term used for the
intended mode of review.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion
that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of
the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus
plumae because appeals by certiorari and the
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned
here is that the special civil action of certiorari is
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge
in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve,
but would subvert, the intention of Congress as
expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill
No. 1495.
22 CERTIORARI
G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. HON.
DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74
FACTS:
Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the
government agency which supervises and regulates
the country's medical colleges, and Secretary
Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of
the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and
set aside the order issued by respondent Judge
Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo,
Rizal, restraining the enforcement of petitioner
Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent
Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine
Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the College).
The, College, a private educational institution, was
founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of
producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim
citizens from age-old attitudes on health."
In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical
Education (BME) authorized the Commission on
Medical Education to conduct a study of all
medical schools in the Philippines. The report of
the Commission showed that the College fell very
much short of the minimum standards set for
medical schools.
In her letter, Secretary Quisumbing informed the
Chairman of the College's Board of Trustees, Mr.
Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of
Medical Education to close the College. The College
appealed the decision to the Office of the President,
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the
Secretary.  Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the contested
decision, affirmed it.
On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It
filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of respondent
Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary
Quisumbing questioning the decision as illegal,
oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and
ATTY. CABRAS
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain its implementation.
Hence the present petition, assailing the order of
injunction made by respondent judge as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and
praying for a restraining order against its
enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the
action instituted in the court a quo.
ISSUE:
Whether the Courts can hear or determine appeals
from decisions or orders of the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports
HELD: No.
Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the
determination by the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to
continue its operations is in this case clearly
unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law
authorizing an appeal from decisions or
orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It
is not the function of this Court or any other
Court to review the decisions and orders of the
Secretary on the issue of whether or not an
educational institution meets the norms and
standards required for permission to operate
and to continue operating as such. On this
question, no Court has the power or
prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of
the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected
that any Court would have the competence to do
so.
The, only authority reposed in the Courts in
the matter is the determination of whether or
not the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports has acted within the scope of powers
granted him by law and the Constitution. As
long as it appears that he has done so, any
decision rendered by him should not and will not
be subject to review and reversal by any court.
Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the
Court that those powers were in a case exercised
so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively,
despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory
correction — or stated otherwise, that the
Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion,
or had unlawfully neglected the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or
excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled — it
becomes the Court's duty to rectify such action
through the extraordinary remedies
of  certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus,
whichever may properly apply. Yet even in
these extreme instances, where a Court finds
that there has been abuse of powers by the
Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or
forbids such an abuse of power, or compliance
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
whatever is needful to keep its exercise within
bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason
to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary
the ultimate determination of the issue of the
satisfy action or fulfillment by an educational
institution of the standards set down for its
legitimate operation, as to which it should not
ordinarily substitute its over judgment for that of
said office.
Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the
requirements laid down for medical schools and to
mete out sanctions where he finds that violations
thereof have been committed, it was a grave
abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to
issue the questioned injunction and thereby
thwart official action, in the premises
correctly taken, allowing the College to
operate without the requisite government
permit. A single ocular inspection, done after the
College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in
the circumstances, warrant only the findings of
more qualified inspectors about the true state of
the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc.
The, members of the evaluating team came from
the different sectors in the fields of education and
medicine, and their judgment in this particular
area is certainly better than that of the respondent
Judge whose sole and only visit to the school could
hardly have given him much more to go on than a
brief look at the physical plant and facilities and
into the conduct of the classes and other school
activities.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in substituting his judgment for
theirs. It is well-settled doctrine that courts of
justice should not generally interfere with
purely administrative and discretionary
functions; that courts have no supervisory
power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government;
involving the exercise of judgment and
findings of facts, because by reason of their
special knowledge and expertise over matters
falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are
in a better position to pass judgment on such
matters andn their findings of facts in that
regard are generally accorded respect, if not
finality, by the courts. 15 There are, to be sure,
exceptions to this general rule but none of them
obtains in this case.
23. Certiorari
TESORERO VS MATHAY
FACTS:
Respondent DALIGHT filed with public
ATTY. CABRAS
respondent BOE an application for the approval of
the sound value appraisal of its properties and
equipment. Respondent BOE, after hearings in an
order dated March 13, 1981, constituted an
inspection team to conduct ocular
inspection/verification of the physical existence
and ownership of all the properties and equipment
of DALIGHT. Thereafter, respondent BOE, in an
order dated June 19, 1981, based on the
submission of the inspection team, disapproved
TAMSPHIL appraisal because: (1) TAMSPHIL was
disqualified from making the appraisal, its
President-Chairman being then a technical and
engineering consultant of applicant DALIGHT and
(2) there were deficiencies and discrepancies in the
appraisal report of such serious proportion as to
affect the over-all integrity and reliability of the
said report.
On June 24, 1982, DALIGHT again filed an
application for the approval of the appraisal. BOE
constituted a team to conduct ocular
examination/verification of DALIGHT's properties
and equipment, including its books of accounts
and other papers relative to the Appraisal Report of
Asian Appraisal Co., Inc. Respondent BOE, in a
decision dated December 6, 1983, approved the
amount of P282,024,877.40 as the fair and
reasonable value of DALIGHT's properties, assets
and equipments.
Petitioners, in their own behalf and on behalf of the
more or less 70,000 consumers of Davao City and
its environ opposed the inclusion by herein public
respondent Board of Energy (BOE) of some
properties of DALIGHT for reappraisals because
they will have a direct bearing on the rates that
respondent DALIGHT charges its customers to the
effect that the higher the appraisal of the
properties, the higher will be the base of the 12%
allowable return; or otherwise stated, the higher
the rates the consumers will have to pay.
Seventeen (17) days after receipt of the said
decision, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied in an
order.
ISSUE:Whether petition for certiorari is the proper
remedy
RULING: No.
There is no question that certiorari is not
the proper remedy in this case as PD No. 1206
creating BOE provides for an appeal to the
Office of the President within seven (7) days
from receipt of notice of its decision or orders.
Thereafter, under the Interim Rules Implementing
Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
final decisions, orders, awards or resolutions of
all quasi-judicial bodies other than those
specifically excepted are reviewable by the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS
It will be noted that after receipt of the questioned
decision of December 6, 1983 on December 19,
1983, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
thereof only on January 5, 1984, or seventeen (17)
days from receipt of the said decision, which
therefore had already become final and
executory.
But while it is evident that there was error in the
remedy resorted to, this Court in the broader
interests of justice has in a number of cases given
due course to a petition for certiorari, although the
proper remedy is appeal especially where the
equities warrant such recourse and considering
that dismissals on technicalities are viewed
with disapproval.
Furthermore, it is well settled that litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on technicalities; that every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his case, free from
unacceptable plea of technicalities; that this
Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, decided
to disregard technicalities in order to resolve the
case on its merits based on evidence.
A careful review of the records show that this case
will not only affect herein petitioners who on some
points have a good cause of action but also the
more or less 70,000 consumers in Davao City and
its environ. Hence, it appears more appropriate to
consider the petition on its merits rather than to
dismiss it on technicalities.

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24. Police Commission vs Bello
Facts:
A complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
neglect of duty was filed by certain persons with
the Board of Investigators in Binmaley, Pangasinan
against the respondents Genaro C. Ferrer and
Emerano Bonifacio, Chief of Police and Corporal,
respectively. After the two private respondents filed
their answers, the Board found that the charges
imputed against the two were not committed
deliberately but, rather, were done through honest
mistake and recommending the Police Commission
(PC) that the case be dropped. But in its decision,
the PC still found the respondents guilty of serious
neglect of duty and ordered their dismissal in the
service.
Because of this, Ferrer and Bonifacio filed two
separate petitions and contended that the PC had
no jurisdiction to render a decision on the
administrative case because at that time it had not
yet even published its Police Manual as required by
Sec. 26 of R.A. 4864 (Police Act of 1966); and that
the Commission gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing them. Thereafter, the respondent Judge
issued an order requiring the Commission to file
an answer within ten days and issued the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunctions ex parte filed.
The Judge also dismissed the Civil case against
Ferrer and directed that the latter be reinstated
within 24 hours from receipt of the order. The next
day a similar order was issued in connection with
Bonifacio’s petition.
The Motion for reconsideration filed by PC was
returned unacted upon because it did not have a
proof of service and therefore not in accordance
with the Rules of Court. And on motion by Ferrer
and Bonifacio, respondent Judge issued another
order, this time requiring the members of the PC to
show cause why they should not be held guilty of
contempt for their failure to reinstate the two
private respondents as ordered on the writs.
Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge had the
power to issue said writs against the Police
Commission? No.
Ruling:
The Court has already held that it is improper to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to a
final hearing except in cases of extreme urgency,
where the right is very clear; where considerations
of relative convenience bear strongly in
complainant’s favor; where there is a wilful and
unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his
protest and remonstrance, the injury being a
continuing one, and etc. As the issuance of a
ATTY. CABRAS
mandatory injunction is the exception rather than
the rule, the party applying for it must show a
clear legal right the violation of which is so recent
as to make its vindication an urgent one.
The principal ground of the petitions by the
respondents is the lack of jurisdiction of the Police
Commission because it had not yet published a
Police Manual when it rendered its decision.
Section 26of the Police Act of 1966 is a mere saving
clause, and refers solely to administrative cases
involving police service and personnel which were
pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act. The
PC was required to absorb the said pending cases
after one hundred days after it shall have
published a police manual. The said Sec 26 may
not be interpreted to mean that the Board of
investigators and the police Commission could not
legally function to carry into effect the purposes of
the Act until after the lapse of the said one
hundred days, because Sec 28 provides that “this
Act shall take effect upon its approval.” Since the
Act was approved on September 8, 1966, it became
effective immediately on that date. Moreover, Sec.
5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court prohibits
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ex
parte “unless it appears from the facts, shown by
affidavits, or by the verified complaint that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice.” Such
facts do not appear in the case of the private
respondents. Orders of the respondent Judge are
hereby declared null and void.
25. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La
Suerte-Foitaf vs Noriel
Facts:
Petitioner labor union would impugn the holding of
a certification election ordered by respondent
Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, Carmelo C.
Noriel, it being alleged that there was a failure to
comply with the thirty percent requirement in the
petition for certification and that it was filed after
the sixty-day period provided for by the law.
Federation of Free Workers, La Suerte
Chapter, filed a petition foe certification election
alleging that out of bargaining unit of more or less
3,500, there were 1,068 signatories. The previous
certification collective bargaining agreement
between the employer La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory and petitioner labor union on
December 5, 1975. There was eleven days later, a
motion to intervene filed by petitioner followed by a
motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent
Union had not complied with the thirty percent
consent requirement and that the petition for
certification was filed beyond the sixty-day period
to the expiration of the collective bargaining
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
contract. When a few days later, the employer
submitted a list of the rank and file employees
numbering 4,055. Private respondent thereafter,
opposed the motion to dismiss, stating that there
was compliance with the thirty percent consent
requirement and that the filing was within the
period allowed by law.
An appeal was taken to respondent Noriel
as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. An
order came from him, the dispositive portion of
which is to the effect that the appeal was denied. A
motion for certiorari was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is no showing of
arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority to
justify granting the writ of certiorari
Held:
No. The objection of petitioner as to the
alleged lack of the thirty percent requirement in
the number of signatories according to the present
Labor Code is without merit. Private respondent
filed the petition for certification supported by
1,068 signatories of the employees of the employer.
After the petition was filed, the employer however
submitted a list of its regular rank and file
employees with a total number of 4, 055. Private
respondent in order to comply with 30% consent
requirement submitted additional list of rank and
file employees. Petitioner did miss the point that
such a requirement of thirty percent of all the
employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only
when it becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel
to conduct a certification election. In such a case,
there is no thirty percent requirement.
Nor was there any improvident or arbitrary
exercise of authority when respondent Noriel
ordered the certification election after the lapse of
sixty-dat period provided for by the law. The law
cannot be any clearer. It argues against the
pretension of the petitioner. According to the Labor
Code: “No certification election issue shall be
entertained by the Bureau in any collective
bargaining unit if a collective bargaining agreement
exist between the employer and a legitimate labor
organization, except within sixty (60) days prior to
the expiration of the life of such certified collective
bargaining agreement.”
No other meaning can be attached to such
provision, as applied to the present situation,
except that the former collective bargaining
agreement expired on December 5, 1975, sixty
days prior to that date, a petition for certification
election could have been filed. It does not mean
that after December 5, 1975, no such petition
could be entertained be respondent Noriel,
provided there was no certified collective contract
ATTY. CABRAS
in existence at the time of the petition for holding
the certification election was filed by respondent
union February 6, 1976. There was no legal bar
then to such move.
26.MERALCO VS. CBAA
FACTS: Petitioner questions the decision of the
respondent which held that petitioner’s pipeline is
subject to realty tax. Pursuant to a concession,
petitioner installed a pipeline system from Manila
to Batangas. Meanwhile, the provincial assessor of
Laguna treated the pipeline as real property. So,
petitioner appealed the assessments to the Board
of Assessment Appeals of Laguna. The board
upheld the assessments and the decision became
final and executory after the lapse of fifteen days
from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision by
the appellant. Meralco Securities contends that the
Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review
the decision of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals and no judicial review of the Board's
decision is provided for in the Real Property Tax
Code. Hence, the petitioner’s recourse to file a
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper
recourse of the petitioner.
HELD: YES. It was held that certiorari was
properly availed of in this case. It is a writ issued
by a superior court to an inferior court, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions whereby the record of a particular case is
ordered to be elevated for review and correction in
matters of law.
The rule is that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial power there is an
underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the
acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given
by the statute. The purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of
parties affected by its decisions. The review is a
part of the system of checks and balances which is
a limitation on the separation of powers and which
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
Judicial review of the decision of an official or
administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial
functions is proper in cases of lack of jurisdiction,
error of law, grave abuse of discretion, fraud or
collusion or in case the administrative decision is
corrupt, arbitrary or capricious.
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27. CERTIORARI
7. No. L-74687. November 12, 1987.*
ANTONIO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF
GREGORIO REYES, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS, thru MANUEL LAZARO, (now OFFICE
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY),
respondents.
FACTS
            The land in question is the subject of two
separate applications, one for sale filed by Gregorio
Reyes and one for free patent filed by petitioner
Antonio De Leon. Both are based on the claim of
actual possession.
            The Bureau of Lands ruled against Reyes,
who appealed to the Ministry of Natural Resources.
The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs set aside
the decision of the Bureau, but was reversed by
the Minister on motion for reconsideration. Private
respondents elevated the case to the Office of the
President where they were sustained.
ISSUE
            Whether or not the challenged decision
was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD
            The Court held in the affirmative. While
there is no disputing the authority of
administrative superiors to reverse the findings of
their subordinates, this power must be exercised
sparingly and only upon a clear showing of error.
Lacking such flaw, the decision of the lower
administrative officials should be sustained, if only
because they have closer access to the problem
sought to be resolved and have the direct
opportunity to question the parties and their
witnesses and to assess the evidence first-hand.
28. PLDT vs NTC (241 SCRA 486; G.R. No.
94374, 21 Feb 1995)
Facts
The court rendered a Decision on 27 August 1992
granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by PLDT
and set aside the Decision and Order on 14
November 1989 and 16 July 1990 of the National
Telecommunications Commission ("NTC"). That
Decision of the NTC had granted the application of
private-respondent Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. ("Eastern") for a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN") and to
construct, maintain and operate an International
Gateway Facility ("IGF").
On 16 July 1987 Private respondent Eastern, filed
ATTY. CABRAS
with the NTC an application for a CPCN
(Certification for Public Convenience and
Necessity), to construct, maintain and operate an
IGF (International Gateway Facility).
Eastern is a 60% Filipino owned
corporation organized under Philippine law and
holder of a legislative franchise under R.A. No. 808,
as amended by R.A. No. 5002, in relation to P.D.
No. 489 granting it the right and privilege to: “. . .
land, construct, maintain and
operate telecommunication systems
by cable or any other means now known to
science  or which in the future may be
developed for the reception and transmission of
messages between any point in the Philippines to
points exterior thereto, including airplanes, airships
or vessels even though such airplanes, airships or
vessels may be located within territorial limits of
the Philippines.”
PLDT contended that an IGF is inherently part of
"a telephone system" since it is "useful only for a
telephone system." Thus, PLDT contends that in
effect Eastern is asking for a CPCN to establish
a telephone system. But Eastern has no franchise
to establish a telephone system. Hence, PLDT
continues, Eastern cannot be granted the CPCN it
seeks.
On 14 November 1989 and 16 July 1990, the
National Telecommunications Commission ("NTC")
rendered a Decision and Order respectively. The
court originally set aside the order and decision on
a petition for certiorari filed by PLDT.
Issue
Whether the petition for certiorari should be
dismissed.
Held
Yes. Eastern in its application was not asking for
authority to install and operate
a domestic telephone or other telecommunications
system, understood as a system for carrying
messages from one point in the Philippines to
another point also in the Philippines. Eastern was
merely asking for authority to install and operate
an international  gateway facility, which would
mediate between the domestic telephone system of
PLDT and the transmitting and carrying facilities of
Eastern. The gateway facility will permit messages
originating from a person using PLDT's domestic
telephone system to enter the transmitting and
carrying facilities of Eastern, and as well allow
messages incoming from abroad through Eastern's
carrying facilities to enter PLDT's domestic system.
29. ALZORES VS SEC, 252 SCRA 387
FACTS: Petitioner was a member of Philippine
Columbian Association (PCA), and later immigrated
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
to US to work as Attorney-Adviser in the U.S.
Department of Commerce and simply stopped
paying membership dues without informing the
PCA of his change of residence and citizenship.
When petitioner came back to the Philippines, he
inquired from the PCA President, how he could
reactivate his membership. He was told that he
had to pay all dues, which active members had to
pay, during the time he was out of the country.
Petitioner objected alleging that it was not fair that
he should be required to pay the amount due
active members since he was out of the country
and did not use PCA facilities during his absence.
He was offered to recommend to the PCA Board of
Directors the reactivation of petitioner’s
membership on condition (1) that only one of his
shares would be validated and (2) that petitioner
pay one month due for every year of absence from
the Philippines. Petitioner replied that he was
willing to accept the second condition but
considered the first unfair. But PCA stood pat on
its original proposal. Petitioner filed with the SEC
a complaint, praying for the replacement of his
membership certificates and his reinstatement as
an active member.
Petitioner’s complaint was referred to a Hearing
Officer. After the parties had submitted their
pleadings and evidence, the decision sustained
PCA. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his
motion was denied in an order. His appeal was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
denial of his appeal but the same was denied.
ISSUE: W/N SEC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the petitioner’s appeal.
HELD: NO. The alleged errors assigned by
petitioner are mere errors of judgment, but since
he failed to perfect his appeal to the SEC en banc,
he cannot now raise them. Even then further
appeal should be taken to the CA in accordance
with B.P. Blg. 129, 9 and Circular No. 1-91. In this
case for certiorari are limited to an inquiry into any
jurisdictional errors which are not present in this
case.The failure of a party to perfect his appeal in
the manner and within the period fixed by law
renders the decision sought to be appealed final,
with the result that no court can exercise appellate
jurisdiction to review the decision.
There was absolutely no reason why petitioner did
not perfect his appeal on time. Nor is there any
showing that the SEC committed the errors
attributed to it in the petition. In the first place,
the alleged errors were not committed by the SEC
en banc but, if at all, by the Hearing Officer. What
petitioner claims to be errors of the SEC en banc is
only the consequence of the dismissal of his
appeal. For the fact is that the SEC en banc did
not decide his appeal. What is more, as already
ATTY. CABRAS
stated, the dismissal of petitioners appeal was in
accordance with law and not at all a grave abuse of
the Hearing Officers discretion. In the second
place, this is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. As such, even assuming that errors were
allegedly committed by the SEC en banc, the errors
are not errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. There was, therefore, reasonable basis
for the decision of the Hearing Officer in dismissing
petitioner’s complaint.
30. Chua Hiong vs Deportation Board
No. L-6038 (March 19, 1955)
96 Phil. 665
FACTS:
In this case petitioner, Chua Hiong, was
alleged to have secured the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration with the Bureau of
Immigration through fraud and misrepresentation
claiming to be an illegitimate son of a filipino
mother). He filed a bond and petitioned for the
dismissal of the proceedings against him on the
following grounds: 1. The jurisdiction to deport
aliens exists only with regard to aliens, those who
are admittedly so; 2. Respondent is a citizen of the
Philippines and his claim is supported by evidence
that, if believed, is sufficient to entitle him to a
declaration of his citizenship; and 3. His filipino
citizenship has already been declared by the
Secretary of Labor, in representation of the
President of the Philippines, and the same is
binding on the other executive branches of the
government, the Deportation Board including. The
motion to quash was denied on the ground that
mere plea of citizenship does not divest the
proceedings. That the Deportation Board has
judicial power to pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence that the respondent may submit to
support his claim of citizenship. The Deportation
Board found the support to his citizenship
inconclusive. The petitioner sought herein a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that his arrest was
made without jurisdiction, that his claim of
citizenship is supported by evidence, that a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the Deportation
Board for the case until his petition is heard by the
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preliminary injuction should
continue.
HELD:
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Yes. In the case at bar, the court found that
the evidence of which petitioner and the State may
avail of such substantial nature as to afford belief
that only impartial judicial investigation can
evaluate with fairness to the petitioner with justice
to all concerned. Besides, the Executive
department has seen it proper that the issue of
citizenship be determined in a judicial proceeding.
Wherefore, the preliminary injuction issued in this
case should continue.
31. No. L-22748. July 29, 1977.*
GREGORIO CO and HERCULANO CO,
petitioners-appellees, vs. THE DEPORTATION
BOARD, respondent-appellant.
TOPIC: Modes of Judicial Review | Prohibition
FACTS: Special Prosecutor of the
Deportation Board filed charges against petitioners
with such Board alleging that as Chinese subjects
residing in the Philippines, who failed, neglected
and refused to register as Chinese nationals with
the Bureau of Immigration, they violated the law,
compounded by the fact that they represented
themselves as Filipinos.
Then they filed with the Deportation Board a
motion to dismiss based on the plea that it lacked
jurisdiction for the reason that they are citizens of
the Philippines.
Such motion was denied as was a subsequent
motion seeking reconsideration. They did exhaust
their administrative remedy, an appeal to the
President being fruitless.
Thereafter, they filed the special civil action of
prohibition and habeas corpus, with the decision
as noted being in their favor on the ground of their
being Filipinos.
ISSUE: WON the judiciary may entertain an
action for prohibition against Deportation Board
during the pendency of an inquiry against
appellees.
HELD: Judicial determination is allowable
“in cases when the courts themselves believe that
there is substantial evidence supporting the claim
of citizenship, so substantial that there are
reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct. In other words, the remedy should be
allowed only in the sound discretion of a
competent court in a proper proceeding.”
32. SIMON VS. CHR – 229 SCRA 117
ATTY. CABRAS
Facts:  A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction was
filed by the petitioners (Simon). The petitioners
asks the Court to prohibit public respondent CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case
No. 90-1580, entitled “Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et
al.”
In the case, A “Demolition Notice,” dated 9 July
1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo) in his capacity as
an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were
given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12
July, 1990) within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of
the demolition notice, the private respondents were
informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the “People’s
Park.” On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents’ stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along NORTH EDSA. The complaint
was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23
July 1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the
petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of
the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the
Commission” and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.
Issue: Whether or not the CHR is prohibited to act
upon the case and petition should be granted?
Held: Yes, In the particular case at hand, there is
no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents
on a land which is planned to be developed into a
“People’s Park.” More than that, the land adjoins
the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court
can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is
not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed
paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have
been violated is one that cannot, in the first place,
even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that
as it may, looking at the standards discoursed vis-
a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance,
the Court are not prepared to conclude that the
order for the demolition of the stalls,  sari-
sari stores and carinderia of the private
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
respondents can fall within the compartment of
“human rights violations involving civil and
political rights” intended by the Constitution .
Petition is granted.
33. Under Prohibition:
Paredes vs. CA
Facts: On 9 November 1992, public respondents
(Secretary of Trade and Industry) promulgated
Administrative Order Nos. 1 and 2, Series of 1992,
revising the rules of practice before the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
(BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases, to take
effect on 15 March 1993. Among the provisions of
said administrative orders are Rule 16 of A.O. No.
1 and Rule 15 of A.O. No. 2, which increased the
fees payable to the BPTTT for registration of
patents and trademarks and Rule 59 of A.O. No. 2
which prohibited the filing of multi-class
applications, that is, one application covering
several classes of goods.
On 11 March 1993, petitioners, who are registered
patent agents, filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop public
respondents from enforcing the aforementioned
administrative orders and to declare Rule 16 of
A.O. No. 1 and Rules 15 and 59 of A.O. No. 2,
series of 1992 of the BPTTT null and void.
On 27 October 1993, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for prohibition and on 10
January 1994, denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners on 18
November 1993.
Issue: Whether or not prohibition is a proper
remedy. (Again not the main issue)
Ruling: Prohibition is not the proper remedy. The
enabling law itself, which is B.P. Blg. 325, has
specifically tasked the Cabinet to review and
approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and
charges. Petitioners should have availed of this
easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately
resorting to the judicial process.
Our legislature in delegating to administrative
officers the authority to revise fees and charges
expressly required cabinet approval for the proper
exercise of said power. Petitioners should not have
wasted the opportunity to utilize this built-in
remedy.
The grant (or denial) of a writ of prohibition is
ordinarily within the sound discretion of the court
to be exercised with caution and forbearance,
according to the circumstances of the particular
case, and only where the right to seek relief is
clear.[7]
ATTY. CABRAS
Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other
remedy is available which is sufficient to afford
redress. That the petitioners have another and
complete remedy at law either by appeal or
otherwise, is generally a sufficient reason for
dismissing the writ.[8]
Hence, in Chua Huat v. CA,[9] we ruled that:
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure
for administrative review, and provides a system of
administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the
courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and
the appropriate authorities have been given
opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum.
And in Philnabank Employees v. Estanislao,[10] we
declared:
Secondly, although not inflexible, we have
repeatedly declined on grounds of prematurity, as
well as in the interest of good order, a hasty
recourse to the courts when administrative
avenues are still open. In the instant case, we
concur with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that:
. . . herein petitioners have still another available
recourse under the law being relied upon. Section
2 of B.P. 325 reads in part:
Sec. 2. Determination of Ratio.- xxx. The revision of
rates shall be determined by the respective ministry
heads or equivalent functionaries conformably with
the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance
issued pursuant to Section 4 hereof, upon
recommendation of the imposing and collecting
authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the
Cabinet. xx x (Italics supplied)
The above provision envisions a three-step process
involving a hierarchy of authority before the rate
increases and charges can be imposed and
collected. First, the BPTTT, which is the imposing
and collecting agency, makes a recommendation of
the fee increases and charges. Those recommended
rates and charges are submitted to the Secretary of
the DTI for his evaluation and approval. Second, if
the Secretary of the DTI finds that the rate
increases and charges conform with the rules and
regulations of the Ministry of Finance, then the
same are approved and in turn become the rates of
the department. The determination of the
supposed rates and charges does not end here. As
mentioned in Section 2 above; the rates as
determined by the department head are subject to
the approval of the Cabinet.
The phrase subject to is one qualification. It means
under the control, power or dominion of or
subordinated to, a higher authority (cf.
PNB vs. Deputy, G.R. No. 35515-R, December 12,
1970). Meaning, that the proposed rates and
charges still have to obtain the imprimatur of the
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Cabinet, and prior to which, they have to undergo
Cabinet scrutiny. Thus, there is the contingency
that the same may not obtain the approval of the
Cabinet.
Petitioners are not unaware of this remedy
provided by law. They have, in fact, raised the lack
of Cabinet approval as one of the reasons for
seeking the nullification of the aforementioned
administrative orders. (Note: nasagut na yung
main issue as to exhaustion of administrative
remedy, that is merun pang remedy).
34. G.R. No. April 23, 1993
100127
PETITIONER JOSE D. LINA, JR.
RESPONDENTS ISIDRO D. CARINO, in his
capacity as Secretary of
Education, Culture and
Sports
Facts:
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
filed by petitioner Senator Jose D. Lina, Jr.
principally as taxpayer, against respondent Isidro
D. Carino, in the latter’s capacity as the then
Secretary of Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS).
Petitioner disputes the legal authority of
respondent Carino to issue DECS Order No. 30,
series of 1991, dated 11 March 1991, entitled
“Guidelines on Tuition and/or other School Fees in
Private Schools, Colleges and Universities for
School Year 1991-1992.” It allows private schools
to increase tuition and other school fees, subject to
the guidelines there set out.
Petitioner basically denies the legal authority of
respondent Secretary to issue DECS Order No. 30.
It is the contention of the petitioner that
respondent Secretary at the time of issuing DECS
Order No. 30 no longer possessed legal authority to
do so, considering that authority to promulgate
rules and regulations relating to the imposition of
school fees had been transferred to the State
Assistance Council (SAC) by Republic Act No. 6728
(An Act Providing Government Assistance to
Students and Teachers in Private Education, and
Appropriating Funds therefor).
Issue/s:
Whether DECS Secretary Carino has legal
authority to issue DECS Order No. 30
Ruling:
ATTY. CABRAS
Yes, Secretary Carino has legal authority to issue
DECS Order No. 30.
Ratio Decidendi:
After careful examination of the provisions of both
P.D. No. 451 (Authorizing The Secretary of
Education and Culture to Regulate the Imposition
of Tuition and Other School Fees) and B.P. Blg.
232 (An Act Providing for the Establishment and
Maintenance of an Integrated System of
Education), and the opinions of the Court in Phil.
Consumer case and the Cebu Institute case, the
Court considers that the legal authority of
respondent DECS Secretary to set maximum
permissible rates or levels of tuition and other
school fees, and to issue guidelines for the
imposition and collection thereof, like DECS Order
No. 30, must be sustained.
The Court is unable to agree with Lina’s
contention. We do not see how R.A. No. 6728 could
be regarded as vesting upon the SAC the legal
authority to establish maximum permissible
tuition and other school fees for private schools.
As earlier noted, R.A. No. 6728 deals with
government assistance to students and teachers in
private schools; it does not, in other words, purport
to deal at all with the question of authority to fix
maximum collectible tuition and other school fees.
R.A. No. 6728 did authorize the SAC to issue rules
and regulations; but the rules and regulations
which may be promulgated by the SAC must relate
to the authority granted by R.A. No. 6728 to the
SAC. It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation must
bear upon, and be consistent with the provisions of
the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to
be valid.
The SAC was authorized to define the classes of
students who may be entitled to claim government
financial assistance. Under the statute, students of
schools charging tuition and other school fees in
excess of certain identified rate or levels thereof
shall not be entitled to claim government
assistance or subsidies. The specification of such
levels of tuition and other school fees for purposes
of qualifying (or disqualifying) the students in such
schools for government financial assistance is one
thing; this is the task SAC was authorized to carry
out through the promulgation of rules and
regulations. The determination of the levels of
tution and other school fees which may lawfully be
charged by any private school, is clearly another
matter; this task is vested in respondent Secretary.
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Doctrine Learned:
A rule or regulation must bear upon, and be
consistent with the provisions of its enabling
statute.
35. BLANCO V. BOARD
46 PHIL 190
Topic: Modes of judicial review; Mandamus
Facts:
The petitioners, along with other qualified persons,
took the examination prescribed by law for a
physician's certificate on May 13 to 16, 1924, and
apparently passed the same. The Board of Medical
Examiners thereupon submitted the final results of
the examinations to the Department Head for
confirmation. But the Secretary of the Interior held
the matter in abeyance, pending the outcome of an
investigation conducted by the Under-Secretary of
the Interior. The finding of the special investigator
was that the questions on the subjects of the
medical examinations held on May 13 to May 16,
1924, had leaked out before said dates. Following
the recommendation of the Under-Secretary, the
Secretary of the Interior annulled the results of the
examinations.
The last paragraph of section 776 of the Medical
Law, as found in the Administrative Code, and as
last amended by section 10 of Act No. 3111,
provides that "The results of all examinations
(medical), including the average and grades
obtained by each applicant, shall be submitted for
confirmation to the Department Head (the
Secretary of the Interior) and made known to the
respective candidates within one month after the
date of the examination."
Issue: WON the mandamus filed by the petitioner
will prosper.
Held:
No, the mandamus filed by the petitioner will not
prosper. The writ of mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of the discretion of a
public officer. Where the law imposes upon a
public officer the right and duty to exercise
judgment, in reference to any matter to which he is
called upon to act, it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.
Under the plain terms of the Medical law, it is the
discretionary duty of the Secretary of the Interior
to confirm or not to confirm — to confirm or, as in
this instance, to annul — the report of the medical
examiners. To hold that the Secretary of the
Interior must in all cases confirm, shutting his
eyes to any irregularity, no matter how glaring,
would convert him into an automatic rubber stamp
for imprinting the requisite approval. That the
ATTY. CABRAS
Department Secretary who appoints the members
of the Board of Medical Examiners, who has the
Board under his administrative supervision, and
who has the power of confirmation of the report of
the Board, cannot do more than perform the
clerical duty of approving the results of the
examinations, under any and all circumstances, is
too specious an argument to merit serious
consideration.
It is likewise elementary law that mandamus may
issue to correct abuse of discretion, if the case is
otherwise proper. But here, the record discloses
that the Secretary of the Interior did not exercise
the power granted to him with manifest injustice,
or with gross abuse. Quite otherwise.
Referential Syllabus:
PUBLIC OFFICERS; MANDAMUS, WHEN ISSUES;
DISCRETIONARY DUTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS.—
The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or
review the exercise of the discretion of a public
officer. Where the law imposes upon a public
officer the right and duty to exercise judgment, in
reference to any matter to which he is called upon
to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and
not that of the court.
ID.; ID.; ID.—Mandamus may issue to correct
abuse of discretion, if the case is otherwise proper.
ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 776, AS AMENDED, OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, CONSTRUED;
DUTY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO
CONFIRM RESULTS OF MEDICAL
EXAMINATIONS.—The official duty imposed on the
Secretary of the Interior by the Medical Law (sec.
776, as amended, of the Administrative Code), is
discretionary in nature. It is the discretionary duty
of the Secretary of the Interior to confirm or not to
confirm the report of the medical examiners.
36. Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board
(99 Phil 797 [No. L-10062], 28 August 1956)
Facts: Paula Aquino Policarpio was the widow of a
member of the Armed Forces killed in action in
1942; upon her application duly approved, she was
granted a monthly pension by Philippine Veterans
Board (herein referred to as ‘the Board.’) The
pension was stopped in July 1948 because the
widow received a similar pension from U. S.
Veterans Administration. However, the latter
certified to the Board that the widow had ceased
receiving her pension from the U. S. Veterans
Administration since 1951, whereupon, in
February 11, 1953, Policarpio applied to the Board
for the resumption of her former pension. On
February 28, 1953, the Secretary of the Philippine
Veterans Board issued a memorandum that her
pension was resumed effective January 30, 1951;
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and in view thereof the auditor caused treasury
warrants to be prepared in favor of the widow.
Delivery of the warrants was, however,
subsequently stopped, for the reason that the
Board had not yet granted the restoration of her
pension.
On the basis of such facts and in view of the
refusal of the board officers to release the
warrants, Policarpio applied to the Court of First
Instance for a writ of mandamus to compel their
release. In its answer the Board specifically
pleaded that the preparation of the warrants was
ordered by mistake, because Policarpio's petition
had not been as yet acted upon by the Board.
By agreement of the parties the lower court
decreed the issuance of the writ complained of on
the basis that the fact that the Secretary has
signed the memorandum for the chairman of the
board restoring Policarpio’s pension, and the
further fact that said check has been drawn by
virtue of such memorandum are sufficient reasons
to justify the release of the same in payment of
petitioner's accumulated pension.
Issue/s: Whether or not the lower court lacked the
authority in rendering its decision. (Yes)
Held: The decision is untenable. It being an
established fact that the resumption of the pension
had not yet been approved by the Veterans Board,
the memorandum of the Secretary and the
preparation of the warrants were obviously
unauthorized, and the taking of such action proves
nothing but that the error or lack of authority was
not discovered until later, as shown by the
subsequent withholding of the warrants.
It was improper to compel delivery of the warrants,
because the Board might, in the exercise of its
discretion, refuse to restore Policarpio's pension;
and even if its refusal should be wrongful or
erroneous, the court could not properly intervene
until she should have exhausted her
administrative remedies. Therefore, the court below
should have limited itself to ordering the Board to
take action upon Policarpio's petition that her
pension payments be resumed.
37. Meralco vs. Savellano
FACTS: the late Juan G. Maniago (substituted in
these proceedings by his wife and children)
submitted to petitioner Commissionerof Internal
Revenue confidential denunciation against the
ATTY. CABRAS
Meralco Securities Corporation for tax evasion for
having paid income tax only on 25 % of the
dividends it received from the Manila Electric Co.
for the years 1962-1966, thereby allegedly
shortchanging the government of income tax due
from 75% of the said dividends.
Petitioner caused the investigation but did not
found any deficiency of corporate income tax since
under the law, then prevailing (section 24[a] of the
National Internal Revenue Code) "in the case of
dividends received by a domestic or foreign
resident corporation liable to (corporate income)
tax under this Chapter . . . .only twenty-five per
centum thereof shall be returnable for the
purposes of the tax imposed under this section."
The Commissioner accordingly rejected Maniago's
contention that the Meralco from whom the
dividends were received is "not a domestic
corporation liable to tax under this Chapter."
Because of this ruling, the claim of informer’s
reward to Maniago was also denied.
Maniago filed a petition for mandamus with the
RTC against the CIR and Meralco to compel him to
impose the alleged tax deficiency and award
him the informer’s reward by virtue of RA 2338.
The commissioner moved to dismiss that he is
clothed under the National Internal Revenue Code
and existing rules and regulations with
discretionary power in evaluating the facts of a
case and since mandamus win not lie to compel
the performance of a discretionary power, he
cannot be compelled to impose the alleged tax
deficiency assessment against the Meralco
Securities Corporation. He further argued that
mandamus may not lie against him for that would
be tantamount to a usurpation of executive
powers, since the Office of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is undeniably under the control
of the executive department. The respondent judge
granted the writ hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of mandamus may
lie against the CIR
RULING:
No. A well-recognized rule that mandamus only lies
to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or
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duty and not to control the performance of a
discretionary power. Purely administrative and
discretionary functions may not be interfered with
by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means
the power or right conferred upon the office by law
of acting officially under certain circumstances
according to the dictates of his own judgment and
conscience and not controlled by the judgment or
conscience of others. Mandamus may not be
resorted to so as to interfere with the manner in
which the discretion shall be exercised or
to influence or coerce a particular determination.
Moreover, since the office of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is charged with the
administration of revenue laws, which is the
primary responsibility of the executive branch of
the government, mandamus may not issue against
the Commissioner to compel him to impose a tax
assessment not found by him to be due or proper
for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of
executive functions.
Such discretionary power vested in the proper
executive official, in the absence of arbitrariness or
grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory
authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment
or control of others. Such decision or ruling is a
valid exercise of discretion in the performance of
official duty and cannot be controlled much less
reversed by mandamus.
38. Antonio vs Tanco Jr.
65 SCRA 448, July 25, 1975
Facts:
On Sept 5, 1973, the Sec. of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, pursuant to PD No. 6,
which amended certain rules on discipline on
government employees and upon the
recommendation of Acting Director of Fisheries,
charged Hilario C. Antonio, the Regional Director of
Region No. IV of the Bureau of Fisheries, was
incompetence and conduct highly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. The complaint was
embodied in a “formal charge with order of
suspension” which was served upon Antonio on
Sept. 14, 1973. The suspension took effect
immediately.
It was alleged that Antonio on May 31,
October 31 and Nov. 30 1972 issued to eleven
persons closely related to, or associated with, each
ATTY. CABRAS
other twelve seaweed areas of Manila Bay despite
his knowledge that the official policy was that no
exclusive seaweed licenses.
Some weeks after his suspension, or on
October 24, 1973, Antonio sent a telegraphic
request for reinstatement to President Marcos.
On Nov. 16, 1973 or 63 days after his
suspension Antonio informed the Director of
Fisheries that by virtue of section 35 of the Civil
Service Law he was going to return to duty as
Regional Fishery Director.
On Jan 29, 1974 Antonio without awaiting
the decision of the Pres to his request for
reinstatement, ventilated his grievance in the
Judicial forum by filling the instant petition for
mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition.
Issue; Whether Antonio is entitled to the writ of
mandamus to compel the Sec. of Natural
Resources to reinstate him.
Held:
We are of the opinion that the mandamus
action was prematurely filed, or, as the
respondents put it, the case is not ripe for
adjudication for the court of justice in view of the
pendency of the Office of the President of Antonio’s
request for reinstatement. As long as that request
is pending, the matter of his reinstatement is not
justiciable.
A mandamus action against administrative
officers should not be entertained if their superiors
can grant relief. Parties asking judicial review of
administrative official action must first exhaust
their remedies in the executive branch.
39. QUINTOS-DELES vs. COMMISSION
FACTS: Teresita Quintos-Deles, Al Ignatius Lopez,
Bartolome Arteche, and Rey Magno Teves were
appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the
Constitution. Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter the
appointment of the said sectoral representatives to
Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr. These sectoral
representatives were scheduled to take their oaths
before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session
Hall of Congress after the Order of Business.
However, petitioner and the three other sectoral
representatives-appointees were not able to take
their oaths and discharge their duties as members
of Congress due to the opposition of some
congressmen-members of the Commission on
Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
representatives must first be confirmed by the
respondent Commission before they could take
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their oaths and/or assume office as members of
the House of Representatives. This opposition
compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend
the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires
the appointment of sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives should be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments.
RULING: Yes. SEC.16.The President shall
nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the execu-
tive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint
all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549
[1987]), we construed Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution to mean that only appointments to
offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said
Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; Second, all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; Third, those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
40. Marcos vs Manglapus
FACTS:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was
deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
ATTY. CABRAS
“people power” revolution and was forced into exile.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. But President
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos
and his family. Marcos filed for a petition of
mandamus and prohibition to order the
respondents to issue them their travel documents
and prevent the implementation of President
Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in
the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s
power to bar his return in the country. He also
questioned the claim of the President that the
decision was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Petitioner also
claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the exercise of the power of
judicial review, the function of the court is merely
to check, not to supplant the Executive.
HELD:
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
cited by petitioners show that the framers intended
to widen the scope of judicial review but they did
not intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is
not established, the Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the official concerned and
decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for
the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would
appear clear that the second paragraph of Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining
“judicial power,” which specifically empowers the
courts to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government, that:
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the
Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers
underlying our system of government, the
Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes
hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which the Executive is supreme,
as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only
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if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to
him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested
in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect,
is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the
exercise of such authority, the function of the
Court is merely to check not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in
him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
41.DE BORJA V VILLADOLID
FACTS: Villadolid, as Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries required the plaintiff, to procure a
commercial fishing boat license as owner and
operator of said motor boats.
Plaintiff refused to secure such license and
contended that he is not so required by section 18
of Act No. 4003, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 471, for the reason that he
"is not operating his motor boats for the purpose of
catching fish."
A motion to dismiss the complaint was granted by
the lower court and a motion for reconsideration
having been denied, this case has brought here on
appeal.
Section 17 of Act No. 4003 and section 18 of the
same Act, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 471, read as follows:
SEC. 17. License tax on operation of boat. — Unless
provided with a license issued in accordance with
the provisions of this Act, no person, association or
corporation shall operate any vessel of more than
three tons gross for the purpose of catching fish in
the territorial waters of the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 18. Annual fee on operation of boat. — The
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is hereby
empowered to issue to the proper parties licenses
for fishing operation of powered vessels of more
than three tons gross and sailing or rowed vessels
of more than three tons gross towed or operated in
connection with power -propelled vessels in the
territorial waters of the Philippines upon the
payment of an annual fee of not less than two
pesos nor more than two hundred pesos for every
vessel subject to taxation under this
Act: Provided That failure of a licensee to secure a
renewal or extension of his license and pay the
annual fee on or before the last day of February of
each year shall subject him to a surcharge of one
hundred per centum based on the amount of the
original fee, without prejudice to criminal
proceedings against the delinquent licensee under
the penal provisions of this Act: Provided, further,
That all vessels less than three tons gross shall be
ATTY. CABRAS
licensed under the provisions of section seventy of
this Act: And provided, also, That the catching of
fish under the license issued shall be subject to the
limitations, restrictions, and penalties imposed by
this Act. (As amended by sec. 1 of Com. Act No.
471.)
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of declaratory relief shall
be given due course? No.
W/N plaintiff is obliged to procure a commercial
fishing boat license? Yes.
HELD:
1. It appears that the Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries demanded that plaintiff pay the
license provided in that Act and in view of the
insistent refusal of plaintiff to comply with
such demand, he finally turned over the case to
the Office of the Fiscal of the City of Manila for
appropriate action. However, plaintiff, file a
complaint for declaratory relief. This attitude of
the plaintiff will only result in multiplicity of
actions which should always be invoked and the
Rules of Court obviously seeks to prevent when, in
section 2 of Rule 66, it provides that the action for
declaratory relief must be brought "before there
has been a breach" of a contract or statute the
construction of which is sought.
The facts in this case are so clear and
unambiguous, that in the light of said section 2 or
Rule 66, there is nothing left for the courts to
adjudicate or construe regarding the legal rights,
suites and status of appellant in the premises. The
general purpose of declaratory judgment act is to
provide for adjudication of the legal rights, duties,
or status of the respective parties." 
2.  Pursuant to Act No. 4003, required to pay the
commercial fishing boat license
42. Azajar vs. Bureau of Lands
Facts: The plaintiff, Maria De Azajar filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Albay
seeking a declaratory judgment or relief pleading
that she applied for the purchase of a parcel of
land belonging to the public domain located in the
Province of Albay and that an opposition to such
application was filed by Francisco Ardales, one of
the respondents herein. The respondent contended
that the applicant cannot be entitled to acquire
said lands being a Chinese Citizen. Such
opposition, according to the plaintiff, raises
uncertainty and insecurity to her citizenship which
is prejudicial to her. She contended that unless
such question of citizenship be judicially
determined, the Bureau of Lands should not deny
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her application. Moreover, she contended that her
father is a Filipino Citizen. The petitioner prayed
that after due hearing, judgment be rendered
declaring her to be a Filipino Citizen and as such,
entitled her to acquire lands of the public domain
and that she possessed all the rights and privileges
accorded to the Filipino Citizens. After hearing, the
court rendered a decision stating that the plaintiff
is a Chinese Citizen and being such, she is not
entitled to acquire lands of the public domain. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied. The appeal was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals. While it was pending, the First Assistant
Solicitor General filed a motion praying that the
appeal be dismissed on the grounds that an action
for declaratory relief is not the proper proceedings
for the purpose of securing a judicial declaration of
Filipino Citizenship and that the action brought by
the plaintiff was not the proper remedy because
the trial court had no authority or jurisdiction to
decide on the merits but to dismiss it. The
appellant objected to this motion and moved that
the appeal be forwarded to the Supreme Court
because it involves pre questions of law. However,
the First Assistant Solicitor General objected and
appealed for the case to be dismissed on the
ground that the case involved not only questions of
law but also questions of fact being such the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear and render judgment
therein.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff’s citizenship can
be determined in a complaint for declaratory
judgment or relief.
Held: From a decision of the Director of Lands, an
appeal lies to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Until all the administrative
remedies had been exhausted, no court may
compel the Director of Lands or the Secretary of
Agriculture to decide any sales application as such
is exclusively vested upon them. The Supreme
Court held that the appellant’s citizenship cannot
be determined in the complaint for declaratory
judgment/relief as such is not proper remedy for
determination of citizenship. The appellant may
resort to the courts if the exercise of her rights as
citizens be prevented or denied. However, such was
not the action brought in the case at bar and the
lower court should have dismissed it.
43. DECLARATORY RELIEF
G.R. No. L-4183           October 26, 1951
NATIONAL DENTAL SUPPLY CO. vs. BIBIANO
MEER, in his capacity as Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellee.
ATTY. CABRAS
FACTS:
This is an action for declaratory relief to obtain a
ruling on whether sales of dental gold or gold alloys
and other metals used for dental purposes come
within the purview of Article 184 of the National
Internal Revenue Code as claimed by the Collector
of Internal Revenue.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
(1) that plaintiff has no cause of action for
declaratory judgment and (2) that even assuming
the existence of a cause of action, relief by
declaratory judgment is not proper because it will
not terminate the controversy.
The court sustained the motion under the first
ground holding that actions for declaratory relief
do not apply to cases where a taxpayer questions
his liability for the payment of any tax collectible
under any law administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. From this ruling the plaintiff has
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff can bring the present action for
declaratory relief.
HELD:
Plaintiff contends that it can do so under section 1,
Rule 66, of the Rules of Court, which contains no
prohibition to a taxpayer to file an action for
declaratory relief to test the legality of any tax,
whereas defendant contends that the failure to
incorporate in Rule 66 the proviso added by
Commonwealth Act No. 55 to section 1, of Act No.
3736, does not imply its repeal and, therefore, it
still stands and applies to the plaintiff.
The original law on declaratory relief is Act No.
3736, which went into effect on November 22,
1930.
On October 17, 1936, Congress approved
Commonwealth Act No. 55 adding to section 1 of
said Act No. 3736, the following proviso:
. . . Provided, however, That the provisions of
this Act, shall not apply to cases where a
taxpayer questions his liability for the
payment of any tax, duty, or charge collectible
under any law administered by the Bureau of
Customs or the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
(a) Propriety of remedy.—The proviso added by
Commonwealth Act No. 55 to section 1 of Act No.
3736, which prohibits an action for declaratory
relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his
liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or charge
collectible under any law administered by the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal
Revenue', is not incorporated in the above
provision in order to make it discretionary
upon the courts to apply or not to apply the
remedy in such cases. Of course, where the tax is
already due and collectible, the tax payer cannot
prevent collection by the declaratory action, but he
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should pay the tax and sue for its recovery within
the period limited by law. But, where the tax is not
yet due, there can be no valid reason why the tax-
payer cannot by declaratory relief test its validity.
From the opinion of the former Chief Justice
Moran may be deduced that the failure to
incorporate the above proviso in section 1, rule 66,
is not due to an intention to repeal it but rather to
the desire to leave its application to the sound
discretion of the court, which is the sole
arbiter to determine whether a case is
meritorious or not.
The foregoing view finds support in section 306 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, which
specifically lays down the procedure to be followed
in those cases wherein a taxpayer entertains some
doubt about the correctness of a tax sought to be
collected. Said section provides that the tax should
first be paid and the taxpayer should sue for its
recovery afterwards. The purpose of the law
obviously is to prevent delay in the collection of
taxes upon which the Government depends for its
very existence. To allow a taxpayer to first secure a
ruling as regards the validity of the tax before
paying it would be to defeat this purpose, and to
prevent this result the rule regarding declaratory
relief was declared inapplicable to cases involving
collection of taxes.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.
44. Declaratory Relief
ALLIED BROADCASTING VS REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting
petitioner the permit or franchise to construct,
maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations
in the Philippines. Petitioner was able to
construct, maintain and operate ten (10) radio
broadcasting stations all over the country.
Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001,
petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of
the Philippines when the public interest so
requires . ..."
On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No.
576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership
And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations
And For Other Purposes" was issued.
Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all
franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates,
or other forms of authority to operate radio or
television broadcasting systems/stations, including
the franchise or permit of petitioner under
Republic Act No. 3001, have been deemed
terminated or revoked effective December 31,
1981. Thus, petitioner is left with only 3 radio
ATTY. CABRAS
stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and
Roxas City.
Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it
great and irreparable damage, because — (a) it
divested petitioner of its franchise without due
process of law and forced it to divest itself of some
of its radio stations; (b) it deprived petitioner of its
right to further construct, maintain and operate
radio broadcasting stations in other cities or
municipalities of the country. Hence, this petition
to declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as
unconstitutional and null and void ab initio.
ISSUE:Whether this petition be treated as a
prohibition as being alleged by petitioner
RULING: No.
The petition seeks a declaration of the
unconstitutionality and/or nullity of
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must
be treated as one seeking declaratory relief
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an
action should be brought before the Regional
Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court.
A petition for declaratory relief is not among
the petitions within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court even if only questions of law
are involved.
Thus, the present petition should be dismissed
on this score.
Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy
involving the law sought to be annulled.
Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an
application for a license to operate a radio or
television station in excess of the authorized
number and that the same is being denied or
refused on the basis of the restrictions under
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not
also allege that it had been penalized or is being
penalized for a violation under said Decree. There
is, likewise, no allegation that any of the
petitioner's stations had been confiscated or
shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge
is not being raised in the context of a specific
case or controversy wherein the petitioner has
asserted his rights.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in
vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to determine
actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants."
The allegation of petitioner that its petition should
be treated as a petition for prohibition does not
place petitioner in any better position. The
petition cannot be considered as one for
prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit
further proceedings being conducted by any
tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising judicial or ministerial functions.
In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek
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to prohibit any proceeding being conducted by
public respondent which adversely affects its
interest. Apparently, what petitioner seeks to
prohibit is the possible denial of an application it
may make to operate radio or television stations on
the basis of the restrictions imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the
petition is premature.
45. Mejoff vs Director of Prisons
Facts:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris
Mejoff, the first having been denied. The petitioner
Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent to this
country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the
Japanese forces during the latter’s regime in these
Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a
Japanese spy. The Board of Commissioners of
Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the
Philippines illegally, without inspection and
admission by the immigration officials at a
designation point of entry and, therefore, it ordered
that he be deported on the first available
transportation to Russia. In July and August,
1948, two boats of Russian nationality called at the
Cebu Port. But their master refused to take the
petitioner and his companions alleging lack of
authority to do so. In October of the same year,
after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad,
the authorities transferred him to Bilibid prison
where he has been confined up to the present time.
The Court held that petitioner’s detention be
temporary and said that ”temporary detention is a
necessary step in the process of expulsion and
exclusion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements of his deportation, the Government
has the right to hold the undesirable alien under
confinement for a reasonable length of time”. But
the Court warned that “under established
precedents, too long a detention may justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Issue:
Whether the writ of habeas corpus should be
granted?
Ruling:
Over two years having elapsed since the decision
aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has
not found ways and means of removing the
petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight,
although, it should be said in justice to deportation
authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that
no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no
right of asylum therein even if they are “stateless” ,
which the petitioner claims to be. It is no less true,
however, as impliedly stated in this Court’s
ATTY. CABRAS
decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not enemy,
against whom no charge has been made other than
that their permission to stay has expired, may no
indefinitely be kept in detention.
The protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land is not
limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of
nationality. Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II,
Sec. 3) the Philippines ”adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of
law of the Nation.” And in a resolution entitled
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and
approved by the general assembly of the United
Nations of which the Philippines is a member, the
right to life and liberty and all other fundamental
rights as applied to all human beings were
proclaimed.
Premises considered, the writ will issue
commanding the respondents to release the
petitioner from custody upon these terms; The
petitioner shall be places under the surveillance of
the immigration authorities or their agents in such
form and manner as may be deemed adequate to
insure that he keep peace and be available when
the Government is ready to deport him. The
surveillance and the question of reasonableness
shall be submitted to this Court for decision in
case of abuse. Petition granted.
46. Co vs Deportation Board
Facts:
Petitioners Gregorio Co and Herculano Co
being born in Aparri, Cagayan, on April 24, 1920
and September 25, 1922. Their father, a certain Co
Pengco, was a Chinese merchant residing in
Aparri, Cagayan and their mother was Maria Tan
Comin, whose nationality was disputed. Then on
July 12, 1957, a Special Prosecutor of the
Deportation Board filed charges against petitioners
with such Board alleging that as Chinese subjects
residing in the Philippines, who failed, neglected
and refused to register as Chinese nationals with
the Bureau of Immigration, they violated the law,
compounded by the fact that they represented
themselves as Filipinos. They were thus enabled to
enjoy certain rights and privileges which are
accorded only to Filipino citizens, such as suffrage,
ownership of real property, Herculano's ownership
of a coastwise vessel, Gregorio Co's loan from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.
Then they filed with the Deportation Board
a motion to dismiss based on the plea that it
lacked jurisdiction for the reason that they are
citizens of the Philippines. 9 Such motion was
denied as was a subsequent motion seeking
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
reconsideration. They did exhaust their
administrative remedy, an appeal to the President
being fruitless. Thereafter, they filed the special
civil action of prohibition and habeas corpus, with
the decision as noted being in their favor on the
ground of their being Filipinos.  They pointed out
that both the appellee Deportation Board and the
lower court maintained the contrary view, her
citizenship being admitted
Issue:
Whether or not the judiciary may entertain
an action for prohibition and habeas corpus filed
against the Deportation Board
Held:
No. The petitioners are Filipino citizens and
that the Deportation Board was without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the deportation
proceedings filed against them.
Judge Jesus de Veyra of the Manila Court
of First Instance, in a well-written decision,
sustained his jurisdiction, granted the relief sought
on the ground that they were Filipinos, and
restrained appellant Board from taking further
cognizance of the proceeding. Hence this appeal by
the Deportation Board. On the basis of the finding
of facts of the lower court, tested by the standards
prescribed in Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board,
there was justification for the decision it rendered.
While Vivo v. Montesa 2 and Calacday v.
Vivo  stand for the proposition that under the well-
3
settled administrative law doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, an administrative agency, such as
appellant, must be given the opportunity to decide
the matter before it before the courts could
intervene, the latter case pointed out that there are
appropriate where the right to immediate judicial
review should be recognized. As the lower court
found, this is one of them. We cannot see any valid
ground for reversal.
47. Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag | Fernan,
C.J. (1989)
FACTS
- Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French
national.
- He was a temporary visitor, but his status was
later changed to that of an immigrant.
- respondent CID Commissioner Ramon Liwag
received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio
G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly petitioner's landlord,
accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien
for "committing acts inimical to public safety and
ATTY. CABRAS
progress."
- Liwag issued a mission order to a team of CID
agents for them "to locate and bring subject to
Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and
"submit report."
- CID agents went to petitioner's residence in Sta.
Ana to invite the latter to the CID headquarters for
verification of his status but petitioner and his
then lady companion reportedly locked themselves
inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the
agents.
- The immigration agents then sought the
assistance of members of the WPD. Once again
petitioner adamantly refused to be taken in and in
the ensuing struggle, both petitioner and the
lawmen were injured. Finally, petitioner was
subdued and immediately taken to the CID
Intelligence Office.
- A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
Commissioner on the same day but there is
nothing in the records to convince this Court that
said warrant was served on petitioner prior to his
apprehension.
- Petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for
habeas corpus.
ISSUE/S & HELD:
The core issue is the legality of the arrest and
detention of petitioner by the Immigration
Commissioner preparatory to deportation
proceedings.
RATIONALE
- SC cited Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago: The
requirement of probable cause to be determined by
a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo). There need be no
'truncated' recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation
proceeding.
- What is essential is that there should be a
specific charge against the alien intended to be
arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be
conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of
counsel, if desired, and that the charge be
substantiated by competent evidence. ... .
- The particular circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the
legality and propriety of petitioner's apprehension
by respondent Commissioner. For unlike in the
Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two
suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable
cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a
three-month period during which their activities
were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited" by
a combined team of CID agents and police officers
at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission
order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
based on a sworn complaint of a single individual.
The essential requisite of probable cause was
conspicuously absent.
- But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner
was not legal at the beginning, certain events have
supervened to render his petition moot and
academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect
there was at the inception of his arrest.
- Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement.
Petitioner was released upon the posting and
approval of a personal bailbond.
- The general rule in a number of cases is that the
release, whether permanent or temporary, of a
detained person renders the petition for habeas
corpus moot and academic, unless there are
restraints attached to his release which precludes
freedom of action (Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule)
- Examples in Moncupa vs. Enrile: prohibition to
travel, to change his abode and to grant
interviews…
- Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly
restrained. Secondly, records show that formal
deportation proceedings have been initiated
against petitioner before the Board of Special
Inquiry of the CID.
- The restraint (if any) against petitioner's person
has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas
corpus has served its purpose.
48. HABEAS CORPUS
CASIMIRO BAYANI, petitioner and appellant,
vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
respondent and appellee.
FACTS:
Appellant, Casimiro Bayani arrived at Manila in
August 1917on the syeamship Loongsang and
requested permission to enter declaring that he
was a citizen of the Philippines. The request was
inquired into by a board of special inquiry but was
subsequently denied. Appeal was taken to the
Collector of Customs, which confirmed the earlier
decision.
A writ of habeas corpus was petitioned for in the
CFI, which was also denied.
In the appeal with the Supreme Court , Bayani
alleges that he was not give an full , free and fair
hearing before the special board of inquiry, and he
prayed for a new trial on the merits.
In reply, the Attorney-General admitted the errors
assigned by the appellant. In his brief, he found on
record that some members of the board exhibited
ill-advised actions, there were misstatement of
material facts to witnesses, and one witness was
barred even before she concluded her testimony.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an appeal can be made to courts
after the decision of an administrative body has
ATTY. CABRAS
become final.
HELD:
Yes, The courts will not hesitate to review the
decision of administrative officers whenever it is
alleged and proved that they have abused the
power and discretion conferred upon them.
It was found out that the witnesses came from a
humble background and were perhaps ignorant
and not accustomed with the scenes of judicial
proceedings and that the entire examination by the
board from beginning to end, of all witnesses, was
made in the spirit of hostility.
The court said, that what should have been done
by the board was to allay their fears and indicated
to them that they were under protection. And
where the record itself had disclosed the fact that
the evidence is weighed in such hostility, the court
said that there could never be that impartial, free ,
full and fair hearing contemplated in law.
Further, the court stressed that the essential thing
in investigations like the present as well as all
other judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is that
there shall have been an honest effort to arrive at
the truth by methods sufficiently fair and
reasonable to amount to due process of law.
In the end, the court adopted the recommendation
of the Attorney-General and ordered and decreed
that the record be returned to the court whence it
came with directions that the judgment appealed
from be reversed and that an order be issued
directing and commanding the board of special
inquiry to give to the appellant a rehearing as
speedily as the facts and circumstances will
permit, and without any findings as to costs.
49. Yu vs Defensor-Santiago
Facts
Petitioner Yu was originally a Portuguese national
who was naturalized as a Philippine citizen.
However, he petitioner applied for and was issued
a renewed Portuguese Passport by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. The
CID (Commission on Immigration and Deportation)
detained the petitioner pending his deportation
case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition for
habeas corpus.
Issue
Whether a writ of habeas corpus should be
issued
Held
No. The foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport 23 and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship. Philippine citizenship, it must be
stressed, is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
50. COLLECTOR VS REYES, 100 PHIL 822
FACTS: CIR demanded from Aurelio P. Reyes
payment of his alleged deficiency income taxes,
surcharges, interests and penalties for the tax
years 1946 to 1950. Together with said letter of
assessment, the latter received a warrant of
distraint and levy on his properties in the event
that he should fail to pay the alleged deficiency
income taxes.
Reyes filed with the CTA a petition for review of the
Collector's assessment of his alleged deficiency
income tax liabilities. This was followed by an
urgent petition to restrain the CIR from executing
the warrant of distrain and levy on his properties,
alleging that the right of respondent to collect by
summary proceedings the tax demanded had
already prescribed in accordance with section 51
(d) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as his
income tax returns for the tax years 1946 to 1950
had been filed more than three years ago, the last
one being on April 27, 1951; that a distrain and
levy on his properties would work injustice or
irreparable injury to him and would tend to render
any judgment of the Court in the main case
meaningless and ineffectual; that the requisite if
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 for the filing of
a bond or deposit before a writ of distrain and levy
may be suspended is not applicable in this case;
and that a greater portion of his assets consists of
real properties located in Manila and shares a
stock in the Philippine Racing Club which are all
encumbered in various financial institutions and
therefore there is no possibility that he would
abscond with his property or remove or conceal the
same.
CIR opposed said petition on the ground that CTA
has no authority from executing the warrant of
distraint and levy on his properties of Reyes in
connection with the collection of the latter's
ATTY. CABRAS
deficiency income taxes. CTA upheld the stand of
Reyes and ordered the CIR to desist from collecting
by administrative method the taxes allegedly due
from Reyes pending the outcome of his appeal.
ISSUE: W/N CTA had any power to grant an
injunction without requiring the filing of a bond or
making a deposit as prescribed by section 11 of
Republic Act No. 1125.
HELD: Yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125
prescribes the following:
SEC. 11. — Who may appeal; effect of appeal. —
Any person, association or corporation adversely
affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of
internal Revenue, may file an appeal in the Court
of Tax Appeals within thirty days after receipt of
such decision or ruling.
The requirement of the bond as a condition
precedent to the issuance of the writ of injunction
applies only in cases where the processes by which
the collection sought to be made by means thereof
are carried out in consonance with the law for
such cases provided and not when said processes
are obviously in violation of the law to the extreme
that they have to be SUSPENDED for jeopardizing
the interests of the taxpayer. Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 1125 is therefore premised on the
assumption that the collection by summary
proceedings is by itself in accordance with existing
law; and then what is suspended is the act of
collecting, whereas, in the case at bar what the
respondent Court suspended was the use of the
method employed to verify the collection which was
evidently illegal after the lapse of the three-year
limitation period. The respondent Court issued the
injunction in question on the basis of its finding
that the means intended to be used by petitioner in
the collection of the alleged deficiency taxes were in
violation of law. It certainly would be an absurdity
on the part of the Court of Tax Appeals to declare
that the collection by the summary methods of
distraint and levy was violative of law, and then, on
the same breath require the petitioner to deposit or
file a bond as a prerequisite for the issuance of a
writ of injunction.
51. Pineda vs Lantin
No. L-15350 (November 30, 1962)
6 SCRA 757
FACTS:
In this case, Teresa Cuyaong and Apeles
Lopez thru their counsel, complained of certain
actions of the respondent corporation and its
president. They claimed that the above-mentioned
respondents committed various acts in violation of
the Articles of Incorporation of the respondent
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
corporation. Petitioner ordered the investigation of
the charges and designated the other petitioners,
Yabyabin and Pizarro as investigators. Pursuant to
the order, the petitioners addressed a subpoena to
the respondent. However, the respondent thru a
counsel filed a petition to reconsider order and to
set aside subpoena duces tecum contending that
the approval of the Republic Act. No. 1143 “the
power given by law to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to conduct investigations must be
conducted in accordance with the rules adopted by
the Commission.” And since the Securities and
Exchange Commission had not till adopted the
rules, it could not proceed with the investigation.
The respondents filed a motion to quash and
discontinue the entire proceedings but it is denied.
Hence, the respondents filed a special civil action
for prohibition against herein petitioners. Herein
petitioners moved to dismiss the same. On
December 6, 1958, Judge Lantin deferred the
resolution of the motion to dismiss. Disagreeing,
herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
and reaffirmed their position that only the
Supreme Court may review orders of the Securities
and Exchange Commission; that when the Manila
Court of First Instance did so review, it went
beyond its authority and jurisdiction. It was then
denied by the respondent judge. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court for a review on
petition for certiorari with prohibition and
preliminary injuction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case for prohibition filed by
the respondents within the jurisdiction of the court
of first instance?
HELD:
No. A Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to
grant an injuctive relief against the Securities and
Exchange Commission. That power is lodged
exclusively with the Supreme Court.
52. LEMI vs. VALENCIA
7 SCRA 469, February 28, 1963
FACTS: On January 11, 1963, upon
application of respondent Alfredo M. Cargo,
supported by a sworn statement subscribe by his
co-respondent, Heraclio San Juan, the CFI of
Manila issued a search warrant authorizing them
to search radio station DZQR located at 603
Ronquillo St., Sta. Cruz Manila, and to seize and
take possession of the radio transmitter used
threat, allegedly in violation of the law in that
ATTY. CABRAS
petitioner used a transmitter different from the one
he was authorized to use. On that same date and
in the middle of a broadcasting program, they,
accompanied by the agents of the Presidential Anti-
Graft Committee (PAGCOM) served the search
warrant, made the corresponding search, and
seized the transmitter then being used at the
aforesaid station.
Subsequently, ELiseo B. Lemi filed with Us
a special civil action of mandamus, with a petition
for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunctionagainst the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether preliminary mandatory
injunction is proper.
HELD: It cannot be denied, therefore, that,
in practical effect, the seizure amounted to a
closure of the station and/or disapproval of
petitioner’s last application for the renewal of his
license.
Section 3 of the Radio Control Act provides
that no application for the renewal of stations or
operator or operator license shall be disapproved
without giving the license a hearing.
Respondents claim that the seizure of
petitioner’s transmitter was effected lawfully
because it was done pursuant to a search warrant
issued by the CFI of Manila. We perceive no force
and validity in this argument. That the seizure was
made under the authority of a search warrant
cannot obliterate the fact that such seizure was
made in violation of the law requiring previous
hearing. The application for the issuance of the
warrant amounted, in effect, to an effort to evade
the law requiring said hearing.
Supreme Court granted the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
53. HONDA VS. SAN DIEGO – 16 SCRA 406
Facts:
In the case, the petitioner questioned the
decision of CFI when it issued the writ of
injunction to the Patent Office.
Issue: Whether or not the CFI erred in the issuance
of writ to the Patent Office
Held: The law in this jurisdiction vests upon the
Supreme Court the authority to review final orders
and decisions of the Public Service Commissions.
And in Iloilo Commercial, etc. vs. Public Service
Commission (56 Phil. 28), it was held that in the
absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to
the Courts of First Instance co grant injunctive
relief against orders of the Public Service
Commission, no court, other than the Supreme
Court, possesses such jurisdiction. On the other
hand, under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS
and Section 33 of Republic Act No. 166, as impugning the validity of award of the Workmen's
amended, appeals from orders and decisions of the Compensation Unit and, in the process restrain the
Director of the Patent Office must likewise be taken enforcement of a writ of execution is issued by its
to the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, undeniable Chief Referee. 
that the Philippine Patent Office and the Public Ruling: No!
Service Commission are similarly situated and that SEC. 46. Jurisdiction The Workmen's
both are of the same rank or category as Courts of Compensation Commission shall have exclusive
First Instance. Consequently, the latter have no jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction against compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
them, for the rule is well settled that a writ of Act subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, in the
injunction or of prohibition or of certiorari may be same manner and in the same period provided by
issued against a court only by another court law and by Rules of Court for appeal from the
superior in rank. Court of Industrial Relations to the Supreme
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
54. Under Injuction: For, in reviewing the alleged nullity of the award
Nocnoc vs. Judge Vera CFI Camarines Norte and and enjoining its execution, respondent Judge
Ernesto Manarang assumed jurisdiction over a matter which could
have been elevated from the Workmen's
Facts: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition Compensation Unit to the Workmen's
filed on October 30, 1973, petitioner, a claimant for Compensation Commission, and thereafter, on
death compensation benefit, assails the order of appeal, to this Court. This, he cannot do, for "...
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance the decisions, orders and awards entered by the
dated September 18, 1973 which enjoined the Workmen's Compensation Commission are
execution of the order of the Workmen's appealable to the Supreme Court. ... (T)he Court of
Compensation Unit (WCU) Regional District No. 6, First Instance is not empowered or clothed with
dated March 14, 1973, directing inter alia private jurisdiction to review or modify, much less, annul
respondent to pay petitioner-claimant the sum of an award or order of execution issued by the
P3,910.00 for the death of his son, 2 as well as the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
order of the same Court dated October 10, 1973 In point of fact, respondent Manarang filed a
which denied the motion for reconsideration of Petition for Review on certiorari earlier with this
above order of September 18, 1973. court on May 25, 1973. This, however, was
On September 19, 1972, petitioner- considered "NOT FILED" per this Court's resolution
claimant filed a claim for compensation under Act of June 8, 1973 for his failure to pay docket and
3842, i.e., the Workmen's Compensation Act as legal fees. Since he did not pursue the said remedy
amended, with the Workmen's Compensation Unit by seeking the reconsideration of this Court's
(WCU), Regional District No. 6, at Naga City, for resolution and/or paying the required fees, and,
the death of his son, Norberto Nocnoc, single, who instead, went to respondent Judge's court and filed
died in an accident on June 9, 1970, while the complaint for injunction, he may be deemed to
employed as a bus conductor in the transportation have abandoned the appropriate recourse of appeal
business of private respondent, Ernest Manarang. to the Workmen's Compensation Commission and
The WCU awarded to petitioner-claimant the sum to this Court.
of P6,240.00, but deducted thereform the aforesaid
amount of P2,330.00 which was deemed as
advance and/or partial payment on the claim. 55. G.R. No. October 1, 1992
On May 25, 1973, a petition for certiorari with this 101344
Court, 17 the resolution of which " is a prejudicial PETITIONER ASSET PRIVATIZATION
question," The "Petition for Review on Certiorari" TRUST, as Trustee of the
adverted to was, per resolution of this court dated Government of the
June 8, 1973, considered "NOT FILED" for failure Republic of the Philippines
of peitioner Manarang to pay docket and legal fees. RESPONDENTS COURT OF APPEALS, JOB
On August 4, 1973, respodent filed a complaint, C. MADAYAG Presiding
entitled "Ernesto Manarang v. Estanislao Sarto, et Judge of the Regional Trial
al." Civil Case No. 2438, for injunction with the Court of Makati, Br. 145,
Court of First Instance, branch II at camarines and JOHANNESBURG
Norte, presided by respondent Judge to enjoin the PACKAGING CORP.
enforcement of the writ of execution so issued.
Issue: whether the Court of First Instance, as a Facts:
court of general jurisdiction, can entertain a case
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
On 1 August 1986, the Paragon Paper Plant was
sold in public auction by the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) Inc., over the latter’s parcels
of land in Orani, Bataan, including the
improvements, machinery and equipment thereon.
Private respondent Johannesberg Packaging
Corporation (JPC) with its cash bid of
P120,579,000.00 won in the bidding.
On 22 May 1987, by reason of JPC’s failure to pay
the full amount of its cash bid within the
stipulated period, including the extensions it
obtained, DBP rescinded the sale. To avoid the
rescission, JPC filed an action before the RTC
docketed as Civil Case No. 16960, captioned
“Johannesberg Packaging Corporation and Romeo
Cabalinan vs. Development Bank of the
Philippines.”
On 10 June 1987, the trial court issued a
restraining order directing DBP therein and all
persons acting under them to desist from
implementing the order of 22 May 1987 rescinding
the Award of Sale in favor of JPC and the
repossession/take-over from JPC of the Paragon
Paper Mill/Plant and facilities at Orani, Bataan,
scheduled on 15 June 1987.
Issue/s:
Whether the trial court has the authority to issue a
restraining order or a writ of injunction against
APT in Civil Case No. 16960
Ruling:
No, the trial court has the authority to issue a
restraining order or a writ of injunction against
APT in Civil Case No. 16960.
Ratio Decidendi:
No restraining order lies against APT in view of
Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A dated 15
December 1986 which provides:
“No court or administrative agency
shall issue any restraining order or
injunction against the Trust in
connection with the acquisition, sale
or disposition of assets transferred
to it x x x Nor shall such order or
injunction be issued against any
purchaser of assets sold by the
Trust to prevent such purchaser
from taking possession of any assets
purchased by him.”
ATTY. CABRAS
Indeed, this is not the first time that the propriety
of the issuance of the writ by the lower court
against APT was raised. In Manstruste Systems,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court through Mme.
Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino, ruled that:
“Courts may not substitute their
judgment for that of APT, nor block
by injunction the discharge of its
functions and the implementation of
its decision in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of
assets transferred to it.”
We have expressly ruled therein, in addition, that
Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any
provision of the Constitution. Thus:
“The President, in the exercise of her
legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution; issued Proclamation
No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from
issuing restraining orders and writs
of injunction against APT and the
purchasers of any assets sold by it,
to prevent courts from interfering
the discharge, by this
instrumentality of the executive
branch of the Government, of its
tasks of carrying out “the
expeditious disposition and
privatization of certain government
corporations and/or the assets
thereof (Proc. No. 50), absent any
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction on
its part. This proclamation, not
being inconsistent with the
Constitution and not having been
repealed or revoked by Congress,
has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art
XVIII, 1987 Constitution.)”
Quite significantly, the records do not disclose any
grave abuse of discretion committed by petitioner
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in its
effort to take possession of the assets transferred
to it by DBP. Petitioner simply availed of judicial
processes to recover the transferred assets
formerly owned by private respondent.
In fine, the Court held that respondent Judge has
no authority to issue any restraining order or
injunction against petitioner APT absent any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Doctrine Learned:
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Courts are prevented from interfering with the
discharge of tasks of an instrumentality of the
executive branch absent any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on its part.
56. BINAMIRA V. GARRUCHO
188 SCRA 154
Topic: Modes of judicial review; Quo Warranto
Facts:
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P.
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority from which he claims to have been
removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.
Petitioner was designated as General Manager of
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) by the Minister
of Tourism. In addition to this, he was also become
a member of the Board of Directors of the PTA
which was approved by the President. The
respondent, being the new Secretary of Tourism
demanded the petitioner’s resignation. This was
supported by the memorandum by the President
which states that:
“It appearing from the records you have submitted
to this Office that the present General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated
not by the President, as required by P.D. No. 564,
as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism,
such designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are
hereby designated concurrently as General
Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint
a person to serve in the said office in a permanent
capacity.”
Thus, this case.
Issue: WON the petitioner must be reinstated of
being the General Manager of Philippines Tourism
Authority.
Held:
No, the petitioner must NOT be reinstated of being
the General Manager of Philippines Tourism
Authority. The line must be drawn between
appointment and designation.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by
the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security
of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of
his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the
case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of
ATTY. CABRAS
the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under
the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme
Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House
of Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative
in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an
appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation
is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who
apparently believed in good faith that he was being
extended a permanent appointment by the Minister
of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the
ostensible authority to do so at the time the
designation was made. This belief seemed
strengthened when President Aquino later
approved the composition of the PTA Board of
Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-
Chairman because of his position as General
Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances
fall short of the categorical appointment required
to be made by the President herself, and not the
Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.
We must rule therefore that the petitioner never
acquired valid title to the disputed position and so
has no right to be reinstated as General Manager
of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
Referential Syllabus:
Political Law; Administrative Law; Appointment
and Designation defined.—Appointment may be
defined as the selection, by the authority vested
with the power, of an individual who is to exercise
the functions of a given office. When completed,
usually with its confirmation, the appointment
results in security of tenure for the person chosen
unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other
hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of
additional duties on an incumbent official, as
where, in the case before us, the Secretary of
Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or
where, under the Constitution, three Justices of
the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief
Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said
that appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Same; Same; Same; Where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority.—Designation may also be
loosely defined as an appointment because it
likewise involves the naming of a particular person
to a specified public office, That is the common
understanding of the term However, where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by
the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or
temporary appointment, which does not confer
security of tenure on the person named.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if so understood
as an appointment the designation of the petitioner
cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally
removed; Case at bar; Reason.— Even if so
understood, that is, as an appointment, the
designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his
claim that he has been illegally removed. The
reason is that the decree clearly provides that the
appointment of the General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other
officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for
Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that
discretion as an alter ego of the President. The
appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was
not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that
could be validly performed by a subordinate even if
he happened as in this case to be a member of the
Cabinet.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court cannot accept the
fact that the act of the Secretary as an extension or
projection of the personality of the President made
irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in
question.—Indeed, even on the assumption that
the power conferred on the President could be
validly exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot
accept that the act of the latter, as an extension or
"projection" of the personality of the President,
made irreversible the petitioner's title to the
position in question. The petitioner's conclusion
that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of
President Aquino is based only on half the doctrine
he vigorously invokes,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Acts of Department
Heads performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business to be considered valid as acts of
the President of the Philippines must not be
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.
—The doctrine presumes the acts of the
Department Head to be the acts of the President of
ATTY. CABRAS
the Philippines when "performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business." which was true
of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in
favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such
acts shall be considered valid only if not
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"
as also happened in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner's claim
of security of tenure must perforce fall to the
ground.—With these rulings, the petitioner's claim
of security of tenure must perforce fall to the
ground. His designation being an unlawful
encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did
not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in
question. Even if it be assumed that it could be
and was authorized, the designation signified
merely a temporary or acting appointment that
could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it
was (albeit for a different reason). In either case,
the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be
rejected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the
petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so has no right to be reinstated as
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority.—The Court sympathizes with the
petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith
that he was being extended a permanent
appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all,
Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to
do so at the time the designation was made. This
belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino
later approved the composition of the PTA Board of
Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-
Chairman because of his position as General
Manager of the PTA However, such circumstances
fall short of the categorical appointment required
to be made by the President herself, and not the
Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.
We must rule therefore that the petitioner never
acquired valid title to the disputed position and so
has no right to be reinstated as General Manager
of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
57. Tarrosa vs. Singson (232 SCRA 553 [G.R.
No. 111243], 25 May 1994)
Facts: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor
of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos
in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer",
filed a petition for prohibition questioning the
appointment of Singson for not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
(CA) as required by the provisions of Section 6 of
R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko
Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the
Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Management was impleaded for disbursing public
funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments
of respondent Singson. In their comment,
respondents claim that Congress exceeded its
legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by
the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the
Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment
to the said position is not among the appointments
which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing
Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Governor of the Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is subject to CA’s
confirmation. (No)
Held: Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the CA of the
appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An
appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the
CA under Section 16 of Article 7 of the
Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the
confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of
appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
58. Phil. Racing Club vs. Bonifacio
FACTS: In a race held at the Sta. Ana Hippodrome
belonging to the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. on
July 23, 1950, the competing horses went off to a
faulty start. When the barrier was lifted, one of the
horses turned around and blocked the three
horses at its left thus enabling the three horses on
the right side to run ahead and gain a good lead.
The official starter signaled the stewards of the
races who were then on the judges' stand
indicating that the race should be
cancelled. However, one of the stewards told him to
"shut up" and allowed the race to go on until its
termination.
When the winning horses as well as the
corresponding dividends were announced, the
betting public showed its disapproval of the result.
A commotion resulted which reached the
knowledge of the members of the Commission on
Races among whom were respondents Arsenio
Bonifacio et al. When they noticed the uproar they
sent for the stewards and made an on the spot
investigation. Convinced that the start of the race
was faulty, they decided to cancel it and had their
decision announced to the public. In the
ATTY. CABRAS
meantime, while the investigation was going on,
the holders of the winning the tickets were able to
cash the same. The result was that while the club
paid the dividends on the winning tickets it had to
refund to the holders of the losing ones the sum of
P5,032.00.
Because of this incident, plaintiffs commenced the
present action before the Court of First Instance of
Manila seeking to recover from defendants said
sum of P5,032.00; plus P10,000.00 as moral
damages, alleging that defendants acted without or
in excess of their authority when they ordered the
cancellation of the race and the return of the bets
of the holders of the losing tickets, said acts having
caused plaintiffs moral damages for having placed
their character and reputation under public
suspicion.
Defendants disclaimed responsibility alleging that
if on the date alleged in the complaint they
annulled the race they did so merely pursuant to
their official duties as members of the Commission
on Races and after conducting an on the spot
investigation at which plaintiffs and its employees
were heard, and hence they cannot be held liable
for damages. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the Board of Stewards
in not cancelling the race notwithstanding the bad
start which raised a howl of protest from the public
was final and irrevocable and could no longer be
revised by the Commission on Races in the
exercise of the power of supervision it has over all
horse races in the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
The law governing the operation of horse races in
the Philippines is Republic Act No. 309. This Act
creates a Commission on Races which is charged
with the supervision and regulation as well as the
duty to enforce the laws relating to horse races in
the Philippines.
It would, therefore, appear that in every horse race
the rule requires that there be a board of judges
who should determine the result of the race and
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
whose decisions are final and unappealable. In
addition, the rule requires that there be a board of
stewards which among others, is given the power
to "annul any race before the horses reach their
destination if in their opinion there is a bad start
or any other incident takes place that makes such
action necessary" Hence, there are two groups of
officials who act in every race whose functions are
different from the other: the board of judges and
the board of stewards. The judges determine who
the winners are, their decision being final and
irrevocable; the stewards, on the other hand, are
given the power to annul any race if in their
opinion there is a bad start or some good reasons
exist justifying it. And over these officials we have
the Commission on Races which is charged with
the duty to supervise their action and the
performance of their duties in connection with the
races.
The action taken by the Commission on Races
cancelling or annulling the race held on July 23,
1950 for the reason that there was a faulty start on
the part of some horses was in excess of the
authority granted to it by law. As defined by this
Court, supervision only means overseeing or the
power or authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. It is different from control
which includes the power to alter, nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer may do in the
performance of his duties, as well as to substitute
the judgment of the superior for that of his
subordinate (Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143;
51 Off. Gaz., [6] 2884). This power of control has
been withheld from the Commission.
However, considering that respondents have acted
in their official capacity in the honest belief that
they had such power as in fact they acted on the
matter only after an on the spot investigation, we
hold that they cannot be held liable for damages.
In this sense, the decision of the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed.
59. Donato vs Phil Marine Officers Assoc.
105 SCRA 1317
Facts:
Appeals by certiorari from a decision of the
CIR, Teodora Donato, an operator of fishing boats,
ATTY. CABRAS
was accused of unfair labor practice within the
meaning of section 4(a) (1) and (4) of RA No. 875.
The complaint alleged that on Sept. 2, 1955, said
Teodora Donato discriminately discharged Melanio
Morales, one of her employees, by reason of his
membership in the complaint union.
The Cir found that the charges
substantiated and rendered the appealed
judgment, ordering the petitioner herein to
reinstate to Morales to his position with back pay,
at the rate of P4.00 a day.
Issue: Whether findings of facts by CIR are binding
on SC
Held:
The findings of fact of Court Industrial
Relations that Morales was an employee, not a
mere servant, of the petitioner and that he was
dismissed because he joined a labor union, not
being unsupported by substantial or creditable
proof, are binding upon the SC. However, the court
acted without authority and without jurisdiction in
fixing the amount of back pay at P4.00 a day
because (1) that the amount was not in issue and
was entirely outside the complaint for unfair labor
practice based on improper dismissal and (2)
violation of the Minimum Wage Law, as well as the
collection of underpayment, fall under the
jurisdiction of the regular court, not the Industrial
Court.
Decision Modified
60. DAUAN vs. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
FACTS: This case involves claims to 14.25 hectares
of public land in Bambancsg, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Vizcaya. The land was originally applied for as
homestead by Jose Aquino. Upon his death,
Aquino was succeeded by his children who sold
their rights to the land to Serapio Dauan.
Dauan filed an application for a homestead of the
land but there is considerable dispute as to
whether this application was approved by the
Director of Lands. Meanwhile, Dauan sold his
rights to various portions of the homestead to the
appellants without securing the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and both parties took the view that, if Dauan’s
application had been approved, then the transfer of
rights to appellants must be approved by the
Secretary; otherwise, no such approval was
necessary. It appears that Dauan sold his rights to
one-half of the land to appellant Simon Ilarde and
that he sold his rights to 4 hectares to appellant
Lord Calangan and to 3 hectares to appellant
Basilia Tomas. Calangan and Tomas in turn sold
their rights to some part of the land to Santos
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Baysa. These sales were all made without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.
Dauan, the appellee, asked the Bureau of Lands to
cancel the application for free patents which the
appellants filed, covering the portions of the
homestead sold to them. Appellee questioned the
validity of the sales, claiming that the agreement
was that of a loan and that at any rate the
supposed sales were void for having been made
without the prior approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On the other
hand, appellants maintained that their agreement
with the appellee was that of a sale and, that as
the homestead application of appellee himself had
not been approved by the Director of Lands, no
approval by the Secretary of the subsequent sales
to them was necessary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyances to the
appellants, made without the previous approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
is valid.
RULING: No. Here the question ‘was whether from
the evidence submitted by the parties it could fairly
be concluded that appellee’s homestead application
had been granted. Were the matter a simple
process of ascertaining from the records whether
the application had been granted, we would agree
with appellants that it is a question of fact But
precisely because the records of the Bureau of
Lands had been destroyed during the war that
circumstantial evidence had to be introduced and
it is a rule now settled that the conclusion drawn
from the facts is a conclusion of law which the
courts may review.
We hold that the conveyances to the appellants,
which were admittedly made without the previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, are void and, consequently,
that appellants return the possession of the land in
question to the appellee upon the return to them of
the purchase price they had paid to the appellee.
We do not forget, of course, that a transfer of rights
without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources “shall result in
the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the
patent” of the appellee but the cancellation is not
automatic and as long as the Government has not
chosen to act, the rights of appellee must stand.
61. REYES VS REYES
FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the
majority of the members of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, denying a claim for
compensation of petitioners for the death of
ATTY. CABRAS
Victoriano Santiago, driver of a jeepney operated by
the respondent. The said deceased was the driver
of an autocalesa belonging to respondent and was
last seen operating said autocalesa in the evening
of September 26, 1955. In the morning of
September 27, 1955, his dead body was found in
Tayabas, Quezon obviously a victim of murder by
persons who were at large and whose identities
were not known. Apparently the driver must have
been attacked with blunt instrument or
instruments as an examination of his head
disclosed that it was heavily fractured, fragmenting
it into many pieces, crushing and lacerating the
brain. The respondent contended that there is a
specific instruction to the deceased to follow the
route prescribed by the Public Service
Commission. The decision of the majority of the
members of the Commission concludes that the
deceased willfully violated Public Service
Commission rules and regulations and, therefore,
death did not arise out of or by reason of his
employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law establishes the
presumption that the ordinary course of business
has been followed.
HELD:
Inasmuch as the law establishes the presumption
that the deceased followed the law and regulations,
it was incumbent upon respondent to prove that
the deceased voluntarily went out of his route and
drove his jeepney towards the province of Quezon.
In the absence of evidence to that effect, it must be
concluded that the deceased was forced by
circumstances beyond his will to go outside his
ordinary route. There being a presumption under
the provisions of Section 43 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act that the deceased died while in
the course of his employment, his death must be
presumed to have arisen out of said employment.
Consequently, his heirs are entitled to receive the
compensation provided for by law.
62. ABOITIZ V PEPITO
FACTS:
heirs of Pepito filed to Department of Labor
anotice and claim for compensation, asking for
death benefits, and describing the circumstances
of the alleged death of Demetrio Pepito on the night
of November 30, 1961 in the following manner, viz:
"While the vessel was navigating from Surigao to
Tandag, the herein deceased was lost or reported
missing as per record of the deck log of the M/V P.
Aboitiz".
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
without hearing, the Regional Administrator issued
an award for death benefits to respondents,
planted upon the ground that "the right to
compensation of the claimant has not been
controverted by respondent within the period
provided for by law."
HENCE, the petition
HELD: Legal implications — such as right to
compensation, succession, the legal status of the
wife — are so important that courts should not so
easily be carried to the conclusion that the man is
dead.2 The result is that death cannot be taken as
a fact.
Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in
the case of pleadings in ordinary civil cases, simply
means admission of facts, not conclusions of law.
The mere failure to controvert the statement that
Demetrio Pepito is believed to be "dead" or
"deceased" because he "was lost" or was "reported
missing", does not import an admission that the
man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or
missing. Petitioner was directed to pay
compensation without inquiry into the fact and
circumstances of death. This trenches upon
petitioner's right to due process enshrined in the
Constitution.
ART. 391. The following shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, including the division of estate
among the heirs:
(3) A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and his existence has
not been known for four years.6
With the known facts, namely, that Demetrio
Pepito was lost or missing while the boat was
navigating, he could have been in danger of death.
But of course, evidence must be taken that his
existence has not been known for four years or
thereafter
The SC order that the appealed decision be set
aside and to direct that the record be returned to
the wokmens compensation commission
1. To hold a hearing, with notice to the parties, to
determine (a) whether Demetrio Pepito is alive; or
(b) whether he should be presumed dead, under
the provisions of paragraph 3, Article 391 of the
Civil Code; and (c) the circumstances of death if it
be found or presumed that he died; and
2. To render judgment accordingly.
63. Fortunato Ortua vs Singson Encarnacion
FACTS: The principal facts admitted by the
pleadings may be stated as follows: In January,
1920, the petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an
application with the Bureau of Lands for the
purchase of a tract of public land situated in the
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municipality of San Jose, Province of Camarines
Sur. Following an investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, Ortua’s application was rejected,
allowing him, however, to file a sale or lease
application for the portion of the land classified to
be suitable for commercial purposes. Two motions
for reconsideration of the decision were filed and
denied. On appeal to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Agriculture
and Commerce), the decision was affirmed.
It should be explained that one condition for the
purchase of a tract of public agricultural land,
provided by the Public Land Law, Act No. 2874, in
its sections 23 and 88, is that the purchaser shall
be a citizen of lawful age of the Philippine Islands
or of the United States. Fortunato Ortua in his
application stated that he was a Filipino citizen,
but the Director of Lands held that on the
contrary, Ortua was a Chinese citizen. The Dir of
Land established the ff facts: Fortunato Ortua was
born in 1885 in Lagonoy, Camarines Sur,
Philippine Islands, being the natural son of Irene
Demesa, a Filipina, and Joaquin Ortua, a Chinese.
In 1896 Fortunato was sent to China to study.
While he was in China his father and mother were
legally married. Fortunato returned to the
Philippines in 1906, that is, when he was twenty-
one years of age. And that even if presumptively
Fortunato Ortua was a Philippine citizen, certain
acts of Ortua were pointed to as demonstrating
that he had forfeited his Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: WON the question of law arising from the
undisputed evidence was correctly decided by the
Director of Lands.
HELD: NO.
ON QUESTION OF FACT. — A decision rendered by
the Director of Lands and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a
question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be
reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing
that such decision was rendered in consequence of
fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of
judgment in estimating the value or effect of
evidence, regardless of whatever or not it is
consistent with the preponderance of the evidence,
so long as there is some evidence upon which the
finding in question could be made.
There is, however, another side to the case. It
certainly was not intended by the legislative body
to remove from the jurisdiction of courts all right to
review decisions of the Bureau of Lands, for to do
so would be to attempt something which could not
be done legally. Giving force to all possible
intendments regarding the facts as found by the
Director of Lands
ON QUESTION OF LAW. — The decision of the
Director of Lands approved by the Secretary of
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Agriculture and Commerce on a question of law, is
in no sense conclusive upon the courts, but is
subject to review. Any action of the Director of
Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of
the law can be corrected by the courts.
The Director of Lands gave too much prominence,
we think, to two minor facts, susceptible of
explanation. When Ortua returned from China at
the age of twenty-one, it was the most natural
thing in the world for him to land as a Chinese, for
this would facilitate entry and obviate
complications. Again, when Ortua applied for the
registration of a boat, there may have been any
number of reasons why he did not care to appeal
from the decision of the Insular Collector of
Customs. On the other hand, some consideration
should be given to the intention of the petitioner,
and he vigorously insists that it is his desire to be
considered a Philippine citizen. He has taken a
Filipino name. He has gone into business and has
improved the property here in question to a great
extent. There has been no implied renunciation of
citizenship, because the petitioner has been
domiciled in these Islands except for a short period
during his infancy when he temporarily sojourned
in China for study. On the contrary, he states that
he has always considered himself to be a Filipino,
and that he has elected to remain as a Philippine
citizen. Therefore, on the facts found by the
Director of Lands, we hold that clear error of law
resulted in not considering petitioner a Philippine
citizen and so qualified under the Public Land Law
to purchase public agricultural lands.
64. QUESTION OF LAW
G.R. No. L-14280             May 30, 1960
JUAN YSMAEL & COMPANY, INC. vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
FACTS:
On November 27, 1957, the petitioning Union, a
legitimate labor organization duly registered with
the Department of Labor, filed a petition praying
for the aforesaid certification, upon the ground
that it is a labor organization composed of all the
salesmen working for the Ysmael Steel
Manufacturing Co., which is operated by the
Company, as a subsidiary thereof, both of which
are employers of the aforementioned salesmen;
that there are in the Company two (2) other labor
unions, namely, the Ysmael Steel Labor
Organization (PAFLU), the membership of which is
composed mainly of manual factory workers (non-
supervisors), and the Ysmael Steel Employees
Union, the membership of which is composed of
supervisors, non-supervisors who are technical
employees, office non-technical employees and
clerical factory workers, and that the members of
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petitioning Union are not included in or
represented by any of said two (2) unions in their
collective bargaining agreement with the Company,
for the economic factors affecting the members of
petitioning Union are different and they constitute
a separate and distinct union for an appropriate
bargaining unit.
The Company filed an answer objecting to the
petition upon several grounds, which were, in
effect, overruled by the Court in the order appealed
from.
The Company assails the same as null and
void for alleged want of a clear and distinct
statement of the law and facts on which it is
based, in violation, it is claimed, of Article
VIII, Section 12, of the Constitution. The
pertinent part of the order appealed from reads as
follows:
At the hearing of this case on February 11, March
12, 26 and May 5, 1958, the following facts appear
to have been established in evidence: That the
petitioning Union is duly registered by the
Department of Labor and is, therefore, a legitimate
labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(f) of the Act; that the Company is a corporation
engaged in the manufacture of steel equipment,
machines, etc., owned and operated by the Juan
Ysmael & Company, Inc; that at the time of the
instant petition for certification was filed, there
were twenty (20) salesmen or commission agents
working for the Company, but that as of March 26,
1958, only fourteen (14) of them were left; and that
neither of the two unions existing in the Company,
namely the Ysmael Steel Employees' Union,
represents the members of the petitioning Union in
any of their respective collective bargaining
agreement with the Company.
Furthermore, after a careful examination of the
records, particularly the respective memoranda
filed by both of the petitioning Union and the
Company, and after a mature consideration of all
the proofs submitted in evidence in this case by
both parties, the Court believes and so holds that
there exists an employer-employee relationship
between the members of the petitioning Union and
the Company; that all the salesmen working with
the Company may constitute a distinct and
separate appropriate unit for bargaining purposes
with the Company; and that the members of the
petitioning Union constitute the majority of the
salesmen working for the Company. The
certification of the petitioning Union, therefore, as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
all the salesmen working with the Company is in
order.
ISSUE:
Whether the findings constitute compliance with
the constitutional mandate invoked by the
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company
HELD:
The foregoing findings constitute a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate
invoked by the Company. In any event, this
Court held in Talabon vs. Provincial Warden (78
Phil., 599; 44 Off. Gaz. 4326) that failure to
comply with said requirement of our
fundamental law does not nullify or affect the
validity of the decision or order in question.
(another issue, not sure if related to the topic
“QUESTION OF LAW”)
The main issue is whether the members of
petitioning Union are employees of the Company,
for purposes of certification of the former as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
the salesmen of the latter. The Company maintains
the negative upon the ground that the members of
petitioning Union are mere commission agents or
sales representatives, whose form of selection and
engagement is different from that of the employees
of the Company, for unlike such employees,
commission agents are not required to undergo
physical examination, to submit a police clearance,
and to punch the bundy clock, and are not
provided with identification cards. It is further
urged that commission agents are paid neither
wages nor salaries, but are granted commissions,
the amount of which depends on their sales, and
that their conduct as agents is not subject to the
control or supervision of the Company, which,
moreover, has no power of dismissal over them.
The aforementioned difference in the manner of
"selection and engagement" does not prove,
however, the alleged absence of employer-employee
relationship. Most business enterprises have
employees of different classes, necessarily
requiring different methods of selection and
contracts of services of various types, without
detracting from the existence of said relationship.
Besides, the very evidence for the Company shows
that commission agents are dispensed from
physical examination and from punching the
bundy clock because their duties are extraneous to
the factory work and they have no fixed hours to
contact their customers.
Again, the records disclose the following facts,
among others:
1. One who wishes to be a commission agent must
file an application therefor. Then he is given a two-
month probationary period, within which technical
men of the Company train him. On the basis of his
performance during said period, the Company,
thereafter, decides whether or not he will be taken
as a regular commission agent.
2. His duties as such include the following: (a) One
hundred per centum (100%) "loyalty to the
Company", and "disloyalty of any form or free-
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lancing for any other company during their tour of
duty, will be sufficient cause for cutting allowances
and withdrawal of the authority to sell for the
Company." (b) He must check in at 8:00 a.m., to
"report daily all visits made", and "any
misrepresentation with regard to coverage will be
sufficient cause for cutting allowances." He was,
also, required, before, to check in at 4:00 p.m., but
subsequently, this requirement was eliminated. (c)
He "must list in his daily report all items offered to
customers, plus results." (d) He "has to visit his
accounts at least twice every month", and "if he
fails to visit an account within two (2) months, he
shall automatically lose any claim to his account."
3. The Company directs the details of the work of
making sales, through a sales manager, under
whose authority commission agents are.
4. As the agents or salesmen report for work each
morning, they are given transportation allowances
of P1.50 or P2.00 each. They have, also, a drawing
allowance, the amount of which varies depending
upon past performances, deductible from future
commissions.
5. The Company exercises the power of dismissal:
(a) by cutting off these allowances, when the agent
makes a misrepresentation with regards to
coverage or report on daily visits made, or is guilty
of disloyalty in any form or free-lancing for any
other company during his tour of duty; (b) by
withdrawing the authority to sell in case of such
disloyalty or free-lanching, or when an agent fails
to make any reasonably good sale within a
reasonable period; and (c) by forcing him to resign
for any compelling reason, as the company has
done in the case of commission agents Jose S.
Esquivias, Melecio Data and Felicidad Sinope.
6. The company has adopted the foregoing norms
unilaterally — generally by the promulgation of
pertinent rules — without the intervention or
consent of the agents, and without any objection
on their part. Both parties have thereby indicated
that the Company has full authority to determine
the manner and conditions under which the agents
shall perform their duties. In other words, the
Company has control over the conduct of its
salesmen or agents. Thus, absence of any duty on
their part to keep regular office hours, submit a
police clearance and punch the bundy clock, and
of other additional duties, is due, not to lack of
power or authority to impose the same, but merely
to a policy of the management which deems it, for
the time being, either unnecessary or inexpedient
or both, owing to the peculiar nature of the task of
commission agents.
7. All sales of products of Ysmael Steel
Manufacturing Company are seemingly effected
through the aforementioned salesmen or
commission agents. There are no other persons,
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apart from the sales manager and sales supervisor
of the Company, charged with the duty to sell
therefor said products.
8. The salesmen or agents in question are,
according to the assistant general manager of the
Company, registered as members of the Social
Security System, established by Republic Act No.
1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792,
sections 9 and 8(d) of which reads:
xxx     xxx     xxx
SEC. 9. — Compulsory coverage. — Coverage in the
System shall be compulsory upon all employees
between the ages of sixteen and sixty years,
inclusive, if they have been for at least six months
in the service of an employer who is a member of
the System ... .
SEC. 8. — Terms defined. — For the purposes of
this Act, the following shall, unless the context
indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
(d) Employee. — Any person who performs services
for an "employer" in which either or both mental
and physical efforts are used and who receives
compensation for such services.
Pursuant to section 2, paragraphs (c) and (d), of
Republic Act No. 875:
An employer includes any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include any labor organization (otherwise
than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting
in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization.(Sec. 2[c], Rep. Act No. 875.)
The term "employee" shall include any employee
and shall not be limited to the employee of a
particular employer unless the Act explicitly states
otherwise and shall include any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any labor practice and who has not
obtained any other substantially equivalent and
regular employment. (Sec. 2[d], id.)
In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered
opinion that the lower court did not err in
holding that the members of petitioning Union
are employees of the Company — within the
purview of the terms "employer" and
"employee" as defined in the Industrial Peace
Act — for purposes of certification of said
union as the bargaining representative of its
salesmen or commission agents.
65. Question of Fact
GONZALES VS VICTORY LABOR UNION
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Gonzalez was engaged in
trawl fishing, and among his employees were
Julian Beltran, Severino Apawan, Ponciano Sayan,
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Quirico Mendez and Virgilio Baes - all of them
working in petitioner's fishing boat, the M/L
Emiliana.
On March 31, 1962 the Acting Prosecutor of the
Court of Industrial Relations filed a complaint
against petitioner, charging him with unfair labor
practice in dismissing said employees without
just cause but by reason of their membership in
VICLU and thereby interfering and coercing them
in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
Gonzales denied that he dismissed them for their
union affiliation, and alleged that their dismissal
was for cause, they having been found to have
connived with each other in pilfering the catch
of the fishing boat and selling the same to the
public for their personal benefit. Petitioner
further denied that he had knowledge, prior to the
filing of the complaint, of the complainants'
membership in the labor union. After trial, the
court below, in a decision penned by Presiding
Judge Jose S. Bautista, held herein petitioner
guilty of unfair labor practice.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before
the Court en banc, but the motion was denied in a
minute resolution signed by Presiding Judge
Bautista and concurred in by Associate Judges
Arsenio I. Martinez and Baltazar M. Villanueva. An
extended dissent, however, was filed by Associate
Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, with the concurrence
of Associate Judge Amando C. Bugayong.
ISSUE: Whether the findings of fact are binding
upon the Court
RULING: No.
In this case we are again faced with the
application of the substantial evidence rule,under
which the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial
Relations are not disturbed on appeal as long as
they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
There is one circumstance which, at the
very outset, has detained the Court from accepting
the findings of fact in the decision appealed from
as conclusive, namely, that the said decision was
rendered by an almost evenly divided court and
that the division was precisely on the facts as
borne out by the evidence. In such a situation
the Court feels called upon to go over the record
and, in order to determine the substantiality of the
evidence, consider it not only in its quantitative
but also in its qualitative aspects. For it to be
substantial, evidence must first at all be credible.
The circumstances found by the Court,
objective as they are, lend strong support to the
testimony of petitioner Gonzales and of his witness
Felipe Jubay, to the effect that they had received
evidence, consisting of reports from different
sources, that whenever the boat arrived at Cebu
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after a fishing trip respondents would sell fish at
very cheap prices; that Gonzales investigated them
one by one and was convinced of their guilt; that
he was not yet through with the investigation, but
they failed to return after February 7, 1962; and
that he did not know they were members of any
labor union.
The bare testimony of respondents,
complainants below, is insufficient to establish the
charge of unfair labor practice under the standard
fixed by law and enunciated in the decisions of this
Court.
66. Suarnaba vs WCC (Workmen’s
Compensation Commission
Facts:
This case involves the decision of WCC regarding
the claim of Rosita Suarnaba for death benefits as
the widow of Ireneo Suarnaba, employee of private
respondent Clavecilla Radio System. At first the
Regional Office of the Department of Labor in Ilo-ilo
favored Rosita and awarded her with P4,986.00
representing death benefits and reimbursement of
medical expenses. However, upon review, the
Commission (WCC) sustained the compensability
of the claim but found the evidence submitted by
petitioner to prove that she is the widow of Ireneo
Suarnaba as insufficient and barred from
recovering any benefits. According to the
Commission, The certification issued by the
Assistant Parish Priest in Iloilo attesting to the fact
that they were married cannot be considered
authentic document to prove filiation between the
deceased and the herein claimant but only a proof
of the solemnization of their marriage sacrament.
The Commission instead sentenced Rosita to pay
the sum of P1,000 to the WCC fund in accordance
with Sec 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
As a defense, counsel for the petitioner argues that
marriage may be proved by parol evidence; that
petitioner submitted her affidavit to the effect that
she and the late Ireneo Suarnaba were married in
the Catholic Church of Sta. Barbara in Iloilo City,
as shown by the Marriage Registry of said place,
attested by Fr. Samandra in a Certificate of
Marriage which was made an integral part of her
affidavit because she lost her Marriage Contract
during the Japanese Occupation and can no longer
retrieve it. She also mentioned witnesses that
could attest that they frequently see the petitioner
herself as the one collecting the salary of Ireneo.
This, according to them is a clear indication that
Rosita and Ireneo have entered into a lawful
marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the facts support the claim of
Rosita Suarnaba that she is the rightful widow of
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the deceased Ireneo Suarnaba? Yes
Ruling:
The petition is invested with merit. The
Commission’s decision under review should be set
aside as contrary to the evidence on record.
A cursory examination of the records shows that
private respondent (Clavecilla Radio System)
through its General Manager, Manuel Padua,
stated in the “Employers Reports of Accident and
Sickness” that petitioner Rosita Suarnaba is the
wife and one the dependents of the deceased. In
view of this admission by private respondent,
herein petitioner’s status as the legal wife of its
deceased employee, the same may be considered as
duly established without the need for further proof,
since the Employer’s Report serves as Answer.
Aside from this the Certification of Death
submitted by the petitioner when she was claiming
for the benefits indicates her as the “surviving
spouse” of the deceased employee of the
respondent. Moreover, under its rules, “The
hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy in workmen’s
compensation cases shall be without regard to
technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on
evidence. Substantial evidence, whenever
necessary, shall be sufficient to support a decision,
order or award. Respondent Commission
disregarded this rule by negligently failing to
consider the several pieces of evidence extant in
the record of this case which clearly establish the
material status of petitioner. Petition granted.
67. Community Sawmill Company vs CIR
Facts:
A petition for certiorari to review an order of
the Court of Industrial Relations, denying a motion
for the reopening of a case wherein petitioner
company as respondent was required to pay the
total amount of P128,920.50 by way of back wages.
Petitioner would seek a reduction of its liability for
such payment on the ground that its responsibility
to pay compensation ought to have ceased as far
back as November 30, 1975, when it closed shop.
The total amount of back wages if the
claimants from the time they were dismissed up to
November 11, 1961 is P128,920.50. Record further
shows that counsel for respondent company or
sawmill received a copy of this Order on December
13, 1961. Considering that the Motion to Re-open
was filed on December 28,1961, there is no doubt
that the same was filed after the Order had long
become final and executory. These facts shows that
the motion has no basis.
Issue:
Whether or not petition to reopen the case
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and petition for certiorari to review by the
petitioner company be granted
Held:
No. The care taken by the labor tribunal to
take into consideration the equitable aspects of
this controversy is manifest in this portion of the
opinion of then Judge Ansberto Paredes: “If as
contended, respondent company had ceased
operation on November 30, 1957, the back wages
should end up to the date and no more. This must
be so if such contention were true, for even if the
workers concerned were not separated from work
they could not have worked after November 30,
1957, because of alleged stoppage of operation. To
give them back wages thereafter would be place
them in a position better than that of dismissed.”
“Even as the Motion to Re-open, which is
verified, admits that a copy of the Oder approving
the Examiner’s Report and directing the deposit of
P128,920.50 with the Court, was received on
December 13, 1961, the same motion attempts to
justify its belatedness by alleging, among others,
that Lee Koc, the respondent’s former Manager,
came to the undersigned’s office after many weeks
of absence. Counsel for respondent Community
Sawmill had been put on notice respecting the
period covered by the back wages since he received
on November 21, 1961, a copy of the Court
Examiner’s Report. It was his duty to inform his
client about the Report From the affidavit of Lee
Koc attached to the Motion to Re-open as well as
his testimony, counsel for respondent sawmill
could have easily contacted Lee Koc because the
latter admitted having resided in the compound of
respondent sawmill even during the time the
operation of the sawmill allegedly had ceased. But
this in not all. Respondent company claims that
since. It ceased operation on November 30, 1957, it
did not operate anymore because it leased the
sawmill and otter machineries to the Mindoro
Eastern Sawmill.
Even a cursory perusal of the order of
Judge Paredes, affirmed in a resolution by the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc on February
16, 1965, did indicate that the imputation of
arbitrariness, allegedly consisting of imposing a
liability for back wages on petitioner even after it
had ceased business operation is devoid of support
in the evidence. It cannot be denied that
painstaking care was taken by the then Judge
Paredes to appraise the competent and credible
evidence of record. Under the circumstances, it did
require a certain degree of temerity on the part of
petitioner to raise an issue that it ought to have
known would be disproved by the very actuation of
its officials. It was indicative of the stubbornness
on its part to refuse compliance with what the law
ATTY. CABRAS
requires. Such being the case, the allegation of
blatant disregard of the proof submitted as to
petitioner having ceased to do business as of
November 30, 1957 clearly lacks of foundation. No
due process question arose.
68. PAL VS. CONFESOR
This petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) seeks to annul the
Orders dated June 30, 1993 and July 30, 1993 of
respondent Secretary of Labor Nieves R. Confesor
which directed the inclusion of benefits worth at
least P1.268 billion in its collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the respondent Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA).
FACTS: On September 30, 1992, the non-
representation aspects or economic package of the
1989-1992 CBA between PAL and PALEA expired.
That same day, PALEA expressed its desire to
renegotiate the CBA and submitted its proposals
for an economic package that would cost PAL
P16.1 billion.
Negotiations soon began thereafter. PAL presented
its proposed economic package amounting to P1
billion. This was rejected by PALEA. The parties
continued their negotiations, but were unable to
reach an agreement.
On May 3, 1993, PALEA declared a deadlock in the
negotiations and filed on the following day a notice
of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB).
According to PAL, the estimated cost of the
foregoing PALEA demands which are easily
computable amounts to P3.4 billion.
On May 21, 1993, PAL wrote respondent Secretary
requesting that she assume jurisdiction over the
dispute in view of the importance of its business
and to prevent PALEA from going on strike.
On May 31, 1993, respondent Secretary issued an
order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
She also ordered the parties to submit their
respective position papers within ten (10) days to
facilitate the resolution of the dispute.
Secretary of Labor rendered decision in favor of
PALEA.
PAL argues that respondent Secretary had gravely
abused her discretion, amounting to lack of excess
of jurisdiction, in awarding P1.268 billion in
benefits in favor of PALEA as the same was based
on probabilities and conjectures not supported by
evidence.
On the other hand, PALEA argues that the issues
questioning the validity of the award involve the
findings of fact of respondent Secretary which
cannot be reviewed in a petition for certiorari.
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Furthermore, PALEA argues that the subject
matter involved pertains to the field of expertise of
respondent Secretary and therefor her appreciation
of the evidence should be respected by this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue concerning the
validity of the award involve question of fact which
cannot be reviewed in petition for certioari.
HELD: No, it does not involve question of fact but
question of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that
certiorari is the proper remedy because there is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction where the respondent board, tribunal
or officer exercising judicial functions exercised its
judgment in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner.
While it is true that findings of fact of the Secretary
of Labor are entitled to respect by this Court, we
are inclined to review her findings since the
fundamental issue here is the survival of the
company. Besides, her findings are not based on a
thorough examination of the parties' contending
claims but merely on their respective position
papers. There was no trial wherein the adversarial
process would ensure a better presentation and
appreciation of the evidence.
After going over the record, we find that
respondent Secretary gravely abused her discretion
when she based her award in favor of PALEA on
the assumption that PAL would earn P3.4 billion
pesos during the three-year contract period. The
assumption finds no basis on the evidence
adduced before her.
Despite her recognition of PAL's unstable financial
performance and the possibility that its earnings in
the foreseeable future could be held down by the
factors she enumerated above, respondent
Secretary proceeded to forecast that PAL would
make a projected net profit of P1.128 billion for FY
1992-1993, and P3.4 billion for the three-year
contract period.
Subsequent events have shown the error in
respondent Secretary's projections. The actual net
income earned by PAL for FY 1992-1993 was
P1,025,665.00, which fell short of respondent
Secretary's projection by P87.813 million. Clearly,
there is no way PAL could realize the income
projected by respondent Secretary.
After making her projection of PAL's net profits for
the three-year contract period, respondent
Secretary then allocated one-third of the projected
profits as labor costs to be paid to PALEA under
the so-called "traditional budget-management
approach." This Court is unaware of such a
budget-management approach being traditional in
this jurisdiction. Given the fact that neither of the
parties cited the same in their position papers filed
ATTY. CABRAS
before her, respondent Secretary should have
explained more thoroughly her application of said
"traditional approach."
In fine, this Court finds that respondent Secretary
had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in failing to give
weight to the evidence presented by PAL and in
applying the so-called traditional budget-
management approach.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE and the same GRANTED.
69. G.R. No. 60054. July 2, 1991.*
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LABOR ARBITER ANDRES LOMABAO, and JOSE
M. MASAYA, respondents.
FACTS:
ANTONIO SANCHEZ a resident of Sta, Ana,
Manila was found to have an illegal connection of
electricity and upon inquiry it was found out that
one of the electric company’s bill collectors, JOSE
MASAYA made such connection and received P200
for the job.
An administrative inquiry ensued where JOSE
MASAYA expressly admitted to the criminal act.
At the conclusion of the investigation,
Masaya was put on preventive suspension and
Manila Electri Company sought clearance to
terminate Masaya from the Ministry of Labor.
A week later, Jose Masaya filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against MERALCO, Both actions
were brought before Labor arbiter Lomabao, who
eventually ruled in Masaya’s favor, and ordered
MERALCO to pay complainant backwages and
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
On appeal of MERALCO, the NLRC affirmed the
arbiter’s decision, and affirmed his ruling as
follows:
“x x while it is true that in administrative
proceedings, substantial evidence only is required,
the instant case is an exception for the reason that
respondent-appellant in this case is charging
complainant-appellee of a criminal offense, and,
therefore, it is incumbent upon the former to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the
crime, failing which, complainant-appellee must be
absolved from responsibility. The alleged admission
of complainant-appellee during the investigation
conducted by the legal department of respondent
appellant does not, if at all, prove beyond
reasonable doubt the criminal act allegedly
committed by complainant-appellee in the absence
of any showing that he was given the opportunity
to be heard by counsel or at least, a representative
to confront his accuser.”
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the quantum of proof required for
administrative proceedings involving criminal
violation is “proof beyond reasonable doubt”?
HELD:
NO. The Court has ruled that the ground for an
employer’s dismissal of an employee need be
established only by substantial evidence, it not
being required that the former’s evidence “be of
such degree as is required in criminal cases, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt.” It is absolutely of
no consequence that the misconduct with which
an employee may be charged also constitutes a
criminal offense: theft, embezzlement, assault on
another employee or company officer, arson,
malicious mischief, etc. The proceedings being
administrative, the quantum of proof is governed
by the substantial evidence rule and not, as the
respondent Commission seems to imagine, by the
rule governing judgments in criminal actions.
It was thus serious error, and grave abuse of
discretion for the Labor Arbiter and the respondent
Commission, for the reasons given, to reject and
exclude from consideration the express admissions
made by Masaya during the administrative
investigation conducted by Meralco.
70. Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. Department of
Agriculture & Natural Resources, 75 SCRA 285
Facts
Petitioner is, a domestic mining corporation
engaged in the exploration and development of
certain mineral claims. Private respondent Sofia V.
Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse
claim against petitioner's Lode Lease Application
covering three mining claims in Benguet, Mountain
Province. Petitioner countered with a motion to
dismiss, alleging as one of three legal objections
the failure of such adverse claim to comply with
the mandatory requirements of Section 73 of the
Mining Act. The private respondent then submitted
an opposition with the Bureau of Mines thereafter
dismissing the adverse claim. The private
respondent filed an appeal with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
At first, the action taken by respondent
Department was the dismissal of such appeal, but
on a second motion for reconsideration, it issued
an order in favor of private respondent. Hence this
certiorari petition.
Issue
Whether the petition should be granted.
Held
No. This petition lacks merit. It must be dismissed.
First, Petitioner lost sight of the fundamental
doctrine that a decision rendered by the Director of
ATTY. CABRAS
Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of fact
is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the
courts, in the absence of a showing that such
decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition, or mistake, other than error of
judgment in estimating the value or effect of
evidence, regardless of whether or not it is
consistent with the preponderance of the evidence,
so long as there is some evidence upon which the
finding in question could be made. Here such a
stage has not been reached. Precisely, the assailed
order spoke of no "hearing on the merits, therefore
it is but right and proper in the interest of justice
that a formal hearing on the merits be
conducted. There is, therefore, an element of
prematurity.
71. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY vs. PSC,
G.R No.10903, 18 January 1957
FACTS: Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company(BLTBC) filed a petition for mandamus
and contempt with a prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order to compel Land Transportation
Commission(LTC) to act on its letters wherein it
sought deferment of action on any request of
Eastern Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. (ETBC) for the
issuance of plates covering units involved in its
lease agreement with petitioner for the alleged
nullity of an order of Commissioner Cadiao of the
Public Service Commission(PSC) granting the
petition of ETBC. Petitioner contends that it is
beyond the jurisdiction of the PSC, on the ground
that the matter involved is pending resolution in
arbitration proceeding and PSC was without
jurisdiction to continue with the case until final
judgment is rendered by the CFI of Laguna.
In an amended petition, It was alleged that
ETBC in cooperation with LTC caused the
registration of the units for use in the disputed
lines, that the delay in deciding its petition to
vacate the order is part of the scheme of
respondent under which the order of denial would
be issued at the last minute to give petitioner no
chance to take seasonable action.
ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: YES. What is involved in this litigation,
namely, a "petition to acquire and register the
units or trucks required to operate the lines of
respondent ETBC." after it had decided not to
renew or extend its lease contract with petitioner,
is properly cognizable by the Public Service
Commission. The plea of lack of jurisdiction is
therefore unavailing. It should suffice to dispose of
this petition, were it not for the additional
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
allegation that in the issuance of the order of
November 2, 1967, there was no hearing accorded
petitioner. Such an allegation is without basis as
set forth in the motion to dismiss. Petitioner "did
not disclose that the respondent PSC, through
Associate Commissioner Josue L. Cadiao,
conducted a full hearing on the dispute under
Public Service Commission. What was not
disclosed was specifically set forth in the motion to
dismiss.
It has already been a settled doctrine that a
plea of denial of procedural due process does not
lie where a defect consisting of an absence of
notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the
alleged aggrieved party having had the opportunity
to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. "What
the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack
of opportunity to be heard. As was stated in a
recent decision, what "due process contemplates is
freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is
fairness or justice, the substance rather than the
form being paramount,".
72.
Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs Zulueta, et.
al.
No. 46853 (January 30, 1940)
68 Phil. 45
FACTS:
In this case, the petitioner, Manila Trading
and Supply Co. filed a petition for certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations directing the reinstatement of laborer
Filomeno Ramolio. Filomeno Ramolio was
suspended for a breach of duty. The breach
consisted in that as the gatekeeper of the
petitioner, he permitted, contrary to instructions,
one of the customers to pass thru the exit gate
without paying for work done on the car. The
respondent court found that the laborer was guilty
of the breach imputed to him but deciding that
suspension from June 30 to July 28, 1939 was a
sufficient punishment and ordered his immediate
reinstatement. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. The Court of Industrial Relations
denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari shall
continue.
HELD:
The court finds that an employer cannot
legally be compelled to continue with the
employment of a person who admittedly was guilty
ATTY. CABRAS
of malfeasance of misfeasance towards his
employer, and whose continuance in the service of
the latter is patently inimical to his interests. The
law, in protecting the rights of the laborer,
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction
of the employer. There may be of course, be cases
where the suspension or dismissal of an employee
is whimsical or unjustified or otherwise illegal in
which case he will be protected. Each case will be
scrutinized carefully and the proper authorities will
go to the core of the controversy and not close their
eyes to the real situation.
73. No. L-47182-83. October 30, 1978.*
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (BISIG NG
MANGGAGAWA SA UTEX), petitioner, vs.
CARMELO C. NORIEL as Director of the Bureau
of Labor Relations, Department of Labor;
UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS WORKERS UNION-
ALU and UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.,
respondents.
TOPIC: Questions of Discretion
FACTS: This is a certiorari proceeding
assailing the decision of respondent Carmelo C.
Noriel, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
reversing an order of the Med-Arbiter calling for a
certification election.
Noriel directed the respondent Union to renegotiate
with the management of the Universal Textile Mills
instead of issuance of a certification of election as
mandated by law.
ISSUE: WON administrative agency are
vested with discretionary powers.
HELD: Yes, this is not to deny that an
administrative agency entrusted with the
enforcement of a regulatory statute is vested with
discretion. Such discretion, however, is not
unbounded.
Where, as in this case, the Labor Code itself sets
limits, they must be observed. That is the only way
to manifest fealty to the rule of law. We turn again
to Article 258. Its least sentence specifically defines
what must be done by the Bureau of Labor
Relations once the certification election is
conducted; it must “certify the winner as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of all
the employees in the unit.” That is the extent and
scope of the authority entrusted to respondent
Noriel as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations.
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He cannot go further than that. Yet, in the assailed
order, he would direct respondent Union “to
renegotiate with the management at Universal
Textile Mills the benefits and other conditions of
employment for the second and third year of the
contract within three (3) months from receipt of
this Resolution and to submit the renegotiated
benefits to the workers for acceptance and
ratification through a secret balloting to be
supervised by this Office.” And this, too, without
the benefit of a certification election mandated by
law. The failure to abide by what the Labor Code
categorically requires is thus plain and manifest.
What was done by respondent Noriel is bereft of
support in law. To countenance it would be to foil
the statutory scheme. There can be no other
conclusion except that his assailed order is tainted
with a serious jurisdictional defect. This is then the
proper occasion for the exercise of the corrective
authority of this Tribunal.
Writ granted and decision nullified, reversed, and
set aside.
74. LUPO VS. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD
– 190 SCRA 69
Facts: Petitioner substantially assails the
Resolution dated September 30, 1988 of the
Secretary Rainerio O. Reyes of the Department of
Transportion and Communications which
suspended her for one year and disqualified her for
promotion for a period of one year and also, the
Order of July 5,1989 of Chairman Onofre A.
Villaluz of the Administrative Action Board of said
department which set Adm. Case No. AAB-034-88
for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the rules of procedure has
been complied with?
Held: No, From the very start, the basis upon
which this case was investigated had been
defective and irregular. For the letter-complaint of
Fructuoso Arroyo was not verified and yet, the
same was haphazardly made the basis of the
informal inquiry. It should be stressed in par. (a) of
Sec. 38 of the Civil Service Law mandates that
administrative proceedings may be commenced
against an employee by the head of the department
officer of equivalent rank or upon sworn written
complaint of any other person. It should also be
noted that under paragraph (b) of said Section, a
respondent is given the option to elect a formal
investigation of the charge against him if his
answer is not found satisfactory. In the case of
petitioner, it appears that when her answer to the
unverified complaint was found unsatisfactory, she
ATTY. CABRAS
was never given a chance to decide whether or not
to submit herself to a formal investigation.
The Memorandum of Telecom Investigator
Calapano to the Regional Director is merely
recommendatory since it was only the outcome of a
fact finding investigation based on the unverified
complaint. Note that the informal investigation was
only an inquiry into the alleged dishonest acts of
petitioner in which case the Memorandum could
not be made as the basis for any final resolution of
the case. The legal and proper procedure should
have been for the Regional Director of Region V,
the alter ego of the department secretary to initiate
the formal complaint on the basis of the results of
the inquiry of the Telecom Investigator. Instead of
observing the mandatory rules on formal
investigations as prescribed by PD No. 807, the
DOTC Secretary cut corners and apparently
railroaded this case by rendering the assailed
resolution.
It should be noted that the Telecom
Director who was supposed to review the findings
of the Telecom Investigator merely affixed his
approval within the Memorandum, thus obviously
indicating that he never reviewed the merits of the
case.
It appears highly irregular that Asst.
Secretary Sibal of the DOTC, in his letter dated
August 2, 1989 to Chairman Villaluz of the
Administrative Action Board, informed the latter
that his Office did not file any administrative
complaint against petitioner nor had it filed a
formal charge against her for whatever
administrative offense. Note that even with this
letter, Chairman Villaluz proceeded to order the
hearing of this case. This is a clear indication that
for lack of coordination among the DOTC
authorities and the Regional Office, the mandatory
requirements of due to which petitioner was
entitled were irreverently ignored.
Thus, in the case of Jose Rizal College v.
National Labor Relations Commission the SC
reiterated the “cardinal primary” requirements of
due process in administrative proceedings.
Evidently, respondents denied petitioner
her right to a formal and full-blown administrative
proceeding which she never had.
75. Provident Tree Farms Inc. vs. HON.
DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge
Branch 48, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and 
A. J. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Facts: Petitioner is a Philippine corporation
engaged in industrial tree planting. It
grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and
Mindoro which it supplies to a local match
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
manufacturer solely for production of matches. In
consonance with the state policy to encourage
qualified persons to engage in industrial tree
plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry
Code  confers on entities like PTFI a set of
incentives among which is a qualified ban against
importation of wood and "wood-derivated"
products.
On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J.
International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4)
containers of matches from Indonesia, which the
Bureau of Customs released on 12 April 1989, and
two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore
on 19 April 1989. The records do not disclose when
the second shipment was released.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Court of Manila a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer
for a temporary restraining order against
respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC
to enjoin the latter from importing matches and
"wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of
Customs from allowing and releasing the
importations.
PTFI prays for an order directing the Commissioner
of Customs to impound the subject importations
and the AJIC be directed to pay petitioner
P250,000.00 in actual damages, P1,000,000.00 in
exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
Court on its 28 July 1989 order dismissed the case
on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to
determine what legal or illegal importations.
In this present recourse, PTFI seeks to set aside
the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and
prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil
Case No. 89-48836
Issue: 1.Whether or not the Courts may order to
impound, seize or forfeit the imported matches.
2. Whether or not the absence of procedure for the
enforcement of the import ban under the Tariff and
Customs Code as premised by petitioner reduces
the jurisdiction of the Bureau Customs.
A.1 The enforcement of the importation ban under
Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is
within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of
Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner
of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal
basis. To allow the regular court to direct the
Commissioner to impound the imported matches,
as petitioner would, is clearly an interference with
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a
judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably
be based on his determination and declaration of
the invalidity of the importation, hence, an
usurpation of the prerogative and an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
ATTY. CABRAS
Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed
against the Bureau of Customs 15 as well as the
prayer for injunction against importation of
matches by private respondent AJIC 16 may not be
granted without the court arrogating upon itself
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs.
A.2 The claim of petitioner that no procedure is
outlined for the enforcement of the import ban
under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does
not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement
of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence
of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of
Customs has the power to "promulgate all rules
and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions
of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Finance." 17 Moreover,
it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does
not require any particular method of procedure to
be followed by an administrative agency, the
agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry
out its functions.
76. G.R. No. L- April 30, 1966
21685
PETITIONER- CLETO ASPREC
APPELLANT
RESPONDENTS- VICTORIANO ITCHON,
APPELLEES JOSE SUGUITAN, FELIPE
P. CRUZ, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, NICANOR G.
JORGE, ANTONIO
NOBLEJAS,1 and JACINTO
HERNANDEZ
Facts:
An administrative complaint for unprofessional
conduct was filed against Asprec with the Board of
Examiners for Surveyors. The complaint alleged
that Asprec received compensation from
Hernandez but failed his obligation to survey and
deliver a plan to Hernandez. The board found for
Hernandez and revoked and required surrender of
Asprec’s certificate of registration as a private land
surveyor. Office of the President affirmed. Asprec
went to CFI on certiorari which was denied. Appeal
of CFI decision to SC.
Issue/s:
Whether Asprec was denied his day in court
Ruling:
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No, Asprec was not denied his day in court.
Ratio Decidendi:
From the facts, petitioner has had more than
ample opportunity to defend himself before the
board. But he and counsel did not appear at the
last and stipulated date of hearing without cause
or without any excuse at all. Presence of a party at
a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the
essence of due process. Really, all that the law
requires is that parties be given notice of trial, an
opportunity to be heard. More than this, the date
of trial had been previously agreed upon by the
parties and their counsel. He has forfeited his right
to be heard in his defense.
Doctrine Learned:
Administrative due process requires delivery of
notice of trial, an opportunity to be heard.
77. SEC. OF JUSTICE V. LANTION
GR 139465, OCT. 17, 2000
Topic: Administrative procedure; adjudication
process; Due process
Facts:
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration that focuses in the decision of this
Court, by a vote of 9-6, which dismissed the
petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant him
a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence
This case merely involves the case of Extradition
Proceeding the guarantee of rights available to an
extraditee. The Private Respondent, an extraditee,
demands the Constitutional guarantee, available to
an accused, of due process of law and the twin-
pillars of it, which is notice and hearing. The case
is concerned on the following law and treaty – P.D.
No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall
be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition
as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing
of the petition for extradition in the extradition
court.
Issue: WON the private respondent is entitled to
the due process right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Held:
No, the private respondent is NOT entitled to the
due process right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
The Court holds that private respondent is bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. x x x
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition
ATTY. CABRAS
Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner
Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition
request from the US government and its
supporting documents and to comment thereon
while the request is still undergoing evaluation.
The Court cannot write a provision in the treaty
giving private respondent that right where there is
none. It is well-settled that a “court cannot alter,
amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any
clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its
conditions and requirements or take away any
qualification, or integral part of any stipulation,
upon any motion of equity, or general convenience,
or substantial justice.”
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the
State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that
the private respondent has no right to due process
at all throughout the length and breadth of the
extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process
requires a determination of what process is due,
when it is due, and the degree of what is due.
Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be
made as to whether procedural protections are at
all due and when they are due, which in turn
depends on the extent to which an individual will
be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." The Court
had explained why an extraditee has no right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No.
1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity
to meet the evidence against him once the petition
is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know
the basis of the request for his extradition is
merely moved to the filing in court of the formal
petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to
know is momentarily withheld during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process to
accommodate the more compelling interest of the
State to prevent escape of potential extraditees
which can be precipitated by premature
information of the basis of the request for his
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the
extradition proceedings is the need to be more
deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of
the government, the Executive, which has been
endowed by our Constitution with greater power
over matters involving our foreign relations.
Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a
static but a moving balance which can be adjusted
as the extradition process moves from the
administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the
execution stage depending on factors that will
come into play. In sum, the Court rule that the
temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of
notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to
due process which will not deprive him of
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fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the
request for his extradition to the United States.
There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Referential Syllabus:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition;
Court holds now that private respondent is bereft
of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.—We
now hold that private respondent is bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. x x x There is no
provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in
P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right
to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice
copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to
comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision
in the treaty giving private respondent that right
where there is none. It is well-settled that a “court
cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the
insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense
with any of its conditions and requirements or take
away any qualification, or integral part of any
stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general
convenience, or substantial justice.”
Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceeding is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation
all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights.—An extradition proceeding is sui
generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will
call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee,
especially by one whose extradition papers are still
undergoing evaluation.
Same; Same; Same; Differences between an
extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding.
—There are other differences between an
extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding.
An extradition proceeding is summary in nature
while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding,
the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding
allow admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to
be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive
may be ordered extradited “upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case.” Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory
ATTY. CABRAS
upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him.
Same; Same; Same; Private respondent’s plea to
due process collides with important state interests
which cannot also be ignored for they serve the
interest of the greater majority.—To be sure,
private respondent’s plea for due process deserves
serious consideration involving as it does his
primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process,
however, collides with important state interests
which cannot also be ignored for they serve the
interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights
demands a delicate balancing of interests approach
which is a “fundamental postulate of constitutional
law.” The approach requires that we “take
conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation.” These interests
usually consist in the exercise by an individual of
his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the
government’s promotion of fundamental public
interest or policy objectives on the other.
Same; Same; Same; The time for the extraditee to
know the basis of the request for his extradition is
merely moved to the filing in court of the formal
petition for extradition.—We have explained why
an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which
implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords
an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the
evidence against him once the petition is filed in
court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis
of the request for his extradition is merely moved
to the filing in court of the formal petition for
extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is
momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process to accommodate the
more compelling interest of the State to prevent
escape of potential extraditees which can be
precipitated by premature information of the basis
of the request for his extradition. No less
compelling at that stage of the extradition
proceedings is the need to be more deferential to
the judgment of a co-equal branch of the
government, the Executive, which has been
endowed by our Constitution with greater power
over matters involving our foreign relations.
MELO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition;
Petitioner is well versed in the use of a hold
departure order which could easily lay his fear of
private respondent’s flight to rest.—And as regards
the apprehension of flight, petitioner is well versed
in the use of a hold departure order which could
easily lay his fear of private respondent’s flight to
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rest. In accordance with Department Circular No.
17 issued on March 19, 1998 by then Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, a hold departure
order (HDO) may be issued by the Secretary of
Justice “upon the request of the Head of a
Department of the Government; the head of a
constitutional body or a commission or agency
performing quasi-judicial functions; the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court for the Judiciary; or
by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives for the legislative
body” when the interested party is the Government
or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, “in the
interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law” (Paragraph 2
[d], Department Circular No. 17 [Prescribing Rules
and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold
Departure Orders]). This provision can easily be
utilized by petitioner to prevent private
respondent’s flight.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; To
grant the respondent his right to know will not, in
any significant way, weaken or frustrate
compliance with treaty objectives.—After going over
the grounds given by the Government in support of
the motion for reconsideration, I regret that I
cannot go along with the new ruling of the Court’s
recent majority. I am convinced that there is
greater reason to strike the balance in favor of a
solitary beleaguered individual against the exertion
of overwhelming Government power by beth the
Philippines and the United States. To grant the
respondent his right to know will not, in any
significant way, weaken or frustrate compliance
with treaty objectives. But it will result in
jurisprudence which reasserts national dignity and
gives meaningful protection to the rights of any
citizen who is presumed innocent until proven
guilty.
Same; Same; Same; No provision in the Treaty
mandates that an extraditee should be kept in the
dark about the charges against him until he is
brought to trial.—There is no provision in the
Treaty which mandates that an extraditee should
be kept in the dark about the charges against him
until he is brought to trial. The Treaty deals only
with the trial proper. It cannot possibly cover
everything. Our law and jurisprudence are not
superseded by the mere absence of a specific
provision in a treaty. What is not prohibited should
be allowed.
Same; Same; Same; A proposed extraditee should
not be denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare
for trial.—A proposed extraditee should not be
denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare for
trial. In an extradition trial, there may be reasons
for the exercise of special care and caution. It is
ATTY. CABRAS
not a casual occurrence to give up your citizen to
another country’s criminal justice system. I do not
want to sound unduly jingoistic but in certain
Western countries, especially those using the jury
system, a second-class citizen or a colored non-
citizen may not always get equal justice inspite of
protestations to the contrary. The prospective
extraditee, therefore, deserves every lawful
consideration which his poor third-world country
can give him.
78. Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532, [Nos. 24844
&24853], 26 October 1967)
Facts: Pedro Gatchalian, a minor, arrived at the
Manila International Airport together with four
other persons and sought entry as a Filipino
citizen. Not satisfied with his papers, the
immigration officer referred the case of Pedro
Gatchalian to the Special Board of Inquiry. This
body, after due hearing, rendered decision
admitting Pedro Gatchalian and seven others, as
Filipino citizens. Submitted to the individual
members of the Board of Commissioners, the
decision was marked "noted" by Commissioners
Talabis and De la Rosa respectively, while
Commissioner Galang voted to "exclude" the
persons subject of the decision few days later.
Pedro Gatchalian was issued an identification
certificate by the immigration authorities, attesting
to his admission as citizen of the Philippines as per
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated July
6, 1961. Months after, the Secretary of Justice
issued a memorandum order directing the
Immigration Commissioners to review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the
entrant was a citizen of the Philippines.
In July, 1962, the Board of Commissioners
reversed the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of Pedro
Gatchalian, for being improperly documented.
Macario Arocha, on behalf of Pedro Gatchalian,
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for
a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the detention
of Gatchalian, a Filipino, by the Immigration
Commissioner is violative of said petitioner's
constitutional rights.
During the trial, the issues in controversy centered
on the actual date of rendition of the
Commissioners' decision, reversing that of the
Special Board of Inquiry; and the validity of that
Commissioners' decision, admittedly issued motu
proprio and without affording petitioner
opportunity to be heard. It was therein petitioner's
contention that the decision was originally dated
July 20, 1962, which date was erased and
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superimposed with another figure to read July 6,
1962. On the other hand, respondents alleged that
the erasures were made to correct clerical
mistakes.
In its decision, the court sustained petitioner's
theory that the decision of reversal of the Board of
Commissioners was antedated and issued beyond
the prescribed one-year period. Holding that the
decision of the Special Board of Inquiry, admitting
the Philippine citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian had
already become final, the Court ordered his
immediate release from detention and enjoined
respondents, permanently, from arresting,
deporting and otherwise depriving him of his
liberty. On the strength of a writ of habeas
corpus issued by the Court, Pedro Gatchalian was
released from custody of the immigration
authorities. Notified of the abovementioned
decision of the lower court, respondents filed notice
to appeal therefrom.
Issue/s: Whether or not the decision rendered by
the Board of Commissioners was beyond the one-
year period. (No)
Held: Whereas the pivotal point of the case hinges
upon the true date when the Board of
Commissioners of Immigration reversed the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry for the
purpose of determining whether or not such
reversal was rendered within the one-year period
set by Sec. 27(b) of Commonwealth Act 613, as
amended by Republic Act 503, which empowers
the former Board to review the latter's decision
either upon appeal or motu proprio, otherwise the
original decision admitting immigrant petitioner-
appellee would have become final and definitive;
where the originally typewritten date of July "20"
1962 had been erased and then superimposed by
"6" so as to rectify a clerical mistake not only on
the decision of reversal but also on the notice of
appellee's counsel and on the warrant of exclusion;
and where there is a showing that the reversal was
actually rendered on July 6, 1962, such
rectification or correction, in the absence of any
evidence on record, does not constitute sufficient
ground for holding that the three members of the
Board of Commissioners are acting as a board,
regardless of the date when the decision in
extenso was prepared, written and signed, because
such decision in extenso must relate back to the
day the resolution was actually adopted; and
where the correction of the date July "20" to July
"6" is susceptible of an explanation that it was on
July "20" that the reasoned and extended decision
was typewritten in final form, it was error for the
lower court to rule that the reversal decision was
rendered beyond the one-year period.
ATTY. CABRAS
79. Arocha vs Vivo supra
In re: Form and Promulgation of Judgment
…In the instant cases, the decision of the Board of
Commissioners (Exh. 5), the notification to
appellee's counsel that such decision was rendered
(Exh. 6), and the warrant of exclusion (Exh. 7),
bear the date July 6, 1962, or within one year from
the reviewed decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry. It is contended, however, that in all of
these documents, the date of promulgation of the
decision appeared to have been originally written
as July 20, 1962, but the number "20" was erased
and superimposed by "6".
Appellant Commissioner of Immigration insists
that these erasures and substitutions were
corrections made only to rectify clerical mistakes.
Besides, according to appellant, there is proof that
the decision was actually rendered on July 6,
1962, pointing to a certification of the Secretary of
the Board of Commissioners that the said body
voted to exclude the applicants in the said cases
and to the minutes of the meeting of that Board.
As previously stated, the Court of First Instance
agreed with the appellee that the erasures
indicated that the original date was July "20" but
that the figures had been erased and retyped as
"6"; and concluded that the Commissioners'
decision and the warrant of exclusion had been
antedated, in order to bring the decision within the
one-year term fixed by Section 27 (b) of
Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, wherein the
proceedings before the Board of Special Inquiry
may be reviewed and revoked, either upon appeal
or motu proprio by the Board of Immigration
Commissioners. The Court below held, therefore,
that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry,
declaring Pedro Gatchalian to be a Filipino citizen
had become final and definitive.
We do not believe that the mere fact of a retyping of
dates on the face of the documents, without
further evidence of record, suffices to convict the
three members of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners of maliciously antedating their
decision, considering the presumption of regularity
in official actuations, and the serious implications
of the charge, which amounts to no less than a
falsification of official documents. Such an offense
cannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearly
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In the official minutes of the Board's proceedings,
no alteration in dates appears in these Exhibits.
And it goes without saying that the operative date
of the Commissioners' action is that when the
resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by
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them as a Board, regardless of the date when the
decision in extenso was prepared, written and
signed.
It is argued for the appellee that the minutes in
Exh. 5-A refer only to the cases of Gloria,
Francisco and Benjamin Gatchalian. But the
designation of the case is "Gloria Gatchalian et al."
No reason is shown why the case of these three
should be considered and voted upon separately,
considering that the claims to citizenship and entry
of all were based on the same circumstances,
applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino, and that all their
applications for entry were in fact jointly resolved
by the Board of Inquiry in one single decision
(Annex 1, petition, G.R. No. L-24844).
We, therefore, conclude that the Court below erred
in finding and declaring that the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry in the case of petitioner-
appellee had become final and unreviewable, and
that its review and revocation by the
Commissioners of Immigration was null and void.
Appellee also argues that the decision of the
Inquiry Board had become non-reviewable since
1961 because of its confirmation by the majority of
the preceding Board of Commissioners. It is
pointed out that two members of the latter board
(Talabis and De la Rosa) in reference to said
decision had marked "Noted" over their own
signatures, while only the third Commissioner
made of record his adverse opinion. Such
argument is untenable.
First, even disregarding the ambiguity of the term
"Noted", the former Immigration Commissioners
appeared to have acted individually in this
particular instance and not as a Board. It is shown
by the different dates affixed to their signatures
that they did not actually meet to discuss and vote
on the case. This was officially made to record by
the Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order
No. 9, on January 24, 1962, wherein he stated.
Individual action by members of a board plainly
renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as
a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of
Commissioners precisely in order that they should
deliberate collectively and in order that their views
and ideas should be exchanged and examined
before reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs.
Humphrise, LRA 1915F 1047). This process is of
the essence of a board's action, save where
otherwise provided by law, and the salutary effects
of the rule would be lost were the members to act
individually, without benefit of discussion.
The powers and duties of boards and commissions
may not be exercised by the individual members
separately. Their acts are official only when done
by the members convened in session, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least
ATTY. CABRAS
a quorum present. (42 Am. Jur. 389, sec. 74).
Where the action needed is not of the individuals
composing a board but of the official body, the
members must be together and act in their official
capacity, and the action should appear on the
records of the board. (Penn R. Co. vs. Montgomery
Co. Pass. R. Co., 167 P 2d. 62, 27 LRA 766).
Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of
different individuals, that board can act officially
only as such, in convened session, with the
members, or a quorum thereof, present. (State vs.
Kelly, 21 ALR 156
80. G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983
Villadolid vs Inciong
G.R. No.L-53349 March 25, 1983
Ricardo Valladolid, the death of Joseph, was
employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone
switchboard operator. He was subsequently
transferred to the position of clerk-collector by
Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM.
On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to
Valladolid signed by Daniel T. Yu, advising him of
his preventive suspension effective February 26,
1979 preparatory to the termination of his services
10 days from receipt of a copy of the application for
clearance to dismiss him. The grounds given were:
(1) Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in
various instances, confidential business matters to
competitors of the company; and (2) Gross Neglect
of Duty for having been absent without leave or
notice for more than 25 days, to the detriment of
the company. 
Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979,
denied having committed any breach of trust.  In
corroboration, he presented the affidavits of Mr.
Manuel Yu dated March 20, 1979 and March 29,
1979, wherein the latter stated that Valladolid was
"one of Copacabana's most hard-working and
efficient employees;" that Valladolid's work is "mere
routinary collection and clerical in nature which do
not involve trust (or) confidential business or trade
secrets which he may 'divulge' to other
companies." 
Deputy Minister of Labor ruled in favor of
Villadolid ordering his reinstatement without
backwages. 
JRM filed a petition that; Deputy Ministry acted in
excess of his jurisdiction when, without any
statutory authority or transcending beyond his
jurisdiction, that he absolutely disregarded
procedural requirement in the hearing of the
present controversy, thus depriving petitioner of its
right to due process.
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Issue: Whether or not the decision of Regional
Director committed error on his decision.
Held:
No error was committed by respondent Regional
Director in ordering his reinstatement without
backwages.
JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for
5 days from December 30, 1978, and thereafter for
15 days, but denies that he notified the company
of his absences subsequent to this. The Regional
Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid were
unauthorized but did not amount to gross neglect
of duty or abandonment of work which requires
deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear
showing in terms of specific circumstances that the
worker does not intend to report for work. We
agree. But as Valladolid had been AWOL,
Constitutional provision requiring that decisions of
court must contain a statement of facts and the
conclusions of law upon which it is based applies
only to courts of record, not to the Ministry of
Labor; Reasons; Proceedings in the NLRC non-
litigatious and summary in nature without regard
to legal technicalities.—Nor is the questioned Order
of the Deputy Minister of Labor violative of Section
9, Article X of the Constitution, which requires a
statement of the facts and the conclusions of law
upon which it is based. That prescription applies to
decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor
is an administrative body with quasi-judicial
functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, states that
proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious and
summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in courts of law. As the
Deputy Minister was in full accord with the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law drawn
from those facts by the Regional Director, there
was no necessity of discussing anew the issues
raised therein.
81. NERIA vs. COMMISSIONER
FACTS: Pio Neria with his widowed mother
(Dolores Neria) and two younger brothers (Felix
and Manuel Neria), arrived at the Manila
International Airport from Hongkong on board a
Cathay Pacific Airways plane. The petitioner was
armed with Certificate of Registration and Identity
621, issued by the Philippine Consulate in
Hongkong. The immigration inspector at the
airport, not satisfied with the petitioner’s travel
documents and those of his companions upon
primary inspection thereof, referred the matter of
their admission to the Board of Special Inquiry for
investigation “to determine filiation and paternity
to a Filipino citizen Accordingly, the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing at which
time the petitioner offered oral and documentary
ATTY. CABRAS
evidence to support his claim for admission as a
Filipino citizen. After the conclusion of the
investigation, the said board deliberated on the
case and unanimously voted for petitioner’s
admission. The Immigration authorities issued
Identification Certificate to the petitioner, attesting
that he “was admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines” per decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1. The Secretary of Justice issued a
Memorandum Order declaring that all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on Appeal from, or on review motu
proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry
are set aside. In compliance with the above
directive, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners, composed of Acting
Commissioners proceeded to review motu proprio
the entire proceedings had before the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to the petitioner’s,
case and that of his supposed relatives. The new
Board of Immigration Commissioners found that
the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his
claim for admission as a Filipino citizen and,
consequently, reversed the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1, and ordered that the
petitioner be excluded from the Philippines as an
alien not properly documented for admission and
be returned to the port from where he came or to
the country of which he is a national. The
petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said
decision. This motion was denied by the new
Board, and the petitioner was informed of this
denial by letter.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, praying the Court of First Instance of
Manila to restrain the Commissioner of
Immigration and the Board of Immigration
Commissioners from arresting and expelling him,
and prohibit them from taking any further steps or
actions contrary to the decision rendered by the
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1. This petition was
given due course, and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued as prayed for. But later on
this petition was dismissed, without prejudice and
without costs.
The present petition for habeas corpus was filed.
Pio Neria seeks to inquire into the legality of his
arrest by agents of the respondent Commissioner
of Immigration, and his subsequent detention or
confinement at the Bureau of Immigration’s
detention station at Engineering Island, Manila.
The petitioner claims that the warrant of exclusion
issued by the respondent is illegal because it is
based on a decision rendered by the Board of
Immigration Commissioners without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
in violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613, as
amended.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the new
Board of Immigration Commissioner is null and
void for having been rendered without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: The petitioner’s argument, at all events,
is without merit. Section 27 (b), provides that
proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry—its
appraisal of a case on the merits, the result of its
deliberation, its decision and notice thereof to an
alien, and the time when an appeal may be
brought therefrom—“shall be conducted under
rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.”
It is of no moment that before the present petition
for habeas corpus was instituted, the petitioner
had previously filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The dismissal of that petition was
“without prejudice”, and, therefore, avoided the
effects of the Rules of Court provision (Rule 30,
sec. 3, now Rule 17, sec. 3) that dismissal for
failure to prosecute is equivalent to “an
adjudication on the merits [with prejudice].” The
-order of dismissal therein did not settle the
legality of the acts of the Board of Commissioners,
nor the legality of petitioner’s arrest and detention.
The order dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition simply recites that the same is
“dismissed without prejudice and without costs.”
82. Police Commission vs. Hon. Judge Lood
FACTS:
Respondent Ibea had been dismissed from the
police service by the then Mayor Braulio Sto.
Domingo pursuant to the decision of petitioner
commission finding him guilty of serious
irregularity in the performance of duty on
complaint of Jose Lee, Jr. Respondent thereafter
filed his complaint with respondent court seeking
his reinstatement. He was sustained by respondent
court which rendered its decision declaring the
decision of the Police Commission as null and void
and ordered the town mayor to reinstate the
plaintiff to his former position as patrolman in the
Police Department. Respondent court ruled that
the decision of petitioner commission was based on
incomplete records as there was no transcript of
the testimonies of witnesses or minutes of the
proceedings before the Board of Investigators and
that the commission’s conclusion was without
factual basis and was in violation of administrative
due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in
disturbing the findings of facts of the Police
Commission, an administrative agency duly vested
by Republic Act No. 4864 with the power and
authority to render decision in administrative
ATTY. CABRAS
cases against policemen and whose decision is
final.
HELD:
The record amply shows that petitioner’s decision
was supported by substantial evidence consisting
of the affidavit-complaint (which was duly affirmed
when complainant Jose Lee, Jr. appeared and
testified before the board) and the documentary
evidence duly marked by the board as exhibits for
the complainant (and which were not questioned
by respondent). As uniformly held by the Court, it
is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are
supported by evidence on the record, or stated
negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are
not shown to be unsupported by evidence. As
expounded by Justice Laurel in the leading case of
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
substantial evidence is all that is needed to
support an administrative finding of fact, and
substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”
Respondent court therefore erred in choosing to
believe the theory of the defense put up by
respondent Ibea on the equally erroneous ground
that there was no evidence to support the findings
of the Police Commission. In effect, respondent
court substituted its own judgment for that of the
Police Commission which is final, contrary to the
prevailing principle that “in reviewing
administrative decisions, the reviewing court
cannot reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence as
if originally instituted therein, and receive
additional evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned. The findings of
fact must be respected, so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant.’’
83. PMC V ANG BISIG NG PMC
FACTS:
During the period 1947 to August 3, 1953,
the schedule of shifts in the PMC (Philippine
Manufacturing Company) was from 7 a.m. to 3
p.m.; from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. and from 11 p.m. to 7
a.m. This schedule was adopted by the company
and the employees, who are members of
respondent Ang Bisig ng PMC, agreed to the same
and worked in the shifts during the period
mentioned.
The union asked the Court of Industrial Relations
to order the company to pay 50 per cent extra
compensation for work done from 12:01 a.m. to 7
a.m. from 1947 to August 3, 1953, whenever the
period mentioned fell on a Sunday or a legal
holiday.
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PMC contended that since there was an agreement,
the period between 12:01 a.m. and 7 a.m. of
Sunday should be considered a part of the
Saturday workday and therefore work done during
that period was not entitled to any extra pay.
CIR: ruled in favor of Respondents. Denie the
motion for reconsideration.HENCE, the petition of
the case
PMC contended that they were denied of due
process in violation of Sec 1 Commonwealth act
no. 103 which provides:
. . . Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or
decision of any of the judges, request a
reconsideration hereof, or at the request of any of
them, the judges shall sit together, and the
concurrence of at least three of the five Judges
shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, order or award.
ISSUE: W/N the PMC was denied of due process?
HELD:
1. NO.The hearing of a motion for
reconsideration in oral argument is a matter
which rests upon the sound discretion of the
Court of Industrial Relations. Its refusal does not
constitute a denial of due process in the absence of
a showing of abuse of discretion.  duly constituted, by the appointment and
Neither may it be said that the judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations did not, as
required by law, "sit together" in resolving the
company's motion for reconsideration because
as held in Tolentino, et al. v. Angeles, et al., 52 O.G.
No. 9, 4262, "the fact that they (the judges) signed
the resolution means that they sat together in
consultation and in passing upon the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners." More recently,
this Court ruled that "the requirement that a
motion for reconsideration shall be resolved by
the court en banc, the judges sitting together,
simply demands that all the available judges
shall take part, for as long as three at least of
the judges attending concur, it is enough for
the pronouncement of the decision or award
For while the resolution may have been prepared
by one judge, yet it cannot be inferred from this
circumstance alone that no previous deliberation
was held. On the contrary, it is safe to assume
that the resolution was the result of a previous
consultation among the judges
2. The point rather is whether, on the assumption
that the agreement is valid, work done on Sunday
or legal holiday as a result of the schedule is to be
paid extra compensation and we said it should be.
ATTY. CABRAS
84. Mison vs Coa
Facts:
The case is about customs case no. 813 where the
commissioner of customs, MIson, declaring illegal
the seizure by elements of the Philippine Navy of
the M/V "Hyojin Maru" a vessel of Japanese
registry, and ordered the release of the vessel and
its cargo to the claimants, Chan Chiu On and
Cheung I.
However, the vessel was never released because it
sank while in the custody of the bureau of customs
and it could not be salvaged. The claimants filed a
claim with the Commission on Audit for the
payment of the vessel.
Acting thereon "(b)y authority of the Acting
Chairman," Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu, Manager,
Technical Service Office of the COA, denied the
claim for the reasons set forth in his registered
letter to the claimant's lawyer dated November 3,
1977-captioned "Decision No. 77-142."
In a letter dated May 10, 1978, claimant’s counsel,
Mr. David replied that said Decision No. 77-142-
rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service
Office of the COA, and "not (by) the Acting
Chairman, much less . . . the Commission on
Audit" — was void because the matter could validly
be acted upon only by "the Commission on Audit
qualification of its Chairman and two
Commissioners," "as specifically provided by
Section 2, Article XII-D of the (1973) Constitution.
In a 4th Indorsement dated June 22, 1987
addressed "to the Auditor, Bureau of Customs,"
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "FOR THE
COMMISSION," reconsidered Decision No. 77-142
of Acting Commissioner of Audit Tantuico, supra.
He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal
custody of the Bureau of Customs, which "should
have pre-eminently taken adequate measures to
preserve" it but did not.; hence, he declared that
"this Commission will interpose no objection" to
the instant claim, subject to the usual auditing
and accounting requirements." Petitioner
seasonably filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari to nullify said COA Decisions pursuant to
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the decision to reverse the Espiritu
Decision was proper?
Held:
In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was void
ab initio. As manager of the COA Technical Service
Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power
whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or
for the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman,
alone, had not that power. As clearly set out in the
Constitution then in force, the power was lodged in
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the Commission on Audit, "composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners." 20 It was the
Commission, as a collegial body, which then as
now, had the jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case
brought before it within sixty days from the date of
its submission for resolution," subject to review by
the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu
decision by the Acting COA Chairman was
inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an act
void ab initio because done absolutely without
authority. The act has to be done anew by the
person or entity duly endowed with authority to do
so.
Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no proper
ratification or validation could have been effected
by the Acting Chairman since he was not the
Commission, and he himself had no power to
decide any case brought before the Commission,
that power, to repeat, being lodged only in the
Commission itself, as a collegial body. it must be
made clear that the Espiritu Decision was not
merely "technically invalid," as the petitioner
describes it. It was substantively void ab initio,
because rendered without jurisdiction. It had an
essential inherent defect that could not be cured or
waived.
85. JURISDICTION
G.R. No. L-4572             May 22, 1953
DOLORITO M. FELICIANO vs. THE DIRECTOR
OF PATENT
FACTS:
An application for patent was filed with the
Patent Office.
Pending examination of the application, Meliton D.
Albaña filed a motion to intervene claiming that the
applicant-inventors had "sold and/or bartered and
assigned to him their right to contract or deal the
sale of their invention called Fel-Tap Meter Guard
and Detector to or though the Corporation that
they were then organizing under his direction and
to fix and decide on the purchase price of it to at
least P200,000 in installments cash and P300,000
in shares of stock of said Corporation.
The motion was denied on the ground under the
provisions of the Patent Law (Republic Act No. 165)
the Director of Patents has no jurisdiction or power
to decide the question submitted to him..
From the orders denying his motions to intervene
the movant has appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the Director of Patents has the authority
to decide the question submitted to him
HELD: No.
ATTY. CABRAS
What the appellant attempted to secure by his
motion to intervene is clearly beyond the
jurisdiction and authority of the Director of Patents
to grant. Despite the amendment to the first
motion to the intervene by which he claims
assignment of the invention, still it remains that
the alleged assignment is not the invention but it is
an agreement whereby he is to act as selling agent
for the inventors of the patent (if granted) and of
the invention covered thereby and to receive
compensation therefor.
Assignments of patents and inventions covered
thereby may be recorded in books and records kept
for the purpose in the Patent Office is presented in
due form;3 but the appellant does not ask for the
registration of the alleged agreement between him
and the inventors, because as it is not in due form
it cannot be recorded, but prays that the Director
of Patents compel applicant-inventor Maximo B.
Tapinio to sign the contract executed and signed
by the other applicant-inventor Dolorito M.
Feliciano on 14 March 1950 (Appendix I) and both
applicant-inventors to acknowledge it and another
document which by all indication refers to the
minutes of a meeting of the organizers of the
Manufacturing Corporation held on 30 March
1950, before a notary public, and then to have
both documents recorded in the Patent Office and
in the office of the Registrar of Deeds.
Under the provisions of the Patent Law
(Republic Act No. 165), the Director of Patent
has no power and authority to compel the
applicant-inventors to do what the appellant is
asking them to perform. What the appellant
asked the Director Patents to do for him is
essentially a judicial function which would
require the determination or finding by a court
of competent jurisdiction as to whether there
was a meeting of the minds of the contracting
parties before it could compel the applicant-
inventors to perform what the appellant prays the
court to order them to do. Aside from want of
authority and power, the Director of Patent
lacks the means to make such determination
and finding which would be necessary before
he could act on the appellant's motion.
The orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.
86. JURISDICTION
SYQUIA VS BOARD
FACTS:
In December, 1974, private respondents
filed three separate complaints with respondent
Board of Power and Waterworks charging
petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia
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Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of
selling electricity without permit or franchise
issued by respondent board, in that petitioner
billed respondents-complainants various
specified amounts for their electricity
consumption at their respective apartments for
the months of May to September, 1974 in excess of
the Meralco rates authorized by respondent board.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss the
complaints asserting that they involved
contractual obligations of respondents as
apartment tenants and were beyond respondent
board's jurisdiction was denied by the latter.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez,
Jr. concurred with petitioner and submitted
that respondent regulatory board acted without
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
complaints.
ISSUE:Whether respondent Board has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case
RULING: No.
Respondent board as a regulatory board
manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed
by respondents against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over
petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-
complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is
not engaged in a public service nor in the sale
of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he
additional cost of electricity for common facilities
used by the tenants (in addition to those registered
in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a
question that is purely civil in character that is
to be adjudged under the applicable provisions
of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and
not by the respondent regulatory board which
has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of
general jurisdiction.
Respondent board in resolving the complaints
against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the
additional rising costs of electricity consumed for
the common areas and elevator service even at a
resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the
judicial function. Its orders were beyond its
jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.
87. Go Tek vs Deportation
Facts:
Certain agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) searched an office located in
Sta. Cruz Manila which is believed to be a
headquarters of a guerrilla unit of the “Emergency
Intelligence Section, Army of the United States”
and that among those arrested threat was Go Tek,
ATTY. CABRAS
a china man and an alleged sector commander and
intelligence and record officer of that guerrilla unit.
It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were
found in Go Tek’s possession which is violation of
article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and rendered
himself an undesirable alien. The prosecutor
prayed to the President that the undesirable alien
be immediately deported because “his presence in
this country having been, and will always be a
menace to the peace, welfare, and security of the
community.” After a case was filed against him, Go
Tek filed a motion to dismiss contending that the
board had no jurisdiction in view of the obiter
dictum discussed in the case Qua Chee Gan vs.
Deportation Board and that they may deport an
alien only on the ground specified under the law.
The Board denied Go Tek’s motion and reasoned
out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before
the state may exercise its rights to deport an
undesirable alien and that their function is just to
be a fact finding body and make recommendations
to the President.
The Trial Court granted a writ of prohibition in
favor of Go Tek and ordered the Borad to desist
from taking cognizance of Go Tek’s case. The trial
court’s reason is that a mere ion of forged dollar
checks is not a ground for deportation under the
Immigration Law and that a conviction must first
be given to Go Tek before he may be validly
deported otherwise the deportation would be
premature. In appeal, the Board contends that the
trial court erred in assuming that the President
may deport undesirable aliens only to grounds
enumerated by law.
Issue:
Whether the Deportation Board can entertain a
deportation proceeding based on a ground not
specified under the Immigration Law and even if
the alien has not yet been convicted of the offense
charged? Yes.
Ruling:
Under existing laws, the deportation of an
undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of
the President, after due investigation, pursuant to
section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and
(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners
under section 37 of the Immigration Law. The State
has the inherent power to deport undesirable
aliens. That power may be exercised by the Chief
Executive “when he deems such action necessary
for the peace and tranquillity of the nation.” There
is nothing illegal or unconstitutional in the
provision defining the power to deport aliens
because the intention of the law is to grant the
Chief Executive “full discretion to determine
whether an alien’s residence in the country is so
undesirable as to affect or injure the security
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
welfare or interest of the state.” It has been held
that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive
judge of the existence of facts which warrant the
deportation of aliens as disclosed in an
investigation conducted in accordance with sec. 69
of the Revised Administrative Code. No other
tribunal is at liberty to re-examine or to controvert
the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
The lower court’s decision is reversed and set
aside.
88. Vera vs Cuevas
Facts:
Consolidated Milk Company sells the
“Darigold” brand and Milk Industries sells “Dutch
Baby” brand (Milk Companies). Along with General
Milk selling under the brand “Liberty”, these three
milk companies are the plaintiffs of an action for
declaratory relief for an adjudication of their
respective rights and obligations in relation to the
enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against
their filled milk products. [Civil Case] Institute of
Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines,
Inc. is a corporation organized for the principal
purpose of upholding and maintaining at its
highest the standards of local filled milk industry,
of which all the milk companies are members.
 The milk companies get a preliminary
injunction against the CIR. Later, the CIR files for
an injunction against the Fair Trade Board from
hearing a special proceeding on a complaint for
misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or
misbranding involving the same milk companies.
The issue is who among the CIR and the FTB have
jurisdiction to decide the matter.SC says neither.
Section 169 of the Tax Code was enacted with
other provisions that have already been repealed,
resulting in Section 169 being repealed by
implication and becoming a declaratory provision,
losing its tax purpose. Without its tax purpose, the
CIR loses his authority to enforce it. Neither the
CIR nor the FTB have jurisdiction as the law that
repealed Section 169 (RA 3720) provides that the
Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food
and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of
Health and Secretary of Justice have jurisdiction
over the matter.
Issue:
Whether or not the Fair Trade Board has
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged
misbranding, mislabeling, and/or misleading
advertisement of filled milk product
Held:
No. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax
ATTY. CABRAS
purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost
authority to enforce the same. The Comissioner’s
contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce
Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of Tax Code
which provides that the Bureau of Internal shall
also “give effect to and administer the supervisory
and police power conferred to it by this Code or
other laws” is untenable. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue may claim police power only when
necessary in the enforcement of its principal
powers and duties consisting of the “collection of
connected therewith”. The enforcement of Section
169 entails the promotion of the health of the
nation and is thus unconnected with any tax
purpose for in Republic Act No. 3720
Republic Act No.3720 provides:
Section 9. Its shall be the duty of the Board
(Food and Drug Inspection), conformably with the
rules and regulation, to hold hearings and conduct
investigations relative to matters touching the
Administration of this Act, to investigate processes
of food, drug and cosmetic manufacture and to
subject reports to the Food and Drug
Administrator, recommending food and drug
standards for adoption. Said Board shall perform
such additional functions, properly within the
scope of the administration thereof, as maybe
assigned to it by the Food and Drug Administrator.
The decisions of the board shall be advisory to the
Food and Drug Administrator.
Section 26.
c) Hearing authorized or required by this
Act shall be conducted by the Board of Food and
Drug Inspection which shall submit
recommendation to the Food and Drug
Administrator.
d) When it appears to the Food and Drug
Administrator from the reports of the Food and
Drug Laboratory that any article of food or any
drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of
this Act is adulterated or branded he shall cause
notice thereof to be given to the person or persons
concerned and such personor persons shall be
given an opportunity to subject evidence
impeaching the correctness of the finding or charge
on question.
e) When violation of any provison of this Act
comes to the knowledge of the Food and Drudg
Administrator of such character that a criminal
prosecution ought to be instituted against the
offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary
of Justice through the Secretary of Health, together
with the chemists’ report, the findings of the Board
of Food and Drug Inspection, or other
documentary evidence on which the charge is
based.
f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
requiring the Food and Drug Administrator to
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
ceritify for prosecution pursuant to subparagraph
(e) hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he
believes that public interest will be done
adequately served by suitable written notice or
warning.
From this, it is clear that the Comissioner
of Internal Revenue and Fair Trade Board, are
without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute
alleged misbranding, mislabeling, and/0r
misleading advertisements of filled milk. The
jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the
Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food
and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of
Health and the Secretary of Justice, also
intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be
instituted.
89. ONGKINGCO (President of Galeria de
Magallanes Condominium Association, Inc.) vs.
NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioner Galeria de Magallanes
Condominium Association, Inc. (Galeria for brevity)
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation formed in
accordance with R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known
as the Condominium Act.
Galeria's Board of Directors appointed private
respondent Federico B. Guilas as
Administrator/Superintendent.e was given a
"monthly salary of P10,000 subject to review after
five (5) months and subsequently thereafter as
Galeria's finances improved."[2]
As Administrator, private respondent was tasked
with the maintenance of the "performance and
elegance of the common areas of the condominium
and external appearance of the compound.
However, on 17 March 1992, through a resolution
passed by the Board of Directors of Galeria, private
respondent was not re-appointed as Administrator.
As a result, on 15 May 1992, private respondent
instituted a complaint against petitioners for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of salaries with the
NLRC.
In response, on 22 July 1992, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that it is the SEC, and
not the labor arbiter, which has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaint.
Labor Arbiter Lorenzo granted the aforestated
motion to dismiss.
The NLRC, however, reversed the Labor Arbiter's
order. Petition for certiorari was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue falls within the
jurisdiction of th NLRC.
ATTY. CABRAS
HELD: No. The case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC. Under P.D 902-A, the SEC
has exclusive jrisdiction over controversies in the
election or appointment of directors, trustees,
officers, or managers of such corporations,
partnerships or associations. P.D 902-A, Sec. 5(c).
The Solicitor General contends that the case at bar
falls outside the purview of the aforequoted
provision. He insists that private respondent was a
mere employee of petitioner corporation being
tasked mainly, as administrator/superintendent,
with the upkeep of the condominium's common
areas. He, thus, maintains that private respondent
cannot be deemed a corporate officer because "it is
the nature of one's functions and not the
nomenclature or title given to one's job which
determines one's status in a corporation.
The contentions of public respondent lack merit.
That private respondent is an officer of petitioner
corporation and not its mere employee cannot be
questioned. The by-laws of the Galeria de
Magallanes Condominium Association specifically
includes the Superintendent/Administrator in its
roster of corporate officers.
In the case at bar, considering that herein
petitioner, unlike an ordinary employee, was
appointed by respondent corporation's Board of
Trustees in its memorandum of October 30, 1990,
she is deemed an officer of the corporation.
Perforce, Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No.
902-A, which provides that the SEC exercises
exclusive jurisdiction over controversies in the
election or appointment of directors, trustees,
officers or managers of corporations, partnerships
or associations, applies in the present dispute.
Accordingly, jurisdiction over the same is vested in
the SEC, and not in the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is given
DUE COURSE, the assailed resolutions of the
NLRC are hereby REVERSED and the Order of the
Labor Arbiter dated 29 December 1992
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
90. Yu vs Defensor-Santiago
Facts
Petitioner Yu was originally a Portuguese
national who was naturalized as a Philippine
citizen. However, he petitioner applied for and was
issued a renewed Portuguese Passport by the
Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in
Tokyo. The CID (Commission on Immigration and
Deportation) detained the petitioner pending his
deportation case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a
petition for habeas corpus.
Issue
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Whether a writ of habeas corpus should be
issued
Held
No. The foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport 23 and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship. Philippine citizenship, it must be
stressed, is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
91. BOISER vs CA
Facts
Petitioner Boiser and private respondent
PLDT entered into a contract denominated as
"Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound
itself to provide Premiere with long distance and
overseas facilities through the use of a PLDT relay
station.  Petitioner on the other hand had the
obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities
provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay
switching services and qualified radio operators,
and otherwise maintain the required standards in
the operation of facilities under the agreement.
Later, without any prior notice to the petitioner,
respondent PLDT issued a "circuit authorization
order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees
Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the
connection of PLDT's relay station with the
facilities of the petitioner's telephone system. To
avert serious consequences to the public and
private hours resulting from any disruption of the
telephone network and to the long distance and
overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was
compelled to seek judicial relief. It filed a case with
the CFI which issued a TRO against PLDT.
The petitioner filed a petition with the CA alleging
that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter because it is NTC that has jurisdiction.
Issue
ATTY. CABRAS
Whether the NTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held
The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT
has made no showing of any, not even by
necessary implication, to decide an issue involving
breach of contract. And as the Court stated
in RCPI v. Board of Communications, "if in the two
cases before us, complainants Diego Morales and
Pacifica Inocencio allegedly suffered injury due to
petitioner's breach of contractual obligation, ... the
proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances
for possible recovery of damages against petitioner
should be in the courts and not in the respondent
Board of Communications." Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It
cannot be conferred by the will of the parties. The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. 
92. GORDON VS VERIDIANO
FACTS:
Food and Drug Administration and the
mayor of Olongapo City are in conflict over the
power to grant and revoke licenses for the
operation of drug stores in the said city. While
conceding that the FDA possesses such power, the
mayor claims he may nevertheless, in the exercise
of his own power, prevent the operation of drug
stores previously permitted by the former.
San Sebastian Drug Store and Olongapo City Drug
Store, both owned by Rosalinda Yambao were
covered by Mayor's Permits and licenses to operate
issued by the FDA. A joint team composed of
agents from the FDA and narcotics agents
conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug
Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg.
without a doctor's prescription. A report on the
operation was submitted to the petitioner wherein
it revoked the Mayor’s permit. Vice-Mayor de Perio,
caused the posting of a signboard at the San
Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent
closure. FDA Administrator Arsenio Regala,
directed the closure of the drug store and lifted the
same after noting that the penalties imposed had
already been discharged and allowed the drug
store to resume operations. Yambao, through her
counsel, wrote a letter to the petitioner seeking
reconsideration of the revocation of Mayor's Permit.
Having received no reply, she and her husband
filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a complaint for
mandamus and damages, with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction, against the petitioner
and de Perio. Yambao requested permission from
the FDA to exchange the locations of drug stores
for reasons of "business preference." The request
was granted. But when informed of this action, the
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
petitioner disapproved the transfers and
suspended Mayor's Permit for the Olongapo City
Drug Store.
Respondent judge issued an order directing the
maintenance of the status quo with respect to the
Olongapo City Drug Store pending resolution of the
issues. Petitioner wrote the FDA requesting
reconsideration of its order, allowing resumption of
the operation of the San Sebastian Drug Store but
the same was denied. The court declared the
Mayor's Permit for the San Sebastian Drug Store
as null and void. A writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction was issued and the said drug store
resumed in its normal business operation.
ISSUE: W/N FDA or the Mayor has jurisdiction in
revoking Yambao’s permit.
HELD:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings
of administrative authorities are accorded great
respect because of their acknowledged expertise in
the fields of specialization to which they are
assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this
Court, are concluded by such findings in the
absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion, which is not present in the case at bar.
For all his experience in the enforcement of city
ordinances, the petitioner cannot claim the
superior aptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement
of the pharmacy and drug addiction laws. He
should therefore also be prepared, like the courts
of justice themselves, to accept its decisions on
this matter.
The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit for
Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the
transfer thereof to the site of the San Sebastian
Drug Store as approved by the FDA but without
permission from the petitioner. On this matter, the
Court believes that the final decision rested with
the mayor. The condition violated related more to
the location in Olongapo City of business
establishments in general than to the regulation of
drug stores in particular. It therefore came under
the petitioner's jurisdiction.
The FDA would have the right to disapprove the
site of the drug store only if it would impair the
health or other interests of the customers in
contravention of the national laws or policies, as
where the drug store is located in an unsanitary
site. But the local executive would have reason to
object to the location, even if approved by the FDA,
where it does not conform to, say, a zoning
ordinance intended to promote the comfort and
convenience of the city residents. The challenged
orders are modified in the sense that the
suspension of Mayor's Permit shall be considered
valid but only until the San Sebastian Drug Store
ATTY. CABRAS
and the Olongapo City Drug Store return to their
original sites as specified in the FDA licenses and
the mayor's permits or until the request for
transfer, if made by the private respondents, is
approved by the petitioner.
93. Union Bank of the Philippines vs Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board
G.R. No. 95364 (June 29, 1992)
210 SCRA 558
FACTS:
In this case, Martha David purchased a
condominium unit from Fereit Realty Development
Corporation. Without her knowledge, and without
the approval of the National Housing Authority,
mortgaged the condominium project to Bancom,
predecessor-interest of Union Bank of the
Philippines as a security for loan. FDRC failed to
pay its obligation to Bancom. Martha David and
Teresita Quazon filed a complaint in the HLURB
against FRDC, UBP and FEBTC to annul the title
of UBP and FEBTC over David’s condominium
unit and to order the issuance of a new certificate
of title in his name. UBP and FEBTC filed their
answer questioning HLURB’s jurisdiction over the
case and filed a motion on the same ground.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is correct on
assailing HLURB’s jurisdiction.
HELD:
No. The act of a subdivision developer mortgaging
the subdivision without notifying an installment
buyer is violative P.D. 957. Case falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. Clearly,
FRDC’s act of mortgaging the condominium project
to Bancom and FEBTC without the knowledge and
consent of David as buyer of a unit therein, and
without the approval of NHA (now HLURB) as
required by P.D. 957, was not only an unsound
real estate business practice but also highly
prejudicial to the buyer. David, who has a cause of
action for annulment of mortgage, the mortgage
foreclosure sale, and the condominium certificate
of the title that was issued to the UBP and FEBTC
as highest bidders at the sale. The case falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of NHA (now HLURB) as
provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No.
1344 of 1978.
94. G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.*
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RP VS MIGRINO
TOPIC: Jurisdiction
FACTS: Acting on information received by
the New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the
acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income,
private respondent Ret. Lt. Tecson was required by
the Board to submit his explanation/comment
together with his supporting evidence. Private
respondent was unable to produce his supporting
evidence because they were allegedly in the
custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.
The Board proceeded with its investigation and
submitted its resolution, recommending that
private respondent be prosecuted and tried for
violation of Rep. Act No.3019, as amended, and
Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. The case was set
for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private
respondent moved to dismiss the case on the
following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no
jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action
against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already
prescribed; (3)that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it
suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on
prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his
case; and (4) that having retired from the AFP, he
was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No.3019.
The Board opposed the motion to dismiss. The
PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG.
Private respondent was directed to submit his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence.
Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction with the RTC.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed
the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on the principal ground that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing
the case of PCGG v. Pena. Private respondent
opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to
the opposition. The court judge denied petitioner’s
motion to dismiss. The respondent judge granted
the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from
investigating or prosecuting private respondent
under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the
filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos. Petitioner strongly argues that the private
respondent’s case falls within the jurisdiction of
the PCGG. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the court could act on cases
with exclusive jurisdiction to Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Yes, Petitioner assails the trial court’s
cognizance of the petition filed by private
ATTY. CABRAS
respondent. Particularly, petitioner argues that the
trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
PCGG. This matter has already been settled in
Peña, supra, where the Court ruled that those who
wish to question or challenge the PCGG’s acts or
orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan,
which is vested with exclusive and original
jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan’s decisions and
final orders are in turn subject to review on
certiorari exclusively by this Court. [Ibid, at pp.
564-565]. The ruling inPeña was applied in PCGG
v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163
SCRA 363, Soriano III v. Yuson, G.R. No. 74910
(and five other cases), August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA
226 and Olaguer v. RTC, NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No.
81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 478, among
others, to enjoin the regional trial courts from
interfering with the actions of the PCGG.
95. NASIPIT LUMBER VS. NLRC – 177 SCRA 93
Facts:
Private respondent Juanito Collado was
employed by petitioner as security guard. In the
course of his employment, 4 crates of lawanit
boards were stolen. He was implicated in the theft
and thereafter placed under preventive suspension.
NALCO then filed an application with the Regional
Office of the Department of Labor for clearance to
dismiss Collado. The application was approved by
Officer-in-Charge Rey Seneres. The said officer
certified the case to the labor arbiter who, after
perusal of records, returned the case to the
Regional Director, who recommended that the case
be elevated to the Secretary of Labor. The acting
Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of Seneres
granting petitioner’s application for clearance to
dismiss Collado.
Collado then filed a complaint before the
District Labor Office for unjust dismissal and
reinstatement with backwages and benefits.
NALCO filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground
that the order of the Acting Secretary of Labor had
become final and executory, making the issue of
illegal dismissal res judicata. The Labor Arbiter
ordered NALCO to reinstate Collado without
backwages. Both parties appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision
adding backwages.
Issue: Whether or not the principle of res judicata
applies.
Held: The Court stated therein that the principle of
res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations
proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are
“non-litigious and summary in nature without
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of
law.” Said pronouncement is in consonance with
the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
96. Under Enforcement of Agency Action and
Reorganization/Dissolution of Agencies:
GODELIVA S. DULAY, Petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
Facts:
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this
Court and asks Us to confine public respondent
Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources within his jurisdiction and to uphold the
principle of res judicata in administrative
proceedings by nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978
order giving due course to the letter-petition of
private respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for
the reopening of Fishpond Conflict case of Mrs.
Angeles Dico against Juan Quibete, Petronilo
Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and
the "Cancellation of Fishpond Lease Agreement No.
2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay"
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases
decided by the Office of the President, both of
which have attained finality. To wit:
Re: DANR Case No. 2898
entitled "Angeles Dico
v. Juan Quibete
That by a barter agreement entered into between
Juan Quibete and Jose Padios sometime in 1932,
the former exchanged his parcel of land situated at
Sitio Palaypay, municipality of San Dionisio,
province of Iloilo, for the latter's fishpond area of
about 24 hectares located at sitio Talaba-an,
municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz City), province of
Negros Occidental. That Juan Quibete, also in
1932, applied for a Fish and Game Special Permit
over the area .His application was approved on
February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No. F-
738-E was issued.
Dico applied for fish pond permit over the same
area, and was disapproved due to the existing
permit of Quibete.
Quibete meanwhile sold and/or transferred his
rights and interests over the area under Fishpond
Permit No. F-738-E to one Petronilo Retirado.
Dico protested such transfer but was dismissed.
That after denial of a motion for reconsideration,
she appealed to the Office of the President. Her
appeal was in turn dismissed in the decision of
November 14, 1969.chanrobles
2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447
entitled "F.P.A. No.
ATTY. CABRAS
V-3-3852, Angeles Dico,
Applicant-Appellant v.
Juan Quibete, Claimant-
Appellee
Private respondent Angeles Dico filed with the
Director of Lands a free patent application (No. V-
3-3852) for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot 489-C
covered by Fishpond Permit 
No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete, the latter in turn
protested.
That the Director of Lands rejected said
application.
That a motion for reconsideration having been
denied, private respondent Dico appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider
the Secretary's decision, Annex "F", but her motion
was denied on January 26, 1971. A second motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied per Order
dated May 5, 1971.
Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay)
succeeded to the rights and interests over the area
in question. On May 21, 1973, the heirs of
Petronilo Retirado executed a "Deed of Sale of
Fishpond Improvements and Transfer of Rights"
(Annex "J") transferring their rights and interests
in favor of the petitioner over a portion of Lot No.
489-Cconsisting of 19.15 hectares, more or less,
and covered by their Fishpond Permit No.
1582.chanr
On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles
Dico) submitted a letter-petition to the respondent
officials (Annex "L") requesting for a "reopening of
fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete,
Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay
based on newly discovered evidence". It was there
alleged that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan
Quibete did not cover the area in question (Lot No.
489-C) located in Sitio Talaba-an, Municipality of
Cadiz (now Cadiz City) but Lot No. 487 located in
Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. She prayed that
petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2169 be
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, a new one be issued
in her name.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on
the ground of res judicata.
Issue: Whether or not res judicata is applicable.
Ruling: Yes!
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that
the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial
authority, have, upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule
of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent
Page 73 of 82
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction.  The vessel M/V “Crazy Horse” arrived on
DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs.
Juan Quibete" was decided by the Office of the
President on November 14, 1969. 11Since the same
was not brought to the courts for judicial review,
the same has long become final and
executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs.
Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent Application No.
V-3-385 of private respondent Dico. The Director of
Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected
her application. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources affirmed the same on July 9,
1970. 12The findings of fact in said DANR case,
which were found by the Secretary to be the same
facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are deemed
conclusive by operation of law. 13Said DANR case,
not having been brought likewise to the courts for
judicial review has also become final and
executory.
The matter having become final as of August or
September 1970, 27it was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of public respondent Director of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give
due course to private-respondent's letter-petition of
October 28, 1977 requesting for a re-opening of the
fishpond conflict involved herein.
Petition Granted
97. G.R. No. May 17, 1993
101426
PETITIONER PHILIPPINE AMERICAN
GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC.
RESPONDENTS COURT OF APPEALS and
TRANSPACIFIC TOWAGE,
INC.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari where
Philippine American General Insurance Company,
Incorporated (Philamgen) assails the decision of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila and entered a new
one dismissing the Philamgen’s complaint which
sought to collect the sum of P1,511,210.00 from
the Transpacific Towage, Inc.
Davao Union Marketing Corporation of Davao City
shipped on board the vessel M/V “Crazy Horse”
operated by the Transpacific Towage, Inc. cargo
ATTY. CABRAS
consisting of construction materials consigned to
Bicol Union Center insured by Philamgen.
September 7, 1985 as scheduled at the port of
Pasacao, Camarines Sur. Bicol Union Center was
also notified forthwith of the arrival time.
Unfortunately, the discharging, could not be
effected immediately and continuously due to the
ff:
1. the buoys were installed only
on September 11, 1985;
2. the discharge permit was
secured by the consignee
only on September 13, 1985;
3. a wooden catwalk had to be
installed and extension of
the wharf had to be made,
which was completed only on
September 26, 1985;
4. the discharging was not
continuous because there
were intermittent rains and
the stevedores supplied by
the consignee did not work
during the town fiesta.
Pending discharge of the cargo’s remainder,
a strong typhoon named Saling hit the area.
As a result, the vessel’s anchor chain
stopper released its clutch; the vessel was
dragged against the rocks, eventually
destroyed and partially sank. People of the
barrio came and started looting the vessel.
As a result, nothing was left of the
remaining cargo.
Forty (40) days from the time the vessel
arrived and thirty-four (34) days from the
time actual discharge of the cargo
commenced before Saling came.
The total number of cement bags damaged
and/or lost was 26,424 costing
P1,056,960.00 while there were 4,000
pieces of the GI sheets unrecovered, the
cost of which was P454,250.00.
Hence, as the insurer, Philamgen was bound to
pay Davao Union Marketing Corporation the sum
of P1,511,210.00. Then, it sought to recover what
it paid from Transpacific Towage, Inc. but
Transpacific refused to do so. Thusly, Philamgen
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money
before the RTC.
Transpacific, as one of its arguments for the
dismissal of the case, said that the doctrine of res
judicata applies in the case at bar, because the
Board of Marine Inquiry rendered a decision
(acting on the marine protest filed on 19 October
1985 by the shipmaster of M/V “Crazy Horse”)
holding that said shipmaster was not guilty of
“negligence as the proximate cause of the
grounding and subsequent wreckage of M/V
“Crazy Horse”, hence, recommending that the
captain, his officers and crew be absolved from any
administrative liability arising out of the subject
incident.”
RTC ruled that although the immediate cause of
the loss may have been due to an act of God, the
defendant carrier had exposed the property to the
accident because of unreasonable delay anchoring
its decision on Article 1740 of the Civil Code which
provides that if the common carrier negligently
incurs in delay in transporting the goods, a natural
disaster shall not free the carrier from
responsibility.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court and
ruled instead that private respondent, as a
common carrier, is not responsible for the loss of
the insured cargo involved in the case at bar, as
said loss was due solely to a fortuitous event.
According to the CA, the delay in fully unloading
the cargo from the vessel “was occasioned by
causes that may not be attributed solely to human
factors, among which were the natural conditions
of the port where the M/V “Crazy Horse” had
docked, the customs of the place and the weather
conditions.
Issue/s:
1. Whether delay for the unloading of the Cargo is
attributable to Transpacific so as to not exempt it
from liability due to fortuitous event?
2. Whether the case filed by Philamgen is barred by
the doctrine of res judicata?
Ruling:
1. No, the delay in the discharge was not
negligence attributable to any party, in particular,
to Transpacific.
2. No, the case is not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
ATTY. CABRAS
Ratio Decidendi:
1. We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither
of the parties herein could be faulted for such
delay, for the same (delay) was due not to
negligence, but to several factors earlier discussed.
The cargo having been lost due to typhoon
“Saling”, and the delay incurred in its unloading
not being due to negligence, private respondent is
exempt from liability for the loss of the cargo,
pursuant to Article 1740 of the Civil Code.
2. The resolution of the present case is not barred
by the judgment of the Board of Marine Inquiry.
One of the requisites of the principle of res judicata
is that there must be, among other things, identity
of subject matters and causes of action between a
first and second case in order that the judgment in
the prior case may bar that in the subsequent
case.
The cause of action in the marine protest was to
enforce the administrative liability of the
shipmaster/captain of M/V “Crazy Horse”, its
officers and crew for the wreckage and sinking of
the subject vessel. On the other hand, the cause of
action at bar is to enforce the civil liability of
private respondent, a common carrier, for its
failure to unload the subject cargo within a period
of time considered unreasonably long by the
petitioner.
While it may be true that the Court is bound to
accord great weight to factual findings of the
Board,9 we hold that the protest filed before it and
the present case assert different causes of action
and seek different reliefs.
Doctrine Learned:
Res judicata doctrine does not apply to courts
where prior decision was done by Board of Marine
Inquiry.
98. APOLEGA V. HIZON
25 SCRA 336
Topic: Enforcement of Agency Action and
reorganization/dissolution of agencies
Facts:
This case involves a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction in
connection to the writ of execution from the
Department of Labor through its Regional Office’s
deputized officials. Petitioner is the employer of the
respondent’s late husband. The respondent’s late
Page 75 of 82
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
husband was a former employee of the petitioner
which suffered injury from the render of service to
the latter. As result of the injury, the employee
filed a claim for compensation for the injury
sustained. The Regional Director issued an award
requiring petitioner to pay the claimant for a sum
of money. Petitioner was given a letter from the
Chief Administrative Section in connection with
claim which the former fails to answer. Due to the
injury, the respondent’s husband died. A year after
the husband’s death, petitioner, as guardian ad
litem of their minor children, filed a death
compensation claim which was granted.
The petitioner filed a "Motion to Vacate the Award
and Motion to Dismiss the Case," which was
granted but was not acted upon by the petitioner.
The award became final and executory and
remanded the case to the Regional Office a quo for
appropriate action. Thus, the petitioner elevated
the case to the Supreme Court, alleging, among the
others, that the Commission or the duly deputized
officials in the Regional Offices of the Department
of Labor have no authority to issue writs of
execution, and questions the constitutionality of
Section 17, Republic Act 4119, which amended
Section 51 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
and vests such authority in the Commission and
its duly deputized officials.
Issue: WON the Commission or the duly deputized
officials in the Regional Offices of the Department
of Labor have no authority to issue a writ of
execution.
Held:
Yes, the Commission or the duly deputized officials
in the Regional Offices of the Departme nt of
Labor have authority to issue a writ of execution.
Originally the power to enforce a final award made
under the Workmen's Compensation Act was
vested "in any court of record in the jurisdiction of
which the accident occurred" (Sec. 61, Act 3428).
Subsequently, pursuant to Republic Act 997, as
amended by Republic Act 1241, and as effected by
Reorganization Plan 20-A adopted in 1956, the
authority to enforce awards was transferred from
the courts of justice to the Regional Administrator
and the Workmen's Compensation Commission,
This Court, in a number of cases, nullified writs of
execution issued by the Regional Offices and by the
Commission on the ground that Reorganization
Plan 20-A, insofar as it purported to grant such
power, was without legislative authority or
sanction.
As the law now stands, however, the power to
enforce awards under the Workmen's
Compensation Act is expressly vested in the
Commission or the duly deputized officials in the
ATTY. CABRAS
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor (R.A.
4119). This grant of power does not contravene the
Constitution. Execution is a necessary step in the
enforcement of the award, and while it is
procedural in nature and therefore essentially falls
within the rule-making power of this Court, it may
be legislated upon by Congress under its
constitutional authority to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure x x x." (Section 13, Article VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines). In Republic Act
4119 the legislative intent to vest in the
Commission the power to enforce its awards is
clear, in contrast of Republic Act 997, which did
not authorize the Reorganization Commission to
transfer such judicial power from the courts of
justice to the officials appointed or offices created
under Reorganization Plan 20-A. In Lo Chi, et al. v.
De Leon, et al., L-18584, Jan. 30, 1967, where the
Regional Administrator issued a writ of execution
to enforce a compensation award, we held that
"inasmuch as the writ of execution WAS issued by
Regional Administrator De Leon on Dec. 2, 1960,
before the effectivity of Republic Act 4119, the said
writ is there-fore null and void," thus impliedly
upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act
4119.
Referential Syllabus:
Workmen's Compensation Act; Claim for
compensation; Effect of failure to controvert claim;
Where allegation of lack of notice and hearing
cannot be sustained; Case at bar.—In the present
case, petitioner's (employer) allegation of lack of
notice and hearing cannot be sustained Petitioner
failed to controvert the claims (injury and death)
for compensation, as required by Section 45 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. By reason of such
failure petitioner waived his right to present
evidence concerning the claims and therefore
cannot complain that he was not duly heard.
Under the circumstances the hearing officer could
make the award without the necessity of a formal
hearing, treating the claim as uncontested and
thus dispensing with the reception of evidence. As
to the failure of the claimant to f ile the claim
within the time prescribed in Section 24 of the Act,
the same was non-jurisdictional and did not
constitute a bar to the proceeding, considering that
the employer did not suffer by such delay or
failure.
Same; Effect of partial payment of benefits.—Where
the employer had paid the total amount of P530.00
—P480.00 when the employee was still alive and
P50.00 after his death, such partial payment of
benefits renders it unnecessary to file the claims
(injury and death) within the time limit provided
for under Section 24 of the Workmen's
Page 76 of 82
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Compensation Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4119.
Same; Power to enforce awards; Original and
present law; Constitutionality of Republic Act No.
4119 upheld.—Originally the power to enforce a
final award made under the Workmen's
Compensation Act was vested "in any court of
record in the jurisdiction of which the accident
occurred" (Sec. 61, Act 3428). Subsequently,
pursuant to Republic Act 997, as amended by
Republic Act 1241, and as effected by
Reorganization Plan 20-A adopted in 1956, the
authority to enforce awards was transferred from
the courts of justice to the Regional Administrator
and the Workmen's Compensation Commission,
This Court, in a number of cases, nullified writs of
execution issued by the Regional Offices and by the
Commission on the ground that Reorganization
Plan 20-A, insofar as it purported to grant such
power, was without legislative authority or
sanction.
As the law now stands, however, the power to
enforce awards under the Workmen's
Compensation Act is expressly vested in the
Commission or the duly deputized officials in the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor (R.A.
4119). This grant of power does not contravene the
Constitution. Execution is a necessary step in the
enforcement of the award, and while it is
procedural in nature and therefore essentially falls
within the rule-making power of this Court, it may
be legislated upon by Congress under its
constitutional authority to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure x x x." (Section 13, Article VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines). In Republic Act
4119 the legislative intent to vest in the
Commission the power to enforce its awards is
clear, in contrast of Republic Act 997, which did
not authorize the Reorganization Commission to
transfer such judicial power from the courts of
justice to the officials appointed or offices created
under Reorganization Plan 20-A. In Lo Chi, et al. v.
De Leon, et al., L-18584, Jan. 30, 1967, where the
Regional Administrator issued a writ of execution
to enforce a compensation award, we held that
"inasmuch as the writ of execution WAS issued by
Regional Administrator De Leon on Dec. 2, 1960,
before the effectivity of Republic Act 4119, the said
writ is there-fore null and void," thus impliedly
upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act
4119.
99. Merano vs. Tutaan (115 SCRA 343, [No. L-
56833], 20 July 1982)
Facts:
The National Labor Relations Commission
ATTY. CABRAS
in a decision ordered San Miguel Corporation to
reinstate Ramon V. Merano to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and other rights
and benefits to which he is entitled under existing
laws and with backwages from December 16, 1977
up to his reinstatement.
Pursuant to that decision, Merano was paid
P53,949.16 as monetary award up to August 31,
1980 but he was not reinstated. San Miguel
Corporation opposed the reinstatement due to his
supervening physical unfitness and asked that it
be allowed to pay Merano separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.
The NLRC in its en banc resolution of June 11,
1981 ruled that because Merano could no longer
be reinstated due to his illness, he should be paid
his additional backwages and separation pay up to
that date at the rate of one month’s salary for every
year of service, a fraction of at least six months
being considered as one year.
Even before the issuance of that NLRC resolution
of June 11, 1981, or on February 10, 1981,
Merano filed in the Court of First Instance at
Quezon City a special civil action of mandamus
against San Miguel Corporation and the Labor
Arbiter who functioned as the execution arm of the
NLRC.
Respondent Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan, in his order
of April 20, 1981, dismissed Merano’s petition on
the ground that he had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the case which falls within the
competent of the NLRC.
Issue/s: Whether or not the trial court judge was
wrong in dismissing the case. (No)
Held: Respondent judge did not err in dismissing
Merano’s petition for mandamus on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance is
not the proper tribunal to pass upon Merano’s
complaint against the failure of the Labor Arbiter
to enforce the NLRC’s decision to reinstate him to
his former position of sales staff assistant. The
labor tribunal has the same rank and is in the
same category as the Court of First Instance.
100. GSIS vs. CSC
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the order
of the Civil Service Commission(CSC) dated June
20, 1990 which directed the Government Service
Insurance System(GSIS) to pay the compulsory
heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal
separation up to the date of their demise. The
Order dated November 22, 1990, however, denied
herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
CSC’s Order dated June 20, 1990. Deceased Elizar
Namuco and Eusebio Manuel were illegally
dismissed by the GSIS for allegedly being involved
in irregularities in the canvass of supplies and
materials
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has
the power to execute its judgments, final orders or
resolutions?
RULING:
Ruling: The Civil Service Commission has the
power to execute its judgment, final orders or
resolutions. The CSC is a constitutional
commission invested by the Constitution and
relevant laws not only with the authority to
administer the civil service but is also vested with
quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear
and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted directly with it or brought to it on
appeal. The grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, normally and logically is deemed to
include the grant of authority to enforce or execute
the judgments it thus renders unless the law
otherwise provides. It is quite obvious that the
authority to decide cases would be inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has
been decided is carried out. The writ of execution
issued on June 20, 1990 is valid. The Court
upholds the same, simply because there is no fair
and feasible alternative in the circumstances.
The binding force of Resolution of July 4, 1988, for
all intents and purposes, is that it makes
exoneration in the administrative proceedings
a condition precedent to payment of said back
salaries, it cannot however exact an impossible
performance or decree a useless exercise such as
that the subsequent disciplinary proceedings is an
empty, and inutile procedure as to the deceased
employees, they cannot possibly be bound by any
substantiation in the said proceedings of the
abovementioned charges.
101. NATIONAL LAND TITLES and DEEDS
REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION vs CSC
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993.
Facts:
Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws
graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was
appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under
permanent status. Said position was later
reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III
pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner
ATTY. CABRAS
was also appointed under permanent status up to
September 1984. She was for two years, more or
less, designated as Acting Branch Register of
Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of
Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on
February 9, 1981) which authorized the
restructuring of the Land Registration Commission
to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the
Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on
October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not
being a member of the Philippine Bar. She
appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her
request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for
reconsideration but her motion remained unacted.
On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was
administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case
was pending decision, her temporary appointment
as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum
dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now
Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of
the termination of her services as Deputy Register
of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving
bribe money".
However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988,
the Civil Service Commission directed that private
respondent Garcia be restored to her position as
Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the
NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right
theory the new requirement of BAR membership to
qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy
Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under
said Executive Order, would not apply to her
(private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling
up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February
9, 1981, the date said Executive Order took effect.
since private respondent Garcia had been holding
the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II from
1977 to September 1984, she should not be
affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of
Executive Order No. 649.
Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to
assail the validity of the above Resolution of the
Civil Service Commission. It contends that Sections
8 and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all
existing positions in the LRC and transferred their
functions to the appropriate new offices created by
said Executive Order, which newly created offices
required the issuance of new appointments to
qualified office holders. Verily, Executive Order No.
649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not
being a member of the Bar, she cannot be
reinstated to her former position as Deputy
Register of Deeds II.
Issue: Whether or not a law abolishes an office is
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one of legislative intent about which there can be
no controversy and if there is an explicit
declaration in the law itself.
Held:
A closer examination of Executive Order No.
649 which authorized the reorganization of the
Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in
express terms, provided for the abolition of existing
positions. Thus, without need of any
interpretation, the law mandates that from the
moment an implementing order is issued, all
positions in the Land Registration Commission are
deemed non-existent. This, however, does not
mean removal. Abolition of a position does not
involve or mean removal for the reason that
removal implies that the post subsists and that
one is merely separated therefrom. Executive Order
No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the
now defunct LRC and required new appointments
to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA.
There is no dispute over the authority to carry out
a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of
the Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of
the 1973 Constitution. The power to reorganize is,
however; not absolute. This court has pronounced
that if the newly created office has substantially
new, different or additional functions, duties or
powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an
office different from the one abolished, even though
it embraces all or some of the duties of the old
office it will be considered as an abolition of one
office and the creation of a new or different one.
The same is true if one office is abolished and its
duties, for reasons of economy are given to an
existing officer or office. Executive Order No. 649
was enacted to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land Registration
Commission. A reorganization is carried out in
good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the
requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key
positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the
changing circumstances and new development of
the times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly
held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did
not have such qualification. It is thus clear that
she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA,
The additional qualification was not intended to
remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion
imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization
measure.
ATTY. CABRAS
102. CRISOSTOMO vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was
appointed by the President of the Philippines as
the President of the Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC) on July 17, 1974. During his
incumbency as president of the PCC, two
administrative cases were filed against petitioner
for illegal use of government vehicles,
misappropriation of construction materials
belonging to the college, oppression and
harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and
dishonesty. The administrative cases, which were
filed with the Office of the President, were
subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation. On October 22, 1976,
petitioner was preventively suspended from office
pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, as amended. In his
place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as
officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and then
as Acting President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, converting
the Philippine college of commerce into a
polytechnic university, defining its objectives,
organizational structure and functions, and
expanding its curricular offerings.
Mateo continued as the head of the new University.
On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting
President and on March 28, 1980, as President for
a term of six (6) years.
On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of
the charges against him. On February 12, 1992,
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a
motion for execution of the judgment, particularly
the part ordering his reinstatement to the position
of president of the PUP and the payment of his
salaries and other benefits during the period of
suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of
execution was issued by the trial court on March 6,
1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President
Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as
acting president of the PUP, following the
expiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio
Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner
was one of the five nominees considered by the
President of the Philippines for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of the PCC
into PUP abolished the PCC.
RULING: No. In part the contention is well taken,
but, as will presently be explained, reinstatement
is no longer possible because of the promulgation
of P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the Philippines
on June10, 1978. P.D. No. 1437 did not abolish,
but only changed, the former Philippine College of
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Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, in the same way that
earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what
was then the Philippine School of Commerce into
the Philippine College of Commerce. What took
place was a change in academic status of the
educational institution, not in its corporate life.
Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its
curricular offerings, and the changes in its
structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when
the purpose is to abolish a department or an
office or an organization and to replace it with another
one, the lawmaking authority says so.
But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position
of president of the PUP could not be ordered by the
trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had
been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of
state universities and colleges at six
(6) years, renewable for another term of six
(6) years, and
authorizing the President of the Philipp
ines to terminate the terms of incumbe
n t s   w h o   w e r e   n o t reappointed.
103. Blaquera vs. Civil Service Commission
FACTS:
The petitioners and intervenors who are
permanent employees in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) filed
this petition for prohibition and mandamus to stop
the respondents from removing them from their
positions in the DENR pursuant to the 1987
reorganization of that department under an
Executive Order. To carry out said reorganization,
the DENR Secretary submitted to the Department
of Budget and Management a staffing pattern
consisting of 24,614 positions. The DBM released a
revised staffing pattern containing 23,612
positions only which was 1,002 positions less than
what the DENR Secretary requested and which still
did not include the positions of the petitioners. The
DENR requested the DBM to restore 839 positions
which DBM had disapproved earlier. The request
was approved after long negotiations between the
DENR and DBM, subject to the condition that
these positions shall be coterminous with the
appointees but not to exceed three (3) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not reorganization is a
recognized valid ground for separation of civil
service employees.
HELD:
The right of the State to reorganize the
ATTY. CABRAS
government resulting in the separation of career
civil service employees under the 1987
Constitution is beyond dispute but said
reorganization, ouster and appointments of
successors must be made in good faith. That the
reorganization of the DENR was not intended to
achieve economy and efficiency, is revealed by the
admission in the public respondents’ Comment
that the new staffing pattern of the department
contains “991 positions more than the total
number of permanent positions in the DENR before
the reorganization.” Since the abolition of their
positions will not conduce to either “efficiency” or
“economy” in the Service, which are the principal
justifications for any government overhaul, then,
obviously, the reorganization of the DENR is not
justified. The conversion of the petitioners from
permanent to coterminous employees is a
wholesale demotion of personnel which is
tantamount to removal without cause and without
due process. The Court held that the removal of
the petitioners and intervenors from office is
declared null and void. The respondent Secretary
of the DENR or his successor in office, is ordered to
reinstate the petitioners to their former or
equivalent positions in the DENR.
104. DTI V CSC
FACTS:
EO 133 was promulgated (reorganizing the
Dept of trade and industry )which provides that the
NACIDA(nat’l cottage industry development
authority) was to be reorganized into the CITC
(cottage industry technology Center) and attached
to DTI. Pursuant to EO 133. DTI issued
Memorandum Circular no. 28 expressing the
guidelines for the evaluation and the placement of
DTI personel.
Espejo, who was a Division Chief II, Public
Relations and Management Staff Service, of
NACIDA, was assessed and evaluated and found
that Espejo not to be sufficiently qualified for
retention. A termination later was issued to her.
Later, she was offered the position of Industrial
Development Specialist, Operations Department,
CITC, which was four (4) ranges lower than her
previous position.  She turned down the offer;
instead, she appealed her case to the DTI-RAB. 
DTI RAB in favor of DTI
CSC ruled that Espejo should be given any position
comparable to her previous position(Division Chief
II)
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
ISSUE: W/N Espejo should be given position
comparable to her previus postion?
HELD:   We find particular merit on the evidence submitted
YES. Republic Act No. 6656, "An Act to
Protect the Security Tenure of Civil Service Officers
and Employee in the Implementation of
Government Reorganization," in part, provides:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career
service shall be removed except for a valid
cause and after due notice and hearing A valid
cause for removal exists when pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization, a position had been abolished
or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of
any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered its evidence of bad faith in the removals
made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a
claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an
aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is
created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by less qualified
in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of officers
in the department of agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the
same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of
separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
"(i)t is a paramount principle in Public Officers Law
that the power to abolish public offices rested in
the legislature is not absolute, (and that it) is
subject to the limitations that it be exercised in
good faith, should never be for personal or political
reasons, and cannot be implemented in a manner
contrary to law." It may be recalled that after 02
February 1987, any reorganization undertaken by
government is also circumscribed by the provisions
and safeguards of the new Constitution.
Section 18 (e) of E.O. No. 133 provides that
NACIDA is merely reorganized as CITC, and its
functions other than technology development and
training, were transferred to the Bureau of Small
and Medium Scale Business Development
(BSMBD) and relevant operating units of the
Department (DTI). Thus, the function of NACIDA
are merely transferred to other units of DTI, it
follows that its personnel performing particular
ATTY. CABRAS
functions shall also be transferred to the
corresponding units.
by Espejo that incumbents were replaced by those
less qualified in terms of educational qualification,
performance and merit.  Espejo "undoubtedly
possesses education and work experience to
perhaps, merit retention in the service."(CHIEF OF
DIVISION for 11yeears/MASTERAL DEGREE)
105. Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of
Appeals
FACTS:
The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was
created by PD No. 272, in order, generally, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry in
the Philippines. Initially, it was created for a term
of 5 years but when its original term expired, its
term was extended for another 10 years by EO No.
555. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a
wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is an entity wholly
owned by the National Government embarked on
an expansion program which includes the
construction of a steel mill in Iligan City.
Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President
withdrawing from sale or settlement a tract of land
in Iligan City to be used by the NSC. However,
certain portions of the public land under
Proclamation 2239 were occupied by Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Co. (MCFC). LOI No. 1277 was
issued directing NSC to negotiate with the owners
of MCFC for and on behalf of the Government for
the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy
rights on the subject land. The LOI directed that
ISA may exercise the power of eminent domain
should the negotiations fail. The negotiations failed
and ISA commenced expropriation proceedings
against MCFC. While trial was on-going the
statutory existence of ISA had expired prompting
MCFC to file the dismissal of the case since ISA
has ceased to be a juridical person. The trial court
granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss anchoring on the
Rules of Court that “only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties to a
civil case.” ISA moved for a reconsideration
contending that despite the expiration of its term,
its juridicial existence continued until the winding
up of its affairs could be completed. In the
alternative ISA urged that the Rep. of the
Philippines should be allowed to be substituted in
its place. The RTC denied its motion for
reconsideration. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS
Whether or not the Republic of the in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation
Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in proceedings.
view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

HELD:
There is no provision in PD No. 272
recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the Government. ISA in fact
appears to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that
other agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government of the Republic are case in corporate
form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or
instrumentalities, sometimes with and other times
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a
juridical personality distinct from the personality of
the Republic. The term “Authority” has been used to
designate both incorporated and non-incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.
The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded
as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate
and juridical person vested with full panoply of
powers and attributes which are compendiously
described as “legal personality.”
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated
agency expires, the powers, duties and functions
as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency
revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the
Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of
special provisions of law specifying some other
disposition thereof such as e.g. devolution or
transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc.
to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one,
the consequences of such expiry must be looked for,
in the first instance, in the charter of that agency
and, by way of supplementation in the provisions of
the Corporation Code. Since ISA is a non-
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and
liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into
the Government of the Philippines and hence
assumed once again by the Republic, no special
statutory provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some other entity
or agency of the Republic.
It follows that the Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the
statutory term of ISA having expired. The expiration
of ISA’s statutory did not by itself require or justify
the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
Further, no new legislative act is necessary should
the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA,
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