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Critique of Henry Mintzberg S The Design School: Reconsidering The Basic Premises Strategic Management
Critique of Henry Mintzberg S The Design School: Reconsidering The Basic Premises Strategic Management
obscurity. These readers are also likely to know and of conflicts which are typical of academic
that my entire professional career has been life. Therefore, Henry’s generalization from a
focused on helping organizations manage their sample of one requires factual support.
strategic behavior in unpredictable environments. Such support is not offered. Instead, Mintzberg
Thus, if I am to accept Henry’s verdict, I have attempts to minimize evidence to the contrary.
spent 40 years contributing solutions which are Since world-wide visibility of Michael Porter
not useful in the practice of strategic management. cannot be left unnoticed, Mintzberg tries to
Therefore, it should not be surprising that I minimize his influence on The Design School on
rise in defense of at least one prescriptive school the grounds that the HBS classic text on policy
(the one to which I belong) in an effort to set devotes only one chapter to Porter. Thus the
the record straight and thus salvage a lifetime of reader is asked to believe that Porter’s influence
work which has received a modicum of acceptance in the Harvard Business School has been confined
by practicing managers. to one chapter in a book!
In situations like the present, it is easy to fall
prey to a game of polemic charge-countercharge
Proof by implied intent
in the hope that the louder voice will carry the
day. I will attempt to avoid this trap in two ways. Having chosen Andrews as the ‘mouthpiece’ of
First, I will show that the methodology by which the Design School, Mintzberg uses Andrews’
Mintzberg disposes of the prescriptive school will own writings to prove that the school ‘refused
hardly stand its day in the court of logic, and itself the chance to adapt’ over time.
persuasiveness. Second, I will offer evidence of This is done by challenging Andrews’ state-
repeated instances in which Mintzberg’s key ments which suggest that the School’s original
assertions are factually wrong. Thirdly, I will design principles should be enlarged and modi-
fault Henry on the fact that, having confined the fied.
prescriptive schools to a narrow context, he does The methodology is simple. First, having
not place his own in an appropriate context. quoted a paragraph from Andrews, which sug-
Finally, I will identify the context which is gests to an intelligent reader that the Design
appropriate for Henry’s prescriptions. It is ironic School did indeed continue to elaborate the
that this context will appear very similar to the original principles, Henry asserts (without any
context to which he confines the prescriptive further evidence) that Andrews did not really
schools, but is somewhat larger in scope. Thus, mean what he said!
to borrow a phrase which Henry uses in his An example of one of several such ‘proofs’
critique of Professor Kenneth Andrews, his paper should suffice to illustrate this ‘methodology’.
emerges as ‘a caricature of his own model.’ According to Mintzberg the second design prin-
ciple advanced by the Design School (1990: 176)
is as follows:
used later in this paper €or defining the appropri- to articulate any viable strategy (1990: 184).
ate context for Mintzberg’s Model.
5. Nor is it possible to formulate a viable strategy
in predictable environments:
MINTZBERG’S MODEL OF STRATEGY
FORMATION
The point we wish to emphasize is: how could
the firm have known ahead of time? The
Mintzberg leaves the reader in no doubt about discovery of what business it (firm) was to be
his central theme: in could not be undertaken on paper, but had
to benefit from the results of testing and
experience (1990: 182).
Our critique of the Design School revolves
around one central theme: its promotion of
thought independent of action, strategy forma- The same quotation logically gives rise to the
tion above all as a process of conception, rather following conclusion, which is not articulated by
than as one of learning (Mintzberg, 1990: 182).. Mintzberg:
454 H . Igor Ansoff
6. It is not possible to forecast the future with With these two exceptions recognized, we can
complete confidence. infer the following prescription implied by Mintz-
berg:
Mintzberg’s concern with managers’ need ‘to
be sure,’ and his assertion that they ‘cannot’ act 10. The ‘emerging strategy approach’ should be
before they are ‘sure,’ permeates the paper and used in all situations with the exception of
is used as a basis for several descriptions and the two specified above.
prescriptions, including the following:
In summary, Henry’s prescription can be
7. Managers should not make statements about named as one of implicit strategy formation,
the future if they are not totally sure of what under which strategy need not be a part
they are saying. of manager’s concern, except under special
8. Managers should not evaluate their organi- circumstances. Managers should allow strategy
zation’s strengths and weaknesses until they and capabilities to evolve organically, through
become evident from the trial and error trial and experience, and focus their attention on
experience. the operating efficiency of the organization.
9. In complex organizations it is not possible to Thus, Mintzberg prescribes a world free of
plan and coordinate an organization-wide explicit strategy formulation and free of strategic
process of strategy formulation. This assertion managers.
is contained in the following quotation from
Brian Quinn, used and approved by Mintz-
berg: CRITIQUE OF MINTZBERG’S MODEL
It is virtually impossible for a manager t o While reading the first part of the paper, one
orchestrate all internal decisions, external wonders why Mintzberg went to such length to
environmental events, behavioral and power p r w e that the prescriptive schools were identical
relationships, technical and informational needs,
and actions of intelligent opponents so that they and have jointly ‘denied themselves’ the oppor-
come together at a precise moment (Quinn, tunity to adapt to the changing times.
1978: 184). The reason becomes clear in the second part:
Mintzberg is now free to criticize all of the
Mintzberg makes no direct reference to the prescriptive schools as if they were still adhering
context in which his prescriptive principles should to their original design principles of 1965.
be used. But in his concern with what to do with In the light of the methodological and factual
The Design School, after he has demolished it, deficiencies pointed out earlier in this paper, it
he does identify two contexts in which the is hardly worthwhile to challenge Mintzberg’s
explicit strategy formulation championed by the criticisms of the original design principles, since
prescriptive schools may be applicable. they have been outstripped by developments,
One of these contexts is: both in the practice of strategic management and
in the writings of the prescriptive schools of
thought. But Henry’s own model of reality
a new organization. . . .(during). . . .the period
of initial conception of strategy. . . . (1990: 191).
summarized in the preceding pages cries out for
a critical appraisal. It is to this task that we now
turn our attention.
(In this case Mintzberg implicitly suspends his As a person who has spent over 40 years of
earlier claim that in unpredictable environments his life as manager, consultant, educator, and a
strategy cannot be formulated and allows the close observer of the business scene, I have
founding entrepreneur to have a ‘vision’.) difficulty accepting Henry’s model as description
The other context is one in which: of strategic management reality.
And yet, Henry is an intellectually outstanding
person, globally respected, and recognized as
the design school model would seem to apply
best. . .(is when) an organization (is) coming one of the leading contributors to the literature
out of a period of changing circumstances and on strategic management.
into one of operating stability (1990: 191). As I studied his paper several explanations of
Critique of ‘The Design School’ 455
this apparent paradox became clear. In the the 1940s the environment of many business
following pages I will present these explanations. firms has progressively become more and more
As before, I will base my critique on methodo- turbulent, unpredictable, and surpriseful. On
logical deficiencies and on factual contradictions the other hand, the not-for-profit organization
between Henry’s claims and the real world of had enjoyed a relatively placid environment
strategic management. until the 1970s (Ansoff, 1984).
2. Within the two classes of organizations, the
environments of different industries became
Self-denial of a chance to study business
differentiated. At one extreme, some organiza-
environment
tions continue to enjoy a relatively placid
It is strange how in his paper Mintzberg repeatedly existence and at the other extreme are
commits sins of which he accuses the Design and organizations which are experiencing very high
the other prescriptive schools. One of these is turbulence (Ansoff, 1984).
the accusation directed at the Design School that 3. The level of environmental turbulence has
it ‘slight(s) the environment in favor of a focus become a driving force which dictates strategic
on the organization’ (1990: 182). responses necessary for success (Ansoff and
Henry’s paper shows that he commits the same Sullivan, 1990).
sin. Below is the sum total of his references to 4. In high turbulence environments success comes
the environment. to firms which use strategies which are
One learns that managers: discontinuous from their historical strategies
(Ansoff and Sullivan, 1990; Ansoff et al.,
cannot be sure of the future. Sometimes organiza- 1990).
tions need to function during periods of unpre- 5. In low turbulent environments success comes
dictability. Sometimes organizations come out to firms which use strategies of incremental
of a period of changing circumstances into a
period of operating stability. development of their historically successful
product-development, (op cit.).
6. The final characteristic of the environment
Nothing is said about how often is ‘sometime’, neglected by Mintzberg is the acceleration of
what is meant by ‘unpredictability’ , by ‘changing the speed of change in the environment which
circumstances’ or how long and how prevalent has occurred during the past 30 years (Drucker,
are the ‘periods of operating stability.’ 1980).
The only complete sentence devoted to the
environment does not help very much: The latter aspect of the environment puts in
doubt the major prescription which Mintzberg
. . . .environment is not some kind of pear to offers in his paper. In turbulent environments,
be plucked from the tree of external appraisal, the speed with which changes develop is such
but a major and sometimes unpredictable that firms which use the ‘emerging strategy
force. . . (1990: 185).
formation’ advocated by Mintzberg endanger
their own survival. The reason is that when they
This cryptic statement begs all kinds of questions: arrive on a market with a new product/service,
whose environment is being discussed, what kind such firms find the market pre-empted by more
of influence does the force exert on organizations; foresightful competitors, who had planned their
under what circumstances is it exerted; what strategic moves in advance.
impact does it have on strategic behavior, etc? Thus, the first reason for the contradictions
This slight of the environment is unfortunate. between Mintzberg’s picture of reality and the
If Henry had taken the minimum trouble to observable real world is his failure to observe
peruse the cover pages of Business Week for the the current business environment.
past 4-5 years, he would have easily found
answers to most of the above questions. In brief, Failure to meet validity tests for prescriptive
he would have found the following information. and descriptive observations
1. In today’s world, different types of organiza- To be valid, a descriptive observation must meet
tions have different environments. Thus, since a single test: it must be an accurate observation
456 H . Igor Ansoff
of reality. A prescription must pass a much . . . .sometimes organizations. . . .need to func-
more rigorous test: it must offer evidence tion during periods of unpredictability, when
that use of the prescription will enable an they cannot possibly hope to articulate any viable
strategy (1990: 184) (italics added for emphasis).
organization to meet the objective by which it
judges its success.
Mintzberg seems to be oblivious to the need Having stated the description, Henry offers
for evidence to support his descriptive statements, the following prescription, again without any
and he converts descriptions into prescriptions supporting evidence:
without any offering evidence that they will bring
success to organizations using them. When strategists are not sure, they had better
An example of such conversion is offered by not articulate strategies, for all the reasons given
Mintzberg’s treatment of experience with related above (1990: 184) (italics added for emphasis).
diversifications. He starts with a descriptive
statement about the ‘vast majority of experiences
reported in the popular press’ which shows that However, a careful and multiple rereading of the
firms make a number of mistakes in their proceeding text fails to reveal any ‘reasons’ unless
diversification programs and, without batting an it is the unarticulated conviction of Mintzberg’s,
eyelash, converts it into a prescriptive statement: which permeates the paper, that strategy formu-
‘acquiring firm has fu make a number of mistakes lation is impossible unless the environment is
until it gradually learns what works for i t , if it ‘stable and predictable.’
ever does’ (1990: 183) (italics added for We must now deal with the origin of this
emphasis). Thus a described pattern of successive conviction.
failures is automatically transformed into a
prescription for success.
I am not sure that Henry appreciates the Descriptive definition of strategy
consequences of advocating use of trial and error
in diversification programs. Having been in If Henry had taken the trouble to acquaint
charge of a diversification department of a major himself with the history and current practice of
American firm, I can testify to the fact that trial strategic management, he would have found
and error diversification is enormously expensive. widespread use of explicit a priuri strategy
The successive acquisitions require major formulation. Furthermore he would have found
investments by the acquirer, and disinvestment that explicit strategy formulation is typically used
from mistakes multiplies the costs, because an in environments in which managers are not ‘sure’
acquisition cannot be sold-off overnight as one about the future (Steiner and Schollhammer,
would sell a portfolio of poorly performing 1975).
shares. Thus, once more, Henry’s assertion is contra-
But, even more importantly, the mere fact that dicted by facts. In this case the explanation is
‘the vast majority’ of experiences has led to twofold.
repeated mistakes is not a valid basis for The first is the black and white picture of the
recommending that others should follow the same environment painted by Mintzberg: managers are
path. What is being reported by Mintzberg are either ‘sure’ or totally ‘unsure’ about the future.
cases of failure and the fact that there are many In the real world of management these two
of them does not mean that success seeking firms extremes are rarely observable (Schwartz, 1990).
should follow their example. In practice managers are typically partially
In fact, a major research study of mergers and ‘unsure’ (see concept of partial ignorance in
acquisitions has shown that it is the planned . Ansoff, 1965). And they formulate strategy
approach to diversification, and not the trial and precisely because being ‘unsure’ makes it danger-
error approach, that produces better financial ous to assume that the firm’s future will be an
results (Ansoff et af., 1971). extrapolation of the past.
A second example is of critical importance to The second explanation is found in the
Mintzberg’s model of strategic management. difference between Henry’s definition of the
Without any prior evidence Henry offers the concept of strategy and the definition used in
following description: practice. His definition is descriptive since, in
Critique of ‘The Design School’ 457
order to identify the strategy, it is necessary to In cases in which decision-making is less time-
wait until a series of strategic moves has been consuming than trial and error, the rational
completed. model saves time by selecting action alterna-
But the concept used in practice is prescriptive tives which are most likely to produce success.
and it stipulates that strategy should be formulated This time saving is of great importance in
in advance of the events which make it necessary. organizations which find themselves in rapidly
Thus Henry’s failure to differentiate between changing environments.
descriptive and prescriptive statements once again L. It permits additional savings of time through
places him in the position of contradicting starting strategic response in anticipation
observable reality. of need to act-a process called strategic
planning.
3 . It reduces the number of strategic errors and
Use of existential model of learning
reduces costs by eliminating the probable
The model of organizational learning advocated ‘non-starters’ from the list of possible strategic
by Mintzberg consists of a sequential trial and moves.
error process, neither preceded nor interrupted,
nor followed by cognitive strategy formulation. Thus, the rational model becomes particularly
To be sure, under special circumstances, he important when the cost of a failed trial is very
allows the possibility of postexperience strategy high, as in the case of diversification by business
diagnosis. But nowhere in the paper does he firms.
suggest that the diagnosed strategy should in any Mintzberg makes no mention of the fact that
way affect the choice of subsequent strategic the rational model is a legitimate alternative to
moves. In fact, as cited before, Mintzberg the existential model. But he does devote a great
considers explicit strategies to be ‘blinders deal of energy to proving that the existential
designed to block out peripheral vision.’ model should be the only one used in strategic
This model of learning is the oldest one in management. To support this claim, he makes a
human history. It was the model of the prehistoric number of descriptive assertions which, as we
man when he ventured from his cave in search have shown, are in conflict with factual evidence.
for food. It was also the model of the master First, he declares that cognitive strategy formu-
builders in The Middle Ages who created glorious lation is not possible in unpredictable environ-
cathedrals by repeating lessons learned from past ments, a claim which is contradicted by the fact
successes, without understanding of what made of habitual strategy formulation in business firms.
the cathedrals stand or fall. This was also the Second, he argues that, even in environments
model which was used to train new apprentices which are predictable, managers should not
by putting them to work under direct guidance formulate a strategy unless they are sure of its
of experienced master builders. We shall refer consequences. He does this in the face of factual
to it as the existential model of learning. evidence that strategy formulation is typically
Henry’s insistence on exclusive use of this most found in firms whose managers are unsure about
rudimentary model of learning in formation of the future.
strategy is ironic because it is the model on which Thirdly, he claims that explicit strategy makes
The Harvard Business School Case method, strategic action rigid and forecloses opportunities
which he criticizes at length, was originally built. which were not anticipated by the strategy.
The age of enlightenment ushered a new model In making this claim, Henry neglects two facts
which recognized importance of cognition in the which are readily available in the literature of
affairs of man. In this model decision-making is the prescriptive schools (Ansoff, 1965).
the first stage, followed by implementation of The first is that the strategy concept used in
the decision. It became the standard model of practice does not specify alternatives. On the
the natural sciences, and it was the model used contrary, it sets guidelines for the kinds of
in the early prescriptions for strategic planning. opportunities the firm wants to develop through
We shall call this model the rational model of search and creativity.
learning. The second fact is that successful practitioners
The rational model has several advantages over of strategy typically use a strategic control
the existential: mechanism which periodically reviews and, if
458 H . Igor Ansoff
necessary, revises the strategy in the light of model is valid. It is curious because, as already
experience. discussed in this paper, Mintzberg does identify
Thus, use of explicit strategy in successful the context for the Design School Model. And
practice is not rigid and does not foreclose in his other work he was one of the first
attention to new opportunities which are outside researchers to call attention to the importance
the scope of strategy. But use of explicit strategy of contextual view of organizational structures
does control erratic deviations from the strategy. (Mintzberg, 1979).
This point was well made in a quotation from His failure to identify the context for his own
Andrews used and rejected by Mintzberg: work is damaging because it exposes his model
to counterexamples from the entire field of
Strategy will evolve over time, no matter what. ‘organizationatives’ and from the complete range
. . . .But the elucidation of goals can transcend of organizational settings. As a result, in the
incrementalism (and). . .result in the deliberate absence of contextual limits, Mintzberg inadver-
amendment of strategy or in curtailment of
strategic erosion (Christensen ef al., 1982: tently ventures to make comments on contexts
553-554). to which he has had little exposure.
And yet, it is the opinion of this writer that,
if streamlined and put into proper context,
Use of strategic control converts the rational Mintzberg’s model of strategy has demonstrable
learning mode into a more sophisticated one. validity, both descriptively and prescriptively,
The model becomes a chain of cognition-trial- and represents an insightful and important
cognition-trial etc. We will refer to it as strategic contribution to Strategic Management. In the
learning model (See Chapters 2.6, 2.9, 5.3 in remainder of this paper I will describe the
Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990). appropriate descriptive and prescriptive contexts
Finally, Mintzberg attacks the rational model for Mintzberg’s model.
of learning by pointing out that it decouples
strategy formulation from implementation, which
causes organizational resistance and even failure VALID CONTEXT FOR MINTZBERG’S
of implementation. PRESCRIPTIVE MODEL
This point underlines the irony of Mintzberg’s
Modification of Mintzberg’s Model
insistence on criticizing outdated original prin-
ciples of the Design School without acquainting A complete description of Mintzberg’s Model
himself with their subsequent evolution. As was presented in this paper. From this model we
discussed earlier in this paper, the problem of abstract the following core concepts which can
resistance to change has been recognized and be shown to be valid in specified contexts.
treated back in the 1980s without abandoning
explicit strategy formulation (Ansoff, Part 6, To succeed, an organization should use the
1984). ‘emergent strategy’ trial and experience pro-
In summary, Mintzberg’s ‘proofs’ that the cess of strategy formation.
rational model of learning does not apply to No attempt should be made to formulate the
strategic management are contradicted by facts firm’s strategy in advance of the trial and
of management practice. And his insistence on experience process.
universal use of the existential model invites No formal organization-wide strategic planning
managements to abdicate their role as strategic should be used.
thinkers, and to confine their attention to Except under special circumstances, the strat-
optimizing the operating behavior of their organi- egy which is implicit in the historical sequence
zations. of successful trials should not be made explicit.