by providing both emotional support and attainable training tasks of a suitable difficulty level. This theoretical framework has several implications. It implies that if someone is interested in the upper limits of human performance and the most effective training to achieve the highest attainable levels, they should study the training techniques and performance limits of experts who have spent their entire life maximizing their performance. This assumption also implies that the study of expert performance will provide us with the best current evidence on what is humanly possible to achieve with today’s methods of training and how these elite performers are able to achieve their highest levels of performance. Given that performance levels are increasing every decade in most domains of expertise, scientists will need to work with elite performers and their coaches to discover jointly the ever-increasing levels of improved performance. The framework has implications for education and professional training of performance for all the preliminary levels that lead up to the expert levels in professional domains of expertise. By examining how the prospective expert performers attained lower levels of achievement, we should be able to develop practice environments and foster learning methods that help people to attain the fundamental representations of the tasks and the self-regulatory skills that were necessary for the prospective experts to advance their learning to higher levels. With the rapid changes in the relevant knowledge and techniques required for most jobs, nearly everyone will have to continue their learning and even intermittently relearn aspects of their professional skills. The life-long quest for improved adaptation to task demands will not be limited to experts anymore. We will all need to adopt the characteristics and the methods of the expert performers who continuously strive to attain and maintain their best level of achievement. References Anderson, J. R. (Ed.) (1981). Cognitive skills and their acquisition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum . Aristotle (2000). Generation of animals (Translated by A. L. Pick and first published in 1942). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univesity Press. Barnes, J. (2000). Aristotle: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Becker,G. S. (2002). The age of human capital. In E. P. Lazear (Ed.), Education in the twenty-first century (pp. 3–8). Stanford,CA: Hoover Institution Press. B´edard, J. (1991). Expertise and its relation to audit decision quality. Contemporary Accounting Research, 8, 198–222. Benner, P. E. (1984). From novice to expert – Excellence and power in clinical nursing practice. Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley. Bloom, B. S. (Ed.) (1985a). Developing talent in young people. New York: Ballantine Books. Bloom, B. S. (1985b). Generalizations about talent development. In B. S. Bloom (Ed.), Developing talent in young people (pp. 507–549). New York: Ballantine Books. Bloomfield, J. (2004). Australia’s sporting success: The inside story. Sydney, Australia: University of South Wales Press. Bolger, F., & Wright, G. (1992). Reliability and validity in expert judgment. In G. Wright and F. Bolger (Eds.), Expertise and decision support (pp. 47–76). New York: Plenum. Bryan,W. L., & Harter, N. (1899). Studies on the telegraphic language: The acquisition of a hierarchy of habits. Psychological Review, 6, 345– 375. Camerer, C. F., & Johnson, E. J. (1991). The process-performance paradox in expert judgment: How can the experts know so much and predict so badly? In K. A. Ericsson and J. Smith (Eds.), Towards a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 195–217). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chase,W.G. (Ed.) (1973). Visual information processing. New York: Academic Press. Chase,W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). The mind’s eye in chess. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 215–281). New York: Academic Press. Chi, M. T. H., Feltovich, P. J., & Glaser, R. (1981). Categorization and representation of physics problems by experts and novices. Cognitive Science, 5 , 121–15 2.