Part 2 of the Introduction to Law reviewer.

*PROSPECTIVITY
EX POST FACTO LAWS

STOGNER v. CALIFORNIA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 01-1757. Argued March 31, 2003-Decided June 26, 2003

In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting prosecution for sex-
related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired if, inter alia, the prosecution is
begun within one year of a victim's report to police. A subsequently added provision makes clear that
this law revives causes of action barred by prior limitations statutes. In 1998, petitioner Stogner was
indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. At the time those crimes were
allegedly committed, the limitations period was three years. Stogner moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution.
The trial court agreed, but the California Court of Appeal reversed. The trial court denied Stogner's
subsequent dismissal motion, in which he argued that his prosecution violated the Ex Post Facto and
Due Process Clauses. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Held: A law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. California's law
extends the time in which prosecution is allowed, authorizes prosecutions that the passage of time
has previously barred, and was enacted after prior limitations periods for Stogner's alleged offenses
had expired. Such features produce the kind of retroactivity that the Constitution forbids. First, the
law threatens the kinds of harm that the Clause seeks to avoid, for the Clause protects liberty by
preventing governments from enacting statutes with "manifestly unjust and oppressive" retroactive
effects. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391. Second, the law falls literally within the categorical descriptions
of ex post facto laws that Justice Chase set forth more than 200 years ago in Calder v. Bull, which this
Court has recognized as an authoritative account of the Clause's scope, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S.
37,46. It falls within the second category, which Justice Chase understood to include a new law that
inflicts punishments where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment. Third, numerous
legislators, courts, and commentators have long believed it well settled that the Clause forbids
resurrection of a time-barred prosecution. The Reconstruction Congress of 1867 rejected a bill that
would have revived time-barred treason prosecutions against Jefferson Davis and others, passing
instead a law extending unexpired limitations periods. Roughly contemporaneous State Supreme
Courts echoed the view that laws reviving time-barred prosecutions are ex post facto. Even courts that
have upheld extensions of unexpired statutes of limitations have consistently distinguished situations
where the periods have expired, often using language that suggests a presumption that reviving time-
barred criminal cases is not allowed. This Court has not previously spoken decisively on this matter.
Neither its recognition that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination does not apply
after the relevant limitations period has expired, Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 597-598, nor its
holding that a Civil War statute retroactively tolling limitations periods during the war was valid as
an exercise of Congress' war powers, Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 503504, dictates the outcome here.
Instead, that outcome is determined by the nature of the harms that the law creates, the fact that the
law falls within Justice Chase's second category, and a long line of authority. Pp. 610-633.
 *DECISIONS

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)

PADILLA, J.:

I.          THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. 

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be
directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the
people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make
searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II.        THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?

III.       THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public
security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police
and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and
the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what
one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLES'S
RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs. GEN.RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
G.R. No. 83988 | 1990-05-24
D E C I S I O N 
PADILLA, J.: 
In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners' petition for prohibition seeking the
declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was
dismissed. 
Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said
decision. Before submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents,
filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. 
It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all
checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints
are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized
government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. 
Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed,
checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. 
Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints
manned by either military or police forces. The sixth (6th) attempted coup d'etat (stronger than all
previous ones) was staged only last 1 December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d'etat is taken
almost for granted. 
The NPA, through its sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of armed
forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse have become daily
occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling
is at an all-time high. Whether or not effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the
authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a
dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade. 
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its
ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or
performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and,
while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit
of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the
reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such
means it has selected. 
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free
passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. 1
For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. 
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. 
As held by the U.S. Supreme Court: 
"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. 
First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are
not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and
will not be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less
discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are
operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized
and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in
the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of
limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a
checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers
may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of
individuals them there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular
exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop
judicial review." 2 
The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless search and seizure and,
therefore, violative of the Constitution.
As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection
and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable
cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a
law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as
held by the U.S. Supreme Court 
"Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying
a warrantless search of a residence or office. 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302(1949); 
Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543, 45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The cases so holding
have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have 'reasonable or probable
cause' to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime
before they begin their warrantless search. . . ."
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and
seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately
thereafter. In People vs. Kagui Malasuqui, it was held 
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his
crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest,
the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances." 5 
By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and
departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is
founded on public interest, safety, and necessity. 
Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses
committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with power,
i.e. whether the government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once
that power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in
the constitutional arena. 
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become aware of how some
checkpoints have been used as points of thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent civilians.
Even the increased prices of foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area
and other urban centers, are largely blamed on the checkpoints, because the men manning them have
reportedly become "experts" in mulcting travelling traders. 
This, of course, is a national tragedy. 
But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the men in uniform are
rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume that the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor
and they are assigned to the checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint
is a military "concoction." It behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of their men assigned to
these checkpoints. For no system or institution will succeed unless the men behind it are honest,
noble and dedicated. 
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the
military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme.
Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of
their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts. 7 This tenet
should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by higher military authorities. 
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED. This
denial is FINAL. 
SO ORDERED. 
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur. 
Gancayco, J., is on leave. 
Separate Opinions 
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: 
The problem we face in the resolution of this petition arises from our knowledge that law
enforcement officers use checkpoints as opportunities for mulcting, oppression, and other forms of
abuse. However, to completely ban checkpoints as unconstitutional is to lose sight of the fact that the
real objective behind their use is laudable and necessary. If we say that ALL checkpoints are
unconstitutional, we are banning a law enforcement measure not because it is per se illegal but
because it is being used for evil purposes by the soldiers or police who man it. 
This is another instance where the Supreme Court is urged to solve a problem of discipline facing the
executive and the military. My reluctant concurrence with the majority opinion is premised on the
hope that our top military and police officials will devise effective measures which would insure that
checkpoints are used only where absolutely needed and that the officers who are assigned to these
checkpoints discharge their duties as professional soldiers or peace officers in the best traditions of
the military and the police. I repeat that this is a problem of enforcement and not legality. 
 
CRUZ, J., dissenting: 
I reiterate my original dissent and add the following observations. 
The majority would justify the checkpoints on the ground of rampant criminality, e.g., the failed
coup, the "sparrow" killings, murders, sex crimes, drug abuse, smuggling, etc. I was not aware that
the failure of the authorities to suppress crime was an excuse to suspend the Bill of Rights. It has
always been my impression that even criminals, and more so the innocent, are entitled to the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The protection of the security of the State is a convenient pretext of the police state to suppress
individual rights. Constitutional shortcuts should not be allowed in a free regime where the highest
function of authority is precisely to exalt liberty. 
The ponencia says that the Constitution is not violated because "the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search." Assuming that this is all the search entails, it suffers from the additional
defect of inefficaciousness, making it virtually useless. It did not prevent the staging of the December
1 coup, where the rebels used all kinds of high-powered weapons that were not detected by "a visual
search." 
Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, probable cause is determined "personally by the
judge," not by a soldier or a policeman. It is not for the peace officer to decide when a warrantless
search and seizure may be made save in the exceptional instances allowed, as where a crime is being
committed or before or after its commission. I can hardly believe that the majority is seriously
offering this exception as a continuing situation to justify the regular warrantless searches at the
checkpoints. 
It is easy to say that "where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless." Let
us at least be realistic. This Court would be the first to dismiss the complaint if not supported by hard
evidence, which we know is not easily come by. The remedy, in my view, is to remove the source of
the evil instead of leaving it unchecked and then simply suggesting a cure, which is not even
effective. It is like inoculating a patient after exposing him to contagion. 
 
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting: 
The majority states that checkpoints are justified by "grave peril." The question, however, is whether
or not the existence of such grave perils has the effect of suspending the Bill of Rights, specifically, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Under the Constitution, "[a] state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution."
(CONST., art. VII, sec. 18). If not even martial law can suspend the fundamental law, I do not see how
a mere executive act can. 
That the State has the light to defend itself is a proposition difficult to argue against. The query,
again, is whether or not it may defend itself against its enemies at the expense of liberty. After
fourteen years of authoritarian rule, I think by now we should have learned our lesson, and known
better. 
Although "routine inspections" are another matter, I can not think that the checkpoints in question
have been meant to undertake routine inspections alone. As it is, no ground rules have been given
our law enforcers, which is to say that they have the carte blanche to search vehicles and even
persons without the benefit of a valid judicial warrant. I do not believe that this can be done in a
constitutional regime. 
I find references to the case of People v. Kagui Malasugui [63 Phil. 221 (1936)] to be inapt. In that case,
there was a waiver of the right against unreasonable search and secondly, there existed a clear
probable cause for search and arrest. Certainly, there was reason for excepting the case from the rule. 
Malasugui, however, is an exception. And obviously, the majority would make a general rule out of
it. 
Certainly, it is different where the authority has probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed by a suspect, in which case, it may place him under arrest or search his person
(Malasugui, supra). But I do not think that it may claim the existence of probable cause for every
vehicle or person stopped and searched at a checkpoint. And precisely, checkpoints are intended to
allow the authorities to fish for probable cause even if in the beginning there was none. This makes,
to my mind, the setting up of checkpoints unconstitutional. 

[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996.]

 COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION,
PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM
CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY
STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS,
INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and
DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioners.

Rodriguez & Verano Law Offices and Cesar G. David for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; FOREIGN CORPORATIONS NOT DOING

BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY SUE IN PHILIPPINE COURTS; LICENSE NOT
NECESSARY. — The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not
a condition precedent to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by foreign
corporation. However, under the aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the Corporation Code, unless
it shall have the license required by law, and until it complies with the law in transacting business
here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts. As thus interpreted, any foreign
corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our courts upon any
cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the
court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but "doing business" in the Philippines without
such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other words, although
a foreign corporation is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that
It has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in
the Philippines. Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory
standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present action. There is no showing that,
under our statutory of case law, petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on
business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from
our courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the
enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in
the Philippines.

2. ID.; ID.; FOREIGN CORPORATION; "DOING BUSINESS" OR "TRANSACTING

BUSINESS", CONSTRUED. — No general rule or governing principle can be laid down as to what
constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business. Each case must be judged in the light of
its own peculiar environmental circumstances. The true tests, however, seem to be whether the
foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was
organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. As a general
proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject to such modifications as may be
necessary in view of the particular issue or of the terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a
foreign corporation is "doing", "transacting", "engaging in", or carrying on "business in the State
when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agent and is there engaged in carrying
on and transacting through them some substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually
continuous in the sense that it may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional
transactions and isolated acts. The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts
constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the
term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent,
the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in
progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT PETITIONERS ARE COPYRIGHT OWNERS OR OWNERS OF
EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION RIGHTS OF FILMS, NOT AN INDICATION OF "DOING BUSINESS". -
The fact that petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in
the Philippines motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing
business which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause of action in
local courts.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT OF AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CANNOT BE DEEMED AS

"DOING BUSINESS". — Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of
petitioners, tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising one's legal
and property rights and taking steps for the vigilant protection of said rights, particularly the
appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of themselves to be doing business here.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENGAGING IN LITIGATION, NOT WITHIN THE MEANING OF "DOING
BUSINESS". — In accordance with the rule that "doing business" imports only acts in furtherance of
the purposes for which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the mere institution and
prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the transation which is the basis of the suit took place
out of the State, do not amount to the doing of business in the State. The institution of a suit or the
removal thereof is neither the making of contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional
provision placing foreign corporations licensed to do business in the State under the same
regulations, limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic corporations. Merely
engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the
exercise of Jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.

6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO

SUE, DISTINGUISHED FROM LACK OF PERSONALITY TO SUE. — Among the grounds for a
motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint
states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of
his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the
character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality
to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state
a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account
of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest.
Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of
legal capacity to sue, whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on
the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, NOT LACK OF PERSONALITY TO
SUE, PROPER GROUND AGAINST A FOREIGN CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT A
LICENSE. — As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents' basis
for arguing that petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly being
foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents
repeatedly maintain in all their pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an
action before Philippine courts. Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground
available for barring recourse, to our courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting
business in the Philippines should properly be "lack of capacity to sue," not "lack of personality to
sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated is undeniably such, if not the
only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing
requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF LACK OF CAPACITY TO SUE; NEVER INTENDED TO

INSULATE FROM SUIT UNSCRUPULOUS ESTABLISHMENT FOR VIOLATION OF LEGAL
RIGHTS OF UNSUSPECTING FOREIGN FIRMS. — The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on
failure to first acquire a local license is based on considerations of public policy. It was never intended
to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid
obligations or violation of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because they
are not licensed to do business in the country.

9. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; RULING IN CENTURY FOX CASE

(164 SCRA 655), WITH NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. — Mindful as we are of the
ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view
that the 20th Century Fox ruling (164 SCRA 655) calling for the production of the master tape of the
copyrighted films for determination of probable cause cannot be retroactively applied to the instant
case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that
"(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the
same Code declares that "(j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines." Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be
considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create law. While it is true that Judicial
decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the
Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decision, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of
what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself. Interpreting
the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the above disquisition, this
Court emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that the principle of prospectivity applies
not only to original or amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and
properly so, to judicial decisions.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — Our holding in the earlier case of People vs. Jabinal echoes
the rationale for this judicial declaration, viz.: Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not
laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of
the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of the legal system." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a
part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed, since this Court's construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim
"legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law. . . , but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof .
 11. ID.; COURTS; JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION BECOMES PART OF THE LAW OF THE
LAND AS OF THE DATE THAT LAW WAS ORIGINALLY PASSED; QUALIFICATION. — It is
consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and
a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in
good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if
there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

12. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; RULING IN CENTURY FOX CASE

(164 SCRA 655) SERVES AS A GUIDEPOST IN DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES ONLY WHERE THERE IS DOUBT AS TO THE TRUE
NEXUS BETWEEN THE MASTER TAPE AND THE PIRATED COPIES. — The supposed
pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as
a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where
there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful
reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was
hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement
cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition,
otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of
overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN CENTURY FOX CASE (164 SCRA 655) DOES NOT RULE OUT
USE OF TESTIMONIAL OR DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. — It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as
the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the
presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of
probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that
in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstrations
involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure, however,
does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other
classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, especially where the production in court
of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its
evidentiary value.

14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS IN THE

ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS. — Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory
provisions relating to search warrants prohibit their issuance except on a showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants on loose, vague,
or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the purpose to protect against all general searches. Indeed,
Article III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides that any evidence
obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
 15. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; MANDATORY
REQUIREMENT OF EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. — The constitutional (Sections 2 and 3,
Article III) and statutory (Sections 3,4,5 of Rule 126 of the Rule of Court) provisions of various
jurisdictions requiring a showing of probable cause before a search warrant can be issued are
mandatory and must be complied with, and such a showing has been held to be an unqualified
condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not based on probable cause is a
nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.

16. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, CONSTRUED. — At best, the term "probable cause" has
been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged, or the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite an
honest belief in a reasonable mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of
the magistrate that the charge made by the applicant for the warrant is true. Probable cause does not
mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the
existence of probable cause is not concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has
been or is being committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether the
affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief. The requirement is less than certainty or proof , but more
than suspicion or possibility. In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refused to issue,
the warrant as soon as practicable after the application therefor is filed, the facts warranting the
conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the time of such judicial determination by
necessarily using legal standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to
be crafted thereafter.

17. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE THEREOF. — The prescribed
procedure for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) the examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and his witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized; (2) an examination personally conducted by the judge in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on facts
personally known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted, which were duly attached to the records.

18. COMMERCIAL LAW; P.D. 49 (DECREE ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY); INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT, CONSTRUED. — The essence of intellectual piracy
should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate
understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and
occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of
copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any
person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is
conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.

19. ID.; ID.; INFRINGEMENT; COPY OF A PIRACY IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE

ORIGINAL. — A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the
pirate, in such cases, did not know what works he was indirectly copying, or did not know whether
or not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and
he copied at his peril. In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from
the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary
that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the
value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and
to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy.

20. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; MUST

PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THINGS TO BE SEIZED. — A search warrant may be said to
particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses
a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search
and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court). If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the
said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen
such evidence (Bache and co., Phil., Inc., et al. vs. Ruiz, et al.).

21. COMMERCIAL LAW; P.D. 49 (DECREE ON PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY); REGISTRATION AND DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT, PREREQUISITE ONLY TO A SUIT
FOR DAMAGES. — It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the
registration and deposit requirements under Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking
the court's protective mantle in copyright infringement cases. As explained by the court below: As
correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors, the Department of Justice has resolved this
legal question as far back as December 12, 1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50 do not apply to cinematographic works
and PD No. 49 "had done away with the registration and deposit of cinematographic works" and that
"even without prior registration and deposit of a work which may be entitled to protection under the
Decree, the creator can file action for infringement of its rights." He cannot demand, however,
payment of damages arising from infringement. The same opinion stressed that "the requirements of
registration and deposit are thus retained under the Decree, not as conditions for the acquisition of
copyright and other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for damages." The statutory interpretation of
the Executive Branch being correct, is entitled (to) weight and respect.

22. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS THEREUNDER SUBSISTS FROM MOMENT OF CREATION. — Section 2

of the decree prefaces its enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit statement that "the
rights granted under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the
following classes of works." This means that under the present state of the law, the copyright for a
work is acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in the absence of
registration and deposit.

23. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF AUTHORITY OR CONSENT TO SELL, LEASE, DISTRIBUTE OR

CIRCULATE COPYRIGHTED FILMS CONSTITUTES FILM PIRACY; LICENSE FROM THE
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, NOT A BAR TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
— This case has been fought on the basis of, and its resolution long delayed by resort to, technicalities
to a virtually abusive extent by private respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce any
credible evidence showing that they conduct their business legitimately and fairly. The fact that
private respondents could not show proof of their authority or that there was consent from the
copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate petitioners' copyrighted films
immeasurably bolsters the lower courts initial finding of probable cause. That private respondents
are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does not insulate from criminal and civil liability for
their unlawful business practices.

||| (Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110318, [August 28, 1996], 329 PHIL 875-932)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 76649-51. August 19, 1988.]
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M.
BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE LEDESMA, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Office for petitioner.
B.C. Salazar & Associates for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURE; IMPORTANCE. — The constitutional right provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the present
Constitution protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his privacy and liberty
as to his person, papers and effects. We have explained in the case of People v. Burgos (144 SCRA 1)
citing Villanueva v.Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important: "'It is deference to one's
personality that lies at the core of this right but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa
v.United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose
who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not
only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him.
There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v.California, 384 US
757 [1966],Brennan, J. and Boyd v.United States, 116 630 [1886]).In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]),could fitly characterize
constitutional right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is
no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.' (ibid, p. 74).'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT; RESTRICTED BY THE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES PROVISION. — The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers
and effects is circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches and seizures provision of
the Constitution.
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;PROBABLE CAUSE; DEFINED. — In the case of Burgos,Sr. v. Chief of Staff , AFP
(133 SCRA 800),we defined probable cause for a valid search "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."
4. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF COMPLAINANT OR WITNESSES, REQUIRED. —
This constitutional provision also demands "no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or
his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified" in order to
convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of a probable cause. (Alvarez v.Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v.Chief
of Staff, AFP, supra).
5. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, PRESENTATION OF MASTER TAPES
ALLEGEDLY COPIED IS NECESSARY. — The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity
or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the
applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
6. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;GENERAL WARRANTS, A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. —
In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP supra, we stated: "Another factor which makes the search
warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants." Undoubtedly, a similar conclusion can be deduced from the description of the articles
sought to be confiscated under the questioned search warrants. Television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged
in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and
appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving
piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles
without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating an Anti-
Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation of all items
found in any video store.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-PIRACY LAW; COURTS MUST NOT IMPOSE OBSTACLES IN ANTI-
FILM PIRACY CAMPAIGN; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. HOWEVER, MUST BE SAFEGUARDED.
— The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of much needed
revenues but is also an indication of the widespread breakdown of national order and discipline.
Courts should not impose any unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy campaign.
However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards. To say that the problem of
pirated films can be solved only by the use of unconstitutional shortcuts is to denigrate the long
history and experience behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill of Rights.
DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J p:

The petitioner questions the application of the constitutional provision against illegal
searches and seizures to raids conducted in connection with the government's anti-film piracy
campaign. The main issue hinges on whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants
he issued earlier upon the application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the
complaint filed by the petitioner.
 In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of
searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a
flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection
of Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the
outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search
warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The applications were
consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132. prLL
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.
Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided
the video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was
made and left with the private respondents.
Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private
respondents, the lower court issued an order dated October 8, 1985, lifting the three (3) search
warrants issued earlier against the private respondents by the court. The dispositive portion of the
order reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that Search Warrants Nos. SW-85-024;
issued against Eduardo M. Barreto of the Junction Video, etc.,Parañaque, Metro
Manila; SW No. 85-025, issued against Raul M. Sagullo of South Video Bug Center,
Inc.,etc.,also of No. 5355 Pres. Avenue BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila; and SW
No. 85-026, issued against Fortune A. Ledesma of Sonix Video Services of San Antonio
Plaza, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, be lifted.

"Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of the three search warrants
which could not be a basis of any criminal prosecution, now in the possession of the
National Bureau of Investigation which under the law must be delivered to this Court,
but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby ordered to be returned to their owners
through their lawyer, Atty. Benito Salazar or his agents or representatives, against
proper receipt, to be forwarded to this Court for record purposes, as proof that said
properties have been returned to the possession of the rightful owners." (p. 34, Rollo)

The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in its order
dated January 2, 1986. llcd
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the October
8, 1985 and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue hinges on the meaning of "probable cause" within the context of the
constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section 3, Article IV, 1973
Constitution, now, Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the questioned search warrants after
finding the existence of a probable cause justifying their issuance. According to the petitioner, the
lower court arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's two
witnesses which were taken through searching questions and answers by the lower court.
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution which substantially reproduces Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution on illegal searches and seizures provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."

This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his
privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We have explained in the case of People v.
Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:

"'It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right but it could
be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US
293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects
he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have
access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation,
his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion
by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and
to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966],Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 630 [1886]).In the same vein,
Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court
[1966]),could fitly characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value
human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.' (ibid, p.
74)."

The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers and effects is
circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution. llcd
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133 SCRA 800),we defined probable cause for
a valid search "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This constitutional provision
also demands "no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified" in order to convince the judge, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of a
probable cause. (Alvarez v. Court of First Instance,64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP,supra).
 In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the
private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said
search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that
infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower
court stated in its questioned order dated January 2, 1986:

"According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the
application for the three search warrants testified of their own personal knowledge.
Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of the
Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video cassettes that were
pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The witness
Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without stating the manner it
was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.

"On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly
pirated tapes was from master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century
Fox, because, according to him, it is of his personal knowledge.

"At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty.
Albino Reyes testified that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the
NBI, the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made
comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master
tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare
statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand.

"Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of

criminal cases under PD 49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is
required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause, that
probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time-honored precept that
proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be interpreted
in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the alleged
offender.

xxx xxx xxx

"This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been
enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973 Constitution.

"So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were
viewed by the NBI and were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from
the respondents' establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by
competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey
debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of respondents
herein.

"But the glaring fact is that 'Cocoon,' the first video tape mentioned in the
search warrant, was not even duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines.
(Annex C of Opposition p. 152 record).So, that lacking in the requisite presentation to
the Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased
 evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents, there
was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the film of
the complainant Twentieth Century Fox." (pp. 37-39, Rollo)

xxx xxx xxx

The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the
lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes
of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.
All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it lifted the three
questioned search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to the petitioner's allegation that the
lower court based its January 2, 1986 order only "on the fact that the original or master copies of
the copyrighted films were not presented during the application for search warrants, thus leading
it to conclude that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses." (p. 17, Rollo)
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films
were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have
in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation
of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or
copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly
were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the
petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of
the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the
court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.
This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. LLphil
Furthermore, we note that the search warrants described the articles sought to be seized as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,

accessories, equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the
unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video
tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described." (p 26,
Rollo)
  

In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP supra, we stated:

xxx xxx xxx

"Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration

constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The
search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

"'1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment,

typewriters, cabinets, tables communications/recording equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the 'WE FORUM'
newspaper and any related to the WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all
document/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the 'WE FORUM'
newspaper.

"'2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to

promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and

"'3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the `WE FORUM'

and other subversive materials and propaganda, more.

"1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

"'2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;

"'3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

"'4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. NBS 542;

"'5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with
marking 'Bagong Silang.'

"In Stanford v. State of Texas (379 U.S. 476, 13 L ed 2nd 431),the search warrant
which authorized the search for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas,'
was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner,
directions to 'seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise' have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which
authorized the seizure of any 'paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec 54-197
of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]'
was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid (68 Am. Jur. 2d.,pp. 736-
737).The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently." (at pp. 814-815)

Undoubtedly, a similar conclusion can be deduced from the description of the articles
sought to be confiscated under the questioned search warrants.
 Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which can
be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out
betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a
legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that
they were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general
which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually
happened in the instant case. Thus, the lower court, in its questioned order dated October 8, 1985
said:

"Although the applications and warrants themselves covered certain articles of

property usually found in a video store, the Court believes that the search party
should have confined themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence
constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual property,
but not to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to, a legitimate
business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of copyright
laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax tapes,
video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected in the Returns of Search
Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged in the video tape industry, and
which could not be the subject of seizure. The applicant and his agents therefore
exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate personal property usually
found in a video cassette store or business establishment." (p. 33, Rollo)

All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it lifted
the search warrants it earlier issued against the private respondents. We agree with the appellate
court's findings to the effect that:

"An assiduous examination of the assailed orders reveal that the main ground
upon which the respondent Court anchored said orders was its subsequent findings
that it was misled by the applicant (NBI) and its witnesses 'that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed when it issued the
questioned warrants.' Stated differently, the respondent Court merely corrected its
erroneous findings as to the existence of probable cause and declared the search and
seizure to be unreasonable. Certainly, such action is within the power and authority of
the respondent Court to perform, provided that it is not exercised in an oppressive or
arbitrary manner. Indeed, the order of the respondent Court declaring the existence of
probable cause is not final and does not constitute res judicata.

"A careful review of the record of the case shows that the respondent Court did
not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned orders. Grave
abuse of discretion 'implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.' But far
from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders were motivated by a noble desire
of rectifying an error, much so when the erroneous findings collided with the
constitutional rights of the private respondents. In fact, the petitioner did not even
 contest the righteousness and legality of the questioned orders but instead
concentrated on the alleged denial of due process of law." (pp. 44-45, Rollo)

The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of much
needed revenues but is also an indication of the widespread breakdown of national order and
discipline. Courts should not impose any unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the anti-film
piracy campaign. However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards. To
say that the problem of pirated films can be solved only by the use of unconstitutional shortcuts is
to denigrate the long history and experience behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill of
Rights. The trial court did not commit reversible error. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76649-51, [August 19, 1988], 247 PHIL
624-637)

*STARE DECISIS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 189698. December 1, 2009.]
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION

NACHURA, J p:
"In our predisposition to discover the 'original intent' of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars
of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises
thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune
and irrelevant to our day". 1 It is in this light that we should address the instant case.
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4 (a) of Resolution
No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In view of pressing contemporary events, the
petition begs for immediate resolution.
The Antecedents
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES". Section 11 thereof reads:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot. — The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in
an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be
arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space
where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate
the official ballot shall be provided. cHCSDa
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty
(120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the
certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under
the Party-List System as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the
Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which
the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the
printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission
may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial
number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by
inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine and that
identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are
provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1)
ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct. 2
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No.
9369, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED 'AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY,
CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED
ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES'". Section 13 of
the amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus: cSaATC
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Section 15. Official Ballot. — The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display
and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled
and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where
practicable, electronic displays must be constructed to present the names of all candidates for the
same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to
present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees
all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to review
and change all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each position to
be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly
indicated using the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot,
as preferred by the female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be
uniformly indicated using the same font and size.
"A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
"For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files
his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at
the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
"Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates within thirty
(30) days before the start of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy.
"With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed by the National
Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private
printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may
contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and
deputized citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the printing, storage and
distribution of official ballots. HEITAD
"To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the
necessary safeguards, such as, but not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink,
microprinting, are provided on the ballot.
"The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one ballot
for every registered voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct." 3
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, 4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy. — a) Any person holding a public appointive office
or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on
regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall
be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their
CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections, 5 filed the instant petition for prohibition
and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4 (a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null
and void. 
The Petitioners' Contention
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed
Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the
purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance
filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing.
In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Petitioners then
assert that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices
when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They
should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period
when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. 6 ECaHSI
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect
to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon
the filing of their CoCs.
Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon
the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.
The Respondent's Arguments
On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit. Petitioners
have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the
COMELEC resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for judicial
determination. Petitioners have admitted that they are merely planning to file their CoCs for the
coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is thus merely speculative and
contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise contends that petitioners availed of the
wrong remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the latter's
rule-making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an improper remedy. 9
On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion
in phrasing Section 4 (a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The OSG,
however, agrees with petitioners that there is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be
resolved. According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso
facto resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the same day that they file their CoCs,
because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this "deemed resigned"
provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our present
election laws with the innovations brought about by the automated system. 10
Our Ruling
I.
At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their
petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power.
Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to
question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial
function. 11 Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners actually seek from
the Court is a determination of the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights
thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory relief, 12 over which this Court does not
exercise original jurisdiction. 13 aTICAc
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both
the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the
instant petition.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state
interest involved in their early resolution — the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has
already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their
employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at
the same time, crippling the government's manpower — further dictate that the Court must, for
propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication
of all, especially the constitutional, issues.
In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of
procedure and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle
that the Rules were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not
to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves
to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. 14
II.
To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the brief history of the assailed
provision. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as follows:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files
his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at
the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. 15
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No. 9369.
The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the
Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. — Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. acCTSE
It may be recalled — in inverse chronology — that earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296, or the 1978
Election Code, contained a similar provision, thus —
SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. — Every person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his
office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall
continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of candidacy,
subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in its Section 23 the
following:
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. — Every person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
every officer or employee in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in
his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a
certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which he
may have incurred.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code approved on June 21, 1947,
also provided that —
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are candidates. — Every
person holding a public appointive office or position shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on
the date he files his certificate of candidacy.
During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE
FOR THE NEXT ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING
THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR", approved on January 5, 1946, contained, in the last
paragraph of its Section 2, the following:
A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its political
subdivisions or agencies or government-owned or controlled corporations, whether such office by
appointive or elective, shall be considered to have resigned from such office from the moment of the
filing of such certificate of candidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST ELECTION
FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS
THEREOF", enacted without executive approval on June 22, 1941, the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only
provided for automatic resignation of elective, but not appointive, officials. cCaDSA
Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22, 1938, had, in its Section 22,
the same verbatim provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180. 
The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election Law enacted by
the Philippine Commission in 1907, the last paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers. — . . . .
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he be eligible during the
time that he holds said public office to election, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election,
except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First
Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary
or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take any part in
any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being deprived of his office and
being disqualified to hold any public office whatever for a term of five years: Provided, however,
That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the
right to vote at any election.
From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 — that any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy — traces its roots to the
period of the American occupation.
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be consolidated with House
Bill No. 5352 and enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill,
acknowledged that the said proviso in the proposed legislative measure is an old provision which
was merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus —
Senator Osmeña.
May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion of the good Sponsor. This reads like, "ANY
PERSON HOLDING [means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION. . . SHALL BE
CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED" [which means that the prohibition extends only to
appointive officials] "INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES". . . This is a prohibition, Mr. President. This means if one is chairman of SSS or PDIC,
he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his certificate of candidacy. Is that the intention?
Senator Gordon.
This is really an old provision, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña.
It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee amendment. DAcSIC
Senator Gordon.
No, it has always been there.
Senator Osmeña.
I see.
Senator Gordon.
I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage, especially certain people.
Senator Osmeña.
All right.
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago expressed her concern over
the inclusion of the said provision in the new law, given that the same would be disadvantageous
and unfair to potential candidates holding appointive positions, while it grants a consequent
preferential treatment to elective officials, thus —
Senator Santiago. On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I make this point more as a
matter of record than of any feasible hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come to a
division of the House, it will be upheld by the majority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21. The proviso begins: "PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON
HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICE. . .SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED
FROM HIS/HER OFFICE".
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this Hall is that there is, for me, no
valid reason for exempting elective officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by the
law. If we are going to consider appointive officers of the government, including AFP members and
officers of government-owned and controlled corporations, or any other member of the appointive
sector of the civil service, why should it not apply to the elective sector for, after all, even senators
and congressmen are members of the civil service as well?
Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to give an exception to itself
which is not available to other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the answer is, the
reason why we are special is that we are elected. Since we are imposing a disqualification on all other
government officials except ourselves, I think, it is the better part of delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as
well, so that if we want to stay as senators, we wait until our term expires. But if we want to run for
some other elective office during our term, then we have to be considered resigned just like
everybody else. That is my proposed amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the distinguished
Sponsor, because of sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of. It is a good policy.
However, this is something that is already in the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court in
a recent case that the rider was not upheld and that it was valid. 17
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil
servants must have been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following
during the period of amendments: "ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT
THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC". 18 The said proviso
seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons
who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the
tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start
of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates.
Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436
contained a similar provision on automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their
CoCs for any office other than that which they hold in a permanent capacity or for President or Vice-
President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act, 19 in 2001, this
provision was repealed by Section 14 20 of the said act. There was, thus, created a situation of
obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not. EcAHDT
This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary 21 when
it ruled that —
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature
of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except
to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed
it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in
the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by
them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification. TEHIaA 
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 22
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fariñas, was intently focused on the main issue of
whether the repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it
unwittingly failed to ascertain with stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the provision on
automatic resignation of persons holding appointive positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-à-vis the
equal protection clause. Moreover, the Court's vision in Fariñas was shrouded by the fact that
petitioners therein, Fariñas et al., never posed a direct challenge to the constitutionality of Section 66
of the OEC. Fariñas et al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional grounds, the repealing clause,
or Section 14 of the Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration inFariñas may then very
well be considered as an obiter dictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge
advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown
above, was based on provisions dating back to the American occupation, is violative of the equal
protection clause.
But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the issues on legal standing and
on the existence of an actual controversy.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. 23 In this case, petitioners allege that they will be directly affected
by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the
2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs,
they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the
COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to
raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on
candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public
officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation;
laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. 24 The
Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the
assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights. 25 DcHSEa
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a
liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. 26
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited
to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. 27 The Court, in this case, finds
that an actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a
precise manner that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the
provision — they would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed
provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it
presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy. 28
IV.
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the Court now delves into the
constitutional challenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental
freedoms, those of expression and of association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft,
29 viz.:
Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter to the local
newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an
official building to seek redress of grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First
Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly defined concept of public order and
safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy the individual
wishes to expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of projecting his message to
the public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an effective means for
protest at one point in time may not seem so effective at a later date. The dilettante who participates
in a picket line may decide to devote additional time and resources to his expressive activity. As his
commitment increases, the means of effective expression changes, but the expressive quality remains
constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or to publish the newspaper. At one point in time he
may decide that the most effective way to give expression to his views and to get the attention of an
appropriate audience is to become a candidate for public office-means generally considered among
the most appropriate for those desiring to effect change in our governmental systems. He may seek to
become a candidate by filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of
a political party. And in the latter instance, the individual's expressive activity has two dimensions:
besides urging that his views be the views of the elected public official, he is also attempting to
become a spokesman for a political party whose substantive program extends beyond the particular
office in question. But Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may
not become a candidate and may not engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as a
candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be the most important expression an
individual can summon, namely that which he would be willing to effectuate, by means of concrete
public action, were he to be selected by the voters. aEAcHI
It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also affects the freedom to
associate. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election
system that made it virtually impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court
found that the First Amendment protected the freedom to associate by forming and promoting a
political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state effectively denied a party access to
its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects associational rights,
albeit in a slightly different way. An individual may decide to join or participate in an organization or
political party that shares his beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas. And at
some juncture his supporters and fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person to
carry the group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus restrict the options available to political
organization as the Cranston charter provision has done is to limit the effectiveness of association;
and the freedom to associate is intimately related with the concept of making expression effective.
Party access to the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery to
carry the party's programs to the people are precluded from doing so because those nominees are
civil servants.
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual expression or
associational effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office. The
fact of candidacy alone may open previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may be
invited to discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may be able to secure equal time on television to
elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover his candidacy; he may be invited to
debate before various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views. In short, the fact
of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities that are not available to even the most
diligent of picketers or the most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for public office
is not an interest protected by the First Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier
era when public office was the preserve of the professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold
that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment right and a fundamental interest. Hence any
legislative classification that significantly burdens that interest must be subjected to strict equal
protection review. 30 EAISDH
Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of
Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the
opportune time for the Court to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal
protection clause and for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective
ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial
distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not
justify such differential treatment. 
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, 31 a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal — a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirement — if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his
treatise on constitutional law, explains,
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to
the purpose of the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and
women will justify the prohibition of the latter from employment as miners or stevedores or in other
heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification, however, the law cannot provide
for a lower passing average for women in the bar examinations because physical strength is not the
test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than locally
assembled automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no
justification for treating them differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations.
The source of the vehicle has no relation to the observance of these rules. 32 DHIaTS
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as
long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. 33
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the
purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. 34 The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign
rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected
Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development,
interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive
offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the
elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let
us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the
resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his
certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.
Mancuso v. Taft, 35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation, which restricts
the rights of civil servants to run for office — a right inextricably linked to their freedom of
expression and association, is not reasonably necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest. Thus,
in striking down a similar measure in the United States, Mancuso succinctly declares —
In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review, however, we do see some
contemporary relevance of the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order for
the Cranston charter provision to withstand strict scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion of
all government employees from candidacy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. And, as
stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see Wisconsin State Employees,
supra; Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial interest in protecting the integrity
of its civil service. It is obviously conceivable that the impartial character of the civil service would be
seriously jeopardized if people in positions of authority used their discretion to forward their
electoral ambitions rather than the public welfare. Similarly if a public employee pressured other
fellow employees to engage in corrupt practices in return for promises of post-election reward, or if
an employee invoked the power of the office he was seeking to extract special favors from his
superiors, the civil service would be done irreparable injury. Conversely, members of the public,
fellow-employees, or supervisors might themselves request favors from the candidate or might
improperly adjust their own official behavior towards him. Even if none of these abuses actually
materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might seriously erode the public's confidence in its
public employees. For the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the impartiality itself;
the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office who is running for the local zoning board has
access to confidential files which could provide "pressure" points for furthering his campaign is
destructive regardless of whether the clerk actually takes advantage of his opportunities. For all of
these reasons we find that the state indeed has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and
impartiality of its public work force. HTaSEA
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a flat prohibition on
office-seeking of all kinds by all kinds of public employees-as even reasonably necessary to
satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice Marshall pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, "[s]tatutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 'precision'". For three sets of reasons we conclude
that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-handed manner and hence
must fall under the equal protection clause. First, we think the nature of the regulation-a broad
prophylactic rule-may be unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting
some sort of prophylactic rule may be required, the provision here prohibits candidacies for all types
of public office, including many which would pose none of the problems at which the law is aimed.
Third, the provision excludes the candidacies of all types of public employees, without any attempt to
limit exclusion to those employees whose positions make them vulnerable to corruption and conflicts
of interest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
V.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections.
This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government
to wield influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who
occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with
them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained,
subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These
qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the
citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is the
essence of democracy. 
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.
Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such
a sweeping scale. 36 cCAaHD
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict
guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all
governmental power emanates from them.
Mancuso v. Taft, 37 on this point, instructs —
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of the leave of
absence. Some system of leaves of absence would permit the public employee to take time off to
pursue his candidacy while assuring him his old job should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover,
a leave of absence policy would eliminate many of the opportunities for engaging in the questionable
practices that the statute is designed to prevent. While campaigning, the candidate would feel no
conflict between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor any conflict between
his efforts to persuade the public and his access to confidential documents. But instead of adopting a
reasonable leave of absence policy, Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public employee
cast off the security of hard-won public employment should he desire to compete for elected office.
The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by enforcing, through
dismissal, discipline, or criminal prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of interests, bribery,
or other forms of official corruption. By thus attacking the problem directly, instead of using a broad
prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without unduly burdening the First Amendment
rights of its employees and the voting rights of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein, the
Supreme Court faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted that the interest of
"ballot box purity" justified its imposition of one year and three month residency requirements before
a citizen could vote. Justice Marshall stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of
criminal statutes that could be used to punish voter fraud without unnecessary infringement on the
newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears from the record in this case that the Cranston charter
contains some provisions that might be used against opportunistic public employees.
Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that Cranston has put much effort
into tailoring a narrow provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the problem. The
charter forbids a Cranston public employee from running for any office, anywhere. The prohibition is
not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but rather extends to statewide offices and even to
national offices. It is difficult for us to see that a public employee running for the United States
Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same employee if he were
running for a local office where the contacts and information provided by his job related directly to
the position he was seeking, and hence where the potential for various abuses was greater. Nor does
the Cranston charter except the public employee who works in Cranston but aspires to office in
another local jurisdiction, most probably his town of residence. Here again the charter precludes
candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil service. Finally, the charter does not limit
its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but sterilizes also those public employees who would seek
nonpartisan elective office. The statute reviewed in Mitchell was limited to partisan political activity,
and since that time other courts have found the partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material one. See
Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between
nonpartisan and partisan can often be blurred by systems whose true characters are disguised by the
names given them by their architects, it seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the
temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from regular
party politics to warrant distinctive treatment in a charter of this sort. ScEaAD
The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston charter relates not to
the type of office sought, but to the type of employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas pointed
out in his dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative
employees who either participate in decision-making or at least have some access to information
concerning policy matters are much more justifiable than restrictions on industrial employees, who,
but for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in, are, for purposes of access to official
information, identically situated to all other industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia
mint could be distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Department of Agriculture; so also
could a janitor in the public schools of Cranston be distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the
same city. A second line of distinction that focuses on the type of employee is illustrated by the cases
of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In both of these cases a civil service deputy decided to run for the
elected office of sheriff. The courts in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in question were
much too broad and indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to justify a flat rule
was one in which an inferior in a public office electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given
all these considerations, we think Cranston has not given adequate attention to the problem of
narrowing the terms of its charter to deal with the specific kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it
seeks to avoid.
We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will drain the energy of
the public employee to the extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that
inevitable on-the-job campaigning and discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others.
Although it is indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the performance of official work,
the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the city could fire the
individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts the work of others. Also,
the efficiency rationale common to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies equally
well to a number of non-political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston
charter. Finally, the connection between after-hours campaigning and the state interest seems
tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to campaign aggressively and still continue
to do his job well. 38
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing 39 sustained as constitutional a provision on the automatic
resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District
Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of
the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys, County Attorneys, Public
Weighers, and Constables if they announce their candidacy or if they become candidates in any
general, special or primary election. TCHcAE
In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular officials, as
distinguished from all others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law, merits
the stamp of approval from American courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping provision, and
more so one violative of the second requisite for a valid classification, which is on its face
unconstitutional.
On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we copied the provision
in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional. It is high-time
that we, too, should follow suit and, thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren,
restrictions to such freedoms.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, [December 1, 2009], 621 PHIL 236-375)
J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., vs. Mariano
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON,
petitioners, vs. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
 Rizal, MANUELA AQUAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA,
respondents.
- | 1978-10-23

DECISION

AQUINO, J:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas
of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).

On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the
owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the
north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio Tiburcio, on the east by Sapang
Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat. The land, which has an area of three hundred
eighty-three quiñones, was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to
him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).

They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that
land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa,
Juan, Demetrio and Augusto, all surnamed Tuason, pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in
Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.

They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to
defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.

Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to
certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.

Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The
lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in
the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary
hearing be held on those defenses.

On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven
hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.

On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of
Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title
derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of
the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed
by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.

On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint
and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ
of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The
parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument.

The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour
by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding,
which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues
raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio
Mencias in those cases, invalidating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is
cited by them to support their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in
court.

On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles
derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128
and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July
25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the
following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil.
183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 477; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612;
Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42;
Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents
and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova
cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the
courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

"It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again,
consuming the courts' time and energies et the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis
sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to
dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.

SO ORDERED
 *RES JUDICATA
THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES WILLIE A.
DENATE and MYRNA LO DENATE, respondents.
G.R. No. 114928 | 1997-01-21

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner, The Andresons Group, Inc., questions the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which set
aside the two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 122 which denied private
respondents' Motion to Dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground of lis pendens.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, show that private respondent Willy Denate entered into
an agency agreement with petitioner as its commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits (wines
and liquors) in Davao city, three Davao provinces and North Cotabato.

On November 18, 1991, private respondents filed a civil action for collection of sum of money against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 21, 061-91. In the
complaint, private respondent Willie Denate alleged that he was entitled to the amount of
P882,107.95, representing commissions from petitioner but that the latter had maliciously failed and
refused to pay the same.

A month later, or on December 19, 1991, petitioner likewise filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money with damages and prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against private
respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
15214. Petitioner alleged in the complaint that private respondent still owed it the sum of
P1,618,467.98 after deducting commissions and remittances.

On February 5, 1992, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. C-15214 with the
Kalookan RTC on the ground that there was another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, citing the case earlier filed with the RTC of Davao City.

On February 14, 1992, petitioner filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
RTC of Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over it.

On April 24, 1992, the RTC of Kalookan City issued the questioned order, the decretal portion of
which states:

The Court finds the instant motion without merit.

Admittedly, the Davao case involves the same parties, and involves substantial identity in the case of
action and reliefs sought, as in the instant case.

Perusal of the record in this case, however, shows that jurisdiction over the parties has already been
acquired by this Court, as herein defendants received their summons as early as January 8, 1992, and
the plaintiff's prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment has been set for hearing last
January 21, 1992, but which hearing was cancelled until further notice because of the filing of the
instant motion to dismiss by the defendants herein on February 17, 1992, after asking for extension of
time to file their responsive pleading. Clearly, the instant case has been in progress as early as
January of this year. On the other hand, the summons in the Davao case has not yet been served as of
April 21, 1992, the date of the hearing of the instant motion, so much so that the said Davao Court has
not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties.

On May 29, 1992, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
trial court on July 1, 1992. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which set aside the
order of the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

The sole issue set for resolution before the Court is: Should the action in the Kalookan RTC be
dismissed on the ground of lis pendens?

We hold in the affirmative.

Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. 2 To constitute the defense of
lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same but there is
substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought. 3 Further, it is required that the identity
be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata on the case on hand. 4

All these requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in the Davao and Caloocan cases are
the same. They are suing each other for sums of money which arose from their contract of agency. As
observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the same facts and there is identity
of rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case would amount to res judicata in the other.

In conceptualizing lis pendens, we have said that like res judicata asa doctrine, litis pendentia is a
sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. 5 The principle upon which a plea of another
action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious. 6

Petitioner asserts that the Davao Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties as the
summons had not been served as of April 21, 1992 and it claims that pendency of a case, as
contemplated by the law on lis pendens, presupposes a valid service of summons.

This argument is untenable. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. 7 The
phraseology adopted in the Rules of Court merely states that another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause is a ground for motion to dismiss. As worded, the rule does not
contemplate that there be a prior pending action, since it is enough that there is a pending action. 8
Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens should apply.

In Salacup v. Maddela, 9 we said:

The rule of lis pendens refers to another action. An action starts only upon the filing of a complaint in
court.

The fact that when appellant brought the present case, it did not know of the filing of a previous case
against it by appellees, and it received the summons and a copy of the complaint only after it had
filed its own action against them, is immaterial. Suffice it to state that the fact is, at the time it brought
the present case, there was already another pending action between the same parties seeking to assert
identical rights with identical prayers for relief based on the same facts, the decision in which would
be res judicata herein.

It must be emphasized that the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield
to the earlier. 10 The criterion used in determining which case should be abated is which is the more
appropriate action 11 or which court would be "in a better position to serve the interests of justice." 12

Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money collected in and
around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to hear and try the case, as the
witnesses and evidence would be coming from said area.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.