Chapter 6.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM

While ancient Greco-Roman authors sometimes adopted positions known as “skepticism,” their motives,
concerns, methods, and so on were quite different from those of philosophers in the Modern period (--roughly
1550 A.D. to 1804 A.D.--). In this chapter, we shall explore the type of radical external world skepticism,
invoked by Rene Descartes’ (1600’s A.D.), which flourished in the Modern period, preoccupying a great deal
of epistemic inquiry all the way through the Modern Period and into the contemporary era. Before we turn our
attention to the primary form of skepticism that shall concern us, let us briefly adumbrate ancient skepticism in
order to set it aside.

Classical Roman and Greek skeptics doubted in order to purge themselves of the desire to achieve theoretical
knowledge. These ancient types of skeptics were seeking a kind of inner “peace” that allegedly comes from
“suspending judgment.” Ancient skeptics emphasize skepticism as a way of life in which serene peace of
mind (ataraxia) is achieved by suspending judgement. What matters, for these ancients, is to
practice ataraxia and to attain mental tranquility. What the skeptical philosopher seeks to provide is not
theory, but something along the lines of “therapy.” In ancient skepticism one suspends judgement, neither
affirming nor denying that anything is “certain” or “veridical.” Other skeptics recognize the fallibility of
human judgment and hold the view that knowing anything with certainty is impossible, so we should just focus
upon peace of mind, tranquility, and anxiety-free living. These classical forms of skepticism enjoyed
popularity in Descartes’s time, and he was unquestionably aware of them. However, the skepticism that he
invokes in utterly different in content, kind, and motivation. His version of epistemic skepticism shares
virtually nothing with classical forms of skepticism. It is important to understand this fact.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650 A.D.) is typically considered to be the founder of Modern philosophy (roughly, the
period of philosophy between 1550 A.D. and 1804 A.D.). Descartes,inter alia, is critical in developing
“systematic doubt” and placing epistemology at the center of philosophy. His motives are contemporaneous
with the scientific revolution. Within mathematics, Descartes invented analytical geometry—an
accomplishment that would have cemented him into history as one of the most important thinkers of the
1600’s. Among his many contributions to philosophy, Descartes devised “foundationalism,” “substance-
Dualism,” and systematic skepticism, thus setting epistemic inquiry at the heart of philosophy. While Descartes
is not a “skeptic,” his systematic skepticism erected a mammoth sized puzzle for the next thirteen
generations of philosophers.

Philosophical Skepticism

Philosophical skepticism typically begins by isolating some common beliefs which are fundamental to our
basic worldview, and whose verity and accuracy we do not question. For example: the belief that a table is in
front of me; I am typing on my computer; the sun is shining…etc. Such beliefs seem “basic,” commonsensical,
and beyond doubt. However, the skeptic then goes on to identify the fundamental basis upon which such
beliefs rest (--such as the reliability of sense experience--). At this point, the skeptic proceeds to show that the
grounding of such beliefs is unjustified. A “mild” skeptic argues that our grounds do not conclusively prove
the beliefs to be true with apodictic certainty. The “radical” skeptic argues that our grounds offer no
reason whatsoever for believing in their truth at all. Radical skepticism is the type of skepticism that is most
interesting to philosophers, particularly philosophers of the Modern period.
It is important to note a crucial distinction among human beliefs. Some beliefs (--while important, perhaps, to
the person who holds them--) are, let us say, “Inessential” in that they do not undermine our basic
commonsense or scientific views of the world. For example, a belief in the afterlife is “inessential” in this
manner. To be clear, such beliefs might be (--and probably are--) very important to some individuals.
However, if that belief turns out to be false our commonsense and scientific beliefs about the world remain
intact. Our basic beliefs, such as the belief that the sun is shining, or the belief that human beings live on earth,
or that I am sitting at my desk, remain intact and unchallenged. The scientific law of gravity, for example,
remains untouched, intact, and unscathed. Thus, discarding a belief in the “afterlife” does not destroy all
commonsense and scientific beliefs, nor would it undermine the very project of attaining knowledge about the
external world; this is what is means to say that such beliefs are “inessential” to the foundations of human
knowledge.

However, many beliefs are not inessential in this sense. An example of an “essential” belief would be that I
inhabit an objective world that is distinct from me, and whose existence does not depend upon my thinking. If I
give up this belief, all of my scientific and commonsense beliefs must be abandoned too. I would find it hard,
or even impossible, to formulate a conception of myself or the world in general. If I were led to the conclusion
that the world and everything in it is just an imaginary, then all of my beliefs would be undermined and laid to
waste. In his Meditations, Descartes contemplates skeptical hypotheses that challenge our
most fundamental and commonsense beliefs about the world.

Descartes’s Infamous Meditations on First Philosophy

Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy are one of the most important works in the Modern period.
Descartes begins his Meditations by asking: “What, if any, of my beliefs are apodictically certain?” Descartes
tells us that in order for there to be anylegitimate knowledge at all, he must start from scratch and lay the
“foundations” of human knowledge. As it stands, human knowledge is a mess of dogmatism, superstition,
opinion, here say, and the like. Thus, he must “rebuild” the edifice of knowledge from the foundations up.
Descartes holds that if and only if knowledge rests upon a firm and solid foundation can beliefs be
genuinely justified and the project of establishing scientific knowledge possible. As the label implies, this
position is called “Foundationalism.” Descartes refers to the metaphor of a foundation numerous times in all
of his major writings, as well as in his letters and correspondences. Within epistemology, “Foundationalism”
holds that knowledge is ultimately based on beliefs that require no further justification, thus providing a
“foundation” for human knowledge. Foundationalism claims that knowledge and epistemic justification has
a tiered structure: Some instances of knowledge and justification are non-inferential, or foundational; all other
instances of knowledge thereof are inferential or non-foundational in that they ultimately derive their
justification from foundational knowledge (which is apodictically certain). Descartes holds that foundational
beliefs must necessarily be apodictically certain and able to guarantee the apodictic certainty of the non-
foundational beliefs they support. As such, the edifice of knowledge looks something like this:

In thinking about his own beliefs, Descartes arrives at the conclusion that many of his beliefs, throughout his
life, have been show to rest upon shaky foundations, as they were later discovered to be utterly false. Many
people, including Descartes, adopt and form beliefs out of hearsay, opinion, conjecture, blind assumption,
prejudice, rumor, myth, superstition, and the like. It is wise, Descartes tells us, to distrust anything that
is notentirely reliable. In order to embark upon the momentous project of scrutinizing his beliefs from the
foundations up, Descartes declares that he would need a reliable “method” for such an undertaking.
Descartes’ Method of Radical Doubt

In his Meditations and in his Discourse on Method, Descartes ponders at length about finding a “correct

method.” To discover a firm foundation of absolute certainty upon which to build an objective system of
knowledge, Descartes devises a method called “radical doubt”—everything is to be doubted. Descartes
proposes to doubt anything and everything that could possibly be doubted, no matter how weak the grounds for
doubting, until he discovered a proposition (or propositions) that are logically indubitable. Such a proposition
(or propositions), would be the absolute certain foundation for all knowledge, the bedrock foundation upon
which the edifice of knowledge is to be erected. It is important to note, however, that “radical doubt” is being
used as a philosophical tool, not as a “practical” guide for living out one’s life. This, immediately,
distinguishes Descartes from ancient skeptics. Furthermore, Descartes does not intend for ordinary human
beings to start running around “doubting” everything. Radical doubt is a philosophical tool, used within the
context of a specific philosophical inquiry, for the purpose of grounding epistemic justification within a “solid”
foundation. Descartes’ ultimate concern pertains to justifying “the new sciences,” particularly physics. Let us
turn to Descartes’s use of radical doubt.

Cases of Sense-Illusion

Descartes quickly acknowledges that most of his beliefs about the world are obtained through sense
experience. He says:

‘Everything which I have thus far accepted as entirely true and assured has been acquired from the senses or by
means of the senses. But I have learned by experience that these senses sometimes mislead me, and it is
prudent never to trust wholly those things which have once deceived us.’

Descartes’ point can be illustrated by considering cases of sense-illusion. When a straight stick is placed in
water it often looks bent. But this is mere illusion, as the stick is straight. Similarly, when driving on a sunny
day it might appear as if there is water in the distance; but when one reaches the “puddle” of “water,” nothing
is there. Even further, we can note that large objects in the far distance appear small to the observer. The sun
(or moon), for example, might appear as a tiny object. In reality, of course, the sun (or moon) is very large. If
florescent lighting is placed in the sockets, one might “see” colors differently than usual. Similarly, a sick,
jaundiced person might see colors (--or taste foods--) different than when her body is healthy. In short, our
senses are often deceived by illusions. Descartes is advising his reader not to trust a “source” that is unreliable.
Since the senses are unreliable on some (or many) occasions, it is best that we do not trust them as the
foundation (or “grounds”) of human knowledge.

Descartes’ preliminary procedure is to show that the inquirer’s ordinary grounds for belief are compatible with
their falsehood. The inquirer had such and such beliefs, on these grounds; but they turned out to be mistaken.
So how does one know that one is not mistakennow? Sense experience is the primary ground/ justification for
beliefs about the physical world. Descartes, in typical skeptical fashion, is undermining our primary grounds
for justifying belief by demonstrating that such a ground is notoriously prone to error. One may suffer
illusions, hallucinations, sensory aberrations, etc. Such illusory experiences seem true when they occur, but of
course they are actually false. However, if the ground for one’s belief is compatible with a skeptical scenario
(--such as sense illusions--), wherein one’s sense experiences are not veridical, then one can conclude that
one’s sense experiences do not provide a sufficient grounds for absolute, apodictic certainty.
While case of sense-illusion sometimes occur, many sense experiences seem to be immune from such
deception. Descartes knows that his reader will not be particularly impressed by that case alone. One might
agree that sometimes people have illusory sense experiences. This might occur if the object of cognition is far
away, or the lighting is strange, or the body is sick. However, could any reasonable person doubt extremely
common, fundamental experiences? For example, would it be reasonable for someone to doubt that she is a
human being, looking out her back window, enjoying a sunny day? Could one reasonably doubt such ordinary,
fundamental experiences? Descartes expresses the same sentiment as follows:

‘But it is possible that, even though the senses occasionally deceive us about things which are barely
perceptible and very far away, there are many other things which we cannot reasonably doubt, even though we
know them through the senses—for example, that I am here seated by the fire, wearing a winter dressing gown,
holding this paper in my hands, and other things of this nature. And how could I deny that these hands and this
body are mine, unless I am to compare myself with certain lunatics whose brain is so troubled and befogged by
the black vapors of the bile that they continually affirm that they are kings while they are paupers, that they are
clothed in gold and purples while they are naked; or imagine that their body is glass. But this is ridiculous;
such men are fools, and I would be no less insane then they if I followed their example.’

Descartes, in effect, acknowledges that our fundamental beliefs about the world are grounded in sense
experience, and that such basic experiences seem completely immune to such doubt unless the person is
psychologically unbalanced. Only a person suffering a psychotic break would doubt that her most fundamental,
average perceptions of the world are totally false. Could the inquirer really doubt, for example, that she has two
hands, a body, and is sitting in her living room? In order to fully explore this possibility, Descartes invokes his
infamous “Dream Hypothesis.”

The Dream Hypothesis

Infamously, Descartes recalls that on other occasions he had believed he was sitting before the fire, looking at
his hands, only to awaken later to discover that it was all a dream. Descartes realizes that there is no test to
prove with absolute certainty that at any given moment one is not dreaming. He argues, in effect, that wake
experience is qualitatively identical to dream experience. Descartes writes:

‘Nevertheless, I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently I am accustomed to sleep and in my
dreams to imagine the same things that lunatics imagine when awake, or sometimes things which are even less
plausible. How many times has it occurred that the quiet of the night made me dream of my usual habits: that I
was here, clothed in a dressing gown, and sitting by the fire, although I was in fact lying undressed in bed! It
seems apparent to me now, that I am not looking at this paper with my eyes closed, that this head that I shake is
not drugged with sleep that it is with design and deliberate intent that I stretch out this hand and perceive it.
What happens in sleep seems not at all as clear and distinct as all this. But I am speaking as though I never
recall having been misled, while asleep, by similar illusions. When I consider these matters carefully, I realize
so clearly that there are no conclusive indications by which waking life can be distinguished from sleep that I
am quite astonished, and my bewilderment is such that it is almost able to convince me that I am sleeping.’

Often in dreams one has experiences that are similar to experiences in waking life. Crucially, however,
Descartes notes that one’s experience while dreaming quite often are qualitatively identical to experiences
when one is not dreaming. Dreams are, of course, fictitious and provide no grounds for knowledge. (False
beliefs cannot provide a ground or justification for knowledge.) But if dream experience (--which is false--) is
indistinguishable from wake experience [--which is (or could be) veridical--], then at any given moment one’s
perceptions might be the product of dreaming (--i.e., illusion--). And since dreaming is false/illusory, one’s
perceptions and experiences would be groundless. Thus, Descartes believes that we must consider and take
seriously the fact that dream experience (which is false) is indistinguishable from wake experience. Upon close
investigation we can now see that all of our sense experiences (--which are never apodictically certain--) are
subject to doubt and, therefore, cannot provide a justificatory ground of certain knowledge of the world. In
other words, sense experience is not apodictically certain, which is Descartes’ requirement for justifying
beliefs about the external world.

Descartes’ dream hypothesis unseats sense experience as a true ground for justification and knowledge by
demonstrating that sense experience is not apodictically certainty and, hence, a firm foundation for knowledge.
The authority of the senses are substantially undermined as a ground for knowledge because: (1) At any
moment one could be dreaming; and, (2), dream experience is qualitatively indistinguishable from wake
experience. Perhaps, however, one isnot convinced; suppose one believes that even if one cannot prove with
apodictic certainty that one is awake, one can have good grounds for believing that one is probably awake.
This type of reply, however, misses the point. Insofar as it is logically possible that one is dreaming and not
awake, then sense experience as such is not apodictically certain and, hence, is wholly insufficient as a ground
for justifying knowledge.

What Survives The Dream Hypothesis?

At this point in Meditation One, we can ask: “What survives the Dream Hypothesis?” Descartes ponders: Isn’t
the truth of some beliefs independent of sense experience, such as mathematical truths and logical truths?
Descartes says:

‘For whether I am awake or whether I am asleep, two and three together will always make the number five,
and the square will never have more than four sides; and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and so
apparent can ever be suspected of any falsity or uncertainty.’

In other words, whether I am awake or dreaming 2 + 3 =5, and a square has exactly four sides. This is true
even if I am dreaming. It is also true that a triangle has three sides and that a circle is 360 degrees. Even
further, the law of identity (A = A) is true even if one is dreaming. Descartes’ method of radical doubt requires
him to question even the simplest propositions of arithmetic and logic. If there is any logically possible reason
doubting the veracity of math and logic, then Descartes must explore that possibility.

Thus, Descartes asks: “Are there any possible grounds for doubting simple sense-independent truths of math
and logic?” Descartes notoriously thinks that such a possibility does exist, even if it sounds farfetched and
ridiculous to his audience. It is important to remember that Descartes is using “radical doubt” as a tool to find
the apodictically certain ground that would justify foundational knowledge. If Descartes can find any logically
possible grounds for doubting, no matter how small or improbable, then he must apply his method and doubt.
Recall, his method requires him to doubt just in case there is any logically possible grounds for doubting.
Herein lays the infamous “Deceptive God” / “Evil Genius” hypothesis.

The Deceiving God / Evil Genius Hypothesis

 Descartes asks: What if the creator of the universe is not the benevolent “God” of traditional religion, but an
Evil Genius—a “malevolent demon” whose sole purpose is that of deception, such that even the simplest
mathematical judgments are unreliable or false? If this radical scenario were true, then not only would our
sense experiences be false, but the entire content of our minds would be false and unreliable, including
mathematical and logical truths. Descartes says: ‘I will suppose that, not a true God, who is very good and who
is the supreme source of truth, but a certain evil spirit, no less clever and deceitful than powerful, has bent all
his efforts to deceiving me.’ Again, Descartes is contemplating the idea that his experiences seem “real” and
veridical, but in reality they are the product of a demon—an Evil Genius—who is powerful enough, and
perverse enough, to generate in his victims the steady illusion of an objective reality. If this were the case, then
all or some of the victim’s beliefs might be completely false. The victim might not even have a body; the
victim might only exist as a thought in the Evil Genius’ mind. Under the deceiving God hypothesis, not even
math and logic are “certain.”

How, exactly, are we to understand the deceptive God / Evil Genius hypothesis? Descartes’ text is ambiguous
between two theses: Some scholars understand Descartes as advocating an “Intervention Hypothesis” while
other scholars understand his view as invoking a “Defective Design Hypothesis.” Establishing which version
of the idea is actually in Descartes’ texts is irrelevant, as they are both equally devastating. For clarity, the two
possibilities go as follows:

We shall call The Intervention Hypothesis “IH” and it goes as follows:

 IH: God intervenes to give us false thoughts.

According to this interpretation, God (--or an Evil Genius--) affects our minds at any given moment to give us
the thought that something is true when it is false (or vice versa). This hypothesis undermines sense-based
truths as well as truths of reason (such as math and logic). The other way to understand the Evil Genius
hypothesis is called “The Defective Design” hypothesis” and shall be designated by “DDH.” It goes as follows:

 DDH: God made us in such a way that we always (or regularly) produce false thoughts.

Since “God” is assumed to have created and equipped our minds, a deceiving God (or Evil Genius) might have
made us so that we often (or always) produce false thoughts, no matter how careful we think about the matter
at hand, or how “real” the perception seems to us. Once again, both (1) beliefs based upon the senses, as well
as (2) beliefs based upon pure reason would be undermined, for any belief whatsoever might be produced by
the Evil Genius.

The Disastrous Results of IH or DDH:

The Evil Genius scenario is utterly devastating, undermining both the senses and the intellect as possible
grounds for justifying beliefs. This means that the hypothesis is strong enough to rule out the seemingly
impenetrable truths of logic and mathematics.IH could be used to call all reason into question by supposing
that God intervenes sometimes, or always, when we are adding sums or counting the sides of squares (or even
when performing a logical deduction) , thus making us arrive at false conclusions. Similarly, DDH can be used
to call the senses, reason, or both into question in the same way. On the DDH hypothesis, we are designedso as
to produce falsehoods, regardless of how “correct” they seem to us.
Radical External World Skepticism

The very nature of the deceptive God / Evil Genius hypothesis is to invoke radical External World skepticism.
Descartes’ view is that genuine knowledge of the external world is only possible if radical skepticism can be
defeated and ruled out. Without a guarantee that radical skepticism is not the case, knowledge seems
impossible. Thus, Descartes forces us to ask: Do we (--or could we--) know for certain that such a deceptive
God / Evil Genius does not exist? The immediate answer seems to be “No.” It seems logically possible that our
minds might be (or logically could be) controlled and manipulated by a malevolent force that is totally out of
our control.

Since Descartes’ time, philosophers have invoked radical skepticism in one way or another. In one of the most
famous “updates” to Descartes’ deceptive God / Evil Genius hypothesis, Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and
History) suggest that one’s experience could be just as they are, even though one is in fact nothing but a
“brain-in-a-vat,” at the hands of some evil scientist who stimulates the brain with electrodes. This is called
“Brain-in-a-Vat Skepticism,” and it accomplishes the same type of radical doubt as does Descartes’ Evil
Genius hypothesis.

The Thirteenth Floor and Philosophical Skepticism

Literature and film, over the years, have produced many illustrations of radical skepticism. In the late 1990’s
and early 21st century many highly significant and well-done films have explored the possibilities of radical
skepticism. These would include: The Matrix (1999),eXistenz (1999), The Truman Show (1998), Strange
Days (1995), The Thirteenth Floor (1999), Abre los Ojos “Open Your Eyes” (1997), Vanilla Sky (2001, a
remake of Abre los Ojos), and Dark City (1998). Of these films, The Thirteenth Floor is the best insofar as it
wraps a murder-mystery into a plot that is ultimately a depiction of radical external world skepticism. While
each film has its own merits, The Thirteenth Floor compellingly depicts radical external world skepticism.

The Thirteenth Floor opens with an elderly man writing a letter that has something to do with “discovering”
an awful truth that “changes everything.” He is in a 1930’s Los Angeles hotel visiting a prostitute. As he exists
the hotel we learn that his name is “Hannon Fuller” and that he is a frequent guest. He hands his letter to a
bartender named “Ashton,” and tells him to be sure to give the letter to “Douglass Hall.” Fuller then goes home
to his wife, who complains about the smell of “smoke” on his clothing. We also learn that Ashton opens the
letter, reading its contents. Ashton’s face visibly changes as he learns its contents. Yet, all of a sudden Fuller
wakes up in a laboratory surrounded by super computers. The 1930’s setting is now gone and a computer voice
says “End of simulation.”

Fuller is then seen leaving a building and going into an L.A. dive bar. We learn that it is 1999, not 1937. Fuller
begins to make a phone call. However, all of a sudden someone out of the camera’s view distracts Fuller,
causing him to hang up the phone. Fuller walks into an ally way, seeming unafraid and quite familiar with the
person he is talking with. As he begins to talk the unseen individual pulls out a knife and murders Fuller,
leaving him dead in an ally.

A bit latter we see a plush L.A. apartment where “Douglass Hall” lives. He awakes, listens to his voicemail
messages and discovers a bloody shirt in his laundry. He also hears Fuller’s voice who begins to tell him about
an astonishing discovery. As we already know, the phone message is cut short, leaving Hall unsettled. The
bloody shirt as well as Fuller’s message has him upset. A message from Detective Larry McBain is also on the
answering machine. Hall goes to visit McBain at the police station and learns that Fuller was murdered. When
asked about his whereabouts, Hall explains that he arrived late last night from a business trip and that he knows
nothing about Fuller’s death. He explains that Fuller is his boss and friend. McBain informs Hall that Fuller’s
daughter has just arrived from Europe, which shocks Hall even further, as he was unaware that Fuller had a
daughter.

After the police interview, Hall goes to the computer laboratory where we saw Fuller the night before. Hall’s
colleague Jason Whitney is there mourning the loss of their boss and friend. Hall begins to investigate Fuller’s
activities and Whitney informs him that Fuller had been “down-loading” into a computer simulated world set
in the 1930’s. Hall was under the impression that the simulated world was not yet safe or ready for “users.”
While Whitney adamantly protests, Hall tells Whitney that he is going to “download” into the 1930’s computer
simulation in order to investigate his boss’ doings and goings on in that simulated world.

As the process begins we see Hall lay on a table. A strange green light encircles him. A timer is set for 120
minutes. As the “downloading begins” we see many computer screens that “transfer” Hall’s consciousness into
the simulation. Hall experiences a discomforting type of jolt and then awakens as a teller in a 1930’s bank. He
is in a body that looks just like his own, but we learn that his name is “John Ferguson.” While disoriented and
unable to help his customer, Ferguson’s boss tells him to take the afternoon off. Hall / Ferguson begins to
interact with the “people” in the 1930’s world. In every sense of the term, the 1930’s world seems real. The
people do not act like (or seem like) computer programs. They seem like autonomous agents with free will,
reason, and the whole range of human emotions. We also learn that the city has economic social stratification.
Hall visits a man who “looks and sounds” like Fuller, but who is a bookstore owner by the name of Grierson.
We learn that when Fuller downloaded into the 1930’s world he downloaded into Grierson’s “body.” Grierson
is painfully aware of periods when he “blacks out” and loses consciousness. Hall quickly realizes that these
times correspond with the times wherein Fuller downloaded into the 1930’s world.

When Hall’s 120 minutes are “up,” he leaves Ferguson’s body and returns to his 1999 body and the computer
lab. He explains to Whitney that the 1930’s world is as real as the “real” world (--perhaps the colors are
slightly off, but nobody notices--). Exiting the lab, Hall becomes more entwined with both Fuller’s mysterious
daughter, Jane Fuller. Detective McBain surprises Hall with evidence that Hall’s car was spotted very near
Fuller’s murder. Indeed, evidence seems to suggest that Hall, despite his total absence of memory, knowledge,
or consciousness of the event, might have murdered Hannon Fuller. To complicate matters, a dreg from the
dive bar claims to have seen Hall with Fuller directly before the murder. He threats blackmail. If Hall does not
pay, he will tell the cops. Mysteriously the blackmailer dies just after making a police report.

While the murder mystery in 1999 deepens and the stakes get higher, Hall seems to be the prime suspect. Hall
must figure out the mysteries that harken back to the 1930’s world. After visiting the 1930’s world again, he
realizes that Fuller was using the simulation to visit prostitutes at a high-end hotel / club. He also sees Ashton
who claims that he does not have any “message” from Fuller. (We know, of course, that Ashton is lying.) We
also know that Ashton physically resembles Whitney and was “modeled” after Whitney’s appearance. But their
personalities, tastes, and styles are not the same. In fact, Ashton tries to kill Hall / Ferguson—as Hall knows
that Ashton is hiding the letter written by Fuller. All the while, Grierson is realizing that Fuller used his “body”
and, thus, the memories of prostitutes and such come back to his conscious awareness.

After the botched assassination attempt, Hall reads the letter written by Fuller. The letter describes the limits of
the simulation, the impossibility of escaping the situation, the shock of it all, etc. Confused, Hall wonders why
Fuller would describe the limitations of the 1930’s world. They invented that world together and Hall know its
limitations. However, Hall soon realizes that the letter is not about the 1930’s world. It is, in fact, about the
1999 world. To test out the validity of the letter, Hall begins to drive out of the city. He drives and drives and
drives only to reach a point where the “real” world degenerates into empty computer code. He realizes that
Fuller, somehow, discovered that their world (--the 1999 world--) is nothing more than a simulation.

Mysteriously, Jane Fuller is gone. Hall (as well as Detective McBain) begin to “look for her.” McBain tells
Hall that Jane Fuller does not really exist, that there are no records of her in the USA or Europe. Both begin to
look for the woman who called herself “Jane Fuller.” Hall tracks cab-rides, buses, addresses, etc. until he finds
where “Jane Fuller” lives, which is a rundown suburban section of L.A. He learns that her name is actually
“Natasha Molinaro.” Hall talks to Natasha’s roommate who says that Natasha has been gone the last few days
but that she came back earlier that morning. The roommate also says that Molinaro suffers of late from
blackouts. Hall goes to her place of employment, which is a supermarket checkout stand. Approaching the
checkout with a few items, Natasha does not show any signs of recognition of Hall. Hall stares at her, as she
looks younger, dressed cheaply, and has an accent. She does not appreciate Hall staring at her as he buys a few
items. He realizes that Natasha has no knowledge of him. Detective McBain visits her too, as she shows no
recognition of him either. However, while checking out a customer, Natasha suddenly “becomes” Jane Fuller;
she leaves the supermarket, changes her clothing, and calls Hall for a meeting.

Jane Fuller explains to Hall that everything was an unexpected accident. Her world created the 1999 simulation
world, along with all of the people in it (such as Douglass Hall, Hannon Fuller, Jason Whitney, Detective
McBain, etc.) But as creators, they never expected anyone in the 1999 world to create another simulation
world; the 1930’s world invented by Hannon Fuller and Douglass Hall was a mistake and a total surprise. The
1999 world was not supposed to ever “know” that it was a simulation, just as the 1930’s world should never
know that it is a simulation. She also explains to Hall that “his user” downloaded into him and killed both
Fuller and the guy from the dive bar (--the “witness”--). In her world, she (Jane Fuller / Natasha Molinaro)
looks like Jane; but she is someone totally different. Her father looks like Fuller, and her husband looks like
Douglass Hall. The man who downloads into Hall and “uses him,” is in fact her husband. She tells Hall that
her husband, “David,” used to be a nice man, but now he is a psychopath who downloads into people and
murders for fun. She does not love her husband; she loves Douglass Hall. Hannon Fuller was killed by her
husband David in order to “stop” the truth from coming out—namely, that the 1999 world is a fake simulation.
She downloaded into Natasha Molinaro in order to pose as Hannon’s daughter and shut down the computer
company and put an end to the 1930’s simulation world.

While Douglas Hall is busy learning the truth about his (simulation) world, Whitney decides to download into
Ashton and explore the 1930’s world. As he downloads into the “body” of Ashton, he comes to consciousness
driving a car. He swerves and gets stopped by the police. While the cop is willing to let him off with a
warning, he hears moaning and cries from the trunk. The police officer has “Ashton” (who is really Whitney)
open the trunk. In the trunk is John Ferguson. (Whitney, of course, knows nothing of the kidnapping.) As the
officer is about to arrest Ashton, Ashton steps in front of a car and is killed. However, the consciousness that
goes back into the 1999 body of Whitney is that of Ashton. Ashton, we learn, is a psychopathic killer. After
killing the guard at the computer lab, and causing much distress, Hall sees “Whitney” acting strangely and the
dead guard. He quickly learns that “Whitney” is now Ashton. In typical fashion Ashton begins to act
psychotically and attempts to kill Hall. However, Hall’s user (“Brian”) downloads into Halls body in order to
kill Whitney and his wife (who is downloaded into Jane Foster’s body / Natasha Molinario).
 As the carnage and chaos plays out, the film ends with Douglass Hall being uploaded into the body of “David,”
and Jane Fuller uploaded into her regular body. At the end of the film, we know at least the following:

 The 1930’s world is a simulation created by Hannon Fuller and Douglass Hall.
 The 1999 world is a simulation created by a man who looks like Hannon Fuller and who is
Jane’s father.
 The people who live in each “simulation” are unaware that they are living in a simulation.
 All of the experiences of the people living in the simulation seem veridical, utterly real, vibrant
and indistinguishable from “the real world.”
 Each “simulated person” is a conscious being with every mental attribute we attribute to
“persons.”
 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we do not know if the “future” world of the man who
looks like Hannon Fuller and his daughter is, in fact, the “real world”—or just another simulation.
 It is reasonable to think that that world is just a simulation too!

What evidence do we have that the world shown at the end of the film is, in fact, the “real” world? It might be
a simulation too. We have no way of knowing, and no reason to think that it isn’t. The Thirteenth Floor is a
graphic example of external world skepticism. While it does not follow Descartes’ Dream Hypothesis or his
Evil Genius scenario “to the letter,” it gives us an illustration of an appearance of “reality” that we learn to be
utterly specious. Note: The “senses” do not allow the people in the 1930’s world or the 1999 world to discover
that their world is false. When Fuller or Hall download into the 1930’s world they have the same sensual
experiences as they do in the 1999 world. Every sense register’s the world as “real.” We know that it
is not because we understand that it is a simulation created by Hall and Fuller. But nothing about the world
seems false / fake. And no experience in that world is qualitatively different than an experience in any other
world. The film very accurately represents radical external world skepticism with one exception: It is possible
to “discover” that the simulated world is not real by “going” to the limit of the simulation. This is how Ashton
figured out that the 1930’s world was fake, and how Fuller and Hall figured out that the 1999 world was fake.
However, in real and genuine external world skepticism, there is no such “test” or “limit.” The film writers had
to invent such a limit or test in order to make the film “work.” But in the full-blown version of external world
skepticism, there is no such test. Let us turn back to Descartes and other philosophers that invoke radical
skepticism.

Why Descartes Invokes Radical External World Skepticism:

In analyzing Descartes, we paused to consider his Evil Genius scenario in respect to a pop culture film, The
Thirteenth Floor. Let us return to Descartes. Descartes clearly states in the opening paragraph of
the Meditations that radical doubt is used as a means to achieve systematic and stable knowledge “in the
sciences” (especially the “sciences” of physics and metaphysics). This aim further distinguishes Descartes’
skepticism from classical skepticism. Descartes adopts and uses skepticism for very specific aims: to get rid of
old, bad opinions, to “withdraw the mind from the senses,” and ultimately to ascertain “indubitable truths” that
will allow him to build an edifice of knowledge that rests upon apodictic certainty.

Despite using a method of radical doubt, Descartes was not a skeptic. It is essential to understand this fact. For
the purposes of ordinary life, Descartes considered the skeptical doubts that he raises to be preposterous—so
much so that anyone taking them to heart in ordinary life would thereby raise questions about his/her own
sanity. Thus, Descartes found skepticism to be a useful tool in his philosophical project of acquiring
foundational truths which would secure knowledge and ground the burgeoning new sciences.

The first Meditation was devoted to “demolishing” all of the meditator’s “opinions.” The exercise is deemed
successful in that respect. The First Meditation is, implicitly, aimed at demolishing all theories of knowledge
of ultimate reality based upon sense-experience, particularly Aristotelian philosophy, Hellenistic philosophy,
and British/Scottish Empirical philosophy. Descartes thinks that he has demolished sense-based theories of
knowledge. In this regard, his first Meditation is a total success.

While he does not announce his “revolutionary vision” as such, Descartes’s first Meditation contains a
“revolutionary” idea that will transform into a crusading vision. One way to think of Descartes’ basic
revolutionary vision is this: He is trying to separate the “pure intellect” from sense-experience. (This is not
made fully evident until Meditation Three, but it is worth noting at the outset.) His vision is revolutionary
because it repudiates Classic Aristotelianism, Medieval Aristotelianism, and British Empiricism—the
dominant epistemic schools that reigned for over 1,500 years. By the end of the Second Meditation, the pure
intellect is separated from sense-experience in a dramatic fashion. More importantly, Descartes argues that
genuine knowledge arises from the pure intellect alone (--the “Mind’s Eye”--). This is a vision that harkens
back to Plato and Plato’s view that the pure intellect is the only human faculty capable of grasping ultimate
reality (i.e., the Forms). To be a philosopher, for Plato, is to give one’s life to the intellect. Various Stoics
adhered to such a vision as well. But from the time of Rome’s Christianization to the 16th century, a certain
kind of empiricism dominated the philosophical stage in the form of neo-Aristotelianism. Descartes’s
revolutionary vision put Rationalism on a new footing, thus reinvigorating rationalism and spawning
“Continental” Rationalism” in the Modern period.

Descartes’ Second Meditation

Descartes’ Second Meditation begins with a review of the skeptical arguments that were put forward in
the First Meditation. The meditator has discovered that his/her senses are unreliable and cannot be the
foundation of knowledge. The Dream Hypothesis establishes that at any given moment the meditator might be
dreaming, as he/she has done on so many previous occasions. According to Descartes, dream experience is
qualitatively identical to wake experience. So, there is always the possibility that one is (currently) dreaming
and, hence, is actually unaware of the true happenings of the external world. This means that sense-experience
is not apodictically certain and, therefore, cannot be the foundation of all knowledge.

The meditator then considers truths that survive the dream hypothesis. Since the operations of reason, as found
in math and logic, are not sense-based and hold true regardless of whether or not one is dreaming—perhaps
foundational knowledge is derived from logic and math—i.e., reason alone. Whether the mediator is dreaming
or awake, 4+3 = 7, a square has four sides, etc. At this point the meditator, using the method of radical doubt,
contemplates a hyperbolic skeptical scenario, namely, the possibility of a deceptive God or Evil Genius who
either (a) intervenes in one’s mind so as to deliver one over to falsehoods; or, (b), has designed one’s cognitive
faculty defectively such that falsehoods convincingly masquerade as truths. If such a deceptive God or Evil
Genius did exist and was bent on deceiving the meditator, then all rational truths seem to be just as worthless
as sense-experience. The meditator is lost in radical skepticism. Genuine knowledge of the external world
seems impossible.
Descartes’s "Cogito, Ergo Sum” (“I Think Therefore I Am”)

Under the conditions of the Evil Genius hypothesis, what can be certain? Under such conditions, the mind
would seemingly be emptied of absolutely everything: Truths based upon sense-experience, as well as truths
based upon rational deduction (mathematical truths and logical truths). Descartes says:

‘I suppose, accordingly, that everything that I see is false; I convince myself that nothing has ever existed of all
that my deceitful memory recalls to me. I think that I have no senses; and I believe that body, shape, extension,
motion, and location are merely inventions of my mind. What then could still be thought true?’

Such a radical hypothesis seems to empty the mind of all content, as both sensory information is lost, as well as
logical and mathematical truths. Many scholars think that Descartes’ Evil God Hypothesis totally empties the
mind such that nothing can be apodictically certain. This would mean that knowledge of the external world is
totally impossible. Radical skepticism would loom, undefeatable. One might think that the meditators’ mind is
emptied and so corruptive that nothing can be known.

Descartes, however, believes that one fundamental self-evident truth remains. Herein is his infamous phrase:
“Cogito, Ergo Sum.” Translated from the Latin: “I think, therefore I am.” In Descartes’ writings and letters he
phrases this one, indubitable proposition in various ways: “Sum, Existo” (Meditations), translated as: “I am, I
exist”; “Cogito, Ergo Sum” (Discourse), translated as: “I think, therefore I am.” ; or, “I am nothing but a thing
that thinks, I am thinking substance.” (Meditations) All three propositions mean the same thing and express the
same fundamental idea.

Given the radical skeptical hypothesis of the evil Genius, only one absolute certainty remains: “I am, I exist, is
necessarily true every time that I pronounce it or conceive it in my mind.” The assertion “I exist” is true
whether I am dreaming, whether my senses deceived, or whether I have no real sense experiences at all but am
being deceived by an Evil Genius. It is, in fact, necessarily true. It cannot be denied or even doubted without
self-contradiction. If you say “I doubt that I exist” you have actually proven that you do exist. Descartes’ most
famous way of phrasing the proposition is: “I think, therefore I am” (“Cogito, Ergo Sum.”). Self-certainty is
allegedly beyond all possible doubt. It is the foundation that Descartes has been looking for all along.

Descartes believes that from the fact that the meditator has thoughts (--is doubting, has been deceived into false
thoughts, or has any thoughts you like--), she is entitled to conclude “I exist.” The idea is presumably that if
one is thinking, then one exists. A non-existent thing could not think. So the “content” of one’s thoughts is
irrelevant to the fact that the meditator is an existing thing that is thinking.

Having “found” the one apodictically certain proposition that withstands all possible doubt, Descartes ventures
to build upon the one certain truth (“I think, therefore I am”) so as to re-establish the edifice of human
knowledge, thereby legitimizing the new sciences and setting all future metaphysics on a solid foundation. The
foundational bedrock is established with the “Cogito” argument. But moving forward and establishing further
truths remains to be done.

Assessing Descartes

Scholars, from Descartes’ time onward, have doubted the moves that he makes in theMeditations and in his
other writings. While the criticisms of the “Cogito” argument are difficult and technical to follow, some of the
 basic contentions goes as follows: Some scholars argue that Descartes cannot legitimately make an argument
of any kind, since he tossed reason and logic out the door as unreliable (due to the Evil Genius Hypothesis). In
a different vein, Lichtenberg argues that from the fact that the meditator has thoughts (--is doubting, has been
deceived into false thoughts, or has any thoughts you like--), she is NOT entitled to conclude “I exist” but only
“there is thinking going on” or “there are thoughts.” To posit an “I” is to move without justification beyond the
mere presence of thoughts. The meditator should affirm the thoughts without affirming an “I” (or singular
subject) that has the thoughts. Virtually all contemporary scholars agree. Furthermore, Descartes was asked if
he was making an argument with a missing premise, namely:

1. (Premise) I think
2. (Missing Premise) Everything that thinks exists.
3. (Conclusion) I exist.

However, in a letter written after the Meditations, Descartes explicitly says that he did not intend to draw a
logical conclusion (of that type). He believed that the conclusion was a self-evident truth. But this is not really
helpful and is quite strange in some respects, as “self-evident truths” are a species of logical truths. And by
way of Descartes’ Evil Genius hypothesis, logical truths are not possible to establish. This would rule out
allegedly “self-evident” truths too. Most critics agree that Descartes might have thought that he found one
proposition that survives radical doubt, but it is highly contentious that he really did find such a proposition.
While going further with Descartes’ story is quite important and necessary for an understanding of Modern
Philosophy, we shall leave Descartes behind in order to contemplate radical external world skepticism.

Radical External World Skepticism

Descartes is the first philosopher in the Modern Period to place radical skepticism at the heart of Epistemology.
Descartes holds a particularly stringent view of “justification.” Let us recall: Plato says that knowledge is:
“Justified True Belief.” Descartes requires, for justification, that a belief be grounded in a foundation of
“apodictic certainty.” This is an exceedingly high bench-mark. Descartes eventually comes to the conclusion
that our scientific beliefs about the world are guaranteed to be true by God, as God would not want to deceive
us about “clear and distinct ideas” about the external world (as given by science). As mentioned, Descartes’
entire “solution” to the puzzle he invokes in his first Meditationis entirely problematic, not to mention all of
the other blunders that he makes along the way. Requiring that a belief must be, or must necessarily rest upon,
apodictic certainty places the bar for justification as high as the bar could possibly go.

Many philosophers after Descartes seek, in one way or another, to “defeat” radical external world skepticism.
Some philosophers invoke religious notions, as does Descartes. Others attempt to argue that the idea of radical
skepticism is conceptually problematic or incoherent. However, the majority of philosophers believe that it is a
serious threat to the possibility of knowledge. Unless we acknowledge the problem and deal with it in some
fashion, it seems as if genuine knowledge is impossible. The key problem with radical external world
skepticism, however, is that nobody’s attempts to defeat it actually work. It seems to always loom as a threat to
human knowledge.

Radical External World Skepticism and Sense-Data Theory

Any philosopher that invokes a sense-data type of theory is particularly prone to radical external world
skepticism. The majority of philosophers in the Modern period are sense-data type theorists: Descartes, Locke,
Priest, Leibniz, Hume, etc. The sense data theorist believes that we are indirectly aware of the external world
by being directly aware of a mental representation of the world. In fact, we never “experience” the external
world directly. We only experience mental representations of the external world. While each philosopher has a
slightly different story, the basic mechanics of the theory are the same for every sense date theory. Our senses
are “struck” by “data” from external reality. External reality is what exists outside of our minds, independently
of us. We are a feature of external reality insofar as we have real existence, extension, and a constitution of our
own. We are capable of “representing” the real external world because our senses are somehow suitedto take
inputs from the external world and our minds are somehow suited to generate pictures from the stream of data.
For Example, Carlos sees his cat on the table. Carlos is not seeing external reality directly. He never sees
external reality directly. His senses take in data and generate a picture, a picture of his cat on the table.
Normally, he does not think too much about the mental representation qua private mental entity. He just takes
the representation as a real depiction of the external world. A philosopher, however, must dig deeper.

It is crucial to note that mental representations are private. They exist only in the mind of the subject that has
the representation. Two subjects do not “share” the same private mental representation. Each has her own
representation. Sense-data type theories are by their very nature picture-type theories of the mind. They work
on the “model” of a picture. For example, Carlos opens his eyes and the world, via data, floods in, generating
pictures. He “sees” his cat on the table. He feels its soft fur. All of these “perceptions” are generated by the
data. Carols never has any direct awareness of the external world. All that he has, for his entire life, is his own
private mental episodes. The world is like a picture-show that runs before his mind’s eye. As a theory of
perception, this theory is called “Indirect-Realism.” More commonly (and more broadly), this is a sense-data
theory.

The issue of skepticism comes into play thus: If the sense-data theory is true, how does anyone know that her
mental representations are accurate or true of the world as it really is? Recall, on this theory all that we are
directly aware of is a mental representation. We are never directly aware of the external world. Most sense-data
theories just take it as a “given” that our private mental representations accurately depict the external world as
it really is in itself. The subject is, allegedly, naturally disposed to represent the objects of cognition. But let us
pose the skeptical challenge, without invoking anything as extreme as Descartes’ Evil Genius hypothesis. How
do I know that my private mental representation of my dog are true independent of my private mental
representation? I “perceive” my dog as white and fluffy (--a Poodle and Bichon mix--). If all that I have is my
private mental representations, and my interactions with my representations are private mental episodes—how
could I ever know if my private mental experiences are true of the world as it really is in itself? Since I am not
in contact with things-in-themselves, just mental representations, I am inherently metaphysically removed from
the real world, fated to never have direct contact with it. And I have no way of determining how far removed I
actually am. My entire life is spent dealing with private mental representations, and I never know if any of
them are accurate at all.

While this type of skepticism is generated in a different way than Descartes’ Evil Genius Hypothesis, it is
never the less just as devastating in many ways. The very theory itself removes me from being in direct contact
with reality. And nothing in the theory guarantees my “inherent” disposition to represent things accurately.
Someone like Descartes or Locke may claim that “God” gives such a guarantee. However, their attempts to
prove God’s existence fail. Descartes’ entire procedure for erecting an edifice of knowledge depends upon the
truth of the Ontological Argument for God’s existence. But that argument does not work for a very good
reason, namely it treats “existence” as a predicate. This mistake is so important that Aristotle’s logic was
overturned in favor of contemporary logic that builds existential quantification into its foundations.
Contemporary logic, out of which computer science is based, depends upon existential qualification, as well as
the expressions of predicates and sentences. Aristotle’s logic only has the power to establish logical relations
among classes. In any case, sense-data theory leaves its victim trapped within an inner, private world of mental
representations and perceptions. There is, literally, no escape.

David Hume: The Arch Skeptic

David Hume is the greatest of all Empiricists, and probably the greatest British / Scottish philosopher of all
time. David Hume is a radical skeptic. Hume builds a very detailed sense-data theory with innumerable
complexity and sophistication. However, unlike John Locke and other Empiricists, David Hume explicitly
denies that we can know anything at all, anything whatsoever, about “where” our sense-data comes from, or if
they accurately depicts the external world. In fact, Hume never even posits the existence of the external world.
He specifically remains silent on “where” our sense-data come from. He calls it “the unknown.” Hume tells us
that from the unknown our senses are impinged upon and begin to generate impressions, ideas, etc. He too
eventually develops a picture theory of the mind wherein our minds traffic in representations, images,
perceptions, etc.

Hume, however, goes even further. He explains that anything that is not part of our impressions, perceptions,
or sense-data driven representations is “nonsense” and should be condemned to the flames. Infamously, Hume
begins to analyze traditional philosophical and religious concepts. He asks, for example, about causality. Do
we ever have a representation of causation? We have an image of one thing, such as a billiard ball (A)—and
then we have an image of another thing—a different billiard ball moving (B). We then say that (A) caused (B)
to move. But in this story of images and representations, no matter how carefully you inspect them, you
will never find a representation of causation. Causation, according to Hume, is something that the human mind
devises when there is a constant conjunction between (A) and (B). Having done away with causation, Hume
attacks a variety of philosophical and religious notions.

Hume recounts the various discussions of personal identity (--a classic topic within Modern Philosophy--).
Hume says: No matter how hard I look into myself I am never without a perception. But I never see an
“impression” of “self.” On Hume’s view, the mind is like a theater with perceptions ever flowing across the
stage. At any moment one has a perception of something: watching TV; looking at a cellphone; thinking of a
yummy dinner; feeling pain; enjoying a sunset, etc. etc. However, there is never a time in which one has a
perception of “self.” Descartes declares that he is a soul, an immaterial substance. Hume says that he has no
impression at all of a “soul” or “self” and that the whole notion should be considered nonsense. The same goes
for talk about “God.” Of all the perceptions that have flowed across the stage of his consciousness, he has
never had a perception of “God” or “angels” or the like. Hence, such talk is pure nonsense. Meaningful speech
will be either Analytic or Synthetic. If it is Analytic, it is a tautology, empty, boring. (The predicate is already
contained within the subject term.) If it is Synthetic, then it will be informative and must be traceable to a
perception. Anything that is neither Analytic nor Synthetic is pure and utter nonsense and must be tossed into
the flames. As it turns out, Hume is willing to toss most of the topics within philosophy into the flames. Living
in this radically skeptical manner, however, tosses almost everything that one care’s about out the window. All
notions of “the real world,” “self,” “other minds,” “causation,” “God,” etc. are gone. Hume tells us that if one
were to live and believe in the conclusions that he draws, one would be like a hideous monster. Thus, it is
better to forget philosophy and enjoy a nice pint of beer.

Conclusions
Philosophical skepticism of the kind that worries most philosophers begins with Descartes’Meditations.
However the Spector of philosophical skepticism does not disappear or go away easily. Since
Descartes’ Meditations, innumerable attempts have been made to dissolve it. However, very few philosophers
agree that radical external world skepticism has been ruled out as a logical possibility. In the mid twentieth
century the Anglo word turned its attention to science, specifically physics, as the “best” example of human
knowledge. The dominate attitude became one of ignoring the skeptic and focusing upon science. If science is
our best example of knowledge, then it is better that philosophy turns its full attention to science—such as
working out a theory of the mind. The skeptic will always be there, like an annoying itch that never goes away.
Our model of knowledge should be based upon our best science, as that is the best that we have to offer.