CASES RELATED TO RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE

1) GEORGE ARRIOLA VS PILIPINO STAR NGAYON, INC. G.R. No. 175689

FACTS:
George Arriola was a column writer for the newspaper Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. since 1986. His column thereat was
“Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs”. On November 15, 2002, he filed a case for illegal dismissal against Pilipino Star as he
averred that on November 15, 1999, he was arbitrarily dismissed when his column was removed from publication by
Pilipino Star. In its defense, Pilipino Star argued that they never removed Arriola; that it was Arriola who abandoned his
work because he went on to write for a rival newpaper, Imbestigador. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Pilipino Star. The
labor arbiter held that Arriola’s case was filed out of time as it was filed three years and one day from the date he was
allegedly illegally dismissed. The labor arbiter cited Art. 291 of the Labor Code:
Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity
of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arriola’s suit involves a money claim contemplated by Art. 291 of the Labor Code.
HELD:
No. Art. 291 of the Labor Code only covers the following claims:

1. overtime pay,

2. holiday pay,

3. service incentive leave pay,

4. bonuses,

5. salary differentials,

6. illegal deductions by an employer, and

7. money claims arising from seafarer contracts.

It does not cover “money claims” consequent to an illegal dismissal such as backwages. It also does not cover claims for
damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides: Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon injury to the rights of the
plaintiff... xxx
Further, in an illegal dismissal case, the claim for backwages, the money claim, is just but one of the reliefs that an
employee prays before the arbiter. As such, Arriola’s claim for backwages is still filed within the prescriptive period of
four years.
However, Arriola’s case must still be dismissed because it was established that he in fact abandoned his work. In the first
place, it is a newspaper’s prerogative whether or not to remove a particular column from publication. The removal of a
certain column does not ipso facto mean the removal of the columnist. That being, Arriola should have reported to work
even if his column was removed.

2) GMA NETWORK V. PABRIGA, ARIAS, ET AL. G.R. No. 176419, November 27, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) caused the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need
for a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager. Alcaraz - who was then a Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager at
Aventis Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated (another pharmaceutical company like Abbott) showed interest and submitted
her application.

In Abbotts offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary basis. Later that day, she accepted
the said offer and received an electronic mail (e-mail) from Abbotts Recruitment Officer, petitioner Teresita C. Bernardo
(Bernardo), confirming the same. Attached to Bernardos e-mail were Abbotts organizational chart and a job description of
Alcaraz work.

During Alcarazs pre-employment orientation, petitioner Allan G. Almazar (Almazar), Hospiras Country Transition
Manager, briefed her on her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Petitioner Kelly Walsh (Walsh),
Manager of the Literature Drug Surveillance Drug Safety of Hospira, will be her immediate supervisor. Petitioner Maria
Olivia T. Yabut-Misa (Misa), Abbotts Human Resources (HR) Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an
explanation of the procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary employees.
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During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some of the staff had disciplinary problems. Thus, she would
reprimand them for their unprofessional behavior such as non-observance of the dress code, moonlighting, and disrespect
of Abbott officers. However, Alcaraz method of management was considered by Walsh to be "too strict."

Alcaraz was called to a meeting with Walsh and Terrible, Abbotts former HR Director, where she was informed that she
failed to meet the regularization standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs Manager. Walsh, Almazar, and Bernardo
personally handed to Alcaraz a letter stating that her services had been terminated effective May 19, 2005. The letter
detailed the reasons for Alcaraz termination. Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and thus,
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers, namely, Misa, Bernardo, Almazar,
Walsh, Terrible, and Feist. She claimed that she should have already been considered as a regular and not a probationary
employee given Abbotts failure to inform her of the reasonable standards for her regularization upon her engagement as
required under Article 295of the Labor Code.

LA dismissed Alcaraz complaint for lack of merit. The LA rejected Alcaraz argument that she was not informed of the
reasonable standards to qualify as a regular employee. The NLRC reversed the findings of the LA and ruled that there was
no evidence showing that Alcaraz had been apprised of her probationary status and the requirements which she should
have complied with in order to be a regular employee. On appeal, CA affirmed the NLRC decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alcaraz was illegally dismissed

HELD:

The probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.

A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary
employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 295 of
the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.
Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the
following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.

A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott had indeed complied with the above-stated requirements.
This conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as
Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to, during the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages of her employment. On
this score, the Court finds it apt to detail not only the incidents which point out to the efforts made by Abbott but also
those circumstances which would show that Alcaraz was well-apprised of her employers expectations that would, in turn,
determine her regularization.

Abbott caused the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager, indicating
therein the job description for as well as the duties and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position. In Abbotts
December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary status. On the day Alcaraz
accepted Abbotts employment offer, Bernardo sent her copies of Abbotts organizational structure and her job description
through e-mail. Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment orientation where Almazar informed her that she had to
implement Abbotts Code of Conduct and office policies on human resources and finance and that she would be reporting
directly to Walsh. Alcaraz received copies of Abbotts Code of Conduct and Performance Modules from Misa who
explained to her the procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary employees; she was further notified that
Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its employees.

Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be doubted that Alcaraz was well-aware
that her regularization would depend on her ability and capacity to fulfill the requirements of her position as Regulatory
Affairs Manager and that her failure to perform such would give Abbott a valid cause to terminate her probationary
employment.

An employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter
nominal damages.

Despite the existence of a sufficient ground to terminate Alcaraz employment and Abbotts compliance with the Labor
Code termination procedure, it is readily apparent that Abbott breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it failed
to abide by its own procedure in evaluating the performance of a probationary employee.

Records show that Abbotts PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia, that the job performance of a probationary employee
should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least twice: first on the third month and second on the
fifth month from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a Performance Improvement Plan
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during the third month review to bridge the gap between the employees performance and the standards set, if any. In
addition, a signed copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to Abbotts HRD as the same would serve as basis for
recommending the confirmation or termination of the probationary employment.

In this case, it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies
a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of AlcaraZ. PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a
PPSE form was completed to formally assess her performance. Neither was the performance evaluation discussed with her
during the third and fifth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott come up with the necessary Performance
Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcaraz performance with the set company standards.

In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcaraz probationary employment for her failure to meet the standards
required for her regularization, and while it must be further pointed out that Abbott had satisfied its statutory duty to serve
a written notice of termination, the fact that it violated its own company procedure renders the termination of Alcarazs
employment procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of nominal damages. A further exposition is apropos.

3) IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING V. ALCON G.R. No. 194884 October 22, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture
of auto seat-recliners and slide-adjusters. It hired the respondents as manual welders in 2001.

On October 5, 2002, the respondents reported for work on the second shift – from 8:00 pm to 5:00 am of the
following day. At around 12:40 am, Cyrus A. Altiche, Imasen’s security guard on duty, went to patrol and inspect the
production plant’s premises. When Altiche reached Imasen’s Press Area, he heard the sound of a running industrial fan.
Intending to turn the fan off, he followed the sound that led him to the plant’s “Tool and Die” section.

At the “Tool and Die” section, Altiche saw the respondents having sexual intercourse on the floor, using a piece
of carton as mattress. Altiche immediately went back to the guard house and relayed what he saw to Danilo S. Ogana,
another security guard on duty.

Respondent’s defense: they claimed that they were merely sleeping in the “Tool and Die” section at the time of
the incident. They also claimed that other employees were near the area, making the commission of the act charged
impossible.

Both LA and NLRC held that the dismissal was valid. CA however nullified NLRC’s decision and held that
sexual intercourse inside company premises is not serious misconduct.

ISSUE:

A) Whether the respondents’ infraction – engaging in sexual intercourse inside company premises during work
hours – amounts to serious misconduct justifying their dismissal.
B) Whether the dismissal is valid.
HELD:

A) YES. Sexual acts and intimacies between two consenting adults belong, as a principled ideal, to the realm of
purely private relations. Whether aroused by lust or inflamed by sincere affection, sexual acts should be carried out at
such place, time and circumstance that, by the generally accepted norms of conduct, will not offend public decency nor
disturb the generally held or accepted social morals. Under these parameters, sexual acts between two consenting adults
do not have a place in the work environment.

Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse inside company premises and during work hours.
These circumstances, by themselves, are already punishable misconduct. Added to these considerations, however, the
implication that the respondents did not only disregard company rules but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could
reflect adversely on the status of ethics and morality in the company. Additionally, the respondents engaged in sexual
intercourse in an area where co-employees or other company personnel have ready and available access. The respondents
likewise committed their act at a time when the employees were expected to be and had, in fact, been at their respective
posts, and when they themselves were supposed to be, as all other employees had in fact been, working.

B) YES. The Court also considered the respondents’ misconduct to be of grave and aggravated character so that the
company was justified in imposing the highest penalty available ― dismissal. Their infraction transgressed the bounds of
socially and morally accepted human public behavior, and at the same time showed brazen disregard for the respect that
their employer expected of them as employees. By their misconduct, the respondents, in effect, issued an open invitation
for others to commit the same infraction, with like disregard for their employer’s rules, for the respect owed to their
employer, and for their co-employees’ sensitivities.
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4) AMADO RANCE VS. NLRC GR. NO. L-68147 JUNE 30, 1988

FACTS:
A Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into on April 30, 1981 by and between respondents Polybag
Manufacturing Corporation and Polybag Workers Union one of which is a stipulation that the former may dismiss any
employee if they would join other organizations aside from the existing one.2.Petitioners were among the 125 members of
the respondent union who were expelled by the latter for disloyalty in that they allegedly joined the NAFLU-a large
federation. Because of the expulsion, petitioners were dismissed by Respondent Corporation. Petitioners sued for
reinstatement and backwages stating their dismissal was without due process. Losing both in the decisions of the Labor
Arbiterand and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), they elevated their cause to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal was due to a just cause.

HELD: The court held that the dismissal was made in bad faith. There was indeed connivance between the corporation
and the Union. The facts show that even if the workers sought help from their union, they were disregarded by the leaders,
who were not dismissed. Their plights were not heeded by the corporation. Therefore, the main recourse is to seek help
from NAFLU, but such act did not authorize the federation to represent them. Nor is it an act of disloyalty based on the
CBA. The members did not even sign documents to prove the allegations. In fact, it is the mere act of preserving what
they have; their jobs. The state recognizes the right of the workers to security of tenure and that they may not be
terminated without a just cause, which in this case is absent.

5) JOSE M. MAGLUTAC vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, COMMART (PHIL.), INC.
AND JESUS T. MAGLUTAC, G.R. No. 78345September 21, 1990

FACTS:

Jose M. Maglutac, complainant, was employed by Commart (Phils.), Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Commart)
sometime in February, 1980 and rose to become the Manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. On October 3, 1984, he
received a notice of termination signed by Joaquin S. Cenzon, Vice-President-General Manager and Corporate Secretary
of CMS International, a corporation controlled by Commart. Thereafter, Jose Maglutac filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Commart and Jesus T. Maglutac, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Commart. The
complainant alleged that his dismissal was part of a vendetta drive against his parents who dared to expose the massive
and fraudulent diversion of company funds to the company president's private accounts, stressing that complainant's
efficiency and effectiveness were never put to question when very suddenly he received his notice of termination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant is illegally dismissed.

HELD:

YES, the complainant, Jose M. Maglutac is illegally dismissed. Because of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC's
findings that his dismissal was not merely without just cause but was also an act of vendetta, malice attended the act.
Consequently, he is entitled to moral and exemplary damages under the Civil Code. The formation of another corporation
by complainant's parents including the complainant himself cannot be used to justify the termination of complainant. The
formation came about before complainant's parents brought a minority stockholders' derivative suit and in fact, this was
with the sanction of respondent company's president. The following handwritten communications by respondent Jesus
Maglutac show that he even encouraged the organization of MM International Inc. which Articles of Incorporation show
complainant among the incorporating directors. It appears very clearly that the feud between complainant's parents and
respondent's president, the brother of complainant's father, seethed to an intolerable point not sparing innocent people
among whom is the complainant.
The legislative intent appears clear to allow recovery in proceedings before Labor Arbiters of moral and other
forms of damages, in all cases or matters arising from employer-employee relations. This would no doubt include,
particularly, instances where an employee has been unlawfully dismissed. In such a case, the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically provided by labor laws, but also moral
and other forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Moral damages would be recoverable, for example, where the
dismissal of the employee was not only effected without authorized cause and /or due process for which relief is granted
by the Labor Code but was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals good customs or public policy for which the obtainable relief is determined by the Civil Code
(not the Labor Code).

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 CASES RELATED TO RIGHT TO WORK IN A HUMANE CONDITION

1) ROYAL PLANT WORKERS UNION vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.-CEBU PLANT,
G.R. No. 198783 April 15, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and
distribution of soft drink products. It has several bottling plants all over the country, one of which is located in Cebu City.
Under the employ of each bottling plant are bottling operators. In the case of the plant in Cebu City, there are 20 bottling
operators who work for its Bottling Line 1 while there are 12-14 bottling operators who man its Bottling Line 2. All of
them are male and they are members of herein respondent Royal Plant Workers Union
The bottling operators work in two shifts. The first shift is from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and the second shift is from 5 p.m. up to
the time production operations is finished. Thus, the second shift varies and may end beyond eight (8) hours. However,
the bottling operators are compensated with overtime pay if the shift extends beyond eight (8) hours. For Bottling Line 1,
10 bottling operators work for each shift while 6 to 7 bottling operators work for each shift for Bottling Line 2.
In 1974, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2 were provided with chairs upon their request. In 1988, the bottling
operators of then Bottling Line 1 followed suit and asked to be provided also with chairs. Their request was likewise
granted. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs provided for the operators were removed pursuant to a national directive
of petitioner. This directive is in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of petitioner for bottling operators,
wherein every bottling operator is given the responsibility to keep the machinery and equipment assigned to him clean and
safe. The program reinforces the task of bottling operators to constantly move about in the performance of their duties and
responsibilities.
With this task of moving constantly to check on the machinery and equipment assigned to him, a bottling operator does
not need a chair anymore, hence, petitioner’s directive to remove them. Furthermore, CCBPI rationalized that the removal
of the chairs is implemented so that the bottling operators will avoid sleeping, thus, prevent injuries to their persons. As
bottling operators are working with machines which consist of moving parts, it is imperative that they should not fall
asleep as to do so would expose them to hazards and injuries. In addition, sleeping will hamper the efficient flow of
operations as the bottling operators would be unable to perform their duties competently.
The bottling operators took issue with the removal of the chairs. Through the representation of herein respondent, they
initiated the grievance machinery of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in November 2008. Even after
exhausting the remedies contained in the grievance machinery, the parties were still at a deadlock with petitioner still
insisting on the removal of the chairs and respondent still against such measure. As such, respondent sent a Notice to
Arbitrate, dated 16 July 2009, to petitioner stating its position to submit the issue on the removal of the chairs for
arbitration.
Both parties submitted their position papers and other subsequent pleadings in amplification of their respective stands.
Petitioner argued that the removal of the chairs is valid as it is a legitimate exercise of management prerogative, it does
not violate the Labor Code and it does not violate the CBA it contracted with respondent. On the other hand, respondent
espoused the contrary view. It contended that the bottling operators have been performing their assigned duties
satisfactorily with the presence of the chairs; the removal of the chairs constitutes a violation of the Occupational Health
and Safety Standards, the policy of the State to assure the right of workers to just and humane conditions of work as stated
in Article 3 of the Labor Code and the Global Workplace Rights Policy.
ISSUE:
Whether the removal of chairs of the operators assigned at the production/manufacturing line while performing their
duties and responsibilities is valid or not.
RULING:
On June 11, 2010, the Arbitration Committee rendered a decision in favor of the Royal Plant Workers Union (the Union)
and against CCBPI
Yhat the use of chairs by the operators had been a company practice for 34 years in Bottling Line 2, from 1974 to 2008,
and 20 years in Bottling Line 1, from 1988 to 2008; that the use of the chairs by the operators constituted a company
practice favorable to the Union; that it ripened into a benefit after it had been enjoyed by it; that any benefit being enjoyed
by the employees could not be reduced, diminished, discontinued, or eliminated by the employer in accordance with
Article 100 of the Labor Code, which prohibited the diminution or elimination by the employer of the employees’ benefit;
and that jurisprudence had not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years before a benefit would
constitute a voluntary company practice which could not be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer.

5
Although the removal of the chairs was done in good faith, CCBPI failed to present evidence regarding instances of
sleeping while on duty. There were no specific details as to the number of incidents of sleeping on duty, who were
involved, when these incidents happened, and what actions were taken. There was no evidence either of any accident or
injury in the many years that the bottling operators used chairs. To the Arbitration Committee, it was puzzling why it took
34 and 20 years for CCBPI to be so solicitous of the bottling operators’ safety that it removed their chairs so that they
would not fall asleep and injure themselves.
RULING OF CA:
The CA held, among others, that the removal of the chairs from the manufacturing/production lines by CCBPI is within
the province of management prerogatives; that it was part of its inherent right to control and manage its enterprise
effectively; and that since it was the employer’s discretion to constantly develop measures or means to optimize the
efficiency of its employees and to keep its machineries and equipment in the best of conditions, it was only appropriate
that it should be given wide latitude in exercising it.
The CA stated that CCBPI complied with the conditions of a valid exercise of a management prerogative when it decided
to remove the chairs used by the bottling operators in the manufacturing/production lines. The removal of the chairs was
solely motivated by the best intentions for both the Union and CCBPI, in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean"
program for bottling operators, wherein every bottling operator was given the responsibility to keep the machinery and
equipment assigned to him clean and safe. The program would reinforce the task of bottling operators to constantly move
about in the performance of their duties and responsibilities. Without the chairs, the bottling operators could efficiently
supervise these machineries’ operations and maintenance. It would also be beneficial for them because the working time
before the break in each rotation for each shift was substantially reduced from two and a half hours (2 ½ ) to one and a
half hours (1 ½) before the 30-minute break. This scheme was clearly advantageous to the bottling operators as the
number of resting periods was increased. CCBPI had the best intentions in removing the chairs because some bottling
operators had the propensity to fall asleep while on the job and sleeping on the job ran the risk of injury exposure and
removing them reduced the risk.
The CA added that the decision of CCBPI to remove the chairs was not done for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of its employees under the special laws, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) or the
general principles of justice and fair play. It opined that the principles of justice and fair play were not violated because,
when the chairs were removed, there was a commensurate reduction of the working time for each rotation in each shift.
The provision of chairs for the bottling operators was never part of the CBAs contracted between the Union and CCBPI.
The chairs were not provided as a benefit because such matter was dependent upon the exigencies of the work of the
bottling operators. As such, CCBPI could withdraw this provision if it was not necessary in the exigencies of the work, if
it was not contributing to the efficiency of the bottling operators or if it would expose them to some hazards. Lastly, the
CA explained that the provision of chairs to the bottling operators cannot be covered by Article 100 of the Labor Code on
elimination or diminution of benefits because the employee’s benefits referred to therein mainly involved monetary
considerations or privileges converted to their monetary equivalent.
SC RULING:
The Court sustains the ruling of the CA on both issues.
Regarding the first issue, the Union insists that the CA erred in ruling that the recourse taken by CCBPI in appealing the
decision of the Arbitration Committee was proper. It argues that the proper remedy in challenging the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA is by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not a petition
for review under Rule 43.
CCBPI counters that the CA was correct in ruling that the recourse it took in appealing the decision of the Arbitration
Committee to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was proper and in conformity with the
rules and prevailing jurisprudence.
On the second issue, the Union basically claims that the CCBPI’s decision to unilaterally remove the operators’ chairs
from the production/manufacturing lines of its bottling plants is not valid because it violates some fundamental labor
policies. According to the Union, such removal constitutes a violation of the 1) Occupational Health and Safety Standards
which provide that every worker is entitled to be provided by the employer with appropriate seats, among others; 2) policy
of the State to assure the right of workers to a just and humane condition of work as provided for in Article 3 of the Labor
Code;8 3) Global Workplace Rights Policy of CCBPI which provides for a safe and healthy workplace by maintaining a
productive workplace and by minimizing the risk of accident, injury and exposure to health risks; and 4) diminution of
benefits provided in Article 100 of the Labor Code.9
Opposing the Union’s argument, CCBPI mainly contends that the removal of the subject chairs is a valid exercise of
management prerogative. The management decision to remove the subject chairs was made in good faith and did not
intend to defeat or circumvent the rights of the Union under the special laws, the CBA and the general principles of justice
and fair play.
The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. There is no law that requires employers to provide chairs
for bottling operators. The CA correctly ruled that the Labor Code, specifically Article 13211 thereof, only requires

6
employers to provide seats for women. No similar requirement is mandated for men or male workers. It must be stressed
that all concerned bottling operators in this case are men.
There was no violation either of the Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefit provisions under Book IV of the Labor
Code of the Philippines. As shown in the foregoing, the removal of the chairs was compensated by the reduction of the
working hours and increase in the rest period. The directive did not expose the bottling operators to safety and health
hazards.
The Union should not complain too much about standing and moving about for one and one-half (1 ½) hours because
studies show that sitting in workplaces for a long time is hazardous to one’s health. The report of VicHealth, Australia,
disclosed that "prolonged workplace sitting is an emerging public health and occupational health issue with serious
implications for the health of our working population. Importantly, prolonged sitting is a risk factor for poor health and
early death, even among those who meet, or exceed, national activity guidelines." In another report, it was written:
Workers needing to spend long periods in a seated position on the job such as taxi drivers, call centre and office workers,
are at risk for injury and a variety of adverse health effects.
Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives. Labor Jaws also discourage interference with an
employer's judgment in the conduct of its business. For this reason, the Court often declines to interfere in legitimate
business decisions of employers. The law must protect not only the welfare of the employees, but also the right of the
employers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

2) ISAE vs. QUISUMBING G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes
the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine
or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25%
more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign
and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which
favored the School. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.”
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the
manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of
the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. A bargaining unit is a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to
the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law. The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of
the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is

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whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-
hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups
were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-
hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain
benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter.
To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective
collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.

3) SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. v. JOY C. CABILES G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an ad
it published respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan, and signed with a
one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. The agency required her to pay a placement fee of
70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract. She was deployed to work in Taiwan for Wacoal, but was given a
position as a cutter. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get
her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from
June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her
plane ticket to Manila. She filed a filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and
Wacoal for illegal dismissal.
Sameer’s Defense:
 Respondent’s termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her “failure to comply with
the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer];
 The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of NT$70,000.00 (evidenced by an OR bearing NT
% 20,360.00);
 Petitioner added that Wacoal’s accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower
&Management Services, Inc. (Aug. 06, 1997) thus, obligation is substituted with Pacific, which the latter denied
Labor Arbiter Ruling:
 Case is dismissed – Rationale: Complaint is based on mere allegations.
 No excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt presented by petitioner.
 Transfer of obligation to Pacific is immaterial.

NLRC Ruling:
 Joy is illegally dismissed
 Reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause
belongs to the employer.
 It found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination,
 There was no sufficient proof to show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply
with company requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in terminating respondent
 Did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees for lack of jurisdiction.
 It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific.
 It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the
Labor Arbiter’s decision not to rule on the matter.
 Sameer filed for MR but NLRC dismissed; filed for petition for certiorari at CA.

CA Ruling:
 Affirmed NLRC with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three
months’ worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees
 Remanded case to NLRC to address the validity of petitioner’s allegations against Pacific.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

A. WON the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her
repatriation and attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination.

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B. WON there was a just cause for termination because there was a finding of Wacoal that respondent was inefficient in
her work.
C. WON Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual obligations to the workers originally
recruited by petitioner.

SC Ruling:
JUST CAUSE:
 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s petition is without merit. SC find for respondent.
 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The
employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
 Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. They
may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards.59 Failure to comply
may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an
employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer. While the law acknowledges the
plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.”
Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence. This prerogative, however, should
not be abused. It is “tempered with the employee’s right to security of tenure. Workers are entitled to
substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may not be removed from employment without a
valid or just cause as determined bylaw and without going through the proper procedure. Security of tenure for
labor is guaranteed by our Constitution
 With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, follow the principle of lex loci contractus.
 Pinned - Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC
 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a)
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;(d) Commission of a crime or
offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representatives;(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
 Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties may, therefore,
constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it.
 The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. “The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.” Failure to show
that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.
 To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:
1) The employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged;
2) The standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and
3) The communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment. The
regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all the standards for
employment. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the employer’s failure to communicate work standards that
would govern one’s employment “if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate.”

2. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT

 Petitioner failed to comply with the due process requirement. A valid dismissal requires both a valid
cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The employer is required to give the charged
employee at least two written notices before termination.
 One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.
The other notice must “[inform] the employee of the employer’s decision.” Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must also be given “an opportunity to be heard.”3.) Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995o Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been
illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated
together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
 SC reiterate their finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by an
illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
 Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent’s salary must be
modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14,1997,
respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. “To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to
petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers
and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract
embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.”
 Respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from the finality of this
judgment.
4.) LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYER
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  SC clarify the liabilities of Wacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency that facilitated
respondent’s overseas employment.
 Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer
and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims including claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section also provides that the performance
bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded
to the employee.
 This provision is in line with the state’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating
workers’ plight. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers
have recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of the
foreign employer may be “enforced to the full extent” against the local agent, the overseas worker is assured
of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of
her employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is
also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney’s fees of
NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. The clause, “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

4) STAR PAPER CORPORATION VS. RONALDO SIMBOL G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

FACTS:
Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-employee and they eventually had a relationship and got married.
Prior to the marriage, the manager advise the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign
pursuant to a company policy: 1) new applicant will not be allowed to be hired if he/she has a relative, up to 3rd degree of
consanguinity, already employed by the company. 2) if the two employees got married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated first. Simbol resigned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from working in the same company, a valid exercise of
management prerogative.

RULING:
No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of employees under the constitution. The
case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge , discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.” The
company policy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly establish the requirement of reasonableness. In the case at bar,
there was no reasonable business necessity. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting
Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business
operations. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate
effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable
despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital
discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.

5) EXOCET SECURITY VS. SERRANO G.R. No. 198538 September 19, 2014

Facts: Petitioner Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation (Exocet) is engaged in the provision of security
personnel to its various clients or principals. By virtue of its contract with JG Summit Holdings Inc. (JG Summit), Exocet
assigned respondent Armando D. Serrano (Serrano) on September 24, 1994 as "close-in" security personnel for one of JG
Summit's corporate officers, Johnson Robert L. Go. After eight years, Serrano was re-assigned as close-in security for
Lance Gokongwei, and then to his wife, Mary Joyce Gokongwei. As close-in security, records show that Serrano was
receiving a monthly salary of P11, 274.30
On August 15, 2006, Serrano was relieved by JG Summit from his duties. For more than six months after he reported back
to Exocet, Serrano was without any reassignment. OnMarch 15, 2007, Serrano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Exocet with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

ISSUE: whether or not Serrano was constructively dismissed

Ruling: The petition has merit.

While there is no specific provision in the Labor Code which governs the "floating status" or temporary "off-
detail" of security guards employed by private security agencies, this situation was considered by this Court in several

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cases as a form of temporary retrenchment or lay-off. The concept has been defined as that period of time when security
guards are in between assignments or when they are madeto wait after being relieved from a previous post until they are
transferred to a new one. As pointed out by the CA, it takes place when the security agency’s clients decide not to renew
their contracts with the agency, resulting in a situation where the available posts under its existing contracts are less than
the number of guards in its roster. It also happens in instances where contracts for security services stipulate that the client
may request the agency for the replacement of the guards assigned to it, even for want of cause, such that the replaced
security guard may be placed on temporary "off-detail" if there are no available posts under the agency’s existing
contracts.

When a security guard is placed on a "floating status," he does not receive any salary or financial benefit provided
by law. Due to the grim economic consequences to the employee, the employer should bear the burden of proving that
there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned.

It must be emphasized, however, that although placing a security guard on "floating status" or a temporary "off-
detail" is considered a temporary retrenchment measure, there issimilarly no provision in the Labor Code which treats of a
temporary retrenchment or lay-off. Neither is there any provision which provides for its requisites or its duration.
Nevertheless, since an employee cannot be laid-off indefinitely, the Court has applied Article 292 (previously Article 286)
of the Labor Code by analogyto set the specific period of temporary lay-off to a maximum of six (6) months.
Petitioner Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation is neither guilty of illegal dismissal nor constructive
dismissal. Petitioner is hereby ORDERED to look for a security assignment for respondent within a period of thirty (30)
days from finality of judgment. If one is available, petitioner is ordered to notify respondent Armando D. Serrano to report
to such available guard position within ten (10) days from notice. If respondent fails to report for work within said time
period, he shall be deemed to have abandoned his employment with petitioner. In such case, respondent Serrano is not
entitled to any backwages, separation pay, or similar benefits.
If no security assignment is available for respondent within a period of thirty (30) days from finality of judgment,
petitioner Exocet should comply with the requirements of DOLE Department Order No. 14, Series of 2001, in relation to
Art. 289 of the Labor Code, and serve a written notice on respondent Serrano and the DOLE one (1) month before the
intended date of termination; and pay Serrano separation pay equivalent to half month pay for every year of his service.

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