Embrace, extend, and extinguish

"Embrace, extend, and extinguish" (EEE),[1] also known as "embrace, extend, and
exterminate",[2] is a phrase that the U.S. Department of Justice found[3] was used internally by
Microsoft[4] to describe its strategy for entering product categories involving widely used standards,
extending those standards with proprietary capabilities, and then using those differences in order to
strongly disadvantage its competitors.

Contents
Origin
Strategy
Examples
Variant
Companies other than Microsoft
See also
References
External links

Origin
The strategy and phrase "embrace and extend" were first described outside Microsoft in a 1996 article
in The New York Times titled "Tomorrow, the World Wide Web! Microsoft, the PC King, Wants to
Reign Over the Internet",[5] in which writer John Markoff said, "Rather than merely embrace and
extend the Internet, the company's critics now fear, Microsoft intends to engulf it." The phrase
"embrace and extend" also appears in a facetious motivational song by an anonymous Microsoft
employee,[6] and in an interview of Steve Ballmer by The New York Times.[7]

The variation, "embrace, extend and extinguish", was first introduced in the United States v.
Microsoft Corp. antitrust trial when then vice president of Intel, Steven McGeady, used the phrase[8]
to explain Microsoft vice president Paul Maritz's statement in a 1995 meeting with Intel that
described Microsoft's strategy to "kill HTML by extending it".[9][10]

Strategy
The strategy's three phases are:[11]

1. Embrace: Development of software substantially compatible with a competing product, or

implementing a public standard.
2. Extend: Addition and promotion of features not supported by the competing product or part of the
standard, creating interoperability problems for customers who try to use the "simple" standard.
3. Extinguish: When extensions become a de facto standard because of their dominant market
share, they marginalize competitors that do not or cannot support the new extensions.
Microsoft claims that the original strategy is not anti-competitive, but rather an exercise of its
discretion to implement features it believes customers want.[12]

Examples
Browser incompatibilities:
The plaintiffs in the antitrust case claimed that Microsoft had added support for ActiveX
controls in the Internet Explorer Web browser to break compatibility with Netscape Navigator,
which used components based on Java and Netscape's own plugin system.
On CSS, data:, etc.: A decade after the original Netscape-related antitrust suit, the Web
browser company Opera Software filed an antitrust complaint against Microsoft with the
European Union, saying it "calls on Microsoft to adhere to its own public pronouncements to
support these standards, instead of stifling them with its notorious 'Embrace, Extend and
Extinguish' strategy".[13]
Office documents: In a memo to the Office product group in 1998, Bill Gates stated: "One thing
we have got to change in our strategy — allowing Office documents to be rendered very well by
other people's browsers is one of the most destructive things we could do to the company. We
have to stop putting any effort into this and make sure that Office documents very well depends
on PROPRIETARY IE capabilities. Anything else is suicide for our platform. This is a case where
Office has to avoid doing something to destroy [sic] Windows." [14]
Breaking Java's portability: The antitrust case's plaintiffs also accused Microsoft of using an
"embrace and extend" strategy with regard to the Java platform, which was designed explicitly
with the goal of developing programs that could run on any operating system, be it Windows,
Mac, or Linux. They claimed that, by omitting the Java Native Interface (JNI) from its
implementation and providing J/Direct for a similar purpose, Microsoft deliberately tied Windows
Java programs to its platform, making them unusable on Linux and Mac systems. According to an
internal communication, Microsoft sought to downplay Java's cross-platform capability and make
it "just the latest, best way to write Windows applications".[15] Microsoft paid Sun US$20 million in
January 2001 (equivalent to $28.88 million in 2019) to settle the resulting legal implications of
their breach of contract.[16]
More Java issues: Sun sued Microsoft over Java again in 2002 and Microsoft agreed to settle
out of court for US$2 billion[17][18] (equivalent to US$2.84 billion in 2019).
Instant messaging: In 2001, CNet's News.com described an instance concerning Microsoft's
instant messaging program.[19] "Embrace" AOL's IM protocol, the de facto standard of the 1990s
and early 2000s. "Extend" the standard with proprietary Microsoft addons which added new
features, but broke compatibility with AOL's software. Gain dominance, since Microsoft had 95%
OS share and their MSN Messenger was provided for free. Finally, "extinguish" and lock out
AOL's IM software, since AOL was unable to use the modified MS-patented protocol.
Adobe fears: Adobe Systems refused to let Microsoft implement built-in PDF support in Microsoft
Office, citing fears of EEE.[20] Current versions of Microsoft Office have built-in support for PDF,
as well as several other ISO standards.[21][22][23]
Employee testimony: In 2007, Microsoft employee Ronald Alepin gave sworn expert testimony
for the plaintiffs in Comes v. Microsoft in which he cited internal Microsoft emails to justify the
claim that the company intentionally employed this practice.[24]

Variant
An older variant of the phrase is "embrace, extend then innovate" in J Allard's 1994 memo
"Windows: The Next Killer Application on the Internet"[25] to Paul Maritz and other executives at
Microsoft. The memo starts with a background on the Internet in general, and then proposes a
strategy on how to turn Windows into the next "killer app" for the Internet:
 In order to build the necessary respect and win the mindshare of the Internet community,
I recommend a recipe not unlike the one we've used with our TCP/IP efforts: embrace,
extend, then innovate. Phase 1 (Embrace): all participants need to establish a solid
understanding of the infostructure and the community—determine the needs and the
trends of the user base. Only then can we effectively enable Microsoft system products to
be great Internet systems. Phase 2 (Extend): establish relationships with the
appropriate organizations and corporations with goals similar to ours. Offer well-
integrated tools and services compatible with established and popular standards that have
been developed in the Internet community. Phase 3 (Innovate): move into a leadership
role with new Internet standards as appropriate, enable standard off-the-shelf titles with
Internet awareness. Change the rules: Windows become the next-generation Internet
tool of the future.

— J Allard, Windows: The Next Killer Application on the Internet (https://web.archi

ve.org/web/*/https://www.microsoft.com/about/companyinformation/timeline/ti
meline/docs/di_killerapp_InternetMemo.rtf)

Companies other than Microsoft

During the browser wars, other companies besides Microsoft introduced proprietary, non–standards-
compliant extensions. For example, in 1995, Netscape implemented the "font" tag, among other
HTML extensions, without seeking review from a standards body. With the rise of Internet Explorer,
the two companies became locked in a dead heat to out-implement each other with non–standards-
compliant features. In 2004, to prevent a repeat of the "browser wars", and the resulting morass of
conflicting standards, the browser vendors Apple Inc. (Safari), Mozilla Foundation (Firefox), and
Opera Software (Opera browser) formed the Web Hypertext Application Technology Working Group
(WHATWG) to create open standards to complement those of the World Wide Web Consortium.[26]
Microsoft refused to join, citing the group's lack of a patent policy as the reason.[27]

See also
Criticism of Microsoft
Halloween documents
Microsoft and open source
Network effect
Path dependence
Vendor lock-in
32-bit vs 64-bit
AARD code

References
1. "Deadly embrace" (https://www.economist.com/node/298112). The Economist. 2000-03-30.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20180523190053/https://www.economist.com/node/29811
2) from the original on 2018-05-23.
2. "Microsoft limits XML in Office 2003" (https://web.archive.org/web/20050922005808/http://news.z
dnet.com/2100-3513_22-996528.html). Archived from the original (http://news.zdnet.com/2100-35
13_22-996528.html) on September 22, 2005. Retrieved 2006-03-31.
3. "US Department of Justice Proposed Findings of Fact—Revised" (https://www.usdoj.gov/atr/case
s/f2600/v-a.pdf) (PDF). Usdoj.gov. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
 4. "US Department of Justice Proposed Findings of Fact" (https://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2600/26
13.htm). Usdoj.gov. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
5. John Markoff (July 16, 1996). "Tomorrow, the World Wide Web! Microsoft, the PC King, Wants to
Reign Over the Internet" (https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/16/business/tomorrow-world-wide-we
b-microsoft-pc-king-wants-reign-over-internet.html?pagewanted=all). The New York Times.
Retrieved 2013-07-25.
6. Rebello, Kathy (1996-07-15). "Inside Microsoft (Part 1)" (https://web.archive.org/web/1996101918
1801/http://www.businessweek.com/1996/29/b34841.htm). Business Week. Retrieved
2018-08-05.
7. Steve Lohr, "Preaching from the Ballmer Pulpit". The New York Times, Sunday, January 28, 2007.
pp. 3-1, 3-8, 3-9.
8. "Steven McGeady court testimony" (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/transcripts/1110a.doc).
Cyber.law.harvard.edu. Retrieved 2006-03-31. (DOC format)
9. "United States v. Microsoft: Trial Summaries (page 2)" (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/transcri
pt/summaries2.html). Cyber.law.harvard.edu. Retrieved 2006-03-31.
10. "In Microsoft We Trust" (https://archive.is/20050419194550/http://reactor-core.org/in-microsoft-we
-trust.html). Archived from the original (http://reactor-core.org/in-microsoft-we-trust.html) on 2005-
04-19. Retrieved 2006-03-31.
11. "Embrace, Extend, Extinguish (IT Vendor Strategies)" (http://www.hr.com/servlets/sfs?&t=/Default/
gateway&i=1116423256281&b=1116423256281&application=story&active=no&ParentID=111927
8102301&StoryID=1119649742078). Hr.com. Retrieved 2007-10-14.
12. "U.S. v. Microsoft: We're Defending Our Right to Innovate" (https://web.archive.org/web/2007032
9064009/http://openacademy.mindef.gov.sg/openacademy/Learning%20Resources/Microsoft/wor
ds/words_4.htm). Openacademy.mindef.gov.sg. Archived from the original on March 29, 2007.
Retrieved 2007-03-29.
13. "files antitrust complaint with the EU" (http://www.opera.com/pressreleases/en/2007/12/13/).
Opera. 2007-12-13. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
14. "Plaintiff's Exhibit : 2991 : Comes v Microsoft" (http://antitrust.slated.org/www.iowaconsumercase.
org/011607/2000/PX02991.pdf) (PDF). Antitrust.slated.org. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
15. Matt Richtel (1998-10-22). "Memos Released in Sun-Microsoft Suit" (https://query.nytimes.com/gs
t/fullpage.html?res=9C02EEDE103DF931A15753C1A96E958260&sec=&spon=&partner=permali
nk&exprod=permalink). The New York Times. Retrieved 2008-02-22. "The court documents state
that in April 1997, Ben Slivka, the Microsoft manager responsible for executing the Java strategy,
sent an E-mail to Microsoft's chairman, William H. Gates, noting "When I met with you last, you
had a lot of pretty pointed questions about Java, so I want to make sure I understand your issues
and concerns." Mr. Slivka goes on to ask if Mr. Gates' concerns included "How do we wrest
control of Java away from Sun?" and "How we turn Java into just the latest, best way to write
Windows applications?"
16. "Sun, Microsoft settle Java suit" (http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-251401.html). News.cnet.com.
Retrieved 2001-01-23.
17. "Microsoft's lawsuit payouts amount to around $9 billion" (http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/new
s/1048246/microsoft-lawsuit-payouts-usd9-billion). Theinquirer.net. Retrieved 2010-03-04.
18. "Microsoft and Sun Microsystems Enter Broad Cooperation Agreement; Settle Outstanding
Litigation" (https://web.archive.org/web/20100225015449/http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/pre
ss/2004/apr04/04-02SunAgreementPR.mspx). Microsoft.com. Archived from the original (http://w
ww.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2004/apr04/04-02SunAgreementPR.mspx) on 2010-02-25.
Retrieved 2010-03-04.
19. Jim Hu (2001-06-07). "Microsoft messaging tactics recall browser wars" (http://news.cnet.com/Mi
crosoft+messaging+tactics+recall+browser+wars/2009-1023_3-267971.html). CNet News.com.
20. "Adobe Speaks Out on Microsoft PDF Battle" (http://www.cio.com/article/22058/Adobe_Speaks_
Out_on_Microsoft_PDF_Battle). CIO. 2006-06-14. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
21. "Archived copy" (https://web.archive.org/web/20090517045138/http://www.microsoft.com/presspa
ss/features/2009/apr09/04-28office2007sp2qa.mspx). Archived from the original (http://www.micr
osoft.com/presspass/features/2009/apr09/04-28office2007sp2qa.mspx) on May 17, 2009.
Retrieved May 25, 2009.
22. "Archived copy" (https://web.archive.org/web/20090501133844/http://www.microsoft.com/Presspa
ss/press/2008/may08/05-21ExpandedFormatsPR.mspx). Archived from the original (http://www.m
icrosoft.com/presspass/press/2008/may08/05-21ExpandedFormatsPR.mspx) on May 1, 2009.
Retrieved May 19, 2009.
23. "Office 2007 SP2 and PDF version support – @Pot&Kettle | Gray Matter" (http://blogs.technet.co
m/gray_knowlton/archive/2009/05/04/office-2007-sp2-and-pdf-version-support-the-shell-game.as
px). Blogs.technet.com. 2009-05-04. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
24. Expert Testimony of Ronald Alepin in (http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20070108020408
557)Comes v. Microsoft — Embrace, Extend, Extinguish, Groklaw, January 8, 2007.
25. "Windows: The Next Killer Application on the Internet" (https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://www.
microsoft.com/about/companyinformation/timeline/timeline/docs/di_killerapp_InternetMemo.rtf)
(RTF). Microsoft.com. Retrieved 2016-04-28.
26. "What is the WHATWG and why did it form?" (https://web.archive.org/web/20070821014820/htt
p://blog.whatwg.org/faq/#whattf). Blog.whatwg.org. Archived from the original (https://blog.whatw
g.org/faq/#whattf) on 2007-08-21. Retrieved 2007-08-25.
27. "MSConversations" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080216101506/http://channel9.msdn.com/pod
casts/MSConversations_wilson_ch9.mp3). Archived from the original (http://channel9.msdn.com/
podcasts/MSConversations_wilson_ch9.mp3) on 2008-02-16. Retrieved 2009-07-28.

External links
Report on Microsoft documents relating to Office and IE Embrace, extend and extinguish (http://te
chrights.org/2009/06/25/bill-gates-office-patents/)

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