Ethnic and Racial Studies

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Affective solidarities or group boundaries?

Muslims’ place in America’s racial and religious
order

Aaron Ponce

To cite this article: Aaron Ponce (2019): Affective solidarities or group boundaries?
Muslims’ place in America’s racial and religious order, Ethnic and Racial Studies, DOI:
10.1080/01419870.2019.1691741

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ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1691741

Affective solidarities or group boundaries? Muslims’

place in America’s racial and religious order
Aaron Ponce
Center for Research on Race and Ethnicity in Society, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA

ABSTRACT
Muslims in the U.S. have been politically targeted as a threat to the nation. Yet,
little is known about how most Americans’ attitudes are formed toward this
growing group. While often othered in terms of their religion, race-ethnicity,
and national background, Muslims also constitute the latest minority group in
America’s racialized landscape. This study draws on theories of race-ethnicity,
intergroup relations, and religious exclusion to situate Muslims relative to
existing intergroup relations in the United States. Using four waves of the
American National Election Survey, the study finds little evidence for affective
solidarities between America’s largest racial-ethnic groups and Muslims.
Instead, intergroup boundaries tend to predict lower levels of Muslim
favorability. Further, the study uncovers a religious dimension concentrated
among largely White evangelical Protestants. Findings are discussed within
the context of sociodemographic changes in the U.S., and the prospect for
shifting colour lines in the wake of increasing immigration-led diversity.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 20 June 2019; Accepted 1 November 2019

KEYWORDS Muslims; Islamophobia; group boundaries; intergroup relations; race; religion

Introduction
In contemporary American politics, Muslims have garnered attention dispro-
portionate to their numbers. Viewing Muslims as a national threat has
become a political pastime, and in recent years policymakers have
implemented bans on immigration from predominately Muslim countries.
Despite this high-level targeting, relatively little is known about how people
form their attitudes toward Muslims, particularly in the United States.
Muslim-Americans constitute a marginalized minority group within an
already racialized landscape, suggesting that other minorities could recognize
them with a level of affective solidarity. Where do Muslim Americans fit into an
already fractured and raced context, and how are Americans’ views toward
them shaped by existing intergroup relations?

CONTACT Aaron Ponce ajponce@indiana.edu; ponceaar@msu.edu @profponce

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1691741.
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 A. PONCE

This study draws on theories of racialization, intergroup boundaries, and

religious exclusion to identify the factors that shape Americans’ attitudes
toward Muslims. Muslims are a unique minority in that they are potentially
othered in terms of their religion, race-ethnicity, and national background.
Growing evidence suggests that while they are often defined in terms of
their religion, Muslims also face religious-based racialization (Cainkar 2009;
Husain 2019; Love 2017; Moosavi 2015; Selod 2018). Focusing on the contours
of racial boundaries, the current study examines how other Americans’ racial
group membership influences their favorability toward Muslims. As an
example, the unique Black Muslim tradition in the U.S. and its links to Black
communities suggest the potential for affective solidarities between Blacks
and Muslims. On the other hand, histories of often tense relations between
Blacks and Hispanics point to Blacks’ negative views of new immigrant-
origin groups.
The study also recognizes religious difference as a source of anti-Muslim
attitudes. Research on religious exclusion finds that forms of Christian nation-
alism are associated with anti-Muslim sentiment (Dahab and Omori 2019).
Similarly, religious groups like evangelical Protestants, which remain largely
White, are typically more negative of Muslims (Cimino 2005; Merino 2010).
How do race and religion, together and separately, shape Americans’ favor-
ability toward Muslims?
The current study fills a gap in the literature on race and Muslim otherness.
First, it considers both race and religion within a symbolic boundary frame-
work, thus accounting for the multiple dimensions of Muslim difference: reli-
gion, race-ethnicity, and immigrant status. Weighing these sources against
each other, the study allows for an assessment of which differences activate
symbolic boundary processes, and the interplay between these processes
and already established racial group dynamics. Further, the study provides
a new level of empirical refinement and detail. It leverages larger racial-
ethnic group subsamples than previous studies over a wider range of years,
making it possible to draw conclusions about White, Black, and Hispanic
Americans. The study also employs novel measures of racial boundaries,
filling a gap in how we understand minorities’ attitudes toward other min-
orities. Further, it differentiates dimensions of religion and uses an established
measure of religious affiliation. Findings thus become more generalizable in
their robustness and are better able to speak across theoretical literatures
to the importance of both race and religion for the study of Muslims in the U.S.

Background: Muslims in America

Muslims Americans constitute a group with diverse racial-ethnic and
national backgrounds. No single racial group forms a majority (Pew Research
Center 2017). Thus, self-identified Muslims could include Black Americans,
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 3

White Bosniaks, or Indonesian immigrants. Because of this diversity, it is

difficult to objectively classify Muslims as a single entity. However, the
demographic profile of those encompassed by the term “Muslim” – particu-
larly in the view of the public – generally includes people of immigrant back-
ground originating in the Middle East and South Asia. Immigrant families
from these regions have been part of American life since at least the early
twentieth century. Many Middle Eastern immigrants became successful
shop owners and grocers, and by mid-century came as professionals, facili-
tating later generations of wealth (Love 2017; Selod 2018). More recent
decades have witnessed migration from Middle Eastern countries like Iraq,
Kuwait, Syria, and Egypt, and South Asian countries such as Pakistan,
India, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. First and second-generation immigrants
make up three quarters of all Muslims in the U.S. (Pew Research Center
2017). Despite the racial-ethnic diversity of these groups, many come from
Muslim-majority nations, which contributes to overall public perceptions
about them.
9/11 solidified commonly-held misconceptions about Arabs and Muslims,
and set the scene for laws and policies that elevated national security con-
cerns while targeting Muslims as potential threats (Cainkar 2009; Selod
2018). The belief that Muslim communities in the U.S. secretly supported
the attacks and were complicit in hiding sleeper cells across the country
depended on pre-9/11 stereotypes of Muslims as violent, disposed to terror-
ism, and overly critical of America (Cainkar 2009). After 9/11, the War on Terror
justified a widely-supported surveillance of Muslim Americans that relies on
racialized signifiers such as visible features, language, and name (Selod
2018). Thus, 9/11 and its aftermath thoroughly politicized Islam within a
global geopolitical context where radical forms of Islam and terrorism are per-
ceived as distinct local dangers (Tyrer 2013). Like no other group in recent
history, Muslims have contended with this global threat narrative that pos-
itions them against Western liberal ways of life. Their vilification is predicated
on well-worn orientalist tropes of Eastern people embodying cultural and reli-
gious backwardness that is resistant to change and, notably, contrary to
Western Judeo-Christian values (Naber 2012).
While anti-Muslim sentiment is on the rise (Edgell et al. 2016), the securiti-
zation of Muslims predates recent political memory. Shortly after 9/11, the
New York Police Department (NYPD) engaged in a systematic surveillance
programme, monitoring Muslim community leaders, mosques, student associ-
ations, businesses, and individuals (Selod 2018). The NYPD programme even
extended to neighbouring states, and targeted more devout Muslims as
NYPD leaders assumed they were more likely to radicalize (Love 2017). At a
national level, the FBI has also used sting operations in its counterterrorism
efforts, cultivating a network of tens of thousands of informants (Love
2017). This direct targeting of Muslim communities identifies confidential
4 A. PONCE

informants who are sent into the community while fabricating conflict to see
how members respond; it has largely affected the community’s youngest and
most vulnerable (Love 2017). Such policing of Muslims further solidifies public
perceptions of them.
A growing body of evidence suggests that Muslims experience systematic
racialization (Cainkar 2009; Husain 2019; Love 2017; Moosavi 2015; Naber
2012; Selod 2018). A racialized category in many ways elides Muslim diversity,
yet it plays a crucial role as a construction, or “ideal type”, with which the
public and elite generate and sustain their own deeply held biases against
this group. The racialization of Muslims closely follows stereotypes of Arabs
and other Middle Easterners since these groups are often conflated in the
public’s mind (Cainkar 2009; Love 2017). Americans have come to view
Arabs and Muslims in largely negative terms, with ascriptions tied to
specific geographic origins, symbolized by skin colour, hair type, written
script, way of dressing, and name (Cainkar 2009). The racialization process
symbolically links these ascriptions to a set of values and orientations associ-
ated with the whole group. Thus, racialization selects a dark-skinned man with
a full beard named Muhammad, or a hijabi woman from Egypt, as fundamen-
tally dangerous and destabilizing, and as covertly harbouring anti-American
sentiments.
Non-Muslims even fall victim to this racialization. Immigrants from the
same parts of the world, for instance Christian Arabs or Sikh South
Asians, often become the targets of anti-Muslim sentiment despite their
different religious affiliation (Love 2017). This racial “spillover effect”
(Tyrer 2013, 16) highlights the power of racialization processes in contem-
porary Islamophobia, where suspected individuals can “look Muslim” (Love
2017, 14).
Racialization also intersects with other salient categories like gender.
Muslim women and men face different processes of racialization and associ-
ated stereotypes: Muslim men are often seen as violent and prone to terror
and women as oppressed and in need of liberation (Selod 2018). This can
lead to different experiences, for example in the way racialization plays out
in surveillance. Muslim men have reported avoiding participation in political
and religious discussions in public for fear of being perceived as anti-Ameri-
can, while women have intentionally chosen brightly coloured hijab so as
to counter the perception of being oppressed (Selod 2018). The racialization
of Islam may also be amplified for traditionally raced groups in the U.S. For
Black Muslim women, for example, veiling offers refuge from a cultural
context that hyper-sexualizes Black female bodies (Rao 2015). The added
racialization of Islam places Black Muslim women in a precarious position
where the decision to cover or not entails multiple levels of religious, cultural,
racial, and sexual meaning.
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 5

Affective solidarities or group boundaries?

A key objective is to determine whether affective solidarities exist between
similarly marginalized groups. Here I define affective solidarities as the
acknowledgment of one’s own marginalized position in connection with
that of other marginalized groups in a way that creates a bond between
both groups.
A native Black Islamic tradition exists in the U.S. African Muslims involunta-
rily arrived as slaves, but little of their Muslim tradition survived slavery
(Gibson 2012). Native Black Americans began Muslim movements in the twen-
tieth century, connecting the Islam of Africa to their experiences in a racialized
country. The Nation of Islam (NOI), a well-known Black Islamic movement,
developed separately from immigrant-origin Muslim communities, although
it at different times appealed to traditional Islam in contrast to what followers
view as White Christianity (Berg 2009; McCloud 1995). Sweeping social and
demographic changes, namely the Great Migration and increased urbaniz-
ation and industrialization, provided the foundation for the organization’s
great success (Gibson 2012; Turner 2003). Black Islam and the NOI flourished
in many African American communities because of their message of Black
empowerment, national – and distinctly non-American – pride, and socioeco-
nomic advancement (Curtis 2006; Smith 1999).
Many Black Americans may view Islam and Muslims, whether Black or not,
in a positive light, particularly since the mainstreaming of Black Islam to dis-
tance itself from its more radical beginnings (Curtis 2006). Positive represen-
tations of Black Muslims and their reputation for being honest and
hardworking (Mamiya 1982) could also correspond with positive views
among Black Americans.
H1a: Given the visibility of Black Muslim movements in communities, Black
Americans will exhibit more positive attitudes toward Muslims.

Understanding how minorities view each other could produce insights on

their views toward Muslims. The literature on Black-brown relations shows
that Black Americans with lower education and income (Jackson, Gerber,
and Cain 1994) or in environments where they are economically disadvan-
taged (Gay 2006) are more averse to Hispanics. Ethnic concentration may
also play a role: Blacks in concentrated Black neighbourhoods hold more
negative attitudes toward Hispanics (Oliver and Wong 2003), while those
living in areas with large Hispanic growth exhibit greater intergroup trust
(Taylor and Schroeder 2010). Further, Blacks who feel racially alienated from
American society perceive greater competition with Hispanics (Bobo and
Hutchings 1996), as many see continued immigration as a loss of political
and economic opportunity (Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn 1997). More recent
evidence suggests that Blacks may identify more with Whites on the basis
6 A. PONCE

of American identity and less as racial minorities in response to Hispanic

growth (Abascal 2015).
Hispanics’ views of Blacks are found to be generally negative. Many Latinos
subscribe to negative stereotypes of Blacks, and appear to feel closer to Whites,
although Whites do not reciprocate this feeling (McClain et al. 2006). Hispanics’
panethnicity and nativity shape these attitudes. Immigrant Latinos perceive
greater competition from Blacks compared to their native-born counterparts
(Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Further, Latinos’ feelings of linked fate with each
other moderates their negative views of Blacks (McClain et al. 2006). Hispanics’
general aversion to Blacks could be tied to racial stereotypes from Latin Amer-
ican cultures (Rivera-Salgado, Sawyer, and Telles 2011, 99).
Hispanics’ views of other immigrant-origin groups, like Asian-Americans,
are not so well understood. Some research suggests that Hispanics subscribe
to the Asian “model minority” narrative (Wong et al. 1998). Other evidence
from an urban setting, however, suggests that Hispanics view Asian-Ameri-
cans as welfare dependent and hard to get along with (Johnson, Farrell,
and Guinn 1997). Yet additional evidence suggests neutrality in social dis-
tance, as neighbourhood racial composition (per cent Asian) has little effect
on Hispanics’ housing preferences (Lewis, Emerson, and Klineberg 2011).
The extant literature motivates the following hypotheses:
H1b: Black Americans, particularly those with low socioeconomic standing, will
exhibit more negative attitudes toward Muslims.
H2: Hispanics’ negative views of other minorities suggest they could exhibit
more negative attitudes toward Muslims; on the other hand, Hispanics’ group
membership could exert little influence on their attitudes.

Whether Blacks and Hispanics view Muslims negatively or positively may also
depend on whether they generate boundaries that contrast them and others.
The foundational literature on symbolic boundary making suggests that groups’
social cohesion and divisions are the product of perceived identity defined
against other racial-ethnic groups (Barth 1969). Boundaries can reflect and
create social inequalities based on class, race, or ethnicity (Lamont and Molnár
2002), with racial-ethnic differences often constituting very powerful boundaries
(Wimmer 2013). It is expected that even within the same minority group, attitudes
toward outside groups varies, with some minorities drawing intergroup bound-
aries and others finding affective solidarities. Thus, I predict that:
H3: Blacks and Hispanics who draw symbolic boundaries between themselves
will be more likely to view Muslims negatively.

Anti-Muslim sentiment
Muslims face a bright racial-ethnic boundary in much of Europe (Alba 2005)
and have increasingly faced negativity in the U.S. (Edgell et al. 2016).
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 7

Quantitative studies show that anti-Muslim sentiment has similar predictors as

general xenophobia (Helbling 2014; Strabac and Listhaug 2008), although
there is also evidence of racialization (Ponce 2019). A handful of quantitative
studies exploring Americans’ attitudes shows that a mix of race and religion
variables shape attitudes toward Muslims, with racial minorities often
showing more positive, and Christian fundamentalists or nationalists
showing more negative, attitudes (Dahab and Omori 2019; Kalkan, Layman,
and Uslaner 2009; Zainiddinov 2013). Such studies have generally not ana-
lysed race and religion simultaneously or in detail.
Research on religion and symbolic boundaries shows that White evangeli-
cals have a unique worldview that espouses a national identity that is reli-
giously and racially exclusive. Evidence suggests that White evangelicals are
less tolerant of marginalized outgroups: they are less willing to extend civil lib-
erties to unpopular groups compared to other religious Americans (Froese,
Bader, and Smith 2008; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). White evangelicals’ anti-struc-
tural and individualistic views of racial inequality further strengthen racialized
symbolic boundaries (Emerson and Smith 2000). Evangelicals and those with
exclusive theological beliefs hold more negative views of Muslims and Islam
than other religious groups (Cimino 2005; Merino 2010).
While I expect evangelicals to hold more negative views of Muslims, it is
unclear whether religion shapes racial minorities’ attitudes. The literature
points to a few possibilities. Religious Black Americans differ from White evan-
gelicals and even other Black Americans in their less individualistic approach
to inequality and their social justice orientation (Emerson and Smith 2000).
Possibly, religion’s traditional role in uniting African American communities
in the struggle against racial injustice could compel greater solidarity with
Muslims among churchgoers. For Hispanic Catholics, the historical foun-
dations of liberation theology and the church’s social involvement could
play a similar role in fostering a culture of sensitivity to injustice and, thus, soli-
darity with Muslims. Research finds that religious Blacks and Hispanics are
more likely to recognize racial inequalities, suggesting that “race influences
the way in which religious cultural schema are developed” (Edgell and
Tranby 2007, 284).
H4: Evangelical Protestants will exhibit more negative attitudes toward Muslims.

Data, measures, and methods

I use data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) for years 2004
through 2016 covering four elections cycles. ANES surveys are well-suited for
testing hypotheses about race since they can be pooled to produce
sufficiently large racial-ethnic group samples. The ANES is also unique in its
regular inclusion of a question measuring generalized attitudes toward
8 A. PONCE

Muslims, which the General Social Survey includes less frequently.1 The ANES
samples from the universe of U.S. eligible voters, and thus excludes people
with immigrant status. The survey features a dual-mode design with both
face-to-face and internet interviews; the latter mode is controlled for in all
analyses. Analyses proceed in two stages (described below) that both pool
the sample and decompose the sample into racial-ethnic subsamples.

Outcome
The outcome variable represents Americans’ favorability toward Muslims and is
measured by the standard “feeling thermometer” used to evaluate different
social groups in the ANES. Respondents are asked to rate Muslims on a
scale of 0, which represents a very cool feeling, to 100, a very warm feeling.
Respondents’ assigned rating on this scale represents their overall positive
attitudes toward Muslims. The feeling thermometer exhibits good reliability
and has been shown to correlate highly with multiple-item measures of
social distance (see, e.g. Verkuyten and Katarzyna 2005). This measure has
also been used in high-profile studies analyzing Americans’ attitudes
toward Muslims (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; Sides and Gross 2013).
ANES takes care to avoid ordering effects by randomizing the order of
groups that respondents must rate.

Predictors
Predictors for stage 1 represent respondents’ (1) racial-ethnic group member-
ship; and (2) religious belonging, behavior, and religiosity. For race, respondents
were asked to self-identify what racial or ethnic group best described them. A
series of dichotomous variables represents the following self-identified
groups: (1) non-Hispanic Whites; (2) non-Hispanic Blacks; (3) Hispanics; and
(4) Asians. Respondents who identified as Native American or multiracial are
collapsed into an “Other” category due to low numbers.
Religious belonging is measured by respondents’ affiliation with a recog-
nized religious tradition. The ANES asks a series of questions that begins
with broad religious tradition (Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism) and
drills down to measure more specific affiliation with over seventy denomina-
tions. I use the widely-used religious tradition classification scheme (reltrad)
formulated by Steensland et al. (2000) to code these data, which allows for
the recognition of America’s most socially salient religious groupings. Dichot-
omous variables are constructed that identify: (1) Evangelical Protestants; (2)
Mainline Protestants; (3) Black Protestants; (4) Catholics; and (5) Jews. Respon-
dents not captured by these groups are collapsed into an “Other” category
due to low numbers. Religious behavior is measured by a question asking
respondents how often they attend religious services. The attendance variable
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 9

captures important social and orthopraxic dimensions of religion by identify-

ing those who practice more frequently, net of their actual beliefs. Original fre-
quency categories are used to generate dichotomous variables that identify:
(1) those who never attend; (2) those who attend a few times a year; and
(3) those who attend between once a month and weekly. Religiosity is
measured by a question asking respondents whether they consider religion
an important part of their life. Those who answer yes are contrasted with all
others. Religiosity captures the subjective value that respondents place on
religion.
Predictors for stage 2 include a series of racial boundary measures. I con-
ceptualize intergroup boundaries as a function of how individuals rate their
own racial-ethnic group compared to how they rate other racial-ethnic
groups, in line with the foundational literature’s focus on perceived contrast
(Barth 1969) and with empirical studies on race relations (Valentino, Brader,
and Jardina 2013). Each respondent is asked to rate (1) Whites; (2) Blacks;
(3) Hispanics; and (4) Asians using the feeling thermometer, consistent with
their own understanding of each group. I construct three racial boundary
measures that difference respondents’ rating of their own group relative to
their rating of each other group. Higher boundary values correspond to a
stronger, more defined group boundary via lower comparative evaluations
of other racial groups.2 Racial boundary measures are used to examine the
contours of intergroup boundaries and the way they influence raced
groups’ attitudes toward Muslims.

Controls
Several respondent characteristics are included as controls following prior lit-
erature, and are described in detail in Online Supplement Table S1. I include
controls for female gender, age, level of education, low income, Republican
ideology, residence in the South, inclusion in the internet interview sample,
and dichotomous fixed-effects variables for survey year. I also include a
control for positive attitudes toward “illegal immigrants”, which is constructed
from a standard group thermometer item. Because respondents could view
Muslims as a foreign threat and part of an invasive group of immigrants, it
is important to capture the role of race and religion net of such anti-immigrant
attitudes.

Analytical strategy
Analyses proceed in two stages. Standard quantitative methods are used to
analyse the role of predictors in shaping attitudes toward Muslims net of con-
trols. In stage 1, I estimate standard OLS models to determine how racial
group membership and religious belonging, behaviour, and religiosity
10 A. PONCE

influence attitudes toward Muslims net of controls and of each other. In stage
2, I focus on how racial boundaries shape favorability toward Muslims by
decomposing the sample into separate race subsamples and by estimating
the influence of racial boundaries between and among groups.3 All analyses
include sample weighting that accounts for individuals’ probability of
selection.4

Results
Figure 1 provides a descriptive account of racial group differences in Ameri-
cans’ attitudes toward Muslims. Whites have the lowest levels of favorability
toward Muslims with a mean of 47.58 on a scale of 0 to 100. In contrast,
Asian, Hispanic, and Other raced groups show a mean that hovers around
50. Of all racial groups, Black Americans rate Muslims the highest with a
mean of 57.91. Analysis of variance shows that differences are significant
between Blacks and Whites, Hispanics and Whites, and the Other raced
group and Whites. Figure 1 thus shows that significant racial differences in
Muslim favorability exist, with Blacks exhibiting the most positive attitudes
and Whites the least.
Do racial differences remain after accounting for other expected influences?
Table 1 presents regression estimates of favourable attitudes toward Muslims
on race and religion variables. Model 1 (M1) shows that even after adding socio-
demographic controls, significant racial differences remain. Blacks have signifi-
cantly more favourable views of Muslims rating them on average 8.19 points

Figure 1. Strip plots of Muslim favorability by race. Source: American National Election
Studies 2004–2016. Note: Boxes represent interquartile range with bold median line;
cross-cutting gray line represents group means. *Significant differences in intergroup
means (reference: White).
Table 1. Regression estimates of Muslim favorability on race and religion variables.
Controls + Illegal immigrants Religion Religiosity Attendance Full model
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Race (ref.: White, non-Hispanic)
Black 8.19*** 4.66*** 2.45 4.86*** 4.84*** 2.40
(8.48) (5.02) (1.38) (5.16) (5.10) (1.35)
Hispanic 2.37** −4.22*** −4.39*** −4.19*** −4.13*** −4.36***
(2.63) (−4.63) (−4.59) (−4.57) (−4.50) (−4.54)
Asian −3.66* −4.81** −5.55*** −4.84** −4.78** −5.48***
(−2.12) (−3.02) (−3.42) (−3.03) (−3.00) (−3.37)
Other 1.59 1.04 1.25 1.02 1.11 1.30
(0.92) (0.63) (0.72) (0.62) (0.67) (0.75)
Religious tradition (ref.: None)
Evangelical Protestant −3.36*** −2.89**
(−3.96) (−2.73)
Mainline Protestant −0.46 0.17
(−0.55) (0.17)
Black Protestant 1.94 2.63
(0.97) (1.26)
Catholic 0.18 0.66

ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES

(0.23) (0.70)
Jewish −3.03 −2.49
(−1.45) (−1.14)
Other faith 4.69*** 4.99***
(4.06) (3.85)
Religiosity −0.77 −0.51
(−1.37) (−0.66)
Religious attendance (ref.: Never/NA)
Few times a year −1.02 −1.08
(−1.35) (−1.19)
At least once a month −0.49 0.01
(−0.83) (0.01)

(Continued )

11
Table 1. Continued.

12
Controls + Illegal immigrants Religion Religiosity Attendance Full model
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6

A. PONCE
Positive: Illegal Imm. 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(25.10) (24.47) (25.12) (25.12) (24.49)
Female 3.72*** 3.04*** 3.02*** 3.09*** 3.05*** 2.97***
(6.77) (5.88) (5.68) (5.93) (5.84) (5.58)
Age (std.) −2.52*** −2.29*** −2.27*** −2.29*** −2.27*** −2.34***
(−8.79) (−8.50) (−8.18) (−8.47) (−8.32) (−8.37)
Education (ref.: High school or less)
Some college/AA 4.56*** 3.77*** 3.88*** 3.74*** 3.83*** 3.87***
(6.60) (5.76) (5.79) (5.73) (5.84) (5.77)
College degree 8.18*** 5.91*** 5.95*** 5.85*** 5.93*** 5.89***
(10.60) (8.10) (7.92) (8.01) (8.10) (7.77)
Professional degree 10.68*** 7.42*** 7.40*** 7.30*** 7.47*** 7.32***
(12.89) (9.57) (9.27) (9.39) (9.64) (9.10)
Low income −2.22** −2.43** −2.19** −2.47** −2.47** −2.23**
(−2.79) (−3.24) (−2.83) (−3.29) (−3.28) (−2.87)
Republican −10.12*** −6.28*** −5.62*** −6.14*** −6.17*** −5.61***
(−17.05) (−10.68) (−9.25) (−10.33) (−10.34) (−9.15)
South −3.57*** −3.27*** −2.74*** −3.25*** −3.24*** −2.78***
(−6.17) (−5.98) (−4.83) (−5.90) (−5.88) (−4.86)
Internet interview −4.70*** −4.04*** −4.05*** −4.13*** −4.05*** −4.11***
(−6.99) (−6.26) (−6.16) (−6.42) (−6.26) (−6.27)
Constant 52.53*** 40.71*** 40.85*** 41.20*** 40.96*** 41.00***
(51.65) (37.22) (34.09) (36.03) (36.50) (34.01)
N 11,182 11,086 10,672 11,049 11,062 10,630
Adjusted R 2 0.155 0.249 0.255 0.249 0.249 0.256
AIC 101267.19 99097.09 95371.04 98754.32 98879.71 94983.86
BIC 101391.66 99228.73 95545.65 98893.21 99025.93 95180.19
Source: American National Election Studies 2004–2016.
*All models include year fixed effects (not shown).
t statistics in parentheses; probabilities based on two-tailed t-tests.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 13

higher on the thermometer scale compared to Whites. Hispanics are also signifi-
cantly more favourable of Muslims than Whites, with an average difference of
2.37 points. In contrast to descriptive results, Asians show significantly lower
evaluations of Muslims compared to Whites after accounting for sociodemo-
graphic characteristics. Respondents in the Other racial category are not statisti-
cally distinguishable from White Americans.
Groups could view Muslims as foreign outsiders who are part of an “immi-
gration problem”. Model 2 (M2) further controls for respondents’ attitudes
toward “illegal immigrants” to capture a xenophobia-xenophilia continuum.
After accounting for positivity toward immigrants, the White–Black difference
is substantially reduced, yet still significant at 4.66 points. In contrast, Hispa-
nics show significantly lower ratings of Muslims compared to Whites after con-
trolling for their immigrant positivity. As the largest American immigrant
group, this shows that Hispanics have a net view of Muslims that is not rela-
tively positive. Accounting for immigrant attitudes strengthens Asians’ net
negative view compared to Whites. Thus, M2 provides some evidence for
H1a that Blacks will exhibit more positive attitudes toward Muslims (yet,
contra H1b), and H2 that Hispanics could exhibit more negative attitudes.
What role do religious belonging, behaviour, and religiosity play in the for-
mation of attitudes toward Muslims? Model 3 (M3) includes estimates for
respondents’ religious affiliation. Of all the religious groups, evangelical Pro-
testants are the only group with significantly more negative views of
Muslims. Evangelical Protestants rate Muslims 3.36 points lower on average
compared to the non-religious, net of other factors. This provides evidence
for H4, which emphasizes evangelicals’ low tolerance and high exclusivity.
Those included in the Other faith category show significantly more positive
attitudes toward Muslims compared to the non-religious.5 Notably, the intro-
duction of religious affiliation eliminates Black–White differences in support of
Muslims. Thus, net of religious belonging, no significant difference exists
between Black and White Americans. In particular, this racial contrast attenu-
ates after accounting for strong anti-Muslim sentiment among White evange-
licals. This provides superseding evidence against both H1a and H1b, which
suggest the distinctiveness of Blacks’ attitudes. In contrast, Hispanics’ and
Asians’ negative attitudes toward Muslims remain significant and are some-
what strengthened net of religious belonging.
Models 4 and 5 (M4 and M5) introduce religiosity and attendance variables
to determine whether subjective religious identity and actual behaviour
influence Americans’ attitudes toward Muslims. M5 shows that while religios-
ity shows a negative relationship with attitudes, it does not rise to a level of
statistical significance. Similarly, religious attendance exhibits a negative,
but not statistically significant, relationship with attitudes toward Muslims.
Results suggest that neither religiosity nor religious attendance shape atti-
tudes toward religiously different Muslims.
14 A. PONCE

The final model (M6) includes all race and religion variables. Results are
consistent with those from M4, with a somewhat attenuated evangelical Pro-
testant coefficient once accounting for religiosity and attendance. Again, no
Black–White differences emerge. M6 is favoured as the preferred model
according to AIC and BIC statistics, and explains nearly 26 per cent of the vari-
ation in attitudes toward Muslims.
Controls perform as expected. Females and those with more education are
more favourable toward Muslims. Older respondents, those with low income,
Republicans, and those living in the South hold significantly less favourable
attitudes. Notably, the variable showing the clearest effect is positivity
toward “illegal immigrants”, which is consistently associated with favourable
views of Muslims. This suggests that many Americans position Muslims in
the same category as foreign outgroups with at best liminal acceptability.
How do racial boundaries shape attitudes toward Muslims for different
racial-ethnic groups? Table 2 presents estimates of racial boundaries for
different race-based subsamples (organized by rows). Limiting the sample
to White respondents only, results show that Whites who draw strong bound-
aries between themselves and other racial-ethnic groups are more likely to

Table 2. Regression estimates of Muslim favorability on racial-ethnic group boundaries,

by group subsample.
White-defined Black-defined Hisp.-defined Asian-defined
boundary boundary boundary boundary
S1 S2 S3 S4
White Subsample
White-Black −0.25***
boundary (−13.96)
White-Hispanic −0.24***
boundary (−14.07)
White-Asian −0.26***
boundary (−14.47)
Black Subsample
Black-White 0.04
boundary (1.00)
Black-Hispanic −0.12*
boundary (−2.38)
Black-Asian −0.06
boundary (−1.36)
Hispanic Subsample
Hispanic-White −0.04
boundary (−0.78)
Hispanic-Black −0.15***
boundary
Hispanic-Asian −0.14***
boundary (−3.36)
Source: American National Election Studies 2004–2016.
*All models include controls and year fixed effects (not shown; see Online Supplement Tables S2–S4).
Separate racial boundary measures entered into models by rows; rows grouped by racial-ethnic group
subsamples.
t statistics in parentheses; probabilities based on two-tailed t-tests.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 15

exhibit unfavourable attitudes toward Muslims. All White-minority boundaries

show significant effects, with Muslim scores decreasing an average of a
quarter of a point for every point increase in boundary scores.
Results for the Black subsample show contrasting results. Black Americans
who draw strong boundaries between themselves and Whites do not have
more unfavourable attitudes toward Muslims than those who do not. The
Black–White boundary coefficient is indeed positive, but not statistically sig-
nificant. However, Blacks who draw boundaries between themselves and His-
panics exhibit significantly lower evaluations of Muslims. A one-point increase
in the Black-Hispanic boundary measure results in a 0.12 decrease in favorabil-
ity toward Muslims. This suggests that Black Americans could view Muslims
similarly to how they view Hispanics, as a foreign outgroup as well as racial-
ethnic minorities, although it is important to note that results also show
that the Black-Asian boundary is not statistically related to attitudes toward
Muslims.6
Limiting the sample to Hispanics produces results similar to the White sub-
sample. Hispanics who draw boundaries between themselves and Whites are
not more unfavourable toward Muslims. However, Hispanics who draw
boundaries between themselves and Blacks, and between themselves and
Asians, show more negative attitudes toward Muslims. A one-point increase
in the Hispanic-Black or Hispanic-Asian boundary results in a decrease of
about 15 points on the Muslim favorability scale. Thus, Hispanics who see
themselves as distinct from America’s other main racial-ethnic groups are
also less favourable toward more recent Muslim groups.
Racial boundary results suggest that White Americans are more prone to
viewing others through a White/non-White lens and that a boundary drawn
for one racial group corresponds to boundaries for other racial groups. In con-
trast, Blacks may view Muslims similar to how they view Hispanics: those who
see themselves as separate from immigrant-background Hispanics also view
Muslims negatively. This provides some evidence for the notion that Blacks
may draw on their privileged status as U.S.-born, and not on their status as
racial minorities, to draw a boundary between themselves and recent immi-
grant groups (Abascal 2015). However, the lack of a Black-Asian boundary
effect net of pro-immigrant attitudes suggests that other dynamics may be
at play, perhaps a sense of being racially othered in contrast to simply ethni-
cally othered in the case of Hispanics and Muslims. Hispanics who draw
boundaries between themselves and any other minority group are also,
similar to Whites, more likely to view Muslims negatively. This is consonant
with the view that Hispanics feel they have more in common with Whites
(McClain et al. 2006).
H1b suggests that low socioeconomic position prompts some Black Amer-
icans to view Muslims less favourably. Aside from a reduced positivity
premium associated with education for Blacks, there is little evidence that
16 A. PONCE

race interacts with socioeconomic position (see Online Supplement for full
details).
On the whole, results provide little evidence for minority groups’ affective
solidarity with Muslims. Although not all racial-ethnic minorities view Muslims
negatively, those who draw boundaries between themselves and other min-
ority groups do. Instead, it appears that group boundaries emerge at multiple
points both between and within racial-ethnic groups.

Conclusion and discussion

Muslims in the U.S. form a diverse community that has been politically tar-
geted as a threat to national culture and security. This study draws on insights
from theories of racialization, intergroup boundaries, and religious exclusion
to analyse Americans’ favorability toward Muslims. The study’s first objective
is to examine whether other groups, like Black and Hispanic Americans, view
Muslims with a level of minority-minority affective solidarity, or whether they
have more negative views of Muslims.
Findings show that both racial and religious characteristics shape attitudes.
All racial-ethnic minorities exhibit higher mean levels of favorability compared
to Whites. However, theories of race relations and intergroup boundaries
predict that some groups may actually be less favourable. Results show that
Hispanics are significantly less favourable of Muslims compared to White
Americans after accounting for pro-immigrant attitudes. This could be due
to their viewing Muslims simply as Arab, South Asian, or Black, that is, as
racial minorities. Similarly, Asian-Americans are consistently less favourable.
For Blacks, the literature suggests either more positive attitudes through fam-
iliarity with Black Muslim movements, or less positive attitudes related to past
Black-brown relations. Interestingly, Blacks show no distinguishable difference
in their attitudes toward Muslims compared to White Americans net of other
influences. This suggests that neither race- nor religious-based explanations of
intergroup relations are sufficient for explaining Blacks’ attitudes toward
Muslims.
Religion also matters. Evangelical Protestants are a group that consistently
views Muslims in a more negative light, in line with expectations of religio-
nationalist exclusion. Some may argue that such groups have successfully
set the tone for how the public views Muslims in the U.S. Campaigns to
characterize Muslims as dangerous, foreign threats with illiberal tendencies
have succeeded in painting a menacing picture for the average American.
Currently, nearly half of all Americans feel that Muslims do not agree with
their vision of society (Edgell et al. 2016), despite many Muslims who undoubt-
edly hold mainstream views (Pew Research Center 2017). The foundation of
widespread anti-Muslim sentiment can thus be located in religio-nationalism,
yet it is also raced. As an example of this, a full 81 per cent of the sample’s
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 17

evangelical Protestants identify as White. The only religious effect may thus be
a function of a fundamentally racialized perspective.
The study’s second objective is to map the contours of intergroup bound-
aries among and between racial-ethnic groups. Are group members who
draw boundaries between themselves and other groups more likely to view
Muslims negatively? Findings suggest a qualified “yes”. The group that draws
the greatest number of boundaries most consistently are White Americans.
Specifically, White Americans who draw boundaries between themselves and
any racial minority group are also more likely to view Muslims less favourably.
This provides evidence for the primacy of a White/non-White colour line. Hispa-
nics are also less likely to view Muslims favourably when they draw boundaries
between themselves and Blacks or themselves and Asians. In contrast, Blacks’
views of Muslims are only influenced by a Black-Hispanic boundary, perhaps
as they may view Muslims as the latest group of culturally different yet residen-
tially close brown outsiders originating from Global South countries. Interest-
ingly, Hispanic-White and Black–White boundary making does not influence
minority groups’ attitudes toward Muslims. This suggest that White-Minority
boundary processes are distinct from Minority-Minority boundary making,
something that the literature has not fully explored.
Findings have implications for how we think about an evolving colour line
in an age of increased migration-led diversity. The little evidence that exists
for affective solidarities suggests that even society’s main minority groups
see Muslim Americans as outsiders. This makes some sense in the context
of recent theories of racial boundary-making, including Bonilla-Silva’s Latin
Americanization thesis (Bonilla-Silva 2004). The strong and pervasive stereo-
typing of Muslims as foreign, violent, and anti-American outsiders could be
enough to push this group down to the non-White group that Bonilla-Silva
calls the “collective black” at the bottom of a tri-racial system (Bonilla-Silva
2004, 932). This may particularly be the case for Muslims who are racialized
since this tri-racial system operates through visible features and skin colour
in a type of “pigmentocracy” (Bonilla-Silva 2004). What is interesting is that
even many Black Americans draw boundaries against Muslim Americans,
suggesting that there could be a nationalist component to such boundary-
making processes (Abascal 2015), possibly adding an additional geopoliti-
cally-based axis to the proposed tri-racial system. Findings may also provide
some evidence for ethnic project theories. Bashi Treitler (2013) argues that
generations of racialized groups in the U.S. have used ethnic projects to
launch campaigns for “racial uplift” by taking advantage of the systemic mar-
ginalization of those groups at the bottom, namely Black Americans. A group
succeeds only by taking the racial structure as a given and trying to improve
their placement within it. The patterns herein may point to an ethnic project
where other recognized minority groups systematically marginalize Muslims
to secure their position above the very bottom of an accepted racial-ethnic
18 A. PONCE

hierarchy. Although the data cannot speak to this with certainty, future
research should test whether minority groups are using tri-racial or ethnic
project thinking to distinguish themselves from Muslims.
Overall, findings qualify previous research on race and Muslim favorability
that finds Black-Muslim affinities (Zainiddinov 2013). Although this could be
due to sample constitution, sizes, and time period, differences raise interest-
ing questions regarding the purported resonance between non-Western reli-
gious traditions and racial minorities in America. Some have suggested that
Islam provides potential minority converts with a religious framework that
is more directly linked to racial recognition and equality, at least as typically
portrayed. The growth of the Hispanic Muslim population in urban areas
like Los Angeles and Houston has produced an abundance of recent commen-
tary as to why Latinos are drawn to the religion (see analysis in Morales 2018).
Indeed, other rapidly growing Muslim populations include Black inmates in
the American prison system (Hamm 2009). These trends along with the tra-
ditional appeal of Black Islam support the notion that some racial-ethnic min-
orities in the U.S. find an appeal to ways of life rooted in Islam. At the very
least, it points to complex variation within racial-ethnic groups in America,
which should put current findings in perspective.
This study leaves open questions for future research and debate. First, the
sample used, while nationally representative, only represents American citizens.
Including other populations that could in theory exhibit greater solidarity, poss-
ibly undocumented, immigrant, or disenfranchised Hispanics and Blacks, or fully
unpacking geographic variability may qualify findings. Future research should
continue to examine minority groups’ views of Muslims as more comprehensive
and consistent data become available. Second, while the study focuses on
general favorability toward Muslims, it does not speak to more defined attitudes
related to stereotypes, such as whether respondents associate Muslims with ter-
rorism and violence, and what factors predict these. Such an analysis would
require a more robust battery of questions about Muslims. As a future step,
survey programmes should incorporate more detailed data on growing min-
ority groups to make such analyses possible. Finally, while the second set of
analyses in the study examine racial groups separately, sources of intragroup
variation could form the basis of future analyses. Systematically identifying
which groups of Blacks or Hispanics hold contrasting views of Muslims could
shed light on whether affective solidarities arise among minorities within min-
orities, and what characteristics define these groups.

Notes
1. The GSS’s repeated questions include more specific items about restricting
Muslims’ civil liberties, and thus gauge political tolerance as opposed to
general favorability toward Muslims.
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 19

2. It is possible to rate one’s own group lower than another racial-ethnic group.
These cases are conceptualized not as examples of strong intergroup bound-
aries, but rather of group affinities. Such cases correspond to negative values
on the boundaries measures and represent 16 per cent of Whites, 1 per cent
of Blacks, and 2 per cent of Hispanics.
3. Stage 2 focuses on the racial-ethnic groups for which there are sufficiently large
subsamples: Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. Asians are not examined due to low
numbers.
4. A DuMouchel-Duncan test is performed to determine whether weights should
be used in analyses. The test compares weighted and unweighted estimates
using a standard F-test from a model that includes the weighting variable
plus weight-by-independent variables interactions. Results from the F-test
suggest that unweighted estimates are biased (F(27, 10576) = 1.72; p > F = 0.01).
5. The other category includes Muslims and followers of other non-Western reli-
gious traditions, such as Buddhists. Only 45 Muslims count in the full sample.
Excluding Muslims from the sample produces substantively equivalent results.
6. The negative Black-Asian boundary coefficient rises to a level of statistical signifi-
cance when excluding the attitudes toward “illegal immigrants” variable. This
suggests that Black-Asian boundary effect is likely a function of xenophobia in
contrast to the Black-Hispanic boundary, the latter of which is likely shaped
by residential proximity.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their feedback and
helpful comments. I also thank Vanessa Cruz Nichols, Denia Garcia, Dorainne Green,
Patricia McManus, Michelle Moyd, Dina Okamoto, Tennisha Riley, Kody Steffy, and
attendants at the Center for Research on Race and Ethnicity in Society talk where a pre-
vious version of this paper was presented. All errors are my own.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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