The Reformation of Iraqs Foreign Relations

The reformation of Iraq’s foreign relations:
new elites and enduring legacies
GARETH STANSFIELD
With the holding of national elections, followed by the withdrawal of US combat

forces, 2010 marks a significant stage in the development of the post-Ba’athist
state. Now that Iraq exists once more as a sovereign country, with many analysts
contending that the worst of its intersocietal problems have been left behind, it is
a pertinent moment to consider how Iraq’s foreign relations have been conducted
from 2003 until the present, and how they will develop into the future. Consid-
ering the opportunities that lie ahead for Iraq’s foreign policy-makers, as well as
the constraints that have to be overcome, is a useful and valuable exercise; but
it is also necessary to take stock of Iraq’s foreign relations over the longer term.
Writing about the foreign policy of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Charles Tripp
noted that ‘it is clearly important to understand the degree to which Iraqi state
policies during the past few decades have been shaped both by the constraints
under which Iraqi leaders must operate and by the choices their own cognitive
environment has presented to them’.1 The same holds true in the post-Saddam
environment.
The conduct of Iraq’s foreign relations as the country emerges from occupa-
tion and civil war and embraces a still undetermined and uncertain future remains
conditioned by the same constraints and environments that Saddam faced. Yet
some determinants of foreign policy and constraints on Iraq’s foreign relations are
clearly different. There are new elites, newly empowered political groupings, an
ethnicized and sectarianized political system, and far more penetration of Iraq’s
domestic politics by regional and international actors. Therefore, while it is useful
to consider the similarities between now and before 2003, it is also necessary to
understand how the pattern of foreign policy formulation in today’s Iraq differs
radically from the pattern apparent under Saddam’s regime. Some departures
can be straightforwardly identified—the fact that post-2003 governments have
been of a distinctly different design from those that went before has clearly given
rise to differences in objectives and actions, particularly when the heavy hand of
the coalition occupation is acknowledged. Furthermore, Iraq’s interaction with
its neighbours and the wider international community was dramatically trans-
formed by regime change, altering the country’s immediate regional setting. But,
1
Charles Tripp, ‘The foreign policy of Iraq’, in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds, The
foreign policy of Middle East states (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 167–92 at p. 167.
International Affairs 86: 6 (2010) 1395–1409

© 2010 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2010 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by Blackwell Publishing
Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford ox4 2dq, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Gareth Stansfield
as the years moved on, the basic domestic political dynamics of Iraq, combined
with perennial g eopolitical and geo-economic concerns, have steadily reasserted
themselves as influential factors, even determinants, of the aspirations of Iraq’s
foreign relations. It is this balance between the new elites and enduring legacies
that this article seeks to uncover.
Enduring legacies: contextualizing Iraq’s foreign relations

It is tempting to view post-2003 Iraq as being so different from Saddam’s Iraq that
the legacies of the twentieth century may prove inconsequential in charting how
its foreign policy will develop. With the strong Ba’athist state no more, a new
range of political actors vying for power, and Iraq’s domestic affairs penetrated
by regional and international powers more deeply than at any time in its modern
history, arguments presenting Iraq’s foreign relations from 2010 onwards as
unencumbered by references to previous patterns may seem on the surface persua-
sive. But they would be wrong. Iraq in 2010 is undeniably different from Iraq in
2002, yet the removal of the Ba’ath regime in 2003 was not the first upheaval to
afflict the country. Phebe Marr notes three sets of changes that have occurred in
the modern history of Iraq: major domestic upheavals (e.g. the 1958 revolution
and the second Ba’athist coup of 1968); wars and sanctions (e.g. the Iran–Iraq war
of 1980–88; the Gulf war of 1990–91 and the subsequent sanctions regime of the
1990s); and major alterations in the regional and international environment (e.g.
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq in 1980, and the end of the Cold War and the loss
of the USSR as an international supporter).2 Arguably, Iraq from 2003 onwards
may constitute a special case when compared to other moments, as every possible
change that could impact upon Iraq’s stability and foreign relations has occurred in
a very significant way: domestic upheaval has been tumultuous and is continuing;
the country has suffered a destructive war and destabilizing occupation, while at
the same time emerging from the crippling effects of sanctions; and the interna-
tional and regional environment was effectively overturned by the actions of the
US against Iraq in particular after September 2001.
But the legacies of the past, and the wider geopolitical environment, have
continued as conditioning constants, providing an underlying structure for
Iraq’s relations with the outside world just as they did throughout the twentieth
century.3 These enduring legacies or determinants of foreign policy and Iraq’s
wider relations are referred to consistently in analyses of Iraq’s foreign policy
and relations, and are summarized by Tripp in his analysis of the foreign policy
of Saddam’s Iraq.4 They concern, first, domestic political dynamics, and particu
larly the still contested question of Iraq’s national identity and the political
2
Phebe Marr, ‘Iraq: balancing foreign and domestic realities’, in L. Carl Brown, ed., Diplomacy in the Middle East:
the international relations of regional and outside powers (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 181–206 at p. 187.
3
Marr, ‘Iraq’, p. 187.
4
See Adeed Dawisha, ‘Footprints in the sand: the definition and redefinition of identity in Iraq’s foreign
policy’, in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds, Identity and foreign policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 117–36; Tripp, ‘The foreign policy of Iraq’; Marr, ‘Iraq’.
1396
International Affairs 86: 6, 2010
Copyright © 2010 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2010 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
The reformation of Iraq’s foreign relations
and socio-cultural orientation of a country explicitly part of the Arab world,
but including significant numbers of non-Arabs (including Kurds, Assyrian/
Chaldeans and Turkmen) and bordering on powerful and influential non-Arab
regional powers (Turkey and Iran); second, the insecurity engendered by Iraq’s
peculiar geopolitical situation, which serves to sensitize Iraq’s leaders to questions
concerning territorial integrity, boundary disputes, access to waterways, and
utilization of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and third, the importance
of hydrocarbons to the Iraqi economy, and the relationship between economic
independence and national advancement.5
Domestic political dynamics

Iraq’s foreign relations are a product of its political and economic place within
the wider regional and international setting, but also a reflection of the contested
and ongoing process of policy formation, which is itself a manifestation of state
definition.6 This latter problem has been referred to by many writers focusing on
Iraq’s foreign relations who note in particular the competing narratives apparent
within the state, their fluctuating fortunes affecting how the region and the wider
world beyond are perceived, and how Iraq’s interests (as defined by the dominant
community of the time) are projected.7
The domestic politics of Iraq interact with foreign relations not only in terms
of how foreign policy is ultimately designed and implemented, and how relations
with other states are conducted, but also in terms of the opportunities given to
other states to exploit political spaces between Iraqis of different identities for
their own national interests. This overlapping relationship between the spheres of
domestic political dynamics and foreign relations results in an ‘omni-balancing’
approach to foreign policy, with the state seeking to project its national inter-
ests while also using foreign relations to legitimate the regime and weaken or
remove domestic opposition. This balancing act has been a common feature of
Iraq’s foreign policy and explains to a considerable extent the pattern of Iraq’s
foreign relations—at least in the regional context.8
It is useful, briefly, to reflect on the landscape of political contestation in Iraq.
Formed in the aftermath of the First World War by Britain’s combining the three
former Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, the new state brought
together into a complex amalgam a range of peoples of different ethnicities, faiths
5
Tripp, ‘The foreign policy of Iraq’, pp. 169–70.
6
Tripp, ‘The foreign policy of Iraq’, p. 168.
7
See R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz and Lewis W. Snider, Middle East foreign policy: issues and processes (New
York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 73–130; Marr, ‘Iraq’, pp. 182–4; Ahmad Yousef Ahmad, ‘The dialectics of domestic
environment and role performance: the foreign policy of Iraq’, in Bahgat Korany and Ali Hillal Dessouki,
eds, The foreign policies of Arab states (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), pp. 147–74; Tripp, ‘The foreign policy of
Iraq’, p. 168; Alberto Tonini, ‘Propaganda versus pragmatism: Iraq foreign policy in Qasim’s years, 1958–63’,
in Gerd Nonneman, ed., Analysing Middle East foreign policies and the relationship with Europe (London: Routledge,
2004), pp. 123–44.
8
See Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Introduction: the analytical framework’, in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, The
foreign policy of Middle East states, pp. 1–28 at p. 14, quoting Steven David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’,
World Politics 43: 2, 1991, pp. 233–56.
1397
Gareth Stansfield
and nationalist visions, against the background of the British desire to ensure that
Iraq would develop into a state ultimately supportive of broader imperial inter-
ests.9 The pattern of Iraq’s political communities has been frequently recited in
recent years as successive coalition efforts to resolve the still raw question of Iraq’s
identity have foundered in the face of resurgent Shi‘i and Kurdish visions and
the backlash of the formerly dominant Arab Sunnis.10 To put the problem in
the simplest, even simplistic, terms, the inability of successive Iraqi regimes to
meld a coherent political community from a population composed of some 20–22
per cent Sunni Arabs (mainly in Baghdad and the north-west), 18–20 per cent
Kurds (in the north and north-east), and 55–60 per cent Shi‘i Arabs (in the south),
presented challenges that were never resolved, irrespective of the domestic policies
followed—including wide-scale repression.
These questions need not be investigated in full here—the debate around them
is well known and has been rehearsed extensively by many writers. However,
what is important to note is that the post-2003 environment remained just as
conditioned as the pre-2003 environment by the question of whose nationalist
vision would prevail, which community would control the narrative of the state,
and how power would be held by one community or divided among all. Indeed,
because the authoritarian state and its structures of repression evaporated in the
face of the US-led invasion, all the communities with a view of what Iraq should
‘be’ gained new abilities to promote and even implement their visions. Whether
Iraq is part of a larger Arab ‘nation’, bound by ties of language and religion,
or whether Kurdish identity is such that the now firmly established Kurdistan
Region of Iraq continues to prosper, and even grow, or whether Iraq’s identity
will be dominated and its narrative written by the democratic majority of the
Shi‘i Arabs, are all questions that have yet to be resolved. Moving away from the
simplistic ethnic and sectarian view of Iraq’s divided communities, the impact
of modernity and the transforming of Iraq’s socio-economic classes over several
decades also present new visions of Iraq’s interest and future that impact upon its
foreign relations. But while the intensity, and even complexity, of the questions
posed by domestic political balances are perhaps greater than they have ever been
since the days of Iraq’s formation, their pattern, and their ability to influence as
well as be influenced by foreign relations, remain as before.
Geopolitical insecurities
The problems endemic in the domestic political sphere—caused by a hetero
geneous population—are magnified by the geopolitical environment in which
9
For accounts of the formation of Iraq, see Charles Tripp, A history of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000); Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: the failure of nation building and a history denied (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003); Phebe Marr, The modern history of Iraq, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004);
Gareth Stansfield, Iraq: people, history, politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).
10
See Toby Dodge, Iraq’s future: the aftermath of regime change, Adelphi Paper 372 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 2005); Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in fragments: the occupation and its legacy
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Gareth Stansfield, ‘Accepting realities in Iraq’, Chatham House
briefing paper, May 2007.
1398
the Iraqi state has to operate. Marr points to the sheer complexity of the physical
environment, emphasizing the fact that Iraq is part of, or faces, several different
regions, including the Arab world (itself differentiated between the Levant and the
Gulf ), the non-Arab world (differentiated between Turkey and Iran), and states of
a variety of sizes, ranging from Kuwait to Iran. While it seems an obvious point,
the sheer variety of the states in Iraq’s regional neighbourhood presents signifi-
cant challenges in terms of rationalizing national interests, constructing a coherent
set of foreign policies and developing constructive foreign relations, requiring, as
Marr notes, a high degree of sophistication and flexibility.11 However, sophistica-
tion and flexibility have proved difficult to attain when the pressures of domestic
political dynamics are added to the equation, with the result that Iraq’s foreign
policy has often been reactive and rigid, creating foreign relations that have been
difficult if not blatantly hostile.
This hostility saw Iraq, particularly under Saddam, embroiled in frequent and
serious boundary disputes with neighbours—most notably Iran and Kuwait;
relations with Turkey were also difficult at times. Considering Saddam’s Iraq in
particular, Tripp suggests that the belligerent attitude displayed towards neigh-
bours, particularly regarding boundary disputes, is tied to a deeply felt insecurity
that goes to the foundation of the state itself, noting that ‘the defiant rhetoric of
Iraqi governments often conceals a deeper fear that what the great powers created,
they may one day decide to dismantle, indicating an awareness of the vulnerability
of Iraq in a world not of its own making’.12 But the geopolitical problems facing
Iraq are not just in the minds of its leaders. They have proved to be very real and
very serious, and have at times presented actual threats that could have under-
mined the legitimacy of a state that itself effectively represented minority interests
in the form of a nationalist project challenged by large swathes of the population.
Once again, this theme, which conditioned Iraq’s foreign relations before 2003,
remains a potent force in the contemporary state—perhaps even more potent, as
Iraq is now more strongly penetrated by regional actors than before, its borders are
more porous and the domestic challenges are more severe. Yet these psychological
and political insecurities relating to Iraq’s territorial integrity, serious though they
remain, currently pale into insignificance compared to the very real geopolitical
problems surrounding the exploitation and management of natural resources.
Managing natural resources

The final theme to consider is the management of Iraq’s natural resources, partic-
ularly water and hydrocarbons. As with the previous two themes, the stresses
associated with ensuring a water supply commensurate with Iraq’s current and
future needs, and the ability to export hydrocarbons to the necessary levels in a
secure manner, are not new; but again they are now more significant than they
were previously.
11
12
Tripp, ‘The foreign policy of Iraq’, p. 170. Also see Eric Davis, Memories of state: politics, history and collective
memory in modern Iraq (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).
1399
Gareth Stansfield
The international politics of water has always been a contentious issue between
the states through which the Euphrates and Tigris rivers flow—Iraq (the Tigris
and Euphrates), Syria (the Euphrates) and Turkey (the Tigris and Euphrates).13
With the headwaters of both rivers lying in Turkey, and with major tributaries
of the Tigris also rising in Iran, Iraq has always found itself woefully exposed
to the overexploitation of these great waterways. With an agricultural sector
largely dependent upon irrigation from the two rivers, Iraq has in the past nearly
come to blows with Syria over the damming of the Euphrates in the 1970s, which
endangered millions of Iraqi farmers.14 Similarly, Turkey found itself having to
contend with Saddam’s belligerent rhetoric following the commencement of the
Southeast Anatolia Project, which has seen a complex of new dams and irrigation
structures being built on the headwaters of both rivers, greatly reducing their
downstream flow. The pressures on the water supply of the Tigris and Euphrates,
felt so acutely in the twentieth century, will only increase in the twenty-first.
With the populations of all four riparian states increasing, with urbanization
continuing to expand, and with all the states seeking to develop their economies,
it seems inevitable that the geopolitics of water supply will become even more
important. For Iraq in particular, as the last country through which the two great
rivers flow into the sea, the situation promises to be very difficult indeed, and will
greatly impact upon its relations with the other riparian states.
The second natural resource issue is, of course, the exploitation and manage-
ment of hydrocarbons—gas as well as oil. The importance of hydrocarbons to the
Iraqi economy needs little explaining: with the fourth largest proven reserves of oil
in the world and as yet undetermined but very significant natural gas reserves, Iraq
depends crucially for its economic well-being upon the successful management of
the hydrocarbons sector.15 Before 2002 the management issues centred primarily
on the question of state ownership—particularly successive Iraqi governments’
struggles with the British-dominated Iraqi Petroleum Company16—and the ability
to export the necessarily large quantities of oil either through pipelines that ran
into neighbouring countries (namely Jordan and Turkey), or via tankers loading
in the Gulf and therefore at the mercy of Iranian interference.17
Following the removal of Saddam’s regime and the subsequent ending of
sanctions, Iraq is now able to export hydrocarbons, and the deprivation and
underinvestment across the country caused by the invidious effects of sanctions
suggest that very high levels of export are necessary. Yet the problem of exporting
13
For further information on water disputes between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, see A. Çarkoglu and M. Eder,
‘Domestic concerns and the water conflict over the Euphrates–Tigris river basin’, Middle Eastern Studies 37:
1, 2001, pp. 41–71. For a detailed technical assessment of the supply and demand pressures on the river basin,
see Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu and John-Michel Goldman, ‘International water resources allocation and
conflicts: the case of the Euphrates and Tigris’, Environment and Planning A, 36, 2004, pp. 783–801.
14
15
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2010, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2178.html?countryName=&countryCode=&regionCode=%E2%80%99 accessed 12 Sept. 2010.
16
Tripp, ‘The foreign policy of Iraq’, p. 170.
17
For an excellent account of the issues surrounding oil supply and security in the Gulf, see Şamil Şen and
Tuncay Babalı, ‘Security concerns in the Middle East for oil supply: problems and solutions’, Energy Policy,
35, 2007, pp. 1517–24.
1400
such large volumes continues to dog Iraq—particularly as the sector’s infrastruc-
ture is woefully inadequate—and the old spectre of foreign company involvement
has again reared its head, as Iraq desperately needs the expertise and where-
withal of major international oil companies to kick-start its dilapidated industry.
Compounding this problem is the decision of the Kurdistan Region to openly
embrace partnerships with international oil companies to develop the region’s oil
sector independently of the rest of Iraq’s. Whether the two sides can be reconciled
remains to be seen.18
Together, these three themes, constants throughout Iraq’s history, continue
into the twenty-first century. Indeed, aspects of them may be magnified by the
upheavals of 2003 and subsequent developments, which have created an environ-
ment different from that of previous decades when authoritarian structures could
quash domestic pressures or make it easier to challenge geopolitical constraints, for
example. The interaction of these themes with the changes brought about in Iraq
by regime change will set in motion the processes through which the dynamics
of Iraq’s foreign policy formulation operate, and the pattern of foreign relations
which then emerges.
New elites and the practice of foreign relations

The upheaval caused by the removal of the Ba’ath regime in 2003 was clearly a
watershed in terms of how all aspects of the future Iraqi state would operate. In
the domestic and foreign policy realms alike, the removal of the authoritarian
structures of Saddam’s regime gave space and opportunity to a range of previously
subordinated actors to carve out power centres of their own. Yet, arguably, the
pattern of how policies would be determined by each of these sets of actors, and
how foreign relations would later be constructed, maintained striking similari-
ties with those of Ba’athist Iraq. Considering the making of foreign policy under
Saddam, Tripp offers a number of insights which tend to encourage a view of
the situation as unique, including the control of the regime by Saddam and a
small circle of men related through family or clan bonds; the command of
security and intelligence services, and economic resources; and the sustaining of
large networks of neo-patrimonial control that made Saddam the commanding
presence not only in the politics of Iraq, but in the lives of nearly all Iraqis. In
Tripp’s view, the significance of these structures and approaches is deeper than
merely confirming the overwhelming grasp on power enjoyed by Saddam and his
circle of trusted lieutenants. In addition to this clear dominance, foreign policy in
Saddam’s terms was very much defined as starting at the boundaries of the presi-
dential compound—that is, everything beyond the inner circle of trusted figures
was, in effect, ‘foreign’, particularly as those not trusted would almost certainly be
from ‘communities amenable to the machinations of outside powers’.19
18
For an overview of the relative positions taken by the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional
Government towards the management of the oil sector, see Rex Zedalis, The legal dimensions of oil and gas in
Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
19
Tripp, ‘The foreign policy of Iraq’, pp. 171–2.
1401
Gareth Stansfield
Two views can then be presented of how this vision of foreign policy decision-
making under Saddam compares with that which emerged following his demise.
The first is that a new and increasingly coherent Iraqi government emerged
which headed a reconstructed Iraqi state free from the privations created by
neo-patrimonialism and the shadow of authoritarianism, in which Iraq’s foreign
policy was constructed in the interests of all Iraqis, irrespective of ethnicity, sect
or class. This view would certainly be supported by the formal pronouncements
of the ministry of foreign affairs and the US State Department. Yet it is not an
accurate representation of how Iraq’s foreign relations have been conducted.
Indeed, a more persuasive, if cynical, argument can be presented suggesting that,
far from foreign policy and relations now being totally different from those of
Saddam’s time, they are in fact quite similar.
This similarity is apparent in the structures and determinants of policy forma-
tion. Neo-patrimonialism remains in place, ‘the other’ is seen as ‘foreign’ (it is
not unusual, for example, for the Shi‘i-dominated government to be referred to
as ‘Safavid’ in a derogatory fashion, insinuating that it is at least influenced by
Iran, if not actually Iranian),20 and decisions are controlled by relatively few men.
However, there is one notable difference compared to the period of Saddam’s
regime. There is no longer ‘one’ foreign policy, controlled from one presiden-
tial palace beyond which all else enters the realm of foreign relations. Instead,
there are multiple foreign policies emanating from a range of actual or allegorical
palaces. Different sets of political elites then act autonomously in deciding what
they consider to be in Iraq’s foreign policy interests, from their own norma-
tive positions and particular perspectives, and engage in foreign relations often
irrespective of what the formal government line may be.
This is not to say that the ministry of foreign affairs and foreign minister
Hoshyar Zebari—who has served in this post since 2003—have proved incapable
or ineffective at projecting a unified foreign policy and embarking upon promoting
Iraq’s national interests by engaging in foreign relations. Indeed, an argument
could be made that Zebari has been a remarkably adept and successful minister,
successfully distancing himself from the political demands of the Kurdish bloc
from which he comes. However, the fact remains that the government of Iraq is
still weak and the institutions of the state form only one part of the structures
which administer Iraq: foreign policy is not purely the domain of the government
and the ministry—in Tripp’s parlance, the singular Presidential Palace—but rather
is as much to do with the aspirations and actions of the most prominent political
groupings and their elites as it is with the government of the day.
The post-2003 political landscape of Iraq has been characterized by a number of
parties, blocs or coalitions dominated by community-based approaches to political
life. Whether these parties are representative of the dynamics of Iraqi politics, or
reflect the imposition of the coalition’s approach to managing Iraq, is the subject
20
See e.g. the statement of the Islamic State of Iraq of 27 Oct. 2009, ‘Islamic State of Iraq claims deadly Oct.
25 kamikaze attacks in Baghdad’, http://occident.blogspot.com/2009/10/islamic-state-of-iraq-claims-oct-25.
html, accessed 13 Sept. 2010.
1402
of intense debate. The important point for the purposes of this article is that the
political landscape of Iraq is fractured, power is localized to the point that the state
has often struggled to exert itself or has been forced to negotiate with local power-
holders, and the political groupings themselves have their own well-established
links to patrons and supporters, many of whom are foreign, in addition to having
a range of detractors, many of whom are also foreign.
This situation has emerged as a result of three factors or stages. The first of
these is the manner in which opposition groups to Saddam’s regime (or, in the
case of the Kurds and Dawa, previous military regimes) formed. With the most
prominent threats to the regime coming from Shi‘i mobilization and Kurdish
insurrection, the repression of these communities by the state’s security services
fostered heightened communal allegiances and also forced them to operate from
exile. With the support of neighbouring powers which feared or opposed Saddam’s
Iraq, opposition groups enjoyed assistance at particular times when they were well
placed to support the national interests of the neighbour. While patronage ties
could and did change often, by the 1990s a basic pattern had emerged. The main
Shi‘i parties (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq—ISCI—or the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq—SCIRI—as it was then known), and also
different wings of Dawa to a lesser extent, the most prominent Kurdish parties
(the Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
PUK, in addition to a range of Kurdish Islamist parties) and amalgams of secular
or cross-cutting groupings (particularly the Iraqi National Congress, INC, and
the Iraqi National Alliance, INA) had all developed their own visions of what a
post-Saddam Iraq should be like and, by extension, had begun to formulate their
own tentative foreign policies. Sometimes these policies would be aligned in the
formation of umbrellas and coalitions, such as the post-1998 INC and the later
groupings of SCIRI, the Kurds, the INA and the INC in the run-up to regime
change, but the individual—largely communally focused—parties maintained
their own visions, had their own aspirations, and enjoyed their own relationships
with neighbouring powers.
The second factor behind the emergence of a fragmented political system
concerns the institutionalization of the opposition groups as the building blocks
of the post-Saddam political system. After toppling the old regime the US-led
coalition faced a political vacuum; and, having been exposed primarily to exiled
opposition leaders during the 1990s as there was little or no opportunity to engage
directly with politically minded Iraqis inside Iraq, its easiest option was to replace
the Ba’ath regime by relying on the known and seemingly capable exiled opposi-
tion groups. This move, combined with the coalition’s adoption of a consociational
governmental structure which ordered politics in Iraq according to communal
identity, set in place the fragmented pattern that would characterize Iraq to the
present.
The final factor contributing to the durability of this fragmented system, and
the emergence of many poles of foreign policy, concerns the consolidation of
the structures established since 2003. With the coalition’s plans dependent upon
1403
Gareth Stansfield
satisfying the panoply of major political parties, and regional actors exploiting
their already extant ties with them, political parties’ engagement in foreign
relations was legitimized and has become an acceptable and normal feature of
Iraqi diplomacy.
A reading of open-source materials available on the internet illustrates this fact
very clearly. Parties that have been part of the government of Iraq also display
proudly their engagement with foreign powers as political parties, and often on
behalf of Iraq. Furthermore, parties or movements that may be considered to
be opposed to the government of Iraq, such as the Sadr movement, also engage
with regional actors overtly. The website of the ISCI led by Ammar al-Hakim
provides an enlightening insight into this dynamic. The site presents the visits
of foreign dignitaries to the ISCI leadership, as well as the 2010 regional tour of
Ammar himself, in ways that seem redolent of formal government announce-
ments. Similarly, the website of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
reports constantly on the large number of foreign governmental figures visiting
the region and the Kurdish leaders.21
The practice of foreign policy-making and building foreign relations is clearly
different in contemporary Iraq from that under Saddam. No longer does the heavy
hand of the authoritarian state pervade society, and the dominating Presidential
Palace has been removed. But the pattern that characterized Saddam’s approach
to foreign policy has remained in place, in that foreign policy is constructed
according to particular visions of Iraq that are held at a communal level. In 2010,
however, there is no longer one view and one palace. Instead, there are several,
with each proverbial palace interacting with foreign actors in its own ways and for
the advancement of its own interests.
Iraq’s foreign relations

Even though Iraq has made significant strides in terms of improved security in
recent years, following devastating episodes of civil war from 2006 through to
2008, domestic Iraqi political developments remain the primary set of influences
over the character of foreign relations. This is the case for two reasons: first,
domestic political patterns will govern not only the composition and shape of the
Iraqi government and state, but also its foreign policy aspirations and its ability
to project them; second, the Iraqi domestic political setting is an environment
in which other states (particularly others in the same region) pursue their own
foreign policies—making Iraq a penetrated state in which the national interests of
a range of states are being pursued. Iraq’s foreign relations, therefore, take place
not only outside Iraq’s boundaries, but within them as well.
21
See http://www.isci-iraq.com/home/he-alhakims-regional-tour and www.krg.org, both accessed 15 Sept.
2010. While the KRG is a constitutionally recognized structure of the Iraqi state, and as such has the right to
receive foreign dignitaries and have foreign relations to a limited degree, the dominance of the KDP and PUK
in the KRG is such that the activities of the KRG are often seen as manifestations of KDP and PUK policy.
For further analysis of KRG politics, see the article by David Romano in this special issue.
1404
Iran
The fall of Saddam presented Iran with both challenges and opportunities:
challenges in terms of having to deal with a US presence in Iraq at a time when
Washington viewed Tehran’s presence in the region as offensive and expansionist;
opportunities in terms of being able to weave critical strategic issues, such as the
nuclear issue, with other regional problems such as the Arab–Israeli conflict.
As Kayhan Barzegar noted, ‘by building relationships with friendly states (e.g.
Syria) and political movements (e.g. Hezbollah or Shi‘i factions in Iraq), Iran tried
to deter the US or Israeli military threat in the short term and to prevent the
institutionalization of a US role in its backyard in the long term’.22
Iraq’s relationship with Iran since 2003 has therefore been driven by two forces:
US opposition towards Iran on the one hand, and Iran’s attempts to influence Iraqi
politics to further its own national interests on the other. Tehran has attempted to
exert influence by building alliances principally with Shi‘i parties in Iraq, working
to develop long-term relationships with Nuri al-Maliki’s government and the
Dawa party, and Ammar al-Hakim’s ISCI, with the aim of empowering Shi‘is
in Iraq’s power distribution. These relationships, however, have not prevented
Tehran from supporting more radical groups, such as the Sadr movement of
Muqtada al-Sadr, though these were more short-term links with the intention of
causing immediate problems for the US while maintaining pressure upon the Iraqi
government.23 The political levers available to Tehran have not, however, been
Shi‘i alone. Over a long history of conflict with Iraq, Iran had often found cause
to support Iraqi Kurdish rebels against Baghdad, with the result that a durable
and deep relationship continues to exist between Kurdish elites in Iraq and the
Islamic Republic. While not as effective a means of influencing affairs in Iraq as
direct links with Shi‘i parties have proved to be, the ability to promote or prevent
interaction between Shi‘i and Kurdish blocs at particular moments has proved to
be invaluable for Iran since 2003.
Achieving a strong and stable relationship with Tehran has been at the forefront
of Iraqi government policy. However, any discussion about government policy
has to be considered through the lens of communal expectations. Both Maliki’s
Dawa and Hakim’s ISCI need strong government-to-government relations with
Iran in order to preserve and promote their own power and status in Iraq, and
to gain support in projecting their visions of Iraq in the wider region.24 In this
respect, it is telling that the relationship between Maliki’s government and Saudi
Arabia has been very poor indeed, making a strategic relationship with Iran an
even more pressing necessity.
22
Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Iran’s foreign policy strategy after Saddam’, Washington Quarterly 33: 1, 2010, pp. 173–89 at
p. 173.
23
Barzegar, ‘Iran’s foreign policy strategy after Saddam’, p. 178.
24
Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Iran’s foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq’, Middle East Policy 15: 4, 2008, pp. 47–58 at p. 52.
1405
Gareth Stansfield
Turkey
The relationship between Iraq and Turkey is best understood with reference to
three themes—water politics, managing Kurdish aspirations and opposing Iranian
influence. All remain important in 2010, although it is the Kurdish and Iranian
dimensions that are driving the relationship at present. Turkey’s goals in Iraq
mirror closely those of the US. Ankara wishes to see Iraq stable, democratic and
prosperous, and independent of Iranian influence. This latter point is of course
supported strongly by the US, which views an Ankara–Baghdad axis as an ideal
counterweight to Tehran in terms of providing security to the wider region.25
To achieve this, however, Ankara would need to find a way to accommodate
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as, from 2003 onwards, the Kurds were no longer
isolated politically and geographically in the mountains of the north, but were
now in Baghdad, with a very significant role to play in the government of Iraq.
The orthodox view of Turkey’s posture towards the Iraqi Kurds remains one
of Ankara resolutely opposing any notion of the KRG’s survival, let alone its
advancement. This view, however, is obsolete. The transformation in Turkey’s
posture towards Iraq that has come about through its engagement with the KRG
is striking. From being utterly opposed to the very existence of the KRG until the
mid-2000s, Ankara has embarked upon a forward-looking strategy towards Irbil
(the KRG capital) built primarily around trade, diplomatic visits and initiatives,
and engagement on highly sensitive issues including the status of the Turkish
Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), based in the inaccessible Qandil mountains in the
north of the KRG.26 The relationship has blossomed, culminating in high levels of
trade between Turkey and the KRG, the appointment of a formal Turkish consul-
general to Irbil, and the reception in Ankara of Masoud Barzani as president of the
KRG, rather than of the KDP. The relationship is clearly in the interests of the
Kurdish leaders, and has developed in parallel with increasing tension and strain
in interaction between Baghdad and Ankara. How the relationship will develop
in the future remains an open question, yet the investment being made by Turkey
in many different sectors of the KRG economy—including hydrocarbons—is
striking and serves as an excellent example of the fact that foreign relations in
Iraq are now no longer the sole preserve of the central government or a singular
regime in Baghdad.
The Arab world

Iraq has long held a position of political and economic prominence in the Arab
world. Often this prominence was seen as problematic, reflected in aggressive
foreign policies that created tension and alarm. However, it was also viewed as
25
Henri Barkey, Preventing conflict over Kurdistan (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2009), p. 20.
26
This improved relationship between Ankara and Irbil has been mirrored by the Turkish government distancing
itself from the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF)—a Turkmen political organization previously supported by Ankara
and diametrically opposed to KRG aspirations. See Barkey, Preventing conflict over Kurdistan, p. 17.
1406
useful, both in terms of balancing Iran and challenging Tehran’s attempts to bring
the Gulf into its sphere of influence, and in terms of evidence of the vitality of
the Arab nationalist project. Both aspects applied while Saddam Hussein’s regime
held power. Since the removal of the Ba’ath regime, the relationship between
Iraq and the rest of the Arab world has become strained. With Iraq under US
tutelage from 2003, Arab states simply found it easier not to attempt to engage
with Baghdad, as any attempt to build relations too early could quickly incur the
wrath of vociferous public opinion opposed to the invasion and occupation of
Iraq. Some countries, especially Syria, found themselves de facto enemies of the
new Iraq. With a Ba’ath leadership in place, Syria quickly found itself not only
the natural enemy of the post-Ba’ath Iraqi state and its US guardians, but maybe
even the next target of Washington, particularly as many Iraqi Ba’athist leaders
sought exile in Syria, and Sunni jihadists found the route to Iraq through Syria a
relatively easy one.
It is the changing status of the Sunni community in Iraq that has most sensi-
tized public opinion in the Arab world and, until relatively recently, made it diffi-
cult for Arab governments to engage directly with Baghdad. The disempowering
of the Sunni Arab community from 2003 onwards, reflected by the fact that the
post-Ba’ath governments in Iraq have been dominated by parties of an overtly Shi‘i
or Kurdish hue, was received with consternation across the Arab Middle East; and
this alarm was only strengthened with the onset of the brutal sectarian civil war
that brought Iraq almost to collapse in 2006–2007. For most countries of the Arab
world, the relationship with Baghdad will remain difficult for as long as there
is a government dominated by overtly Shi‘i parties. Particularly for Gulf states,
with their concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions and strategies for expanding its
influence in the wider region, the existence of a Shi‘i-dominated government in
Baghdad presents particular and serious challenges to their own national security.
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in particular view the emergence of a Shi‘i Arab Iraq as
highly problematic, as it could function as a model for Saudi and Bahraini Shi‘is
to aspire to and emulate.
However, in recent years the picture may have begun to change somewhat,
perhaps as a result of US encouragement. While Iraq’s relations with Saudi Arabia
remain very tense indeed, as evidenced by the poor relationship between Prime
Minister Maliki and his Saudi counterpart,27 other Arab states have begun the
process of rebuilding their links with what they believe to be an increasingly
stable, if still Shi‘i and Kurdish-dominated, Iraq. Particularly in terms of trade
and economic development, pragmatism and economic benefit seem to be eroding
the edifice of Arab nationalist pride. Trade delegations from Jordan, Egypt and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have all visited Baghdad, and investment flows
from the Arab world into Iraq have been increasing. This pragmatism also seems
able to ignore the previous high levels of animosity showed across the Arab world
towards the Kurdistan Region, where investments have been made by Emirati and
27
For a recent example of this, see Assad Aboud, ‘US and Iran favour Maliki as Iraqi PM six months after polls’,
Agence France Presse, 7 Sept. 2010.
1407
Gareth Stansfield
Lebanese companies in the hydrocarbons and tourism sectors. The amounts are
also significant here, with investment from the UAE into Kurdistan expected to
double from $3 billion to $6 billion by 2013.28
The United States

The US may have withdrawn combat forces from Iraq, but its relations with Iraq
will remain critical over the coming years. In effect, both Baghdad and Washington
still have significant interests in keeping each other as close as possible; but this
closeness has to be managed carefully, especially from the perspective of Baghdad.
Iraqi leaders already have to perform a delicate balancing act between a public
opinion that is largely opposed to US involvement in Iraq’s affairs and a recog-
nition that the US still performs a valuable role in shoring up Iraq’s fledgling
security structures and providing political security to the different constituent
parts of the political spectrum. The Shi‘i parties view US support as useful in
helping to develop relationships with the Arab world, and in preventing any
possible Ba’athist resurgence. The Sunni parties and secular umbrella groups
view the US as a necessary and valuable ally in its commitment to ensuring that
the influence of Iran remains within limits. And the Kurds desperately want to
maintain a strong relationship with the US in order to protect and further the
development of their autonomous region, recognizing that its existence remains,
even now, tenuous.
The relationship with the US is also, to some degree, outside the control of the
Iraqi political elite. For the US, Iraq remains too important, and too much has been
invested in it, not have a strong relationship with the country and to leave the door
open for increased Iranian influence or even for Al-Qaeda to re-establish itself.
While the Obama administration is clearly wary of involving itself too deeply
in the affairs of Iraq at present, it remains the case that the US will commit itself
to a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq that ensures the security services
are able to maintain a semblance of order (therefore allowing the US to continue
to refer to Iraq as a ‘success’ that does not require the redeploying of combat
forces) and are closely tied, through logistics and equipment, to the US military–
industrial complex. Finally, the US also realizes that the continuation of the
tenuous ‘success’ in Iraq depends very much on maintaining the fragile relation-
ships between Iraq’s main parties and ensuring that all actors remain committed
to resolving political issues peacefully. In this regard, Meghan O’Sullivan notes
that, ‘although Washington is less central than in the past, it remains influential.
The United States is the only party respected, if grudgingly, by nearly all sides.
No other entity has the same power to convene in Iraq—not Iran, not the United
28
See ‘UAE to double investment in Kurdistan to $6bn’, The National, 20 May 2010. The strength of the
relationship between the UAE and the Kurdistan Region is further evidenced by an impressive commercial
conference staged by the two countries in May 2010. The UAE delegation was led by the minister of foreign
trade, Sheikha Lubna al-Qasimi. See http://www.kurdistaninvestment.org/Default.aspx?page=articles&c=C
onference&id=521, accessed 12 Sept. 2010.
1408
Nations.’29 Irrespective of fatigue towards Iraq within the Washington beltway,
and of the problems Baghdad politicians face in keeping the Americans close, but
not too close, the relationship between them over the coming years will by mutual
necessity remain highly formative.
Conclusion
Iraq has entered many periods of transformation since 2003, and crossed many
thresholds which have been referred to as critical. As a country emerging from
decades of authoritarian control, war, sanctions and profound internal instability,
this is understandable. However, the juncture at which Iraq stands in 2010 is
equally transformative in a political sense. With the standing down of US combat
forces and the holding of second nationwide parliamentary elections, Iraq’s leaders
now have the opportunity not only to consolidate the fragile positive develop-
ments that have occurred in recent years (the survival of the political process itself
perhaps being the most important) but to consider Iraq’s place in the international
community and to begin to shape its re-entry into regional and international
political and economic life in a constructive manner. A balance, of course, exists
between regional and international engagement on the one hand and domestic
political stability and survival on the other; and it is this interaction of exoge-
nous and endogenous forces that will determine whether post-American Iraq will
succeed or fail.
29
Meghan O’Sullivan, ‘After Iraq’s election, the real fight’, op-ed, Washington Post, 7 March 2010, http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19981/after_iraqs_election_the_real_fighthtml?breadcrumb=%2Fe
xperts%2F1575%2Fmeghan_osullivan, accessed 10 Sept. 2010.
1409

The Reformation of Iraqs Foreign Relations

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Reformation of Iraqs Foreign Relations

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The reformation of Iraq’s foreign relations:

new elites and enduring legacies

With the holding of national elections, followed by the withdrawal of US combat

International Affairs 86: 6 (2010) 1395–1409

Enduring legacies: contextualizing Iraq’s foreign relations

Domestic political dynamics

Managing natural resources

New elites and the practice of foreign relations

Iraq’s foreign relations

The Arab world

The United States

You might also like