Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Facts:
On May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted
RMC funds in the form of cash totaling P304, 979.74 to his secretary, Irene
Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC
with Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). They were not credited to RMC's
account but were instead deposited to Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas.
Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing
complete trust and confidence on PBC.
Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and
both are always validated and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad;
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his
current account number - retained by the bank; duplicate copy was written
the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was
left blank; after validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the
space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account
number to RMC's account number. This went on in a span of more than 1 year
without private respondent's knowledge. Upon discovery of the loss of its
funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money.
Issues:
1. Whether applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to
avoid the injury by not exercising the proper validation procedure.
2. Whether there was contributory negligence by RMC.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times
as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was
indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both
parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would
also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the
opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it
cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure.
2. Yes. While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of
account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would have discovered the loss
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early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. This omission on the
part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and
reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete duplicate
deposit slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred.
Considering, however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year
covering various deposits, common human experience dictates that the same would not
have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms. Yabut and bank teller
Mabayad. Ms. Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller
nonetheless. Thus, the petitioners are entitled to claim reimbursement from her for
whatever they shall be ordered to pay in this case.
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Facts:
Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson
Street where they resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA
said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not
have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from
the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open
trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench which
was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light
or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban
allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent
scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was
also shattered.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the
spouses’ complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set
aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his
wife’s injuries but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident,
as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some
alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden
of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof,
otherwise, his action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case, there was
insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What were
presented were just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified
photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police
report and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where
the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been explained.
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Facts:
Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased Julio Cantolos for the
settlement of the latter’s estate. On January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda. On January 20, 1965, Pasamba and Fornilda executed a
deed of real estate mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy
to secure the payment of his attorney’s fees. But on August 6, 1969, after the taxes had
been paid, the claims settled and the properties adjudicated, the estate was declared
closed and terminated. When Pasamba and Fornilda passed away, Fornilda was
succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez. On January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the closure
of the two lots alleging the non-payment of attorney’s fees. The herein respondents
denied the allegation, but judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy.
Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able to
buy the lots by auction where the house of the spouses Gutierrez was situated. On
Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986, orders were implemented for the demolition of
structures in the said lot, including herein respondents’ house. On September 27, 1985,
David Fornilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a TRO for the suspension of the
demolition, which was granted, but the houses have already been demolished. A
complaint for damages was filed by respondents, which was denied by RTC but granted
by CA, thus this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable for damages to
respondents.
Ruling:
Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from
the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque
injuria — for which the law gives no remedy, saying he is not liable for damages. The
precept of Damnum Absque Injuria has no application is this case. Petitioner did not heed
the TRO suspending the demolition of structures. Although the acts of petitioner may
have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad
faith.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following:
to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. This
must be observed. Clearly then, the demolition of respondents’ house by petitioner,
despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of
such right. The petition is denied. The decision of CA is affirmed.
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Facts:
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the
covered cargoes to Concepcion Industries, Inc., (CII). Being subrogee of CII’s rights &
interests, FGU, in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the
claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage against GPS
and the driver with the RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was only the
exclusive hauler of CII since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common
carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the
ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier. The RTC granted
the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently dismissed the complaint holding
that GPS was not a common carrier defined under the law & existing jurisprudence. The
subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, FGU interposed an appeal to
the CA. The CA rejected the FGU’s appeal & ruled in favor of GPS. It also denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, FGU filed this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
WON the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case.
Ruling:
Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused
the injury complained of is shown to be under the latter’s management and
the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be
expected to happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care. It affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a rule of
substantive law and, as such, it does not create an independent ground of
liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of,
the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply
places on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Resort to
the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when (a) the event is of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other
responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons,
are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence and (c) the indicated negligence is
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within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff. Thus, it is not
applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of
several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.
Petition denied.
Facts:
A jeep was carrying passengers when its right rear wheel became detached, causing it to be
unbalanced. The driver stepped on the brake, which made the jeep turn around, encroaching on the opposite
lane. The passenger jeepney was bumped from behind by a speeding truck with such violence that three of
its passengers died whereas two other passengers suffered injuries. The representatives of the dead and of
the injured passengers filed suits to recover damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and also
against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
The trial court rendered judgment absolving the driver and the owners of the jeepney but required the
driver and the owners of the truck to compensate the victims. The Plaintiffs appealed insisting that the
driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable. The Intermediate appellate court (now
Court of Appeals), relying primarily on the doctrine of last clear chance, affirmed the trial court's decision.
The plaintiffs then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. Citing the landmark case of Anuran, et al. v. Buño et. al., THE
Supreme Court reiterated that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance,
would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on
the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court modified the questioned decision by making all the
defendants’ solidarity liable.
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Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the
truck was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck,
there would have been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen
that at the speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge
and as the road was getting narrower the truck would be too close to the jeep
and would eventually sideswipe it. Otherwise stated, he should have
slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to the truck
because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time.
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Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or
a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening
forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes
which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's
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responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of
heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even
though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the
highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another
negligently drives into it.
Facts:
On April 20, 1983 a collision occurred between gravel and sand truck
Driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda
passenger Bus driven by Defendant Susulin, along the national road at
Kalibuyao Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion of the body of the truck
sideswiped the left sidewall of the passenger bus which resulted to the death
of five individuals. The passenger bus was owned and operated by Magtibay
and Serrado.several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they sustained. The bus was registered in the name of
Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by
Magtibay and Serrado. Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger
bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the
highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus
driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the
truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his
belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from
fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which
was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a
Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the
highway.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the two drivers is liable are solidarily
liable for their negligence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided that the bus driver had the clear
chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to
overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision. Plaintiffs
-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the CA.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision o the respondent Court of appeals.
Issue:
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Ruling:
In the case at bar, the suit is not between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers
against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the court
erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
Facts:
Issues:
(1)Whether the decision in the Civil Case No 3490 for quasi-delict
between Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on the other, is res
judicata to the issue in this case.
(2) Whether the ruling in Civil Case No 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the
proximate cause of the accident negates Calalas’ liability.
Ruling:
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1. No. There is no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No 3490,
finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to Calalas’ jeepney,
should be binding on Sunga. The latter was never a party to the Civil Case.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor.
The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in
quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it
is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.
2. No. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to
a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a
case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence
required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well
as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.
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Facts:
In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, typhoon
"Gening" buffeted the Province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent
flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon
had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao
Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio
Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the
direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to
look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep
flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo
Estavillo. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters
behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the
water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on
the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and
moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz
came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four
meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. When
Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been electrocuted, he
acted immediately. Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the
people of Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then
the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the
lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in
Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body was
recovered about two meters from an electric post.
Meanwhile, on the same day the incident happen, Engr. Antonio Juan of the National
Power Corporation set out on an inspection trip between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he saw
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grounded and disconnected electric lines owned by such electric company but saw
no INELCO lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on Rizal Street was still
closed.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased before the CFI of
Ilocos Norte a year after the incident. At the trial, petitioner’s witnesses testified in a
general way about their duties and the measures which defendant usually adopts to
prevent hazards to life and limb. From these testimonies, the lower court found that the
electric lines and other equipment of the electric company were properly maintained by a
well-trained team of lineman, technicians and engineers working around the clock to
insure that these equipment’s were in excellent condition at all times. The petitioner then,
prays that the company be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are
fortuitous events and that the acts of the private respondents falls within the sphere of the
maxim of "volenti non fit injuria"
Issue:
Ruling:
No. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God
for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality
which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place. The finding of the lower court
was based on what the defendant's(petitioner-company) employees were
supposed to do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in
question, and not on the occasion of the emergency situation brought about
by the typhoon.
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the
night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence
requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any
probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show
that defendant-company did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that
there were no men policing the area, nor even manning its office. Indeed,
under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it
that no harm is done to the general public. Considering that electricity is an
agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The
duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every
place where persons have a right to be (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil.
427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now
absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due
to a fortuitous event. When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is
liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct or omission.
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds
no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof
and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and
Aida Bulong, the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their
way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not
flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her
property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption
that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been
held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he
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Facts:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity)
and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result,
two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil
case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The
MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case
is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The
MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court
(Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal but
the Capas RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
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Issue:
Can an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case?
Ruling:
Yes. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised
Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and
Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. Article 2176 provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Further, Art. 2177 reads
that responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Any
aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of
evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another.
There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal
case may invoke these articles. Hence, either the private complainant or the accused can
file a separate civil action under these articles.
Facts:
SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board
M/V ―Alexander Saveliev‖ (a vessel of Russian registry and owned by respondent Black
Sea) 545 hot rolled steel sheets. The vessel arrived at the port of Manila and the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned it a place of berth at the outside breakwater at
the Manila South Harbor. Petitioner Schmitz Transport, engaged to secure the requisite
clearances, to receive the cargoes from the shipside, and to deliver them to Little Giant
Steelpipe Corporation‘s warehouse at Cainta, Rizal. It likewise engaged the services of
respondent Transport Venture Inc. (TVI) to send a barge and tugboat at shipside.
The tugboat, after positioning the barge alongside the vessel, left and returned to the
port terminal. Later on, arrastre operator commenced to unload 37 of the 545 coils from
the vessel unto the barge. By noon the next day, during which the weather condition had
become inclement due to an approaching storm, the unloading unto the barge of the 37
coils was accomplished. However, there was no tugboat that pulled the barge back to the
pier. Eventually, because of the strong waves, the crew of the barge abandoned it and
transferred to the vessel. The barge capsized, washing the 37 coils into the sea. Earnest
efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant and Industrial Insurance to recover
the lost cargoes proved futile.
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Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI and Black
Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants) before the RTC of Manila, for
the recovery of the amount it paid to Little Giant plus adjustment fees, attorney‘s fees,
and litigation expenses. Industrial Insurance won and the Schmitz et al.’s motion for
reconsideration is denied.
In effect, Schmitz now filed charges against TVI et al. It asserts that in chartering the
barge and tugboat of TVI, it was acting for its principal, consignee Little Giant, hence,
the transportation contract was by and between Little Giant and TVI. The Court rendered
a decision holding Schmitz and TVI liable.
Issues:
1. Was the loss of the cargoes due to a fortuitous event, independent of any act of
negligence on the part of petitioner Black Sea and TVI?
2. Assuming that there is negligence, who is/are liable for such loss?
Ruling:
1. No. The failure of TVI to tow the barge back in the pier was the proximate cause
of the loss of the cargoes. Settled is the rule that an act of God doctrine strictly
requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human
intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of
man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of
God. Had the barge been towed back promptly to the pier, the deteriorating sea
conditions notwithstanding, the loss could have been avoided. But the barge was
left floating in open sea until big waves set in at 5:30 a.m., causing it to sink along
with the cargoes. The loss thus falls outside the act of God doctrine.
2. Schmitz and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the cargoes. TVI‘s failure to
promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk that might have been
reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation, but was the proximate cause
of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge
floating for a considerable number of hours, at such a precarious time, and in
the open sea, knowing that the barge does not have any power of its own and is
totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea. That it was nighttime and,
therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be charging overtime pay
did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat. As for Schmitz, for it to be
relieved of liability, it should, following Article 1739 of the Civil Code, prove that
it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before, during and after
the occurrence of the storm in order that it may be exempted from liability for the
loss of the goods. While Schmitz sent checkers and a supervisor on board the
vessel to counter-check the operations of TVI, it failed to take all available and
reasonable precautions to avoid the loss. After noting that TVI failed to arrange
for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea conditions, it
should have summoned the same or another tugboat to extend help, but it did not.
As for Black Sea, its duty as a common carrier extended only from the time the
goods were surrendered or unconditionally placed in its possession and received
for transportation until they were delivered actually or constructively to consignee
Little Giant. Since Black Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little
Giant, through Schmitz, it had discharged its duty. In fine, no liability may thus
attach to Black Sea.
18
Facts:
Issues:
1. Whether or not the bank was negligent when it encashed the forged
check.
Ruling:
Yes, the bank is negligent in encashing the forged check. The Court rules
that while it is true that the bank complied with its internal rules prior to
paying out the questionable check, there are several troubling circumstances
that led the Court to believe that the bank itself was remiss in its duty. The
Supreme Court reiterates that the highest degree of care and diligence is
required of banks. Banks are engaged in a business impressed with public
interest, and it is their duty to protect their many clients and depositors who
transact business with them. They have the obligation to treat their client's
account meticulously and with the highest degree of care, considering the
fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required of banks,
therefore, is more than that of a good father of a family. Given the
circumstances, extraordinary diligence dictates that FEBTC should have
ascertained from Jong personally that the signature in the questionable check
was his.
LIBI VS IAC
G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992
Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, both minors, are sweethearts for more
than two years until Julie (for brevity) broke up her relationship with Wendell
after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell wanted
reconciliation but Julie persisted in her refusal. This prompted the former to
resort to threats against her. One day Julie Ann and Wendell died from a
single gunshot wound each comingfrom the same
Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi,
Wendell’s father.
20
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case against
the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court rendered
judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. CA
set aside the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Ruling:
Valenzuela vs. CA
253 SCRA 303, February 7, 1996
Facts:
the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her
car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was
suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in
the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact
plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which
was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was confined in the hospital
for twenty days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
Issues:
Ruling:
2. No. Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails
to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. The emergency which led her
to park her car on a sidewalk was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.
3. Yes. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is
jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident. Based on the principle
of pater familias, the liability ultimately falls upon the employer for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
his employees.
Facts:
22
On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.
Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court by
petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and
Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to
adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
This petition for adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In
their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result
of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their Reply contended that since
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority
had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural
parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may
be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in
a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when
actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents?
Ruling:
No. The Court does not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive
effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged
in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the
time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
Facts:
23
On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit and killed
the seventeen years old, Alfredo Amadora. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru
reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, Amadora, as the victim's
parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the
respondent court, the school averred that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended. The petitioners,
contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite
to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. It found that Article 2180 was not
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. Although the Supreme Court ruled that (1) ALL schools, academic or not,
may be held liable under the provision of Article 2180 which provides that: “Lastly,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody” and
that (2) such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester ends
and the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues so long as it can
be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because
only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort
committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to
have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such custody. In the case at bar, the Physics
teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient evidence presented
to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Thus, absent the direct liability of the teachers
because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.
Facts:
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join
a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents
spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not
allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic,
with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of
persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic,
one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned
and later on died.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against
the St. Francis High School, and the teachers contending that the death of their son was
due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the
family in preventing their son's drowning. The trial court found the teachers liable but
dismissed the case against the school. The Court of Appeals declared that the teachers
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to guard against the foreseen
harm. Also, the school and the principal Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and
solidarily liable with the teachers for the death of Ferdinand Castillo, under Article 2180
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether the school St. Francis High School, principal, teachers were liable
for the death of Ferdinand.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, before an employer may be held liable for
the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice
must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In
the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private
affair, a picnic which had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin
Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as
an extra-curricular activity. Also, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the
planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any
manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application
therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any
jurisprudence.
Facts:
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and her 6 year old daughter Zhieneth were at
the second floor of Syvel’s Department Store, Makati City. While Criselda was
signing her credit card slip at the counter, suddenly she felt a sudden gust of
wind and heard a loud thud. As she looked behind her, she saw Zhieneth's
body pinned by the entire structure of the store's gift-wrapping counter.
Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was
operated on.
The following day, Zhieneth lost her speech and can only communicate
through a magic slate. Unfortunately, she died 14 days later because of the
severity of her injuries. After the burial, Crisielda demanded upon Jarco
Marketing the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake
and funeral expenses which they had incurred. But, they refused to pay
hence, Crisielda filed for a complaint for damages.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
The parents of Carlos Bautista filed a civil action against the school
authorities alleging that the school is negligent, reckless and with failure to
take security precautions during and after the attack. The case was elevated
in the court of appeals, and the CA favored the claim of the parents of
Baustista.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on
Article 2180- in loco parentis
Ruling:
The SC did not agree with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article 2180, in
conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco
parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that
the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in custody.
Hoewever, this material situation does not exist in the present case for
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the
school could have been made liable.
Carlitos had been breached thru the school’s negligence in providing proper
security measures.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
The petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of
the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a
minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the
jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus,
negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening
causes.
The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of
the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Further, there was no evidence that
petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical
defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3 rd persons for injuries
caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination
of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.
28
Facts:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So
Vasquez, was driving a motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was
traveling counter-clockwise, but without any protective helmet. He was also
only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at that time. Upon the other hand,
Benjamin Abad, manager of Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner
of a pick-up, drove the said company car out of a parking lot. But instead of
going around the Osmeña rotunda, he made a shortcut against the flow of
the traffic.
Issue:
WON Castilex Industrial Corporation may be held vicariously liable for the death of
Romeo So Vasquez resulting from the negligent operation by Abad of a company-issued
vehicle.
Ruling:
NO. The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious
incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment.
29
In the case at bar, Abad did some overtime work at the petitioner's office.
Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant which is about seven kilometers
away from petitioner's place of business. At the Goldie's Restaurant, Abad
took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when Abad was leaving
the restaurant that the incident in question occurred.
To the mind of the Court, Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he
figured in a vehicular accident. It was about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the
normal working hours. Abad's working day had ended; his overtime work had
already been completed. Since there is paucity of evidence that Abad was
acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner Castilex
Industrial Corporation had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle. Thus, justice
and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle.
Facts:
On November 24, 1962, Fernando Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the
bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the
company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit
was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed
on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against
him.
Issue:
Ruling:
NO. Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. Under Article 2180
the term "manager" is used in the sense of "employer" and does not embrace a "manager"
who may himself be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer.
Facts:
The private car of Ernesto Martin was being driven by Nestor Martin when it crashed
into a Meralco electric post. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Thus,
Meralco demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It
thereupon sued him for damages, alleging inter alia that he was liable as the employer of
Nestor Martin. The petitioner's main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his
employee.
The complaint for damages was filed by the private respondent against Ernesto Martin
only as alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the time of the
accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded. The action was based on tort under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no evidence had
been adduced to show that Nestor Martin was his employee. The motion was denied. The
RTC held in favor of the plaintiff. The CA affirmed it in toto.
Issue:
Ruling:
NO. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article
2180 is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned
task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship.
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that
the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial
court merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee relationship and held that
the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It noted that although the defendant
alleged that he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present any proof to
substantiate his allegation”.
The ownership of the car and the circumstances of the accident, are not enough
bases for the inference that the petitioner is the employer of Nestor Martin.
As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not 4/1
be presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco had
the burden of proof, or the duty "to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to
32
establish his claim" as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Failure to do this is fatal to its action.
It was enough for the defendant to deny the alleged employment relationship,
without more, for he was not under obligation to prove this negative averment.
Facts:
Accused Melvida and Rosas, being then the persons in charge of Plymouth car and a
Victory Liner bus, respectively, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drive and operate their respective motor vehicles in a negligent, careless and imprudent
manner, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and the weather
conditions, and without taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to persons and
damage to property, causing the said Plymouth car driven by the said accused Melvida to
swerve to its left, cross the island, and move onto the lane for the opposite traffic, and the
said Victory Liner bus to hit and bump the said Plymouth car, thereby inflicting on Diaz-
Leus which directly caused her death. The trial court found the accused Hernani Melvida
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged (Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Double Homicide, Serious and Slight Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. For
failure to establish the guilt of accused Rosas beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby
acquitted of the offense charged. From said decision the legal heirs appealed to the CA
only with respect to the civil aspect.
Issue:
WON accused-appellee Rosas could still be held civilly liable despite his acquittal in
the criminal case.
Ruling:
The findings of the Court of Appeals were a complete exoneration of Rosas. Since
petitioner's appeal on the civil aspect is predicated upon Rosas' alleged negligence which
has been found not to exist, this Court must likewise uphold the Court of Appeals' ruling
that Rosas' acquittal in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of his civil liability
which bars herein petitioners from recovering damages from Rosas. Since Rosas is
absolved from any act of negligence which in effect prevents further recovery of any
damages, the same is likewise true with respect to his employer victory Liner, Inc. which
at most would have been only subsidiarily liable.Nor can the spouses Jesus Gali and
Leonisa Gali as employers of respondent Hernani Melvida be subsidiarily liable. Art. 103
of the Revised Penal Code provides. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.In order that
33
employers may be held liable under the above-quoted provision of law, the following
requisites must exist.
(1) That an employee has committed a mime in the discharge of his duties;
(2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability;
and
(3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. 6
The preceding requisites are not present in the case of the Gali spouses. They are not
engaged in any kind of industry. Industry has been defined as any department or branch
of art, occupation or business, especially, one which employs much labor and capital and
is a distinct branch of trade, as the sugar industry. 7
Thus, the Gali spouses cannot be held subsidiarily liable. As We stated in a previous case:
"Where the defendant is admittedly a private person who has no business or industry, and
uses his automobile for private purposes, he is not also subsidiarily liable to the plaintiff
for the damages to the latter's car caused by the reckless imprudence of his insolvent
driver." 8
Facts:
The jeep being driven by defendant Sabiniano collided with another jeep,
which had then two passengers on it. As a result of the collision the
passengers of the other jeep suffered injury and the automobile itself had to
be repaired because of the extensive damage. A case was filed against
Sabiniano as driver and against Duavit as owner of the jeep. Duavit admitted
ownership of the jeep but denied that Sabiniano was his employee. Sabiniano
himself admitted that he took Duavit’s jeep from the garage without consent
or authority of the owner. He testified further that Duavit even filed charges
against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did not push through as
the parents of Sabiniano apologized to Duavit on his behalf. Trial Court found
Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but absolved Duavit on the ground
that there was no employer-employee relationship between them, and that
former took the vehicle without consent or authority of the latter. CA held the
two of them jointly and severally liable.
Issue:
Ruling:
was held liable for the death of Erezo even if he was not really the owner of
the truck that killed the latter because he represented himself as its owner to
the Motor Vehicles Office and had it registered under his name; he was thus
estopped from later on denying such representation. In Vargas, Vargas sold
her jeepney to a third person, but she did not surrender to the Motor Vehicles
Office the corresponding AC plates. So when the jeepney later on figured in
an accident, she was held liable by the court holding that the operator of
record continues to be the operator of vehicle incontemplation of law, as
regards the public and third persons.
The circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in
the present case. Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of vehicle but
denies having employed or authorized the driver Sabiniano. The jeep was
virtually stolen from the petitioner’s garage.
Facts:
Issue:
WON the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its
jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.
Ruling:
for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.
(United States v. Bernardo). Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at
bar who suffered the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner
too is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was
assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services. She
suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the
check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was
issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Facts:
At about 3:00 p.m. of December 19, 1986, Lorenzo Menard "Boyet" Dolor, Jr. was
driving an owner-type jeepney with plate no. DEB 804 owned by her mother, Margarita,
towards Anilao, Batangas. As he was traversing the road at Barangay Anilao East,
Mabini, Batangas, his vehicle collided with a passenger jeepney bearing plate no. DEG
648, driven by petitioner Juan Gonzales and owned by his co-petitioner Francisco
Hernandez, which was travelling towards Batangas City. Boyet Dolor and his passenger,
Oscar Valmocina, died as a result of the collision. Fred Panopio, Rene Castillo and Joseph
Sandoval, who were also on board the owner-type jeep, which was totally wrecked,
suffered physical injuries. The collision also damaged the passenger jeepney of Francisco
Hernandez and caused physical injuries to its passengers.
Petitioners countered that the proximate cause of the death and injuries sustained by
the passengers of both vehicles was the recklessness of Boyet Dolor, the driver of the
owner-type jeepney, who was driving in a zigzagging manner under the influence of
alcohol. Petitioners also alleged that Gonzales was not the driver-employee of the
Hernandez spouses as the former only leased the passenger jeepney on a daily basis. The
Hernandez spouses further claimed that even if an employer-employee relationship is
found to exist between them, they cannot be held liable because as employers they
exercised due care in the selection and supervision of their employee.
During the trial of the case, it was established that the drivers of the two vehicles
were duly licensed to drive and that the road where the collision occurred was asphalted
and in fairly good condition. The owner-type jeep was travelling uphill while the
passenger jeepney was going downhill. It was further established that the owner-type jeep
was moderately moving and had just passed a road bend when its passengers, private
respondents Joseph Sandoval and Rene Castillo, saw the passenger jeepney at a distance
of three meters away. The passenger jeepney was traveling fast when it bumped the
owner type jeep. Moreover, the evidence presented by respondents before the trial court
showed that petitioner Juan Gonzales obtained his professional driver's license only on
September 24, 1986, or three months before the accident. Prior to this, he was holder of a
student driver's permit issued on April 10, 1986.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals was correct when it pronounced the Hernandez
spouses as solidarily liable with Juan Gonzales, although it is of record that
they were not in the passenger jeepney driven by latter when the accident
occurred
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
In the present case, was respondent partly negligent and thus, should not
recover the full amount of the damages awarded by the trial court? We rule in
the negative. In sum, the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of petitioners driver who, as found by the lower courts, did not
slow down even when he was already approaching a busy intersection within
the city proper. The passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up
respondent and his three companions and, in fact, respondent was already
partly inside the jeepney, when petitioners driver bumped the rear end
ofrear-ended it. The impact was so strong such that respondent fell and
fractured his left thigh bone (femur), and suffered severely woundeds in his
left knee and leg. No doubt that respondentpetitioners driver was reckless
speeding.
Since the negligence of petitioners driver was the sole and proximate
cause of the accident, in the present case, petitioner is liable, under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, to pay damages to respondent Begasa for the injuries
sustained by latterhim. Petition denied.
Facts:
On September 25, 1991, SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the port of
Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V “Alexander Saveliev” 545 hot rolled steel sheets in coil
weighing 6,992,450 metric tons. The cargoes, which were to be discharged at the port of
Manila in favor of the consignee, Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant), were
insured against all risks with Industrial Insurance Company Ltd. (Industrial Insurance)
under Marine Policy No. M-91-3747-TIS. The vessel arrived at the port of Manila and
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned it a place of berth at the outside breakwater
at the Manila South Harbor.
Schmitz Transport, whose services the consignee engaged to secure the requisite
clearances, to receive the cargoes from the shipside, and to deliver them to its (the
consignee’s) warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, in turn engaged the services of TVI to send a
barge and tugboat at shipside. TVI’s tugboat “Lailani” towed the barge “Erika V” to
shipside. The tugboat, after positioning the barge alongside the vessel, left and returned
to the port terminal. Arrastre operator Ocean Terminal Services Inc. commenced to
39
unload 37 of the 545 coils from the vessel unto the barge. By 12:30 a.m. of October 27,
1991 during which the weather condition had become inclement due to an approaching
storm, the unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. No tugboat pulled
the barge back to the pier, however. At around 5:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991, due to
strong waves, the crew of the barge abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. The barge
pitched and rolled with the waves and eventually capsized, washing the 37 coils into the
sea.
Little Giant thus filed a formal claim against Industrial Insurance which paid it the
amount of P5,246,113.11. Little Giant thereupon executed a subrogation receipt in favor
of Industrial Insurance. Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz
Transport, TVI, and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants)
before the RTC of Manila, they faulted the defendants for undertaking the unloading of
the cargoes while typhoon signal No. 1 was raised. The RTC held all the defendants
negligent. Defendants Schmitz Transport and TVI filed a joint motion for reconsideration
assailing the finding that they are common carriers. RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration. CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto, finding that all the defendants
were common carriers — Black Sea and TVI for engaging in the transport of goods and
cargoes over the seas as a regular business and not as an isolated transaction, and Schmitz
Transport for entering into a contract with Little Giant to transport the cargoes from ship
to port for a fee.
Issue:
If there was negligence, whether liability for the loss may attach to Black Sea,
petitioner and TVI.
Ruling:
This Court holds then that petitioner and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the
cargoes. The following pronouncement of the Supreme Court is instructive:
In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved
of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
The liability of the common carrier and an independent contractor would be solidary
(Art. 2194). A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of
contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no
contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by
tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
As for Black Sea, its duty as a common carrier extended only from the time the
goods were surrendered or unconditionally placed in its possession and received for
transportation until they were delivered actually or constructively to consignee Little
Giant.
40
the signature of Jong she then asked Gonzaga to submit proof of his identity
and the latter presented 3 ID cards.
It was bank policy that two bank branch officers approve checks
exceeding P100,000.00 thus it was checked by Senior Assistant Cashier
Gemma Velez and Shirley Syfu.
Syfu then noticed that Jose Sempio III, the assistant accountant of Samsung
Construction, was also in the bank. Sempio was well-known to Syfu and the
other bank officers, he being the assistant accountant of Samsung
Construction. Syfu showed the check to Sempio, who vouched that Jong’s
signature is genuine. Sempio said that the check was for the purchase of
equipment for Samsung Construction. Satisfied, Syfu authorized the bank's
encashment of the check to Gonzaga.
The next day, Kyu, Samsung’s Accountant examined the balance of the
bank account and discovered that an amount of P999,500.00 had been
encashed. Kyu perused the checkbook and found out that the last page was
missing. Kyu reported to Jong who proceeded to the bank and found out that
his signature was forged. He then filed a criminal case against Sempio for
qualified theft.
The RTC held that Jong’s signature was forged and directed FEBTC to pay
back Samsung said amount. On appeal, CA revered and absolved FEBTC of
liability, concluding there was no forgery and Samsung negligent.
Issue:
Ruling:
The court ruled that FEBTC is negligent. Even assuming that FEBTC had a
standing habit of dealing with Sempio, acting in behalf of Samsung
Construction, the irregular circumstances attending the presentment of the
forged check should have put the bank on the highest degree of alert. The
Court emphasized the highest degree of care and diligence is required of
banks.
Facts:
Original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case
and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The trial court ordered the defendants to give plaintiff permanent egress
and ingress to the public street and ordered plaintiff to pay defendants
P8,000.00 as indemnity for the permanent uses of the streets.
Issue:
Ruling:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result
of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury.
Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to
have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of
abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
44
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have
acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff.
Facts:
This prompted Josephine to file a damage suit against Dr. Mendoza before
the RTC of Iloilo. She died before the trial could end thus her husband Adriano
and their children Jennifer Adriane and John Andre, substituted her in the
case. She was a housewife and 40 years old when she died.
The RTC found Dr. Mendoza guilty of neglect that caused Josephine’s
illness and eventual death and order to pay the plaintiff’s heirs actual
damage of P50,000.00, moral damages of P200,000.00, and attorney’s fees
P20,000.00 plus cost of suit.
The RTC reversed itself upon motion for reconsideration and dismissed
the complaint. The CA reinstated the RTC’s original decision and held that Dr.
Mendoza committed a breach of her duty as a physician when a gauze
remained in the body of her patient after surgery. The CA denied her motion
for reconsideration.
Issue:
Ruling:
The court ruled that she is negligent. Dr. Mendoza claims that no gauze or
surgical material was left in Josephine’s body as evidenced by the surgical
sponge count in the hospital record. The court pointed out that Josephine did
not undergo any other surgical operation and it is unlikely for her to inject a
roll of gauze into her cervix. The court held in Professional Services, Inc. vs.
Agana:
The Court also deems it just and equitable under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code to increase the award of attorney’s fees from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.
46
Facts:
47
In their Complaint, respondents alleged that Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger
jeep heading north on the national highway in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner.
He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite
lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by
Arnulfo Ramos caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance.
Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep. Respondents
sought to recover actual damages for medical expenses and funeral expenses, as well as
moral and exemplary damages, lost earnings, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the operator and as the administrator
of the conjugal partnership properties of the Spouses Achevara. In their Answer,
petitioners denied respondents’ allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and
bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that Benigno Valdez was
driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the
south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of
the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of
the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western
lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was
Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very
well knew had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of action against
petitioners.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners applying the doctrine of last clear chance which
was then affirmed by the CA with modifications.
.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages incurred as a result
of the vehicular accident.
Ruling:
caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular
accident.
49
Facts:
Teresita Pineda consulted her town mate Dr. Fredelicto Flores regarding her medical
condition, complaining about general body weakness, loss of appetite, frequent urination
and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. After interviewing Teresita, Dr. Fredelicto
advised her to go to United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City for a
general check-up the following week but the former did not. As for her other symptoms,
he suspected that Teresita might be suffering from diabetes and told her to continue her
medications. When her conditions persisted, she went to UDMC where Dr. Fredelictor
check-up her and ordered her admission and further indicate on call Dilation and
Curettage (D&C) operation to be performed by his wife, Dra. Felicisima Flores, an Ob-
Gyne. Laboratory tests were done on Teresita including internal vaginal examination,
however, only the blood sugar and CBC results came out prior to operation which
indicated of diabetes. D&C operations were still done and thereafter, Dra. Felicisima
advised her that she can go home and continue to rest at home but Teresita opted
otherwise. Two days after the operation, her condition worsened prompting further test to
be done which resulted that Teresita have diabetes melitus type II. Insulin was
administered but it might have arrived late, she died.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for negligence and thus
should pay damages to PRC.
Ruling:
Both parties are held to be at fault but the bank has the last clear chance
to prevent the fraudulent encashment hence it is the one foremost liable.
There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are genuine but the
presence of irregularities on the face of the check should have alerted the
bank to exercise caution before encashing them. It is well-settled that banks
are in the business impressed with public interest that they are duty bound to
protect their clients and their deposits at all times. They must treat the
accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest degree of care
considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required
of banks are more than that of a good father of a family.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot evade responsibility for the loss by
attributing negligence on the part of respondent because, even if we concur
that the latter was indeed negligent in pre-signing blank checks, the former
had the last clear chance to avoid the loss. To reiterate, petitioners own
operations manager admitted that they could have called up the client for
verification or confirmation before honoring the dubious checks. Verily,
petitioner had the final opportunity to avert the injury that befell the
respondent. Failing to make the necessary verification due to the volume of
banking transactions on that particular day is a flimsy and unacceptable
excuse, considering that the banking business is so impressed with public
interest where the trust and confidence of the public in general is of
paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must
be a high degree of diligence, if not the utmost diligence. Petitioners
51
Facts:
Spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots
68 and 69 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 2422454 and
2829615 respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon
City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc.
(Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita
Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.
The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain
the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to
undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation.
The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and
building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations
as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had
Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have
been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos
opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that
they might incur as a result of such construction.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He
got into an altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad
fell onto the tracks and was killed when a train came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the
train driver who is Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization
and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and
Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA
exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero
jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for compensatory
damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory
damages.
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of a common
carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176
of the New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages.
53
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code, renders a common carrier liable for death of
or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of
due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Facts:
Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a
jeepney driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by
Oscar del Carmen Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a
criminal case while the father of the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacoy,
filed an independent civil action againt the former in behalf of the minor
children left by the Monsalud spouses.
Del Carmen Jr. claimed he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and
was not hired as a driver by the former; he was a conductor and had been
released from employment lately and it was the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who
was hired as a driver. Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan but
was dismissed by the court for insufficient evidence.
RTC held Del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on
the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation
of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not
only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was
dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to
have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle because
the brothers were assigned to said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney
would be parked beside the brothers’ house and not returned to Del Carmen’s
residence; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition
key; the said parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the
unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the
ignition key
Issue:
W/N owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused by
the operation of such
Ruling:
Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary
liable.
55
Del Carmen Jr.’s own evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney. Given
the dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del Carmen Jr. against Allan, the
former also admitted to such dismissal in the SC. Under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur , “where the thing that caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the
accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence – in
the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant
– that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of
care. All three are present in the case at bar.
SPS. Alfredo Bontilao and Sherlina Bontilao Vs. Dr. Carlos Gerona
GR No. 176675 September 15, 2010
Facts:
Issue:
56
Ruling:
No. The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor to pin
liability on respondent for Allen’s death. Res ipsa liquitor is a rebuttable
presumption or influence that the defendant was negligent. The presumption
only arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in the
defendant’s exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in the absence of negligence. It is a rule of evidence
whereby negligence of the alleged wrong does may be inferred from the mere
fact that the accident happened, provided that the character of the accident
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that in the
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that the thing which
caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of
the alleged wrong doer.
Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but
a rule to be cautiously applied defending upon the circumstances of each
case. In malpractice case, the doctrine is generally restricted to situations
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequence of professional care were not as such as
would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
Facts:
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC
Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of
the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain
Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon
shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm
which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result,
Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime
of Homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B.
Abon and the BCF .
Issue:
57
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of
Jimmy B. Abon
Ruling:
Under the paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” The rationale of such
liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter
“stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.” Likewise, “the phrase
used in [Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendancein the school, including
recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at attendance in the
school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy
B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Facts :
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is liable under article 2180 of the Civil Code?
Ruling:
Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case is the
breach of the school-student contract, petitioner, in the alternative, also holds
respondents vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. However,
respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was
employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a
principal and a security agency.
Facts:
On August 27, 1997, Respondent Albayda was on his way to the office to
report for duty as Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, riding a bicycle
along the streets. The taxi driver Completo, the petitioner, bumped and side
swiped him, causing respondent Albayda suffered from serious physical
injuries. Albayda was brought to the hospital and was confined twice therein
from August 27, 1997 to February 11, 1998 and February 23, 1998 until
March 22, 1998, respectively, due to fracture in his left knee which
necessitated his stay in the hospital for several months. Then after, he
underwent medical physiotherapy for more than a year. A barangay
conciliation was effected between the parties, but failed. Thus, this prompted
Albayda to file a complaint for physical injuries through reckless imprudence
against Completo. On the other hand, Completo filed a counter-charge of
damage to property through reckless imprudence against Albayda. Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against
petitioners Completo and taxi owner/operator Abiad in the MTC. The RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Albayda and against the driver and taxi
59
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not Filamer is liable to pay the damages for the tortious act of
Funtecha.
Ruling:
Facts:
Spouses Mamaril are jeepney operators since 1971. They park their 6
passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout (BSP) compound for a fee of
P300.00 per month for each unit. The AIB Security Agency, Inc (AIB) was the
contracting agency responsible for the security and protection of the
compound and its properties. On May 26, 1995 in the evening, all jeepneys
were parked inside th BSP compound. The following morning, one vehicle was
missing and was never recovered. The security guards namely, Gaddi and
62
Peña, of AIB who were incharged when the embezzlement was committed
said that a male person who looked familiar to them took the vehicle out of
the compound. The spouses filed a complaint for damages before the RTC
against BSP, AIB and security guards Peña and Gaddi for gross negligence.
The court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Mamaril and defendants
were ordered to pay jointly and severally the cost of the vehicle including the
damages. On June 11, 2002, the RTC modified its decision reducing the cost
of the stolen vehicle. Only BSP appealed before the CA. The CA affirmed the
findings of the lower court, but, absolving BSP from any liability. It also
deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as the amount of
the accessories of the lost jeepney. Spouses filed a motion for reconsideration
thereof, however, the motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the BSP is jointly and severally liable for gross negligence
along with AIB and security guards Peña and Gaddi.
Ruling:
No. Article 1311 of the Civil Code states that contracts take effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights
and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. It is undisputed that Sps.
Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract between the BSP and
AIB. Neither did the subject agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui
that a third party may demand fulfillment of the either parties’ obligation,
provided that the requisites are complied with. However, in this case no
stipulations pour autrui was provided. Thus, under the principle of relativity of
contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said
agreement.
The court also declared that what was between BSP and spouses Mamaril
is a contract of lease. Article 1643 of the Civil Code held that the act of
parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. As
a lessor, Article 1664 of the same Code states that "the lessor is not obliged
to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the
use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the
intruder." Here, BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Sps. Mamaril a
suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to
secure the premises; hence, it should not be held liable for the loss suffered
by Sps. Mamaril. As to the contract of lease and its management, the parking
fee of P300.00 per month or P10.00 a day for each unit is too minimal an
amount to even create an inference that BSP undertook to be an insurer of
the safety of plaintiff’s vehicles. The awards of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees were properly disallowed by the CA for lack of
factual and legal bases.
Professional Services Inc., Petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 127590
February 2, 2010
Facts:
63
Enrique Agana told his wife Natividad Agana to look for their neighbour, Dr. Ampil, a surgeon staff
member of Medical City General Hospital, a prominent and known hospital, owned and operated by
Professional Services Incorporated (PSI). Natividad Agana underwent medical surgery in said Hospital.
The attendant doctors were Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. Natividad suffered from injury due to two (2)
gauzes left inside her body during the operation. Despite the report of the (2) two missing gauzes, PSI did
not initiate an investigation.
This case consolidated three (3) other cases previously decided and became final and executory.
Hence, this case is limited only to the second motion for reconsideration filed by the PSI in an attempt
absolve itself from liability.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. PSI is liable. Firstly, under the principle of Ostensible Agency, according to the Court, ample
evidence that the hospital held out to the patient that the doctor was its agent. Present are the two factors
that determine apparent authority: first, the hospital's implied manifestation to the patient which led the
latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the
conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence the decision made by
Enrique for [his wife] Natividad to consult Dr. Ampil was significantly influenced by the impression that
Dr. Ampil was a staff member of Medical City General Hospital, and that said hospital was well known and
prominent. Enrique looked upon Dr. Ampil not as independent of but as integrally related to Medical City.
The Supreme Court also held that the hospital’s “consent for hospital care” - required to be signed
prior to the surgery - affirmed that the surgeon was of the hospital.
Secondly, under the principle of Corporate Negligence, which was self-imposed liability because of
the statements made by the PSI which constituted judicial admission in its Motion for Reconsideration. Its
statements revealed that it had the power to review or cause the review of what may have irregularly
transpired within its walls strictly for the purpose of determining whether some form of negligence may
have attended any procedure done inside its premises, with the ultimate end of protecting its patients.
The Court also noted the hospital admitted “the standards of its corporate conduct under the
circumstances of this case, specifically: (a) that it had a corporate duty to Natividad even after her operation
to ensure her safety as a patient; (b) that its corporate duty was not limited to having its nursing staff note or
record the two missing gauzes and (c) that its corporate duty extended to determining Dr. Ampil's role in it,
bringing the matter to his attention, and correcting his negligence. The Court held that the case is “not
intended to set a precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals liable for every form of
negligence of their doctors-consultants under any and all circumstances.”
Facts:
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales (Corazon), who was then
37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada (Dr.
Estrada) beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as
December 1975. Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to
experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales (Spouses
Nogales) to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada
advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center (CMC). t 6:13
a.m., Corazon started to experience convulsionsAt 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada,
assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the
process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn.At 6:27
a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly
became profuse. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was
uhemorrhage, post partum.
64
Issue:
Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.
Ruling:
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending
and visiting uconsultantu staff. The basis for holding an employer solidarily
responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but
also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a
relationship of patria potestas.
Facts:
Espinas, while driving, was hit by another car. The other car escaped from
the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number.
After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that
the owner of the other car, with plate number UCF-545 is Filcar.
After sending several letters to Filcar and to its President and General
Manager Carmen Flor,demanding payment for the damages sustained by his
car without response, Espinas filed a complaint for damages against Filcar
65
Issue:
Ruling:
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, ofthe Civil Code, an
action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against
the employer who is held liable for the negligentact or omission committed
by his employee.It is well settled that in case ofmotor vehicle mishaps, the
registered owner ofthe motor vehicle isconsidered as the employer ofthe
tortfeasor'driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committedby the
latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, ofthe Civil Code.Filcar
is not be permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing
on the blame toanother party8 in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor
and his alleged driver, Floresca. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
decision the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner Filcar
Transport Services.
Facts:
In 1988, Kraft Foods Phils., (KRAFT) hired Czarina Malvar as its Corporate
Planning Manager. She rose in the ranks and became the Vice President for
Finance in the Southeast Asia region of Kraft Foods International, KFPI’s
mother company. In 1999, the chairman of the board of KFPI and concurrently
66
the VP and Area Director for SEA, sent Malvar a memo directing her to explain
why no administrative sanctions should be imposed on her for possible
breach of trust and confidence and for willful violation of company rules and
regulations. She was places under preventive suspension and ultimately she
was served a notice of termination. Malvar, aggrieved, filed a complaint for
illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI and Bautista in the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal
and ordered her reinstatement. The judegment became final and executory
however Malvar’s award was reduced. Both parties appealed the computation
of the NLRC. While pending appeal, Malvar and the respondents entered into
a compromise agreement wherein Malvar would be paid 40 million pesos.
Malvar moved to withdraw the case in view of the compromise agreement .
But before the court could act on the motion to dismiss/withdraw, a motion
for intervention to protect the Attorney's rights was filed. It appears that, to
the intervenor’s surprise, Malvar unceremoniously and without any justifiable
reason terminated its legal service and required it to withdraw from the case.
The intervenor indicated that Malvar’s precipitate action had baffled, shocked
and even embarrassed the intervenor, because it had done everything legally
possible to serve and protect her interest. It added that it could not recall any
instance of conflict or misunderstanding with her, for on the contrary, she
had even commended it for its dedication and devotion to her case.
Issue:
Whether or not KRAFT is jointly and severally liable to pay the intervenor
Law firm?
Ruling:
Facts:
67
Issue:
Whether or not NPC is liable for the tort of driver Gavino Ilumba?
Ruling:
YES. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in labor-only
contracting vis-a-vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter. So,
even if PHESCO hired driver Gavino Ilumba, as PHESCO is admittedly a labor only
contractor of NPC, the statute itself establishes an employer-employee relationship
between the employer NPC and the employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor
(PHESCO).
Consequently, we hold PHESCO not liable for the tort of driver Ilumba, as there was
no employment relationship between PHESCO and driver Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, to hold the employer liable for torts committed by his employees within
the scope of their assigned task, there must exist an employer-employee relationship.
Also, the position of NPC that even assuming that a labor only contract exists
between it and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due
to the tortious acts of the employee of the labor-only contractor, stated otherwise, its
liability shall only be limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasi-delicts is
misplaced. It bears stressing that the action was premised on the recovery of damages as a
result of quasi-delict against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not
the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case.
In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the
driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse
against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the
action.
68
Facts:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He
got into an altercation with the Security Guard Junelito Escartin. They had a
fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed instantaneously upon
being hit by a moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman. The Heirs of Navidad
filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver (Roman), the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (agency of
security guards) for the death of her husband. The trial court found Prudent
and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The Court of
Appeals however reversed the decision of the RTC by exonerating Prudent
and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally
liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and
replacing it with nominal damages.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of a common
carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for
a tort under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the
employee Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable
on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The award of nominal damages in addition to actual
damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages
cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The award was deleted.
69
Facts:
On May 14, 2004, at about three oclock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara
was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops,
with companions, namely, Cresencio, Crispin, Samuel, Dominador and Joel.
While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National
Railways (PNR) train, then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas
(Estranas), suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The
collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin,
and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious
physical injuries. The survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador, together
with the heirs of the deceased victims, filed an action for damages against
PNR, and the alternate driver of the train. The petitioners claimed that they
exercised due diligence in operating the train and monitoring its
roadworthiness. They asseverate that right before the collision, Estranas was
driving the train at a moderate speed. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the
private respondents. Unyielding, the petitioners appealed the RTC decision to
the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification. Thus this petition.
Issues:
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it,
taking into consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward
incident. In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to
prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an
approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the Stop, Look
and Listen signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence,
inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger. A reliable signaling
device in good condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage,
is needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad
company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order.
Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. Having established the
fact of negligence on the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held
liable for damages.
The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable. The doctrine of last
clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where
it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages
70
caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. To
reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners negligence
in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad
track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have
any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell
them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for
their own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the
respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.
There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.
Contributory negligence is a conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. It is an
act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person
injured which, concurring with the defendants’ negligence, is the proximate
cause of the injury. Hence, we cannot see how the respondents could have
contributed to their injury when they were not even aware of the forthcoming
danger.
71
Facts:
Lifetime Marketing opened a current account with the BPI. In this account,
the sales agents of LMC would have to deposit their collections or payments
to the latter. As a result, LMC and BPI, made a special arrangement that the
formers agents will accomplish three (3) copies of the deposit slips, the third
copy to be retained and held by the teller until LMCs authorized
representatives, shall retrieve them on the following banking day. Sometime
in 1986, LMC availed of the BPIs inter-branch banking network services,
whereby the formers agents could make deposit to any BPI branch in Metro
Manila under the same account. Under this system, BPIs bank tellers were no
longer obliged to retain the extra copy of the deposit slips instead, they will
rely on the machine-validated deposit slip, to be submitted by LMCs agents.
For its part, BPI would send to LMC a monthly bank statement relating to the
subject account. This practice was observed and complied with by the
parties. As a business practice, the registered sales agents or the Lifetime
Educational Consultants of LMC, can get the books from the latter on
consignment basis, then they would go directly to their clients to sell. These
agents or Lifetime Educational Consultants would then pay to LMC, seven (7)
days after they pick up all the books to be sold. Since LMC have several
agents around the Philippines, it required to remit their payments through
BPI, where LMC maintained its current account. It has been LMCs practice to
require its agents to present a validated deposit slip and, on that basis, LMC
would issue to the latter an acknowledgement receipt. Alice Laurel, is one of
LMCs Educational Consultants or agents, made check deposits with the BPI
branches and, after the check deposit slips were machine-validated,
requested the teller to reverse the transactions. Based on general banking
practices, however, the cancellation of deposit or payment transactions upon
request by any depositor or payor, requires that all copies of the deposit slips
must be retrieved or surrendered to the bank. This practice, in effect, cancels
the deposit or payment transaction, thus, it leaves no evidence for any
subsequent claim or misrepresentation made by any innocent third person.
Notwithstanding this, the verbal requests of Alice Laurel and her husband to
reverse the deposits even after the deposit slips were already received and
consummated were accommodated by BPI tellers. Upon discovery of this
fraud, LMC made queries from the BPI branches involved. In reply to said
queries, BPI branch managers formally admitted that they cancelled, without
the permission of or due notice to LMC, the deposit transactions made by
Alice and her husband, and based only upon the latters verbal request or
representation.
Issues:
Ruling:
72
Facts:
Issues:
Ruling:
No, there is no showing, that the Bank was made specifically aware of the
fact that the very property already covered by the free patents were only
adjudicated to and Torrens Titles issued in the name of the heirs of Miguel,
who were the parties that afterwards had secured the mortgages from the
Bank, not only this, the declaration of nullity of the titles of the heirs of
Genoveva Miguel due to the fact that there had already been free patents
issued in the name of plaintiff's predecessors Moya and Sison came in only
much later and in fact as of the time when these mortgages were accepted
by the Bank, there was as yet no decision declaring the titles of the
mortgagors null and void; stated otherwise there can be no denying the fact
that the Bank was made to rely and had the right to rely upon regular
certificates of title first presented to it by the mortgagors.
The Philippine National Bank relied on the torrens titles of the mortgagors
which had been regularly issued. The torrens titles were the result of regular
land registration proceedings duly registered with the Register of Deeds.
There was nothing in the torrens titles which would excite suspicion that the
same were fraudulently processed by the mortgagors. Applying, therefore,
the principles enunciated in the aforecited cases, the respondent Bank was
74
not duty bound to further investigate the validity and or invalidity of the
torrens title.
The court might as well invoke the principle that where one of two
innocent parties must have to suffer due to the act of a third person, he
whose negligence had caused the damage should be made to bear the loss;
in the present case if the heirs of Genoveva Miguel, that is to say herein
plaintiff had only been diligent, and had appealed from the decision in the
registration case, no certificate of Title would have been issued just like that
in the name of the heirs of Genoveva Miguel and no mortgage could have
been constituted by them in favor of Bank but as it is, said successors of
Praxedes Moya and Josefa Sison failed to do that; instead they let the
decision in the registration case gain the status of finality; allowed without
prior protest, the certificate of title to be issued; did not even as early as
possible, annotate an adverse claim on the titles; and they filed this case only
several months afterwards, it was their negligence that permitted said
adjudicatees in the said registration case to apply for and secure mortgages
from the Bank.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Gan was driving her car one day, when, in order to avoid two incoming
vehicle encroaching her side of the road, one trying to overtake the other,
she swerved her car to the right, pinning an old man trying to cross the
street, pinning his body to a jeep, causing the jeep to move forward and
causing damage to other vehicles. Gan was found guilty by the RTC of
homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, the CA found her guilty with
homicide thru simple imprudence, and pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code, she was sentenced to the indeterminate penalty
of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Isidro
Casino in the sum of P12,000 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Issue:
SC Ruling:
No. A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule.
"Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence." 6
76
The course of action suggested by the appellate court (that Gan should
have stopped her vehicle) would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that
such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded
petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the
suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to
analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different
courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to
others.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was
driving her car within the legal limits. We therefore rule that the "emergency
rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and
consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection
with the incident under consideration.
We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who
by executing a release of the claim due them, had effectively and clearly
waived their right thereto.
Facts:
The car driven by the relatives of the petitioner were crossing a bridge,
when some kids tried to dart to cross the road, unsure whether to cross or
not. The car blew its horn, swerved to the left side of the road, switched on its
head light to try to warn the driver of the truck and tried to return to its lane.
But the truck did not slow down. As a result, before the car could return to its
side, it got hit by the truck, leading to the death of the driver, his daughter
and the baby sitter [in the front passenger seat], and injury to the rest of the
passengers. Witnesses saw the truck stopped only after colliding with the car.
There were skid marks under the truck, but there were no skid marks behind
the truck.) RTC found Galang liable. CA affirmed RTC. Galang went to the SC
via Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
SC Ruling:
Yes. Galang was negligent. If ever the car driver was guilty of some
negligence, it was excused by “Emergency Rule” and the doctrine of the
“Last clear chance”. Galang was driving at 40miles per hour (38 kilometers
per hour) when the allowable speed limit when crossing a bridge is only 30
kilometers per hour. Galang alleged that there was mistake in interpretation,
but regularity of performance of duty by the officers getting his testimony is
presumed.
Facts:
An action for damages based on quasi delict was filed by the minor
children of the Mangalinao spouses through their legal guardian against the
registered owners and drivers of the two 10-wheeler trucks that collided with
their parents’ Nissan Pathfinder. The children imputed recklessness,
negligence, and imprudence on the truck drivers for the deaths of their sister
and parents; while they hold Sonny and Orix equally liable for failing to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their respective drivers.
Issue:
Ruling:
Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso Truck is liable to the heirs of
the victims of the mishap. Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner
to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by
reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages
or injury the truck registered under it have caused. Besides, the registered
owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the
amount that they may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to
the plaintiff, which Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party
complaint against the owner of the Fuso, Manuel. Moral damages, it must be
stressed, are not intended to enrich plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
They are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she had
undergone due to the other party’s culpable action and must, perforce, be
proportional to the suffering inflicted.
Issue:
79
Ruling:
No. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron
driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner
has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received
and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show
that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury
or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or
in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says
that “driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight
during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident,” that because the
Cimarron had only one headlight, there was “decreased visibility,” and that
the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded
“decreased [its] maneuverability.” However, mere allegations such as these
are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged
negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding them liable for
damages based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial court.
Ruling:
Facts:
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his
driver. Ramos in his opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable
since it is Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of the accident.
He further argued that when the accident happened, Aquilino violated an
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MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting the crossing is the place where the accident
happened.
Issue:
Whether Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the
accident is his employee's negligence.
Ruling:
Facts:
MACLIN sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the
car. In reply, petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event
(Art. 1174 and 1262, NCC), prompting private respondent to bring this suit for the value
of its vehicle and for damages. Private respondent argued that petitioner was liable for the
loss of the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous event. It contended that the nature of
petitioner’s business required him to assume the risk because under P.D. No. 1572,
petitioner was required to insure his property as well as those of his customers.
RTC ruled in favor of MACLIN stating that the “failure of defendant to comply
with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant
liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire,” and that rustproffing is
“definitely covered” by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not register his business and
insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his customers. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that a violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. It ruled
that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has
happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only a negligent act but also the
proximate cause.
Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does
not bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict. Petitioner’s
negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his
contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a
duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private
respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not
insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.
Facts:
through Philadelphia National Banck which had temporarily credited the same
to PNB’s account as of Nov.6, 1992. On the same day, Garin, PNB’s Division
Chief, informed Ofelia that the check has already been cleared and the same
was credited to the account of Sps Cheah. He further allowed the withdrawal
of the amount on Nov 17-18, 1992. Filipina Tuazon, thereafter, received the
proceeds.
However, the Cable Division of PNB Head Office received a message
from Philadelphia informing PNB for the return of the check for insufficiency of
funds. Upon demand by PNB Buendia to return the money withrdrawn, Ofelia
contacted Filipina to get the money back but the same has been given to
several people who asked for the check’s encashment.
PNB filed a complaint against the spouses and froze their peso and
dollar deposits. RTC ruled in favor of the PNB and held the spouses Cheah
guilty of contributory negligence. The CA declared both parties equally
negligent and should suffer and shoulder the loss.
Issue:
Whether both parties are equally negligent, hence, should suffer the
loss.
Ruling:
Yes. PNB’s act of releasing the proceeds of the check prior to the lapse
of the 15-day clearing was the proximate cause. The disregard of its own
banking policy amounts to gross negligence. It bears stressing that the
“diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. The highest
degree of diligence is expected. PNB failed to do its duty in exercising
extraordinary diligence and reasonable business practice.
Facts:
petitioner Philtranco Service. Felix went through number operations and was
unable to obtain sufficient financial assistance from Inland for the costs of his
operations, hospitalization, doctors’ fees and other miscellaneous expenses,
thus, on 31 July 1989; Paras filed a complaint for damages based on breach of
contract of carriage against Inland. On 02 March 1990, upon leave of court,
Inland filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles. In
this third-party complaint, inland, sought for exoneration of its liabilities to
Paras, asserting that the latter’s cause of action should be directed against
Philtranco considering that the accident was caused by Miralles’ lack of care,
negligence and reckless imprudence. The RTC then rendered a decision
declaring Philtranco and Apolinar liable for moral and actual damages. The
said award of damages was also affirmed by the CA. Ultimately, Philtranco
questions the validity of awarding moral damages on the ground that the
basis of such award is based on a breach of contract of carriage, which is not
one of the enumeration provided by the Civil Code.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. Section 16, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court defines a third party
complaint as a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third party defendant,
for contribution, indemnification, subrogation, or any other relief, in respect of
his opponent’s claim.
The case at bar is one in which the third party defendants are brought
into the action as directly liable to the plaintiffs upon the allegation that the
primary and immediate cause as shown by the police investigation of said
vehicular collision between the above-mentioned three vehicles was the
recklessness and negligence and lack of imprudence of the third-party
defendant Virgilio Esguerra y Ledesma then driver of the passenger bus. The
effects are that "plaintiff and third party are at issue as to their rights
respecting the claim and the third party is bound by the adjudication as
between him and plaintiff. It is not indispensable in the premises that the
defendant be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before the third-party defendant
may be held liable to the plaintiff, as precisely, the theory of defendant is that
it is the third party defendant, and not he, who is directly liable to plaintiff.
The situation contemplated by appellants would properly pertain to situation
(a) above wherein the third party defendant is being sued for contribution,
indemnity or subrogation, or simply stated, for a defendant's "remedy over".
Facts:
Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for
a medical check-up. On the following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood,
and hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that respondent’s
blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave
respondent two medical prescriptions, Diamicron for his blood sugar and
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to petitioner
Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a
prescription for Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to respondent was
Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware that what was given to him was
the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of Dormicum on three
consecutive days.
On November 8 or on the third day he took the medicine, respondent
figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of
one Josie Peralta. Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could not
remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the
tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the
time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Upon being shown
the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent
was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Thus, on April 14, 1994,
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for damages
against petitioner. After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision dated
March 18, 1997 in favor of respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its
Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied, hence, this petition.
Issues:
Ruling:
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. To sustain a claim based on
the above provision, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law
demands. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was
respondent’s negligence in driving his car.
Facts:
RTC decided in favor of Noble’s parents. RTC observed that NPC witnesses
were biased because all but one were employees of NPC, and they were not
actually present at the time of the accident. RTC found NPC negligent since
the company has not acted upon the requests and demands made by the
community leaders since 1991. CA affirmed RTC with modification–award of
moral damages was reduced from 100k to 50k, and award of attorney fees
was disallowed since the reason for the award was not expressly stated in the
decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could
cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to
want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with
the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
YES. In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause
of the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of
respondent who cleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing
facility without observing its own verification procedure. As correctly found by
the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary care
in the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon
seeing the date written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent
could have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus
dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to the
payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the
petitioner in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek
reimbursement from respondent the amount credited to the payee’s account
covering the check.
88
Facts:
Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter to PNR to ask indemnity for the
death of her daughter, but PNR did not respond. As a result, she and Garcia
filed a complaint in the RTC Manila (later tried by Br. 20, Manila RTC). They
alleged that it was PNR’s failure to provide necessary equipment at the
railroad crossing in Brgy. Rizal, Moncada. Tarlac which was proximate and
direct cause of Garcia’s injuries and the death of Rhonda.
Meanwhile, contrary to Brunty and Garcia’s allegations, PNR stated that
it was not negligent in selection and supervision of its employees(using the
diligence of a good father doctrine) and it was Mercelita’s negligence which
was the immediate and proximate of the accident. It also stated that it had
the right of way, and has no legal duty to put a bar or red light signal at the
crossing. Moreover, it had adequate, visible, and clear warning signs
strategically posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing.
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The RTC ruled in favor of Brunty and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, PNR appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Whether Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur
Ruling:
YES. The photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap
occurred is marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left
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lane. Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the
statement therein that the Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and not the
other way around is deemed established. While not constituting direct proof
of Ong’s negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application
of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.
Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie
negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for
specific proof of negligence permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of
the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the
defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part
based on the theory that defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and
is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon
the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence
can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of
the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the
defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
Facts:
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the
anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony
showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not
exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the
anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to
undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in
intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a
“good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable
for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after
the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the
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DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners.
The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Issues:
Ruling:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the
damages. Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in
order to tell whether or not the intubation was a success. The Supreme Court
also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the
day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which
is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise
the proper authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the
anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he
did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery.
Facts:
Upon investigation, the NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab; that he
was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical
treatment; that an X-ray of the victim’s ankle was ordered; that the X-ray
result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia; that Dr. Bastan entered the
emergency room and, after conducting her own examination of the victim,
informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was only the ankle that was hit, there
was no need to examine the upper leg. despite Mrs. Santiago's protest the
doctors did not examine the upper portion of the leg of Roy. that eleven (11)
days later, Roy Jr. developed fever, swelling of the right leg and misalignment
of the right foot; that Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the hospital; and
that the X-ray revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture
in the shaft of the bone.
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After trial and applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor the RTC found
petitioners to be guilty of simple negligence. The decision was affirmed in
toto by the CA.
Issues:
Whether of not the petitioner physicians are negligent, hence liable for
damages.
Ruling:
Thus, simple negligence is resent if: that there is lack of precaution on the
part of the offender, and that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan, explained the court, cannot pass on the liability
to the taxi driver who hit the victim. It may be true that the actual, direct,
immediate, and proximate cause of the injury of Roy Jr. was the vehicular
accident when he was hit by a taxi. The petitioners, however, cannot simply
invoke such fact alone to excuse themselves from any liability. If this would
be so, doctors would have a ready defense should they fail to do their job in
attending to victims of hit-and-run, maltreatment, and other crimes of
violence in which the actual, direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the
injury is indubitably the act of the perpetrator/s.
Petitioners were absolved in the criminal charge for the reason that a
reasonable doubt existed but the are liable for damages. There is no direct
evidence proving that it was their negligence that caused the suffering of Roy.
Facts:
developed in Allen’s arm. The x-ray examination showed that the deformity
was caused by a re-displacement of the bone fragments, so it was agreed
that an open reduction surgery will be conducted on June 24, 1992 by the
respondent, again with Dr. Jabagat as the anesthesiologist. On the said date,
Sherlina was allowed to observe the operation behind a glass panel. Dr.
Jabagat failed to intubate the patient after 5 attempts so anesthesia was
administered through a gas mask. Respondent asked Dr. Jabagat if the
operation should be postponed given the failure to intubate, but Dr. Jabagat
said that it was alright to proceed. Respondent verified that Allen was
breathing properly before proceeding with the surgery. As respondent was
about to finish the suturing, Sherlina decided to go out of the operating room
to make a telephone call and wait for her son. Later, she was informed that
her son died on the operating table. The cause of death was asphyxia due to
the congestion and edema of the epiglottis. Hence, a criminal, administrative
and civil case was filed by the parents of Allen against the doctors for the
negligence that caused Allen’s death.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor to pin
liability on respondent for Allen’s death. Res ipsa liquitor is a rebuttable
presumption or influence that the defendant was negligent. The presumption
only arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in the
defendant’s exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in the absence of negligence. It is a rule of evidence
whereby negligence of the alleged wrong does may be inferred from the mere
fact that the accident happened, provided that the character of the accident
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that in the
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that the thing which
caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of
the alleged wrong doer.
Moreover, we note that in the instant case, the instrument which caused
the injury or damage was not even within respondent’s exclusive control and
management as Dr. Jabagat was exclusively in control and management of
the anesthesia and endotracheal tube. The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor allows
the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence or the
part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided
that the following requisites concur:
The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence;
Facts:
Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a
jeepney driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by
Oscar del Carmen Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a
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criminal case while the father of the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacou
filed an independent civil action againt the former in behalf of the minor
children left by the Monsalud spouses. Del Carmen Jr. claimed he was a victim
as well as Allan stole the jeep and was not hired as a driver by the former; he
was a conductor (and had been released from employment lately) and it was
the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who was hired as a driver. Del Carmen Jr. filed a
carnapping case against Allan but was dismissed by the court for insufficient
evidence. RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based
on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such
vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only
because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed
but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan
the implied permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers were
assigned to said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney would be parked beside the
brothers’ house and not returned to del Carmen’s residence; the jeep could easily
be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not
fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be
started even without the ignition key.
Issue:
W/N owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused by
the operation of such
Ruling:
Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary
liable. Del Carmen Jr.’s own evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney.
Given the dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del Carmen Jr. against
Allan, the former also admitted to such dismissal in the SC. Under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, “where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown
to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in
the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or
control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence – in the absence of a
sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant – that the accident
arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. All three are present in
the case at bar.
Facts:
February 1, 1993: Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the San Roque
Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school
premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Her parents Dominador and
Rosalita Cardaa filed a case for damages against the school principal Joaquinita
Capili knowing that the tree was dead and rotting did not dispose of it
RTC: dismissed for failing to show negligence on the part of Capili
CA: reversed. Awarded P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Jasmin and P15,010
as reimbursement of her burial expenses, moral damages P50,000 and attorney's
fees and litigation P10,000
Issue:
W/N Capili can be held liable for damages under Res ipsa loquitur.
Ruling:
YES. Negligent act, inadvertent(unintentional) act may be merely carelessly
done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation
involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the
other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature an ordinary prudent person in
the actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an
appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a
more careful manner.
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm
someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As school principal, she was
tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
within the school and its premises. Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned
disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee
Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school's premises
shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls
for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.. Once respondents made out a
prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due
care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. Under the circumstances, we have
to concede that petitioner was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis--vis
respondents' daughter's death.. The award of moral damages is therefore not
proper.
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Facts:
Jorge Reyes has been suffering from recurring fever with chills for around days.
Home medication afforded him no relief so he went to Mercy Community Clinic. He
was then attended by Dr. Marlyn Rico. Since typhoid fever was common at that
time, the Widal test was performed and he was found positive for typhoid.
Thereafter, Dr. Marlyn Rico indorse Jorge Reyes to Dr. Marvie Blanes. Suspecting
that that Jorge had typhoid fever, Dr. Marvie Blanes ordered that Jorge be tested for
compatibility with chloromycetin, an antibiotic. Such test was conducted by Nurse
Pagente. As there was no adverse reaction, Dr. Blanes administered 500 mg of the
antibiotic. Another dose was given 3 hours later. Subsequently, Jorge Reyes
developed high fever and experienced vomiting and convulsions. He then turned
blue due to deficiency in oxygen – cyanosis – and died. The cause of death was
stated to be “ventricular arrhythmia secondary to hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”
The heirs of Reyes filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Sisters of
Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico and Mercy Community Clinic
contending that the death of Jorge was due to the wrongful administration of
chloromycetin. (NOTE: Petitioner’s action is for medical malpractice.)
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that: Dr. Marlyn Rico hastily and erroneously relied upon the
Widal test, diagnosed Jorge’s illness as typhoid fever, and immediately prescribed
the administration of the antibiotic chloromycetin, Dr. Marvie Blanes erred in
ordering the administration of the second dose of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin
barely 3 hours after the first was given. Testimony presented: That of Dr. Apolinar
Vacalares, (Chief Pathologist of the Northern Mindanao Training Hospital) who
performed an autopsy on the body – Dr. Vacalares testified that Reyes did not die of
typhoid fever but of shock undetermined, which could be due to allergic reaction or
chloromycetin overdose.
Issue:
WON there was medical malpractice.
Ruling:
NO. Dr. Apolinar Vacalares is not a specialist of typhoid fever and he is thus not
qualified to prove that Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in her diagnosis. While petitioners
presented Dr. Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness, we do not find him to be so
as he is not a specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid fever. Furthermore,
although he may have had extensive experience in performing autopsies, he
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admitted that he had yet to do one on the body of a typhoid victim at the time he
conducted the postmortem on Jorge Reyes. It is also plain from his testimony that
he has treated only about three cases of typhoid fever.
The two doctors presented by respondents clearly were experts on the subject
They vouched for the correctness of Dr. Marlyn Rico’s diagnosis. Dr. Peter Gotiong,
a diplomate whose specialization is infectious diseases and microbiology and an
associate professor at the Southwestern University College of Medicine and the
Gullas College of Medicine, testified that he has already treated over a thousand
cases of typhoid fever.
99
Facts:
NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the
1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the
construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water
flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No.
6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation.
The court ruled that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i)
of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and
does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case.
Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit
to recover just compensation for their land.
Facts:
Petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., sold to the spouses Joe Uy and Myrna Uy a
subdivision lot which thereafter was registered in the name of the Uys. The spouses Uy
sold the same lot to herein respondents. From then on, respondents visited their property
a number of times, only to find out the sad state of development thereat. In short, there
has been no development at all.
The respondents, in a letter dated December 18, 1995, demanded petitioner to
provide the needed utility systems and clear the area of squatters and other obstructions
and to enable them to start the construction of their house thereon and to allow other lot
owners in the area a full access to and peaceful possession of their respective lots.
Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the Field Office
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), NCR a complaint for specific
performance and damages which the Housing and Land Use Arbiter, in a decision
rendered judgment in favor of the respondents by directing petitioner to perform its
obligation to provide subdivision facilities in the subject premises and to rid the premises
of squatters and to pay complainants.
Dissatisfied, petitioner went on appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners,
which, in a decision affirmed that of the Arbiter. The petitioner then elevated the case to
the Office of the President (O.P.), which also affirmed with modification the appealed
decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.
Respondents filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the aforementioned
decision, praying for the deletion of that portion thereof giving petitioner the option of
merely paying them the purchase price with interest. Respondents argued that it would
be more in accord with equity and fair play if they will be paid the fair market value of
the lot in question and not merely its purchase price.
Issue:
Whether or not in the event respondents opt to rescind the contract, should
petitioner pay them merely the price they paid for the lot plus interest or the current
market value thereof.
Ruling:
No. The court held that “a literal application of any part of a statute is to be
rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contradict the evident
meaning of the statute taken as a whole. Statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion.”
Indeed, there would be unjust enrichment if respondents Solid Homes, Inc. &
Purita Soliven are made to pay only the purchase price plus interest. It is definite that the
value of the subject property already escalated after almost two decades from the time the
petitioner paid for it. Equity and justice dictate that the injured party should be paid the
market value of the lot, otherwise, respondents Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita Soliven would
enrich themselves at the expense of herein lot owners when they sell the same lot at the
present market value. Surely, such a situation should not be countenanced for to do so
101
would be contrary to reason and therefore, unconscionable. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient or contrary to
reason is not allowed in law.
Facts:
Elsa Arcilla and her husband, Calvin Arcilla secured on three occasions,
loans from the Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage bank in the amount of
Php.107,946.00 as evidenced by the “Promissory Note” executed by the
spouses in favor of the said bank. To secure payment of said loans, the
spouses executed “Real Estate Mortgages” in favor of the appellants (Banco
Filipino) over their parcels of land. The appellee spouses failed to pay their
monthly amortization to appellant. On September 2, 1985 the appellee’s filed
a complaint for “Annulment of the Loan Contracts, Foreclosure Sale with
Prohibitory and Injunction” which was granted by the RTC. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it held that the cause of action of
the private respondents accrued on October 30, 1978 and the filing of their
complaint for annulment of their contracts in 1085 was not yet barred by the
prescription
Ruling:
The court held that the petition is unmeritorious. Petitioner’s claim that
the action of the private respondents have prescribed is bereft of merit.
Under Article 1150 of the Civil Code, the time for prescription of all kinds of
action where there is no special provision which ordains otherwise shall be
counted from the day they may be brought. Thus the period of prescription of
any cause of action is reckoned only from the date of the cause of action
accrued. The period should not be made to retroact to the date of the
execution of the contract, but from the date they received the statement of
account showing the increased rate of interest, for it was only from the
moment that they discovered the petitioner’s unilateral increase thereof.
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Facts:
Petitioners alleged that CCC, through Lim and Mariano, had filed the
"baseless" Complaint and procured the Writ of Attachment in bad faith.
Relying on this Court's pronouncement in Sapugayv. CA, petitioners prayed
that both Lim and Mariano be held "jointly and solidarily" liable with
Respondent CCC. On behalf of Lim and Mariano who had yet to file any
responsive pleading, CCC moved to dismiss petitioners' compulsory
counterclaims on grounds that essentially constituted the very issues for
resolution in the instant Petition.
RTC ruled that the counterclaims of the petitioners against Lim and
Mariano were not compulsory, that the ruling in Sapugay was not applicable
and that the petitioner’s answer with counterclaims violated the procedural
rules on joinder of actions.
103
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of (FEU) when he was shot
by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school
premises on August 18, 1996. Saludaga was rushed to FEU Hospital due to
the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station
where he explained that the shooting was accidental and eventually released
for no formal complaint was filed against him.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Court agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was
employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a
principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of
control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. It is settled in our
jurisdiction that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and
assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the
employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not
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KHRISTINE REGINO, petitioner, vs. Pangasinan College of Science and Technology, Respondent
G.R. No. 156109
November 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Khristine Regino, an enrolled student at respondent PCST, was disallowed to take from
taking tests or examinations by her teachers Rachelle A. Gamut and Elissa Baladlad, because the former did
not pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each as required by PCST. The payment was for fund raising
campaign dubbed as the Rave Party and Dance Revolution. Petitioner did not pay because of financial
difficulties and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations. Petitioner then
filed a complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot, and Baladlad.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies which
the RTC upheld and resulted to the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Issues:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a civil action
exclusively for damages based on violation of human relations provisions of the Civil Code, filed by a
student against here former school, thus concluding that CHED has exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions for damages based upon violation of the Civilc Code provisions and that a prior declaration of
invalidity of a certain school administrative policy is need for the action to prosper.
Ruling:
No. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case.
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to
take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the
acts complained of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the
consequences of respondents acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of
the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they
are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does
not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the
Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal
and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioners action for damages inevitably calls for the
application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the
courts.
105
Facts:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the
other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same
school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle.
Sherwin died due to this accident.
Issue:
Ruling:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code
where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a
causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any
efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the
petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless
driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no
evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an
event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not
the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants
excluding herein petitioner.
Facts:
106
The complaint alleged that during the school year 1990-1991, Timothy
was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution
operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the
afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boys
comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call
of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out.
Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled
several times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window
to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right
through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given
medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by respondents
against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses
Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning
Salvador, and the Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao.
In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the
locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its
fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care
and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and
convenience of its students.
Issue:
Whether or not Child Learning Center is liable for torts and consequently,
of damages?
Ruling:
Yes. In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide
precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two
instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified
of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window where
Timothy fell from. The trial court found that the lock was defective on March
5, 1991. The door knob was defective. After the incident of March 5, 1991,
said door knob was taken off the door of the toilet where Timothy was in. The
architect who testified during the trial declared that although there were
standard specifications for door knobs for comfort room[s], and he designed
them according to that requirement, he did not investigate whether the door
knob specified in his plans during the construction [was] actually put in place.
This is so because he did not verify whether the door knob he specified w[as]
actually put in place at the particular comfort room where Timothy was
barred from getting outside.
The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that
the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the
fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where
(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly
answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at
107
all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the
window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.
Facts:
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the
taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding
a bike on his way to the office, when Completo’s taxi bumped and sideswept
him, causing serious physical injuries. He [Albayda] was brought to the PH Air
Force General Hospital, but he was transferred to the AFP Medical Center
because he sustained a fracture and there was no orthopedic doctor available
in the first hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and
again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7 months].
On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the
taxicab when he heard a strange sound from the taxicab’s rear right side. He
found Albayda lying on the road, holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to
PH Air Force General Hospital. Completo asserted that he was an experienced
driver, and that he already reduced his speed to 20km even before reaching
the intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at high speed, causing
him to lose control of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had no cause of
action.
Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the
testimony of the owner of the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from
being a soldier, he also held franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys,
and being a taxicab operator, he would wake up early to personally check the
taxicabs. When Completo applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad required him to
show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s license. Completo never
figured in a vehicular accident since he was employed and according to
Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and good man.
Issues:
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1. Whether the CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the
collision.
2. Whether Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of
the family; and
Ruling:
1. No. It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorists breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence
required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides
that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict. In this regard, the question of the motorist's negligence is a question of
fact.It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to
exercise reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding
at the time he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo
did not slow down even when he approached the intersection of 8 th and 11th
Streets of VAB. It was also proven that Albayda had the right of way, considering
that he reached the intersection ahead of Completo.
Facts:
The bank issued Manager’s Check No. 035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49,
representing the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in the
name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee. The manager’s check was deposited in the
account of Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at respondent Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan as
indorser. To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations,
Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check.
The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Upon the presentment of
the check, Allied funded the check even without checking the authenticity of
Lim Sio Wan’s purported indorsement. Thus, the amount on the face of the
check was credited to the account of FCC.
Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market placement,
upon the maturity date of the first money market placement, Lim Sio Wan
went to Allied to withdraw it. She was then informed that the placement had
been pre-terminated upon her instructions. Allied refused to pay Lim Sio Wan,
claiming that the latter had authorized the pre-termination of the placement
and its subsequent release to Santos.
Issue:
Whether or not Allied negligence was the proximate cause of the loss of
Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement.
Ruling:
The court ruled that Allied is liable to Lim Sio Wan. Fundamental and
familiar is the doctrine that the relationship between a bank and a client is
one of debtor-creditor. Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio Wan’s
111
money market placement, the bank still has an obligation to pay her at six
percent (6%) interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment thereof.
We cannot, however, say outright that Allied is solely liable to Lim Sio
Wan. Allied avers that even if it had not issued the check payment, the
money represented by the check would still be lost because of Metrobank’s
negligence in indorsing the check without verifying the genuineness of the
indorsement thereon. The trial court correctly found Allied negligent in
issuing the manager’s check and in transmitting it to Santos without even a
written authorization. In fact, Allied did not even ask for the certificate
evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her
residence or office to confirm her instructions. Both actions could have
prevented the whole fraudulent transaction from unfolding. Allied’s
negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the resulting loss.
Facts:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the
Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of
Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it
was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from
Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila
flight. The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent
Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano
was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head
injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.
Issues:
1. May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver
assigned to him
2. May an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.
Ruling:
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued,
the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer.
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with
the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of
injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual
owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle
as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible
for the consequences incident to its operation.
Facts:
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that there is an existing
employer-employee relationship between Almirez and Infinite Loop since the
latter exercises control over the means and methods used by Almirez in the
performance of her duties.
Issue:
Ruling:
Contrary to the finding of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, the
"Scope of [Almirez’] Professional Services" does not "show that the
company’s management team exercises control over the means and methods
in the performance of her duties as Refinery Process Design Engineer."
Having hired Almirez’ professional services on account of her "expertise and
qualifications" as Almirez herself proffers in her Position Paper, the company
naturally expected to be updated regularly of her "work progress," if any, on
the project for which she was specifically hired.
Facts:
ACI was engaged in the distribution and sale of various brands of liquor
and alcoholic spirits. Felipe Loi was employed as its manager and Jalapadan
was one of the ACI’s hired salesmen. Under the Agreement for the Sale of
Merchandise between Jalapadan and ACI, among others, the former shall be
provided with a 6-wheeler truck to facilitate the sale and delivery of products
to customers and outlets and was authorized to employ and discharge a
driver and other assistants as he deemed necessary, who would be
considered his employees, and that he alone would be liable for their
compensation and actual expenses, including meals while on duty. On August
5, 1997, Jalapadan hired Arnulfo Acebedo as driver.
Issue:
Whether or not Jalapadan, and not ACI and Loi, was the employer of
Acebedo.
114
Ruling:
Facts:
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once gain brought at the LMC, as she
was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was
attended by Drs. Dela Cruz, Mayo and Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed
Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latter’s womb, after Editha went
laparectomy, she was found to have massive intra abdominal hemorrhage
and ruptured uterus. Thus, she had to go hysterectomy and as a result no
more chance to bear a child.
115
Issue:
Ruling:
The breach of the professional duties of skill and care, or their improper
performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in body
or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. Further, in as much as the
causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in
the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony
is usually necessary to suspect the conclusion as to causation.
However, in this case, it was undisputedly established that Editha did not
return for follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioner’s advice. This is,
as found out, is the proximate cause of the injury she sustained.
Facts:
At 12:15 am, the operation on Raymong started. But while the operation was on-
going, Raymond suffered a cardiac arrest and he was pronounced dead at 2:30 A.M with
his death certificate indicating "hypovolemic shock" as the immediate cause of death.
Issue:
116
Whether Dr. Cereno and Dr. Zafe are guilty of gross negligence in the performance
of their duties.
Ruling:
No, the petitioners are not guilty of gross negligence.The type of lawsuit which has
been called medical malpractice or medical negligence, is that type of claim which the
complainant must prove: (1) that the health care provider, either by his act or omission,
had been negligent, and (2) that such act or omission proximately caused the injury
complained of. The best approach to prove these is through the opinions of expert
witnesses belonging in the same general line of practice as defendant surgeon. The
deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the former’s
realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances
are incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.
In the case at bar, there were no expert witnesses presented to testify norwas there
any testimony offered, except that of Dr. Tatad’s, on which it may be inferred that
petitioners failed to exercise the standard of care, diligence, learning and skill expected
from practitioners of their profession. Dr. Tatad is not an expert witness in this case as her
expertise is in the administration of anesthesia and not in the determination of whether
surgery ought or not ought to be performed.
In medical negligence cases, it is established that the complainant has the burden of
establishing breach of duty on the part of the doctors or surgeons. It must be proven that
such breach of duty has a causal connection to the death of the patient.Aside from their
failure to prove negligence on the part of the petitioners, they also failed to prove that it
was petitioners’ fault that caused the injury.
Facts:
Corazon Nogales (“Corazon”) was pregnant with her fourth child. She was
under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada. On her last trimester
of pregnancy, she had leg edema and an increase in blood pressure. Her
condition was a dangerous complication of pregnancy. When she experienced
mild labor pains, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to Capitol
Medical Center (CMC). Upon Corazon's admission at the CMC, Rogelio Nogales
("Rogelio") executed and signed the "Consent on Admission and Agreement"
and "Admission Agreement." Corazon was then brought to the labor room of
the CMC. She had incidents of medical complication and was given treatment
by the doctors in CMC. Despite several measures administered, Corazon died.
The cause of death was hemorrhage, post partum.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against CMC, Dr. Estrada, and
the rest of CMC medical staff for the death of Corazon. In their defense, CMC
pointed out that Dr. Estrada was a consultant to be considered as an
117
After more than 11 years of trial, the court rendered judgment finding Dr.
Estrada solely liable for damages. Petitioners appealed the trial court’s
decision. Petitioners claimed that aside from Dr. Estrada, the remaining
respondents should be held equally liable for negligence. Petitioners stressed
that the subject matter of the petition was the liability of CMC for the
negligence of Dr. Estrada.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
On April 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General
Hospital (Medical City Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and
bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from
"cancer of the sigmoid". The doctor performed an anterior resection surgery
on Natividad and found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread
on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Dr. Ampil
obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr.
Juan Fuentes, to perform hysterectomy on her. Dr. Fuentes had completed
the hysterectomy and thenafter left after he presented to Dr. Ampil his work
being done. Dr. Ampil took over and completed the operation and closed the
incision. The attending nurses had "announced to Dr. Ampil that two (2)
"sponge count lacking” but he continued the closure. The attending nurses
entered the incident in the Record of Operations.
118
Natividad and her husband, went to the United States to seek further
treatment and was told she was free of cancer after four (4) months. She was
advised to return to the Philippines.
In August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering
from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil was informed about it and he
preceded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains
would soon vanish. She suffered intense pains hence prompted her admission
to the Polymedic General Hospital.
On Nov. 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch
96, Quezon City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services,
Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322. They alleged that the latter are liable for
negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and
malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.
On March 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas,
finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice.
The defendants PSI, Dr. Miguel Ampil and Dr. Juan Fuentes to pay to the
plaintiffs, jointly and severally for actual damages (US $ 19,900 at the rate of
P21.60-US$1.00, as reimbursement of actual expenses incurred in the United
States of America); travel taxes; cost of hospitalization at Polymedic Hospital
(P45,802.50); ) moral damages (P2,000,000.00); attorney’s fees
(P250,000.00); legal interest and the cost of suits. Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
are liable for exemplary damages and the interest thereon (P300,000.00).
Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and
malpractice.
Ruling:
YES.The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken together,
directly point to Dr. Ampil as the negligent party: (1) it is not disputed that
the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient
during the surgical operation. (2) immediately after the operation, the nurses
who assisted in the surgery noted in their report that two ‘sponge count was
lacking’; that such anomaly was ‘announced to surgeon’ and that a ‘search
119
was done but to no avail’ prompting Dr. Ampil to ‘continue for closure’. (3)
after the operation, two gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the
body of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was performed.
Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze.
Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was experiencing was the
ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad
could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove
the gauzes from her body. What was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil
has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient.
Facts:
cost of hospital bills were incurred and intense pains still felt even when the
two “sponges” were later removed from the vagina of Natividad.
The Agana’s filed a complaint for damages against PSI, Dr. Migule Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes at the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City. The RTC ruled in favor
of the Aganas and ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiff. The defendants interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeal (CA).
On April 1993, the Aganas filed with the RTC a motion for a Partial Execution
of its Decision. The Court granted the motion. The sheriff levied upon certain
properties of Dr. Ampil and sold them for P451,275.00 and delivered the
amount to the Aganas.
On September 21, 1993, the RTC granted the motion and issued the
corresponding writ. Dr. Fuentes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary injunction, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 32198. On Oct. 29, 1993, the CA issued a Resolution granting
Dr. Fuentes’ prayer for injunctive relief.
The Aganas maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Dr.
Fuentes is not guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They contend that the pieces of gauze are prima
facie proofs that the operating surgeons have been negligent.
Issue:
Ruling:
NO. Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." The
requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1)
the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under
the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such
that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who
had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
explanation by the defendant.
The element of "control and management of the thing which caused the
injury" to be wanting. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead
surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr.
Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the
malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes
performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr.
Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed
Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on
Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses
informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was
conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed
that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no
longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.
121
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person
in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon
thus he was the "Captain of the Ship." It was this act of ordering the closure
of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained
unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control
and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr.
Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se
create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a
mere evidentiary rule.c In other words, mere invocation and application of the
doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Here,
the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by
Dr. Fuentes.
Facts:
Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died 11 days after the
administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Respondents
filed a damage suit against Dr. Li and other doctors and against SLMC,
charging them with negligence and disregard of Angelica’s safety, health and
welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their
failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms
of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy,
which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely
demise.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose
serious side effects to the parents of the child patient who died while
undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding that petitioner was
negligent in administering the said treatment.
Ruling:
informed consent. Thus, the Court has no factual basis to declare that the
chemotherapy administered by the petitioner proximately caused Angelica’s
death.
Facts:
When his wife Raymunda wento into labor pains and began bleeding,
respondent Rodrigo Calayag brought her to St. Michaels’s Clinic. After initial
examination, the doctor told Rodrigo that Raymunda had to have caesarean
section for her baby but this had to be done at the beteer-equipped Sacred
Heart Hospital (SHH), owned and operated by petitioner Dr. Alberto Reyes (Dr.
Reyes). SHH admitted on the same day. To prepare her, the attending
anesthesiologist, petitioner Dr. Eduardo Aquino injected with a preliminary
“Hipnotic” and he administered an anesthesia on her spine. A few minutes
later, Dr. Unite delivered a stillborn eight-month-old baby. A few minutes later
the operating team noticed that Raymunda had become cyanotic and her
blood darkened for lack of oxygen and suddenly her vital signs gone.
Fortunately, she was restored. It was found out that suffered a cardiac arrest
during the operation which explained her comatose states and was advised
to move her to a better-equipped hospital. Raymunda was moved to Medical
Center Manila where Dr. Libarnes, a neurologist, found her in a “vegetative
state” having suffered from an anoxic injury due to cardio-respiratory arrest.
Her condition worsen and she never regained consciousness, prompting her
MCM doctors to advise Rodrigo to take her home since they could do no more
to improve her condition. MCM discharged her and she died 15 days later.
Rodrigo filed, together with his seven children, a complaint damages for Dr.
Unite, Dr. Aquino and Dr. Reyes claiming that Dr. Unite and Dr. Aquino failed
to exercise the diligence required for operating Raymunda while Dr. Reyes, as
Rodrigo averred, was negligent in supervising the work of the two doctors.
Issues:
Whether or not Dr. Unite (the surgeon) and Dr. Aquino (the
anesthesiologist) acted negligently in handling Raymunda’s operation,
resulting in her death; and
Whether or not Dr. Reyes is liable, as hospital owner, for the negligence
of Dr. Unite and Dr. Aquino.
Rulings:
Yes, Dr. Unite and Dr. Aquino are liable. The cause of action against the
doctors in these cases is commonly known as medical malpractice and to
successfully mount a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff should establish
four basic things: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.
The evidence should show that the physician or surgeon, either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would not have done; and that the failure or action caused injury to
the patient. To prove the doctors negligence, Rodrigo presented Dr. Libarnes
who explained that it was the lack of oxygen in the brain that caused
Raymunda’s vegetative state and it could be traced to the anesthetic
accident that resulted when Dr. Aquino placed her under anesthesia.
Furthermore, Dr. Libarnes blamed the doctors who operated on Raymunda for
not properly keeping track of her vital sign during the caesarean procedure
resulting in their failure to promptly address the cyanosis when it set in. The
damage coud have been averted had the attending doctors promptly
detected the situation and resuscitated her on time.
124
No, Dr. Reyes is not liable as a hospital owner. The doctrine of apparent
authority would not apply to make Dr. Reyes liable. Two factors must be
present under this doctrine: 1) the hospital acted in a manner which would
lead a reasonable person to believe that the person claimed to be negligent
was its agent or employee; and 2) the patient relied on such belief. In this
case, there is no evidence that the hospital acted in a way that made
Raymunda and her husband believe that the two doctors were in the
hospital’s employ. There appears no concrete proof to show that Dr. Unite and
Dr. Aquino were under the hospital’s payroll. Indeed, Dr. Aquino appeared to
be a government physician connected with the Integrated Provincial Health
Office of Bulacan while Dr. Unite appeared to be a self-employed doctor. No
evidence has been presented that Raymunda suffered her fate because of
defective hospital facilities or poor staff support to the surgeons.
125
Facts:
Four months later and after the petitioner suffered from significant
swelling of his right eyeball, headaches, nausea and blindness on this right
eye, he sought for the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Aquino. Dr. Aquino found
that the petitioner had been suffering from glaucoma and needed to undergo
laser surgery, lest he might suffer from total blindness. After reading the
literature on the use of the medicine Maxitrol, Fatima, one of the petitioners
herein and Peter Lucas’ wife, read that one of the adverse effects of
prolonged use of steroid-based eye drops could possibly be
glaucoma. Claiming to have steroid-induced glaucoma and blaming Dr. Tuano
for the same, Peter, Fatima, and their two children instituted a civil case for
damages against herein respondent for medical malpractice.
Issue:
Ruling:
As the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care as
that of any other reasonably competent physician would use in the treatment
of his patient, said standard level of care, skill and diligence must likewise be
proven by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care in a
medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of
experts in the field. The same is outside the ken of the average layperson.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper
performance of such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is
126
Facts:
On November 22, 1998, respondent Espinas was driving his car in Manila
when another car suddnenly and bumped his car. The other car escaped from
the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number. After
verifying with the LTO, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car is
Filcar. Espenias sent several letters to Filcar and to its President and General
Manager. On May 31, 2001, Espinas filed a complaint for damages against
Filcar and Carmen Flor before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and
demand that they pay actual damages sustained by his car.
Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and
bumped Espinas car, the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary and
further stated that when the incident happened, the car was being driven by
Atty. Flor’s personal driver, Timoteo Floresca. Filcar denied any liability to
Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence
since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Flor both
said that they always exercised the due diligence required of a good father of
a family in leasing and assigning their vehicles to third parties.
Issue:
Ruling:
Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the
motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in
relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-
employee relationship is not required. It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is
the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order that it
may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The main
127
Facts:
Ford Philippines drew and issued Citibank Check. No. SN 04867 on
October 19, 1977, Citibank Check No. SN 10597 on July 19, 1978 and Citibank
Check No. SN-16508 on April 20, 1979, all in favor of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) for payment of its percentage taxes. The checks were
crossed and deposited with the IBAA, now PCIB, BIR's authorized collecting
bank. The first check was cleared containing an indorsement that "all prior
indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed." The same, however,
was replaced with two (2) IBAA's managers' checks based on a call and letter
request made by Godofredo Rivera, Ford's General Ledger Accountant, on an
alleged error in the computation of the tax due without IBAA verifying the
authority of Rivera. These manager's checks were later deposited in another
bank and misappropriated by the syndicate. The last two checks were cleared
by the Citibank but failed to discover that the clearing stamps do not bear
any initials. The proceeds of the checks were also illegally diverted or
switched by officers of PCIB — members of the syndicate, who eventually
encashed them. Ford, which was compelled to pay anew the percentage
taxes, sued in two actions for collection against the two banks on January 20,
1983, barely six years from the date the first check was returned to the
drawer. The direct perpetrators of the crime are now fugitives from justice.
The decision of the lower courts are the following:
1st case:
(1) Trial Court: Citibank and IBAA were jointly and severally liable for the
checks (2) CA: only IBAA (PCIB) solely liable for the amount of the first check
2nd case:
(1) Trial Court: absolved PCIB from liability and held that only the Citibank is
liable for the checks issued by Ford
(2) Court of Appeals: held both banks liable for negligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees resulting in the erroneous encashment of
the checks.
Issue:
1. Whether the petitioner Ford had the right to recover from the collecting
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bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks
intended as payment to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue?
Ruling:
A. Citibank Check No. SN-04867
FORD
Ford, is guilty of the "imputed contributory negligence" that would defeat its
claim for reimbursement, bearing in mind that its employees, Godofredo
Rivera and Alexis Marindo, were among the members of the syndicate.
although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an
organized syndicate, in our view, their actions were not the proximate cause
of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Ford's negligence,
if any, could not be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the
parties.
IBAA/PCIB
As agent of the BIR (the payee of the check), defendant IBAA should
receive instructions only from its principal BIR and not from any other person
especially so when that person is not known to the defendant. It is very
imprudent on the part of the defendant IBAA to just rely on the alleged
telephone call of one (Godofredo Rivera and in his signature to the
authenticity of such signature considering that the plaintiff is not a client of
the defendant IBAA." The crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's
Account Only," is a warning that the check should be deposited only in the
account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to
ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's account only. Therefore, it is
the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to scrutinize the check and to
know its depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement "all prior
indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed". PCIBank is liable in
the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN-04867.
Citibank
None
B. Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508
PCIBank
Section 5 31 of Central Bank Circular No. 580, Series of 1977 provides
that any theft affecting items in transit for clearing, shall be for the account
of sending bank, which in this case is PCIBank.
Citibank
Citibank is negligent in the performance of its duties. Citibank failed to
establish that its payment of Ford's checks were made in due course and
legally in order. In its defense, Citibank claims the genuineness and due
execution of said checks, considering that Citibank (1) has no knowledge of
any infirmity in the issuance of the checks in question (2) coupled by the fact
that said checks were sufficiently funded and (3) the endorsement of the
Payee or lack thereof was guaranteed by PCIBank (formerly IBAA), thus, it has
the obligation to honor and pay the same. As the drawee bank breached its
contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability contributed to
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the damage caused to the latter. It failed to perform what was incumbent
upon it, which is to ensure that the amount of the checks should be paid only
to its designated payee.
Invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that
both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both were
negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the
encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 and 16508. Thus, we are
constrained to hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of said
checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR. Time and again, we have stressed
that banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and
confidence of the public in general is of paramount importance such that the
appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest,
degree of diligence. A bank's liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but
primary, wherein the defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees is of no moment. Banks handle daily
transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the
degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their
employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and
employees. Banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees.
The relationship between a holder of a commercial paper and the bank to
which it is sent for collection is that of a principal and an agent and the
diversion of the amount of the check is justified only by proof of authority
from the drawer; that in crossed checks, the collecting bank is bound to
scrutinize the check and know its depositors before clearing indorsement;
that as a general rule, banks are liable for wrongful or tortuous acts of its
agents within the scope and in the course of their employment; that failure of
the drawee bank to seasonably discover irregularity in the checks constitutes
negligence and renders the bank liable for loss of proceeds of the checks;
that an action upon a check prescribes in ten (10) years; and that the
contributory negligence of the drawer shall reduce the damages he may
recover against the collecting bank.
Since a master may be held for his servant's wrongful act, the law
imputes to the master the act of the servant, and if that act is negligent or
wrongful and proximately results in injury to a third person, the negligence or
wrongful conduct is the negligence or wrongful conduct of the master, for
which he is liable. The general rule is that if the master is injured by the
negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of
his own servant or agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior
and will defeat the superior's action against the third person, assuming, of
course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
of which complaint is made.
As a general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the
wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents within the
course and scope of their employment. A bank will be held liable for the
negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the course and scope
of their employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even
as regards that species of tort of which malice is an essential element. A bank
holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence will not be
permitted to profit by the frauds these officers or agents were enabled to
perpetrate in the apparent course of their employment; nor will it be
permitted to shirk its responsibility for such frauds, even though no benefit
may accrue to the bank therefrom. For the general rule is that a bank is liable
for the fraudulent acts or representations of an officer or agent acting within
130
The court also find that Ford is not completely blameless in its failure
to detect the fraud. Failure on the part of the depositor to examine its
passbook, statements of account, and cancelled checks and to give notice
within a reasonable time (or as required by statute) of any discrepancy which
it may in the exercise of due care and diligence find therein, serves to
mitigate the banks' liability by reducing the award of interest from twelve
percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. As provided in Article 1172 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability
may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. In quasi-
delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages
that he may recover.
Facts:
Respondents Pablito M. Castillo and Guia S. Castillo are spouses engaged a business
under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprises (Permanent
Light).
After conducting an inspection of Permanent Lights electric meter, the petitioner
Manila Electric Company (Meralco) concluded that the meter was tampered with and
electric supply to Permanent Light was immediately disconnected, without notice to
respondents, for one day. However, respondents used generators soon after the power
went out to keep the operations of Permanent Light on track. Subsequently, Meralco
assured respondents in a letter that Permanent Lights meter has been tested and was
found to be in order. In the same letter, petitioner informed respondents that said meter
was replaced anew after it sustained a crack during testing. However, respondents
requested for a replacement meter. According to them, the meters installed by Meralco
ran faster than the one it confiscated following the disconnection. Subsequently, Meralco
installed a new electric meter at the premises of Permanent Light.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to claim damages for petitioners act of
disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light.
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2. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to actual damages for the supposed
overbilling by petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from the time the new
electric meter was installed.
Ruling:
First Issue:
In Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company, the Court treated the immediate
disconnection of electricity without notice as a form of deprivation of property without
due process of law, which entitles the subscriber aggrieved to moral damages. In addition
to moral damages, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good. In this case, to serve as an example - that before disconnection of electric
supply can be effected by a public utility, the requisites of law must be complied with the
Court sustained the award of exemplary damages to respondents.
Second Issue:
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty. The award is dependent upon competent proof of the
damage suffered and the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on the evidence
presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy,
remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof. Nonetheless, in the absence of competent
proof on the amount of actual damages suffered, a party is entitled to temperate damages.
Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same
should be reasonable.
In this case, the Court is convinced that respondents sustained damages from the
abnormal increase in Permanent Lights electric bills after petitioner replaced the latters
meter. However, respondents failed to establish the exact amount thereof by competent
evidence. Thus, temperate damages is awarded.
Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA is affirmed
Facts:
and Resources for breach of contract and damages suffered due to the
disruption of their respective business operations. Universal forged an
Agreement with Obrero Pilipino. Thus, the strike which affected the business
operations of Universal and Marman ended. Universal and Tan then filed a
Notice of Dismissal as against the strikers Resources filed a Motion to
Dismiss. But the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Latter then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but it was still denied by the RTC.And later filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. The CA rendered a Decision which
set aside the Orders of the RTC and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
of action.The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA in its Resolution.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
To whom may negligence over the fire that broke out on board M/V
"Superferry 3" be imputed?
Ruling:
Facts:
Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
General Santos City, one Armando Tenerife (Tenerife) was driving his Toyota Corolla
sedan on the National Highway heading in the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato.
Tenerife noticed the van owned by petitioner Paulita Edith Serra (petitioner) coming from
the opposite direction, which was trying to overtake a passenger jeep, and in the process
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encroached on his lane. The left side of the sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan to
swerve to the left and end up on the other side of the road. The van collided head on with
the motorcycle, which was about 12 meters behind the sedan on the outer lane, causing
injuries to Mumar, which eventually led to his death.
On the other hand, petitioner denied that her van was overtaking the jeepney at
the time of the incident. She claimed that the left tire of Tenerifes sedan burst, causing it
to sideswipe her van. Consequently, the left front tire of the van also burst and the van’s
driver, Marciano de Castro (de Castro), lost control of the vehicle. The van swerved to the
left towards Mumars motorcycle. The impact resulted in the death of Mumar.
Issue:
Whether or not both the lower court and the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in holding Editha Serra as liable for damages and
in not appreciating that she was not negligent in the selection and
supervision of the driver of the van, Marciano de Castro
Ruling:
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to
exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or
supervision of its employees. The liability of the employer is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Moreover,
under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, if the causative factor was the drivers
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if
he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence.Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence
required in supervising her driver in order to prevent the accident. She
admitted that de Castro had only been her driver for one year and she had no
knowledge of his driving experience or record of previous accidents. She also
admitted that it was de Castro who maintained the vehicle and would even
remind her to pay the installment of the car. Petitioner also admitted that, at
the time of the accident, she did not know what was happening and only
knew they bumped into another vehicle when the driver shouted. She then
closed her eyes and a moment later felt something heavy fall on the roof of
the car. When the vehicle stopped, petitioner left the scene purportedly to
ask help from her brother, leaving the other passengers to come to the aid of
her injured driver.
135
Facts:
On May 16, 1995, Pleyto tried to overtake Esguerra’s tricycle but hit it instead.
Pleyto then swerved into the left opposite lane. Coming down the lane, a car driven by
Arnulfo Asuncion with his passengers, Rhino, Ricardo Lomboy and her
daughter Carmela Lomboy. The bus driven by Pleyto smashed head-on the car driven by
Asuncion, killing Arnulfo and Ricardo instantly. Carmela and Rhino suffered injuries, but
only Carmela required hospitalization. On November 29, 1995, Maria and Carmela
Lomboy filed an action for damages against PRBL and its driver, Pleyto, with the RTC of
136
Dagupan City. The Lomboys prayed that they be indemnified for the untimely death of
Ricardo Lomboy, his lost earnings, the medical and hospitalization expenses of Carmela,
and moral damages. RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
ordering the defendants to pay solidarily Maria and Carmela. The RTC also found Pleyto
negligent and lacking in precaution. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, with
modification in award for actual damages from P59,000.00 to P39,550.00 for funeral and
religious services and for medical expenses of Carmela Lomboy from P52,000.00 to
P27,000.00; and the award for loss of earning capacity is accordingly corrected from
P1,642,521.00 to P1,152,000.00
Issue:
Ruling:
damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. Its award is aimed
at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Under the circumstances of
this case, an award of P100,000 to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy would be
justified and in keeping with the purpose of the law and jurisprudence in
allowing moral damages. The indemnification award of P50,000 is
also sustained.
Facts:
138
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue in Quezon City, was hit by
a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano was thrown five meters away, while the
vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the point of impact. Gerard Villaspin, one of Sorianos
companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but after checking out the scene of the
incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to flee. A school bus brought Soriano to East Avenue Medical
Center where he later died. Subsequently, the Quezon City Prosecutor recommended the filing of a criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide against Macasasa. RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner,
while CA reversed the findings of the RTC.
Issues:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case, if so, was there sufficient legal basis to award
damages?
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City possessed and properly
exercised jurisdiction over the case. Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691, read together with Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is the authority for this ruling. Applicable
provision is read as follows: “The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Petitioner was presumed negligent in selecting and supervising the driver. The records show that
Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to
maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives. Both the trial and the appellate courts found Macasasa
overspeeding. The records show also that Soriano was thrown five meters away after he was hit. Moreover,
the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of impact. Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver,
did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry.
Contrary to petitioners claim, there is no showing of any factual basis that Macasasa fled for fear of the
peoples wrath. What remains undisputed is that he did not report the accident to a police officer, nor did he
summon a doctor. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations. However, respondent is also
guilty of contributory negligence.
Facts:
Sgt. Rodrigo Almazan and Giovanni Gumalo, both of the Office of the
Resident Ombudsman for Manila International Airport Authority-Ninoy Aquino
International Airport/Duty Free Phils., Inc. filed a complaint against Simon
Añonuevo, Jr., Acting Examiner, Vicente Estrella, Customs Operations Officer I,
Nora Linda Cosme, Customs Operations Officer V, and Ricardo Concha, Acting
Principal Customs Appraiser, all of the Bureau of Customs, NAIA, Pasay City
for violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713.
The respondents alleged that the petitioners while assigned at the NAIA
customs lanes numbers 9 and 10, received money handed directly or inserted
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The Ombudsman placed the four officials under preventive suspension for
six (6) months without pay, [2] considering that the evidence against them
was strong.
Cosme pointed out that there was nothing in the video footage which
would implicate her for any act of solicitation or acceptance of any money,
whether directly or indirectly, while in the course of the performance of her
duties. In the same way, Concha asserted that it was grossly malicious for the
complainants to infer that, just because he was caught by the camera
passing by the place where petitioners were standing, he received money
from them.
The Ombudsman held that respondents Añonuevo, Jr. and Estrella were
guilty as charged and Cosme as not guilty.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in rendering
the assailed Decision. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case for
failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issues:
In the case at bar, although the petition filed before the Court of Appeals
was not accompanied by an affidavit of service, petitioners were able to
confirm that indeed copies of the petition were served on the respondents as
shown in the registry receipts attached opposite their names. They attached
the certified true copies of the Decision and Order of the Ombudsman when
they filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dismissing their
petition.
This Court is not a trier of facts. Findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive, as in
the case at bar. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, suffices to hold one administratively liable. The
“substantial evidence” rule in administrative proceedings merely requires
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
Alfredo Mallari, Sr. and Alfredo Mallari, Jr., petitioners vs. Court of
Appeals and Bulletin Publishing Corporation, respondents
[G.R. No. 128607. January 31, 2000]
Facts:
lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of respondent BULLETIN
coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The
sketch of the accident showed that the collision occurred after Mallari Jr.
overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The points of
collision were the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front
side of the delivery van of BULLETIN. The two (2) right wheels of the delivery
van were on the right shoulder of the road and pieces of debris from the
accident were found scattered along the shoulder of the road up to a certain
portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. The impact caused
the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its
passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the
gravity of his injuries.
The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van, considering
the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles
hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by
Alfredo Mallari Jr. Hence, the trial court ordered BULLETIN and Felix Angeles to
pay jointly and severally Claudia G. Reyes, widow of the deceased victim.
On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court
and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and consequently of his
employer, respondent BULLETIN. Instead, the appellate court ruled that the
collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.
who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a
curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and
that he had seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. The
Court of Appeals ordered petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. to compensate
Claudia G. Reyes.
Issue:
WON petitioners are correctly held jointly and severally liable to Claudia
G. Reyes.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals correctly found, based on the sketch and spots
report of the police authorities which were not disputed by petitioners, that
the collision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a
vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. This act of
overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to
see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
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In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already
saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction
and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock
in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2)
vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause
of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the
jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney,
petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in
a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of
the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court,
petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal
presumption.
Facts:
Petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against
respondent Morales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old
student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and
Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as
sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The
gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with
Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be
going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the
caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by
the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to
return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the
bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however,
was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of
“accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for
homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their
evidence in the instant case.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. Morales is civilly liable. Clearly, Morales did not exercise the
degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much
less the bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a
customer of the gun store for repair.
This case for damages arouse out of the accidental shooting of Alfred.
Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code petitioners may enforce their claim
for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under
Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action
for damages under the Civil Code.
He was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded.
For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, Morales himself was
negligent.
144
In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a
vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, Morales should have
made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident.
Indeed, Morales should never accept a firearm from another person,
until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that
the weapon is completely unloaded.
145
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi,
through an intestate court, two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan
Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz
filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent
to the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the
administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the
buildings he constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself
as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the
tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of
inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby
violating his leasehold rights over it.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs
of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in
dire need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied
interfering with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease
contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject
lots.
The petitioner then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun vs. Court of Appeals , laid down the
elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of
a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal
justification or excuse.
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge
on the part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the
subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action
for tortuous interference. A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable
for interfering with a contract he is unaware of. While it is not necessary to
prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if
followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the
contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract. In this case,
petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers
(the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any
existing lease contract.
In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner
liable for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to
answer for private respondents losses. This case is one of damnun absque
147
injuria or damage without injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right
while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.
Facts:
As presented previously.
Issue:
Ruling:
By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
qualifications in the hospital directory, the hospital created the impression
that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services
for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them,
accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were being rendered
by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants.
PSI has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all
patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. It is liable for the
148
The Court CONFIRMED the rulings of the Court of Appeals that a hospital
has the duty of supervising the competence of the doctors on its
staff. No reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat
superior.
Facts:
The PSI filed a second motion for reconsideration urging referral thereof
to the Court en banc and seeking modification of the decision dated January
31, 2007 and resolution dated February 11, 2008 which affirmed its vicarious
and direct liability for damages to respondents Enrique Agana and the heirs
of Natividad Agana (Aganas).
Issue:
Whether or not PSI may be held liable for the negligence of physicians-
consultants allowed to practice in its premises.
Ruling:
YES. The Court holds that PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the
principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment
relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible
agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the
principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a
hospital.
PSI is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil as its ostensible
agent. It assumed a duty to "tread on" the "captain of the ship" role of any
doctor rendering services within its premises for purpose of ensuring the
safety of the patients availing themselves of its services and facilities. Thus,
PSI could not simply wave off the problem and nonchalantly delegate to Dr.
Ampil the duty to review what transpired during the operation.
The wretchedness in this case could have been avoided had PSI simply
done what was logical: heed the report of a guaze count discrepancy, initiate
a review of what went wrong and take corrective measures to ensure the
safety of Nativad. PSI committed corporate negligence by its inaction. As
hospital corporation, it gave rise to a direct liability to the Aganas distinct
from that of Dr. Ampil.
Facts:
BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps. Mamaril
directly deal with AIB with respect to the manner by which the parked
vehicles would be handled, but the parking ticket itself expressly stated that
the "Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its
accessories or article left therein." It also claimed that Sps. Mamaril
erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. Apart from not being
parties thereto, its provisions cover only the protection of BSP's properties, its
officers, and employees.
Issue:
Whether BSP should be held liable for the loss of their vehicle based on
the Guard Service Contract and the parking ticket it issued.
Ruling:
151
No. The petition is without merit. In this case, it is undisputed that the
proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril’s vehicle was the negligent act of
security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive
out the subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the result
would not have occurred. Moreover, Peña and Gaddi failed to refute Sps.
Mamaril’s contention that they readily admitted being at fault during the
investigation that ensued. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no reversible error was
committed by the CA in absolving it from any liability for the loss of the
subject vehicle based on fault or negligence.