G.R. No.
180284, September 11, 2013 hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled out the form
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against
Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-
AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years
old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and
hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child
from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and
friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner
refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as
well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described
respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went
to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on petitioner’s
jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima de Guzman.
Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said
police officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges against respondent’s
brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent introduced
herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner
denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine
altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s
chicanery and deceit designed to “scandalize” him in exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived
his right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based on respondent’s
evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his “kumadre” Felicisima de Guzman at
Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already
a widower and he has no more companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned
that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision (petitioner offered her
a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single
mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that
he will take care of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought
that she and her child will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave
her money for her child. When she became pregnant with petitioner’s child, it was only then she learned
that he is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he wanted
to have another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed with a
housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28, 1994 at
the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the
for the child’s birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also
petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son
at his advanced age who is his “look-alike,” and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace
Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the baby’s
birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter and eventually
his wife was also informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt
the baby and just give respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner
stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help of relatives
and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by
Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their
meeting with petitioner. However, it was only petitioner’s wife who showed up and she was very mad,
uttering unsavory words against respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his
weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery of
respondent’s baby, respondent’s attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for
which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioner’s wife at
the headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS
for the child Christian Paulo through the mother;
2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation
expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case without affording him the
right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the
putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. The appellate court found no
reason to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for postponement
on April 17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of defendant’s evidence, and the
motion for reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for postponement and submitting the
case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent satisfactorily established
the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was committed by the trial
court in granting respondent’s prayer for support. The appellate court thus
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in the civil registry which
bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiff’s evidence, however, that during her pregnancy, Annabelle was
provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN, October 6,
1995, p. 18). Narciso provided her with a household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month (TSN,
October 6, 1995, ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18).
Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the latter was in labor, “walking” her around and
massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after
Annabelle’s discharge from the hospital. People living in the same apartment units were witnesses to
Narciso’s delight to father a son at his age which was his “look alike”. It was only after the 18th day when
Annabelle refused to give him Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner of the
apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record. Narciso did not present any evidence,
verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiff’s evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme Court
made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said
legal provision provides that the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child x x “3) when
the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father”.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that–
“The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other cases
in the preceding paragraphs. ‘Any other evidence or proof’ that the defendant is the father is broad
enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the
action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first three
paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.”
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of defendant Narciso Salas, he
is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).
It “shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance x x.” (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONER
WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IN
UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT
CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FILIATION OF
CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION
TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the
plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an
action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to
file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant must be
residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the Answer itself and no prior
motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before the 1997
amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed.
Otherwise, it will be deemed waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioner’s objection on venue is
therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the resetting of the initial
presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first time petitioner’s
motion for postponement was denied by the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondent’s last witness on November
29, 1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of hearing for the reception of
evidence for the defendant (petitioner) on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order
dated December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence at those hearing dates
earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala,
requested for the cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give him time to
prepare for his defense, which request was granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to
March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without
objection from respondent’s counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing to
March 14 and 17, 1997. With the non-appearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997,
the trial court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a waiver of their right
to present evidence and accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision.16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his
appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of appearance, Atty.
Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and
magnanimity of the trial court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Bala’s failure to appear for the
initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its March 14, 1997 Order,
finding it better to give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa
received a notice of hearing for the presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997. On
August 29, 1997, the trial court received his motion requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October
10, 1997 for the reason that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another case which was
incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing
to October 10, 1997. On said date, however, the hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On
February 16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear whether
Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court received on April 16,
1998 an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason given by the latter was the
scheduled hearing on the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8,
1998 Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 1946. But as clearly
stated in the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of the hearing and it
behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he had a previous commitment considering that
the April 17, 1998 hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998. Acting on the motion for
postponement, the trial court denied for the second time petitioner’s motion for postponement. Even at
the hearing of their motion for reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty.
Villarosa failed to appear and instead filed another motion for postponement. The trial court thus ordered
that the case be submitted for decision stressing that the case had long been pending and that petitioner
and his counsel have been given opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a second
motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing thereof on
December 4, 1998.18

A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their
motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.19 Indeed, an order
declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the
trial court’s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the
part of one party.20
Atty. Villarosa’s plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view of his own negligence
in failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As we held in Tiomico v. Court of
Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is evidence of bad faith, malice
or inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to
take note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict in his schedules of
trial or court appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should be borne in mind that a client is
bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion for
postponement filed by petitioner’s counsel, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his day in
court must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. Where a party was afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the
constitutional guarantee.23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that
respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of
petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit “A-1”) of Christian Paulo Salas in which
the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only
respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner
who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of
the certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.26 Neither can such birth
certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no probative value to establish
filiation to the alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit “B”) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the
father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can
only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.30
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and
photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to
prove paternity.31 Exhibits “E” and “F”32 showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment
unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit “C”) from the Good
Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent
to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that
he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits “D” to “D-13”) of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of
admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they
do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by
the parent concerned.35
Petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In the said case, the
handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the father of private respondent’s
daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence which
established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondent’s
daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37the Court sustained the appellate court’s
finding that private respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner was
overwhelming, particularly the latter’s public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondent’s mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts and words, her testimonial
evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that
respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and continuous possession of
status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to
establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that
petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo,
petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to her at
the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial” presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate court’s ruling
anchored on the following factual findings by the appellate court which was quoted at length in
the ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and
Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN,
p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by
Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of “Ilano” since birth without any objection on the part of Artemio, the
fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her
“Daddy” (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic)
(id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his child — bringing home goodies, candies, toys and
whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-
39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by
Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh. “E-7” where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need
for a “frog test” to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the
form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. “E-2” and “E-3”,
and “D-6”), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check
as the Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. “G”) and the signature appearing therein
which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio
would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and
Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19,
10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio has shown concern
as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial
School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. “H”) for the fourth and fifth grading
period(s) (Exh. “H-1” and “H-2”) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio [were]
both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. “H-1” and “H-2” at their
residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28,
10/1/73). x x x.
x x x   x x x   x x x
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture
with the following dedication: “To Nene, with best regards, Temiong”. (Exh. “I”). (pp. 19-20,
Appellant’s Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth
that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not
appellee’s daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of
paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to
petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant
to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established
by clear and convincing evidence.40
41
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion  filed by petitioner’s counsel informing this Court that
petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred
under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative father is not a
bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.43 The rule on
substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail
to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006
and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212171, September 07, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MERCURY DELA CRUZ ALIAS
"DEDAY," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
We resolve the appeal, filed by accused-appellant Mercury Dela Cruz alias "Deday," from the 27
September 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01103. 
In a Decision2 dated 27 November 2008, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, found
the accused-appellant guilty of illegal sale of shabu under Sections 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 91653 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Alejandro Batobalanos,
Police Officer (PO) 1 Angsgar Babyboy A. Reales, and PO1 Leopoldo Bullido who conducted the buy-
bust operation against the accused-appellant, and rejected the self-serving defenses of denial and alibi of
accused-appellant and her live-in partner. The RTC noted that the categorical affirmation of accused-
appellant and her live-in partner that the arresting officers did not demand anything from them in
exchange for the accused-appellant's liberty created the presumption that the arresting officers were
performing their official functions regularly.4
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC's ruling. The CA agreed with the
RTC in giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and held that the arresting officers
complied with the proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs.
Our Ruling
We dismiss the appeal and affirm the accused-appellant's guilt.
We find no reason to reverse the RTC's findings, as affirmed by the CA. In the same manner as the lower
courts, we give full credit to the positive, spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the police
officers pointing to accused-appellant as the seller and possessor of the confiscated shabu.
We have consistently held that in order to secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is
necessary that the prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.5 Here, all the aforesaid elements necessary for accused-appellant's prosecution have been
sufficiently complied with, indubitably establishing that she has indeed committed the crime. PO1 Reales
testified in detail how he was introduced by the confidential informant to accused-appellant. The
confidential informant, thereafter, manifested to the accused-appellant their intention to buy worth
P200.00. Upon giving the accused-appellant the 2 marked P100.00 bills, she, in return, handed to PO1
Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline substance. The plastic sachet later on tested positive
for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The testimony given by PO1 Reales was
corroborated by SPO1 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido in all material details. It is therefore clear beyond
any shadow of doubt that the buy-bust operation had been substantially completed and consummated.
The fact that accused-appellant was able to evade the arrest immediately after the sale and that she was
arrested only after, by virtue of a warrant of arrest, did not change the fact that the crime she committed
earlier had been consummated.
We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of any intent or ill-motive on the part of the police
officers to falsely impute commission of a crime against the accused-appellant, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty is entitled to great respect and deserves to prevail over the
bare, uncorroborated denial and self-serving claim of the accused of frame-up.6
Also, we reject the appellant's contention that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165,7 which provides for the procedure in the custody and
disposition of seized drugs.
After a careful perusal of the records, we agree with the CA that the prosecution had established the
unbroken chain of custody over the seized drugs. This was established through the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, to wit: "At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3
Batobalonos, PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and their civilian asset proceeded to Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St.,
Barangay Labangon. When the team went inside the interior portion of Sitio Cogon, PO1 Reales
together with the civilian asset approached the house of Dela Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1
Bullido were strategically hidden more or less ten (10) meters away. The civilian asset called Dela Cruz
and told her that they will buy shabu worth P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz handed PO1 Reales a small
plastic containing white crystalline substance and in exchange he handed to the former the P200.00
bills. Upon getting hold of the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido, who saw the consummation of
the transaction rushed to the scene. When PO3 Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter shouted for
help and resisted arrest. Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased her, however, her neighbor
Arthur Tabasa Ortega ("Ortega") blocked their way. The team introduced themselves as policemen but
Ortega did not listen, so PO3 Batobalonos fired a warning shot as the people likewise started to gather
around them. Meanwhile, Dela Cruz was able to evade arrest. The team then arrested Ortega for
obstruction of justice.
On their way to the police station aboard their patrol car, PO1 Reales handed to PO3 Batobalonos the
small plastic containing white crystalline substance which he purchased from Dela Cruz. Thereafter,
upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Batobalonos marked the seized item with "DDM 11/10/06."
Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory Examination of the seized item was prepared by PO3 Batobalonos.
The Request and the seized item were delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office-7, Camp Sotero
Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City by PO1 Reales at around 1:10 o'clock in the morning of
November 11, 2006.
Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry Report No. D-1771-2006,"8 with the finding
that the specimen gave positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine hydrochloride.9
The confiscated dangerous drug which also constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime was validly
considered by the courts in arriving at the decision despite the fact that the forensic chemist who
examined it did not testify in court. The relevant portion of the RTC decision reads:
The presentation of the testimony of Forensic chemist PSI MUTCHIT G. SALINAS was dispensed
with, the defense having ADMITTED: the existence of the Letter Request dated November 10, 2006
from the PNP Station 10; the existence of one (1) small plastic pack containing white crystalline
substance which is the subject for examination, however DENIED as to the ownership of said evidence;
the existence and due execution of the Chemistry Report No. D-1771-2006 executed by witness Mutchit
G. Salinas; that the intended witness is and expert witness who examined the specimen found to contain
the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride locally known as shabu, a dangerous drug.10
Anent accused-appellant's contention that the drugs were marked not at the place where she was
apprehended but at the police station and that there was no physical inventory made on the seized item
nor was it photographed, we find the same untenable. The alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution's case because the apprehending team properly preserved
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs.11
Relevant to the instant case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized
dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.]

The last part of the aforequoted issuance provided the exception to the strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect
chain of custody in the handling of evidence, "substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the
handling of the seized item" is sufficient.12This Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting
officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such
procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence.13 What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.14 In other words, to
be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the
whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting
officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their
composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No.
9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.15

In the instant case, the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was
satisfactorily explained by the apprehending officers. They testified that a commotion erupted when
accused-appellant resisted and shouted for help while she was being arrested. The commotion eventually
gave accused-appellant the opportunity to run and elude arrest. The arresting officers further alleged that
the people who gathered around them were already aggressive prompting them to decide to immediately
proceed to the police station for their safety.16 In fact, the arresting officers even had to fire a warning
shot and arrest Arthur Tabasa Ortega, the person who intervened in the arrest of accused-appellant, in
order for them to pacify the people around them.

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith,
ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of
showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of G.R. No. 230228, December 13, 2017
regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly
discharged their duties.17 Accused-appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL DELA ROSA Y LUMANOG @
ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve
"MANNY", Accused-Appellant.
full faith and credit.18 In fact, accused-appellant did not even question the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. She simply anchored her defense on denial and alibi.
DECISION
We affirm the penalties imposed as they are well within the ranges provided by law. Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment to death19 and a fine ranging from GESMUNDO, J.:
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 for the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity or purity
involved.
On appeal is the Decision,1 dated August 12, 2016, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
06607, which affirmed the Decision2 dated November 19, 2013, of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 27 September 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 39 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. CR-09-9515 finding accused-appellant
No. 01103 is hereby AFFIRMED. Manuel dela Rosa y Lumanog (accused-appellant) guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165. 
SO ORDERED.
In an Information,3 dated May 3, 2009, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of illegal sale of
marijuana weighing 0.682 gram. On July 22, 2009, he was arraigned and he pleaded "not
guilty."4 Thereafter, trial ensued. 

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented IO1 Noe Briguel (IO1 Briguel), PCI Rhea Fe Dela Cruz Alviar (PCI Alviar)
and IO1 Ed Bryan Echavaria (IO1 Echavaria) as its witnesses. Their combined testimonies tended to
establish the following: 
On March 28, 2009, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, a confidential informant reported to PCI The RTC Ruling
Marijane Ojastro (PCI Ojastro) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Regional Office IV-B
(PDEA IV-B Office) located at Filipiniana Complex, Calapan City, that accused-appellant was selling
In a decision, dated November 19, 2013, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable of
marijuana at White Beach, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The informant said that he could introduce
the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced
an agent to accused-appellant as a buyer of marijuana. 
accused appellant to the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

Based on the said information, PCI Ojastro directed the conduct of a buy-bust operation against accused-
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the buyer, the seller, the object and
appellant with IO1 Mary Grace Cortez as the team leader. IO1 Briguel was designated as poseur-buyer
the consideration in the illegal sale of the marijuana. It also held that the delivery of the said drug by
using a P200.00 bill bearing serial numbers EC235898 and a P100.00 bill bearing serial numbers
accused-appellant and the payment thereof by IO1 Briguel during the buy-bust operation were duly
QC609916, which were marked with "NSB."5 IO1 John Rick Jabano (IO1 Jabano) and IO1 Echavaria
established. The RTC further ruled that it was reasonable for the PDEA to conduct the inventory of the
were assigned as arresting officers. A Pre-Operation Report6 was prepared. 
seized item at their office in Calapan, Mindoro to prevent a commotion at the place of the arrest. 

The team left for Puerto Galera at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of March 29, 2009 and they stayed
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA arguing in his Brief for the Accused-
for a while in Sabang. IO1 Briguel, however, testified that they arrived at Puerto Galera on March 30,
Appellant10 that: the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent because IO1 Briguel
2009. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, IO1 Briguel and the informant proceeded to the
testified that the buy-bust was conducted on March 30, 2009, while IO1 Echavaria testified that it was
Island Tattoo shop while the other operatives positioned themselves in the area. 
conducted on March 29, 2009; that the sinumpaang salaysay of IO1 Briguel, IO1 Echavaria and IO1
Jabano alleged that the buy-bust was conducted on March 30, 2009; that the integrity and evidentiary
Arriving thereat, the informant introduced IO1 Briguel to accused-appellant. IO1 Briguel asked accused- value of the confiscated item was not secured because it was merely wrapped in a banana leaf and it was
appellant, a tattoo artist, to put a henna tattoo on his right shoulder. As accused-appellant was doing the not placed in an envelope or evidence bag; that there was an inconsistency as to who received the
tattoo, IO1 Briguel asked him: "Manny, pwede bang umiskor?" to which he replied: "Meron." IO1 confiscated drug at the crime laboratory; and that the crime laboratory was not secured at the time of the
Briguel told accused-appellant that he was going to buy P300.00 worth of drugs, and handed the marked examination because any personnel and policemen could enter the premises and even sleep there. 
money to accused-appellant, who, in turn, handed to IO1 Briguel folded dried banana leaves containing
suspected dried marijuana leaves. Thus, IO1 Briguel made the pre-arranged signal of removing the
In their Brief for the Appellee,11 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that all the elements
handkerchief wrapped around his head. Immediately, IO1 Jabano and IO1 Echavaria arrived and arrested
of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were established; that the confiscated drug was properly
accused-appellant. IO1 Briguel frisked him and the marked money was recovered from him. 
inventoried in the presence of accused-appellant, media representative, and an elected official; that the
custody of the drug was duly accounted for; and that accused-appellant failed to refute the evidence
Subsequently, accused-appellant was boarded into the service vehicle of the PDEA to avoid any against him. 
commotion at the shop. While inside the vehicle, IO1 Briguel marked the seized marijuana with his
initials and the date of the arrest. He then testified that he placed the suspect dried marijuana leaves in his
The CA Ruling
pocket. 

In its decision, dated August 12, 2016, the CA dismissed the appeal. It held that the RTC correctly ruled
The team then proceeded back to the PDEA IV-B Office at Calapan City, which was 54 kilometers away
that all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were duly proven. Likewise, the CA
from Puerto Galera. There, IO1 Briguel conducted the Inventory,7 which was witnessed by Barangay
held that full faith and credence must be given to the testimonies of the PDEA agents pursuant to the
Chairperson Anacleto Vergara (Brgy. Captain Vergara) and media representative Dennis Nebrejo
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty. It observed that the buy-bust actually
(Nebrejo). Photographs were likewise taken during the marking and inventory of the seized item. 
happened on March 29, 2009 based on the evidentiary documents of the prosecution. 

IOI Briguel then brought the suspected marijuana and the Request for Laboratory Examination8 to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Regional Office in Camp Efigenio C. Navarro,
Calapan City for forensic examination. Based on Chemistry Report No. D-010-099 prepared by
PCI..Alviar, the specimen weighed 0.682 gram and it tested positive for marijuana.
Version of the Defense
Further, the CA highlighted that the prosecution was able to prove that there was substantial compliance
with the chain of custody rule. It stated that the drug was marked by IO1 Briguel; that he also prepared
the inventory and PCI Ojastro prepared the request for laboratory examination; that the marked item was
delivered by IO1 Briguel to the crime laboratory; that it tested positive for marijuana; and that the same
marked item was presented in court. The CA concluded that there was no compromise in the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized drug. 

The defense presented accused-appellant as its sole witness. He testified that on the date of the said Hence, this appeal. 
arrest, he was inside his tattoo shop, located beside a bar and restaurant at White Beach, Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro. While accused-appellant was attending to several customers, a man suddenly
Issue
approached him and asked if he was Manny. When he replied in the affirmative, the said man asked him
to go with him. When accused-appellant refused, the man pulled out a .45 caliber pistol from his waist
and threatened him that he would make a scene at his shop. Reluctantly, accused-appellant accompanied WHETHER THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
the man to a van parked away from his shop. While inside the van, the man handcuffed accused-appellant PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 
and brought him to the PDEA IV B Office. For unknown reasons, accused-appellant was incarcerated
therein for a month before a case was filed against him. He presupposed that he was arrested and
In a Resolution,12 dated July 12, 2017, the Court required the parties to submit their respective
detained because he was associated with a certain Cris Pelino, who was also arrested earlier due to drug
supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief),13 dated
related charges. 
 August 24, 2017, the OSG manifested it will no longer file a supplemental brief considering that its Brief
   
for the Appellee had already amply discussed the assigned errors. In his Manifestation (In Lieu of a
Supplemental Brief),14 dated September 15, 2017, accused-appellant stated that he will no longer file a
supplemental brief since no new issue material to the case that were not elaborated upon in his appellant's   xxx
brief were discovered. 
   

The Court's Ruling Q:  So tell us in that early morning of March 30, how did you proceed to Puerto Galera?

The appeal has merit.  A: We proceeded to Puerto Galera on board our service the Toyota Revo ma'am.16 (emphases
supplied) 
There are inconsistent dates
when the alleged transaction  It is clear from the testimony of IO1 Briguel that they met their confidential informant in the PDEA
took place office on March 28, 2009. Then, on March 29, 2009, the buy-bust team had a briefing regarding the
operation and it was then that they prepared the pre-operation report. Finally, on March 30, 2009, the
The essential elements that have to be duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving team proceeded to Puerto Galera for the buy-bust operation. The said testimony reflects the statements in
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, the IO1 Briguel's Sinumpaang Salaysay,17 dated April 1, 2009. Likewise, the said dates are reflected in
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.  the Magkasanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay,18 similarly dated April 1, 2009, of IO1 Jabano and IO1
Echavaria. 
Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the
seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the Later, on September 7, 2010, IOI Briguel retracted his statement and, instead, insisted that the buy-bust
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the  corpus delicti.15 operation occurred on March 29, 2009 based on his Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay,19 to wit: 

In this case, the Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution witnesses presented My question now, Mr. Witness, why did you have to execute a Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay
inconsistent dates regarding the occurrence of the alleged drug transaction. On March 3, 2010, IO1 Q: 
when you have already executed a sworn statement with respect to this case? 
Briguel, the poseur-buyer, testified in his direct examination as follows: 
When we filed the case we found out that what is written during the operation was March 30. The
A:
date of operation was March 29. 
Q:  Now, tell us Mr. Witness prior to the conduct of the operation what did your office receive in
connection with the same, if any? 
   
A: On March 28, 2009 one of our confidential informants went to our office and talked to our OIC
Q:  Now, what was the date indicated in all other documents aside from your Sinumpaang Salaysay?
Marijane T. Ojastro and informed her that he knew of somebody selling illegal drugs.
A: Not all, ma'm. 
   
   
xxx
So, you are telling us that the correct date of your operation was March 29, 2009 but what you have
   
Q:  indicated in your Sinumpaang Salaysay is March 30 as the date of your operation. Now my
question is, in what other documents did this March 30, 2009 appeared?
Q:  After you have already formed the team, you as the poseur buyer, IO1Jabano and IO1Echavaria as
arresting officers and Mary Grace Cortez the team leader, what did you agree on in connection with
A: In the laboratory result wherein March 29 was indicated. 
[sic] effecting the operation?
   
A: We set the date on within which we should be proceeding to Puerto Galera to proceed with our
operation and we agreed that we should go to the said place on March 30. 
So you are telling us that it is only in your original initial Sinumpaang Salaysay that March 30 was
Q:
indicated?
   
A:   Yes, ma'm, and the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the two (2) arresting officers.20
Q:  Before going to that place on March 30 what preparations did you make if any? 

A: Prior to that date and if I am not mistaken that was on March 29 we had a briefing regarding the
The Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay  of IOI Briguel, however, contains questionable circumstances.
operation and we also prepared the pre-operational report ma'am. 
The said document was simply dated April 2009 without indicating the exact day of execution. It was
also notarized on April 2, 2009. Assuming arguendo that the said Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay was notarized on April 2, 2009, then it is dubious as to why IO1 Briguel did not mention the shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided; that the
said document at all when he initially testified on March 3, 2010. It was only on September 7, 2010 that physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
IO1 Briguel suddenly remembered that he executed such crucial affidavit. The only plausible explanation at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
is that the incomplete affidavit did not exist as of March 3, 2010.  practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
The Court is of the view that the Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay was only executed as a mere
seizures of and custody over said items; 
afterthought to conceal the inconsistent dates of the buy-bust operation. indicated in IO1 Briguel's
testimony on March 3, 2010, his Sinumpaang Salaysay  dated April 1, 2009, and the Magkasanib na
Sinumpaang Salaysay, similarly dated April 1, 2009, of IO1 Jabano and IO1 Echavaria. Accordingly, Based on the foregoing, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
there is doubt as to the actual date of the buy-bust operation; whether it was done on March 29 or March confiscation, to immediately conduct a physically inventory; and photograph the same in the presence
30, 2009.  of (1) the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
Glaringly, the OSG neither addressed nor explained the discrepancy of these dates. Further, the
thereof.23
prosecution was remiss of its duty because it did not immediately act to rectify its mistake. It was only on
September 7, 2010, when IO1 Briguel testified, that the prosecution attempted to explain the inconsistent
dates, which existed as early as April 1, 2009. The prosecution, however, chose to rely on In addition, Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the physical Inventory and photograph
the Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of IO1 Briguel, which contained doubtful dates of execution and shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
notarization.  or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures. It further states that non-compliance with these requirements shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over the confiscated items provided that such non-compliance
The chain of custody rule
were under justifiable grounds and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.24
Aside from the inconsistent dates of the conduct of the buy-bust operation, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to sufficiently comply with the chain of custody rule. In prosecuting both illegal sale
Interestingly, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was amended recently by R.A. No. 10640, which became
of dangerous drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the identity of said drugs. The
effective on July 15, 2014, and it essentially added the provisions contained in the IRR with a few
identity of the dangerous drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
modifications, to wit: 
elements of sale are present, the fact that the dangerous drug illegally sold is the same drug offered in
court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict.21 (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:
disposition.22
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
As the means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165 officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items. 
specifies that: 
Notably, in the amendment of R.A. No. 10640, the apprehending team is now required to conduct a
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after physical inventory. of the seized items and photograph the same in (1) the presence of the accused or
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.  thereof. In the present case, as the alleged crime was committed on March 29, 2009, then the provisions
of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR shall apply. 
Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 complements Section
21 (1) of RA No. 9165, to wit: 
The apprehending team did not comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its
IRR 
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a The records of the case show that the physical inventory of the confiscated drug and the photographs of
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any "elected public official who the same where only done in the presence of the accused-appellant, Brgy. Captain Vergara and media
 representative Nebrejo. Clearly, a representative of the DOJ, as required by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
inventory when you travelled back 54 kilometers away to Calapan, is it not correct? 
was not present during the inventory of the seized item. 
A: Yes, sir.27(emphasis supplied) 
More importantly, the apprehending team did not immediately conduct the physical inventory and the
taking of the photographs at the time the suspected drug was confiscated or at the nearest police station.
Instead, they travelled fifty four (54) kilometers from Puerto Galera, the place of the seizure, to Calapan In the same manner, IO1 Echavaria testified on the subject matter as follows: 
City before they conducted the inventory of the seized drug. 

Q: Now, since you were there already in the early morning of that date, can you please tell the
The prosecution failed to provide a justifiable ground for the non-compliance of Section 21 of R.A. No. Honorable Court whether or not you coordinate with any member of the media or barangay
9165  official for the purpose of that buy bust operation?

A: We did the coordination only during the inventory to meet the requirements. 
As a rule, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is required
because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and    
easily open to tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident or otherwise. 
Q: So in other words, during the eight (8) long hours, you did not bother to call any barangay
The exception found in the IRR of R.A. 9165 comes into play when strict compliance with the proscribed official nor did you bother to secure the representative from the media while you were in
procedures is not observed. This saving clause, however, applies only (1) where the prosecution Puerto Galera?
recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2)
when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had A: Our team leader deemed it no longer necessary to coordinate with the media or with the
been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity and barangay officials. It was only during the inventory of the confiscated items that we did the
bears the burden of proving — with moral certainty — that the illegal drug presented in court is the same coordination with such agencies.
drug that was confiscated from the accused during his arrest.25
   
In this case, the prosecution failed to recognize its procedural lapses and give a justifiable ground for the
non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Particularly, they were not able to explain the absence Q: So can we be clarified as to where you conducted this inventory?
of a representative of the DOJ and the distant conduct of the inventory of the seized item. IO1 Echavaria
attempted to explain that the said inventory was not done at the place of the arrest at Puerto Galera A: In our regional office, Sir. 
because they could not secure a representative of the media or the DOJ and, thus, went back to their
office in Calapan City.26 Nevertheless, upon their arrival in Calapan City, there was still no representative    
from the DOJ to witness the inventory of the confiscated item. 
Q: In Calapan City?
On the other hand, the witnesses of the prosecution attempted to explain the conduct of the inventory of A: Yes Sir. 
the seized item fifty-four (54) kilometers away from the place of the arrest. IO1 Briguel testified as
follows: 
   

Q: Why did you not conduct that in Puerto Galera?

Q: Did you bother to coordinate with the barangay officials of White Beach, Barangay Isidro, Puerto
Galera? 
A: Because there were already many people in the exact place so we decided to do the
inventory in our office.
A: As I recall, no sir.
 
Q: In other words Mr. Witness, you are telling this Honorable Court that you implemented this buy-
bust operation 54 kilometers away from Calapan City and in the actual site, you did not bother to
coordinate with the barangay official of the place where you conducted your buy-bust operation.  xxx

A: No, sir.  

Q: What do you mean "no"? COURT: 

A: We did not coordinate because that was the decision of our team leader. Questions from the Court. 

Q: So, in other words, your team leader instructed you not to coordinate and instead do the    
 discretion to conduct the inventory in Calapan City; (2) to avoid commotion at the place of seizure; and
Q: During your cross-examination you stated that it was not practical to conduct the inventory
(3) they could not secure the witnesses required by law in the said place. 
at the scene and instead you made the inventory at your office. What do you mean by it is
not practical?
The Court finds that these excuses are unmeritorious. First, Section 21 of the IRR is clear that the
A: Your Honor because during that particular situation there were many people around so we physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place of the seizure or at the nearest police
could only do the marking[s] but we could not do the inventory at that place.  station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team. In this case, the apprehending team did not even
bother to look for the nearest police station at the place of seizure to conduct the inventory. Instead, they
    leisurely took their time and travelled 54 kilometers away from the said place to secure an inventory of
the seized item. 
Q: What do you mean by it is not practical? 
Second, another reason stated by the prosecution witness - that the inventory was done in Calapan to
A: Because we could not secure the presence of the Witnesses if we have done the inventory in avoid a commotion at the place of the seizure - is unavailing. Evidently, there is no need to travel fifty
the exact scene where the buy bust operation happened, Your Honor.  four (54) kilometers away from Puerto Galera simply to avoid a commotion. As stated in IO1 Echavaria's
testimony, the apprehending team had eight (8) hours to prepare before the operation was conducted and
    they could have easily identified the nearest police station in Puerto Galera for the inventory of the seized
item. Certainly, the PDEA office in Calapan City is not the nearest police station in Puerto Galera. 
Q: Why can you not conduct the inventory at the scene and at the presence of the media and the
DOJ representative?
Third, the apprehending officers allegedly travelled all the way back to Calapan City because only there
could they secure the witnesses required by law. However, as discussed above, even when they travelled
A: Your Honor because we could not completely do the inventory at the scene if we would first 54 kilometers to their office, they still failed to complete all the witnesses needed during the inventory.
call the representative of the media and the barangay official so we just did the marking on The RTC even observed that it was impractical for the media representative, DOJ representative and the
that place and did the inventory in the office.  elected official to travel from Puerto Galera all the way to Calapan City to simply witness the inventory.
Indeed, the inventory could have been done at the nearest police station in Puerto Galera and the required
    witnesses could have conveniently attended thereat. 

Q: And how far is your office from the place of the incident?
In Dela Riva v. People,29 the Court acquitted the accused-appellant therein because although the buy-bust
A: I could not exactly determine. It took us about an hour and a half to reach our office.  operation occurred in Subic, Zambales, the apprehending team conducted the marking, inventory and
photographing of the seized item in Quezon City, which was several kilometers away. The prosecution
    could not give any justifiable reason for the unusually distant conduct of the physical inventory. 

Q: And in this particular case did you not prepare the inventory in Puerto Galera but instead
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item was
prepared it in your office in Calapan, is it not?
preserved 
A: Yes Your Honor.
Aside from failing to provide a justifiable ground for the non-compliance of Section 21 of R.A. No.
   
9165, the prosecution also failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item
was preserved. 
Q: Would it not be impractical for the media, the DOJ representative and the barangay
official to travel from Puerto Galera to Calapan City in your office and witness the
preparation of the inventory? In the  first link of the chain of custody, the apprehending officer acquires possession of the suspected
drug from the offender at the time of the arrest. The apprehending officer is required to mark the seized
A: Because in the preparation of the inventory we needed some witnesses. items — to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence — and it should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and(2)
    immediately upon confiscation.30 In this case, the marking was not done at the place of the seizure; rather
it was done at the vehicle. While there may be exceptions to the immediate marking of the seized
Q: Who are these witnesses that you are referring to that you needed to contact for the item,31 even a less stringent application of the requirement would not suffice in sustaining a conviction in
inventory?  this case. 

A: The barangay official, media representative and DOJ representative, your Aside from marking, the seized items should be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type
Honor.28(emphases supplied)  and quantity of these items require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or
container shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the
chain of custody.32 The purpose of placing the seized item in an envelope or an evidence bag is to ensure
As can be gleaned from the witnesses' testimony, the excuses they proffered to justify the distant conduct that the item is secured from tampering, especially when the seized item is susceptible to alteration or
of the inventory fifty-four (54) kilometers away from the place of seizure, are: (1) it was the team leader's damage. 
 Here, as shown by its photographs,33 the seized marijuana was simply wrapped in a dried banana leaf; From the above testimony, it can be observed that when IO1 Briguel seized the marijuana wrapped in
while the marking was merely written on a strip of paper that was attached to the seized item. Evidently, dried banana leaves, he simply placed the said item inside his pocket without securing it in a sealed
the confiscated marijuana was not placed in a secured container. IO1 Briguel testified as to how he container. Evidently, due to the poor packaging of the item, it is susceptible to tampering or alteration.
handled the specimen, viz:  Realizing his damaging testimony, IO1 Briguel suddenly changed his tune and stated that he allegedly
placed the confiscated item in a plastic container. However, the purported plastic container was neither
presented in evidence nor was it marked by IO1 Briguel. Glaringly, the photographs, Inventory35 and the
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, going back to the specimen which was earlier presented to you by the Chemistry Report No. D-010-0936 demonstrate that the seized marijuana was merely wrapped in a dried
government prosecutor. How did you secure the dried marijuana leaves after you bought that from banana leaf and was not secured in a plastic container. 
the body of the accused?
Further, there are also irregularities in the third link of the chain of custody. In the said link, there must
A: I took it from him and placed it in my pocket, sir.  be a delivery by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs
arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of
    the substance.37

Q: But insofar as the way you packed it, it appears that it is wrapped with banana leaves and what did
you do after you packed it with banana leaves? In this case, while IO1 Briguel claims that he delivered the confiscated item to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Efigenio C. Navarro, Calapan City, it was not clear who received the confiscated
A: It was already packed when we bought it, sir.  drug thereat. On direct examination, PCI Alviar testified as follows: 

   
PROSECUTOR
OLIVAR 
Q: Did you not bother to put the same in a secured sealed container?
   
A: We did not bring any, sir, so I just placed it in our [sic] pocket.
Q: Madam Witness, in this letter request the one [sic] received the said specimen
   
on behalf of the Regional Crime Laboratory is one PO1 Carreon. Would you
confirm that PO1 Carreon is connected with your office?
Q: So, in other words when you received the unsecure specimen you did not bother to make it sure that
the integrity of the specimen will be protected by putting it in a seal (sic) container or plastic
A: Yes, ma'm. 
sachet? 
 
A: After marking the said specimen and when we were already in our way home we placed it in a
plastic container, sir. 
xxx
   
   
Q: You said that you placed it in a plastic to secure the specimen. But where is the sealed plastic, Mr.
Witness? Q: May we know if there is also SPO1 Watson in that crime lab? 

A: When we brought this specimen in the crime laboratory and then submitted the same to the office of A: Yes, ma'm.
the prosecutor they already removed it from the plastic, sir.
   
   
Q: What is his position in that crime laboratory?
Q: In other words, you did not bother to put your initial on the plastic in which you placed this
specimen? A: He is now assigned at Mamburao, ma'm. 

A: None, sir.     

    Q: But when he was with the Crime Laboratory what was his position?

Q: Why did you not do that?  A: Macro itching technician, ma'm.

A: I was notable to do it sir.34 (emphasis supplied)     

Q: And also authorized in receiving specimen being submitted?

A: Yes, ma'm.     

    Q: So, if Engr. Niduaza is present logically it (sic) meaning to say that you were not around during that
time because Engr. Niduaza is on duty?
Q: And how about PSI Niduaza, Jr.? Is he also connected with your office?
A: No, sir. 
A: Yes, ma'm. He is our forensic chemical officer. 
   
   
Q: But you cannot remember having been around that time?
Q: From whom did you received that specimen for examination?
A: Yes, sir.39
A: From PSI Ernesto Niduaza, ma'm.

    From the testimony, it can be gathered that PCI Alviar initially testified that the specimen was received
by PO1 Carreon; that PO1 Carreon, SPO1 Watson and PSI Niduaza were authorized to handle the
Q: Who received the same from PO1 Carreon? specimen; that PCI Alviar acquired the item from PSI Niduaza. Then on cross-examination, she then
stated that it was PSI Niduaza that actually received the same; that the latter was present in the crime
A: It was received by PSI Ernesto Niduaza, ma'm.38 laboratory but was not on duty; and that she was on duty but cannot remember whether she was present
at the crime laboratory. Accordingly, there is doubt as to who actually received the seized item from IO1
Briguel. Within the crime laboratory, the said specimen was handed from one person to another. It was
On cross-examination, however, PCI Alviar presented a different chain of custody. even received by an officer who was not on duty at that time. The changing of hands of the specimen is
precarious considering that it was not placed in a secured container. 

Q: When it was delivered to the crime laboratory what time was that when it was delivered to the crime Likewise, as properly pointed out by accused-appellant, the arrangement of the PNP Crime Laboratory
laboratory. therein is problematic based on the testimony of PCI Alviar, to wit: 

A: Our office received the letter request based on the stamp marked appearing on the lower portion
2300H of March 29, 2009, ma'm. Q: Is it not that the PNP Crime Laboratory is composed of three separate rooms, the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Suqui?
   
A: We do not have permanent room, sir. 
Q: That is eleven o'clock in the evening? 
 
A: Yes, ma'm. 
xxx
   
   
Q: And are you the chemist on duty during that time?
Q: The laboratory itself, the sink where you conduct your examination was located at the middle
A: Yes, ma'm. It was received by PSI Ernesto Niduaza. because the first portion of your office is the receiving area where there are many tables side by
side, the second part is this portion where there is a one way mirror?
   
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It was received by PSI Niduaza because during the time when it was received you were not the one
on duty, is it not?    

A: I cannot remember. I do not know if we have SOCO response during that time, sir.  Q: And there is a door to enter that?

    A: Yes, sir.

Q: But is it not that the chemist on duty at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Suqui is either you or Engr.    
Niduaza being the two chemist available thereat?
Q: And the third part is the storage room or evidence room?
A: Yes, sir.
 SO ORDERED.
A: Yes, sir. 

   

Q: It is not that inside that second part, the sink, where you conduct your examination, there is a
double deck bed?

A: Yes, sir. 

   
G.R. No. 231383, March 07, 2018
Q: And it is where some of your personnel and even some policemen would sleep there, day in
and day out whenever there is operation?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOEY SANCHEZ Y LICUDINE, Accused-
Appellants.
A: Yes, sir.40

PCI Alviar admitted that the room where the drugs are inspected had a double deck bed where the
personnel and the policemen would sleep when there is a police operation. These persons can enter the
forensic room and there is a possibility they could contaminate the evidence. Surely, the reliability of the
seized drugs cannot be preserved when there are various persons in the forensic room who are not even
connected with the crime laboratory. The testimony of PCI Alviar falls short of the requirement that the
intergrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug must be preserved.  assailing the Decision2 dated February 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
Conclusion 
In fine, the Court finds that there are several errors in the prosecution of the case. There were inconsistent
dates on the conduct of the alleged buy bust operation because of the conflicting statements and
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses. Likewise, the requirement under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
was not complied with because a representative of the DOJ was not present at the time of the inventory
of the seized item. Further, the inventory was done fifty-four (54) kilometres away from the place of
seizure. No justifiable reason was provided for the non-compliance with Section 21.  illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which state:
The apprehending officers also failed to properly safe-keep the seized item because they did not place it
in a secured container. Finally, the forensic chemist did not give a consistent statement as to who
received the seized item and that the crime laboratory's arrangement made it possible for other personnel
to contaminate the evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated item were preserved.  Pesos, sell and deliver one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine
Given the substantive flaws and procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the
seized marijuana that the prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution
failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal
liability of accused-appellant.41
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Joey Sanchez y Licudine (Sanchez)
06911, which affirmed the Decision3 dated May 21, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando
City, La Union, Branch 27 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 8842 and 8843, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," respectively, with modification imposing
fines therefor.
The Facts
5
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations  filed before the RTC charging Sanchez with the crimes of
Criminal Case No. 8842
That on or about the 29th day of July, 2010 in the Municipality of Bacnotan, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for and in consideration of in the amount of Five Hundred
hydrochloride otherwise known as SHABU, a dangerous drug, with a weight of 0.0352 gram to IO1
RAYMUND TABUYO, who posed as buyer thereof using marked money, a Five Hundred Pesos bill
bearing Serial Number VX925142, without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription
from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 12, 2016, of the Court of Criminal Case No. 8843
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06607 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant Manuel dela Rosa who is That on or about the 29th day of July, 2010 in the Municipality of Bacnotan, Province of La Union,
accordingly ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him and ordered Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.  there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody two (2) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, weighing
0.0430 gram and 0.0352 gram, without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription from
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision and to inform this
the proper government agency to possess the same.
Court of the date of the actual release from confinement of the accused-appellant within five (5) days
from receipt hereof. 
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that on July 29, 2010, with the help of a confidential informant, the members of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional
Public Safety Mobile Battalion organized a buy-bust operation against a certain alias "Totoy" (later on
identified as Sanchez), who was allegedly engaged in illegal drug trade at the Bacnotan Public Market,
Bacnotan, La Union. After a briefing where, inter alia, PDEA Investigation Officer (IO) 1 Raymund
Tabuyo (IO1 Tabuyo) was designated as the poseur-buyer, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target
area. Thereat, IO1 Tabuyo was able to meet Sanchez, who, after receiving the marked money, handed
over a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to the former. After IO1 Tabuyo
examined the contents of the plastic sachet, he executed the pre-arranged signal, thus prompting the other
members of the buy-bust team to rush to the scene and arrest Sanchez. The buy-bust team searched
Sanchez and found two (2) other plastic sachets also containing a white crystalline substance.8
The buy-bust team then conducted the markings, inventory, and photography on site before proceeding to
their office for documentation purposes.9 Thereat, the team was met with representatives from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media,10 both of whom signed the Certificate of Inventory.11 The
seized plastic sachets were then taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory where it was confirmed12 that their
contents are indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.13
For his part, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and offered his version of what
transpired on the day he was arrested. He narrated that between 3:00 to 4:00 in the afternoon of July 29,
2010, he was in front of the public market collecting bets for jueteng, when two (2) men unknown to him
suddenly approached him and gave their numbers; and that when they were about to pay, they
handcuffed and arrested him for allegedly selling drugs. Sanchez then insisted that when he was frisked,
the men were only able to find money from the bets he collected and that they only made it appear that
they recovered sachets containing shabu from him.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision15 dated May 21, 2014, the RTC found Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced him as follows: (a) for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
RTC sentenced Sanchez to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, among others; and (b) for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the RTC sentenced Sanchez to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, among others.16
The RTC found that the buy-bust team validly arrested Sanchez who was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu to the poseur-buyer; and that after his arrest, the arresting officers discovered two
(2) more sachets, also containing shabu, from his pocket. Further, the RTC found that the arresting
officers followed the procedures in conducting buy-bust operation, and that the evidence were preserved
as the chain of custody thereof was not broken.17
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed to the CA.18
The CA Ruling
19
In a Decision  dated February 19, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modifications, further
ordering Sanchez to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, and
P300,000.00 for violating Section 11, Article II of the same law.20 It held that the prosecution had
successfully established the elements necessary to convict Sanchez of the crimes charged.21 It further held
that the arresting officers had shown an unbroken chain of custody over the seized drugs, and thus, their
integrity and evidentiary value were preserved.22
Hence, this appeal.23
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Sanchez's conviction for
the crimes charged.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and,
thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.24 "The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."25
Here, Sanchez was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. Notably, in order to
properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.26Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.27
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous
drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link
in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.28
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers must follow
when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.29 Under the said
section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,30 the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately
after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must
be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.31 In the case of People v. Mendoza,32 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating
presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of
the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."33
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements
of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible.34 In fact, the IRR of RA 9165 - which is
now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provides that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in
instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody
over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team.35 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.36 In People v. Almorfe,37the
Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence
had nonetheless been preserved.38 Also, in People v. De Guzman,39 it was emphasized that the
justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist.40
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Sanchez.
While it appears that representatives from the DOJ and the media were present during the conduct of the
inventory as evidenced by their signatures on the Certificate of Inventory,41 a more careful scrutiny of the
records shows that the buy-bust team conducted the marking, inventory, and photography where the
arrest was made,42 and merely made the aforesaid representatives sign the Certificate of Inventory upon
the buy-bust team's arrival at their office. Moreover, the said procedures were not done in the presence of
any elected public official. During trial, IO1 Tabuyo admitted to these procedural mishaps, viz.:
[Pros. Crispin Lamong, Jr.] Q: Now, after your recovered [the] 2 sachets and the 1 piece P500.00
buy-bust money, what did you do next?
[IO1 Tabuyo] A: We conducted an inventory at the transaction area, your honor.
Q: When you said, in the transaction area, how did you conduct an inventory? [sic]
A: We made marking and photographs.
Q: Marking on what items, mr. witness?  Q: Where was the elected public official? [W]hy was he not present at the place?
A: All, the 3 plastic sachets, sir.
xxxx
Q: Mr. witness, aside from the request you made, what else transpired at the PDEA Office?
A: We requested a DOJ representative to sign the inventory.
Q: Aside from the DOJ representative what else requested Mr. Witness made by your office? [sic]
A: The media representative[,] [Y]our [H]onor.
Q: And were the DOJ representative and media representative were able to sign the
inventory? [sic]
A: Yes[,] [S]ir.
xxxx
Q: While the DOJ representative and the media representative signing what happened next[,] if any, mr.
witness? [sic]
A: They signed, [Y]our [H]onor.
Q: How about you[?] [W]hat were you doing then at the time the DOJ representative and the media
representative signing, [mr.] witness? [sic]
A: I was there[,] [Y]our [H]onor[,] to witness that they signed.
Q: And how about the accused[?] [W]here was he when these DOJ and media representatives were
signing?
A: There also, [S]ir.
Q: Mr. [w]itness, do you have any proof to show that these indeed the DOJ representative and the media
representative signing?
A: Yes, pictures.
Q: And who took the pictures?
A: Our photographers, [Y]our [H]onor.43 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives from the DOJ and
the media during the actual conduct of inventory and photography to ensure that the chain of custody rule
is observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence which could considerably affect a case. However, minor deviations may be excused in
situations where a justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In this case, despite the non-
observance of the witness requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the prosecution. For
instance, in an attempt to justify the absence of any elected public official during the conduct of
inventory and photography, IO1 Tabuyo stated on cross-examination that:
[Atty. Loida Martirez] Q: Mr. Witness, in your Certificate of Inventory[,] it appears that there are only
three (3) persons who signed, you as the seizing officer, a media representative, and a DOJ
representative.
[IO1 Tabuyo] A: Yes, ma'am.
A: We were not able to get one elected official because it was a rush operation and after the
inventory we proceeded right away to our office.
Q: So you are now trying to tell us that you did not coordinate with any barangay official that is
why they were not present, Mr. Witness.
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And is it not a requirement that you have to coordinate with a local official, Mr. Witness, so
that they will be present during the inventory[?] [sic]
A: No, ma'am.
Q: That is not a requirement Mr. Witness?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: So you went to Bacnotan [P]ublic [Mjarket which is a public place and you were not able to see even
one elected public official at the place, Mr. Witness?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: That is just very near the municipal hall, is that correct, Mr. Witness?
A: (no answer)
Q: So you also did not coordinate with the Bacnotan Police, Mr. Witness?
A: We coordinate, ma'am, [sic]
Q: You coordinate with the Bacnotan PNP.
A: The precinct at the left side of the public market.
Q: You just coordinated with them after the operation when you were there already, is that correct?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: You just saw the police sub-station there, is that correct?
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06911 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Joey Sanchez y Licudine is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in
custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.

A: No, ma'am.44 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.45 However, in People v. Umipang,46 the Court held that the prosecution
must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the
law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to
be regarded as a flimsy excuse."47 Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance.48 These considerations arise from the fact that these officers are ordinarily given sufficient
time - beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused
until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the set
procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, the apprehending officers are
compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the
Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the
given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 49

Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances
exist which would excuse their transgression — as in fact the only reason given was that they were
conducting a "rush operation" — the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from Sanchez have been compromised. It is settled that in a
prosecution for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy
burden of proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti, failing in which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.50

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on
the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in
the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x.51
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance
with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have
the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said
procedure during the proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is
determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the
liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raise, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the
G.R. No. 234156, January 07, 2019
records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely complied with, and if
not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the
appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."52 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMMANUEL OLIVA Y JORJIL,
BERNARDO BARANGOT Y PILAIS AND MARK ANGELO MANALASTAS Y
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 19, 2016 of the Court of GAPASIN, Accused-Appellants.
 DECISION
On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by
law to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then
PERALTA, J.:
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point ten (0.10) gram of white
crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 31, 2017 dismissing Emmanuel
Oliva y Jorjil, Bernardo Barangot y Pilais and Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin's appeal, and CONTRARY TO LAW.4
affirming the Decision2 dated October 28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Makati
City, convicting appellants of Violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. Crim. Case No. 15-197
(against appellant Barangot)
The facts follow.
On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by
The Chief of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG), on January 23, law to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then
2015, received a report regarding the sale of dangerous drugs by a certain "Manu" in Barangay Cembo, and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point five (0.05) gram of
Makati City and its nearby areas. As such, a buy-bust operation was planned and after coordination with white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), a buybust team was formed wherein Police Officer 3
(PO3) Luisito Marcelo was designated as the poseur-buyer and given a P500.00 bill as marked money, CONTRARY TO LAW.5
and PO1 Darwin Catabay as back-up. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the exact location of
"Manu" after it was confirmed by the confidential informant.
Crim. Case No. 15-198
(against appellant Manalastas)
When they arrived at the target area, the confidential informant pointed to appellant Oliva as "Manu," the
seller of dangerous drugs; thus, PO3 Marcelo and the confidential informant approached the said
On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by
appellant. PO3 Marcelo was introduced by the confidential informant to appellant Oliva as a buyer who
law to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then
wanted to buy P500.00 worth of shabu. PO3 Marcelo handed appellant Oliva the marked money after the
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point three (0.03) gram of
latter demanded payment. Appellant Oliva then showed PO3 Marcelo four (4) transparent plastic sachets
white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
with white crystalline substance and asked the latter to choose one. Meanwhile, two (2) other persons,
appellants Barangot and Manalastas were also at the target area to buy shabu. Appellants Barangot and
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Manalastas, and PO3 Marcelo each took one sachet from the four sachets that appellant Oliva showed.
Upon arraignment, appellants, with the assistance of counsel, entered pleas of "not guilty" on all charges.
Upon receiving the dangerous drug, PO3 Marcelo immediately scratched his chin, which is the pre-
All appellants used denial as a defense.
arranged signal to his back-up that the transaction has been completed. Subsequently, PO3 Marcelo
grabbed appellants Oliva and Barangot and, thereafter, PO1 Catabay appeared and arrested appellant
According to appellant Oliva, on January 21, 2015, around 10:30 in the evening, he was in front of a
Manalastas.
neighbor's house when several armed men, riding in motorcycles, stopped by and invited him to go with
them. When he refused to go, one of the armed men pointed a gun at him, handcuffed him, and forcibly
The police officers conducted a body search on appellant Oliva and it yielded another sachet containing
took him to the SAID-SOTG office where he was detained.
white crystalline substance, the marked money and two (2) more pieces of P500.00 bills. Eventually,
appellants Oliva, Barangot and Manalastas were arrested and brought to the barangay hall where an
On the other hand, appellant Barangot maintained that on January 22, 2015, around 2:30 in the morning,
inventory was conducted and on the basis thereof, an inventory report was prepared. The confiscated
he was having a drinking spree with one Mel and Nonoy when several men barged inside the house and
items were then marked and photographed, and a request for laboratory examination was accomplished
arrested them. They were then brought to the SAID-SOTG office where they were detained, and
and the seized items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The substance found inside the
subsequently, freed after Mel and Noy paid the police officers for their release.
sachets were all tested positive for the. presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Appellant Manalastas also denied committing the offense charged against him and claimed that on the
Thus, an Information for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was filed against appellant
same date, he was inside his room sleeping, when he was suddenly roused by loud noises causing him to
Oliva, that reads as follows:
go outside and check the commotion. He saw armed men inside his house and, thereafter, the latter took
him, his mother, a certain Bong, Ronald, Abby and two (2) boarders to the SAID-SOTG office where
On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law they were all detained.
and without the corresponding license and prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and distribute zero point six (0.06) gram of white crystalline substance The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against them and were
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, contained in one (1) small sentenced as follows:
transparent plastic sachet, in consideration of Php500.00. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

CONTRARY TO LAW.3 1. In Criminal Case No. 15-195, the court finds the accused, Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, GUILTY beyond
Also, in three informations, appellants Oliva, Barangot and Manalastas were separately charged with reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentences each of
violation of Section 11 of the said law, thus: them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
Crim. Case No. 15-196 (P500,000.00).
(against appellant Oliva)
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 15-196 to 15-198, the court finds the accused, Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil,
Bernardo Barangot y Pilais and Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II, RA. No. 9165 and sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The period of detention of the accused should be given full credit.
Let the dangerous drugs subject matter of these cases be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the plastic sachets containing shabu subject matter of
these cases to the PDEA for said agency's appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
appellants.
The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.  and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.12
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the key elements for illegal possession and sale
of dangerous drugs, and that the bare denials of the appellants cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the police officers. It also held that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police
officers conducted the required physical inventory and take the photograph of the objects confiscated
does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized.
Hence, the present appeal.
Appellants assigned the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES' INCREDULOUS TESTIMONIES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF
THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE POLICE OFFICERS' NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED DRUGS
DESPITE THE POLICE OFFICERS' FLAWED MANNER IN THE CONDUCT OF INVENTORY
AND MARKING THE SAME.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH EVERY LINK IN THE CHAIN OF
CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ITEMS.9
Appellants argue that it is difficult to believe the testimonies of the police officers because it is
impossible for appellants to engage in drug transactions in the middle of the street, under broad daylight,
and in the presence of strangers. They also claim that the arresting officers failed to immediately conduct
a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused, their
representative or counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who are required to sign the copies of the inventory. Thus, according to appellants,
the prosecution failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of the seized items.
The appeal is meritorious.
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No, 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted
of the said violation, the following must concur:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.10
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that "the
[procured] object is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized
from the accused."11
Also, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of dangerous drugs the
following must be proven before an accused can be convicted:
[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not authorized by law;
In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused
comprise the corpus delicti of the charges.13 In People v. Gatlabayan,14 the Court held that it is of
paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt;
and that it must be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is
exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be
produced before the court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the very same substance
recovered from the suspect.15 Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."16
To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:
(1) The apprehending team having in trial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.]
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 1064017 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications,
it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator
Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to
safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said
Section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction
and also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts."18 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the
rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are not always
available in all corners of the Philippines, especially in more remote areas. For another, there were
instances where elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts
apprehended."19 In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is
also very limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were
apprehended."20
Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in
drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing
law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation."21 In his Co-Sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local
and international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to
mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a)
impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the
proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.
xxxx
Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this
in 2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory
and photography of seized illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs
itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The
place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where the
seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the inventory and photograph
are safe and secure from extreme danger.
It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to
be conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs
since a safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be
properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.
Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or
confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could
prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of
the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there
are no media people or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should
not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected
official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.22
The foregoing legislative intent has been taken cognizance of in a number of cases. Just recently, This
Court opined in People v. Miranda:23
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements
of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide
that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that
for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also,
in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.24
Under the original provision of Section 21, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending
team was required to immediately conduct a physically inventory and photograph of the same in the
presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. It is assumed that the presence of these three persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence
and frame up," i.e., they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from
any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."25 Now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2)
with an elected public official, and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, the absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media during the
inventory of the seized items was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. A review of the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes does not yield any testimony from the arresting officers as to the reason why there
was no representative from the DOJ or the media. The only one present to witness the inventory and the
marking was an elected official, BarangayCaptain Evelyn Villamor. Neither was there any testimony to
show that any attempt was made to secure the presence of the required witness.
In People v. Angelita Reyes, et al.,26 this Court enumerated certain instances where the absence of the
required witnesses may be justified, thus:
x x x It must be emphasized that the prosecution must able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting
certain requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: 1) media
representatives are not available at that time or that the police operatives had no time to alert the media
due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake, especially if it is done in more
remote areas; 2) the police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of
the National Prosecution Service; 3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the
urgency of the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 12527 of
the Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the
requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
The above-ruling was further reiterated by this Court in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro,28 thus:
The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses was not obtained
for any of the following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest
was a remote area;·(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her
behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended;
(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and elected public official
within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Could prove futile through no fault of
the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time
constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets,
prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the
offenders could escape.
Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.29 It has the positive duty to
demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it must
initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the law.30 Its
failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in
accordance with the rules on evidence. The rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply
mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a
statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized item.31 A stricter adherence to
Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule since it is highly susceptible
to planting, tampering, or alteration.32

Thus, this Court finds it appropriate to acquit the appellants in this case as their guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. The resolution of the other issues raised by appellants is no longer
necessary.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 31, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 08121 dismissing appellants' appeai and affirming the Decision dated October 28, 2015
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellants
Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, Bernardo Barangot y Pilais, Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin
are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They
are ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for any other
lawful cause. Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections and the
Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prisons, for immediate implementation. Said Director and
Superintendent are ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) working days from receipt of
this Decision the action he/she has taken.

SO ORDERED.