AMAR CHEEMA and DILIP SOMAN*

The authors demonstrate that partitioning an aggregate quantity of a

resource (e.g., food, money) into smaller units reduces the consumed
quantity or the rate of consumption of that resource. Partitions draw
attention to the consumption decision by introducing a small transaction
cost; that is, they provide more decision-making opportunities so that
prudent consumers can control consumption. Thus, people are better
able to constrain consumption when resources associated with a
desirable activity (which they are trying to control) are partitioned rather
than when they are aggregated. This effect of partitioning is demon-
strated for the consumption of chocolates (Study 1) and gambles (Study
2). In Study 3, process measures reveal that partitioning increases
recall accuracy and decision times. Importantly, the effect of partitioning
diminishes when consumers are not trying to regulate consumption
(Studies 1 and 3). Finally, Study 4 explores how habituation may
decrease the amount of attention that partitions draw to consumption.
In this context, partitions control consumption to a greater extent when
the nature of partitions changes frequently.

Keywords: self-control, partitions, consumption, attention, guilt

The Effect of Partitions on Controlling

Consumption

Imagine that you are at the concession stand at a movie
theater and order a bucket of popcorn. The server tells you
that there are no available buckets and instead hands you an
equivalent quantity of popcorn packed in three separate
bags. Would this change in packaging influence how much
popcorn you eat and the pattern of consumption?
Over the past few years, the popular press and academic
research alike have lamented that people are indulging in
excessive consumption in terms of both eating and spend-
ing behaviors (Baumeister 2002; The Economist 2006a;
Greenhouse 2006; Kyrios, Frost, and Steketee 2004).
Although both eating and spending are necessary in moder-
*Amar Cheema is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Olin Business
School, Washington University in St. Louis (e-mail: cheema@wustl.edu).
Dilip Soman is Corus Chair in Communication Strategy and Professor of
Marketing, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto (e-mail:
dilip.soman@rotman.utoronto.ca). The authors thank the review team;
Xiuping Li; Anirban Mukhopadhyay; Vanessa Patrick; Yaacov Trope; Bob
Wyer; and seminar participants at the Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of
Singapore, New York University, University of Georgia, University of
Maryland, and Yale University for comments. The authors also thank
Prakash Bakshi, Emily Chow, Rachel Cohn, Vivian Lam, Frosti Lau,
Mandy Li, Jennifer Mach, Lisa Marchiondo, Dawn Moses, Ashley Rosen,
and Szeling Tam for excellent research assistance. Ravi Dhar served as
associate editor for this article.
ation, the excessive degrees of these behaviors have
resulted in crises in health (with obesity becoming an epi-
demic) and on the economic front (with household savings
plummeting to record lows). The jury is still out on who is
to blame for the epidemic proportions of eating and spend-
ing, but most commentators point to the abundant supply of
these resources. In particular, access to large portions of
food is blamed for the obesity epidemic (The Economist
2006b; Spurlock 2005), and the easy availability of credit is
typically blamed for the spending problem (CNN Money
2006; Manning 2000).
Our objective in this article is not to delve into the causes
of the consumption epidemic but rather to provide a pre-
scriptive recommendation. We study situations in which
consumers aim to regulate consumption but are sometimes
unable to do so (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Further-
more, we study situations in which these consumers have
access to a certain quantity of a resource (a quantity of food
or a sum of money) and compare situations in which the
resource is available as an aggregate quantity with situa-
tions in which the resource is partitioned into smaller quan-
tities. The opening vignette represents an example of parti-
tioning (aggregate popcorn is partitioned into three bags).
Likewise, a cash payment of $500 might be presented in
one envelope or in five separate envelopes, each containing
$100, and 20 cookies might be packaged all together in a

© 2008, American Marketing Association Journal of Marketing Research

ISSN: 0022-2437 (print), 1547-7193 (electronic) 665 Vol. XLV (December 2008), 665–675
666 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2008
box or in four subcontainers with 5 cookies in each. We ask
the following specific questions:
1. When we hold the quantity constant, does the pattern of con-
sumption differ when the resource is aggregated versus parti-
tioned? Across four studies involving food and money, we
show that partitioning the resource results in reduced quan-
tity or rate of consumption.
2. Why do partitions affect consumption? We suggest that when
consumers encounter a partition (e.g., finish one bag of pop-
corn), their decision making moves from being automatic to
more deliberative. In other words, eating the next kernel of
popcorn from an open bucket is typically a thoughtless
process, and consumers might not think about the decision.
However, a small transaction cost (e.g., opening a fresh bag
of popcorn) draws attention to the decision, and the resultant
deliberation leads to consumers deciding to stop or postpone
consumption.
We test our predictions in a series of four studies. In
Study 1, we demonstrate the effect of partitioning on
chocolate consumption, and in Study 2, we replicate these
effects in the domain of gambling (with tokens presented in
aggregate or partitioned form). In Study 3, we use process
measures to illustrate the effect of partitioning on decision
making (in particular, more accurate recall and longer deci-
sion times). Importantly, the effect of partitioning weakens
when consumers are not trying to regulate their consump-
tion activity (Studies 1 and 3). In Study 4, we examine the
possibility that, over time, the partition could become part
of the automatic consumption ritual. We show that fre-
quently changing the nature of partitions, rather than keep-
ing them unchanged, increases their effect on consumption.
These results suggest important implications for behav-
iors that consumers should follow but find it difficult to do
so. Specifically, drawing attention to consumption through
partitions encourages control, especially by consumers who
are trying to constrain consumption (for related work on
food portions, see Delaney 2007). Although the domain of
inquiry herein is restricted to physical partitioning, it repre-
sents one form of intervention that draws attention to con-
sumption. Other interventions that could achieve the same
means include reminders, cognitive interventions, rhetorical
questions, auditory signals, targets, or “progress markers.”
Such attentional tools are expected to have a similar effect
as that of partitions on consumption. In addition to decreas-
ing consumption of tempting items, drawing attention to
decisions through such mechanisms may discourage pro-
crastination and encourage consumers to engage in behav-
iors that are necessities (e.g., dentist visits, medical exams).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We propose that encountering a partition during con-
sumption increases the amount of attention consumers pay
to the decision, giving them a “decision point” at which to
evaluate whether to continue, and thus shifts consumption
decisions from an automatic mode to a deliberative mode.
Consequently, people who are trying to control consump-
tion can use this increased attention to exert self-control
and stop. In the following paragraphs, we review prior
research and build our theoretical framework.
Several streams of research in cognitive and social psy-
chology draw contrasts between automatic (implicit) and
controlled (explicit or deliberative) processes of making
decisions. The former process is typically assumed to occur
outside of awareness, whereas the latter can be consciously
modified (Shiffrin and Dumain 1981; for a review, see
Hastie 2001). Smith and DeCoster (2000) propose that the
automatic (associative) system effortlessly processes salient
cues. In contrast, the controlled (rule-based) system is con-
scious and effortful. Rules control impulsive behavior (e.g.,
eating too much chocolate) by inflicting guilt, remorse, or a
loss of faith in oneself when rules are violated (Benabou
and Tirole 2004; Prelec and Herrnstein 1991; Thaler and
Shefrin 1981). Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987) also dis-
cuss two stages of decision making: predecision delibera-
tion and postdecision implementation; people’s actions are
relatively more automatic in the latter (implemental) stage
than in the former (deliberative) stage (Gollwitzer 1999).
These streams of research suggest that as the amount of
attention consumers pay to the decision increases and as
consumers are provided with explicit decision-making
opportunities, the decision is more likely to be made
because of rules rather than impulse.
Thus, the provision of decision-making opportunities
may have significant implications for consumption by
drawing attention to the decision. On the one hand, con-
sumers may impulsively consume hedonic products (e.g.,
chocolates/gambles). On the other hand, consumers may
think deliberately, taking into account possible negative
consequences of breaking preset rules (weight gain/monetary
loss), and thus restrain consumption. Such a conflict would
not arise if the deliberate decision were identical to the
impulsive one—that is, if consumers did not try to follow
rules that discouraged consumption. Indeed, Strack and
Deutsch (2004, p. 228) suggest that deliberate attention
associated with the conscious system “allows individuals to
resist immediate rewards and strive for more valuable
future outcomes.” In summary, consumers may be able to
constrain consumption successfully if (1) this activity is
something they are trying to control and (2) they pay delib-
erate attention to the decision. Consequently, mechanisms
that increase attention may better enable consumers to con-
trol consumption.
How can decision-making opportunities that draw atten-
tion to consumption be created? Partitions provide one such
intervention because consumers must physically negotiate
them (e.g., tear, break, open, push aside) to continue con-
sumption. Each such partition adds a small transaction cost
that not only draws attention through the physical act of
negotiating the partition but also adds a small temporal
delay to consumption that can induce deliberation. Prior
research has shown that physical proximity to tempting
options makes impulsive behavior more likely (e.g., Mis-
chel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989), potentially creating
“lapse districts” in which people cannot control consump-
tion (Ainslie 2000). Because the presence of partitions is
likely to hamper proximity to tempting options, we expect
that people with partitioned resources will be less likely to
lapse and thus will consume less than people with aggre-
gate resources.
Importantly, another manifestation of successful control
may be a slower rate of consumption over the entire set of
resources, such that people who encounter partitions choose
to consume less in a given instance than people with aggre-
gated resources. Postponing consumption in a given
instance will lead to a slower rate of consumption and, if
The Effect of Partitions on Controlling Consumption
this pattern is followed consistently by the consumer, to
lower overall consumption. Thus:
H1: People consume fewer resources associated with a desir-
able activity they are trying to constrain (or consume them
more slowly) when the resources are partitioned than when
the resources are aggregated.
We emphasize that the proposed effect of partitions is not
expected in situations in which the consumption activity is
not being controlled—that is, when the deliberative, con-
scious decision is consistent with the impulsive one.
Specifically:
H2: The effect of partitioning on consumption decreases when
the consumption is not considered an undesirable activity.
The efficacy of partitions in increasing attention may
also vary across consumption contexts. For example, parti-
tions are expected in some consumption domains and will
not draw attention to the decision. Moreover, repetition
may decrease attention paid to decisions that were once
deliberate because of adaptation and because consumers
could learn to break partitions habitually (e.g., Johnston
and Dark 1986). Thus, expected partitions (e.g., white parti-
tions between cookies) may not increase attention. In con-
trast, unexpected partitions (e.g., partitions of varying col-
ors) may draw greater attention to the decision and thus be
more effective in constraining consumption. A similar dis-
tinction can be made between cash (bills) and gift cards of
the same denomination. Thus:
H3: Partitions that change form over time continue to influence
consumption over a longer duration than partitions that
remain unchanged.
STUDY 1: EFFECT OF PARTITIONS ON CHOCOLATE
CONSUMPTION
Participants, Method, and Design
We recruited 73 undergraduate female students at a
North American university to participate in a chocolate-
tasting study in return for a token payment, along with an
opportunity to taste different chocolates. Participants
received a sealed box containing six pieces of Godiva
chocolate (two pieces each of white, milk, and dark choco-
late). The box was accompanied by a response sheet con-
taining pictures and titles of the different chocolates, along
with questions that the participant would answer after eat-
ing each piece. Thus, all participants knew the contents of
the box. We asked the participants to consume these choco-
lates over the following week and to return the response
sheet to the experimenter after finishing all the pieces. The
packaging was manipulated between subjects. Half the par-
ticipants received boxes that had unwrapped pieces inside
the box (aggregate). Thus, opening the box allowed them
unhindered access to all six pieces. The remaining partici-
pants received boxes that had the pieces individually
wrapped in foil (partitioned). These participants needed to
open the box and then open each piece to eat it. The
response sheet included color pictures of the wrapped or
unwrapped pieces, respectively.
Participants completed an in-class survey about their atti-
tudes toward chocolate that was matched with response
sheets. Overall, the participants liked chocolate (“How
much do you like eating chocolates?” 1 = “not at all,” and
667
11 = “very much”; M = 8.59) but acknowledged that eating
it was not always beneficial (“I believe that eating too much
chocolate is not good for me”: 1 = “disagree,” and 11 =
“agree”; M = 8.41). We also measured the extent to which
overconsumption was aversive to them (average of two
items: “If I eat too much chocolate, I feel guilty/I feel as if
I let myself down”: 1 = “disagree,” and 11 = “agree”). To
rule out alternative explanations, we measured participants’
(1) variety-seeking tendency (Donthu and Gilliland 1996)
and (2) belief that unwrapped chocolates spoil quickly (1 =
“disagree,” and 11 = “agree”).
Thus, the study employed a 2 (partitioning: no, yes) × 3
(chocolate type: white, milk, dark) mixed design, with par-
titioning as a between-subjects factor and chocolate type as
a within-subjects factor. The time at which participants ate
each piece (recorded on the response sheet) was the
dependent measure. Participants also answered taste-related
questions for each piece (e.g., smoothness, creaminess,
sweetness) to maintain the pretense of a taste study.
Results
Effect of partitions. Of the 73 participants, 24 (33%)
returned their response sheets within the seven-day period.
Respondents and nonrespondents did not differ in terms of
liking of chocolate and overconsumption aversion. We
excluded two incomplete responses; all analyses are for 22
response sheets (11 wrapped, 11 unwrapped), each contain-
ing information on six pieces of chocolate. We conducted a
mixed-model analysis with chocolate type as a within-
subject factor and two repeated observations for each
chocolate type (i.e., six observations per participant). Con-
sistent with H1, participants with aggregate (versus parti-
tioned) chocolates took less time to eat each chocolate
(Maggregate = 1.71 versus Mpartitioned = 2.50 days; F(1, 62) =
6.70, p = .01, η2 = .07). Consumption speed did not vary
across chocolate types (F(2, 62) = 1.72, not significant
[n.s.]). The cumulative consumption of chocolate over
seven days for the two packaging conditions appears in Fig-
ure 1. Participants with aggregate (unwrapped) pieces con-
sumed most of the pieces in the first two days, whereas par-
ticipants with partitioned (wrapped) pieces ate them more
slowly.
Moderating role of aversion. We expected that extent of
aversion to overconsumption would also deter chocolate
consumption (H2). Specifically, some participants may
want to control consumption more than other participants.
Thus, the effectiveness of partitions in slowing consump-
tion should be greater for the former versus the latter. A
mixed-model analysis revealed a significant partition ×
aversion interaction, indicating that the effect of partitions
was stronger for participants who had greater aversion to
overconsumption (F(1, 60) = 13.58, p < .001, η2 = .15), in
support of H2. In addition, there was a negative main effect
of overconsumption aversion (F(1, 60) = 5.81, p < .05, η2 =
.06) and a main effect of partitions (F(1, 60) = 4.58, p <
.05, η2 = .05). These were qualified by the aforementioned
interaction.
Discussion
The results from this experiment supported H1; specifi-
cally, resources were consumed at a slower rate when they
were partitioned. In addition, partitioning was more effec-
668 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2008
Figure 1
STUDY 1: PARTITIONING SLOWS RATE OF CHOCOLATE
CONSUMPTION
tive for participants who had greater aversion to over-
consumption (H2).
Individual-level analysis. As a robustness check, we ana-
lyzed the data using one observation per participant. We
designated participants as being averse or not averse to
overconsumption depending on whether they were above or
below the midpoint of the aversion scale, respectively. The
dependent measure was the amount of time participants
took to finish all six pieces of chocolate. Among partici-
pants who were averse to overconsumption, those with
aggregate (versus partitioned) chocolates finished the
six pieces significantly faster (Maggregate = 1.25 versus
Mpartitioned = 5.50 days; F(1, 18) = 10.05, p = .005, η2 =
.31). In contrast, partitions did not affect speed of finishing
the six pieces for those not averse to overconsumption
(Maggregate = 3.00 versus Mpartitioned = 1.40; F(1, 18) = 1.74,
n.s.). This led to a significant partition × aversion inter-
action (F(1, 18) = 10.47, p < .005, η2 = .32), in support of
H2. The small number of observations (n = 22) notwith-
standing, the pattern of results also suggests that aggregate
(versus partitioned) chocolates are consumed faster. Indeed,
82% of the participants in the aggregate condition ate all
their chocolates within the first two days, compared with
45% who did so in the partitioned condition, a difference
that approaches significance (χ2(1) = 3.25, p = .07).
Consumption rate versus amount. All participants in
Study 1 were instructed to finish the task (i.e., eat all the
chocolates) and return the taste evaluations in a week.
Consequently, overall consumption is unchanged across
conditions (i.e., everyone consumed six pieces) but is
slower in the presence (versus absence) of partitions. As
we discussed in the setup for H1, a slower rate of con-
sumption over time would also result in a smaller amount
of total consumption. Thus, the slower rate of consumption
in Study 1 acts as a proxy for reduced amount. Further-
more, in Study 2, we study the effect of partitions on total
spending.
Alternative explanations. We also ruled out two other
explanations. First, participants who seek more variety may
consume pieces faster than others. However, variety-
seeking tendency did not affect consumption (F(1, 61) =
.84, n.s.), and the effect of partitions remained significant
after we controlled for variety seeking (F(1, 61) = 7.34, p <
.01, η2 = .09). Second, the fear of the chocolate spoiling
could lead to the unwrapped (versus wrapped) pieces being
consumed faster. However, freshness did not affect con-
sumption (F(1, 61) = 1.39, n.s.), and the effect of parti-
tioning remained significant after we controlled for it
(F(1, 61) = 4.59, p < .05, η2 = .04).
Study 1 demonstrated the effect of partitions on con-
straining consumption of a hedonic product (chocolates).
We now extend this research to study spending decisions in
the domain of gambles. Our participant pool reported that
though gambling was enjoyable, it was an activity they did
not want to engage in too frequently.
STUDY 2: THE EFFECT OF PARTITIONS ON GAMBLES
Participants, Method, and Design
Fifty-five participants at an Asian university participated
in a risk study after finishing an unrelated experiment. Each
participant received 100 coupons with which they could
gamble. The game was similar to two rolls of dice: Each of
two independently drawn cards could show any number
from 1 to 6 with equal probability. It cost one coupon to
place a bet, and the participant won five coupons (placed in
a winnings box that the participant could see but not draw
from) if the sum of the two cards was 9 or higher. Partici-
pants bet repeatedly until they either exhausted the coupons
or chose to stop. Coupons could be cashed at any point for
US$.064 per coupon. The 10/36 winning probability
resulted in a positive expected value [.064 × 5 × (10/36) =
US$.0889].
We manipulated the number of envelopes containing the
100 coupons (1, 4, or 10) between subjects. Some partici-
pants received one envelope with 100 coupons (aggregate
resources), others received four envelopes with 25 coupons
in each, and the remaining participants received 10 sealed
envelopes with 10 coupons in each. We recorded the num-
ber of coupons used (i.e., the number of gambles) and the
percentage of coupons spent from the last open envelope.
Manipulation Check for Gambling Aversion
Although most people try to control spending on vices,
such as gambling, we checked to determine whether this
was also true for the subject population. In a pretest with
payoffs identical to the ones used here, 59 participants rated
how appropriate it was for them to gamble in the study (1 =
“not at all appropriate,” and 7 = “very appropriate”). The
responses indicated that, in general, participants believed
that it was inappropriate to gamble (M = 2.88). This evalua-
tion was significantly lower than the scale midpoint (of 4;
F(1, 58) = 112.15, p < .0001), indicating an aversion to
gambling.
Results
Effect of partitions on total consumption. Table 1 shows
that participants with partitioned resources (four or ten
envelopes) spent less than those with aggregate resources
(one envelope). Participants with one envelope used more
The Effect of Partitions on Controlling Consumption 669

Table 1 Figure 2
STUDY 2: PARTITIONS DECREASE SPENDING STUDY 2: PARTITIONING DECREASES SPENDING ON
GAMBLES
Number of Envelopes
1 4 and 10 A: One Envelope (with 100 Coupons)
Aggregate 4 10 Partitioned
Experiment Design
Coupons in each envelope 100 25 10 —
Number of participants, n 21 18 16 34
Number of coupons gambled 42.62 25.50 16.44 21.24

Dependent Measures
% of last envelope used 64 90 88 89
% of participants in a condition
who did not open an envelope 33 11 13 12

coupons (M1envelope = 42.62) than those with four envelopes

(M4envelopes = 25.50; F(1, 52) = 4.23, p < .05, η2 = .06) or
those with ten envelopes (M10envelopes = 16.44; F(1, 52) =
9.27, p < .005, η2 = .14). The former (one envelope) used B: Four Envelopes (with 25 Coupons in Each)
more coupons (Maggregate = 42.62) than those with parti-
tioned resources (four or ten envelopes; Mpartitioned = 21.24;
F(1, 52) = 9.06, p < .005, η2 = .13), in support of H1. The
difference between four and ten envelopes, though in the
expected direction, was not significant (F(1, 52) = 1.04,
n.s.). The main effect of number of envelopes was signifi-
cant (F(2, 52) = 4.94, p < .05, η2 = .13).
Effect of breaking a partition on consumption. Figure 2
shows the impact of breaking a partition on subsequent
spending of resources. Each vertical bar shows the number
of coupons used by one participant. Among the participants
with one envelope (Panel A), seven did not open an enve-
lope; the eighth (Participant 10) used 14 coupons, and so
forth. The horizontal dashed line shows the number of
coupons in each envelope (the partition between enve-
C: Ten Envelopes (with 10 Coupons in Each)
lopes). Most participants with multiple envelopes emptied
the opened envelope and stopped short of opening the next
one. Among participants who opened at least one envelope,
those with partitioned resources (four and ten envelopes)
spent a greater proportion of the last opened envelope
(Mpartitioned = 89% versus Maggregate = 64%; F(1, 41) =
12.89, p < .005, η2 = .22).
Discussion
The effect of partitions on total spending was consistent
with H1. Drawing attention to the gambling decision
(breaking a partition) decreased spending. After a partition
was broken, however, participants appeared to spend read-
ily until they encountered the next partition. Because par-
ticipants who opened an envelope were more likely to
spend the coupons within, participants with fewer partitions
spent more than those with a larger number of partitions.
A greater proportion of participants with one envelope envelopes (100 versus 25 or 10 coupons). We leave this
did not use any resources (Maggregate = 33%), compared effect of resource size as an area for further research.
with those with four or ten envelopes (Mpartitioned = 12%; Study 2 demonstrated that partitions can constrain spend-
χ2(1) = 3.77, p = .05). We also contrasted the four- and ten- ing on gambles. Although pretests revealed that participants
envelope conditions because no participant with ten are averse to gambling in aggregate, we did not measure
envelopes opened more than four envelopes. Participants individual-level aversion to predict effectiveness of parti-
with four envelopes opened marginally fewer envelopes tions (as we did in Study 1). Study 3 extends the current
(M4envelopes = 1.11) than those with ten envelopes study by measuring individual-level aversion and also
(M10envelopes = 1.75; F(1, 32) = 3.84, p < .10, η2 = .08). recording two measures of participants’ attention: the
These results suggest that the effort associated with break- amount of time they take to place each bet and the accuracy
ing a partition was greater for larger (versus smaller) with which they can recall their spending after completing
670 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2008
the task. Greater attention may be reflected in the length of
time participants take and their ability to recall spending
more accurately. Furthermore, gambles in Study 3 had a
neutral payoff, whereas those in Study 2 had a positive
expected value, removing a bias that may have caused
Study 2 participants to gamble too much.
STUDY 3: AVERSION MODERATES THE EFFECT OF
PARTITIONS ON GAMBLES
Participants, Method, and Design
We paid 91 participants at an Asian university to partici-
pate in a risk study. The game was similar to that in Study
2, with the exception of the payoff. Participants in Study 3
bet one coupon for each gamble and won six coupons if the
numbers on two independently drawn cards (which showed
a number between 1 and 6 with equal probability) totaled
10 or higher. This 6/36 probability of winning translated to
a neutral expected value (6 × 6/36) that was no different
than cashing in the coupon, which they could do at any
time. Thus, the gambling was driven by the participants’
affinity for or aversion to gambling. All participants
received 100 coupons that they could cash in or bet. We
manipulated the partitioning between subjects. Participants
in the aggregate condition received 100 coupons in a single
envelope, and the remaining participants (in the partitioned
condition) received 20 coupons each in five envelopes.
We used a proofreading task as a between-subjects
manipulation of gambling aversion before participants
began the risk study. All participants read four paragraphs
about gambling. Two of these paragraphs were common
across conditions. In addition, participants in the low-
aversion condition read two paragraphs about the positive
aspects associated with gambling (glamour, skill, and
wealth), and those in the high-aversion condition read two
paragraphs about the negative aspects of gambling (stress,
poor health, and debt). Manipulation checks (average of
two items: “How guilty do you feel when you gamble?” 1 =
“not at all guilty,” and 7 = “very guilty”; “How appropriate
is it for you to gamble?” (reverse scaled): 1 = “not at all
appropriate,” and 7 = “very appropriate”; r = .48, p <
.0001) revealed that guilt was higher in the high-aversion
condition than in the low-aversion condition (Mhigh aversion =
5.67 versus Mlow aversion = 2.90; F(1, 87) = 278.32, p <
.0001).
Thus, the study was a 2 (gambling aversion: low, high) ×
2 (partitioned: no, yes) full-factorial between-subjects
design with 20–25 participants randomly assigned to
each condition. We recorded the number of gambles along
with how long participants took to gamble (i.e., the dura-
tion for which they played the game). After the participant
decided to stop playing (or ran out of coupons to gamble
with), the experimenter collected the remaining coupons
and envelopes and the winnings. While the experimenter
calculated participants’ payoff at a separate table, partici-
pants completed the manipulation checks (described in the
preceding paragraph) and recalled how many coupons they
had bet. Recall errors (indicated by the absolute difference
between recalled and actual amounts) and time per bet were
used as measures of attention.
Results
Number of gambles. Figure 3 reveals that gambling aver-
sion moderates the effect of partitions on gambles (H2). In
Figure 3
STUDY 3: AVERSION MODERATES EFFECT OF PARTITIONS
ON SPENDING
the high-aversion conditions, participants with partitioned
(versus aggregate) resources placed fewer bets
(Mpartitioned = 22.56 versus Maggregate = 52.70; F(1, 87) =
16.16, p < .0005, η2 = .14). However, this effect of parti-
tions was not significant in the low-aversion conditions
(Mpartitioned = 48.96 versus Maggregate = 56.10; F(1, 87) =
.92, n.s.). The aversion × partition interaction (F(1, 87) =
4.74, p < .05, η2 = .05) qualified the main effects of parti-
tions (Mpartitioned = 36.02 versus Maggregate = 54.40;
F(1, 87) = 12.46, p < .001, η2 = .11) and aversion (Mhigh
aversion = 35.96 versus Mlow aversion = 52.07; F(1, 87) = 7.97,
p < .01, η2 = .07).
The usage pattern appears in Figure 4. In the graph for a
condition, each vertical bar shows the number of coupons
used by one participant in that condition. For example,
among participants in the high-aversion, aggregate
resources condition (Panel B), five participants did not
open the envelope, and the sixth and seventh participants
each bet 40 coupons. The horizontal dashed lines in Panels
C and D denote the partition between one envelope and the
next.
Number of partitions opened. We find that in the high-
aversion, partitioned condition (Figure 4, Panel D), most
participants opened two or fewer envelopes, in contrast to
those in the low-aversion, partitioned condition (Panel C).
Thus, among those with partitioned resources, participants
who were trying to control spending (i.e., those in the high-
aversion condition) opened significantly fewer envelopes
than those in the low-aversion condition (Mhigh aversion =
1.44 versus Mlow aversion = 2.73; F(1, 49) = 20.29, p < .0001,
η2 = .28).
Recall errors. We expected participants who paid greater
attention to the gambling decision to exhibit fewer recall
errors (calculated as the absolute difference between
recalled and actual number of bets for participants who bet
at least one coupon). Consistent with the notion that parti-
The Effect of Partitions on Controlling Consumption
Figure 4
STUDY 3: PARTITIONS DECREASE SPENDING FOR HIGH-AVERSION CONSUMERS
A: Low Aversion, Aggregate (1 Envelope)
C: Low Aversion, Partitioned (5 Envelopes)
tions draw attention to the decision, participants with parti-
tioned (versus aggregate) resources exhibited fewer recall
errors (Mpartitioned = 2.83 versus Maggregate = 6.57;
F(1, 80) = 10.19, p < .005, η2 = .10). This increased atten-
tion (reflected by fewer errors) reduced spending only for
participants who were averse to gambling, in support of H2
(Figure 5, Panel A). Specifically, the aversion × error inter-
action significantly affects spending (F(1, 80) = 4.24, p <
.05, η2 = .04).
Decision time. Another measure of attention, the time
taken per bet, shows a similar pattern of results. Partici-
pants with partitioned (versus aggregate) resources took
longer to bet (Mpartitioned = 23.51 versus Maggregate = 15.67
seconds; F(1, 80) = 163.23, p < .0001, η2 = .67). Although
the physical requirement of opening partitioned (versus
aggregate) resources may increase decision time, the mod-
erating role of aversion suggests that attentional differences
671
B: High Aversion, Aggregate (1 Envelope)
D: High Aversion, Partitioned (5 Envelopes)
affect spending. Specifically, increased attention (reflected
by longer times per bet) diminished spending to a greater
extent for participants who were averse to gambling, in sup-
port of H2 (see Figure 5, Panel B). The effect of the aver-
sion × time interaction on spending was significant
(F(1, 80) = 11.83, p < .001, η2 = .10). Log-transformed
time measures revealed similar results.
Discussion
In conditions in which participants were averse to gam-
bling, the pattern of observed decisions was consistent with
the expected effect of partitions on spending. Betting from
partitioned resources drew greater attention to the gambling
decision than did using aggregate resources, as reflected by
fewer errors in recall and in longer decision times per bet.
Consequently, participants with partitioned resources spent
less than those with aggregate resources, in support of H1.
672 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2008
Figure 5
STUDY 3: AVERSION MODERATES THE EFFECT OF
ATTENTION ON SPENDING
A: Effect of Recall Errors on Spending
B: Effect of Decision Time on Spending
However, when participants were not averse to gambling,
partitioning did not affect gambles, in support of H2. This
interaction of aversion with attention measures (recall
errors and decision time) provides additional support for
the proposed process.
In Study 3, we also asked each participant to report the
extent to which he or she was averse to gambling (reported
aversion: average of two items: “How guilty do you feel
when you gamble?” 1 = “not at all guilty,” and 7 = “very
guilty”; “How appropriate is it for you to gamble?” (reverse
scaled): 1 = “not at all appropriate,” and 7 = “very appropri-
ate”; r = .48, p < .0001). As for Study 1, we used scores
that were higher or lower than the midpoint to categorize
participants as being averse to gambles or not, respectively.
Analyses of the number of bets with this individual-level
measure reveal a significant partition × aversion interaction
(F(1, 87) = 9.12, p < .005, η2 = .07). Among participants
who were averse to gambling, those with partitioned
resources placed significantly fewer bets than those with
aggregate resources (Mpartitioned = 21.76 versus Maggregate =
56.20; F(1, 87) = 21.53, p < .0001, η2 = .18). In contrast,
partitions did not affect participants who were not averse to
gambling (Mpartitioned = 49.73 versus Maggregate = 52.60;
F(1, 87) = .15, n.s.). The main effects of partitions
(F(1, 87) = 12.74, p < .001, η2 = .18) and aversion
(Maverse = 37.07 versus Mnot averse = 50.98; F(1, 87) = 5.44,
p < .05, η2 = .04) were qualified by the aforementioned
interaction.
In Study 4, we explored another potential moderator of
partition effectiveness—the nature of the partition. Some
partitions may be expected, and over time people may
begin to remove partitions habitually. In such situations,
partitions that differ from expectations (versus those that
are expected) may constrain consumption to a greater
extent. Specifically, we study the effect of separators in a
pack of cookies. Consumers often expect white separators
between cookies, and these partitions may be removed
automatically as consumers become habituated to them.
Thus, an acceleration in consumption over time (with the
decreasing effectiveness of white partitions) may be
observed. In contrast, separators of varying colors are more
likely to attract attention, and consumers may be less likely
to remove such partitions automatically. Thus, partitions of
varying colors may constrain consumption more than white
partitions.
STUDY 4: EFFECT OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF
PARTITIONS ON CONSUMPTION
Participants, Design, and Procedure
Fifty-four students at a North American university who
were participating in a series of unrelated research studies
were given 20 cookie crisps in a container as refreshments
that they could eat while completing the studies. The pack-
aging of the cookies was manipulated between subjects.
One-third of the participants received cookies in an aggre-
gate form (no partitions). Another one-third of the partici-
pants received white (wax paper) partitions. The last one-
third of participants received partitions of varying colors
between cookies. Therefore, the study design was a single-
factor 3 (partitions: none, white, color) between-subjects
design with 18 participants randomly assigned to each of
the three experimental conditions. The entire session of
studies took approximately 140 minutes to complete. We
discreetly monitored participants’ cookie consumption in
(14) 10-minute intervals during this session. The primary
dependent measure was how long each participant took to
finish the cookies (range = 1–14). We conservatively used
15 intervals as the duration for participants who did not fin-
ish the 20 cookies in the 14 intervals. To explore the pat-
tern, we also split the 14 intervals into three periods and
contrasted consumption across conditions.
Results
Rate of consumption. We expected that white partitions
would slow consumption to a lesser extent than color parti-
tions. Although participants with no partitions finished the
cookies as quickly as participants with white partitions
(Mnone = 9.39 versus Mwhite = 9.94; F(1, 51) = .90, n.s.),
participants with color partitions took significantly longer
(i.e., consumed more slowly; Mcolor = 14.39) than those
The Effect of Partitions on Controlling Consumption
with no partitions (F(1, 51) = 72.93, p < .0001, η2 = .58) or
those with white partitions (F(1, 51) = 57.46, p < .0001,
η2 = .52). Thus, participants with white partitions appeared
to be less affected by the partitions, eating cookies in a
manner consistent with having no partitions. However,
those with color partitions consumed at a significantly
slower rate.
Consumption pattern. Next, we studied the dynamic pat-
tern of consumption by dividing the 14 intervals into three
periods. This enabled us to explore whether participants
paid less attention to partitions (especially white ones) as
time progressed and partitions were repeatedly removed.
The pattern of cumulative cookie consumption appears in
Figure 6. Participants with no partitions consumed cookies
the fastest, followed by those with white partitions.
Participants with white partitions appeared to accelerate
their consumption as time progressed in relation to partici-
pants who had colored partitions. Table 2 summarizes con-
sumption across the three periods. Participants with no par-
Figure 6
STUDY 4: PARTITIONS WITH CHANGING COLORS ARE MORE
SUCCESSFUL IN SLOWING COOKIE CONSUMPTION
Table 2
STUDY 4: PARTITIONS WITH CHANGING COLORS ARE MORE
SUCCESSFUL IN SLOWING COOKIE CONSUMPTION
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Interval range 1–5 6–10 11–14
Average Number of Cookies Consumed
No partition (aggregate) 13.61 5.83 .50
White partition 7.28 11.61 .83
Colored partition 5.33 6.56 4.72
673
titions consumed most of the cookies in Period 1 (Intervals
1–5: Mnone, Period 1 = 13.61) and consumed the remaining
cookies in Period 2 (Intervals 6–10: Mnone, Period 2 = 5.83).
A mixed model analysis revealed that more cookies were
consumed in Period 1 than in Period 2 (F(1, 102) = 107.95,
p < .0001, η2 = .16). For participants with white partitions,
however, cookie consumption accelerated from Period 1
(Mwhite, Period 1 = 7.28) to Period 2 (Mwhite, Period 2 = 11.61;
F(1, 102) = 33.52, p < .0001, η2 = .04). In contrast, this
acceleration was not significant for participants with color
partitions (Mcolor, Period 1 = 5.33 versus Mcolor, Period 2 = 6.56;
F(1, 102) = 2.66, n.s.). This interaction between partitions
(white versus color) and period (first versus second) was
significant (F(1, 34) = 5.92, p < .05, η2 = .04). The overall
partition × period interaction was also significant
(F(4, 102) = 58.88, p < .0001, η2 = .35).
Discussion
The results support H3; moreover, consumption differ-
ences between white versus color partitions rule out physi-
cal effort as the primary driver of the effect. Specifically,
acceleration in consumption from Period 1 to Period 2 for
participants who had white (versus color) partitions indi-
cated that with habituation, these participants decreased the
amount of attention paid to partitions. The proportion of
participants finishing the 20 cookies was also consistent
with the consumption rate. Significantly fewer participants
with color partitions finished their cookies (4/18 = 22%)
than participants with white partitions (17/18 = 94%) or
participants with no partitions (17/18 = 94%; χ2(2) = 19.62,
p < .0001).
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Research
We demonstrate the effect of partitions on consumption
and explore the boundaries of this effect across four stud-
ies. Consistent with H1, we find that partitions slow the
consumption of chocolates (Study 1) and cookies (Study 4)
and decrease the amount of gambles (Studies 2 and 3).
These results are consistent with the notion that partitions
draw attention to the activity that consumers are trying to
control, providing consumers with a deliberate decision-
making opportunity. Process measures in Study 3 (errors in
recall and decision times) support this attention-drawing
role of partitions. Importantly, the success of partitions in
constraining consumption is attenuated when consumers’
desire to control consumption is low (when the consumers
are not averse to eating chocolate in Study 1 or to gambling
in Study 3), in support of H2. In Study 4, we also demon-
strate that when people become habituated to a (white) par-
tition and thus pay less attention to it, they consume at a
faster rate. In contrast, partitions (of varying colors) that
draw more attention are relatively more effective in con-
straining consumption, consistent with H3.
Viewed together, these studies reveal that people with
partitioned (versus aggregate) resources are more likely to
deliberate on the consumption decision. This increased
attention decreases consumption for people who are trying
to control it.
Implications
The demonstrated effect of partitions suggests applica-
tions in myriad domains in which people try to control con-
674 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, DECEMBER 2008
sumption. We first discuss the two domains that were high-
lighted at the outset, namely, food and money. We then dis-
cuss wider implications of partitions and conclude with a
discussion of other attentional mechanisms that may have
similar effects.
Food consumption. People trying to exert self-control
(and eat less) could divide food into smaller portions, thus
forcing themselves to consciously consider the decision of
breaking a partition to consume the next portion. In con-
trast, having one large portion may lead the person to con-
sume food automatically until the serving is finished.
Wertenbroch (1998) studies a similar strategy of “ration-
ing” vices by buying only small quantities. However, that
strategy appears to be based on limited availability of the
resource. The current research suggests that even if addi-
tional units of the resource are available in other partitions,
paying more attention to the consumption decision (need-
ing to break more partitions) leads to greater self-control
success. Frequent variation in partition type would also
enhance partition effectiveness. Conversely, from the per-
spective of a seller, larger packages with no partitions
would increase consumption (Ailawadi and Neslin 1998).
Financial decisions. Partitions could also help people
constrain spending and save more. Partitions of money may
take the form of physical demarcations, in which money is
put aside for a specific purpose (e.g., in one or more
envelopes or in bank accounts). The current research sug-
gests that people will be less likely to use that money for a
purpose other than the one it was earmarked for if it exists
in several partitions than when it exists in one aggregate
amount. Three studies we conducted in the domain of
spending on unplanned desirable purchases show that
money earmarked for a different expense was less likely to
be spent when the person needed to break multiple parti-
tions. These partitions were implemented in the forms of
(multiple) gift cards, bank accounts, and certificates of
deposit. It could be argued that currency denominations are
also partitions of an aggregate amount (e.g., $100 may be
partitioned into ten bills of $10 each). However, we expect
that these partitions would draw less attention to spending
than other physical partitions because people are relatively
habituated to currency denominations.
These findings have important implications for savings
rates, in particular among consumers who do not have
access to banking and guaranteed monthly salaries. We
tested our basic partitioning effects in a field study in rural
China and India with construction workers who get paid
daily wages in cash. Some of the workers were given sev-
eral currency bills as one bundle, and others were given the
same set of bills but divided equally across four sealed
envelopes. Over a three-month window, the workers who
were given wages in sealed envelopes reported saving more
of their earnings than the others. Although these findings
are preliminary and data need to be collected over a signifi-
cantly longer time horizon, the results suggest the power of
the partitioning manipulation in influencing behavior in the
real world.
Other attentional mechanisms. We emphasize that
though physical partitions are the domain of inquiry herein,
they represent one operationalization of the underlying con-
struct of an intervention that moves consumption decision
making from automatic to deliberative. Other interventions
that could achieve the same means include reminders, cog-
nitive interventions, rhetorical questions, auditory signals,
targets, or even progress markers. Research conducted by
one of the authors shows that an auditory beep and an auto-
matic shutdown at certain intervals of leaving an air condi-
tioning unit on forces the consumer to actively decide
whether to reactivate the unit for another period and that
giving people soda in large sizes, but in cups marked by
volume (much like a measuring cup), decreases the volume
they consume. Other contextual or individual-level con-
structs that increase deliberative (versus automatic) evalua-
tion of decisions would also be successful in constraining
consumption in the contexts studied herein.
Limitations and Further Research
Slowing versus reducing consumption. With limited
resources and sufficient time, participants consumed most
of the food resources in Studies 1 and 4. However, the rate
of consumption was slower with partitioned (versus aggre-
gate) resources. We expect that, over time, a slower rate of
consumption will result in lesser total consumption. We
also show that partitions decrease consumption in the con-
text of gambles (Studies 2 and 3), and fewer participants
with colored (versus white or no) partitions finished all the
cookies in Study 4. The relationship between rate of con-
sumption and overall consumption can also be studied in
greater detail in further research.
Demonstrating dual process. Attentional effects of parti-
tions are demonstrated in process measures from Study 3
(recall errors and decision times) and in effects of colored
(versus white) partitions in Study 4. However, demonstrat-
ing the existence of automatic versus deliberate processes
remains a fruitful avenue of further research. Such research
could focus on the effects of cognitive load. The automatic
behavior of consuming a proximal tempting option should
not change as a function of whether the person is placed
under cognitive load. In contrast, deliberative decision mak-
ing (when a person encounters a partition) would be ham-
pered by cognitive load. Thus, cognitive load may attenuate
the effect of partitions on consumption.
Individual and contextual differences in attention to con-
sumption. In addition to interventions that increase atten-
tion to consumption, further research could examine
individual-level differences that affect decision delibera-
tion. For example, people who construe activities at a high
level (why they should consume a resource) may exert bet-
ter self-control than those who construe activities at a low
level (how they should consume it), consistent with the
process that Fujita and colleagues (2006) suggest. In con-
trast, factors that decrease deliberation may increase impul-
sive spending. The shopping momentum effect (Dhar,
Huber, and Khan 2007) details how the momentum from
one purchase makes a second, subsequent purchase more
likely because people who start purchasing are in an imple-
mental (versus a deliberative) mind-set. On the basis of the
current research, we would expect such an implemental
mind-set to persist until the person encounters a partition
that draws deliberate attention to the decision.
Effect of partition size on decision to consume. We also
find some evidence that the size of the resource may affect
people’s decision to break a partition. Participants in Study
2 were marginally less likely to break a large partition than
The Effect of Partitions on Controlling Consumption
a smaller one. However, this effect was smaller than the
constraining effect of smaller partitions (i.e., participants
still spent more from one large partition than from several
small partitions). The reticence to break large partitions
may be based in part on the notion that breaking the parti-
tion signals the breaking of a rule, with the size of the parti-
tion acting as an indicator of the magnitude of failure.
Thus, people who break a large partition may feel worse
than those who break a small partition. Indeed, in studies in
which people could consume by breaking one partition, we
find that they are directionally more likely to consume
when they can do so by breaking a small (versus large) par-
tition. This may be because a person who breaks one small
partition is still able to conserve other small partitions, fol-
lowing the rule of not opening those. This remains a fruitful
area for further investigation.
Ambiguous versus clearly defined partitions. Partitioned
(versus aggregate) resources may also enable consumers to
define clearer rules. Clear rules are easier to follow (e.g.,
Ainslie and Haslam 1992) and may be a factor that affects
successful self-control in our results. However, this would
not explain attentional differences, as demonstrated by
recall errors and response times in Study 3. Moreover, even
with clearly defined (white versus colored) partitions in
Study 4, we observed differences in consumption as a
consequence of consumers’ habituation to such partitions,
implicating attentional differences as the driver of that
effect.
This research used clearly defined partitions in all the
studies. In the presence of ambiguity, however, consumers
may be motivated to redefine the partitions rather than
break them (e.g., Cheema and Soman 2006) or to reallocate
resources across partitions after a transgression to “make
things right.” Further research could also study how
consumers may reexert control after breaking a partition.
This may involve repartitioning the available resources to
increase deliberation of future consumption. Such research
on reexerting self-control would also have significant impli-
cations for controlling consumption.
REFERENCES
Ailawadi, Kusum L. and Scott A. Neslin (1998), “The Effect of
Promotion on Consumption: Buying More and Consuming It
Faster,” Journal of Marketing Research, 35 (July), 390–98.
Ainslie, George (2000), “A Research-Based Theory of Addictive
Motivation,” Law and Philosophy, 19 (January), 77–115.
——— and Nick Haslam (1992), “Self-Control,” in Choice Over
Time, G. Loewenstein and J. Elster, eds. New York: Sage Publi-
cations, 177–209.
Baumeister, Roy F. (2002), “Yielding to Temptation: Self-Control
Failure, Impulsive Purchasing, and Consumer Behavior,” Jour-
nal of Consumer Research, 28 (March), 670–76.
Benabou, Ronald and Jean Tirole (2004), “Willpower and Per-
sonal Rules,” Journal of Political Economy, 112 (4), 848–86.
Cheema, Amar and Dilip Soman (2006), “Malleable Mental
Accounting: The Effect of Flexibility on the Justification of
Attractive Spending and Consumption Decisions,” Journal of
Consumer Psychology, 16 (1), 33–44.
CNN Money (2006), “Consumer Groups Blast Fed,” (July 10),
(accessed November 9, 2006), [available at http://money.
cnn.com/2006/07/10/pf/creditcards/index.htm].
675
Delaney, Anna (2007), “Eating Behavior and Portion Control,”
(accessed August 7, 2008), [available at http://www.calorie
king.com/library/article.php?content_id=3&path=13,66&art_id
=843].
Dhar, Ravi, Joel Huber, and Uzma Khan (2007), “The Shopping
Momentum Effect,” Journal of Marketing Research, 44
(August), 370–78.
Donthu, Naveen and David Gilliland (1996), “The Infomercial
Shopper,” Journal of Advertising Research, 36 (March–April),
69–76.
The Economist (2006a), “Battling the Flab,” (August 18),
(accessed August 20, 2008), [available at http://www.economist.
com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_SRTQDTV].
——— (2006b), “Food Firms and Fat-Fighters,” (February 9),
(accessed August 20, 2008), [available at http://www.economist.
com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_VVDNNTV].
Fujita, Kentaro, Yaacov Trope, Nira Liberman, and Maya Levin-
Sagi (2006), “Construal Levels and Self-Control,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 90 (3), 351–67.
Gollwitzer, Peter M. (1999), “Implementation Intentions: Strong
Effects of Simple Plans,” American Psychologist, 54 (July),
493–503.
Greenhouse, Steven (2006), “Borrowers We Be,” The New York
Times, (September 3), 12.
Hastie, Reid (2001), “Problems for Judgment and Decision Mak-
ing,” Annual Review of Psychology, 52 (February), 653–83.
Heckhausen, Heinz and Peter M. Gollwitzer (1987), “Thought
Contents and Cognitive Functioning in Motivational Versus
Volitional States of Mind,” Motivation & Emotion, 11 (June),
101–120.
Johnston, William A. and Veronica J. Dark (1986), “Selective
Attention,” Annual Review of Psychology, 37 (January), 43–75.
Kyrios, M., R.O. Frost, and G. Steketee (2004), “Cognitions in
Compulsive Buying and Acquisition,” Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 28 (April), 241–58.
Manning, Robert D. (2000), Credit Card Nation: The Conse-
quences of America’s Addiction to Credit. New York: Basic
Books.
Mischel, Walter, Yuichi Shoda, and Monica L. Rodriguez (1989),
“Delay of Gratification in Children,” Science, 244 (4907),
933–38.
O’Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin (1999), “Doing It Now or
Later,” American Economic Review, 89 (March), 103–124.
Prelec, Drazen and Richard J. Herrnstein (1991), “Preferences or
Principles: Alternative Guidelines for Choice,” in Strategy and
Choice, R.J. Zeckhauser, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shiffrin, Richard and Susan T. Dumain (1981), “The Development
of Automatism,” in Cognitive Skills and Their Acquisition, J.R.
Anderson, ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
110–40.
Smith, Eliot R. and Jamie DeCoster (2000), “Dual-Process Mod-
els in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration
and Links to Underlying Memory Systems,” Personality and
Social Psychology Review, 4 (2), 108–131.
Spurlock, Morgan (2005), Don’t Eat This Book: Fast Food and the
Supersizing of America. New York: Putnam.
Strack, Fritz and Roland Deutsch (2004), “Reflective and Impul-
sive Determinants of Social Behavior,” Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 8 (3), 220–47.
Thaler, Richard H. and Hersh M. Shefrin (1981), “An Economic
Theory of Self-Control,” Journal of Political Economy, 89
(April), 392–406.
Wertenbroch, Klaus (1998), “Consumption Self-Control by
Rationing Purchase Quantities of Virtue and Vice,” Marketing
Science, 17 (4), 317–37.