Valmores v. Dr. Achacoso G.R. No.

217453, July 19, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores) is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church,[4] whose
fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day.[5] As such, petitioner
Valmores joins the faithful in worshipping and resting on Saturday, the seventh day of the week, and
refrains from non-religious undertakings from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday.[6]Prior to the instant
controversy, petitioner Valmores was enrolled as a first-year student at the MSU-College of Medicine for
Academic Year 2014-2015.[7] To avoid potential conflict between his academic schedule and his church's
Saturday worship, petitioner Valmores wrote a letter[8] to respondent Achacoso, requesting that he be
excused from attending his classes in the event that a regular weekday session is rescheduled to a
Saturday. At the same time, petitioner Valmores expressed his willingness to make up for any missed
activity or session due to his absence.[9]

Between the months of June to August 2014, some of petitioner Valmores' classes and examinations were
moved from weekdays to Saturdays.[10] In one instance, petitioner Valmores was unable to take his Histo-
Pathology laboratory examination held on September 13, 2015, a Saturday.[11] Respondent Cabildo was
his professor for the said subject.[12] Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was given by
either of the respondents. As a result, petitioner Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that particular
module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.[13]Thereafter, several pastors and officers of
the Seventh-day Adventist Church sent a letter[14] to respondent Achacoso, requesting for a possible
audience with the members of the MSU school board. In addition, the church, through Pastor Hanani P.
Nietes, issued a Certification[15] dated September 15, 2014 in connection with petitioner Valmores'
request for exemption.

On September 19, 2014, petitioner Valmores again wrote a letter[17] to respondent Achacoso to seek
reconsideration regarding his situation, reiterating his willingness to take make-up classes or their
equivalent in order to complete the requirements of his course.

Hence, aggrieved by respondents' lack of consideration, petitioner Valmores elevated the matter before
the CHED.[19] In an Indorsement dated January 6, 2015, the CHED Regional Office, Region X, through Mr.
Roy Roque U. Agcopra, Chief Administrative Officer, referred the matter directly to the President of MSU
as well as respondent Achacoso and requested that the office be advised of the action thus taken.[20]

In response, Dr. Macapado Abaton Muslim (Dr. Muslim), President of MSU, instructed respondent
Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum.

Issues:
whether mandamus lies to compel respondents to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum in the case of
petitioner Valmores.

Ruling:

The freedom of religion enjoys a preferred status among the rights conferred to each citizen by our
fundamental charter.[37] In this case, no less than petitioner Valmores' right to religious freedom is being
threatened by respondents' failure to accommodate his case.[38] In this regard, when confronted with a
potential infringement of fundamental rights, the Court will not hesitate, as it now does, to overlook
procedural lapses in order to fulfill its foremost duty of satisfying the higher demands of substantial
justice.

The Court is also aware of petitioner Valmores' plea for the expedient resolution of his case, as he has yet
to enroll in the MSU-College of Medicine and continue with his studies.[39] Plainly enough, to require
petitioner Valmores to hold his education in abeyance in the meantime that he is made to comply with
the rule on hierarchy of courts would be unduly burdensome. It is a known fact that education is a time-
sensitive endeavor, where premium is placed not only on its completion, but also on the timeliness of its
achievement. Inevitably, justice in this case must take the form of a prompt and immediate disposition if
complete relief is to be accorded.

On these premises, the Court finds sufficient bases to relax the foregoing procedural rules in the broader
interest of justice. The freedom of religion vis-a-vis the 2010 CHED Memorandum

At once, a plain reading of the memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon
HEIs. Its policy is crystal clear: a student's religious obligations takes precedence over his academic
responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious
worship. Accordingly, the CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as faculty
members, from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious obligations.

The Court finds that respondents were duty bound to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it
requires the exemption of petitioner Valmores from academic responsibilities that conflict with the
schedule of his Saturday worship. Their failure to do so is therefore correctible by mandamus.

Every person is free to tread the far territories of their conscience, no matter where they may lead — for
the freedom to believe and act on one's own convictions and the protection of such freedom extends to
all people, from the theistic to the godless. The State must, as a matter of duty rather than consequence,
guarantee that such pursuit remains unfettered. As representatives of the State, educational institutions
are bound to safeguard the religious freedom of their students. Thus, to such end, our schools carry the
responsibility to restrict its own academic liberties, should they collide with constitutionally preferred
rights. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents Dr. Cristina Achacoso and Dr. Giovanni Cabildo
are DIRECTED to enforce the Commission on Higher Education Memorandum dated November 15, 2010
in the case of petitioner Denmark S. Valmores.

Genuino et. al. v. De Lima G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018 ( EN BANC )

FACTS:

The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against former DOJ Secretary
Delima for her issuance of DOJ circular no. 41. Series of 2010, known as the “Consolidated Rules and
Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders (HDO), Watch list Orders
(WLO) and Allow Departure Orders (ADO)” . The Petitioners questions the constitutionality of this DOJ
circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel.

The petitioners in these consolidated cases are former Presiden tArroyo and her husband, and Efraim and
Erwin Genuino. Former DOJ Secretary De lima issued HDO and WLO against petitioners on the ground
that criminal charges of plunder, qualified theft and violation of the Omnibus Election Code were filed
against them. Petitioners, particularly Spouses Arroyo, file temporary restraining order against the issued
HDO and WLO of DOJ seeking relief and grant from court to allow them to travel so that former president
Arroyo may seek medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief sought on a condition that petition
will file a bond of PhP2M, an undertaking that petitioners shall report to Philippine consulate in the
countries they are to visit (Germany, Singapore, USA, Italy, Spain and Austria) and shall appoint a
representative to receive on their behalf subpoena, orders and other legal processes. Petitioners complied
with all the conditions instead of following the order of the court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process
the petitioners travel documents.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the DOJ Circular No. 41 is unconstitutional for being a violation of the right to travel

RULING:

Yes. The DOJ has no authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to
travel through the issuance of Watchlist Orders (WLOs) and Hold Departure Orders(HDOs). There are
only three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security,
public safety or public health. Further, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or Rules of
Court providing for the impairment.

DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment, but a mere administrative
issuance designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law. DOJ is not authorized to issue WLOs
and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to travel. There is no mention of the exigencies stated
in the Constitution that will justify the impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the power to
investigate the commission of crimes and prosecute offenders. It does not carry the power to
indiscriminately devise all means it deems proper in performing its functions without regard to
constitutionally-protected rights.

DOJ cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement imposed by the circular on the ground
that it is necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the preliminary investigation of the
complaints. There is no authority of law granting it the power to compel the attendance of the
subjects of a preliminary investigation pursuant to its investigatory powers. Its investigatory power
is simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately, not broad enough to embrace the imposition of restraint
on the liberty of movement.

Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan ( SPARK ) v. Quezon City Mayor Bautista, G.R. No. 225442, August
8, 2017 ( EN BANC )

Facts: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro Manila, in this case, Navotas City and Quezon City, started to
strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly
known as part of "Oplan Rody.Petitioners,spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan(SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society,
in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors- filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional. Their arguments were the following:(a) it result
in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b)
suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours;
(c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d)
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.

Issue: Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The petition is partly granted. Petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness
is denied." A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1)it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle." In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering
that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its
vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required
so that one may act accordingly. The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.

Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters ( CTRM) G. R. No. 175210, Feb. 1, 2016

Principles: Constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door to any and all information
but is rather confined to matters of public concern. Restricted to transactions involving public interest
"does not open every door to any and all information."... the information sought must be in relation to
matters of public concern or public interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.

Facts: Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM) CTRM, an office under the National Economic
Development Authority (NEDA), held a meeting... lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule
on petrochemicals and certain plastic products,... Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the
Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in
the petrochemical sector,... Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the Association of
Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in th... request a
copy of the minutes of the meeting... denied the request

APMP sent another letter-request dated October 27, 2005 to the CTRM through Director Mendoza
reminding about the legal implications of the refusal to furnish copies of the minutes as in violation of the
petitioner's Constitutional right of access to information on matters of public concern.

CTRM continued to refuse... petitioner and the APMP to bring the petition for mandamus in the RTC...
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction President
Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 486,[10] dated January 12, 2006, to lift the suspension of the tariff
reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic products and RTC denied the Urgent Motion...
dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit. Appeal directly to the Court... whether or not the
CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the May
23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the
State's policy of full public disclosure.

Issues: Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy
of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on matters
of public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure.

Ruling: Dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed. Cnstitutional guarantee of the right
to information on matters of public concern... complements the State's policy of full public disclosure in
all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constituti...
provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the operations of the
Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of expression. In a democratic
society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can be possible only if the people are
provided the proper information on matters that affect them. But the people's right to information is not
absolute. limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.[21]... first requisite, there is no rigid test... e issues
have a direct effect on them or because the issues "naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.

Information requested must not be excluded by law from the Court has already declared that the
constitutional guarantee of the people's right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters.[25] Equally
excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door
Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations
of the Supreme Court. Every claim of exemption,... liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly
against the claim of confidentiality. Government agency concerned that has the burden of showing that
the information sought to be obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted
from the coverage of the constitutional guarantee

Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision of the RTC.

Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin v. BLR G. R. No. 211145, Oct. 14, 2015

Facts:

· February 16, 2010: the Samahan through Alipio filed an application for registration of its name “Samahan
ng mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard” with DOLE o The application stated that the association had a
total of 120 members

· February 26, 2010: the DOLE-Pampanga issued the certificate of registration

· March 15, 2010: Hanjin prayed for the cancellation of registration of Samahan on the ground that its
members did not fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of Art. 243 of
the LC o The enumeration included only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-employed,
and those without definite employers may form a workers’ association o Hanjin also posited that 1/3 of
the members of the association had definite employers and the continued existence of the association
would prejudice the company o Hanjin added that Samahan committed a misrepresentation in connection
with the list of members who took part in the ratification of their constitution and by-laws Hanjin claimed
that Samahan made it appear that its members were all qualified to become members of the worker’s
association.

· DOLE Regional Director: Ruled in favor of Hanjin o RD Bihis found that the preamble as stated in the
Consti and by-laws of Samahan, was an admission that all its members were employees of Hanjin: “KAMI,
ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard ay naglalayong na isulong ang pagbpapabuti…”. The same claim
was made by Samahan it its motion to dismiss, but it failed to adduce evidence that the remaining 63
members were employees of Hanjin. RD Bihis stated that the remaining employees should have formed a
labor union for collective bargaining instead.
 · Aggrieved, Samahan filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Samahan pointed out that the
words “Hanjin Shipyard” was used to refer to a workplace and not as an employer or company o When a
shipyard was put up in Subic, Zambales, it became known as Hanjin Shipyard. Further, the remaining 63
members stated that they were either working or had worked at Hanjin à therefore no misrepresentation

· Bureau of Labor Relations: Granted Samahan’s appeal and reversed the decision of the RD, but directed
Samahan to remove “Hanjin Shipyard” from name of association. BLR stated that the law clearly afforded
the right to self-organization to all workers including those without definite employers but subject to the
limitation that it is only for mutual aid and protection. It is NOT stated anywhere that the right to self-
organization is limited to collective bargaining o The BLR stated that there was no misrepresentation –
“kami ang manggagawa sa Hanjin shipyard”, if translated is: “We, the workers AT Hanjin Shipyard…”. The
use of the preposition “at” is intended to describe a place. At most, the use by Samahan of the name
Hanjin Shipyard would only warrant a change in the name of the association.

· CA: Reversed the decision of the BLR; the registration of Samahan is contrary to the Labor Code o The
CA stressed that only 57/120 members were working at Hanjin while the phrase in the preamble created
an impression that ALL members were employees of Hanjin à a clear proof of misrepresentation.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in cancelling the registration of Samahan?

Held: Yes, right to self-organization includes the right to form a union, workers’ association and labor
management councils: More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism workers,
however, can also form and join a workers’ association as well as labor-management councils. Art. XIII of
the ’87 Constitution Sec. 3 states that the State shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization. Art. III of the Labor Code states that the State shall assure the rights of workers to Self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The right
to self-organization is not limited to unionism. Workers may also form or join an association for mutual
aid and protection and for other legitimate purposes.

Rep. of the Phil. (DPWH) v. Ortigas & Co. Ltd. G.R. No, 171496, March 3, 2014

Facts: Respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its property and reserved one portion for road
widening. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A-1 which was actually used for road widening and it was not
compensated for the use of its property.

Respondent filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government the said lot and
alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of the property for road widening purposes.

Petitioner filed an opposition, alleging that respondent Ortigas’ property can only be conveyed by way of
donation to the government, citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property
Registration Decree.
Issue: Whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the Republic of the Philippines only
by donation?

Ruling: No. Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be compensated because
its property was taken and utilized for public road purposes.

Petitioner’s reliance on the Property Registration Decree is erroneous. It contemplates roads and streets
in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private property that was taken from an
owner for public purpose.

As a rule, when there is taking of private property for some public purpose, the owner of the property
taken is entitled to be compensated.

There is taking when the following elements are present:

1. The government must enter the private property;

2. The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;

3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;

4. The property is devoted to public use or purpose;

5. The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.

All of the above elements are present in this case. Petitioner construction of a road — a permanent
structure — on respondent Ortigas’ property for the use of the general public is an obvious permanent
entry on petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ part. Given that the road was constructed for general
public use gives it public character, and coursing the entry through the DPWH gives it a color of legal
authority. As a result, respondent may not anymore use the property for whatever legal purpose it may
desire. In other words, respondent was effectively deprived of all the bundle of rights attached to
ownership of property.

Hence, respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the Republic of the Philippines with just
compensation.

Aglipay vs. Ruiz 64 P 201

Facts: The government had authorized a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance in Manila
of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The
petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the measure, contending that it
violated the Constitution because it benefited a particular religion; thus he sought to prohibit the issuance
and selling of the stamps commemorative of the event.
Issue: Whether or not the authorized stamp issue be declared invalid for violating the principle of
separation of Church and State.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court, on examining the background facts, discovered that although the original
design of the stamp featured a Catholic chalice, this was later rejected in favor a map of the Philippines
under which appeared the caption, “”Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937.” What
was emphasized, therefore, is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, as the seat of that congress.
The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The only
purpose was “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country.” The stamps were not
issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance “to give publicity to the Philippines and its people”.

While it is obvious that the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main
purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated.

Garces vs. Estenzo 104 S 510

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for
the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.

b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election
of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the
saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s
property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the
priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative
to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with
Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article
VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Ruling: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image,
therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided
to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship
and banning the use of public money or property.

Islamic Da’wah vs. Exec. Sec. GR153888

Facts: Petitioner is a non-governmental organization internationally accredited to issue halal certifications

in the Philippines. To carry out its functions, it formulated internal rules and procedures based on the
Qur’an and Sunnah for food analysis and inspection, and began to issue certifications to qualified products
and food manufacturers for a fee.

Later, respondent Office issued Executive Order 46 which created the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme. Such order vested exclusive authority on the Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. OMA then warned Muslim consumers to buy
only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not been
subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork. It also began to send letters to food
manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate the order. As
a result, the IDCP lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition to nullify EO 46, contending that it is unconstitutional for the government
to formulate policies & guidelines on the halal certification scheme because it is a function that only
religious organizations can lawfully & validly perform for the Muslims.

Issue: Whether or not EO 46 is unconstitutional for violating the non-establishment and free exercise
clauses guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: Yes. Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur’an & Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal,
EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to interpret for Filipino Muslims what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption; by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an & Sunnah on halal
food. Only the prevention of an immediate & grave danger to the security and welfare of the community
can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness &
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right to health
are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring
that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.
Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

Taruc vs. Bishop de la Cruz GR144801

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del
Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest,
respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the
transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the
records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs,
thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political
camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another
parish.Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages
with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the RTC.They contended that their expulsion
was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?

Ruling: The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to Ceasar
what is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s." upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily
apparent that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the
profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but because of the far
reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of
conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the
complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow
themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature The SC agree with the Court of Appeals
that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best
left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization The
amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or
abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical
law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those
allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts.
Victoriano vs. Elizalde 59 S 94

Facts: Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such employee, he was a member
of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed shop agreement with the Company that
membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all its permanent employees.

Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to require as a
condition of employment membership in a labor organization, if such organization is the representative
of the employees. However, the provision was later amended by the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350,
which reads: … “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the Company to dismiss
Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. This
prompted Victoriano to file an action to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing him. The
Union assails the constitutionality of RA No. 3350, contending that it infringes on the fundamental right
to form lawful associations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental freedom to form
associations.

Ruling: No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:

“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement
the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision
on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate,
or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does
the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.”

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent 219 S 256

Facts: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions. Jehovah’s Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are “acts of worship” or
“religious devotion” which they “cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God”. They
feel bound by the Bible’s command to “guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21”. They consider the flag
as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State’s power and invades the sphere
of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.

Issue: Whether the expulsion of the Students in refusing to participate in the Flag Ceremony in compliance
with the teaching of the “Jehovah’s Witnesses” inviolates their Right to Freedom of Religion.

Ruling: Yes, the court held that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah’s Witnesses with
regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however “bizarre”
those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does
not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. While the highest regard must be afforded their
right to the free exercise of their religion, “this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them” if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the
flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose “a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right and duty to prevent.

German vs. Barangan 135 S 514

Facts:

1. In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and
office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude
Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow T-shirts, they
started to march down with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. The marchers
were barred by respondent Major Lariosa, upon orders of his superiors and co-respondent Gen. Santiago
Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the
Malacañang security area. Despite plea, they were not allowed in the church.

2. Because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by
petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present
recourse.

3. Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude
church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never
restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church.
They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship,
but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of
the President of the Republic.

4. Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the
issuance of [1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude
Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from
preventing them from getting into and praying in said church.

Issue: Whether or not the restriction to petitioners to attend church is a violation of their freedom to
religious worship

Ruling: No.

1. The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was established in the interest of national
security. Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but
only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in
accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education.

2. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom,
the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article
19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties ... observe honesty and good faith."

Pamil vs. Teleron 86 S 413

Facts: Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was elected to the position of municipal mayor
of Alburque, Bohol in 1971. He was duly proclaimed. However, a suit for quo warranto was then filed by
petitioner Fortunato R. Pamil, an aspirant for the office, of his disqualification based on the Administrative
Code provision: “In no case shall there be receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national
funds or contractors for public works of the municipality.”

The suit on the other hand, did not prosper as the respondent Judge Honorable Victorino C. Teleron,
sustained the right of Father Gonzaga to the office. The respondent ruled that such statutory ineligibility
was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971.

The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner with his contention that there was no such
implied repeal that it is still in full force and effect.

In the Tribunal, the court was divided on the said issue. Seven members of the Court are of the view that
the judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was
superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed. The remaining five members of this Court, on the other
hand, hold that such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not tainted with any
constitutional infirmity.

Issue: Whether or not the disqualification of the respondent based on the Administrative Code provision
is constitutional.

Ruling: The vote was thus indecisive as five members of the Court constitute a minority and the remaining
votes did not suffice or failed to obtain a majority vote of 8 to render the challenge provision ineffective
and which, is needed for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case.

The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now under the
present Charter, it is explicitly declared: “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.”

It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the provision
on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The
challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any
elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test.

In Torcaso v. Watkins, an American Supreme Court decision, has persuasive weight. What was there
involved was the validity of a provision in the Maryland Constitution prescribing that “no religious test
ought ever to be required as a disqualification for any office or profit or trust in this State, other than a
declaration of belief in the existence of God …” Such a constitutional requirement was assailed as contrary
to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by an appointee to the office of notary public
in Maryland, who was refused a commission as he would not declare a belief in God. He failed in the
Maryland Court of Appeals but prevailed in the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the state
court decision. It could not have been otherwise. As emphatically declared by Justice Black: “this Maryland
religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant’s freedom of belief and religion and
therefore cannot be enforced against him.”It was also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve
the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church
tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still
stands because there is no implied repeal.

Nonetheless, tie above view failed to obtain the necessary eight votes needed to give it binding force. The
attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given
full force and application.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is reversed and set aside.
Respondent Father Gonzaga was hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the municipality
of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect. No pronouncement as to costs.
INC vs. CA 259 S 529

Facts: Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series
Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground
that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the
respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the
respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction
and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with
grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found
the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s
religious program?

Ruling: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the powers
vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled that any
act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board
to overthrow this presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioner’s
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement
of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the
petitioner’s TV program while it reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the
act of respondent in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner.

2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:

1. Freedom to believe (absolute)

2. Freedom to act on one’s belief – where an individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions
affecting the public, this freedom to do so becomes subject to the regulation authority of the
state.
Estrada vs. Escitur 429 S 1

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Ruling: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution.
As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing
its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts
to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only
to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has
to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise
is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom
of religion.

Soriano vs. Laguardia GR 164785

Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but
almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then
a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue: Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and
within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

Ruling: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect
of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his
duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three
months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his
right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons
given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s
role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be
avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are
few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

In Re Request Muslim Employees 477 S 648

Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 P 778

Facts: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the
women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. The city authorities quietly
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, as laborers; Mayor
Justo Lukban, placed some 170 inmates aboard the steamers.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for
as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Ynigo and Rafael Castillo.
The governor and the hacendero Ynigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification
that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.

Issue: Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the authority in expelling the prostitutes in his city (Manila)
without due process of law?

Ruling: No. The Mayor and the Chief of Police of Manila cannot force the prostitutes residing in that City
to go to and live in Davao against their will, there being no law that authorizes them to do so. These
women, despite their being in a sense, lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels, but Filipino citizens,
protected by the same constitutional guarantees as are other citizens.
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos
for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold
his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with
the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If
the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the
city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from
Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts,
while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty
may not thus be easily evaded.

Manotoc vs. CA 142 S 149

Principles:

● A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

● The constitutional right to travel is not an absolute right. The Constitution provides: "The liberty of
abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court xxx." The order of the trial
court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order.

Facts: Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc.
and the Manotoc Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was in US for a certain time. He went home
to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Pending
disposition of the case, the SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear Manotoc for
departure, and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner.

Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints for estafa against
Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion for permission to leave the country in
each trial courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." His motion was denied. He also wrote the Immigration Commissioner
requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus,
he filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges'
orders, as well as the communication-request of the SEC, denying his leave to travel abroad. The same
was denied; hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. He contends that having been admitted to bail as
a matter of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.

Issues:

1. Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.

2. Whether the constitutional right to travel is absolute

Ruling: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail
bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if
the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond
the reach of the courts.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution (Sec 6. Art. III, 1987 Constitution) states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or
when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.

The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by
the above-quoted constitutional provision.

Yap vs. CA GR 141529

Facts: Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed
a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount
of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private
complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He
also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the
same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Ruling:

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an
amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to
permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is
charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil
liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute
rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent
with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available
at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition
will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court
in case he does so.

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission 150 S 530

Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a
special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities
of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the
petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil
service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure
the information sought.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.
Ruling: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records
by the government agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters
of public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are
"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.

The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public
interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while
a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their
eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result
of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that
is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities
of any person occupying government positions.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte 170 S 256

Facts: Atty. Ricardo Valmonte and his co-pettioners wrote a letter to GSIS General Manager Feliciano
Belmonte requesting the list of opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a
clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. They invoked the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall and access to official records shall be afforded. In reply,
GSIS answered in negative, that it has a duty to its customers to preserve confidentiality and that it would
not be proper for GSIS to breach the same unless so ordered by the courts. Accordingly, Valmonte, et. al
filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and
pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to the list of the names and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to
the public records for the subject information.

Issue: Whether or not Valmonte, et. al may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured by
Imelda Marcos in favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa.

Ruling: Yes. The right to information is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuses in the government. The right to information
is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right
to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance
the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in
government.

The constitutional right to information is not an absolute right, hence, before mandamus may issue, it
must be clear that the information sought is of “public interest” or “public concern” and that the same is
not exempted by law from the operation of such constitutional right.

The information sought by herein petitioners as to the truth of reports that some opposition members
were granted “clean loans” by the GSIS is a matter of public interest and concern.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence
and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that
prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity “to preserve at all
times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System” [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No.
1146. Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS “is not supposed to grant ‘clean loans’.” It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the
end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.

The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, it cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. It may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to have been violated.
In this case, neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy
of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature.

Aquino vs. Morato 203 S 515

Facts: In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned,
cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the
ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected
in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely
private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB
to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the
board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same
inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied
petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989,
that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal,
the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

Ruling: The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company,
or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or
community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public
interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to
the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and
acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips
accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such,
are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public
records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

Chavez vs. PCGG 299 S 744

Facts: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news
reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred
to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in
Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG)
and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose
publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and
all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.
He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount
public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to
know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs.
They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked
the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be
compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.

Issue: Whether or not PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

Ruling: Yes, the PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. The
Court held that the "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution (Sec. 7 [Article III]) have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may
be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters
and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information.
Limitations to the Right:

(1) National Security Matters

At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters. But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the
privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information, provided that they
are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection." Likewise, information on
inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be
subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.

(2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions

The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security
matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual
Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.

(3) Criminal Matters

Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension,
the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may nor inquire into prior to such
arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously
jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations,
the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.

(4) Other Confidential Information

The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging
"confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not
made available to the public."

Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed

door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.

Furthermore, the Court used the following case:

In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be "matters of public
concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends
only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law."

The Court also addressed the following of Executive Orders of then President Cory Aquino:

Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses fled the
country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast
government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and
close associates both here and abroad.
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and entities who had knowledge
or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of penalties prescribed by
law, prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise frustrating or
obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.

On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG which,
taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival, required it to
achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten wealth.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. The Court also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by
its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten
wealth" refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or
illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office;
or their use of powers, influences or relationships, "resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave
damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines." The assets and
properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes,
therefore, they belong to the people.

Chavez vs. PEA and AMARI GR133250

Facts: Through PD No. 1084, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was tasked by former president and
dictator Ferdinand Marcos, to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop,
improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. As a result, an amendment was made on a
previous contract with Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). Prior to PEA,
CDCP was tasked to reclaim certain forshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The amended contract
now directed CDCP to transfer to PEA all the development rights, title, interest and partitipation of CDCP
in the reclamation.

Under former President Cory Aquino, titles of parcels of land reclaimed under Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) were transferred to PEA. These covered three reclaimed islands
known as the “Freedom Islands.”

PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands, notably the reclamation of an additional 250 ha of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the plan. The JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding.
Former President Fidel Ramos then approved the JVA.

Controversy broke out when then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. The Senate conducted a joint investigation and concluded that the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of public domain which the government has
not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands. Moreover, the certificates
of title covering the Freedom Islands were void, and that the JVA itself was illegal.
In his capacity as taxpayer, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He argued that the
government will lose billions of pesos in the JVA. He sought for the public disclosure of the renegotiation
of the JVA, invoking Constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

He also alleged that the JVA is against the Constitutional prohibition on the sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to public corporations.

A year after the filing of the petition, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
(Amended JVA). Former President Estrada signed the Amended JVA.

Issues:

Whether the amended JVA violates the Constitution. -- YES.

Whether information on ongoing negotiations may be disclosed to the public. -- NO.

Ruling: The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157. 84 ha have been reclaimed.
The rest are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Under the agreement, AMARI will shoulder
the reclamation of the freedom island and it will get 70% of the usable area. AMARI wil acquire and own
a maximum of 367.5 ha of reclaimed land wich will be titled in its name.

PD No 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.

However, at this time, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass
after PEA had already reclaimed it. However, the additional 592.15 ha are still submerged and forming
part of the Manila Bay. There is also no legislative or presidential act regarding these remaining areas.

Also, the mere physical act of reclamation of PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. It
still needs the authorization of DENR, which classifies lands of public domain into alienable or disposable
lands subject to the President’s approval.

Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA
remain inalienable lands of the public domain.

PEA is also mandated to call for a public bidding. Only if this failed that a negotiated sale is allowed. The
failure of the public bidding involving only 407.84 ha is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750
ha.

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project,
cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Ownership of PEA of the said lands of public domain does not convert them to private lands. Jurisprudence
holding that there is conversion to private land upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate
of title does not apply to government units like PEA.

The rationale behind ban on corporation acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of public domain
is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-
size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings spawn social
unrest. In practice, this ban strengthens limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed
area by simply stting up a corporation to acquire more land.

On the right to information:

The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under
the separation of powers. In this case, the information demanded by Chavez is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers.

Akbayan vs. Aquino GR 170516

Facts: This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan,
concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,
investment, etc.

Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-government organizations,

Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain
from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during
the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress
through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive
is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation is completed.

Issues:

Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged

Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to
concur in treaties, from the negotiation process

Ruling:

JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement
that it be a matter of public concern xxx
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine
of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full
public disclosure.

Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing
valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that “information on inter-
government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to
reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.”

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a
treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be
privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same.
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
foreign governments in future negotiations.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.
While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into
compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve
a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area
of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as
Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be
considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made
may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information,
strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.

Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve national security?

While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as
those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the “informer’s privilege,” or
the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. The suspect involved
need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any given
instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the most high-profile cases, in which
case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial to law
enforcement efforts in general.

Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged
without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not,
the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from
the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.

In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case
deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national
security.

It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute,
one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of
government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from
investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This
qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a
congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.

Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process privilege
recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,
deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the
privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the
“obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a
potential item of discovery and front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance the
quality of agency decisions.

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential
character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if
not identical.

The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant
to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such
negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic
negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the independence in decision-making of
the President, particularly in its capacity as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations.” And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege
accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but
because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest, must
be presumed confidential.

Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the
privileged character of the deliberative process.

Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process?

In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose “definite
propositions of the government,” such duty does not include recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.
Treaty-making power of the President

xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since
whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived
only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401
and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.

The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and
international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes xxx.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the
article on the Executive Department.

xxx

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by
the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into
treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the
President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be
interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis
to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty
negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the
requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively
conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not
interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence,
such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations
attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority
to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the
House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is
critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such privilege?

That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition
does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioner’s position presupposes that
an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House Committee investigations, failing
which respondents are deemed to have waived it.

xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not,
however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents received from
the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as
priorly stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a
subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged request to Committee
Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.

The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no cause to
enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondent’s failure to
invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not amount to waiver thereof.

“Showing of Need” Test

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of need”
only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree
to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such
a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights.

xxx However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been established
that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the
same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any
further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no
force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such
controversies would be whether an information is a matter of public concern.

Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege

xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a
specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same
is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has
established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to
overcome the privilege, must show that that information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its
curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic
decision-making.

GSIS vs. Kapisanan GR170132

Facts: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS
personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
(“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing
131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for
their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration
of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8,
2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however,
effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG
members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the petition and
enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges
arising from the same facts and events.

CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available
to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS
employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization, petitioner Garcia
could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations
notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action.

Issue: Whether or not the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid

Ruling: No, The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in
“peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”. It was against the
backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court
of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage
in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to
organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of
Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and
of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the
association, [and] the overriding considerations of national security.

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance
with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even
deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right
of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.

Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members
launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same
thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity” refers to any collective
activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization,
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out
and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main
office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest,
851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756)
took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving the other employees to fend for
themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second day,
707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third
day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day
activity.

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact
remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had
taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they
assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and
even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery
disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government
personnel.

To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility,
under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise
discipline GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of
administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely
performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in
when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within
his jurisdiction.

Republic vs. Castellvi 58 S 336

Facts: This case involves two cases of a complaint for eminent domain – one against Carmen Vda. de
Castellvi, as the administratix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, and the other is against Maria
Nieves Toledo-Gozunm.

The Republic, through the Philippine Air Force (PAF) was in a lease agreement with Castellvi for the latter’s
property on yearly basis, starting 1 July 1947. Upon expiration of the agreement on 1956, Castellvi did not
renew the same because she wanted to sell the leased property. From then on, the PAF was illegally
occupying the said property and thereby was receiving repeated demands to vacate. The continued use
by the PAF on the property prevented Castillevi from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages
by way of unrealized profit.

The Republic filed a complaint of eminent domain against defendants with the contention that the fair
market value of the subject properties, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of
Pampanga, was not more than P 2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P 259,669.10. Castellvi
claimed on the other hand that the subject land, being residential land, had a fair market value of
P15.00/sqm, totaling to a market value of P 11,389,485. Toledo-Gozun alleged that the parcels of land
owned by her were residential lands and the fair market value of said lands was P 15.00 per square meter,
so they had a total market value of P 8,085,675
In Toledo-Gozun’s answer, she filed a motion to dismiss alleging the contentions or that she be paid the
amount of P 8,085,675, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and
attorney’s fess in the amount of P 50,000.

RTC ruled that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands after it had deposited with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10; and authorized the Provincial Treasurer to pay
Toledo-Gozun the sum of P 107,609 and Castellvi the amount of P 151,859.80 as provisional value of the
lands. The RTC entered an order of condemnation, after.

The RTC afterward, appointed three commissioners to determine the value of the subject properties —
Commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, as commissioner for the court; Atty. Felicisimo Pamandanan for the
plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo Lansangan for the defendants

After having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they
recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P 10.00 per square meter, for
both lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun. An additional P 5,000 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for
improvements found on her land. Legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959,
be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be
awarded.

RTC ruled that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten pesos (P10.00) per square
meter for the lots of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun is fair and just. Thus, it ordered the Republic to:

Pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands to Toledo-Gozun from the time that the
provisional value has been deposited (August 10, 1959) until full payment

Pay 6% interest per annum from July 1, 1956 when Republic commenced its illegal possession of
the Castellvi land until July 10, 1959 when the provisional value thereof was actually deposited in
court

Republic averred that the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special
lease agreement between the Republic and Castellvi, the former was granted the “right and privilege” to
buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease and that in the event of such sale, it was
stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent
improvements amounting to more than half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years
on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of
occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national security.

Castellvi argued that the “taking” of property under the power eminent domain requires two essential
elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Issue: Whether the taking of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the action
or upon occupation.
Ruling: YES. A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of
eminent domain.

1) The expropriator must enter a private property – this circumstance is present in the instant case,
when by virtue of a lease agreement the Republic, through PAF, took possession of the property of
Castellvi

2) The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period – the word
“momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of property should be construed to mean “a
limited period” – not indefinite or permanent. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary
and considered transitory considering that the said contract is renewable from year to year. The fact that
the Republic constructed some installation of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry
into the land was transitory or intended to last a year.

3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority – this circumstance is
present in the instant case because Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee

4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected – this is likewise present in this case because the property was used by the air force of the AFP

5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property – this is wanting in this case as Castellvi remained as owner
and she was receiving the monthly rentals of the property; hence, she was not deprived of the beneficial
enjoyment of the property.

We hold, therefore, that the “taking’ of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947
when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of
the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the “taking” of the
property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the
Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959.
The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid
must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

EPZA vs. Dulay 149 S 305

Fact: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a
certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and
covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area,
however, was public land which includes, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square
meters owned by the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of
land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then CFI of Cebu for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
possession against the private respondent for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing
Zone. The respondent judge issued a writ of possession, order of condemnation and order to appointing
certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated. The petitioner Objection to Commissioner’s Report on the grounds
that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment
of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum
amount set by P.D. No. 1533.

Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533
which states “Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent
domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to
the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the
appropriate Government office to acquire the property.” valid and constitutional?

Ruling: No, the method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Court inutile in a matter which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Although in an expropriation proceeding
the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless
for the court to appoint commissioners under the Rules of Court. The determination of “just
compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings.
Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed compensation.