Cartesian Skepticism 1

CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM

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Cartesian Skepticism

The philosophical tradition of skepticism originates from the depths of centuries.

Skepticism is a specific approach that constitutes doubting as a foundational principle of one’s

thinking processes; in particular, skepticism questions the reliability of the truth, typically,

asserting that it is just another belief or dogma. The history of the development of the

philosophical thought reveals different forms of skepticism: whereas its most radical forms

deny the mere possibility of any knowledge or justified belief, thus, urging one to suspend his

judgments which touch upon some controversial matters, moderate forms of skepticism only

argue that nothing can be known certainly, especially in the context of non-empirical

(metaphysical) matters.

To trace back the history of the development of skepticism in Western philosophical

thought one should, firstly, refer to Greek philosophy. At the same time, it is essential to

understand that Eastern philosophical teachings also have their forms of skepticism. In

particular, the Atthavagga (a collection of suttas, belonging to the Pali Canon of Theravada

Buddhism) emphasized the methodological non-attachment to metaphysical views (Gomez,

1976, 137).

European Skepticism

Different Greek pre-Socratic philosophers (such as Xenophanes and Democritus) used

to express their skeptical views in different forms. The ideas of skepticism were developed

within the philosophical thought of Sophists: for example, Gorgias used to claim (Jones, 1980,

60) that nothing exists – and even in the case that something existed, we would not be able to

know it, as well as we would not be able to communicate it. Cratylus (Edwards, 1976, 449)

also points out our inability to communicate any truthful statements due to the fact that their
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meaning is in the process of a constant change. Hazzlet (2014, 5) also notices that skeptical

tendencies can also be found in Socrates’ thoughts.

However, apart from these particular cases of skepticism, Ancient Greek philosophy

has given birth to two major schools of skepticism: Pyrrhonism and Academic Skepticism. The

former was influenced (Beckwith, 2017, 28) by the ideas of the aforementioned Eastern

skepticism (due to the fact that the founder of this school, Pyrrho of Ellis, traveled to India with

the army of Alexander the Great). The main goal of Pyrrhonism was Eudaimonia: in this sense,

one’s opinions about non-evident matters were considered an obstacle on his way to achieving

ataraxia (psychological stability, contributing to the state of Eudaimonia. Epoche (suspension

of judgment) in the respect of all non-evident judgments was thought to be a necessary step in

one’s way to Eudaimonia. One of the most significant contributions of this philosophical

school to the development of skepticism was the epistemological problem of criterion revealed

by Pyrrho: neither one’s sense perceptions, nor his theories and shared beliefs were not able to

provide him with absolute truth or to distinguish between true and false statements (Beckwith,

2017, 40).

Academic skepticism was developed by Arcesilaus and Carneades, both of them used to

be heads of Plato’s Academy. Whereas Pyrrhonism is often considered to be psychologically

biased (since the fact that the promoted suspension of judgment was aimed at reaching the

psychological state of ataraxia), Academic skepticism developed the doctrine of acatalepsy

which stated that knowledge is impossible: the Academics were not prone to doubt the mere

existence of truth, rather they used to doubt a human capacity to obtain it. In accordance with

Plato’s deliberations in Phaedo (Rowe & Plato, 2001, 64-67), the Academics assumed that

eternal knowledge cannot be accessed by mortal creatures. Distinguishing between these two
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schools of Ancient Greek skepticism, a Roman historian Aulus Gellius stated that the

Academics used to apprehend that nothing can be apprehended (and to determine that nothing

can be determined), whereas the Pyrrhonists would not accept even this view, because nothing

seemed to be true (Gellius & Marshall, 1991, 311).

The subsequent development of skepticism in the context of Western philosophical

thought was undermined by St. Augustine: in his work Against the Academics, Augustine (A.

& King, 1995, 40) argues that if a person happens to doubt everything he cannot doubt the fact

of his doubt, which, following Augustine, undermines the methodological foundations of

skepticism, making this doctrine invalid. The ideas of skepticism, contradicting the foundations

of Christianity (and, in particular, Christian creeds), have been buried into oblivion for more

than a thousand years, being later revived during the periods of the Renaissance and

Reformation. The European public intellectuals of that period (such as Sanches, Montaigne,

Gassendi, and Mersenne) used to defend moderate forms of skepticism, stating that in spite of

the fact that truth cannot be achieved by reason, it can be achieved by faith (Popkin, 1979,

131).

The influence of the works of these authors has contributed to an intellectual crisis that

emerged in the history of European philosophy in the 17th century. One of the most significant

attempts to overcome skepticism was made by Descartes who tried to refute skepticism, yet,

making it a methodological basis for his further deliberations. Admitting that the principle of

doubt should be the cornerstone of philosophical thinking, Descartes, nevertheless, comes to an

idea that a consistent act of skeptical doubt leads one to certain truths (for example, the evident

truth of the existence of the doubting individual). Moreover, Descartes has also made an

attempt to refute any skeptical doubts about our senses’ and perceptions’ reliability, saying that
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God (whose existence was also proved in Descartes’ Meditations) cannot be a deceiver

(Popkin, 1979, 210).

European skeptical tradition was also developed in the works of David Hume. Being an

empiricist who claimed that one’s ideas can only be derived from one’s experiences

(sensations), Hume stated (Popkin, 1979, 456) that these grounds cannot provide one with a

sound reason to believe in the truthfulness of the metaphysical ideas (such as God, soul,

causality, etc.). The real foundation for a person’s beliefs was not reason, but rather a habit:

Pyrrhonian skepticism is viewed in this context as impractical and psychologically impossible.

Hume’s skepticism was later modified in the philosophical works of Immanuel Kant who

developed a concept of thing-in-itself, thus, limiting one’s ability to obtain objective

knowledge (Popkin, 1979, 457).

Cartesian Skepticism

The established notion of Cartesian Skepticism be misleading: Descartes was not a

skeptic and his works can certainly not represent the approach. In some sense, Descartes

managed to turn this philosophical teaching into methodology since the result of his skepticism

is the identification of a secure epistemic foundation. However, Descartes was not the first

great philosopher who attempted to establish some metaphysical or epistemic truth (O’Neill,

1966, 255): in his work Against the Academics, St. Augustine has also made an attempt to

establish the reliability of the fact of his existence based on his doubting. Interestingly, the

existing similarities between Descartes’ and Augustine’s method of doubting were noticed by

the latter’s contemporaries – and he even had to respond to the criticism (Smith, 1998, 94).

Nevertheless, Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy have influenced the

subsequent centuries of the development of philosophical thought – thus, it is essential to refer

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to the text to trace the path of his doubting. In the first meditation (Descartes, 2010, 1-7),

Descartes, preparing the ground for his further metaphysical deliberations, presents his Dream

Argument: following Descartes, one cannot have any sure signs which can lead him to an idea

that he is not dreaming at the moment. According to the apt remark of Ernest Sosa (2007, 7),

most of the skeptical scenarios are quite remote, whereas Descartes’ Dream Argument does not

seem counter-intuitive since each of us has had the experience of dreaming. Moreover, the

philosophical tradition of comparison of everyday life to the dream scenario can be traced back

to Zhuang Zhou who wondered whether he was a monk dreaming about being a butterfly or he

was actually a butterfly dreaming that it is a monk. The Dream Argument attempts to prove

that the mere act of dreaming (which every person is familiar with) leads one to an idea that the

reality cannot be easily distinguished from illusion – and thus, any other state depending on

one’s senses should not be taken for granted, instead, requiring one’s careful examination. This

leads Descartes to the idea that one’s beliefs about the actual existence of the physical world

are at any rate doubtful, along with the information from one’s senses. Suspending his further

judgment in this context Descartes gives up his habitual and intuitive beliefs about the physical

world which paves the way for his further deliberations.

In his second Meditation which touches upon the questions concerning the nature of the

human mind (Descartes, 2010, 1-9), Descartes states that a person can only have direct access

to the world of his ideas, whereas the things of the external world can only be accessed

indirectly. Following Descartes’ thought, the aforementioned ideas include all the content of

the mind, whereas these ideas are separate from the things they represent with the latter being

considered external to the mind. Thus, following the path of his thought, Descartes disconnects

the world from the mind. However, this conviction of questionable existence of the external
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things cannot lead one an idea to question his own existence: that is, even considering the fact

that the observer can be deceived by some evil demon to perceive the things that presumably

do not exist, one cannot lead himself to an idea of his own inexistence due to the fact that the

act of a deceive implies the existence of both the deceiver and the deceived person. In other

words, a person cannot be nothing while being already deceived and having some deceptive

ideas and/or representations. This is the skeptical foundation of Descartes’ influential thesis “I

think therefore I am”.

On the other hand, some representative of Eastern philosophy may question the

consistency of Descartes’ skepticism in the context of his presupposition of the actual presence

of “Self”, as a thinking thing. From the perspective of the Buddhist concept of anatman (non-

self), Descartes’ conclusion of the evident existence of “Self” may seem premature: the

indubitable fact of the existence of doubt, deception, etc. cannot necessary drive one to

constitute the presence of any identified and lasting “Self”. However, the question of the ghost

character of the idea of “Self” was only raised by Scottish empiricist David Hume in his further

development of skeptic ideas under the possible influence of Buddhist teachings (Gopnik,

2009, 5).

Nevertheless, to continue his further definition of himself Descartes proposes the

example of wax: following his idea (Descartes, 2010, 1-11), it is not the faculties of color,

texture, or shape that constitute wax as being “wax” since whereas these faculties may be

changed, the substance of wax remains the same. This leads Descartes to the idea that wax is

the idea of wax is perceived by the intellect alone which also implies the existing distinction

between perception and judgment. That is, one’s understanding of the principles of such

substance as wax (for example, its expansion under heat) makes his knowledge of wax clear
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and distinct. Following Descartes’ analogy, similar to wax, one’s “Self” is not determined by

his sensations of “Self”, but instead by the fact that the “Self” thinks and, therefore, exists

(Descartes, 2010, 1-12).

Descartes’ third Meditation concerns the existence of God (Descartes, 2010, 1-13): in

particular, Descartes claims that insofar as the idea of God is clearly and distinctly perceived

by him (as a possessor of all of the perfections who is subject to no defects), the perfect God

exists. However, in the fourth Meditation, concerning the notions of True and False, Descartes

(2010, 1-20) states that the general veracity of propositions that can be perceived clearly and

distinctly is derived from the conclusion of God’s necessary existence. In this sense, his

argument appears to be circular.

Moreover, Descartes’ Meditations and, in particular, his idea that he is able to constitute

cogito as a thing that thinks, also implies a presupposition that can be understood through the

idea of privileged access to one’s thoughts. Following this idea, the thinking subject can access

and know his own thoughts in such a way that others cannot. That is, coming from the act of

introspection, such knowledge is not based upon any other evidence. Following Descartes’

thesis “I think therefore I am”, one still has privileged access even if he doubts everything

(which actually means that he doubts everything apart from the idea of privileged access). This

idea was criticized by Gilbert Ryle (1994, 19-42), whose semantical behaviorism perspective

proposed an opposing view: following Ryle, a person is aware of his own thought in the same

way that he is aware of other’s thoughts, that is, following one’s linguistic and bodily

behaviors, while the idea of the existence of privileged access can only appear as a result of our

linguistic mistakes, leading one to the idea of the indubitable existence of the domain of his

inner experiences.
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The Development of Skeptic Ideas

Despite that Descartes’ path of philosophical doubt is often subject to criticism, some of

his outstanding thought experiments were incorporated by contemporary philosophers.

Following Newman (2019, 64-88), the most powerful of Descartes’ skeptic attempts is the Evil

Genius scenario, as described in the first Meditation: in accordance with this scenario,

Descartes admits that, in the context of his existence, he is possibly deceived by some Evil

Genius. This idea was incorporated by Gilbert Harman who proposed the way of its further

development in a form of the brain in a vat scenario. Following Putnam (1981, 12), some mad

scientist might have removed a person’s brain from the body, put it in a vat with some life-

sustaining liquid, and connected it to some supercomputer which provides “truthful”

perceptions to this brain simulating our normal conscious experiences.

Similar to Descartes’ path of thought, Putnam considers this idea self-refuting. But

whereas the Evil Genius hypothesis is self-refuting since it is impossible for one to make a

claim of his non-existence, Putnam, firstly, had to introduce his theory of reference to

undermine this hypothesis. This has led him to semantic externalism which implies that the

meanings of the words are not simply psychological in their nature. To understand this idea one

should refer to Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment (Putnam, 1985, 227): let us suppose

that somewhere in the Universe there is a planet which can be referred to as “Twin Earth”

inhabited by twin equivalents of every person from the Earth; however, the liquids of this

planet, being superficially identical to those of ours, are chemically different, composed of

more complicated formula – but these liquids are still referred to as “water” by the planet’s

inhabitants. Now, Putnam asks the following question: if some person from the Earth calls the

water “water” and his twin (possessing identical psychological states) also calls his water
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“water” – do their ideas of water describe one substance? Obviously, no: the first person refers

to water which has a formula of H2O, whereas the second person refers to the water of another

formula. This leads Putnam to the idea that a person’s brain is insufficient to determine the

reference of the term. In this context, Putnam claims (Putnam, 1981, 18-19) that the question of

one’s being a brain in a vat is incoherent since the brain outside the potential simulation is

semantically different from that inside of the potential simulation. In this sense, the idea of a

brain in a vat is also self-refuting which means that Putnam managed to refute the hypothesis

of his simulated existence without his reference to introspection.

Moreover, Putnam’s deliberations raise the question of intentionality: if a crawling ant

happens to trace a line in a form of Winston Churchill’s caricature, can anyone claim that the

ant has traced a picture of Winston Churchill which depicts (at least, to some extent) the

famous politician? Following Putnam, the ant’s performance lacks its initial intention to draw a

picture of Winston Churchill (and even to draw a line). In this sense, Putnam states that the

drawn line is not a representation in itself: its similarity with the look of Winston Churchill

cannot be considered sufficient to call it a representation of Winston Churchill. Moreover, the

fact that the spoken words “Winston Churchill” represent (not pictorially) Winston Churchill

leads one to an idea that similarity is neither sufficient, nor it is necessary to make something

represent something else. Thus, Putnam concludes, the necessary condition for representation

is an intention which, in its turn, depends on one’s thinking abilities and, in particular, an

ability to establish a causal connection between what’s representing and the thing represented;

that is, following Putnam, thoughts possess the characteristic of intentionality, whereas no

physical object in itself can serve a representation of something else. In this sense, coming back

to the issue of a brain in a vat, to tell “I am a brain in a vat” is self-contradictory since no

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causality can be established between the brain in a vat and me as a representation of the brain

in a vat.

Despite that skepticism is not a widely spread philosophical approach nowadays, some

philosophers still advocate for some of its theses. Unger (1971, 198) attempts to prove that

every human being knows, at best, hardly anything to be so. His argument is as follows: one

can know something only if he is certain about it; one can be certain of something only if there

is nothing of which he could be more certain; for anything (or, at least, almost anything), there

is something of which one can be more certain. This leads one to the idea that every human

being can hardly know anything. Unger also distinguishes between absolute and relative terms:

whereas the former do not admit of degrees, the latter do. For example, the term “flat” is

absolute since something can be either absolutely flat or not flat at all; on the other hand, the

term “curved” is relative since it implies a degree of curvedness. Whereas a curved surface can

be made curvier, a flat surface cannot be made flatter. Another marker of the term’s being

absolute is a grammatical possibility to speak about something using an adverb “absolutely”:

whereas one can speak of something as being absolutely flat, it is impossible to speak of

something as being absolutely curvy. Some of the absolute terms, following Unger, are also

basic: that is, they cannot be defined in terms of other basic terms. Unger assumes that the

word “certain” from the initial argument is an absolute basic term (something can either be

certain or uncertain, there is no middle way for certainty) which means that we can be

absolutely certain of very few things if any. Therefore, since there can be found very few

things that one can be absolutely certain about we can hardly know anything.
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Conclusion

To conclude, it should be noticed that the skeptic approach in philosophy and

epistemology has its 2500 years history: during this period, skepticism has been presented in

different forms which range from the Pyrrhonean psychological skepticism (in a sense that it

aims to provide a certain psychological state of ataraxia) to Descartes’ methodological

skepticism (which aimed to lay the foundation for his further philosophical inquiries), and from

Academic skepticism to contemporary skepticism, represented by Unger (both of which

attempted to establish the indeterminable nature of the reality). Moreover, skepticism has also

given birth to numerous thought experiments, leading one to counter-intuitive conclusions

about the reality, the common-sense beliefs about which are, typically, based on our sensory

experience (Vogel, 1990, 658). Thus, skepticism (and, especially, the act of skeptic doubting)

is able to reveal the underlying nature of reality, encouraging individuals to autonomous and

independent thinking which provides better and more consistent explanations about what is

happening in our world.

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