3 Scenarios for India-Pakistan

Relations Under Modi 2.0

Can India and Pakistan shift the balance from
confrontation to cooperation?
In a historic win, Narendra Modi has won another term in office as prime minister of
India while his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has won an even larger
majority than it held before—a first for an Indian political party since 1984. The
question of how Modi will approach the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship in his
second term has become the talk of the town not only among analysts in India and
Pakistan but also international watchers of South Asian politics. This piece lays out
possible scenarios for the future of the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship in Modi’s
second term and argues that improving ties between the two nuclear-armed neighbors
is necessary to resolve historical discord at a time when their hostile relationship is
serving as a stumbling block in harnessing the benefits of an economically-integrated
South Asia and when international terror groups are threatening to destabilize the
region.

Background of Tensions

During his previous term, Modi sought to improve ties with Pakistan by inviting then-
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his 2014 swearing-in ceremony and visited Lahore
for an unplanned visit on Christmas day 2015. But following the January 2016
Pathankot attack, his administration cancelled planned talks with Pakistan
by linking dialogue to action from Islamabad against militants believed by New Delhi
to be responsible for the attack. The bilateral relationship experienced another strain
after India conducted ―surgical strikes‖ inside Pakistan-administered Kashmir in
response to an insurgent attack on its military installation in Uri.
In February 2019, tensions escalated when India launched airstrikes in Pakistani
territory against alleged terrorist camps which New Delhi claimed were behind the
attack on an Indian paramilitary convoy in Pulwama earlier that month.
Pakistan retaliated by launching airstrikes in Indian-administered Kashmir, which was
followed by an air battle in which an Indian Air Force pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman,
was captured by Pakistan. After several days of uncertainty and hostility, tensions
finally eased when Pakistan returned Varthman to India in a goodwill gesture.

The post-Pulwama acrimony was reflected in the campaigning for India’s Lok Sabha
election earlier this year. Like previous election campaigns, this one too was rife with
direct and indirect anti-Pakistan rhetoric, with Modi going as far as to declare that
India is not afraid of Pakistan’s nuclear threats anymore and suggesting that India’s
nuclear weapons are not just for show.

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However, post-election, prospects for engagement look promising. The foreign

ministers of both countries met informally during the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Kazakhstan in May.
Additionally, after the Indian election results were announced recently, Prime
Minister Imran Khan telephoned Modi and congratulated him while expressing the
desire to improve the bilateral relationship. Modi was receptive, and reiterated his
earlier suggestion of working together to fight poverty, develop further cooperation,
and enable an environment devoid of violence and terrorism. Additionally, Indian
officials have recently been quoted by Indian media outlets as acknowledging that
Pakistan is taking meaningful action against anti-India insurgent outfits, which
indicates that an opening for dialogue may soon occur.
Fork in the Road

The next 12 to 18 months will be crucial for the India-Pakistan relationship because,
as recent history is testament, any new Indian government usually undertakes positive
gestures in addressing the Kashmir dispute, which is the main bone of contention
between India and Pakistan, during the first few months of its tenure.
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Given the mutual hostility between the two countries, one of three possible scenarios
is likely to direct the future nature of their bilateral relationship. First, one possibility
is that the status quo will remain intact with no serious engagement between the two
countries during Modi’s second term and violence remaining restricted to the Line of
Control (LoC). However, this scenario seems unlikely after the series of moves
described earlier, such as the telephone call between Khan and Modi, that suggest a
thaw in ties.

Second, relations between the two countries could further deteriorate. The likelihood
of such a scenario will be greater should the Modi administration continue to adopt
policies viewed as attempts to isolate Pakistan. Past examples of these include
India’s non-engagement with Pakistan either at the bilateral or multilateral level since
the National Security Adviser-level talks in December 2017, withdrawing the most-
favored-nation status India had granted Pakistan, boycotting the SAARC summit in
Pakistan in 2016, and linking sports activities with the political nature of the
relationship.

The third scenario is that the bilateral relationship could improve to a certain extent.
This could take many potential forms, including Pakistan taking action against anti-
India insurgent outfits, the ending of proxy warfare and cross-LoC insurgent
activities, both countries accommodating each other’s strategic interests in
Afghanistan, and India joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The possibility
of such a scenario will largely depend on how serious the Pakistani and Indian
governments are in improving bilateral relations. Additionally, the role of third parties
like the United States and China will also factor into the materialization of these
possibilities.

Pakistan’s crackdown on anti-India outfits could serve as a starting point for the
resumption of the composite or comprehensive dialogue, which has been suspended
since 2013, and potentially, movement towards peace. Unlike previous crackdowns,
the Imran Khan government has taken significant action against banned outfits–local
media reports suggest that for the first time in more than three decades, the offices of
Kashmiri insurgent organizations operating in Pakistan-administered Kashmir have
reportedly been sealed and prominent leaders of proscribed outfits have
been arrested and their properties, including seminaries and mosques, seized. Such
steps have resulted in forcing the leadership of some of these outfits to go
underground, and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) has reportedly asked its cadres to
prepare for ―migration‖ and ―a new struggle.‖ These actions suggest that Pakistan is
serious about tackling proscribed outfits and this could convince India to give talks a
chance.

Challenges Ahead

The challenge for both Modi and Khan will be to ensure that cooperation does not
occur at the cost of their strategic interests. For Modi, that means developing a
Pakistan policy that satisfies his right-wing Hindutva-centric base while also engaging
in talks with Islamabad. Similarly, for Khan, the principal challenge will be to
maintain Pakistan’s long-standing position on the Kashmir dispute while also cracking
down on anti-India militant outfits operating within Pakistan.

There are several ways in which both Modi and Khan can improve the bilateral
relationship without appearing weak to their respective publics. First, flare ups on the
LoC should be avoided. Pakistan claimed that India committed 1,140 ceasefire
violations in 2017 while India claimed that Pakistan was responsible for 881 ceasefire
violations the same year. Such incidents have resulted in significant human losses,
both military and civilian, on both sides of the border. But, according
to research conducted by Indian political scientist Happymon Jacob, ceasefire
violations are not necessarily directed by the top political or military leadership–they
are quite often driven by ―local military factors,‖ such as construction of new bunkers,
―tests by firing‖ whenever new officers assume command, etc. Thus, these incidents
do not serve a strategic purpose and can sometimes even trigger crises between the
two countries. Avoiding them by adopting proposals such as regular communication
and meetings between local commanders, coordinated patrolling, and others outlined
by various experts would improve the LoC situation, serving as a major confidence-
building measure to transform the political nature of the relationship.

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Secondly, improvements by both India and Pakistan to the human security situation in
Kashmir would go a long way towards demonstrating to the local populace that both
sides genuinely intend to address their apprehensions. This could be accomplished by
New Delhi adopting a less militaristic approach in Indian-administered Kashmir,
avoiding human rights violations by Indian security forces, and engaging with all the
relevant stakeholders in Kashmir, including the Hurriyat. While Pakistan too could
address grievances in Pakistan-administered Kashmir identified by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights such as clampdown on freedom of speech and
wrongful arrest.

Finally, intelligence-sharing between India and Pakistan regarding the movement of

members associated with international terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) and
al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and anti-India militant groups operating
in Pakistan could simultaneously increase transparency and trust between the two
countries. Lastly, informal meetings between Indian and Pakistani political leadership
should become the norm such that they could lead towards a structured dialogue
process in the future.

In realizing the above-mentioned proposals, Islamabad and Delhi would likely face
several major barriers, including pressure from their armed forces, especially
regarding an intelligence-sharing framework. The prevalence of negative perceptions
of the other in both countries also means that domestic pressure from their respective
publics will factor in.
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However, India and Pakistan must consider that with international terror groups like
IS and AQIS making inroads into South Asia, it is in both their interests to improve
their bilateral relationship. If the Indo–Pak relationship remains broken, the security
of the whole region remains at risk. Additionally, the discord between the two
countries is preventing them from harnessing their fullest economic potential–their
bilateral trade potential is estimated to be $37 billion. Consequently, the mutual
economic benefits will also result in enhancing intra-regional trade in South Asia,
which remains one of the least economically integrated regions of the world.
India and Pakistan Are
Edging Closer to War in
2020
Two crises dominated South Asia in 2019, and each one stands to get worse next year.

Turmoil is never far away in South Asia, between disputed borders, acute resource shortages,
and threats ranging from extremist violence to earthquakes. But in 2019, two crises stood out: an
intensifying war in Afghanistan and deep tensions between India and Pakistan. And as serious as
both were in 2019, expect them to get even worse in the coming year.

Afghanistan has already seen several grim milestones in the last 12 months that attested to the
ferocity of the Taliban insurgency. Casualty figures for Afghan security forces and civilians set
new records. It was also the deadliest year for U.S. forces since 2014.

Ironically, violence soared even as there was unprecedented momentum toward launching a
peace process. U.S. President Donald Trump, eager to exit Afghanistan, stepped up efforts to
secure a deal with the Taliban that would give him the political cover for a troop withdrawal.
U.S. negotiators and senior Taliban representatives held multiple rounds of talks, and by
September the two sides were finalizing a deal that centered on a withdrawal of U.S. troops
coupled with a commitment by the Taliban to renounce ties to international terror groups.

However, in September, Trump abruptly called off talks, giving a recent Taliban attack on a U.S.
soldier as the reason. The likelier explanation, as I wrote for Foreign Policy back then, was the
administration’s recognition that the emerging accord with the Taliban—which didn’t call for
any type of cease-fire—was a lousy deal for Washington and Kabul.

The suspension of talks didn’t last long. Trump announced plans to scale up offensives against
the Taliban, but this was more of a bargaining tactic than a battlefield redirection. Washington
wanted to increase military pressure on the Taliban so that the insurgents would make more
concessions at the negotiating table—such as the cease-fire they had refused to agree to earlier.
Indeed, several days after Trump made a surprise Thanksgiving visit to Afghanistan,
talks resumed—and this time with U.S. negotiators aiming to get a Taliban commitment to
reduce violence against U.S. troops.During the last few days of December, media
reports revealed that the Taliban had agreed to a temporary ceasefire to clear the way for a deal
with the United States. The Taliban, however, rejected these reports.

Meanwhile, 2019 was a dangerously tense year for India and Pakistan—two rivals that are both
neighbors and nuclear states. In February, a young Kashmiri man in the town of Pulwama staged
a suicide bombing that killed more than three dozen Indian security forces—the deadliest such
attack in Kashmir in three decades. Jaish-e-Mohammad—a Pakistan-based terror group with
close ties to Pakistan’s security establishment—claimed responsibility. India retaliated by
sending jets across Pakistan-administered Kashmir and launching limited strikes, for the first
time since a war in 1971. Soon thereafter, Pakistan claimed it had carried out six air strikes in
Kashmir to showcase its might, and it also shot down an Indian fighter jet and captured the pilot.
The confrontation, which de-escalated when Islamabad announced the pilot’s release several
days later, represented the most serious exchange of hostilities in years.

Then, in August, India revoked the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir, the India-administered
part of Kashmir, and declared it a new territory of India. New Delhi also imposed a security
lockdown in Kashmir that included the detention of hundreds of people and a communication
blackout. For Islamabad, which claims Jammu and Kashmir as its own, the move amounted to a
serious provocation, if not a hostile act. Pakistan retaliated by expelling India’s envoy from
Islamabad and suspending trade with New Delhi. Undaunted, in the weeks that followed, senior
Indian officials—including the defense and foreign ministers—turned their attention to Pakistan-
administered Kashmir, which New Delhi has long claimed, and suggested they eventually
planned to reclaim it.

Bilateral relations remained fraught over the last few months of the year. Islamabad issued
constant broadsides against New Delhi for its continued security lockdown in Kashmir. By
year’s end, an internet blackout was still in effect. Then, in December, India’s
parliament passed a controversial new citizenship law that affords fast-track paths to Indian
citizenship for religious minorities—but not Muslims—fleeing persecution in Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan. The new law angered Islamabad not just for excluding Muslims, but
because of the implication—accurate but not something Islamabad likes to admit—that Pakistan
persecutes its Hindu and Christian communities.

These prolonged tensions often overshadowed what was arguably the biggest story in both
countries in 2019: economic struggle. India suffered its biggest economic slowdown in six years,
and Pakistan confronted a serious debt crisis. The two weren’t unconnected: Given the inability
of New Delhi and Islamabad to fix their economies, both governments arguably sought political
advantages from the distractions of saber rattling.

Against this tense backdrop, the opening in November of a new border corridor that enables
Indian Sikhs to enter Pakistan visa-free to worship at a holy shrine, which in better times could
have been a bridge to an improved relationship, amounted to little more than a one-off
humanitarian gesture.

Bad as these crises are, they are poised to get worse next year.

The good news for Americans is that a U.S.-Taliban deal likely isn’t far off; both sides are fully
invested in a troop withdrawal. For Trump, the importance of troop departures will grow as the
U.S. presidential election draws closer, and especially because the Washington Post’s release in
December of the ―Afghanistan Papers‖—documents that feature senior U.S. officials admitting
failure in the war—will likely solidify U.S. public opinion in favor of winding down America’s
role in the 18-year war.

However, any U.S.-Taliban deal will do little to reduce violence, other than halting attacks on
U.S. troops. In other words, the war will continue.

A U.S.-Taliban accord would clear the path for an intra-Afghan dialogue between the Afghan
government, other political stakeholders, and the Taliban that aims to produce a cease-fire and an
eventual political settlement that ends the war.
The path to intra-Afghan dialogue, however, is fraught with obstacles. Afghanistan held a
presidential election in September. The preliminary results—released in December—showed
President Ashraf Ghani in the lead, but with barely the 50 percent of votes needed to avoid a
second round of voting with the second-place finisher, his bitter rival Abdullah Abdullah (who
rejected the results). The close margin suggests that when final results are announced, the loser
won’t accept them.

This means Afghanistan is unlikely to have a new government in place for at least another few
months, and even longer if the final results are different from the initial ones and require a
second vote. Due to winter weather in Afghanistan, a runoff likely wouldn’t occur until the
spring. Without a new government in place, it beggars belief that Afghanistan could launch a
process to establish an intra-Afghan dialogue, much less negotiate an end to the war. And even if
and when an intra-Afghan dialogue is launched, the hardest of sells will be required to convince
the Taliban to lay down arms and agree to share power within a political system that it has long
rejected and vowed to overthrow by force.

Consequently, Afghanistan in 2020 is likely to see a withdrawal of U.S. forces before a peace
agreement is in place—a demoralizing outcome for already struggling Afghan forces that would
deliver another boost to the Taliban and further increase violence.

Meanwhile, the underlying tensions between India and Pakistan remain sharp.
Pakistan arrested dozens of Islamist militants this past year, but New Delhi wasn’t
convinced Islamabad was taking strong and ―irreversible‖ steps against India-focused terrorists
and their networks. And New Delhi’s actions in Kashmir in 2019 represented worst-case
scenarios for Islamabad.

The two nuclear-armed nations will enter 2020 just one big trigger event away from war. The
trigger could be another mass-casualty attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir traced back to
a Pakistan-based group, or—acting on the threats issued repeatedly by New Delhi in 2019—
an Indian preemptive operation to seize territory in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

In either scenario, escalation would be swift. Bilateral relations are much worse than they were
during last February’s confrontation. Ever since its resounding reelection victory last spring,
India’s ruling party has pursued its Hindu nationalist agenda in increasingly aggressive fashion—
which gives it no incentive to go easy on Islamabad. Pakistan, not wanting to show weakness,
will not give in easily.

The doomsday clock for the next India-Pakistan war is at a minute to midnight. Diplomatic
intervention from Washington and other third parties, and cooler heads on both sides, may keep
it from ticking further forward. But it’s hard to see a path to unraveling such tightly knotted
tensions—or to solving Afghanistan’s unending conflict.