Final Hist 347 Research Paper - Quincy Standage

The Russo-Japanese War:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, and an International Struggle Over Influence in Far East Asia
Quincy Standage
HIST 347 History of Modern Japan
Dr. Chin
May 7th, 2020

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Under the Meiji government, the beginning of the 20th century saw a Japanese focus on
minimizing the increasing political and territorial influence of Russia in Far East Asia.
Diplomatic tensions between the allies of Russia and Japan further brought the international
community into the discord surrounding negotiations and control over trade, resources, and
spheres of influence in Far East Asia. The diplomatic tensions between the Russian allies of
France and Germany and Japan’s allies of the U.S. and Great Britain complicated negotiations
because of each country’s vested interest in gaining control over the resources and trade found in
Far East Asia. The primary issues under dispute included Japan’s increasing presence in the
Korean peninsula, trading rights in the Liaodong peninsula, Russia’s encroachment on the
territory of Manchuria including troop movement, and Russian expansionism into China.
Additionally, the Triple Intervention in 1895 between France, Germany, and Russia further
alienated the Japanese government because it invoked an additional encroachment on Japanese
influence in East Asia. These issues became capstone arguments between both parties and during
negotiations both Russia and Japan began posturing military troops in the territory of Manchuria
for war. The culmination of these attitudes led to the Russo-Japanese War, prompting an
unprecedented U.S. policy of interventionism within Japan’s negotiations with Russia. President
Theodore Roosevelt’s involvement and U.S. diplomatic intervention increased dramatically in
the first five years of the 20th century, ultimately creating the foundation of Japan and the U.S.’s
diplomatic relationship. The installation of the Meiji government brought Japan to begin
expanding its sphere of influence and imperialistic tendencies by allying with the U.S. to oppose
Russian expansionism through the Russo-Japanese War, fostering a dramatic increase in
Japanese involvement in the international community.

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In Japan, the establishment of Emperor Meiji’s constitutional monarchy in the 1890s was
essential to the development of Japanese wartime decisions. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War,
Japanese involvement in the Boxer Rebellion and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance shaped the
negotiation strategies of the Meiji. The Boxer Rebellion was a rebellion within China, partially
towards the Qing government, which resulted in an increase in Russian troops in Manchuria.1
Despite Russia’s losses in military personnel and strength during the Boxer Rebellion, they
continued expanding into Manchuria, threatening China and Japan’s interests in Manchuria,
particularly the East China Railway and access to resources such as coal.2 Russia’s commitment
to expanding their sphere of influence brought Japanese fears of Russian expansion to light over
the fate of the Korean peninsula. In particular, Russia was interested in controlling non-freezing
ports in Far East Asia, a direct challenge to Japan’s sphere of influence.3 This escalated further
when Russia discussed expansion to possibly annex the Japanese island of Hokkaido. Within the
same timeframe, the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance brought the Japanese government to
divide into factions on whether or not to negotiate a new treaty with Great Britain.4 Both the
Boxer Rebellion and the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, contributed to the growing mistrust
between Russia and Japan, also effecting their respective allies’ views of the situation in Far East
Asia.
The Meiji government attempted to negotiate a solution with Russia for the withdrawal of
troops from Manchuria, as a result of the Boxer Rebellion. Despite Russia’s verbal commitment
1
John Chapman and Chiharu Inaba 2007. Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 (Folkestone, UK: Global
Oriental, 2007), 5.
2
Oriental, 2007), 5.
3
Yoji Koda, "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success," Naval War College Review 58, no. 2
(2005): 13.
4
Oriental, 2007), 6.
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at the conclusion of the Boxer Rebellion to remove themselves from Manchuria, the situation
escalated.5 On April 8th, 1903 Russia officially passed the deadline of an agreement for troop
withdrawal in Manchuria, without removing their troops’ presence. Scholar John Chapman
argues that Russia’s non-compliance with troop withdrawal in Manchuria after the Boxer
Rebellion aided in increasing tensions between Japan and Russia.6 Fears of increasing Russian
influence in historically Japanese influenced territories, brought Emperor Meiji to fear an
encroachment on Japanese sovereignty in the Far East. Scholar Douglas Howland argues that
“many among the powers understood that Russia was interfering with Japan’s interests in Korea
and with everyone’s interests in China’s Manchuria.”7 In response to this Japan began building
their naval force and justified the proliferation of their military based on Russia’s aggression.8
These escalations drew the U.S. into the conflict because of a growing domestic interest in
gaining leverage in East Asia and China. By siding with Japan, the U.S. worked to continue to
establish their imperialist power while waning the developing influence of Russia, Germany, and
France. The escalation of the conflict because of Russia’s non-compliance during the Boxer
Rebellion mobilized the international community and drew attention to Japan’s new role in the
international community.
The beginning of the Russo-Japanese conflict was widely monitored by the international
community because it was the first conflict in which the newly constructed international laws of
war from the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 were used to
5
Oriental, 2007), 7.
6
Oriental, 2007), 7.
7
Douglas Howland, "Sovereignty and the Laws of War: International Consequences of Japan's 1905 Victory over
Russia," Law and History Review 29, no. 1 (2011): 66.
8
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scrutinize Japanese actions.9 The laws included clauses for limiting international naval
engagements and established the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Laws of war and neutrality
were also discussed during the conference determining the way in which hostile international
actors should engage with each other. Because Japan was the first to enact a military action
towards Russia, critics in the international community called for a tribunal to prosecute Japan
because a formal declaration of war was not established. However, the Japanese largely justified
their actions by arguing “the state of conditional war put the aggressor at a military disadvantage,
because the time interval allowed the enemy to make preparations.”10 International publicists
covered the conflict widely. Publications in Great Britain warned of increasing Russian influence
and justified Japan’s actions to commence military action, whereas publications in France
focused on Russia’s argument that Japan’s initiation of the war was a violation of international
law.11
Between 1904 and 1905 the Russo-Japanese War was fought in a variety of locations in
Far East Asia, resulting in a multitude of significant Japanese victories. The first assault on Port
Arthur was initiated by the Japanese navy on August 18, 1904.12 After two more assaults on Port
Arthur, the Russian forces surrendered the port because of casualties and a weakened military.
Additionally, the Battle of Shaho occurred in Liaoyang, Manchuria and resulted in 12,000
Japanese and 22,000 Russian casualties with a decisive Japanese victory.13 After continued
assaults and campaigns into the heart of Manchuria a paradigm shift occurred at the Battle of
9
10
11
12
Oriental, 2007), 14.
13
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Mukden on March 10th, 1905 where Japan won a major victory over Russia, inflicting severe
losses and unofficially ending the conflict by bringing Russia to the negotiating table.”14 The
three major conflicts including the Battle at Port Arthur, the Battle of Shaho, and the Battle of
Mukden, led the Japanese to a sweeping victory over the Russians, largely credited to Emperor
Meiji’s restructuring of the Japanese military to enable a “military high command” operating in
the war zone.15 Scholar John Chapman asserts that Emperor Meiji asked the Chief of General
Staff Oyama and Army Minister Terauchi to restructure Japan’s military command ordering for
the establishment of a ‘military high command’ which was responsible for leading military
offenses and was located directly in the active war zones of Manchuria to ‘command the
strategy.’16 This command was able to work autonomously from the Meiji government, making
decisions on the ground without approval from the government. This allowed Japan’s military
forces to strike quick and react to Russian advancements in a timely fashion.
Both Japan and Russia also propagated the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War by
disputing what military action began the conflict. Despite these disputes on whether the battle
began with the Japanese seizure of the Russian Ekaterinoslav or the direct attack on the Russian
Navy at Port Arthur, Japan undisputedly initiated the conflict. Both Japan and Russia express
that Japan began the conflict, however the Japanese’s viewed Russia as instigating the impending
conflict by threatening Japan’s sovereignty. When the international community was forming
laws regarding the initiation of war, it was instituted that mandatory declarations of war were
necessary, against the wishes of Great Britain, the U.S., and Japan.17 Scholar Yōko Katō argues
14
15
16
17
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that the initiation of the war began with a Japanese strike before issuing a declaration of war.18
Understanding the initiation of the Russo-Japanese war places context on the subsequent calls
from the international community for disarmament and fears of allied powers that they may be
called to act on behalf of the international community.
Japan’s fear of increasing Russian influence largely came from Emperor Meiji’s desire to
maintain the Korean peninsula under Japan’s sphere of influence. Japans expanding ideas of
colonialism towards Korea and influence over the Korean government further developed Japan’s
vested interest in maintaining neutrality in Manchuria. Japanese scholar Yoji Koda views Japan’s
foreign policy against Russian expansionism in Manchuria as an attempt to maintain Japanese
influence over the Korean Peninsula and southern Manchuria.19 With the relative weakness of the
Qing Dynasty, China was unprepared to defend Manchuria from Russian influences, heightening
Japanese distrust that Russia would respect China’s sovereignty. Emperor Meiji therefore had
three options available to mitigate Russian advances: declare war on Russia and its allies, engage
in negotiations, or empower the Qing Dynasty in the region by returning the Liaodong peninsula
to China.20 The Meiji government was relatively split on how to act with two primary debates
emerging. The first was whether a diplomatic concession of Manchuria for full Japanese
autonomy in Manchuria could be successfully negotiated and instituted. The second was an
assertion that war with Russia over Manchuria could not be avoided, therefore initial
negotiations would not be necessary or fruitful. Initially Emperor Meiji employed the negotiation
centered approach and on January 16th, 1904 the Japanese request for a resumption of
18
Yōko Katō, "What Caused the Russo-Japanese War: Korea or Manchuria," Social Science Japan Journal 10, no.
1 (2007): 95.
19
Yoji Koda, "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success," Naval War College Review 58, no.
2 (2005): 14.
20
2 (2005): 15.
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negotiations was “completely ignored” by the Russians.21 When the diplomatic olive branch was
rejected, Japan proceeded with military actions against Russia.
The unsuccessful negotiations between Russia and Japan, brought the U.S. deeper into
the conflict as tensions in the region increased. The increase in tensions led to a tighter control of
the seas and the shipment of goods throughout Far East Asia. Subsequently the Russian and
Japanese navies began to seize ships carrying any form of “contraband” or military supplies.
Roosevelt was distraught by the increasing actions of the Russia navy, when U.S. ships heading
for Japan were being searched. Scholar Matsato Matsui asserts that Russia became increasingly
disenchanted with American antagonism towards Russia regarding their monopolization of
Manchuria because of the importance of trade to the U.S. interests in Manchuria.22 At the outset
of the Russo-Japanese war, Roosevelt was most interested in keeping France and Germany from
rallying to the Russians and providing military support.23 On July 24th, 1905 Roosevelt wrote to a
British diplomat that he notified Germany and France “in the most polite and discreet fashion,
that in the event of a combination against Japan to try to do what Russia, Germany, and France
did to her in 1894” Roosevelt would “promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length
was necessary on her behalf.”24 This was a significant declaration of Roosevelt’s support of
Japan and demonstrated a U.S. commitment to maintaining Japanese sovereignty in Far East
Asia.
The U.S. was determined to keep a trade line between the U.S. and Japan because of the
attempted implementation of an “Open Door Policy” to continue building a strong trade

21
2 (2005): 25.
22
Masato Matsui, "The Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907: Its Causes and the Progress of Negotiations," Modern
Asian Studies 6, no. 1 (1972): 35.
23
Edward Parsons, "Roosevelt's Containment of the Russo-Japanese War," Pacific Historical Review 38, no. 1
(1969): 21.
24
(1969): 21.
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relationship.25 Additionally, the U.S. wanted Japan as an ally because of its strategic location in
the Pacific Ocean, sitting between the U.S., China, and Russia. Maintaining a relationship with
Japan led to the U.S. developing naval outposts on Japanese islands to monitor the region,
particularly the activities of China and Russia. Russia’s encroachment was occurring in not only
Manchuria but in China, near modern-day Mongolia. Additionally, the Russians were restricting
the U.S. freedoms of movement on the sea.26 U.S. Senator John Hay’s “Open Door Policy” with
regard to Japanese trade, brought Roosevelt to reckon “with Germany’s persistent efforts, both
before and during the war, to forge an alliance with Russia which might spell the ruin of
America’s hopes for the Open Door Policy.”27 Roosevelt's interest in preserving open trade with
Japan is demonstrative of the rapid globalization of Japan. U.S. economic interests in the Far
East influenced Roosevelt’s interest in maintaining diplomacy and supporting Japan in the
Russo-Japanese war. Scholar Christina Davis argues that “security interests represent one
motivation for policies to promote economic interdependence” and mutually beneficial economic
payments are essential to binding together the interests of a country.28 Roosevelt continued to
preserve the economic interdependence between Japan and the U.S., and the Russo-Japanese
War increased their economic partnership. The U.S. also had trade partnerships with Japan prior
to most other countries such as Great Britain in which initial alliances did not propose a
tremendous benefit for Britain or Japan alike and held “both security and economic cooperation
25
(1969): 26.
26
(1969): 28.
27
(1969): 26.
28
Christina Davies, "Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 1902-23," International Security 33, no. 3 (2008): 143-144.
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at low initial levels.”29 Roosevelt knew of the U.S. trade advantage and had a vested interest in
maintaining the economic relationship with his upcoming reelection campaign.
Roosevelt’s strategy for increasing trade relations and providing military supplies to
Japan, influenced the negotiations between Russia and Japan prompted by the beginning of
negotiations at Portsmouth Naval Base in 1905.30 As the negotiations progressed, two major
deadlocks surfaced: Japan’s demands for a war indemnity and how to partition the Island of
Sakhalin.31 The war indemnity proposed by Japan was vehemently refused by China and
Roosevelt was apprehensive of Japan’s initial proposal seeking $600,000,000 in war
indemnities.32 Roosevelt espoused that “he did not think it ‘advisable for Japan to insist on an
indemnity.’”33 Additionally, as Emperor Meiji demanded a war indemnity, the Russian Tsar
threatened to mobilize the entire Russian population and move them into Manchuria rather than
accept a proposal for direct monetary payment to Japan.34 Roosevelt’s apprehension towards
Japanese demands began to cause conflict between U.S. and Japanese relations. This was further
intensified by British leaders questioning Roosevelt’s role in the Russo-Japanese conflict “a
doubt exacerbated by a touch of jealousy at his conspicuous activities in not just arranging but
directly intervening in the peace talks between Russia and Japan.”35 The British questions of
29
Christina Davies, "Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 1902-23," International Security 33, no. 3 (2008): 146.
30
31
32
33
34
35
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Roosevelt’s role in negotiations coupled with Japan’s increasing distrust with the U.S.’s lack of
support for a war indemnity, brought Britain and Japan closer together.
A top-secret pledge by Nicholas II to cede the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan,
and Roosevelt’s choice to not discuss this with the Japanese government, brought about a break
in relations between the U.S. and Japan. Britain was the first to inform Japan of this historic
negotiation and Roosevelt’s silence increased Japanese distrust. It is still unknown as to
Roosevelt’s intentions as to why he did not inform Japan of the pledge from Nicholas II.
Scholars have proposed that perhaps Roosevelt did not view it as a significant offer or perhaps it
came from a disinterest in the Portsmouth Peace Conference because Roosevelt never personally
visited Portsmouth, Emperor Meiji, or Japan.36 Others speculate that Roosevelt began the conflict
with a pro-Japanese stance and shifted to pro-Russian when Japanese demands continued to
increase. These demands can be seen in the issues of emigrants and access to the Manchuria
Railway in which Roosevelt feared a Japanese monopoly in Manchuria resulting from
negotiations.37 The issues of emigrants and the Manchuria Railway drew the U.S. more into the
negotiation process because of their interest in trade. Ultimately, Roosevelt’s motives and his
choice to not communicate Nicolas II’s pledge and to resist Japan’s growing authority in
Manchuria greatly harmed the U.S.-Japan relationship.
The end of negotiations brought the Russo-Japanese War to a close with Japan gaining
significant territorial rights and an increase in its sphere of influence. Despite Roosevelt’s
intervention in Portsmouth, the end of negotiations occurred in 1907 when Russia and Japan
came to an agreement on the division of territory in Manchuria including “two spheres of
influence in which each soon pursued an exclusionary policy over the profits of commerce and
36
37
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investment.”38 This allowed Russian and Japanese expansionism to continue into Manchuria,
under certain restrictions. The unprecedented negotiations and involvement of the international
community and international laws of war in Far East Asia fundamentally changed the way in
which Japan engaged with the international community. The installation of Emperor Meiji in
Japan brought Japan onto the global stage of developing alliances and negotiations. The goals of
the Meiji government were to develop Japan into an imperialist power like the U.S., Europe, and
Russia. The Russo-Japanese War was a conflict that highlighted the growing imperialism of
Japan. The U.S.’s engagement in trade and economic support of Japan greatly influenced the
Russo-Japanese War in Japan’s favor and established Japan as a permanent globalist member of
the international community.
38
(1969): 42.
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Bibliography
Chapman, J. W. M., and Chiharu Inaba. 2007. Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5.
Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental.
http://search.ebscohost.com.drury.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=389411&site=ehost-live.
Davis, Christina L. "Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 1902-23." International Security 33, no. 3 (2008): 143-179. Accessed
March 12, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/40207144.
Howland, Douglas. "Sovereignty and the Laws of War: International Consequences of Japan's
1905 Victory over Russia." Law and History Review 29, no. 1 (2011): 53-97. Accessed
April 15, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25800932.
Katō, Yōko. "What Caused the Russo-Japanese War: Korea or Manchuria?" Social Science
Japan Journal 10, no. 1 (2007): 95-103. Accessed March 12, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/30209685.
Koda, Yoji. "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success." Naval War
College Review 58, no. 2 (2005): 10-44. Accessed March 12, 2020.
Leshchenko, Oksana. 1997. “The Imperial Russian Response to American Contraband during the
Russo-Japanese War: Controversy and Effects.” East European Quarterly 31 (2): 265.
http://search.ebscohost.com.drury.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=f6h&AN=9707170446&site=ehost-live.
Matsui, Masato. "The Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907: Its Causes and the Progress of
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Negotiations." Modern Asian Studies 6, no. 1 (1972): 33-48. Accessed March 12, 2020.
Parsons, Edward B. "Roosevelt's Containment of the Russo-Japanese War." Pacific Historical
Review 38, no. 1 (1969): 21-44. Accessed March 12, 2020. doi:10.2307/3636884.
“The Portsmouth Peace Treaty Trail Maps.” The Treaty of Portsmouth (Portsmouth Peace
Treaty), 2018. http://www.portsmouthpeacetreaty.org/map_home.cfm.

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The Russo-Japanese War:

HIST 347 History of Modern Japan

May 7th, 2020

alienated the Japanese government because it invoked an additional encroachment on Japanese

Theodore Roosevelt’s involvement and U.S. diplomatic intervention increased dramatically in

Russian expansionism through the Russo-Japanese War, fostering a dramatic increase in

Japanese involvement in the international community.

influence in historically Japanese influenced territories, brought Emperor Meiji to fear an

forces to strike quick and react to Russian advancements in a timely fashion.

called to act on behalf of the international community.

foreign policy against Russian expansionism in Manchuria as an attempt to maintain Japanese

rejected, Japan proceeded with military actions against Russia.

disenchanted with American antagonism towards Russia regarding their monopolization of

attempted implementation of an “Open Door Policy” to continue building a strong trade

maintaining the economic relationship with his upcoming reelection campaign.

Roosevelt was apprehensive of Japan’s initial proposal seeking $600,000,000 in war

intensified by British leaders questioning Roosevelt’s role in the Russo-Japanese conflict “a

negotiation and Roosevelt’s silence increased Japanese distrust. It is still unknown as to

Railway in which Roosevelt feared a Japanese monopoly in Manchuria resulting from

Manchuria greatly harmed the U.S.-Japan relationship.

came to an agreement on the division of territory in Manchuria including “two spheres of

the international community.

Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental.

March 12, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/40207144.

April 15, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25800932.

Parsons, Edward B. "Roosevelt's Containment of the Russo-Japanese War." Pacific Historical

Treaty), 2018. http://www.portsmouthpeacetreaty.org/map_home.cfm.

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