Article 3 Section 11 to 13

Banat vs. Comelec GR 177508

Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s
national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC
en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans
ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Issue: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

(2) Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

Ruling:

No, 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then
20% of the members of the House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation
of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution
of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5

(2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the -broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” (3) No. Neither the Constitution nor
RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
Chavez vs. COmelec 437 S 415

Facts: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments
to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up showing petitioner
promoting the products of said establishments.

On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator.

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32:

Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other
materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and
radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing
rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have
conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law
Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated
the assailed provision. He sent another letter, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from
the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements
and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.

The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them
from public view pending the approval of his request.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC, asking that the COMELEC
be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges the Court to declare the assailed provision
unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid
exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act;
and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

Issue: Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?

Ruling:

Police power

Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all announce his
candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he
claims, mere product endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition
to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people. To
determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the
public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power?
and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals?

A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature
campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between
popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by
preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity.

Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do
not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election
campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or indirectly soliciting votes,
pledges or support for or against a candidate.

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he
acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However,
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image
assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the
COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display
of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose
name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make
themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same
chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models.
Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name
and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention
of the rule against premature campaigning.

Non-impairment of contract

Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is
indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard
this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at
any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

Ex post facto law

Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense
for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same
was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement,
liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense.
Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should
be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the
picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the
image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes
a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such
propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One
definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and
image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as
expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials
three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails
to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed
provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

Fair Elections Act

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to him, under this
law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the
COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election propaganda through the
assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners’ argument is not tenable. The Solicitor
General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election
propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as
practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating
the use of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law.

Overbreadth

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may
not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.

The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows the
continued display of a person’s propaganda materials and advertisements after he has filed a certificate
of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also
show his name and image.

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the
campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to
achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities
among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth.

Pp. vs. Mahinay 302 S 455

Facts: Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to take care of
Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to the latter’s residence. The victim was a 12-year-old
girl who used to frequent the residence of Isip.

On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother. The following
morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared. The victim’s body was found,
lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was found in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no
underwear. The autopsy showed that the victim was raped and was strangled to death.

Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and
a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victim’s mother to belong to her daughter. Also, they
found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the appellant. Also found in the yard, three
arm’s length away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and
a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings.

The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated how the
crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court convicted him of the crime of Rape and was
sentenced to death. The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance with
his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights.

Ruling: Yes. The conviction of the appellant is affirmed. Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation
and after having been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes
of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said
confession of Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely
and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his
person. He did not even inform the Inquest Prosecutor when he was sworn to the truth of his statement
on 8 July 1995 that he was forced, coerced or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession
abounds with details known only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office
Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes informed and explained to Mahinay his
constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by Mahinay.

A lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity
in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions of the accused. The postmortem findings
show that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory
substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of Mahinay that he pushed the victim and the latter's head
hit the table and the victim lost consciousness. There being no evidence presented to show that said
confession were obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise
of reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts
narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily
given. In his extrajudicial confession, Mahinay himself admitted that he had sexual congress with the
unconscious child. Such circumstantial evidence, besides 8 others, established the felony of rape with
homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11,
RA 7659.

Pp. vs. Compil 244 S 135

“Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the Constitution and as such
they cannot be admitted.” “Even if counsel arrives prior to the actual signing of the statement, his absence
during the making but presence during the signing will not cure the defect.”

Facts: Just before midnight of October 23, 1987, robbers struck MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, which
doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their
way through the window grills they detached on the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was
located. Two of the robbers herded the 2 maids of the owners into the bathroom. In the investigation,
Jessie Bartoleme, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of the WPD that just before the
incident that evening while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeepney parked near
the store, he saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the
furniture shop. Linda confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police who also learned that the trio
who were all from Samar failed to report to work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was
planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon to be the baptismal godfather to his sister’s child. Thus, the WPD agents
together with Tomas Jay, brother of deceased, and Jenelyn Valle went to the parish church in Tayabas to
look for Mabini. From there they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Mabini and
his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind.
After being positively identified by Jenelyn as one of the workers, Compil was immediately frisked and
placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling.
However, after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admittedhis guilt
and point to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child
of Mabini’s sister. On the way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before
midnight of 23 October he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers
who his companions were and his participation as a lookout. The day following his arrest, Compil after
conferring with a CLAO lawyer Claroz and in the presence of his sister, brother and brother-in law,
executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation. During
arraignment, Compil entered a plea of not guilty and after the prosecution had rested, filed a demurrer
to evidence instead of adducing evidence. The RTC denied his demurrer and instead found him guilty of
robbery.

Issue: Whether Compil’s extrajudicial confession may be admitted?

Ruling: No. Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although
later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the Constitution and as
such they cannot be admitted. Here, it is evident that Compil was immediately subjected to an
interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas. He was then brought to the Tayabas
Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents
again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the
crime and admitted his participation. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel. The belated
arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled
confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory
statements from accused Compil. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that while the extrajudicial confessions of Compil cannot be admitted into
evidence, there still other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as
such his conviction was still sustained by the Court.

Pp. vs. Uy GR 157399

Facts: The accused, Uy, Gamus and Ochoa, public officers being employed by the National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR), was charged for allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) for the amount of P183, 805, 291.25 was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex
crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents for conspiring, confederating
with the private co-accused where they falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s application for the
managers check with the Philippine National Bank(PNB). Sandigan Bayan rendered a decision acquitting
Uy, and Ochoa being found guilty of the said crime and is ordered to pay the equal amount malversate
solidarity with Uy. Ochoa then appealed, He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn
statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant NPC
personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed
the sworn statement while confined at the Heart Center and upon assurance it would not be used against
him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed
the affidavit.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated?

Held: No. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. Considering that his statement was taken during
the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such
inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense. Appellant cannot claim that he is in police
custody because he was confined at the time at Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC
personnel, not to police authorities. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted
by NPC personnel for NPC’s administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a
separate proceeding, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or
lumped together with the latter.

The “investigation” under Section 12 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution refers to a “custodial”
investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and the investigating officers
begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. More
specifically –

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person
is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. And the
rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom
the police would then direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.

Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases
to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused appellant
are not available before government investigators enter the picture.

Thus, the flaw in appellant’s argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis-à-vis the
foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during the administrative
investigation of NPC’s audit team before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general
inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet no specific suspect.
Lumiqued vs. Exevea 282 S 125

Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of The Department of Agrarian Reform – Cordillera
Autonomous Region. On Nov. 16, 1989 Jeannette Ober Zamudio charged Lumiqued with Malversation
through falsification of public documents. He allegedly falsified gasoline receipts amounting to Php
44,172.46 and made unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 116,000.00. Zamudio also charged
him with oppression and harassment after being relieved without just cause after filing the 2 cases against
Lumiqued. May 20, 1992 Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145,
creating a committee to investigate complaints against Lumiqued. June 23, 1992 Lumiqued submitted his
affidavit alleging that the reason the cases were filed against him was to extort money from him. He also
admitted that his average daily consumption was 108.45Li which is an aggregate consumption of the 5-
service vehicle issued to him and that the receipts were turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement.

July 3 and 10 Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted and Lumiqued was not assisted by
a counsel since he was confident that he can defend himself.

July 17, 1992 he was unable to attend the third hearing since he suffered a stroke on July 10.

July 31, 1992 Investigating Committee issued a report finding Lumiqued liable for all charges against him

December 17, 1992 Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration.

April 1, 1993 The Committee informed Lumiqued that the report was already forwarded to the President.

May 12, 1993 President Ramos issued AO No 52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty
in the alteration of 15 gas receipts and he was dismissed from service.

August 31, 1993 Lumiqued filed a Petition for appeal which was denied. He then files a second motion for
reconsideration, alleging that he was denied constitutional right to counsel during the hearing.

September 28, 1993 The second motion was denied.

May 19, 1994 Lumiqued passed away.

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel
during the hearing. They maintained that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was
in writing and in the presence of a counsel.

Issue: Whether or not the right to have a counsel during an administrative hearing is necessary.

Ruling: NO. Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the
government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of
Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent training
seminars both here and abroad. Hence, he could have defended himself, if need be, without the help of
counsel, if the truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he entertained during the hearings
he was able to attend.

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as
it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an
indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests
in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard
is the very essence of due process.Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person
is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Lumiqueds appeal
and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee.

Gamboa vs. Cruz 162 S 675

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including
petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in
the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court
denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated.

Ruling: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled,
at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there
is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information
which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence
of counsel.

On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional
right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion
to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
Pp. vs. Labtan 320 S 140

Facts: Accused-Appellant Henry Feliciano, together with accused Orlando Labtan and Jonelto Labtan,
were convicted of highway robbery and robbery with homicide. Feliciano was convicted on the basis of a
sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial. The prosecution’s case was mainly anchored on
the three-page sworn statement executed by Feliciano, originally in Visayan dialect, before the Cagayan
de Oro City Police Station. According to the prosecution, prior to the propounding of questions to the
accused-appellant, he was informed of his constitutional rights, and he even signed the confession in the
presence of Atty. Pepito Chavez, Attorney de Officio provided to the accused. When the defense
presented its case, only accused Henry Feliciano testified for his behalf. His defense consisted of an alibi
and a repudiation of his sworn statement. He Testified that he was brought to the police station, was
mauled for two hours, and was forced to sign a document. He was also brought to the office of Atty.
Chavez and saw the latter sign the documents. He did not know what was happening. Atty. Chavez did
not even talk to him before signing the document. Then he was brought back to Jail. He appealed to the
higher court alleging that the court a quo erred un admitting in evidence the tainted extra-judicial
confession he executed in the absence of an effective and vigilant counsel.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the sworn statement executed by accused Feliciano in the absence of a competent
counsel of his choice, is admissible in evidence.

2. Did Atty. Chavez provide the accused the kind of counseling required by the Constitution?

Ruling: The appeal is meritorious. Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of
persons under custodial investigation are provided. In People vs Gamboa 13, the Court stated that:

" [T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense. The moment there is a move or even urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or
innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. We find that
accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to have competent and independent counsel
when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he
started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993 regarding his involvement in the killing of
jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to
counsel. In Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 15 we said that a person is deemed under custodial investigation
where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.

2. The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside
the accused. Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not
explain to accused-appellant the consequences of his action — that the sworn statement can be used
against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail. "Ideally, therefore, a lawyer
engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) ‘should be
engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to engage an
attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file
such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity
and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers
and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.’"

Pp. vs. Tomaquin 133188

Facts: On or about 15 December 1996 Jaquelyn Tatoy was found bloodied and sprawled face-up on the
floor of her house, with her head inside a plastic container. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where
she expired.

- In the house of the victim found black shoe and tres kantos which were allegedly owned by the accused
Tomaquin.

- On December 15, 1996 , the same day when the crime happened, the tanods told Tomaquin that he
is a suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangay captain Atty. Parawan
and the latter told his tanods to take Tomaquin to the police station.

- In the morning of December 16, 1996, Tomaquin was investigated by SPO2 Monilar of the Homicide
Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his constitutional rights, Tomaquin told
SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist
him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan and the latter conferred with the appellant for around fifteen
minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told him that the appellant was ready to give his
statement. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession, which was taken down completely in the Cebuano dialect.

Issue: Whether or not a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be considered an independent counsel
within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: No, a barangay captain who is a lawyer cannot be considered an independent counsel within the
purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 12, provides: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric.
It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

In the case at bar, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances
in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times. In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is
deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: ART. 152. Persons in
authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as such. – In applying the provisions
of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person
in authority. On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel
of appellant. considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of
his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to
appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be
considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession.
What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will
effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Pp. vs. Januario 267

Facts: Accused-appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape, together with their co-accused were charged
with violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law) for stealing one Isuzu passenger type
jeepney after killing its driver and conductor. The NBI team took the statements of appellant’s one at
atime with the help of Atty. Carlos Saunar. In convicting accused appellants, the trial court relied upon the
extrajudicial confessions of the latter, extracted and signed in the presence and with the assistance of a
lawyer, Atty. Saunar, who was applying for work in the NBI. Counsels for appellants allege that the extra-
judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having been extracted in violation
of their constitutional right to counsel. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in allowing the
presentation of Saunar as a witness after the prosecution had closed its case and offered its documentary
evidence.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the trial procedure, particularly the presentation and admission of the testimony of
Atty. Carlos Saunar is irregular and prejudicial to the appellants

2. Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having
been extracted in violation of their constitutional right to counsel.
Ruling:

1. No. The trial procedure as outlined in the Rules of Court is ordinarily followed to insure the orderly
conduct of litigations to attain the magisterial objective of the Rules of Court to protect the parties
substantive rights. But strict observance of the Rules depend upon the circumstances obtaining in each
case at the discretion of the trial judge. Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has
rested his case or even after the defense has moved for dismissal, to present in-voluntarily omitted
evidence. Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has rested his case or even after the
defense has moved for dismissal, to present in-voluntary omitted evidence. The claim that the lower court
erred in allowing the prosecuting attorney to introduce new evidence is devoid of any merit, for while the
prosecution had rested, the trial was not terminated, and the cause was still under the control and
jurisdiction of the court.

Saunar’s testimony was admitted in evidence before the trial court rendered its Decision. The court a quo
retained its jurisdiction even though the prosecution had rested its case. As to appellants, Saunar was an
additional prosecution witness because the defense waived presentation of evidence after the
prosecution had rested its case.

2. Yes. Assuming arguendo that Saunar’s competence as a lawyer is beyond question. Under the
circumstances, described by the prosecution however, he could not have been the independent counsel
solemnly spoken of by our Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and therefore it can
never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of
appellants' constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article m of
the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which
mandates that an admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel;
otherwise, it would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. This court values liberty
and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against
the awesome investigative and prosecutorial powers of government. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of
Society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care anti within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 in Tagaytay City, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape are ACQUITTED.

Pp. vs. Peralta GR 145176

Facts: On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring
gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m.
However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners
were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation
while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters. In the investigation, it
was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel
Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants charged therein with
multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue of final judgments.

They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation and
treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed
“Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the
same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised
weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which
directly caused their deaths.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?

(2) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the
crime?

Ruling: A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically
provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of
a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express or
implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.

The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action
of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in order
to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of
the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime,
or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the
conspiracy.

Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.

Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission
of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that
there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all
the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were
from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been
planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared
for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with teamwork precision going from one
brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and
lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six
accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison
by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum
period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty
imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the crime.

Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo
Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate
and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly
and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will
pay one-sixth of the costs.

Pp. vs. Morial GR 129925

Facts: On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part of the investigation
and as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial were asked several questions by the
policemen and were invited to the police station for continuing investigation. They were turned over to
SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again after they woke up at past 6 in the morning. That
investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by Leandro that he was one of
those who participated in the robbery with homicide. With the latter’s consent, his statements were
reduced into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right to remain silent and to have a counsel,
whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a
lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the former and he
first met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning. After Leandro agreed to answer
voluntarily knowing that the same can be used against him as evidence in court, the investigation was
conducted by SPO4 Fernandez with the presence of the counsel. After “all the material points” were
asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if he can leave due to very important engagement. The latter
agreed to the lawyer’s request. But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer
questions in his absence, the latter agreed. During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4 Fernandez
continued with the investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter
answered.

Issue: Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.

Ruling: Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation;
therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him and his other co-accused.
The Court stressed out that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left after
Leonardo had admitted that he and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material points”, referring to the
participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires
that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no
custodial investigation shall be conducted.”

Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and to answer
questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his
right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless
the same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no such written and
counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.

Sia vs. People GR 159659

Facts: Petitioners were charged w/ the RTC of Naga with 3 counts of violation of PD 957 (Subdivision &
Condo Buyers’ Protective Decree). A MTQ was filed by the petitioners on the ground of jurisdiction & that
the prosecutor has no authority to file the information. The MTQ was denied by the trial court & so trial
ensued. Petitioners also filed with the CA a petition for Certiorari w/ TRO but was again dismissed.
Petitioners insist that they wanted to have a counsel of their own choice to represent them and not a
counsel de officio. They allegedly pleaded only w/ the presence of a counsel de officio since their
postponement was not approved by the court for the absence of counsel of their choice.

Issue: W/N there was violation w/ the right of the petitioners to have a counsel of their own choice?

Ruling: NO! Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution assuring an accused of counsel of his choice pertains
specifically to a person under investigation. Even if we were to extend the choice of a counsel to an
accused in a criminal prosecution, the matter of the accused getting a lawyer of his preference cannot be
absolute & arbitrary as would make his choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the
accused. The word ‘preferably’ does not convey the message that the choice of the lawyer by a person
under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent & independent attorneys from
handling the defense. If the rule was otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely
in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd
scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.
Pp. vs. Gallardo GR 113684

Facts: Orizal was found in dead and have sustained seven (7) gunshot. Investigation identified the suspects
as Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa (alias Fermin), and Jessie Micate y Orteza. They
were later further investigated to which they gave statements admitting that they killed Orizal.During the
investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the
statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present and administered the
oath on the jurat of the statements to which Galardo and Columna signed their statements admitting the
killing of Orizal. The Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional Trial Court an information
charging the accused with murder. All three accused entered a plea of not guilty, but the trial court still
found them guilty, to which they filed an appealed.

Issue: Whether the counsel provided by the State to the accused satisfies the Constitutional requirement
that a competent and independent counsel be present in a custodial investigation.

Ruling: Yes. The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and clearly
apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them, and a judge administered their oath. While
the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the
services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice
as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's
appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity
of his statement before the swearing officer. Although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by
the accused themselves, the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him
as their lawyer. They were asked and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel
during the investigation. There is no requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during
custodial investigation be previously known to them. The Constitution provides that the counsel be a
competent and independent counsel, who will represent the accused and protect their Constitutionally
guaranteed rights. Further, to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything
which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent
an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Herein, Atty. Velasco acted properly in accordance
with the dictates of the Constitution and informed the accused of their Constitutional rights. Atty. Velasco
assisted the accused and made sure that the statements given by the accused were voluntary on their
part, and that no force or intimidation was used by the investigating officers to extract a confession from
them. Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible
must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession
must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with.
Pp. vs. Endino GR 133026

Facts: Gerry Galgarin and his nephew Edward Endino were accused of slaying Dennis Aquino, where the
former stabbed him several times and the latter shot him. This was done in the presence of the victim’s
girlfriend. Galgarin was arrested and interviewed by TV Patrol where he confessed and begged his nephew
to surrender as well. This confession was admitted by the trial court as evidence for his guilt. Trial court
convicted him of the crime of murder. He questioned this before the Supreme Court, stating that it was
forced from him and against his constitutional right. The Court rejected his contention stating that it was
not part of the custodial investigation, since it was given to newsmen and not to police. It however
cautioned lower court from admitting evidence such as this, since it should be done only after scrutiny to
avoid abuse and legalizing coerced extra-judicial confessions.

Issue: Whether or not trial court erred in admitting the videotape confession as evidence.

Ruling: No. The interview and confession does not form part of custodial investigation since it was not
given to the police officers but to the media in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the
public. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting guilt,
it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. We should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been given
freely. It should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.

Pp. vs. Malngan GR 170470

Facts: January 2, 2001, when the witness and his tanods saw the accused-appellant, one hired as a
housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., hurriedly leaving the house of her employer. She was seen to have
boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. Thirty minutes later,
at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardo’s group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of
the employer of the housemaid. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he
received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the
occurrence of the fire, he saw accused appellant coming out of the house. Barangay Chairman Bernardo,
Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the accused-appellant.
Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the
woman as accused-appellant, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant’s bag. Thereafter,
accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry
residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire because she had not been
paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province, but her employer told
her to just ride a broomstick in going home. Accused-appellant was then turned over to arson
investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz,
Manila where she was further investigated and then detained. When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San
Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant at the
latters detention cell why she did the burning of her employers house and accused-appellant replied that
she set the house on fire because when she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of her
employer shouted at her and when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused-appellant how she burned the
house, accused-appellant EDNA told her that she crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable
lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the house.

Issue: Whether the all confession without the assistance of competent and independent counsel of the
appellant-accused is inadmissible as evidence.

Ruling: No, Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance,
may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of
the Constitution. When accused appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January
2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as
killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation
and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been
observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was
made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing
accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason,
the confession of accused appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter
found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation
of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio

Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled
that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited
through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-
appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started
the fire in the Separas house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is,
unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the
aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the
relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual as both
accused appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no
evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-
appellants uncounseled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
Pp. vs. Lauga GR 186228

Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is inadmissible in evidence.

Facts: Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year-old daughter. One of
the witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting
testified that after his assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing
only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost,
Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga
contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he,
indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence
because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

Issue: Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer
admissible in evidence?

Held: No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of keeping
peace in their community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in
the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating
to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the
actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a
“bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes
has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel
was inadmissible in evidence.

De la Camara vs. Enage 41 S 3

Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested and detained
at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12
other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Agusan del Sur. The Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the
CFI a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-
accused Tagunan and Galgo. De la Camara filed an application for bail to the lower court. Presiding Judge
Manuel Enage started the trial of de la Camara, the prosecution resting its case on 10 July 1969. On 10
August 1970, the judge issued an order granting de la Camara's application for bail and fixed the bail bond
at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple
murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that the bond required
"is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable.

De la Camara filed motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained
adamant. De la Camara escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971.

Issue: Whether or not the amount of bail ordered by Enage is excessive.

Ruling: Yes. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive. Fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner is clearly
violative of the constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged,
the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. There is an attempt on the part of respondent
Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be indefensible. The guidelines in the fixing of bail was
summarized as follows:

(1) ability of the accused to give bail;

(2) nature of the offense;

(3) penalty for the offense charged;

(4) character and reputation of the accused;

(5) health of the accused;

(6) character and strength of the evidence;

(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;

(8) forfeiture of other bonds;

(9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. Respondent Judge,
however, did ignore this decisive consideration.

With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to
nullify the above order. Wherefore, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic.

Yap vs. Court of Appeals 358 S 564

Facts: Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed
a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount
of P5,5 Million on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private
complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail, but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He
also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secures a certification/guaranty, claiming that the
same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Ruling:

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an
amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to
permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is
charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil
liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute
rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent
with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available
at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition
will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court
in case he does so.