RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES!!!

Sec. 16. Art. Ill: “All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

Difference with right to speedy trial:

Speedy trial is limited to criminal proceedings
Speedy trial limited to TRIALS, as opposed to appeals and disposition of the case
up to the SC

FACTORS TO CONSIDER: USE IN BAR!!

(a) the length of the delay
(b) the reasons for the delay
(c) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
(d) the prejudice caused by the delay

Similarities with right to speedy trial:

However, like the right to a speedy trial, this right is violated only when the
proceedings are attended by
1. vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, or
2. when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
3. when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient.

IMPORTANT: IT HELPS THAT DELAY IS NOT DUE TO THE PROSECUTION

The Supreme Court said that although it was unfortunate that it took about 8 years
before the trial of the case was resumed, there was no delay amounting to a
violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases, considering
that
the delay was not attributable to the prosecution.
-Sambang v. General Court Martial PRO-Region 6

BIT OF HISTORY
Unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases in judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies is a serious problem besetting the administration of justice
in the country. As one solution on the problem of delay in the disposition of
criminal cases, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of
1998", intended to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan. Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court was passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on February
4, 1998 and February 3, 1998, respectively. Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 which
was promulgated31 for the purpose of implementing the provisions thereof took
effect on September 15, 1998

IF ARRAIGNMENT WAS DONE BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF RA 8493, THE UNDUE DELAY CAN
STILL BE ATTACKED THROUGH SEC. 16 ART III
THIS DOES NOT NEED AN IMPLEMENTING LAW
The time limits provided by Republic Act No. 8493 could not be applied to the case
at bar as petitioner was arraigned way back in July 28, 1992. At that time, there
was yet no statute which establishes deadlines for arraignment and trial; and the
time limits for trial imposed by Republic Act No. 8493 are reckoned from the
arraignment of the accused. Nevertheless, Republic Act No. 8493 does not preclude
application of the provision on speedy trial in the Constitution.37 Indeed, in
determining whether petitioner’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, resort
to Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is imperative
-Abardo vs Sandiganbayan
5 or 6 YEARS IS THE MAGIC NUMBER
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the
disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the
delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of
cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman44, where the Court held that
the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman’s duty to act promptly on
complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan45, where the Court held
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the
information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and
thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So
it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has
dragged on for a decade already.
-Abardo vs Sandiganbayan

RIGHT EXTENDS TO ALL CITIZENS INCLUDING THE MILITARY

It was held that this right extends to all citizens, including those in the
military, and covers the period before,
during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Sec. 14 (2), Art.
Ill,
which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the writ of
habeas corpus and stated that the absence of a time limit within which the Chief
of Staff or reviewing authority may approve or disapprove the order of dismissal
on the ground of prescription may be subject to abuse.
-Abadia v. Court of Appeals

ALSO, ASSERT YOUR RIGHTS ON RECORD!

the Supreme Court said that while this Court recognizes the right to speedy
disposition of cases quite
distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always
zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s
individual
rights should not work against and preclude the people’s equally important right to
public justice. In this case, the failure of the petitioner to assert his right
seasonably
was interpreted as a waiver of such right.
-Guerrero vs CA

RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES AND CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS!!!

Sec. 19 Art. III

1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

FLAGRANTLY AND PLAINLY OPPRESSIVE

To violate the constitutional guarantee, the penalty must
be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community [People v. Estoista,

DEATH PENALTY NOT VIOLATIVE OF THIS RIGHT!

It is an exercise of the State’s power “to secure society against the threatened
and actual evil”
-People vs Echegaray

MERE PENDENCY OF BILLS SEEKING TO SUSPEND THE DEATH PENALTY

IS NOT A GROUND FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION
The mere pendency in the two houses of Congress of a bill seeking the repeal of
R.A. 7659 should not per se warrant the outright issuance of a temporary
restraining order to stay the execution of a death sentence that has become final.
In fact, being speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a ground for
the stay of a death sentence
-Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice

(Already discussed in criminal due process)

IF PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE, DUE PROCESS REQUIRES
SEARCHING INQUIRY INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PLEA AND THE ACCUSED'S
COMPREHENSION OF THE CONSEQUENCES
When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the stringent constitutional
standards of the due process clause
require that the trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea, and the accused’s full comprehension of the consequences
thereof.

HE CAN ALSO PRESENT EVIDENCE

It shall also require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree.of his culpability. The accused must also be asked
if he desires to present evidence, and in the affirmative, allow him to do so.
-People vs Sta Teresa

IF STANDARDS NOT COMPLIED WITH, REMAND TO TRIAL COURT

UNLESS IF OTHER EVIDENCE SUGGEST GUILT
Because these standards were not complied with, the Supreme Court remanded to the
trial court the cases
-People v. Aranzado,

On the other hand, in People v. Principe, the conviction was affirmed, because even
if the accused’s improvident plea were
to be disregarded, in addition to his plea, other evidence, consisting of his
extrajudicial confession, his testimony in court and the testimony of other
witnesses, were sufficient to sustain a conviction.

AUTOMATIC REVIEW MANDATORY IN DEATH PENALTY

BUT THIS ALSO COMES WITH THE LESS SERIOUS CRIMES
The automatic review of the death penalty includes an appeal of the less serious
crime not punished by death but arising out of the same occurrence or committed by
the accused on the same occasion
-People vs Panganiban

NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT!!!

Sec. 20 Art. III

No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax

PERSON CAN BE IMPRISONED WHEN DEBT IS ENTERED INTO THROUGH FRAUD

PUNISHMENT IS FOR FRAUD, NOT DEBT
THUS BP 22 IS VALID
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt?
To answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and
punishes as an offense. Is
it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and
issuanceofa worthless checkin payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the
offense? This question lies at the
heart of the issue before us. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless checkor a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law
punishes.

POLL-TAX ONLY
YOU CAN BE IMPRISONED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF OTHER TAXES
Since a tax is not a debt but arises from the obligation of the person to
contribute his share in the maintenance of the government, failure to pay the same
can be validly punished with imprisonment. The only exception is failure to pay a
poll tax, which is defined as a specific fixed sum levied upon every person
belonging to a certain class with out regard to his property or occupation.
-Cruz

TRIVIA: THE POLL TAX PROVISION FOR THE SUPER IMPOVERISHED

This exception, adopted pursuant to the social justice policy, reflects the tender
regard of the law for the millions of our impoverished masses who cannot afford
even the nominal cost of a poll tax like the basic community tax certificate. It
was applied in the case of People v. Linsan-gan in favor ofa person convicted of
non-payment ofthe old cedula tax whose appeal was pending at the time of the
inclusion of the above rule in the 1935 Constitution.