The crux of the argument laid down by the Supreme Court is sustained and manifested through

two sections, Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which prescribed the
maximum number of people allowed to work in connection with the election beyond which the
case would come under the ambit of ‘mischief’ and section 123(7) which propounds that the
employment of extra people and the incurring or authorizing of excess expenditure -must be by
the candidate or his agent.
The main issues or rather questions the judgement aims to tackle are whether Rananjaya Singh is
to be held guilty for employing more persons than authorised by law and for exceeding the
prescribed limit of expenditure for election.
The appellant was held liable under both heads of Part Three of the schedule under Section
123(7) of the Representative of the People Act,1951 and also under section 100(2)(b)and section
145 of the act. The total amount of election expenses exceeded the amount specified ,furthermore
these expenses have not been shown in the appellants final election expenditure,and corruption
was another charge that the appellant was guilty of. Under this light and taking this weighty
evidence into account the judgement opines that the appellants fathers servants,orderlies,and
employees did not work for the appellants but rather under the orders and pay of the father.
A textualist interpretation of section 123(7) is faulty and carries certain fallacies and loopholes
that may be taken advantage of by future campaigners.
Section 77 uses the words “who may be employed for payment” and does not indicate or go deep
into ‘who’ that may be. Section 77 is interpreted parallely and consonantly with section 123(7).
The candidate or his agent are the only people who are allowed to employ people.However when
a close friend or relative(in this case father) employs people to help support and work for his son
and pays them out of his pocket it wont show up in the expenditure,however the son receives a
considerable advantage over the other candidates. This precedent laid down by the Supreme
Court is faulty and filled with loopholes. In the future another candidate may instruct parents or
friends to pay for certain election expenses or extra helpers with their own money and it will be
totally permissible to do so because the law allowed it once. When laws are framed and drafted
the framers have a certain vision in mind which they wanted to achieve by the spirit of law. In
section 123(7) the words the candidate or the agent are such words that when taken literally and
applied verbatim will harm the spirit of the law.
I would also like to make the claim that the servants and orderlies must fall under the ambit and
premises of the candidate.The work that the servants have done through the course of the
election is to aid the appellants career and interests. They are joint in their work,they work
towards the same objective and with the same goal therefore they must be seen and interpreted as
one and even though they are paid out of the fathers pocket that money is being used to further
his son's interests. This puts the candidates with poor relatives at a stark disadvantage.Though it
is the parliaments job to correct the words of the Section and fine tune the language of the law is
is our job too to interpret with morality,justice and in line with the spirit of the law.In section
123(7) the phrase employed by his candidate must be expanded in meaning,not in word and
includes the people employed with their relatives or friends money. A textualist interpretation of
this section bracketed with a case like this would be adverse to the spirit of morality and justice
and against the tenet of free and fair elections.Therefore the appellant must be held guilty under
section 123(7) and section 124(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Meghaleena Mukherjee
BA0210025