Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil.

635 (1940)

(due process and right to present evidence)

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a
number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned
the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of
NLU while  no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were
laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely
busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The
Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents
obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so
inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court
of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records
include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously
accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound
by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:

(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2)     Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.

(3)     While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right,
it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support
it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)     Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion
but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.

(5)     The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6)     The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7)     The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its

decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No. 193636 (July 24, 2012)

(compelling state interest over right to privacy)

FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified
her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the
benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her
to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration
of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and
her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos
Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the
right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to
life, liberty or security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this
regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her
were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials,
they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state
interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of
habeas data must be denied
Roquero vs, UP Manila Chancellor, GR No. 181851 (March 9, 2010)

(Speedy disposition of cases)

FACTS:

Petitioner is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the PGH Security Division as

Special Police Captain.Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-
Bataan Security Agency who was applying for a position in the security force assigned
at UP-PGH.

Private respondent Abutal filed a complaint with then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D.
Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against petitioner Capt. Roquero.

The Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty. Zaldy B. Docena,

Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, was organized to hear the instant case.The
Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the completion
of the cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness, the prosecution agreed to
submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or before16 July 1999.

The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the period
agreed upon. Thereafter, on10 August 1999, when the case was called, only petitioner
and his counsel appeared. The prosecution repeatedly failed to appear.

On22 October 1999, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant
(private respondent herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her
exhibits since complainant was not able to file her Formal Offer within the given period
of fifteen (15) days from1 July 1999or up to16 July 1999.

The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years.Due to the
unreasonable delay, petitioner, on19 May 2004 filed another Motion asking for the
dismissal of the administrative case against him based on the following reasons: that
the prosecution had not formally offered its evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on
the motion filed on 22 October 1999; that the unfounded charges in the administrative
complaint were filed just to harass him; and that he is entitled to a just and speedy
disposition of the case.

On26 May 2004, the prosecution alleged that a Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits
had been filed on24 January 2004, of which a copy thereof was received by Atty. Lee,
petitioners counsel, on 30 January 2004, per registry return receipt.However, petitioner
has not filed his comment to the said Formal Offer.

In its petition for certiorari, the CA denied the petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero
reasoning that the ADT did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
orders. Roquero moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was likewise
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated on1 February 2008.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure of the ADT to resolve Roquero's Motion which he seasonably
filed and order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of Exhibit of
complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost five years violated the
constitutional right of the petitioner to a speedy disposition of cases?

HELD:

The petition is granted.

Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service
statesthat the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given period shall
be considered as waiver thereof,the ADT in fact allowed the prosecution to present its
formal offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January 2004.Starting on that date,
petitioner was presented with the choice to either present his evidence or to, as he did,
file a motion to dismiss owing to the extraordinary length of time that ADT failed to rule
on his motion.

While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict

adherence to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings, the same however should not violate the constitutional right of
respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all person shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test
used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay,
the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:

(1) the length of delay;

(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Applying the doctrinal rulings in the case at bar, the violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay
of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which
resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense;
(2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the
right to an early disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss.Over and above
this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the
trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases

was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration
of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.The adjudication of cases must not
only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of
procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of
justice.Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people
guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.

The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside.