Jabary / Hira: The Kurdish Mirage
The Kurdish Mirage:
A Success Story in Doubt
Kawa Jabary and Anil Hira
Mr. Jabary and Dr. Hira are in the Department of Political Science at
Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, Canada.
T
he controversy surrounding the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003
will continue for years to come,
not only over its justification but
also over its outcomes. The idealistic hope
emanating from the “Arab Spring” is just
one more page added to the story. But one
chapter has surprisingly received short
shrift thus far: the successful development
of a strong Kurdish region. Though U.S.
Vice President Joseph Biden’s suggestion
of breaking up Iraq into three parts was
summarily dismissed, in effect the Kurds
have received de facto autonomy.1 The
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has
been an island of stability in comparison
with the rest of strife-torn Iraq, where
Sunni and Shia continue their conflict. Not
only is such a turn of events miraculous
from the point of view of offering the long-
time Kurdish guerrilla group a chance to
govern part of their region; it also allows
for relative stability and the development
of its abundant oil reserves. Thus, Kurd-
istan potentially offers a prosperous and
stable development model for the rest of
the region.
In this article, we discuss the main
threat to this possible future, namely struc-
tural weaknesses in Kurdish governance,
which remains deeply divided and incom-
© 2013, The Authors
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Hira.indd 99
petent. We consciously avoid a detailed his-
tory. Instead, the discussion is divided into
three main areas to expose the problem. We
begin with a brief discussion of the central
historical dynamic of Kurdish politics: the
interaction of its two main political parties,
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
We then turn to the influence of regional
actors upon Kurdish development and the
related roadblocks to getting the economy
on track. We close with some thoughts
about how the KRG might begin to move
forward and reach its vast potential.
ORIGINS OF THE PARTIES
Kurdish nationalism as a political
movement in Iraq arguably started in the
late 1940s.2 It has been continually marked
by competition among the key political fig-
ures who dominate the KDP and the PUK,
both of which have deep roots in Kurdish
regions and patrimonial networks based on
tribal loyalties. While feelings of nation-
alism within Kurdistan run very strong,
the disagreements among its charismatic
leaders prevent channeling it productively
towards a long-term consensus around
development goals.
The KDP historically has been recog-
nized for representing the Barzani tribe, a
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 Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013

community located in the Badenan region port the communists and the KDP were
in the northern territories of Iraqi Kurd- jointly enjoying in Iraq and attempted to
istan. Unlike the KDP, the PUK has not limit their political freedom.
been the political wing of one single tribe, In 1963, the Arab Socialist Baath
but has depended on tribal loyalties. Its Party overthrew Qassem in a bloody coup.
leader, Jalal Talabani, is from the Talabani However, Barzani was able to distance
tribe, one of the largest in Kurdistan; most the KDP from this political upheaval and
of the high-profile members of the PUK remain nonaligned. During negotiations
represent a tribe. between Barzani and the Baath regime in
The leader of the KDP is Masud Bar- 1963, Iraq’s new president, Abdul Salam
zani. His deputy, a nephew, is Nechirvan Arrif, ignored Ahmad and signed a treaty
Barzani, the prime minister of the Kurd- with Barzani to crush the Iraqi Communist
istan region. Party, which
Several other In 1968, Ahmad Hassan Al-Baker offered had a good
Barzanis also Barzani a deal to solve the Kurdish relationship
hold promi- with Ahmad.
nent positions
question. However, he didn’t include the The agree-
in the KDP: oil-rich city of Kirkuk, control over which ment also
Masroor, the has been the main demand of the Kurds. divided the
eldest son central com-
of Masud, is the head of the KDP’s secret mittee of the KDP, putting Barzani and his
agency; Adham, a cousin of Masud, is a followers on one side, and Ibrahim Ahmad
member of the central committee. The and his son-in-law Jalal Talabani on the
tribe’s influence over the KDP has histori- other.4 In protest, Ahmad and his followers
cal roots, going back to its inception. left the party, blaming Barzani for acting
Mustafa Barzani, Masud’s father, against its principles.5
along with other political figures, formed The departure of these intellectual
the KDP in 1947. In that year, due to the members from the party gave Barzani a
revolt of his brother Sheik Ahmad against chance to gain full control over the KDP.
the government of Iraq, “Barzani had little However, after the Baath crushed the
option but to fight his way out of Iraq and leftist groups and forced them into exile,
seek sanctuary in the USSR.”3 Leader- it turned its attention towards its Kurdish
ship of the KDP fell to Ibrahim Ahmad, ally, the KDP.6 In 1968, Ahmad Hassan
who was popular among students and the Al-Baker replaced Arrif as president of
intellectual elite in Iraq but had very little Iraq and offered Barzani a deal to solve
support from rural areas. When Gen- the Kurdish question. However, he didn’t
eral Qassem removed the monarchy and include the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, control
established the Republic of Iraq in 1958, over which has been the main demand of
he legalized political freedom and invited the Kurds.7 In 1971, the KDP rejected the
Barzani to return to Iraq. However, when deal, and Barzani was left with no choice
Barzani arrived, he was displeased with but to return to the mountains of Kurdistan
the socialist orientation that the KDP had to resume his revolution.
developed under the leadership of Ahmad. For a short time, Barzani was able to
Qassem was in turn annoyed by the sup- continue his resistance because of support

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that he received from Iran. However, in
1975, President Al-Baker signed a treaty
with Iran to settle border disputes and in
return asked Iran to end its support for the
Kurdish rebellion. This agreement en-
abled the Iraqi army to degrade the KDP’s
guerrilla presence and force Barzani to
leave the mountains of Kurdistan and seek
refuge in Iran.8 The retreat of the KDP as a
fighting force was a golden opportunity for
the party’s former political bureau, particu-
larly Jalal Talabani, to gain the initiative as
political leaders. Talabani, with a group of
colleagues, established their own political
party, the PUK, in 1975.9 Through this new
party, they began to challenge the KDP.
SADDAM’S REVENGE
Most of the major problems of Kurd-
ish politics are associated with the rivalry
between the PUK and the KDP. This rivalry
was present even during those worst days,
when the Iraqi regime launched brutal at-
tacks against the Kurds in Iraq. As alluded
to above, “Barzani’s decision to abandon
the struggle [against the Iraqi regime] after
his defeat in 1975, and Talabani’s ability
to make use of this division to start a new
party, the PUK, to carry on the struggle
for Kurdish autonomy,”10 was the start of a
deepening split. The two parties not only
became opponents; they attacked each oth-
er on a daily basis. In addition, in order to
prove itself as the main opposition force in
the mountains of Kurdistan, the PUK found
itself simultaneously fighting the KDP, Iran
and the Iraqi army. These PUK operations,
particularly against the KDP and Iran, were
a relief to the army, allowing it to focus
more on the war with Iran along its south-
ern borders. Saddam offered a ceasefire and
reconciliation with the PUK in 1983.
After a few months, the PUK real-
ized that Saddam was playing for time and
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Hira.indd 101
Jabary / Hira: The Kurdish Mirage
giving nothing to the Kurds. In 1984, the
PUK broke the ceasefire and intensified its
attacks against the Iraqi army. In addition,
for the first time, the PUK made peace with
the KDP under the leadership of Masud
Barzani, who had inherited the leadership
of the KDP after the death of his father. Ta-
labani and Barzani also formed a coalition,
the Kurdistan National Front (KNF), in
1986.11 With help from Iran, the PUK and
KDP jointly attacked the city of Hallabja
and forced the Iraqi army to withdraw. In
revenge, the army famously attacked the
city with chemical weapons, killing more
than 5,000 Kurdish civilians. In 1988, after
the war with Iran ended, Saddam turned
his attention to the Kurds, in particular the
prohibited areas around the cities of Sulay-
mania, Kirkuk, Kalar and Khanaqeen. In
this attack, Saddam captured thousands of
Kurds, most of whom wound up buried in
mass graves.12 This campaign destroyed the
foundations of both the KDP and the PUK,
remnants of which resettled in Iran in 1989.
These tragic events could have led to the
laying of a new unified political foundation
for Kurdish politics, but this was not to be
the case.
EMERGENCE OF THE KRG
From the start of the Kurdish uprising
in 1991, following the Gulf War, people at-
tacked Baath government offices on a daily
basis. Given its own challenges related
to the UN sanctions program, the regime
effectively withdrew from the Kurdish
cities, and a coalition called the Kurdistan
National Front (KNF) took control over
the region. However, the political differ-
ences between the KDP and PUK have
negatively affected the performance of the
KNF. Even though the PUK and the KDP
agreed to form a decentralized Kurdish
Regional Government, they both remain
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 Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013
loyal to their parties and their “politbu-
ros,” developing separate revenue streams
shared through patronage networks to
ensure loyalty. For instance, the KDP col-
lects 85 percent of its revenues, estimated
at $750 million annually, from taxation and
customs generated by illegal trade at the
Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border. The PUK, in
turn, developed the Sulaymania cigarette
factory, which between 1991 and 1997 in-
creased production from 1,200 to 144,000
packs a day.13 Neither party returns these
revenues to the KRG. Moreover, through
other avenues, such as the sale of heavy
construction equipment and the imposition
of tariffs, the parties have profited from
their control of the KRG.
The situation degenerated into civil
war in April 1994. At the beginning of
the conflict, the PUK was able to force
the KDP out of the city of Erbil, but the
victory did not last long. In 1996, with
help from the Iraqi army, the KDP was
able to defeat the PUK and push it out of
Erbil into Sulaymania, thus cementing the
regional centers of power for each party.
Along with the PUK, other small political
parties, such as the Islamic Movement in
Kurdistan and the Socialist Democratic
Party, also left the city of Erbil and joined
the PUK in Sulaymania. After this conflict,
both parties established their own cabinets
of ministers, one in Erbil under the KDP,
the other in Sulaymania under the PUK.14
The détente lasted until 1998. Later,
in the wake of the U.S. invasion, the
KDP and PUK finally agreed to mix their
cabinets and create a single government.
Nevertheless, in the process of creating it,
the KDP insisted on controlling the posi-
tions of prime minster and president. Since
Jalal Talabani was interested in becoming
the president of Iraq, he agreed to give
the KDP the positions they required. In
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Hira.indd 102
the 2005 Iraqi federal election, the KDP
and PUK participated together as one
list, mixed their cabinets, and created a
new government under the leadership of
Nechirvan Barzani, the grandson of Mus-
tafa, with his deputy from the PUK. After
dividing up the important positions, the
KDP received the presidency of Kurdistan
and agreed to present Jalal Talabani as
their candidate for the sovereign post in the
Iraqi federal government.15 Even though
the KRG cabinet was now mixed, the PUK
and the KDP continued to pursue their
separate party interests.
THE QUESTION OF KIRKUK
When the Iraqi constitution was re-
written and ratified through a referendum
in 2005, many people hoped that the KRG
would be able to guarantee the rights of
the Kurds in the new Iraqi constitution
and solve the problem of disputed ter-
ritories. To a limited extent, the PUK and
KDP were able to change the old political
system in Iraq to a “federal government”
(Article One), which also gave the Kurds
further autonomy. The KDP and PUK
were able to include the Kurdish language
along with Arabic as one of two official
languages in the new Iraqi constitution.16
Moreover, the issues of disputed territo-
ries, power relations and natural resources
between Baghdad and Erbil were to be
resolved according to Article 140 no later
than December 2007. Not surprisingly,
there are enormous issues of continuing
dispute between the KRG and the Iraqi
government. According to Michael Gunter,
“These contested powers include the own-
ership of natural resources (mainly oil) and
the control of the revenues flowing from
them, the role of the KRG army, or Pesh-
mergas [the former guerrillas of the PUK
and KDP] and the final status of Kirkuk.”17
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 Jabary / Hira: The Kurdish Mirage

The Iraqi government has been able to and mediation of the regional actors,19
avoid honoring these articles and agree- including Iran, Turkey and a host of others
ments because the KRG has lacked a who wield influence through development
unifying strategy. For instance, after more assistance. The general dynamic is of the
than eight years of disagreement over these KRG accepting outside influence in return
disputed territories, the KDP and PUK for economic favors. The KRG’s response
have not been able to convince the minor- to the agendas and aid of these actors has
ity groups within Kurdistan, mostly the largely been short-term in nature.
Turkmen and the Sunni Arabs, that living Sharing a border, the Kurds did not
within the Kurdistan border would benefit have many options but to build a good
them. For a long time, the PUK and KDP relationship with Iran, a natural ally in
ignored these groups but distributed land their war against Saddam. The relation-
and money among their party members. ship is complicated by the fact that Iranian
In addition, Kurds have
according to The KRG could have more easily also been
Visser and incorporated [Kirkuk] into the Kurdistan fighting for
Stansfield, autonomy in
“With the region by presenting a legitimate their region.
Kurdish lead- leadership for the city and treating Arabs, Through tacit
ership [KDP Turkmens, Christians and Kurds equally. complicity,
and PUK] the PUK and
demanding the inclusion of Kirkuk into KDP have not only built a strong relation-
Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and insisting ship with Iran; they also have allowed it
upon not only its modern Kurdish charac- to operate freely in the Kurdistan region.
ter, but its more ancient Kurdish origins, For example, the Islamic Republic was
the Kurds found themselves an implacable able to establish intelligence offices under
foe in the form of the Turkmens [and the name of Qarargay Ramadan in major
Arabs] of Kirkuk.”18 The PUK and KDP Kurdish cities.20 According to Sheri La-
have not been able to convince these two zier, through these offices, Iran carried out
groups to accept a new identity for the the assassinations of more than 300 Iranian
city as part of a multi-ethnic and modern Kurdish political activists who had taken
Kurdistan region. The KRG could have shelter in Iraqi Kurdistan.21 The PUK and
more easily incorporated the city into the KDP have never publically complained
Kurdistan region by presenting a legitimate about these crimes.
leadership for the city and treating Arabs, Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003,
Turkmens, Christians and Kurds equally. Iran has pursued three goals in Kurdistan:
to challenge the United States in Iraq, to
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS make Kurdistan more dependent on Iran
In the last two decades, Iraqi Kurdistan economically, and to monitor Iranian
has been at the center of a whirlwind of Kurdish activists in the Kurdistan region.
contestation between the KRG and regional The well-known disputes between the
actors. Ongoing tensions between the KDP United States and Iran are beyond the
and PUK therefore have to be understood scope of this paper, but some are important
in the context of the continual meddling to note. According to Liven Magazine, 30-

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 Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013
40 percent of Kurdistan’s goods — fruits,
vegetables and building materials — are
imported from Iran, involving more than
150 Iranian companies.22 Iran has been
using these companies to ensure that
Kurdistan’s markets remain dependent on
Iran’s products and goods. It has also used
this economic relationship to advance its
political interests. For example, whenever
Iranian Kurdish political parties push for
autonomy, Iran closes its borders to pres-
sure the KRG to dissuade Iranian Kurds
from pursuing such dreams. Using the
Kurds to fight each other has been an ef-
fective way for Iran to reduce the number
of its own dissidents.23
Turkey’s antagonistic role towards
autonomy is defined by its ongoing war
with the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party),
yet it has been able to influence the KRG.
This started when Turkey was invited to
intervene as a peacekeeper in the Kurd-
istan region in 1995 to stop the civil war
between the KDP and the PUK. Even
though Turkey’s troops withdrew in 2006,
they left behind many agencies and orga-
nizations to protect Turkey’s interests in
Kurdistan. Like Iran, Turkey has pushed
Iraqi Kurds to refrain from stepping closer
to full independence from Iraq. With the
cooperation of the KRG, Turkey’s National
Intelligence Organization (MIT) has estab-
lished many small organizations and units,
such as Ouzel Tim, Jit Tim, Oyak, the
Turkish Red Crescent and even some press
agencies, to influence the situation in the
Kurdistan region. These Turkish agencies
all have the same purposes: to fight Iraqi
bases of support for the PKK, to prevent
the Kurds from expanding their autonomy,
and to protect the Turkmen ethnic groups
in the Kurdistan region.
Instead of resisting Turkey’s interven-
tion in its internal affairs, the KRG has
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Hira.indd 104
not only provided help, it has also has
fought side by side with the Turkish army
against the PKK. According to Gunter,
the Iraqi Kurds launched a major attack
in 1992 against the PKK in order to retain
Turkey’s support; however, the outbreak of
the civil war between the KDP and PUK
gave the PKK an opportunity to survive.24
Under pressure from Turkey, Jalal Talabani
pushed the PKK to stop its partisan attacks
against the Turkish army. The PUK allied
itself with Turkey by eliminating PKK
activists. In addition, the Turkish army
with 35,000 troops crossed the border of
Kurdistan in 1995, hoping to destroy the
PKK; however, the KDP and PUK only
“partially cooperated with the Turks.”25
The Turkish government has also
been challenging the Kurds to not include
Kirkuk city in their province. The Turkish
government has officially rejected this and
has created a political body, the Turkmen
Front, to challenge this particular demand.
The KRG’s responses have been very
weak. The KRG never used the vulner-
ability of Turkish economic interests, as
we discuss below, to eliminate Turkey’s in-
terference in internal issues in the disputed
territories, particularly Kirkuk.
Other actors also have direct stakes
in the future of Kurdistan, as well as the
same type of patronage relations with the
KDP and PUK. In 1996, the oil-for-food
program officially ended, but aid from
international agencies kept flowing into the
Kurdistan region.26 Moreover, “from 1991
to 1996, Kurdistan received approximately
two-thirds of the total U.S. aid to Iraq, or
over $1 billion in goods and services.”27
According to the official website of the
KRG, “U.S. companies and their partners
have already planned more than $600
million in commercial investments in the
Kurdistan Region in sectors as diverse as
5/20/2013 12:58:35 PM

education, housing and industrial goods.”28
Furthermore, 78 percent of the British
Overseas Development Administration aid
to Iraq went to Kurdistan, as did 65 percent
of total UN funds. UN aid and service rev-
enues to Kurdistan increased from $1 bil-
lion to approximately $10 billion in 1997.
In addition, despite corruption and delay
in delivery, by 2003, the United Nations
had spent an additional $4.1 to $6.1 billion
in Kurdistan. Moreover, “UNOPS [United
Nations Office for Project Services] has
been the second-largest implementer of
projects for the United Nations Develop-
ment Group Iraq Trust Fund (ITF), running
43 projects with a total budget value of
$238 million for the Fund.”29 However,
Michael Rubin points out that much of the
cash and funds transferred to the KRG now
appear to be missing.30 Instead of spend-
ing these funds to develop the region,
some high-ranking political leaders in the
KDP and the PUK “apparently transferred
funds from the international payments into
personal bank accounts [or invested the
money] ... in companies in China, hotels
in the United Arab Emirates, and stocks in
American companies.”31
Furthermore, when Nechirvan Bar-
zani stepped down as prime minster, he
reportedly mentioned that the KRG had $4
billion in the bank, but few people know
where the money went. It seems that,
except for some high-ranking leaders in
both the PUK and KDP, no one else knows
about these funds.
South Korea is an important over-
looked external actor that has helped the
KRG. The involvement of the South Ko-
rean government in the Kurdistan region
goes back to its army’s participation in the
U.S. war against Iraq in 2003. South Korea
put troops in Erbil from 2004 until 2008
as their contribution to the war against
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Jabary / Hira: The Kurdish Mirage
Saddam. However, once the city was free
of war and insurgency, the Korean army
mostly delivered infrastructure develop-
ment and civilian help to the Kurdish re-
gion. Besides their army, the International
Cooperation Agency from South Korea
(KOICA) has helped the KRG in vari-
ous development projects.32 It spent $62
million on building schools, hydro-power
plants, training centers, hospitals, water
resources and a sewage system and another
$52 million to improve the capacity of
government buildings, buy heavy construc-
tion vehicles and build laboratories.
These funds have not been distributed
among the Kurdish cities equally. Ac-
cording to a KOICA report, its spending
in Kurdistan has exceeded $112 million,
of which Erbil has received 67 percent,
Sulaymania 24.2 percent and Duhok only
8.6 percent.33 The unequal distribution of
South Korea’s funds among these three
cities can be associated with the division
between the KDP and PUK. The KDP is
the dominant power in Erbil, where the
South Korean troops stayed. The KOICA
has also provided scholarship programs
that the KRG has awarded to individuals
who are associated with or members of the
PUK or the KDP. Therefore, even though
some of the South Korean aid went to
developing the infrastructure of the region,
a good portion of it went to the KDP and,
to a lesser extent, the PUK.
ECONOMIC POTENTIAL UNTAPPED
Under the leadership of the KRG, the
Kurdish region has witnessed economic
development in some areas. According to
the Kurdistan Board of Investment, this
growth started in 2007. Probably because
Kurdistan is a region, not a nation, this is
the only source of economic data we have
found. The government budget in 2010
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 Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013
was estimated at $9.6 billion. The real
GDP growth rate for 2009 was estimated
at a healthy 4.3 percent (as opposed to 1.5
percent for the world). However, GDP per
capita was only $4,500, up from $3,200 in
2007, but still putting the region effectively
at 117th in country rankings.
In addition, the KRG has helped the
local economy to develop 1,376 private
industries in Kurdistan.34 The regional
partners involved in these economic activi-
ties are Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, the United
States, Jordan, China and the United Arab
Emirates, according to the KRG Board of
Investment in 2010. We can conclude that
this region has achieved a great deal of
economic progress.
However, this economic growth has
only occurred in a few areas. Looking at
the number of licenses issued by the KRG
for projects in different sectors of the prov-
ince’s economy up to 2008, we see that
this growth is temporary and vulnerable.
There is no balance among the sectors in
the process of this economic boom. The
areas of construction (34 percent) and, to
a lesser extent, metals (20 percent) and
food (15 percent) have received the highest
numbers of licenses, indicating that there
are more activities in these fields than the
others.35
Dependency on Oil and Gas
For a long time, the KRG has depend-
ed heavily on aid provided by the regional
actors. However, with increasing rec-
ognition of the extent of its hydrocarbon
deposits, it has rapidly shifted its attention
towards oil and gas. Over 41 companies
are now investing in the oil and gas fields,
and it has signed 37 contracts with them.36
According to the minister of natural re-
sources, Ashty Hawramy, on October 19,
2009, the KRG received approximately $5
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Hira.indd 106
billion as a gift from these contracts.37 Ac-
cording to the rival party, Goran, although
Kurdistan has the capacity to produce 45
billion barrels of oil a day, it now produces
just 200,000. All these fields are under the
direct control of the KDP and PUK, but
not the KRG.38 From 2001 to 2009, the
KRG helped fund 1,376 private indus-
trial projects that employed over 14,184
workers, at a cost of over 500 billion Iraqi
dinars. Baghdad has been accusing the
KDP and PUK of collecting “250 million
a month from the benefits of the oil being
exported to Iran,”39 but not returning the
money to the Iraqi federal government.
The KRG has focused its attention on
gas, announcing that a 461-million-square-
foot site for building the Kurdistan Gas
City has been designed for development
with Gas Cities LLC, “a joint venture
being established by Crescent Petroleum
and Dana Gas.”40 The Kurdish Gas City
includes industrial, residential and com-
mercial components at an estimated cost
of over $3 billion.41 Dana Gas, under its
chairman, Sheikh Ahmed bin Sultan Al
Qasimi of the UAE, is “the first regional
private-sector natural-gas company in
the Middle East.”42It has also launched
a pipeline project of 180 km connecting
the Khor Mor gas field to the cities of
Sulaymania and Erbil to supply electric-
ity stations and civilian demands for gas.
However, it seems that the only people
who have control over these important
sectors are Hawramy, the minister of
natural resources, and the KDP presiden-
tial deputy, Nechirvan Barzani, but not
the KRG. Hawramy informed Kurdish
parliament members that Barzani decided
to open a bank account with HSBC in
which he deposited all the money gener-
ated from oil and gas.43 The KRG and the
federal government are now fighting over
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 Jabary / Hira: The Kurdish Mirage

the revenues from these contracts and who Construction

should pay off the companies.44 Unlike agriculture, as noted above,
the construction sector in Kurdistan has
Agriculture expanded rapidly in the last decade. Ac-
Kurdistan’s soil is very fertile and cording to Denise Natali, while 95 percent
suitable for growing vegetables, fruits and of the construction work in Erbil went to
wheat. During the 1980s, Iraqi Kurdistan Turkish companies, 85 percent in Sulay-
produced a third of Iraq’s wheat.45 Almost mania is operated by Iranian companies.49
74.6 percent of the land in Kurdistan is Natali also mentions that, true to form, the
suitable for agriculture; there is abundant boom in this sector has only benefited a
cropland in plains and forests in mountain small elite who have “become millionaires
areas, plus natural range land and orchards. overnight.”50 For example, to improve the
Nevertheless, electricity
the agricultur- The “KRG Ministry of Agriculture supply, the
al sector has has 13,320 employees; by contrast, KRG cre-
been damaged ated a fund of
the California Department of Food
considerably $116 million
by negligent and Agriculture has 1,892, and the to repair the
policies. Un- Arizona Department of Agriculture has two power
der the KRG, approximately 320.” plants. This
“the current renovation,
average agricultural labor force is approxi- along with the portable generators of
mately 12.8 percent, with high regional private companies, provides Kurdish cities
variations, rising to more than 19.4 percent around 15 hours of electricity daily. The
in Sulaymania Governorate, compared to KRG is still buying electricity from Tur-
only 6.6 percent in Erbil Governorate.” 46
key and Iran and depends on the central
Despite this increase, “the value of agri- government and portable generators for its
cultural imports jumped to $1.37 billion in power.51
1997 from $922 million a year earlier — According to Michael Rubin, even this
an increase of nearly 49 percent; [further- development does not benefit the region,
more] in 2007, 65 percent of the Kurdis- because of the increasing price of prop-
tan Region’s food was imported, and 35 erty.52 This point is important because most
percent was produced domestically.”47 properties require a high down payment,
As in other areas, the KRG has padded beyond the means of ordinary citizens in
payrolls for patronage purposes without Kurdistan. As a result, most properties are
improving governance. For instance, the sold to a small, rich elite.
“KRG Ministry of Agriculture has 13,320
employees; by contrast, the California CIVIL SERVICE AND CORRUPTION
Department of Food and Agriculture has At the heart of these issues is the
1,892, and the Arizona Department of problem of governance. Until 2003, ap-
Agriculture has approximately 320.”48 proximately 80 percent of the people who
Despite the high number of employees, the worked in the public sector were members
Kurdish region still depends on Iran and of the KDP and PUK or associated with
Turkey for its food supply. the other allied political groups. Most

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 Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013
of these party administrators in the civil
services were political appointees. The
Kurdish Regional Reform Commission
(KRRC ) published a highly critical report
in 2012 that has gained attention. Accord-
ing to this report, the KRG is experiencing
poor governing performance in its civil
service, corruption, partisan loyalty in
government institutions, and weak agendas
for developing the nation. The report also
mentions many other outstanding problems
with the Iraqi federal government over
territorial disputes and who should manage
natural resources, specifically oil, in the ar-
eas under the KRG’s control. Beyond this
report, many Kurdish cities have recently
experienced demonstrations and protests
against the KRG’s governing performance.
In order to shed more light on governance
problems, Kawa Jabary conducted in-
terviews with 45 employees from low-,
middle- and high-level positions in the two
most important ministries of the KRG, the
Ministry of Higher Education and Scien-
tific Research (MHESR) and the Ministry
of Planning (MOP), during summer 2012.
According to a MOP report, the
KOICA allocated $80 million in 2004
to improve education, health, electricity,
water and sewage, transportation, uni-
versity language centers, advanced labo-
ratories, hospital emergency rooms, and
hydropower generation. The KOICA also
held training courses in various areas for
government employees in the Kurdistan
region. The MOP also has established the
Kurdistan Institute for Public Administra-
tion “to support the improvement… and
provide modern training and development,
consultancy and research to public service
so that public servants may make the best
use of resources and more effectively serve
citizens.”53 The MOP and the INGOs have
run 1,018 courses, by our calculations,
108
Hira.indd 108
from 2010 to 2012. However, fully 88 per-
cent of these were in Erbil and another 5
percent in Duhok, the centers of KDP pow-
er, while just 7 percent were in Sulayma-
nia, where the PUK is dominant. Similarly,
from 2007 to 2008, only 27 percent of the
129 courses run by JICA (Japan) and only
23 percent of the 13 courses by KOICA
were in Sulaymania.54 This is problematic;
it suggests that partisanship, not need, is
driving training decisions.
Other agencies such as USAID and the
UNDP have also provided advice and help
to promote infrastructure reform, respect
for the rule of law and transparency, and
to implement programs that educate and
inspire the public managers to change their
mindsets for better commitment to imple-
mentation.55
Despite all these courses and train-
ing programs, according to most of our
interviewees from the mid- and lower-
level positions, the courses have not been
effective for several reasons. First of all,
the process of selecting the public servants
to participate in these programs is flawed.
Officials in the KRG’s institutions show
little enthusiasm for sending targeted em-
ployees to attend these programs. Many
interviewees also mentioned that favorit-
ism in selecting the employees has created
another major challenge. High-ranking
officials send ordinary employees to local
training courses, but reward their friends
or family members with scholarships for
study abroad. Some of these individuals
have traveled to many countries several
times just because they are related to
general directors or high-ranking officials,
according to one of our interviewees.
Another issue is the shortage of train-
ers with updated knowledge of public
policy. As an observer, Jabary participated
in three sessions of two different types of
5/20/2013 12:58:36 PM

training workshops in the MOP in August
2012 in Erbil. He noticed that the sub-
jects and materials covered were either
irrelevant to KRG needs or outdated. This
lack of current knowledge has undermined
these training courses, some of our inter-
viewees informed us, in two ways. First,
some public managers and high-ranking
officials do not send their employees to
participate because they do not have any
faith or interest in the programs. Second,
if a public manager from a different city
sends an employee to a training course in
Erbil, they have to bear the cost.
In spite of the reform efforts, “The
KRG has become the largest employer in
the region, providing monthly stipends
to an estimated 1.5 million people in the
public sector.”56 However, due to a lack of
information, and despite asking officials
in both the MOP and the MHESR, it is
not clear where all these employees are
posted. It seems that mass recruitment in
the public sector is still conducted through
the prime minister’s office once a year;
and decisions are mostly made based on
who need jobs, not on the skills that the
KRG’s ministries need. Our conclusion
here rests on personal interviews as well as
the fact that there are no job descriptions
for positions within the KRG’s institutions.
Because of this system of mass recruit-
ment, the government has become so big
that any transaction in public institutions
has to go through many channels and faces
a great deal of delay. Until 2010, multiple
interviewees told us that individuals found
out about public positions through per-
sonal connections or a relative working in
government offices.
There are signs of recognition of
the problem. For instance, according to
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
(2012), more than 50,000 new employees
109
Hira.indd 109
Jabary / Hira: The Kurdish Mirage
were recruited in 2011, and close to 20,000
in 2012. When Jabary asked some of these
new employees about the process of their
recruitment, they said that they heard about
the positions in the public media and then
applied. They had to send in CVs and later
were called for an interview. However, in-
terviewees from the mid- and lower-levels,
who have been working more than two
years in the public sector, said that, even
though the KRG has been recruiting its
employees through resumés and an inter-
view process, many people are still ap-
pointed to public positions due to their re-
lationships with the high-ranking officials,
regardless of their merit. For example, the
office of the KRG’s prime minister has ap-
parently engaged in nepotism. On October
8, 2012, through an official document the
prime minister’s office ordered recruitment
of new employees without consulting or
following the procedures or the legislation
established by the KRG.
To obtain a better understanding of
these issues, Jabary asked several ques-
tions of of MHESR and MOP employees
related to governing capacity, as reflected
in the following table.57 We agreed to
withhold their names so that they could
answer freely. The table includes only
those employees who provided a yes or
no answer. Those who were not sure or
did not respond are not included in some
answers.
The responses in the table show a
pattern: while the top employees’ answers
were mostly positive, the lower and middle
employees were more negative. Their
answers reinforce the problematic findings
of the KRRC report. Furthermore, Rubin
points out, “Party officials have told politi-
cal bureaucrats that they will lose their jobs
if they do not support Barzani and Tala-
bani.”58 The PUK and the KDP have been
5/20/2013 12:58:36 PM
 Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013

Table 1. Employee Responses on MOP Recruitment Process

Is There Do They Have Do They
Do They
Employee Corruption in Do They Identify Merit or Skill Provide Equal
Advertise to Find
Rank Promotion and Needed Skills? Assessment Opportunity in
the Right Skill?
Recruitment? Programs? Competitions?
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
High
12 3 3 12 3 11 0 13 4 10
Level
Middle
14 1 1 13 3 12 0 14 3 12
Level
Lower
15 0 0 13 3 12 0 15 3 12
Level

Total 41 4 4 38 9 35 0 42 10 32

able to retain their members through bribery
and distributing jobs in the public sector.
CONCLUSION
We should not lose sight of the fact
that Kurdish development in the context
of Iraq’s travails has produced a relatively
stable and secure environment. However,
continued progress is impeded by the cen-
tral fact of rivalry between the PUK and
the PDK, whose entente has created peace
on the basis of a divided and ineffective
government that is a vehicle for patronage
rather than collective and public interests.
Outside powers have exploited this divi-
sion to grab a share of the resources of
the region, with little planning to convert
them into bases for long-term economic
development. Essentially, political leaders
from both parties have “used the Kurdish
citizens’ own funds for personal gain,”59
with only those loyal to either machine
able to secure gifts. As Rubin puts it, the
leaders in these two parties “have become
drunk with power and disdainful of public
accountability.”60 To overcome these
problems, the PUK and the KDP would
need to respect and empower the KRG
and its institutions. They can make money
legitimately while growing the economy
through effective governance that ensures
the creation of a stable and prosperous eco-
nomic foundation. In order to achieve that
goal, both the KRG and outside donors
should focus on developing the human
resources that can lead to improved capac-
ity and governance throughout Kurdish
institutions. In the end, however, break-
ing up the political logjam is the only way
Kurdistan can move forward.

1
Denise Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq (Syracuse
University Press, 2010), 103.
2
Gareth R. V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy (Routledge
Curzon, 2003), 66.
3
Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 66.

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 Jabary / Hira: The Kurdish Mirage

4
Ibid, 70-71.
5
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (3rd Edition, I.B. Tauris, 2007), 317.
6
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton University
Press, 1978), 390-400.
7
Kerim Yildiz and Tom Blass, Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future (Kurdish Human Rights Project,
2003), 35-42.
8
Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 70-79.
9
McDowall, The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review, 338.
10
Ibid, 22.
11
Nader Entessar, Kurdish Politics in the Middle East (Lexington, Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2010), 97- 100.
12
Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (Norton, 1994), 6-8.
13
Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 40- 45.
14
McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds.
15
Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State.
16
Bill Park, Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives (Routledge, 2005), 30.
17
Michael Rubin, “Where’s Kurdistan’s Missing $4 Billion?,” The Kurdistan Tribune, July 3, 2011, 184.
18
Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 145.
19
Ofra Bengio, “Iraqi Kurds: Hour Of Power?,” Middle East Quarterly 10, no. 3 (2003): 43.
20
Liven Magazine, “Iran’s Secret Agency in Kurdistan” (Kurdish Edition) (Erbil, 2009), September 20, 2011,
http://www.lvinpress.com/newdesign/Dreje.aspx?jimare=46.
21
Sheri Lazier, Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War (Zed Books Ltd., 1996).
22
Liven Magazine, “Iran’s Secret Agency in Kurdistan.”
23
David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 236-238.
24
Michael Rubin, “The Kurdish Leaders Are Drunken with Power,” The Daily Star, 2009, 120-122.
25
Michael Gunter, “Kurdish Infighting: The PKK-KDP Conflict,” in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in
the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Robert Olson, ed. (University Press of Kentucky, 1996),
50-65.
26
United Nations Development Plan, “Drought Impact Assessment, Recovery and Mitigation Framework and
Regional Project Design in Kurdistan Region (KR),” (December, 2010), 30-54 http://reliefweb.int/sites/relief-
web.int/files/resources/B03750804A0EB2EC85257830006B6A97-Full_Report.pdf.
27
Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 30-31.
28
Kurdistan Board of Investment. Kurdistan’s Economy, February 10, 2012, http://www.kurdistaninvestment.
org/economy.html.
29
UNOPS, 2008, Iraq Operation Center, July 2012, http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/Locations/Eu-
rope/Pages/IraqOperationsCentre.aspx.
30
Rubin, “Where’s Kurdistan’s Missing $4 Billion?” 6.
31
Ibid.
32
Kurdistan Regional Government, Council of Ministers, Ministry of Planning, General Directorate of Devel-
opment Cooperation and Coordination, “A Report of The Republic of South Korea Course from 2004 to the
end of 2008,” (2009) January 23, 2012, http://www.mop-krg.org/.
33
Ibid.
34
Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 87.
35
Ibid, 88.
36
KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resource 2008, “Production Sharing Contracts,” (2008), accessed August 15,
2012, http://www.krg.org/p/p.aspx?l=12&r=296&p=1.
37
Gorran, The Change Movement’s Finance Critique in Kurdistan National Assembly, “Discovering
a Lost Resource,” (Kurdish Edition), August 15, 2011, http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/Inter_Report_Detail.
aspx?id=621&cat=1&title=1.
38
Ibid.
39
Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 84.
40
KRG-MOP, A Report of The Republic of South Korea Course from 2004 to the End of 2008.

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 Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013

41
Ibid.
42
Oil Review Middle East 2010, “Gas Boost for Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” October 20, 2011, http://www.
oilreviewmiddleeast.com/exploration-production/gas-boost-for-kurdistan-region-of-iraq.
43
Gorran, The Change Movement, “The Iraqi Kurdistan Land,” April, 2011, http://www.sbeiy.com/ku/In-
ter_Report_Detail.aspx?id=565&cat=1&title=1.
44
Michael Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds (Scarecrow Press, 2004), 183.
45
UNOPS, 2008. Iraq Operation Centre, 2-7.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
USAID, Iraq Economic Recovery Assessment (USAID, February 5, 2009), June 25, 2012, http://egateg.
usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Iraq_Economic_Recovery_Assessment.pdf.
49
Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 93.
50
Ibid, 102.
51
KRG-MOP, General Directorate for Development Coordination and Cooperation External Resources Man-
agement Unit, 2009, “Report on Donor Contributions to Kurdistan Region,” (2009), accessed June 20, 2012,
http://www.mop-krg.org.
52
Rubin, “Where’s Kurdistan’s Missing $4 Billion?” 8.
53
KRG-MOP, “A Brief about the Kurdistan Institute for Public Administration,” June 2012, http://www.mop-
krg.org/index.jsp?sid=1&id=203&pid=106.
54
Kawa Jabary, The Politics of Low Capacity: The Case of Kurdistan. MA Thesis, Political Science, Simon
Fraser University, 2013.
55
USAID, Iraq Economic Recovery Assessment (USAID, February 5, 2009), June 25, 2012, http://www.
egateg.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Iraq_Economic_Recovery_Assessment.pdf.
56
Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, 91.
57
Tables are from Jabary 2013.
58
Rubin, “The Kurdish Leaders Are Drunken with Power,” 7.
59
Rubin,” Where’s Kurdistan’s Missing $4 billion?” 8.
60
Rubin, “The Kurdish Leaders Are Drunken with Power,” 6.

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