Turkeys Coercive Diplomacy - Aras2011

This article was downloaded by: [University of Hong Kong Libraries]
On: 05 July 2013, At: 09:35

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,
UK
Journal of Strategic Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors
and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20
Similar Strategies, Dissimilar

Outcomes: an Appraisal of the
Efficacy of Turkey's Coercive
Diplomacy with Syria and in
Northern Iraq
a
Damla Aras
a
War Studies Department, King's College, London, UK
Published online: 25 Aug 2011.
To cite this article: Damla Aras (2011) Similar Strategies, Dissimilar Outcomes: an
Appraisal of the Efficacy of Turkey's Coercive Diplomacy with Syria and in Northern Iraq,
Journal of Strategic Studies, 34:4, 587-618, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2011.561086
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.561086
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.
However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or
suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed
in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the
views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should
not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection
with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Downloaded by [University of Hong Kong Libraries] at 09:35 05 July 2013
The Journal of Strategic Studies
Vol. 34, No. 4, 587–618, August 2011
Similar Strategies, Dissimilar

Outcomes: an Appraisal of the
Efficacy of Turkey’s Coercive
Diplomacy with Syria and in
Northern Iraq
DAMLA ARAS
War Studies Department, King’s College London, UK
ABSTRACT Several countries have used coercive diplomacy to dissuade sponsor-

states from supporting non-state armed groups. This study argues that when a
sponsor-state and a non-state armed group’s common identity creates common
aspirations and motives, coercive diplomacy towards the sponsor-state is unlikely
to succeed in the long-term. To assess its efficacy, this research examines
Turkey’s strategy towards Syria in 1998 and in northern Iraq from 2007
onwards. Under the abovementioned conditions, it concludes that there has been
no conclusive evidence for Turkey’s assumption that its approach would succeed;
therefore, it should utilise alternative strategies to coercive diplomacy.
KEY WORDS: Coercive diplomacy, Sponsor-states, Non-state armed groups, Turkey
One of the challenges in the post-Cold War era is the emergence of non-
state armed groups. These are organised armed forces with recognised
political goals, acting independently from states or governments. They
might be variously described as guerrillas, militia forces, paramilitary
organisations or self-defence groups, and also as terrorist groups with
political objectives. They have caused significant damage and casualties
over many years.1
In wars against non-state armed groups, armies have to deal with
irregular forces that can retaliate asymmetrically wherever, however and
1
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2007 (London:
Routledge for IISS 2007), 422.
ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/11/040587-32 Ó 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2011.561086
588 Damla Aras
whenever they choose.2 It is difficult to fight against them for several

reasons: their political objectives become more important than their lives
or properties because of their ideological or religious beliefs;3 they may
not have many identifiable assets that can be located and targeted; their
mindsets, goals, motivations and behavioural patterns may be difficult to
ascertain; they can find several ways to exploit international opinion, for
instance by using human shields or pursuing goals which may be popular
with one or more segments of regional or global opinion.4
Combating the non-state armed groups becomes even more difficult
and complex when there is state support behind them. Backing such
groups can be profitable in several ways for the sponsor-states. For

instance, they can use the non-state armed groups as a tool for their foreign
policy, which entails few risks compared to more direct methods of
action, while easily denying any association with these groups when
expedient,5 thus avoiding international punishment. The nature of the
sponsorship can be active when the sponsor-state makes a deliberate
decision to assist a group to use violence, and supports the group in the
form of money, arms, training or sanctuary. Or it can be passive when the
state allows the group to use its territory as a sanctuary, raise money, and
recruit new members, even though it does not directly aid or develop the
capacity to cease its operations.6 Regardless of the degree of the sponsorship,
in both cases the potential of the non-state armed group increases.7
In addition, a sponsor-state can support an organisation as leverage
against its opponents to gain strategic interests by destabilising or
weakening its opponent.8 For instance, Iran, Greece and Syria’s relation-
ship with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are examples of
partnerships arising due to the sponsor-state’s strategic interests.
However, relationships between the sponsor-state and the group are
not based exclusively on strategic concerns. They can be also based on
2
Rob de Wijk, ‘The Limits of Military Power’, Washington Quarterly 25/1 (Winter
2002), 76.
3
Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, ‘Deterring Terrorism, It Can Be Done’,
International Security 30/3 (Winter 2005–06), 92.
4
Alexander George, ‘The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioural
Models of Adversaries’, Comparative Strategy 22/5 (Dec. 2003), 480.
5
Henry Prunckun Jr and Philip Mohr, ‘Military Deterrence of International Terrorism:
An Evaluation of Operation El Dorado Canyon’, Studies in Conflict Terrorism 20/3
(1997), 268.
6
Daniel Byman, ‘Passive Sponsors of Terrorism’, Survival, 47/4 (Winter 2005), 117–18;
Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections, States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York:
Cambridge UP 2005), 10.
7
Prunckun Jr and Mohr, ‘Military Deterrence of International Terrorism: An
Evaluation of Operation El Dorado Canyon’, 268.
8
Byman, Deadly Connections, States that Sponsor Terrorism, 37.
Turkey’s Coercive Diplomacy with Syria and in Northern Iraq 589
ideology, religion or kinship. In other words, the sponsor-state and the

group can have a common factor of identity such as ethnicity,
nationalism, religion or ideology, and these projected factors can create
common aspirations and motives. In the terminology of this research this
is called ‘resonant identity’. In this case, to stop the sponsor-state’s
support becomes very difficult. In this study the nature of the Kurdish
Regional Government’s (KRG) sponsorship for the PKK is used as an
example of the impact of the resonant identity on the outcome of the
coercer’s strategies. However, other case studies can fall in the same
category. For instance, Syria’s support for various Palestinian groups and
Iran’s affinity with Hizballah are examples of a resonant identity. It must

be noted here that the dichotomy between the two types of motivation,
strategic interests and resonant identity, is not clear-cut since there may be
different levels of sponsorship and different motivations. While the sides
share common objectives, the sponsor can also expect some strategic
gains.9 For instance Iran’s support for Hizballah provides Tehran with
ideological and strategic gains both in Lebanon and against Israel.
In a bid to reduce – if not eradicate – the activities of non-state armed
groups, several countries have used coercive diplomacy to put pressure
on their sponsor-states. The logic behind such a strategy has been that
as rational actors, states are not immune to the costs of their actions, or
the potential gains to be realised by stopping their actions. Therefore,
sponsors are likely to respond to coercive diplomacy by decreasing or
terminating their support10 since states are by nature usually less
ideologically motivated than non-state armed groups and they have a
fixed location.11
This study argues that when the resonant identity exists between a
sponsor-state and a non-state armed group, the strategy of coercive
diplomacy towards the sponsor-state is unlikely to succeed in the long-
term. This is not because the bond between the sponsor-state and the
group based on strategic interests is always weaker than the strength of
the bond the resonant identity forms between them, but the latter is
more often particularly strong. This is because the strength of this
motivation may not leave any space for negotiation or the extent of
their demands may not be acceptable to the coercer. It is also possible
that the incentives that the coercer offers may not satisfy the opponent’s
demands. This would mean that there is a direct correlation between
the strength and the asymmetry of their motivation. Under these
9
Ibid., 26–52.
10
Stephen Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes of Sanctions? An
Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya’, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 27/1 (Jan. 2004), 3.
11
Trager and Zagorcheva, ‘Deterring Terrorism, It Can Be Done’, 88, 108.
590 Damla Aras
circumstances, the coercer’s threat to use force, or even its limited use
of force, is unlikely to convince the sponsor-state to comply. The
coercer may be able to force the sponsor-state to ratchet down its
support in the face of unwanted escalation for a while but its
compliance is likely to be for a limited period of time. Therefore, not
only is the asymmetry beyond being a particularly significant factor as
Alexander L. George suggests in his model of coercive diplomacy,12 but
also along with the strength, it determines the outcome of the strategy.
To assess the efficacy of coercive diplomacy under the above-
mentioned circumstances, this study first explains the strategy of
coercive diplomacy. The theoretical section is followed by analyses of

two case studies: Turkey’s execution of coercive diplomacy towards
Syria in 1998 and in northern Iraq which led to the limited use of force
from 2007 onwards. Finding identical conditions in two cases for
comparative study in social sciences is a particularly challenging task.
However, although these two case studies are not identical, they are
quite significant in that, almost uniquely the same coercer, Turkey,
followed similar strategies towards Syria and in northern Iraq resulting
in somewhat dissimilar outcomes. The two somewhat opposite results
deserve also closer examination especially given that a weak
autonomous territory within Iraq has persevered against Turkey’s
coercive diplomacy whereas as a much stronger state, Syria chose to
comply. To this end, these two cases can help us understand the impact
of the different types of motivation on the outcome of coercive
diplomacy. They demonstrate that Ankara’s strategy succeeded
towards Damascus because the Syrian government did not have the
resolve to bear the high cost of its support for the PKK as it did not
represent more than a marginal investment.
In the northern Iraq case, Turkey’s somewhat less than effective
strategy is due to the fact that the quasi-state of the KRG shares similar
ethno-nationalistic aspirations with the PKK. Both claim to act for
Kurdish interests in the region and there is considerable support for the
PKK among Iraqi Kurds. Thus, the shared aspirations and objectives
along with PKK’s popularity at the grass roots level prevent the KRG
from building long-term co-operation with Turkey against the
organisation. The methodology that this study follows is a structured
and focused comparison of two case studies using the parameters set by
George’s model of coercive diplomacy. It concludes with a comparative
analysis of the results which indicates that coercive diplomacy is not an
12
Alexander George and William Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, in Alexander
George and William Simons (eds), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Oxford:
Westview Press 1994), 287.
effective strategy against sponsor-states which share resonant identity

with non-state armed groups.
What is Coercive Diplomacy?

Coercive diplomacy is ‘the attempt to get a target – a state, a group (or
groups) within a state, or a non-state actor – to change its objectionable
behaviour through either the threat to use force or the actual use of
limited force’.13 According to George, it is the employment of ‘threats
of force to persuade an opponent to call off or undo its encroach-
ment’.14 This kind of diplomacy ‘seeks to persuade the adversary to
cease its aggression rather than bludgeon him with military force into
stopping. In coercive diplomacy, one gives the opponent an opportunity
to stop or back off before employing force against it.’15
Coercive diplomacy is alluring to decision-makers because it
represents a diplomatic and political approach more than it does a
military one. It aims to resolve issues without the actual use of force or,
failing that, with a bare minimum of violence or economic cost. To this
end, the coercer uses threats and military preparations in such a
credible fashion that the opponent will be persuaded that it is not a
bluff.16 In this sense, coercive diplomacy is also different from coercive
attempts since the latter withhold benefits from the opponent by means
such as imposing economic sanctions, but do not involve threat or the
use of force.17
Yet, the main feature of the concept of coercive diplomacy is the
possibility that a limited use of force might be necessary if it is to meet
with success. Robert J. Art describes limited force as ‘anything from
one to several steps beyond exemplary use’, but ‘not so much that the
boundary to war has been crossed’.18 In this sense coercive diplomacy
is also different from ‘full-scale use of force’, which aims to defeat
13
Robert Art, ‘Introduction’, in Robert Art and Patrick Cronin (eds), The United States
and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: USIP 2003), 6.
14
Alexander George, ‘Foreword’, in Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive
Diplomacy, vii.
15
Alexander George, ‘The Development of Doctrine and Strategy’, in Alexander
George, David Hall and William Simons (eds), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,
Laos, Cuba and Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), 18.
16
James Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests, Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution 41/1 (1997), 69.
17
Robert Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, in Robert Art and Robert Jervis (eds),
International Politics, Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York:
Pearson Longman 2005), 163.
18
Ibid., 165.
592 Damla Aras
the target, and compliance is sought only after the opponent

is defeated.19
Indeed, once the coercer starts to use full-scale force, it indicates that his
practice of coercive diplomacy has failed. Essentially, coercive diplomacy
remains a political-diplomatic strategy not only because of the limited use
of force envisaged but also because ‘threats or quite limited use of force
are closely coordinated with appropriate diplomatic communications
to the opponent. Important signaling, bargaining, and negotiating
components are built into the strategy of coercive diplomacy’.20
According to the model developed by George, first the coercer needs
to answer four basic questions, since the strategy of coercive diplomacy

is tailored to suit each specific case: (a) what to demand from the
opponent; (b) whether, and how, to create a sense of urgency in the
mind of the opponent; (c) what punishment to employ in the case of
non-compliance, and how to make an opponent perceive the threat as
credible; (d) what reward will be offered in the event of the opponent’s
compliance.21
George asserts that there are different variants of the strategy depending
on the policymaker’s answers to the four questions above: (a) the classic
ultimatum which includes a demand from the opponent, a time limit or
sense of urgency for compliance, and a threat of punishment for
noncompliance; (b) the tacit ultimatum which does not provide a specific
time limit but conveys the urgency for compliance; (c) the ‘gradual turning
of the screw’ strategy which progressively increases the level of punish-
ment for non-compliance; (d) the ‘try and see’ strategy which spreads out
the coercion in time to evaluate the opponent’s reaction.22
George and his associates also mapped out some contextual and
favourable variables that considerably affect the planning, implementa-
tion and outcome of coercive diplomacy.23 The reason George uses the
terms ‘contextual’ and ‘favorable’ is that while many variables may
influence the outcome of diplomacy, some have to do with the content
of the particular version of the implemented strategy and some have to
do with the contextual and circumstantial situation.24 Accordingly,
19
Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A
Challenge for Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press 1998) 14.
20
George, ‘Foreword’, vii.
21
Alexander George, ‘Theory and Practice’, in George and Simons, The Limits of
Coercive Diplomacy, 16.
22
Ibid., 18–19.
23
George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, 270–87; Alexander George, Forceful
Persuasion, Coercive Diplomacy as An Alternative to War (Washington DC: USIP
1991), 69–81.
24
Ibid.
contextual variables are important in the sense that they can help
decisionmakers determine whether or not their case is suitable for the
execution of a strategy of coercive diplomacy.25 They are: the global
strategic environment; the type of provocation; the image of war;
unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy; the isolation of the
adversary. On the other hand, favourable variables are important as
they assist the decisionmakers in the execution of an effective
strategy.26 They are: clarity of objective; strength of motivation;
asymmetry of motivation; sense of urgency; strong leadership; domestic
support; international support; the opponent’s fear of unacceptable
escalation; clarity concerning the precise term of settlement of the crisis.

According to George, not all of these conditions are equally
important, as he points out four factors as particularly significant:
asymmetry of motivation, a sense of urgency, a fear of unacceptable
escalation, and clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the
crisis to assure the opponent that once he complies, the coercer will not
demand further concessions.27
Turkey’s Coercive Diplomacy towards Syria

The Background
Ankara’s increasing frustration with Syria’s harbouring of PKK training
camps and its leader Abdullah Öcalan should be understood against the
backcloth of a fierce counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK in
southeastern Turkey starting from the late 1970s. As a result of
increasing military pressure after the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, when
the PKK leadership decided to flee abroad, Öcalan chose Syria for
himself and his organisation. Paradoxically, the Syrian government,
which suppressed its own Kurdish people – roughly 10 per cent of its
population – and allowed them no cultural rights, welcomed the
organisation.28 Damascus’ welcome was due to several reasons:
initially Syria’s support was because of the Syrian–Russian alliance.
25
Jakobsen, ‘The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-
Cold War Realities’, 68.
26
Ibid.
27
George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, 287; Jakobsen, Western Use of
Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, 1–49; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘The Strategy of
Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities’, in
Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases (Oxford: OUP
1998), 61–85.
28
Robert Lowe, ‘The Syrian Kurds: A People Discovered’, Chatham House Briefing
Paper (Jan. 2006) 2.
594 Damla Aras
The PKK’s appearance on the scene in the late 1970s coincided with the
deterioration of the balance of power between the US and the
Soviet Union, which had been in the favour of the Americans in the
Middle East.29 In the 1980s, the Soviets funded the PKK, much
as they had supported other Marxist organisations in the Middle East
in order to gain an advantage over the US. In fact, trials of captured
PKK members in Turkey made Syrian and Soviet support for the
organisation public knowledge.30 As an important ally of the Soviets in
the region, Syria continued to back the PKK.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PKK became a trump card
in Syria’s hands against the perceived threat from Turkey. This threat
revolved around Turkey’s potential leadership in the region with the
completion of the Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP), its alliance
with the US and its growing ties with Israel, as well as the conflicts over
the sharing of water resources and Syria’s claims over Hatay.31
Turkey considered Damascus the PKK’s main external supporter and
lifeline: thus, cutting off Syria’s nourishment for Öcalan and the PKK
appeared increasingly imperative in Ankara. Starting from the early
1980s, Ankara put pressure on Damascus to stop supporting the PKK
and adopted a range of approaches to the problem, none of which met
with success. In 1987, Prime Minister Turgut Özal signed a security
protocol with Damascus in which Syria agreed to end its support for
the PKK.32 However, this attempt resulted in only a temporary assuaging
of differences. The Syrians did not even admit that Öcalan was in the
country as they sent him temporarily to the Bekaa Valley. The
headquarters of the PKK remained in Syria and Damascus continued to
tolerate and assist the PKK on its territory.33
In March 1992, the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel attacked
Syria openly, saying that it was unacceptable for Syria to give the PKK
permission to have bases in the Bekaa Valley and that Turkey was
running out of patience.34 Consequently, Ankara and Damascus signed
another accord which stated that the Syrian side would close down the
29
Fikret Bila, Hangi PKK? (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık 2004) 29.
30
Michael Gunter, ‘The Kurdish Problem in Turkey’, Middle East Journal 42/3
(Summer 1988), 401.
31
Ersel Aydınlı and Ümit Özdag, ‘Winning a Low Intensity Conflict: Drawing Lessons
from the Turkish Case’, Review of International Affairs 2 (2003), 105.
32
Gün Kut, ‘Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and Tigris’, New
Perspectives on Turkey 9/3 (Fall 1993), 8–9.
33
Süha Bölükbaşı, ‘Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad and the Regionalization of Turkey’s
Kurdish Secessionism’, Journal of South and Middle Eastern Studies 14/4 (Summer
1991), 25.
34 _ _
Ismet Imset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973–1992)
(Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications 1992), 176.
camp immediately in return for Turkish cooperation on water. Syria

agreed to control its borders more effectively, extradite Öcalan and
stop sheltering PKK militants.35 Although, initially, the agreement
bore fruit and the Helwe camp was closed,36 in the long term, no
change in Syrian policy took place.
Similarly, in 1996 Turkey implemented another coercive diplomacy
effort to end Syrian support. Ankara sent a note verbale to Damascus
which called the latter to stop its support for the PKK on 23 January
1996.37 The note also reiterated Turkey’s right to self-defence and
referred to article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which underlines
‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed

attack occurs against a member of the United Nations’. Meanwhile, it
also reinforced the Army’s presence on the Syrian border to underline
its seriousness.38 However, Asad did not even respond to the note
verbale. Turkey’s second attempt at coercive diplomacy was halted
when a dispute erupted unexpectedly between Greece and Turkey over
the sovereignty rights of an uninhabited islet called Kardak in the
Aegean Sea in January 1996.39 Consequently, Turkey’s second coercion
attempt also failed.
As a result of increasing PKK attacks, in the late 1990s Ankara
started to consider the use of force against Syria. This consideration
was brought to the agenda for the first time during the National
Security Council (NSC) meeting in July 1998. The timing depended on
at least three reasons: first, by 1998, Turkey faced several challenges in
its domestic and foreign policy due to PKK activities. Domestically, it
was experiencing a mounting death toll as a consequence of the PKK
campaign, and was obliged to allocate ever-increasing military and
economic resources to the struggle. Both Turkey’s public and its
political establishment were discomforted and frustrated by the
increase in violence, by the ‘dirty war’ that groups and agencies within
the government appeared to be employing – as evidenced by the
November 1996 Susurluk scandal that involved a car accident in which
state and underworld figures were found to be travelling together – and
by the impact the struggle was having on Turkey’s external relations.40
35 _
Author’s interview with former Interior Minister Ismet Sezgin, 20 Feb. 2006.
36
Ibid.; the interviewee spoke on condition of anonymity.
37
Author’s interview with former Deputy Undersecretary Ambassador Gündüz Aktan,
_
4 Jan. 2006; Murat Yetkin, Kürt Kapanı, Şam’dan Imralı’ya _
Öcalan (Istanbul: Remzi
Kitabevi 2004), 38–40.
38
Author’s interview with Aktan.
39
Ibid.
40
Nicole Pope, ‘War on the Underworld?’, Middle East International (MEI), 18 Sept.
1998, 12; Nicole Pope, ‘Outlawing Dissent’, MEI, 2 Oct. 1998, 12.
596 Damla Aras
Russia, Syria and Iran exploited the PKK card in their relationships
with Ankara, while Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership bid
was undermined by European disapproval of Ankara’s approach to its
Kurdish problem.
Second, despite internal and external problems, Turkey’s strong
relationship with the US and its fast developing rapprochement with
Israel could facilitate Turkey’s efforts to stop Syria’s support for the
PKK. The alliance with Washington was going through one of its
periodic honeymoon periods, as the two countries were cooperating in
a wide range of areas from Kosovo in the Balkans to the energy
pipelines in Central Asia. Furthermore there was, crucially, a

concordance between US and Turkish views towards Damascus. The
US was also obliged to take into account that, in the event of an
eventual US-led strike against Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
program, the Clinton administration would seek Ankara’s collabora-
tion. Indeed, several high-ranking American officials had already visited
Turkey to discuss the prospects for Turkey’s support.41
In addition, Turkey considered that it could finally benefit from its
rapprochement with Israel. Despite the official Turkish rhetoric that
forming an alliance with Israel was not an attempt to strengthen itself
against a third country, Turkey did need a regional ally to fight against
the PKK and countries that supported the organisation, especially
Syria.42 The Turkish military hoped that by establishing close ties with
Israel, it could benefit from Israeli intelligence, such as Israel’s agent
network in Syria, as well as satellite imagery, which the US shared with
Israel.43 And moreover, Turkey’s close relationship with Israel could
augment Syria’s sense of encirclement.44
Third, Turkey saw the challenges Syria was facing in its domestic and
foreign politics as an opportunity for an intense Turkish diplomatic and
military offensive. According to Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz it was
‘the weakest conjuncture in Syria’s history of diplomacy and in
international relations’.45 In domestic politics, Hafiz al-Asad’s primary
concern in the 1990s was the continuation of his family’s rule after his
death. After the death in a 1994 car accident of his eldest son Basil, who
41
‘US-Turkish convergence on Iraq hinges on Kurdish refugee question’, Turkish Daily
News (TDN), 7 Feb. 1998; ‘Washington pressures Ankara on Iraqi crisis’, TDN, 5 Feb.
1998; ‘Vice Admiral in Ankara’, Anadolu Agency, 5 Feb. 1998.
42
Robert Olson, Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991–2000
(California: Mazda Publishers 2001), 149–50.
43
‘Turkey eyes the Middle East’, Strategic Comments 10/6 (2004).
44
Andrew Rathmell, ‘The Encirclement of Syria’, MEI, 10 May 1996, 19; Donald Neff,
‘Money – the Great Lubricant’, MEI, 24 April 1998, 8.
45
Author’s interview with former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, 22 Feb. 2006.
was expected to be his successor, Asad – who was also suffering from a
variety of illnesses, including cancer, diabetes, asthma, and kidney
disease – concentrated on creating a strong base for his other son
Bashar’s future presidency by achieving social and economic stability at
home and a foreign policy as problem-free as possible.46
In addition to Asad’s concerns on securing the future of his family’s
leadership in Syria, he was also aware of the country’s weak economy.
The drop in oil prices hurt Syria’s fragile economy since oil comprised
two thirds of its exports. Moreover, the assistance that the Damascus
government received from the Gulf states and Russia decreased
significantly.
Besides, Syria’s disputes with its neighbours, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq
caused border closures, upsetting its economy further.47 In foreign
policy, Syria was also facing difficulties. Syria no longer had Soviet
backing and it was pushed into isolation by other Arab states because
of contrasting ideologies, religious disparities, conflicting foreign
policies and rivalry for the leadership in the region. Also, its close
ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran did not help Damascus improve
its relations with the others to any extent.48
The Turkish–Syrian Crisis of 1998

The final straw that led to the Turkish consideration of the use of force
was Syria’s complete disregard of the ‘Declaration of Principles’ given
to Syrian Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Adnan Omran during his visit
to Ankara on 1 June 1998.49 The declaration explained Turkey’s
demands for the development of relations based on the principles
of ‘good neighbourhood’.50 Although Omran had declared that the
PKK ‘was a terrorist and separatist organisation; Syria was against the
46
Interview with Syrian journalist Husni Mahalli, 13 Jan. 2006; Eyal Zisser, Asad’s
Legacy, Syria in Transition (London: Hurst 2001), 118, 153–4; Eyal Zisser, ‘Clues to
the Syrian Puzzle’, Washington Quarterly 23/2 (2000), 82.
47
Zisser, ‘Clues to the Syrian Puzzle’, 85, 88; Volker Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-
Asad: Modernisation and the Limits of Change, Adelphi Paper 366 (New York: OUP
2004), 38–9.
48
Hisham Melhem, ‘Syria between Two Transitions’, Middle East Report, 203 (Spring
1997), 3; Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnesbusch, Syria and Iran: Middle
Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (Routledge: London 1997) 112–3; Shireen
Hunter, ‘Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance’, in Hooshang Amirahmadi
and Nader Entessar (eds), Iran and the Arab World (London: Macmillan 1993), 198–
213.
49
‘Adnan Omran visited Korkmaz Haktanır’, TDN, 31 June 1998.
50
Oktay Ekşi, ‘Bir bela ki düşman başına . . . ’, Hürriyet, 3 Oct. 1998.
598 Damla Aras
PKK [and] Apo was not in Damascus’ during his visit,51 Turkey did not
receive any written reply from Syria.
Failing to resolve the issue through diplomatic channels, Turkey
turned its face to other possible alternatives, threatening Syria with the
use of force. Following the July 1998 NSC meeting, in August 1998
Chief of Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıko glu approved newly appointed
Commander of Land Forces General Atilla Ateş’ first visit to the troops
stationed on the Syrian border, and his speech in Hatay outlined
Turkey’s determination to put an end to Syria’s support for the PKK, by
military means if necessary. In doing so the Turkish General Staff
(TGS) aimed to gain the attention of domestic and foreign opinion and
emphasise the seriousness of the situation.52
However, the real escalation of the crisis began with President
Demirel’s speech during the inauguration of the Turkish National
Assembly’s (TNA) new legislative session on 1 October 1998. He said,
‘as a matter of fact, Syria has been following a hostile policy against
Turkey. It has continued to provide active support for the PKK terror
organisation. I declare once more to the whole world that our patience
is running out; we retain the right to counter Syria, which has not given
up its hostile approach despite all our warnings and peaceful
attempts.’53 His statements drew domestic and foreign attention to
the seriousness of the situation. Turkey seemed to have embarked on an
irreversible course in publicly committing itself to resolve its differences
with Damascus by force if necessary. The impact of Demirel’s words
was magnified by General Kıvrıko glu at the TNA opening reception
that same evening, when he declared there to be an ‘undeclared war
between Turkey and Syria’, and by Yılmaz’s subsequent announcement
‘the military was waiting for the order’.54
Ankara further added to the credibility of its threats by inviting crews
from the television station NTV to the Syrian border to film what
appeared to be a mobilisation for war. In fact Turkey’s armed forces
(TAF) were engaged in preparations for the ongoing NATO ‘Dynamic
_
98’ manoeuvres in Iskenderun. Ankara had thereby deliberately
encouraged the impression that Turkish forces were readying for an
51 _
Emin Çölaşan, ‘Işte böyle bir Türkiye!’, Hürriyet, 4 July 1998.
52
Interview with former Commander of Land Forces General Atilla Ateş, 24 Feb. 2006;
‘Suriye’ye Uyarı’, Milliyet, 17 Sept. 1998.
53
Turkish National Assembly Minutes Journal, 62, 1 Oct. 1998; ‘Sabrımız taşıyor’,
Milliyet, 2 Oct. 1998.
54
Stephen Kinzer, ‘Turkey’s ties to Syria to sink to war in all but the name’, New York
Times, 4 Oct. 1998; Ertugrul Özkök, ‘Asker emir bekliyor’, Hürriyet, 3 Oct. 1998.
attack against Syria.55 In addition, following the NATO exercises,

Turkey announced that it was going to organise an independent
manoeuvre at the Syrian border between 7 and 9 November, as a
further attempt to intimidate Damascus. On top of all this, Turkey also
declared that ‘Reliant Mermaid II’ exercises would be held with the
participation of Israel, the US and Jordan in October 1998.56
In domestic politics, there was a large measure of support from the
nation and a rare display of unity among all the political parties in
parliament supporting Ankara’s reasons for coercing Damascus. All
parliamentary political parties agreed on a declaration calling on Syria
to end its support for the PKK or be ready to ‘bear the consequences’.57
Ankara was also acutely aware of the need to gain the

understanding of the international community for the threatening
posture it was adopting towards Syria. Thus, Ankara embarked on a
frenzied diplomatic offensive in the international arena, including
bodies such as the Arab League, NATO, European Union, the
United Nations, and the Organisation of Islamic Countries.58
However, despite the intensity of its diplomatic efforts, Turkey
received little positive diplomatic support for its position.59 The
support that Ankara expected came from Washington. The US had
long classified the PKK as a terrorist organisation, a position it
reiterated as the crisis erupted. It also demanded that Syria cease to
function as a safe haven for terrorists.60
55
Interviewees speak on condition of anonymity; ‘Suriye sınırına yı gınak’, Hürriyet, 1
Oct. 1998; Ertugrul Özkök, ‘Asker emir bekliyor’, Hürriyet, 3 Oct. 1998.
56 _
‘Hüsnü Mübarek arabulucu’, Radikal, 4 Oct. 1998; ‘Israil ile ortak kara tatbikatı’,
Hürriyet, 6 Jan. 1998.
57
Turkish National Assembly Minutes Journal, 63, 7 Oct. 1998; ‘Savaş yetkisi
isteyebiliriz’, Sabah, 8 Oct. 1998; ‘Meclis tek vücut’, Zaman, 8 Oct. 1998; ‘Egypt’s
diplomatic move’, TDN, 8 Oct. 1998.
58
Interview with Turkey’s former permanent representative to NATO in Brussels
Ambassador Onur Öymen, 26 March 2007; ‘Turkish–Syrian Tension conveys her
resolution about the Syrian issue to Annan, the UN Secretary General’, Anadolu Agency,
14 Oct. 1998; Minutes of UN General Assembly, A/C.1/53/PV.5, 5http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N98/860/71/pdf/N9886071.pdf?OpenElement4; ‘Secretary-
General meets with Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Arab League to discuss efforts to
defuse tension between Turkey and Syria’, UN Press Release, SG/SM/6742, 13 Oct. 1998,
5www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981013.sgsm6742. html4.
59
Interview with Öymen.
60
Interviews with former Ambassador of the US to Turkey Mark Parris, 6 Oct. 2006,
and the former US Ambassador to Turkey between 1994 and 1997 and Deputy
Secretary of State at the time of the crisis, Marc Grossman, 20 Oct. 2006; Nihat Ali
_
Özcan, PKK Tarihi, Ideolojisi ve Yöntemi (Ankara: ASAM 1999), 319.
600 Damla Aras
However, the American administration had mixed feelings about

Turkey’s attempt at coercive diplomacy.61 The US was hoping for a
positive result from the ongoing high-level Middle East peace talks, for
which Asad’s cooperation would be essential. Washington was also
convinced that bilateral relations with Syria could ultimately be
improved, notwithstanding the existence of disagreements between
the two states.62 Thus, when Washington was informed of the eruption
of the crisis by the American Embassy in Ankara, it neither gave a green
nor an explicit red light to a strategy which had the potential to end in
armed conflict. As the US did not especially relish the prospect of a
Syrian defeat at Turkey’s hands,63 it sought to defuse the crisis. In
public Washington sided with Ankara while advising the parties to seek
a diplomatic solution. The Clinton government advised the Turks not
to act precipitously, and sent a warning letter to Syria urging them
to expel Öcalan from the country in order to defuse the crisis.
Washington additionally requested regional allies to mediate in the
crisis. Thus encouraged, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak enthusias-
tically took up the challenge with an intense round of shuttle diplomacy
between Turkey and Syria.64 It must be noted here that President
Demirel played the key role in convincing the Egyptian President during
his visit to Ankara about Turkey’s resolve to use force if necessary. In
this sense Demirel, for his strong and skilful leadership, and Mubarak,
for convincing Asad of Turkey’s determination to use force, deserve
much of the credit. Tehran also acted as a facilitator between the two
countries, and it was Tehran that broke the news to Ankara that
Damascus was ready to comply with Turkey’s demands.
Throughout the crisis, Ankara accompanied its threats with
inducements underlining Turkey’s determination to develop its
relations with Damascus in the event of Syria’s compliance.65 Indeed,
Ankara’s promise of better relations with Damascus played a role in
Syria’s compliance. As explained elsewhere, Asad was facing several
domestic and international problems as well as poor health.66 Therefore,
it was in Asad’s interest to develop political and economic relations with
61
Interview with Parris.
62
Ibid.; David Butter, ‘Syria turns over a new leaf’, Middle East Economic Digest, 5
Sept. 1997, 5.
63
Interviews with Parris and Grossman; Harun Kazaz, ‘US suggests caution on the
Turkey-Syria front’, TDN, 4 Oct. 1998.
64
Ibid; the interviewee spoke on condition of anonymity.
65
‘Suriye’den geri adım’, Radikal, 3 Oct. 1998.
66
Interview with Mahalli; Zisser, Asad’s Legacy, Syria in Transition, 118, 153–4;
Zisser, ‘Clues to the Syrian Puzzle’, 82–8; Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad:
Modernisation and the Limits of Change, 38–9.
Ankara. After all, the PKK was a mere lever for Syria’s strategic interests.
Given the difficult circumstances that Asad faced domestically, inter-
nationally and personally, the PKK was dispensable and was not worth
getting into a war over.
In the event, the crisis proved remarkably short-lived. Öcalan
departed Syria on 9 October, and Syria declared its readiness to
commence unconditional talks with Turkey. These began on 19
October. Two days later, the Turkish and Syrian delegations signed
the Adana Accord. It stated that the PKK was a terrorist organisation,
that its camps in the Bekaa Valley would be closed and that Öcalan
would never again be permitted to enter Syria. It also established a

mechanism to monitor Syria’s compliance with the agreement.
Turkey’s coercive diplomacy towards Syria had put an end to
Damascus’ support for the organisation, decreased PKK terrorism
significantly, and facilitated Öcalan’s capture with the help of the CIA
in Nairobi, Kenya in February 1999. Thereafter, there have been
significant improvements in Turkish-Syrian relations.
Turkey’s Limited Use of Force in Northern Iraq

The Background
Although the emergence of the PKK has been a recent development in
contemporary Turkish history, the origins of the Kurdish issue are
rooted in the Ottoman period. At the end of World War I, the Treaty of
Sevres of 1920 envisaged a Kurdish state in eastern Anatolia. However,
it was never recognised by the new Turkish parliament and was
superseded by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which defined the borders
of the new republic. As a result, the independent Kurdish state was not
carved out. Yet the suspicion of its possible establishment in the future
has dominated the Turkish consciousness and decisionmakers’
approach towards the Kurdish issue.67 Fearing the revival of Kurdish
nationalism, Turkey exerted efforts within its borders and beyond by
collaborating with Syria, Iran and Iraq – all three of which have
significant Kurdish populations – in order to suppress it in the region.
Although Turkey successfully contained the Kurdish issue for a few
decades, internal and international developments aggravated the
continuation of this policy. In domestic politics, the PKK emerged in
the late 1970s claiming a monopoly over the expression of Kurdish
nationalist sentiment and attempts to establish an independent state for
67 _
Kemal Kirişci and Gareth Winrow, Kürt Sorunu, Kökeni ve Gelişimi (Istanbul: Tarih
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları 2002), 48–9, 51.
602 Damla Aras
Kurds on Turkish soil.68 In foreign policy, the Gulf War started in

1991. The PKK capitalised on the safe haven created by Operation
‘Provide Comfort’ (OPC) in April 1991, a policy designed to protect the
Kurds in northern Iraq through Western humanitarian and military aid.
It built new camps in the territory, captured the arms left behind by the
Iraqi military and grew stronger.
Under the protection of OPC, the two main Kurdish groups in
northern Iraq, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) also gained strength as they formed the
KRG. By 1992, it acquired its own flag, established a police force,
security and intelligence services, formed a bank and postal service,

started issuing passports and held elections for an assembly in May
1992.69 Externally, the KDP and PUK denied that they wanted to
establish an independent Kurdish state and declared their willingness to
be part of a federal Iraq. For Turkey, however, these developments
meant the revival of the Sevres Treaty of 1920: the establishment of an
independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which might eventually
annex the southeastern part of Turkey that had already become the
battleground between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces (TAF).
Therefore, in the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy towards Kurdish
nationalism aimed at two objectives. The first one was the eradication
of the PKK. To this end, while armed clashes continued in southeastern
Anatolia, Turkey also carried out military campaigns against the
organisation in the form of more than 20 cross-border operations into
northern Iraq. The second objective was to prevent the Kurds forming
an independent state in northern Iraq. To keep the region in check,
Ankara established relations with the KDP and PUK. At times Ankara
even collaborated with them to fight alongside Turkish troops against
the PKK, as in the case of the KDP in the mid-1990s.70
In the 1990s, Turkey’s strategy seemed to be working. When PKK
activities were decreased significantly and Öcalan was captured in 1999
as a result of Turkey’s successful strategy towards Syria in October
1998, many in Ankara believed that the PKK was now a largely spent
force, and that the threat of Kurdish separatism had receded. Although
68
‘Kurdish Militancy in Turkey’, Strategic Comments, 11/5 (July 2005).
69
Michael Gunter, ‘The Foreign Policy of the Iraqi Kurds’, Journal of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Studies 20/3 (Spring 1997), 9; Michael Gunter, ‘The Iraqi National
Congress (INC) and the Future of the Iraqi Opposition’, Journal of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Studies, 19/3 (Spring 1996), 3.
70
Bill Park, Turkey’s Policy towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Prospects, Adelphi
Paper 374 (London: IISS 2005); Asa Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey’s
Kurdish Policy (London: I.B. Tauris 2007); Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish
Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London: Hurst 2003), 312–42.
Ankara suspected that developments such as the signing of Washington

Protocol on 17 September 1998 – a US initiative which declared peace
between the KDP and the PUK – would lead to the effective
disintegration of Iraq, it believed that the Kurdish leadership could not
actualise its aspirations as long as Saddam Hussein was in power in Iraq.
However, the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq changed the
power balance in the region. The Turkish Parliament’s 1 March 2003
vote against US troops using Turkish territory to conduct military
operations in Iraq led to Washington establishing a close political and
security relationship with the KRG in order to maintain security in the
region. In effect, the KRG in Erbil partnered with the US as the primary
security actors in northern Iraq. Thus, Turkey found itself dependent
on Iraq’s Kurds and on US forces to curtail the activities of PKK
members who are based in the Qandil mountains on Iraq’s border with
Iran, have forward bases and ammunition hideouts along the
mountainous Turkish border and whose attacks inside Turkey rocketed
to 1,501 after the invasion in 2003.71
Ankara claimed that the PKK’s revival was due to the KRG’s
support. TGS Chief General Yaşar Büyükanıt voiced these concerns
during a visit to Washington. He accused the two Kurdish groups
(KDP and PUK) of providing full support for the PKK.72 Following
Büyükanıt’s statement, an official report to reinforce his accusations
against the KRG was prepared. It included information such as the
locations of six active PKK camps in the territory, photographs of PKK
leaders Cemil Bayık and Murat Karayılan in a hotel and restaurant in
Erbil, and a one-hour interview with Karayılan on Masoud Barzani-
controlled Kurdish TV on 22 October 2006.73 According to another
TAF report, which was leaked in the Turkish media, the PKK, was
operating in northern Iraq without any obstacles or difficulties, getting
stronger and integrating with the local powers (referring to the KDP
and PUK). It also claimed that the organisation was procuring 100
percent of its logistical and training needs in the territory, and that the
KDP and PUK recruited 1,700 ex-PKK members for their armies
instead of surrendering at least some of them to Turkey.74 Meanwhile,
increasing PKK attacks launched from northern Iraq, such as the killing
of 33 Turkish soldiers in May 2007 and 15 soldiers in two PKK attacks
in early October outraged the Turkish officials further since they
71 _
Ümit Özdag, Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları, 1984–2007 (Istanbul: Pegasus
2007) 145, 159–62.
72
Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, ‘Baş destekçi Talabani ve Barzani’, Sabah, 17 Feb. 2007.
73
‘PKK ile ilişkileri rapora girdi’, Samanyolu Haber, 1 March 2007; ‘Barzani’ye kanıt
tokatı’, Aydın Ses, 1 March 2007.
74
‘Genel Kurmay’ın Irak sıkıntısı’, Milliyet, 25 June 2007.
604 Damla Aras
believed that had the KRG not provided logistics, sanctuary and
ammunition to the PKK, these attacks would have never taken place.75
The tension caused by the PKK problem has been augmented by
Ankara’s tendency to conflate this issue and Iraqi Kurdish aspirations to
incorporate Kirkuk into the KRG. Ankara considered Kurdish efforts to
include the oil-rich Kirkuk region into their self-governing KRG zone a
step towards an independent Kurdistan. From Ankara’s perspective, an
enlarged and oil-rich Iraqi Kurdish entity could attract Turkey’s Kurds.
Turkey’s thesis about Kurdish aspirations seemed to be justified when the
peshmergas (Kurdish militias) entered Kirkuk in April 2003, causing
Ankara to decide to send military observers to the territory.76 Furthermore,
Barzani’s statements aggravated Turkish suspicions when he said that in the

event of intervention in Kirkuk in support of Turkmens, Iraqi Kurds would
take similar action for Kurds in Turkey, and declaring that independence
was a right for Kurds who lived in Turkey, Iraq and Syria.77
Increased PKK activities and the KRG’s defiant stance after the
March 2003 invasion created strong domestic support for, but at the
same time pressure on, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (JDP)
government. On one hand, it could not afford to be outflanked by their
nationalistic electoral rivals who would accuse it of not being
nationalist if it did not tackle the PKK issue and did not use force
when required. This was also an issue that the JDP itself could claim
illustrated its dedication to nationalism to other parties as well as to the
general population. On the other, it had to take the feelings of the
politically powerful TGS into account78 so the TGS could not use this
as an excuse to criticise the JDP and take matters into its own hands.
Furthermore, it faced electoral competition with the Kurdish Demo-
cratic Society Party (DTP) in the country’s southeast. Consequently,
Ankara’s oft-repeated threats that Ankara’s patience was wearing thin,
and that Turkey reserved the right to act unilaterally were accompanied
by military measures;79 once, Büyükanıt even asserted that a cross-
border operation into Iraq was ‘necessary and would be useful’.80
75
‘PKK uses northern Iraq as arsenal, says official report’, Today’s Zaman, 17 Sept.
2007.
76
‘Kirkuk falls to Kurds, Turkey mobilised’, Turks.US, Daily World EU News, 10
April 2003, 5www.turks.us/article.php?story¼200304101223001484.
77
‘Barzani’den Kürt tehdidi’, NTV, 12 April 2007, 5www.NTVMSNB.com/news/
404921.asp4.
78
Mustafa Kibaro glu, ‘The CHP’s role in pushing Turkey toward a cross-border
operation’, Terrorism Focus 4(24), 24 July 2007, 5www.jamestown.org4.
79
‘Top general calls for a cross-border operation to northern Iraq’, TDN, 13 April
2007.
80
Ibid.
The major reason behind the JDP’s hesitation at starting a military

campaign in northern Iraq was its unwillingness to clash with its ally,
the US. Already swamped in turmoil in Iraq, Washington was unwilling
to upset its Kurdish partners and the fragile balance in the relatively
peaceful Kurdish territory. Further it argued that pursuing the PKK in
northern Iraq’s inhospitable and inaccessible mountains would be
costly and time-consuming, that Ankara needed to adopt a political
rather than a military approach to its Kurdish problem and that Iraqi
Kurds would militarily resist any Turkish invasion of their territory.
Frustrated with not being able to receive the assistance it expected
from the US, Turkey planned to put pressure on Washington and

Baghdad to force Erbil to resolve the PKK problem in northern Iraq
since the KRG is part of federal Iraq and the US was the main invader
in the country. Thus, it initiated successive military engagements and
démarches. It deployed a 30,000-strong force along Iraq’s border in
June 2007.81 This action succeeded in mobilising Washington and
Baghdad and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between
Turkey and Iraq in August 2007.82 Then, the Turkish government
requested the TNA to authorise the deployment of the military option
in northern Iraq on 17 October 2007 which demonstrated Ankara’s
determination and the urgency of the situation.83 The motion proved to
be useful, since almost as soon as the vote was taken Washington
openly recognised that Iraq’s Kurds might indeed have the capacity and
should exercise the will to exert influence on PKK members based in
their territory.84
Concurrent with the Turkish parliament’s decision for cross-border
military operations, Ankara applied further pressure on Iraq so that it
persuaded Erbil to comply with its demands. In October 2007 Foreign
Minister Ali Babacan visited Baghdad and handed an ultimatum to be
delivered to the KRG. Turkey was making clear its exact demands on
the Barzani government: close PKK camps in northern Iraq; prevent
PKK activities and its movements; stop the logistical support and use of
northern Iraq as a sanctuary; and surrender the PKK leadership to
Turkey. Despite the promises he was given in Baghdad, later Babacan
emphasised his disappointment by declaring that the administration in
the north (referring to the KRG) had not taken any action to gain
Turkey’s trust, not even one step against the PKK.85
81
‘Buffer zone in northern Iraq’, TDN, 15 June 2007.
82
For the text see 5www.mfa.gov.tr4.
83
‘Turkey requests authority to attack’, Washington Post, 16 Oct. 2007.
84
‘US finally admits Kurdish influence on PKK’, TDN, 19 Oct. 2007.
85
‘Babacan’dan Barzani’ye sert eleştiriler: PKK’ya karşı bir adım atılmadı’, Milliyet, 27
Nov. 2007.
606 Damla Aras
Turkey’s pressure on the US and Iraq produced a positive result since

Washington gave the green light to intensified Turkish military steps
against the PKK in northern Iraq during Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdo gan’s 5 November meeting with President George W. Bush. In
return for Turkish patience for not taking any action without American
approval, an agreement was made for the US to provide Turkey with
limited real time intelligence on PKK movements and bases in northern
Iraq and indeed in southeastern Anatolia. Bush also pledged increased
contact between the TGS, the Department of Defense, and General
David Petraeus’ command in Iraq to track PKK movements.86
Consequently, US provision of actionable intelligence reduced the

required size of a Turkish ground force intervening in northern Iraq and
also ensured less collateral damage to civilian targets.
Turkey also found widespread support at the international level.
Turkey’s successful regional campaign to convince its neighbours of the
dangers of Iraqi Kurdish independence before the March 2003 invasion
spilt over into sympathy for Ankara’s struggle with the PKK. Syrian and
Iranian sympathy was most crucial. Tehran and Damascus’s sympathy
towards Turkey was not due to altruistic reasons. First, at a time when
Turkish–American relations were experiencing some problems, Iran
and Syria probably considered this an opportunity to strengthen their
relationship with the JDP government.87 Second, as explained
previously these three countries have cooperated against the revival
of the Kurdish nationalism and formation of a Kurdish state since the
Sadabad Pact of 1937 because each has significant Kurdish population.
To this end, Syrian support was especially significant,88 while Ankara
and Tehran agreed on joint Turkish–Iranian efforts and intelligence
sharing with respect to non-Iraqi Kurdish factions in northern Iraq –
which is not surprising given the close relationship between the PKK
and PJEK, the Iranian-Kurdish Free Life Party of Kurdistan.89 Even
NATO and the EU expressed understanding of Turkey’s position,
condemned PKK terrorism, and confined their remarks to a plea for
Ankara to exercise restraint. Many of Iraq’s factions have also been
86
Lale Sarıibrahimoglu, ‘US works with Turkey to counter PKK in Iraq’, Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 14 Nov. 2007; Former Turkish Ambassador Şükrü Elekda g’s interview in
CNNTurk programme, 5 Nov. 2008.
87
Emrullah Uslu, ‘Can Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Cooperation with Iran Lead to a
Strategic Partnership?’, Terrorism Focus, 24 June 2008, 5www.jamestown.org/single/
?no_cache¼ 1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D¼50124.
88
‘Syrian president expresses support for incursion into Northern Iraq’, Today’s
Zaman, 18 Oct. 2007; Sami Moubayed, ‘Iran and Turkey fire salvo over Iraq’, Asian
Times Online, 13 May 2006, 5www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HE13Ak034.
89
‘Meeting hits nail on the head’, TDN, 5 Nov. 2005.
sympathetic to Ankara’s plight with respect to the PKK since they believe
the use of Iraqi territory to destabilise a neighbour is not in Iraq’s interest
and Kurdish aspirations can be a threat to Iraq’s integrity.
Turkey’s Use of Limited Force in Northern Iraq

Finally with the US’s agreement, Ankara initiated the use of limited
force in northern Iraq. On 16 December 2007, Turkish F-16 jets began
a bombing campaign against alleged PKK targets in northern Iraq. The
Iraqi authorities somewhat unconvincingly professed outrage as it
became evident that Washington had turned a blind eye to this

violation of Iraqi airspace.90 The raids extended around 100 kilometres
inside Iraqi territory and were accompanied by limited commando raids
across the border. This was followed on 21 February 2008 by an eight-
day ground troop incursion.91 There have subsequently been additional
F-16 bombing raids and cross-border shelling.
As the raids carried on in northern Iraq, Turkey also used the
incentive of improving bilateral trade relations to convince the KRG of
the need for cooperation against the PKK. To this end, Turkish
President Abdullah Gül stated that if the PKK was eliminated, Turkey’s
assistance to Iraq, including northern Iraq, would increase tenfold.92
Such an attempt was not surprising since Ankara and Erbil have been
enjoying a mutually advantageous trade relationship. Turkey is the
main outlet for northern Iraqi trade, and the most important supplier of
essentials. Furthermore, Turkish companies are also involved in the
energy business of northern Iraq, and are also responsible for around
80 per cent of construction projects in the KRG zone. On the other
hand, a frustrated and suspicious Turkey has the capacity to undermine
northern Iraq’s economic and political stability.
In addition to the risk of losing its profitable trade with Turkey, the
KRG has also had concerns about the security of the Iraqi Kurds. For
instance, some media reports claimed that several villagers fled from
their homes near the Qandil mountains and the Turkish border due to
the Turkish air strikes.93 Since the KRG does not have anything
approaching military parity with Turkey, the most it can do is to
90
‘US helps Turkey hit rebel Kurds in Iraq’, Washington Post, 18 Dec. 2007.
91
Gareth Jenkins, ‘A military analysis of Turkey’s incursion into northern Iraq’, Terrorism
Monitor 6/5 (7 March 2008), 5www.jamestown.org4.
92
‘Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Gül: ‘‘PKK aradan çıkarılırsa kuzeyi de dahil Irak’a
yardımımız 10 katına çıkar’’’, Ajans a Peyamner, 8 Jan. 2008.
93
Yahya Ahmed, ‘Iraqi Kurds back PKK despite being displaced by recent fighting’,
Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 22 April 2008; ‘Savaş uçakları FKB hava sahasını
ihlal ederek bazı köyleri bombardıman etti’, Ajans a Peyamner, 11 May 2008.
608 Damla Aras
preserve its people from any collateral damage that Turkish forces
might cause. Consequently, faced on the one hand with economic and
security concerns, and on the other hand increasing US pressure on
Erbil to take steps to decrease the tension with Ankara,94 the different
points of view within the Kurdish leadership notwithstanding, the
tendency tilted towards using moderate language towards Turkey. For
instance, KRG President Masoud Barzani progressively toned down his
language. He was even supportive of Iraq President Jalal Talabani’s
visit to Ankara in March 2008.95 More concretely, KRG officials
declared that PKK offices in the territory had been closed down and
they had also obstructed the PKK’s logistics chain within northern Iraq.
Reportedly Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani said that ‘he could not
sacrifice four million people for 2,000’.96 By the same token, despite
President Barzani’s categorical rejection of declaring the PKK a terrorist
organisation,97 and Talabani’s statement that ‘he would not surrender
Turkey even a Kurdish cat, let alone any PKK members’, on 3
March 2008,98 only a few days later the Iraqi President vigorously
condemned the PKK during his visit to Turkey and called on Ankara to
establish direct dialogue with Erbil.99
However, despite the KRG’s apparent backing down, Turkey
continued claiming that the PKK resided in northern Iraq and launched
its activities from there, and that the KRG has not surrendered any PKK
members to Turkey. Although expecting the KRG to eradicate the PKK
on its own would not be realistic, Turkey’s dissatisfaction with Erbil
has stemmed from Ankara’s perception that the Kurdish leadership has
not done whatever it can do, such as declaring the PKK as a terrorist
organisation or providing any concrete assistance to Ankara against the
group.
Indeed, this perspective was voiced by the second in command in the
TGS, General Hasan I gsız, when he argued that the TGS had not received
94
‘Iraq wants terrorists out’, TDN, 19 Oct. 2007; ‘Maliki, under Turkish pressure,
vows to curb Kurdish rebels’, Washington Post, 24 Oct. 2007.
95
‘Barzani hopes Talabani’s visit serves for good relations’, Today’s Zaman, 11 March
2008.
96 _
Irfan Bozan, ‘Northern Iraq: from deadlock to dialogue’, Foreign Policy Bulletin 6
_
(Istanbul: TESEV 2007) 5–7.
97
Masoud Barzani’s interview with CNN correspondent Nick Robertson, 1 June
2008, 5http://video.aol.com/video-detail/massud-barzanis-interview-with-cnn-over-pkk/
1861131744.
98
‘Talabani’nin ‘kedi bile vermem’ açıklaması’, Milliyet, 3 March 2008. Later Talabani
announced that he said ‘an Iraqi cat’ not ‘a Kurdish cat’.
99
Gareth Jenkins, ‘Talabani Condemns PKK, Calls on Turkey to Engage with KRG’,
Eurasia Daily Monitor 5/45 (10 March 2008), 5www.jamestown.org/publications_
details.php?volume_id¼427&issue_id¼4415&article_id¼23728714.
any support from the government in northern Iraq even though it

knew for a fact that PKK members were using the local infrastructure –
water, electricity – which could not be done without Barzani’s
knowledge.100 Another senior Turkish official claimed that the measures
taken by the KRG were mere window dressing, since pro-PKK offices
were closed only to be reopened next door, or PKK affiliated people were
put in custody only to be released shortly afterwards.101 In addition,
ongoing PKK attacks aggravated Turks’ suspicions as 17 soldiers at the
Aktütün outpost were killed on 3 October 2008, followed by the killing
of six policemen on 8 October and five soldiers in Hakkari on 16
October.102
This complicated picture is due to the KRG’s dualistic relationship

with Turkey and indeed with the PKK. On the one hand, a
demonstration of amicability with Turks would result in a significantly
better economy and peaceful neighbourly relations. In addition,
although the PKK’s political wing in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan
Democratic Solution Party (KDSP) received only marginal support
(15,000 votes and no seats in the parliament against DPAK’s 2,642,172
votes and 53 seats) in the parliamentary elections in December 2005,
the two main coalition partners of the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of
Kurdistan (DPAK), the KDP and the PUK do not want to compete with
another Kurdish faction in the territory.103 Despite the existence of a
small following in the KRG zone and no real weight in internal Iraqi
politics, the PKK has still been in rivalry with the KDP in the KRG and
further in southeastern Anatolia.104 Therefore, the Kurdish leadership
sees that the elimination of the PKK and collaboration with Turkey
avails the KRG significantly.
Besides, the extent and level of President Barack Obama’s new
administration’s assistance for the KRG is uncertain, especially after
the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. The KRG is aware that sooner
or later US troops will withdraw. Once that happens, the Iraqi Kurds
will be left to deal with Turkey largely unaided. This fact also explains
100
Erdal Şafak, ‘Kuzey Irak Politikaları’, Sabah, 12 Oct. 2008.
101
International Crisis Group, ‘Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict and Cooperation?’,
Middle East Report 81, 13 Nov. 2008, 9.
102
‘Acıların en büyügü’, Milliyet, 5 Oct. 2008; ‘Hakkari’de çatışma: 5 şehit’, Milliyet,
16 Oct. 2008; ‘Diyarbakır’da polis okulu servis aracına saldırı’, Milliyet, 8 Oct. 2008;
‘PKK’den Türk ordusuna agır darbe’, Ajans a Peyamner, 16 Oct. 2008.
103
‘Kurdish government closes pro-PKK party’, Reuters, 3 Nov. 2007, 5www.reuters.
com/article/topNews/idUSMAR338419200711034; ‘Elections in Iraq’, Wikipedia,
5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Iraq4.
104
Discussion programme ‘Why?’ on NTV, 14 Oct. 2008; ‘Talabani Öcalan’dan nefret
ediyor’, Radikal, 7 Aug. 2006.
610 Damla Aras
both President Masoud Barzani’s and Prime Minister Nechirvan

Barzani’s strong protests against the Baghdad government’s hesitation
in approving the security pact with the US which extends the duration
of the stay of American forces in Iraq.105
On the other hand, cooperation with Turkey against the PKK may
create public discontent and damage the KRG’s interests. This is due to
widespread support for the PKK among Iraqi Kurds not necessarily
because they agree with the organisation’s methods of struggle or with
its ideological stance or the massive support for its political wing within
the KRG but mainly because it has been fighting for Kurds’ rights in
Turkey. Therefore, at a time when the Kurdish nation arguably needs

the most unity, the KRG’s action against the PKK would be perceived
as ‘betrayal of their fellow Kurds’.
Furthermore, the Kurds have gained a strong voice in the decision-
making of Iraq and arisen as a significant actor in the region after years
of oppression. Under these circumstances the KRG probably realises
that it is not in its interest to create any discord among the Kurds. To
this end the KRG formed by the KDP and the PUK, which fought with
each other and also fought against the PKK on occasion in the 1990s,
pays special attention to keep the Kurds as a united front. This stance is
verified by certain statements of Kurdish leaders such as President
Talabani and KRG Parliament member Mahmud Osman, when they
emphasised that the KRG would definitely not allow the Kurds to turn
against each other and use arms against the PKK.106
Another example of the Kurdish leaders’ stance towards the PKK is
President Talabani’s conflicting statements. During President Gül’s visit
to Baghdad in March 2009 Talabani called on the PKK to lay down its
arms or leave the country in the press conference. However during his
visit to Salahaddin in northern Iraq he denied that he had made such
call and declared that he had just delivered Turkey’s demands and that
those were not his ideas.107 Similarly, the position of the PKK’s Ahmed
Deniz – who is responsible for the organisation’s international relations
– is aligned with that of the KRG’s: Deniz praised the KRG’s strategy
towards Turkey despite the latter’s pressure, stated that Ankara had
105
‘Barzani’den sıcak mesajlar’, Samanyolu Haber, 12 Nov. 2008, 5www.samanyo
luhaber.com/haber-125173.html4; ‘Başbakan Barzani: ‘‘Irak’tan çekilmenin sonucu
kötü olur’’’, Ajans a Peyamner, 26 May 2008; ‘Kürdistan Başkanı: ‘‘Kürdistan
Bölgesi’nin kapısı ABD askerine her zaman açıktır’’’, Ajans a Peyamner, 1 Nov. 2008.
106
‘Osman: FKB Yönetimi PKK’ye karşı hiçbir şekilde silah kullanmayacak . . . ’, Ajans
a Peyamner, 28 Dec. 2008; ‘Talabani: ‘‘Kürtlerin talepleri karşılanırsa PKK silah
bırakmaya hazırdır’’’, Ajans a Peyamner, 22 Dec. 2008.
107
Associated Press, 29 March 2009; ‘Talabani PKK konusunda çark etti’, Radikal, 2
April 2009.
failed in its attempt at dividing the Kurds and creating a war between
brothers, and claimed that the KRG’s disposition had inspired a
national awakening which was in accordance with the Kurdish nation’s
higher interests.108
In addition to the common ethno-nationalist motives, the PKK is also
an important lever in the hands of the Kurdish leadership. This point of
view was also voiced by Öcalan, who warned Barzani and Talabani not
to use the PKK as a decoy against Turkey.109 In this sense, the
organisation is a significant weapon in Barzani’s hand to retaliate
against Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives in the international arena vis-à-
vis the dispute over Kirkuk. Similarly, the KRG benefited from PKK
attacks such as the Aktütün incident since it has forced Turkey to
consider the Barzani government as part of the solution, not part of the
problem.110 Ankara has realised that without the help of and direct
dialogue with the KRG and Erbil’s inclusion in the Ankara–
Washington–Baghdad tripartite, Turkey would not be able to stop
PKK activities. Indeed Babacan’s announcement, when he declared that
Ankara would consider ‘all options’ to resolve the issue and was ready
to hold meetings at ‘all levels’, including with a KRG representative in
the tripartite, verifies this thesis.111
Conclusion
Turkey’s strategy towards Syria and northern Iraq provides us with
important clues about the significance of strength and asymmetry of
motivation in the success of coercive diplomacy. But before discussing
the impact of these two specific factors, let us examine the
manifestation of other variables of coercive diplomacy in both case
studies.
Undoubtedly, the global strategic environment dramatically changed
between the time Turkey executed coercive diplomacy towards Syria in
1998 and Turkey’s limited use of force in northern Iraq in 2007
onwards. Although reluctant to sanction the use of force, in 1998
Washington and Ankara shared perspectives on the Syrian regime, and
the US had a strong relationship with Turkey. Although Washington
did not want Turkey’s invasion of Syria, which would have harmed the
ongoing Middle East peace process, the Clinton administration
108
‘PKK dışilişkiler sorumlusu Deniz: ‘‘Türkiye’nin Kürtleri karşı karşıya getirme
politikası iflasa ugramıştır’’’, Ajans a Peymner, 21 July 2008.
109
‘Öcalan: Barzani PKK’yi yem görmemeli’, 5www.rojaciwan.com/modules.
php?name¼News&file¼article&sid¼275244.
110
‘Türkiye Kürdistan Yönetimi ile diyaloga geçiyor’, Ajans a Peyamner, 10 Oct. 2008.
111
Interview with Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on NTV, 21 Oct. 2008.
612 Damla Aras
endeavored to resolve the crisis in favour of Turkey. Unlike Syria, the

KRG has become Washington’s main ally in Iraq, which put the US on
the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand it understood and
acknowledged Turkey’s problems with the PKK; on the other, it had
important interests to maintain with the Kurds in order not to upset the
fragile balances in Iraq. This situation created an additional obstacle in
Turkey’s attempts to put pressure on the KRG to end its support for the
PKK.
To this end, Turkey’s coercive diplomacy also attempted to attain
three objectives in addition to its main aim of coercing the Kurdish
leadership in northern Iraq: first and foremost, it aimed at intimidating

Iraq’s Kurdish population into stopping their support for the PKK.
Second, it intended to bludgeon them into staying on the right side of
Ankara’s ‘red lines’ – no incorporation of Kirkuk and no declaration of
independence from Iraq. And finally, it was designed to influence the
behaviour of Washington and Baghdad. It appears that Ankara’s
strategy succeeded in prodding the US into action. Washington not only
shared intelligence with Turkey, it also supported Turkey’s limited
military campaign in the territory as verified by Foreign Minister
Babacan when he said that the US was providing strong support for
Turkey.112
In terms of international support, Turkey was in a more advanta-
geous position in 2007 than it had been in 1998. In the Syrian case,
although Turkey benefited from its rapprochement with Israel since it
put psychological pressure on Damascus and increased its sense of
encirclement, Ankara neither received any concrete help from Israel or
any support from the international community. Whereas in the
northern Iraq case, the international community was more sympathetic
towards Turkey and more importantly, it received concrete assistance
from Iran and Syria to fight against PKK members and to put more
pressure on the KRG.113
Domestically, in both cases, Ankara received significant support, and
indeed was subject to much pressure in the northern Iraq case. This
considerable support and pressure was due to the easily inflamed
popular nationalist sentiment in Turkish society, particularly on the
112 _
‘Babacan: ‘‘PKK konusunda Iran-Irak sınırında haberleşme yapılıyor’’’, Ajans a
Peyamner, 7 June 2008.
113
‘PKK’ya bir darbe de Suriye’den’, Hürriyet, 5 Feb. 2009; ‘Iran _ ve Suriye PKK
etrafındaki çemberi daraltıyor’, Zaman, 26 Nov. 2008; ‘‘Turkey and Iran unite to
attack Kurdish rebels’, New York Times, 6 June 2008; ‘Başbakan Barzani: ‘‘Türkiye ve
_
Iran’ın Kürdistan Bölgesi’ne yönelik bombardımanı durmalı’’’, Ajans a Peyamner, 20
_
May 2008; ‘Babacan: ‘‘PKK konusunda Iran-Irak sınırında haberleşme yapılıyor’’’.
Kurdish issue and on any sense of external interference in Turkey’s

internal affairs or challenge to its domestic tranquility.
Again in both cases, Ankara followed the common norms of coercive
diplomacy and ticked all the boxes: it conveyed its clear demands and
the precise terms of settlement of the crises to its opponents through
ultimata; it threatened its opponents with the use of force; it used tools
such as the media, military build-up to back up its threats and the
invoking of urgency, and it offered incentives, chiefly better political
and economic relations, in the event of the opponents’ compliance.
However, the most important difference between the two cases is the
strength and asymmetry of motivation of the opponents. The Syrian

attitude towards the 1992 and 1996 Turkish coercive diplomacy
attempts indicates that in 1998, it was rather Asad’s other calculations
than the fear provoked by the Turkish threats that led him to comply with
Ankara’s demands. His concern to leave a stable country to his successor,
Bashar, was far bigger than that of protecting the PKK. Already swamped
in domestic and international problems, positive political and trade
relations with Ankara would be more profitable for Bashar’s Syria than a
war with Turkey. To this end, Asad was prepared to sacrifice the PKK
since he shared no common aspirations or motives due to a resonant
identity as he did with various Palestinian groups. Such approach is also
evidenced by the fact that his discarding of the PKK notwithstanding, he
persistently continued sponsoring various Palestinian groups and the
Hizballah despite intense Israeli and American coercion.
However, in the case of the KRG, although it has suffered because of
the PKK’s activities, President Barzani has been persistent in not
declaring it as a terrorist organisation. This is because despite the rivalry
in the KRG zone, in the Kurdish public eye all of them – the KDP, the
PUK and the PKK – have been fighting for the Kurdish cause aiming to
actualise their aspirations for decades.114 Therefore, even though they
fought with each other at times (i.e. the KDP’s cooperation with Turkey
against the PKK and the KDP-PUK armed clash in the 1990s), at a time
when the Kurds have seized considerable power and independence,115
they realise that they must maintain their unity.
Having said this, the KRG is also aware that it must avoid escalating
tension with Ankara since it is very much dependent on Turkey
politically and economically, and it certainly does not have the military
power to challenge the latter. Therefore, Erbil understands that to
mollify Ankara and to do the minimum of what it can do against the
PKK is in its interest. To this end, President Barzani has had to find a
114
‘Turkish ‘‘sport’’ for Baghdad’, Dar al Hayat, 26 March 2009.
115
Gareth Stansfield, Robert Lowe et al., ‘The Kurdish Policy Imperative’, Chatham
House Briefing Report (Dec. 2007), 7–8.
614 Damla Aras
balance between not alienating Turkish statesmen while remaining

faithful to the Kurdish population’s needs and aspirations. Talabani by
the same token, as the President of Iraq has had to be careful to
maintain Kurdish unity by supporting the Barzanis and the Kurdish
population without distancing himself from Baghdad, and challenging
Ankara and Washington. Consequently, recent developments indicate
that the KRG is likely to comply with some of the Turkish demands, if
not all, in the short- to medium-term.
However, under the pressure of maintaining dominance over the
nationalistic political parties, complying with the TGS leaders,
competing with the DTP and more importantly seeking ways to stop
PKK activities in Turkey, JDP, and especially the Turkish military,
ultimately aims to eradicate the PKK and its existence in northern Iraq
for good. Therefore, in the long-term Turkey will not be satisfied with
the KRG’s short-term compliance or consider it a ‘success’. Real success
for Turkish coercive diplomacy would be the KRG’s constant
cooperation with Turkey against the organisation as Syria has done.
Yet a limited KRG assistance in the long-term – which would be less
than what Ankara expects – depends on at least three factors.
First, Turkey’s intense dialogue and cooperation with the KRG.
Turkey’s recognition of the Barzani government and its efforts to
improve its political and economic relations with the KRG can make
Turkey positively indispensable for the territory. Furthermore, the
territory can become a natural hinterland for Turkey. To this end,
recent developments such as ceasing to call Barzani and Talabani ‘tribal
leaders’,116 opening direct dialogue and ongoing intense diplomacy
with the KRG as well as President Gül’s use of the term ‘Kurdistan’ in
an unprecedented manner117 can be regarded as a promising start.118
Second, Turkey’s efforts to advance Kurdish citizens’ political,
economic and social conditions inside its own borders can make a
116
Ferai Tınç, ‘Irak hükümet sözcüsü: Tehdit sürdükçe harekát kaçınılmaz’, Hürriyet,
17 Dec. 2007.
117
‘Cumhurbaşkanı Gül Kuzey Irak’a ‘‘Kürdistan’’ dedi’, Radikal, 23 March 2009. He
later denied using the word, Kurdistan. However, the journalists who accompanied him
during his visit point out that he used that term. Saban Kardas, ‘Gül Denies Saying
‘‘Kurdistan’’ During Iraq Visit’, 30 March 2009, 5www.jamestown.org/single/
?no_cache¼1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D¼8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&
tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D¼turkey%2C%20terrorism%2C%20islam&
tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D¼34775&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D¼7&cHash¼f3a26e
e4404; Cengiz Çandar ‘Kürdistan tartışması siyasi cesaret sorunudur’, Radikal, 27
March 2009.
118
‘Özçelik: güneyde ve kuzeyde her grupla görüşece giz’, Ajans a Peyamner, 17 May
2008; ‘Babacan’dan PKK konusunda Kürdistan Bölgesi Yönetimi ile diyalog kapısının
açıldıgı açıklaması’, Ajans a Peyamner, 11 July 2008.
significant difference in Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds’ outlook towards the

PKK’s strategy. Prosperity and the advancement of Kurdish rights can
help not only marginalise PKK’s choice of armed struggle and create
more amiability at the KRG side but also make Turkey the center of
gravity for the Kurds throughout the region. The recent developments
indicate that Ankara has also started to recognise the fact that the
resolution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey cannot be attained by the
threats and limited use of force when President Gül declared that
putting the blame beyond the borders [of Turkey] would be wrong
and that there would be positive developments on the Kurdish
issue.119 Nevertheless, the unfolding of events in the following months
will give a better idea about the skills of the JDP government to offer
new insights into these matters.
Last but not the least, Washington’s assistance to Ankara is
instrumental since the KRG has little choice but to follow the US lead.
KRG realisation of the lack of American support for any further
Kurdish aspirations such as an independent Kurdish state could force
Erbil to develop better relations with Ankara. In this sense the course
of KRG-US relations and the nature of the American assistance for
Turkey will play an important role in the KRG’s relations with
Turkey.
As observed none of these conditions did or do specifically require
the execution of coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, even if the KRG’s
ulterior motive were to form an independent Kurdistan in the case of
Iraq’s disintegration as Turkey suspects, in this case, the basic elements
of coercive diplomacy – threat, limited use of force and incentives – will
not suffice against the Kurds’ aspirations for independence. In this case,
either Turkey will recognise and endeavour to strengthen its relations
with the KRG or it will need stronger tools, such as the full-scale use of
force, should it choose that path.
Of course, the aftermath of Turkey’s 2007–08 raids into northern
Iraq is yet to fully unfold. However, when a resonant identity exists
between the sponsor-state and the non-state armed group, as in the case
of the KRG and the PKK, so far there has been no conclusive support
for the assumption that the threat of force or its limited use will force
the sponsor-state to stop its support for the non-state armed group and
lead to an eventual defeat of the latter.
119
Cengiz Çandar, ‘Kürt sorununa ili? kin önemli geli? meler olacak,’ Referans, 11
March 2009.
616 Damla Aras
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Bill Park for his valuable contributions at every
stage of this article.
Note on Contributor
Damla Aras is a post-doctoral research associate in the War Studies
Department, King’s College, London.
Bibliography
Ahmed, Yahya, ‘Iraqi Kurds back PKK despite being displaced by recent fighting’, Institute for
War & Peace Reporting, 22 April 2008.
Amirahmadi, Hooshang and Nader Entessar (eds), Iran and the Arab World (London: Macmillan
1993).
Art, Robert and Patrick Cronin (eds), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington
DC: US Institute of Peace 2003).
Art, Robert and Robert Jervis (eds), International Politics, Enduring Concepts and Contemporary
Issues (New York: Pearson Longman 2005).
Aydınlı, Ersel and Ümit Özdag ‘Winning a Low Intensity Conflict: Drawing Lessons from the
Turkish Case’, Review of International Affairs 2 (2003), 101–21.
‘Barzani’den Kürt tehdidi’, NTV, 12 April 2007, 5www.NTVMSNB.com/news/404921.asp4.
‘Barzani’den sıcak mesajlar’, Samanyolu Haber, 12 Nov. 2008, 5www.samanyoluhaber.com/
haber-125173.html4.
Bila, Fikret, Hangi PKK? (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık 2004).
Bölükbaşı, Süha, ‘Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad and the Regionalization of Turkey’s Kurdish
Secessionism’, Journal of South and Middle Eastern Studies 14/4 (1991), 15–36.
_
Bozan, Irfan, _
‘Northern Iraq: from deadlock to dialogue’, Foreign Policy Bulletin 6 (Istanbul:
TESEV 2007), 5–7.
Butter, David, ‘Syria turns over a new leaf’, Middle East Economic Digest, 5 Sept. 1997, 5.
Byman, Daniel, ‘Passive Sponsors of Terrorism’, Survival 47/4 (Winter 2005), 117–44.
Byman, Daniel, Deadly Connections, States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge UP
2005).
Collins, Stephen, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes of Sanctions? An Analysis of
Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27/1 (Jan.
2004), 1–18.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Raymond Hinnesbusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a
Penetrated Regional System (Routledge: London 1997).
Fearon, James, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests, Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs’, Journal of
Conflict Resolution 41/1 (1997), 68–90.
Freedman, Lawrence (ed.), Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases (Oxford: OUP 1998).
George, Alexander, Forceful Persuasion, Coercive Diplomacy as An Alternative to War
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 1991).
George, Alexander, ‘The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioural Models of
Adversaries’, Comparative Strategy 22/5 (Dec. 2003), 463–87.
George, Alexander, David Hall and William Simons (eds), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,
Laos, Cuba and Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).
George, Alexander and William Simons (eds), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Oxford:
Westview Press 1994).
Gunter, Michael, ‘The Kurdish Problem in Turkey’, Middle East Journal 42/3 (Summer 1988),
389–406.
Gunter, Michael, ‘The Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the Future of the Iraqi Opposition’,
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 19/3 (Spring 1996), 1–20.
Gunter, Michael, ‘The Foreign Policy of the Iraqi Kurds’, Journal of South Asian and Middle
Eastern Studies 20/3 (Spring 1997), 1–19.
_
Imset, _
Ismet, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973–1992) (Ankara: Turkish
Daily News Publications 1992).
International Crisis Group, ‘Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict and Cooperation?’, Middle East
Report 81, 13 Nov. 2008.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Kurdish Militancy in Turkey’, Strategic Comments
11/5 (July 2005).
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2007 (London: Routledge for
IISS 2007).
Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, a Challenge for
Theory and Practice (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press 1998).
Jenkins, Gareth, ‘A military analysis of Turkey’s incursion into northern Iraq’, Terrorism Monitor
6/5 (7 March 2008), 5www.jamestown.org4.
Jenkins, Gareth, ‘Talabani Condemns PKK, Calls on Turkey to Engage with KRG’, Eurasia Daily
Monitor 5/45 (10 March 2008), 5www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_
id¼427&issue_id¼4415&article_id¼23728714.
Kibaro glu, Mustafa, ‘The CHP’s role in pushing Turkey toward a cross-border operation’,
Terrorism Focus 4/24 (24 July 2007), 5www.jamestown.org4.
_
Kirişci, Kemal and Gareth Winrow, Kürt Sorunu, Kökeni ve Gelişimi (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt
Yayınları 2002).
Kut, Gün, ‘Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and Tigris’, New Perspectives on
Turkey 9/3 (Fall 1993).
Lowe, Robert, ‘The Syrian Kurds: A People Discovered’, Chatham House Briefing Paper (Jan.
2006).
Lundgren, Asa, The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey’s Kurdish Policy (London: I.B.Tauris 2007).
Melhem, Hisham, ‘Syria between two transitions’, Middle East Report 203 (Spring 1997), 3.
Minutes of UN General Assembly A/C.1/53/PV.5, 5http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-
DOC/PRO/N98/860/71/pdf/N9886071.pdf?OpenElement4.
Neff, Donald, ‘Money – the great lubricant’, Middle East International 24 April 1998, 8.
‘Öcalan: Barzani PKK’yi yem görmemeli’ 5www.rojaciwan.com/modules.php?name¼News&
file¼article&sid¼275244.
Olson, Robert, Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991–2000 (California:
Mazda Publishers 2001).
_
Özcan, Nihat Ali, PKK Tarihi, Ideolojisi ve Yöntemi (Ankara: ASAM 1999).
Özda _
g, Ümit, Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları, 1984–2007 (Istanbul: Pegasus 2007).
Park, Bill, Turkey’s Policy towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 374
(London: IISS 2005).
Perthes, Volker, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad: Modernisation and the Limits of Change, Adelphi
Paper 366 (New York: OUP 2004).
Pope, Nicole, ‘War on the Underworld?’, Middle East International, 18 Sept. 1998, 12.
Pope, Nicole, ‘Outlawing Dissent’, Middle East International, 2 Oct. 1998, 12.
Prunckun, Henry Jr. and Philip Mohr, ‘Military Deterrence of International Terrorism: An
Evaluation of Operation El Dorado Canyon’, Studies in Conflict Terrorism 20/3 (1997), 267–
80.
Rathmell, Andrew, ‘The Encirclement of Syria’, Middle East International, 10 May 1996, 19.
Robins, Philip, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London: Hurst
2003).
618 Damla Aras
Sarıibrahimo glu, Lale, ‘US works with Turkey to counter PKK in Iraq’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14
Nov. 2007.
‘Secretary-General meets with Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Arab League to discuss efforts
to defuse tension between Turkey and Syria’, UN Press Release, SG/SM/6742, 13 Oct. 1998,
5www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981013.sgsm6742.html4.
Stansfield Gareth, Robert Lowe et al., ‘The Kurdish Policy Imperative’, Chatham House Briefing
Report (Dec. 2007).
Trager, Robert and Dessislava Zagorcheva, ‘Deterring Terrorism, It Can Be Done’, International
Security, 30/3 (Winter 2005–06), 87–123.
Turkish National Assembly Minutes Journal, 62, 1 Oct. 1998.
Turkish National Assembly Minutes Journal, 63, 7 Oct. 1998.
Uslu, Emrullah, ‘Can Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Cooperation with Iran Lead to a Strategic
Partnership?’, Terrorism Focus, 24 June 2008, 5www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache¼

1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D¼50124.
Wijk, Rob de, ‘The Limits of Military Power’, Washington Quarterly 25/1 (Winter 2002), 75–92.
_
Yetkin, Murat, Kürt Kapanı, Şam’dan Imralı’ _
ya Öcalan (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi 2004).
Zisser, Eyal, ‘Clues to the Syrian Puzzle’, Washington Quarterly 23/2 (2000), 79–90.
Zisser, Eyal, Asad’s Legacy, Syria in Transition (London: Hurst 2001).

Turkeys Coercive Diplomacy - Aras2011

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Turkeys Coercive Diplomacy - Aras2011

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [University of Hong Kong Libraries]

On: 05 July 2013, At: 09:35

Journal of Strategic Studies

Similar Strategies, Dissimilar

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.561086

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Similar Strategies, Dissimilar

War Studies Department, King’s College London, UK

ABSTRACT Several countries have used coercive diplomacy to dissuade sponsor-

KEY WORDS: Coercive diplomacy, Sponsor-states, Non-state armed groups, Turkey

ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/11/040587-32 Ó 2011 Taylor & Francis

whenever they choose.2 It is difficult to fight against them for several

groups can be profitable in several ways for the sponsor-states. For

ideology, religion or kinship. In other words, the sponsor-state and the

Iran’s affinity with Hizballah are examples of a resonant identity. It must

coercive diplomacy. The theoretical section is followed by analyses of

effective strategy against sponsor-states which share resonant identity

What is Coercive Diplomacy?

the target, and compliance is sought only after the opponent

to answer four basic questions, since the strategy of coercive diplomacy

escalation; clarity concerning the precise term of settlement of the crisis.

Turkey’s Coercive Diplomacy towards Syria

camp immediately in return for Turkish cooperation on water. Syria

‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed

pipelines in Central Asia. Furthermore there was, crucially, a

The Turkish–Syrian Crisis of 1998

attack against Syria.55 In addition, following the NATO exercises,

Ankara was also acutely aware of the need to gain the

However, the American administration had mixed feelings about

would never again be permitted to enter Syria. It also established a

Turkey’s Limited Use of Force in Northern Iraq

Kurds on Turkish soil.68 In foreign policy, the Gulf War started in

security and intelligence services, formed a bank and postal service,

Ankara suspected that developments such as the signing of Washington

Barzani’s statements aggravated Turkish suspicions when he said that in the

The major reason behind the JDP’s hesitation at starting a military

from the US, Turkey planned to put pressure on Washington and

Turkey’s pressure on the US and Iraq produced a positive result since

Consequently, US provision of actionable intelligence reduced the

Turkey’s Use of Limited Force in Northern Iraq

became evident that Washington had turned a blind eye to this

any support from the government in northern Iraq even though it

This complicated picture is due to the KRG’s dualistic relationship

both President Masoud Barzani’s and Prime Minister Nechirvan

Turkey. Therefore, at a time when the Kurdish nation arguably needs

endeavored to resolve the crisis in favour of Turkey. Unlike Syria, the

leadership in northern Iraq: first and foremost, it aimed at intimidating

Kurdish issue and on any sense of external interference in Turkey’s

strength and asymmetry of motivation of the opponents. The Syrian

balance between not alienating Turkish statesmen while remaining

significant difference in Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds’ outlook towards the

Partnership?’, Terrorism Focus, 24 June 2008, 5www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache¼

You might also like